# Renz v. Beeman

> Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · November 16, 1978 · 589 F.2d 735

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8908395

## Case

- **Full name:** Mary Whitney RENZ, as a beneficiary under the Charlotte P. Hyde Trust and the Nell P. Cunningham Trust and the Charlotte P. Hyde Testamentary Trust, Franklin W. Renz, as under the Last Will and Testament of Mary P. Whitney who was a beneficiary under the Charlotte P. Hyde Trust and the Nell P. Cunningham Trust and the Charlotte P. Hyde Testamentary Trust, Franklin W. Renz, as under the Last Will and Testament of Mary P. Whitney, and Mary Whitney Renz, derivatively and in the right and for the benefit of Finch, Pruyn & Company, Inc. v. Lyman A. BEEMAN and Mary H. Beeman, Individually and as Trustees of the Charlotte P. Hyde Trust and the Nell P. Cunningham Trust, both created the 14th day of June 1954, Lyman A. Beeman, Samuel P. Hoopes, Thomas E. Meath, Lyman A. Beeman, Jr. and Elmer S. White, as Trustees of a Trust established under Agreements dated January 16,1969, with Mary H. Beeman and Samuel P. Hoopes, Lyman A. Beeman, Mary H. Beeman and Samuel P. Hoopes as Trustees under the Charlotte P. Hyde Testamentary Trust, Mary H. Beeman and Samuel P. Hoopes as Beneficiaries under the Nell P. Cunningham Trust, Lyman A. Beeman, Individually and as Director, Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive of Finch, Pruyn & Company, Inc., Thomas E. Meath, Individually and as Director and President of Finch, Pruyn & Company, Inc., Lyman A. Beeman, Jr., Individually and as Director and Senior Vice-President of Finch, Pruyn & Company, Inc., Samuel P. Hoopes, Individually and as Director and Vice-President of Finch, Pruyn & Company, Inc., Mary H. Beeman and Elmer S. White, Individually and as Directors of Finch, Pruyn & Company, Inc., and Finch, Pruyn & Company, Inc.
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
- **Decided:** November 16, 1978
- **Citations:** 589 F.2d 735; 1978 U.S. App. LEXIS 7670
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Moore
- **Judges:** Gurfein, Moore
- **Cited by:** 48 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8908395

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the trustees broad discretion to exercise powers and rights incident to ownership of the trust property did not permit the trustees to prioritize their own interests over those of the trust beneficiaries
- holding that the statute of limitations was measured from the time of the breach of the trust
- holding that facts did not support a finding of implied consent

## Opinion text

MOORE, Circuit Judge
(concurring):
I concur in Judge Gurfein’s opinion that the statute of limitations bars this action. In addition to the reasons (and facts in support thereof), so convincing of notice, I would merely note that from the moment of the press announcement of Mrs. Foulds’ death in 1958 and her bequest of F-P stock to the Met, the question of its ultimate disposition must have been uppermost in the minds of every member of the Pruyn lineage. Therefore, although the letter of September 10, 1963 gave a direct statement of Mary Beeman’s holdings, the question must have been considered and undoubtedly discussed in family circles, namely: I wonder whatever happened to the Foulds’ stock?
I differ with Judge Gurfein’s opinion as to the fiduciary-trustee issue on his application of the law to the facts or possibly better the facts to the law. I agree that the highest standards of trust loyalty should apply but I am equally mindful of Justice (then Chief Judge) Cardozo’s precept in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458 at 466 , 164 N.E. 545, at 547 (1928): “Little profit will come from a dissection of the precedents”. Decision in each case must rest on its own facts.
I do not place any reliance upon the exculpatory clause. On the other hand I see no justifiable reason for Lyman Beeman to have used F-P assets to purchase a preferred stock for the company when it had no business reason for so doing. To me the reasons for not buying the stock for the Trust are equally clear. It had no assets *753 with which to make the purchase. To have borrowed the money for the purchase, pledging F — P stock, might well have been a breach of trust had the beneficiaries chosen to complain that their interests were adversely affected thereby.
In short, Judge Foley heard all witnesses called by plaintiffs, found that there was no proof of corporate mismanagement, and no fraudulent concealment of Mrs. Beeman’s stock purchase. To the contrary he found the fair inferences to be otherwise. Upon the law and the facts, I would affirm Judge Foley’s decision in its entirety with the comment that some significance adverse to plaintiffs attaches in my opinion to the making of the serious type of charges set forth in causes of action Fourth, Eighth and Ninth as well as Sixth and Seventh (derivative) and then withdrawing them without tendering any proof thereon.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8908395. Public record. Not legal advice.