# Louisville & N. R. v. Bosworth

> District Court, E.D. Kentucky · September 22, 1913 · 209 F. 380

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8790034

## Case

- **Full name:** LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO. v. BOSWORTH
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Kentucky
- **Decided:** September 22, 1913
- **Citations:** 209 F. 380; 1913 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1117
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Cochran
- **Judges:** Cochran
- **Cited by:** 30 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8790034

## Opinion text

COCHRAN, District Judge.
This cause is before me on motion for a preliminary injunction and demurrer to the bill. The plaintiff is a Kentucky corporation, and the defendants are citizens and officers of the state of Kentucky. The injunction sought is to restrain the defendants from taking certain action which they threaten to take in re-* lation to an assessment of certain of plaintiff’s property for taxation made by the Board of Valuation and Assessment of the State, August 31, .1912, for the year 1912. The defendants Bosworth, Rhea, and Crecilius are, respectively, Auditor, Treasurer, and Secretary of State and, as such, constitute the board which made the assessment. The action which they threaten to take is to apportion the assessment to-the several counties, cities, towns, and taxing districts through which plaintiff’s railroad runs in order to the collection of local taxes. This is the only further action which it is within their power to take in relation thereto in such capacity. That which the defendants Bosworth and Likens threaten to take in their capacities as Auditor and Assistant Auditor is to certify such apportionments-to the county clerks of the several counties through which plaintiff’s railroad runs, a further step essential to the collection of local taxes, to enter in account, as. a demand payable at the treasury of the state, the taxes due to the. state based on the assessment, to report to the Attorney General the delinquency on plaintiff’s part arising from a failure to pay those taxes, and to cause proceedings to be instituted against it' because of its failure to pay them. And that which the other defendants, to wit, Garnett, Morris, Logan, and Hogan, respectively, Attorney-General and Assistants Attorney Generals, the defendant Franklin, Commonwealth’s attorney for the Franklin circuit court, and the defendant Marshall, county attorney of Franklin county, threaten to take in such capacities, is to' institute and prosecute proceedings against plaintiff by indictment and civil action to recover such taxes and penalties because of its delinquency in failing to pay them. All of this, action is action to enforce the assessment.
The plaintiff claims that the assessment is void, and that therefore-the defendants have no right to take such action, and the taking thereof will be a wrong to it. The assessment was made by the board under sections 4077 to 4081, inclusive, and section 4083, of the Kentucky Statutes, the constitutionality of which is unquestioned. The plaintiff’s property consists of its railroad, rolling stock, stations, terminal facilities, rights to be and to do, and its good will. All of these constitute a physical and organic unit. This unit covers 13 different states, including Kentucky. On a mileage basis, a larger part thereof *384 is in Kentucky than in any other state. That which was assessable by the board under these statutory provisions was the part of plaintiff’s intangible property located' in this state. Those provisions characterize it as its franchise or corporate franchise therein. The judicial phrase, therefore, is its intangible property so located. In the numerous cases which have arisen under these statutory provisions, the phrases “corporate franchise” and “intangible property” are treated as synonymous. I will hereafter refer to it as plaintiff’s franchise in this state. These provisions have been the law of this state, substantially as they are now, for over 20 years. The assessment made by the board for the previous year, i. e., 1911, amounted to $11,899,200. The state tax thereon was $59,496, and the local taxes $86,994.41, or the two together, $167,644.37. The assessment that year was larger than it had been any previous year. The assessment complained of herein .amounts to $45,428,074. The state taxes thereon amount to $227,-140.37, and the local taxes to $332,166.52, or, the two together, to $559,306.89.' By reason thereof, if it stands, the plaintiff will be compelled to pay $412,816.48 more than it paid the. previous year, and it is reasonable to expect that hereafter it will have to pay at least this increased amount each year of its existence. This increase is not due to -any change in the value of the plaintiff’s intangible property in this state. It is due solely to a change in the judgment of the board as to its value. It should be noted, however, that there has been a change in the constituent members of the board, and the one here in issue is the first assessment which has been made by the board as it is now constituted.
Mr. Justice Brewer, referring to an increase in the assessment of a railroad’s property by an Indiana board in the case of Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421 , 14 Sup. Ct. 1.114, 38 L. Ed. 1031 , which he characterized as “a great increase,” but which was not as great an increase as here, said that it suggested “that which is unfortunately too common—an effort to cast an unreasonable proportion of the public burden upon corporate property.” He added, however:
“Still it must'be borne in mind, tbat a mere increase in the assessment does not prove tbat tbe last assessment is wrong. Something more is necessary before it can be adjudged that the assessment is illegal and excessive, and the question which is to be now considered is whether the testimony shows that the assessment made by the state board can be judged illegal.”
And the court in that case upheld the assessment.
1. The plaintiff claims that the assessment is void on two grounds. One is that it violates the fourteenth amendment to the federal Constitution, in that it denies it the equal protection of the laws. The other is that the board did not follow the statute. It is because of the former claim that this court has essential jurisdiction of this suit. It would not otherwise have it. This is so because there is no diversity of citizenship between the parties hereto. Plaintiff, however, does not have to make this claim good. It is sufficient if the claim is not colorable, or, in other words, is made in good faith. As to this there can be no doubt.
The plaintiff, therefore, is entitled to the relief it seeks if it does, no more than make good the other claim, to wit, that the board in *385 making the assessment did not follow the statute. Siler v. L. & N. R. Co., 213 U. S. 175 , 29 Sup. Ct. 451, 53 L. Ed. 753 _
*[1] _ 2. But before I can consider this claim of plaintiff I must notice and dispose of a preliminary contention put forth by the defendants. It is that this is a suit against the’State of Kentucky and forbidden by the eleventh amendment to the federal Constitution, and that therefore it is not maintainable, even though the assessment complained of is void on both grounds relied on by. plaintiff. As heretofore stated, the relief sought herein is an injunction against the defendants restraining them from taking certain action which they are threatening to take in the name and for the state, under color of their respective offices. What that action is has also already been set forth in detail. This contention, then, is that a suit in a federal court against state officers to enjoin them from taking action which they threaten to take, in the name and for the state, and under color of their offices, to enforce an assessment made by a board under a constitutional statute, as the one involved here is, is a suit against the state and so forbidden, and hence not maintainable, even though the assessment is void. The plaintiff meets the contention with the cases of Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123 , 28 Sup. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 , 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Andrews, 216 U. S. 165 , 30 Sup. Ct. 286, 54 L. Ed. 430 . It claims that they are conclusively against it. The defendants, on the other hand, say that, instead of this being so, these cases conclusively support their contention. This radical difference between the parties is not as to the thing decided in these cases. They agree as to what was decided in each. It was decided therein that a suit in a federal court against state officials to enjoin them from taking action which they threaten to take in the name of and for the state, under color of their offices, to enforce an. unconstitutional statute, is not a suit against the state and so forbidden, and that such a suit is maintainable. The kernel of Mr. Justice Peckham’s opinion in the Young Case is to be found in that portion thereof quoted by Mr. Justice Day in the W. U. Tel. Co. Case, which is in these words, to wit:
“The various authorities we have referred, to furnish ample justification for the assertion that individuals who, as officers of the state, are clothed with some duty in regard to the enforcement of the laws of the state, and who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or a criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a federal court of equity from such action.”
Where they differ is 'as to what follows from this decision. According to defendants, it follows therefrom that such suit is maintainable only when the threatened action sought to be restrained is action to enforce an unconstitutional act o'f the Regislature, i. e., an unconstitutional statute. And it is because this suit is not a suit to enjoin threatened action of that character that they claim that these cases support this contention of theirs as to the maintainability of this suit. According to plaintiff, it follows therefrom that any suit where the threatened action sought to be enjoined is action to enforce an unconstitutional act of any state officer or officers, whether legislators or not, is main- *386 tamable. And it is because this suit is a suit to enjoin threatened action to enforce an unconstitutional act of the Board of Valuation and Assessment, to wit, the assessment complained of herein, though made under a constitutional statute, that they claim that these cases are against this contention. These two cases are not the only cases in the Supreme Court of the United States where the thing decided therein has been decided as there. There are quite a number of others. Such as the following, to wit: Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 , 6 L. Ed. 204 ; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203 , 21 L. Ed. 447 ; Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 531 , 23 L. Ed. 623 ; Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U. S. 1 , 11 Sup. Ct. 699, 35 L. Ed. 363 ; In re Tyler, 149 U. S. 164 , 13 Sup. Ct. 785, 37 L. Ed. 689 ; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 , 18 Sup. Ct. 418, 42 L. Ed. 819 ; Prout v. Starr, 188 U. S. 537 , 23 Sup. Ct. 398, 47 L. Ed. 584 ; Herndon v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 218 U. S. 135 , 30 Sup. Ct. 633, 54 L. Ed. 970 .
In each of these eight cases, as in each of the other two, it was decided that a suit in a federal court against state officers to enjoin them from taking action which they threaten to take in the name and for the state, under color of their offices, to enforce or in pursuance to an unconstitutional statute, is maintainable. They, - likewise, support or are against defendant’s contention according to which of the parties is right as to what follows from such a decision. Here then are ten cases in that court which decide exactly the same thing, and there is a radical difference of opinion as to what follows therefrom. As I view the matter, the defendants are wholly wrong, and the plaintiff does not claim the whole truth. Defendant’s position is wrong because it proceeds on the assumption that those cases' cover the whole law on the subject of the maintainability of suits in federal courts against state officers to enjoin them from taking action which they threaten to take in their capacities as such and for and on behalf of the state. They do not cover the whole law thereon. On the contrary, what is within the principle underlying that which was decided therein is as much the law as what was decided. That the suit is main-tamable where the threatened action sought to be enjoined is action to enforce an unconstitutional act on the part of any state officers or officer, as plaintiff claims, was decided by the Supreme Court in the case of Reagan v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company, 154 U. S. 362 , 14 Sup. Ct. 1047, 38 L. Ed. 1014 , cited and approved in the Young Case. There the threatened action sought to be enjoined was not action to enforce or in pursuance of an unconstitutional statute, but action to enforce transportation rates fixed by the Texas Railroad Commission under a constitutional statute empowering it to fix such rates, on the ground that the rates so fixed were confiscatory, and hence that the act of the Railroad Commission—not the statute—was unconstitutional. The suit was held to be maintainable. To the same effect is the case of Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co., 211 U. S. 210 , 29 Sup. Ct. 67, 53 L. Ed. 150 .
Plaintiff’s position does not cover the whole truth, because the principle underlying the decision that the suit is maintainable if the threatened action sought to be enjoined is action to enforce an unconstitu *387 tional statute is not limited to suits where the threatened action sought to be enjoined is action to enforce an unconstitutional act on the part of some state officers or officer. It gives that principle a too narrow range. And, if it has no wider scope, then this suit, in so far as it is based on the claim that the assessment complained of is void because the Board of Valuation and Assessment did not follow the statute, is not maintainable. If, then, defendants are wrong as to what follows from what was decided in those ten cases and what plaintiff claims follows therefrom is not the-whole truth what is the whole truth that follows therefrom? An ascertainment of this will help us to correctly dispose of this contention of defendants. It is to be found in the principle underlying what was decided therein. What then is that principle? What was the ratio decidendi of what was decided therein? Why was it decided therein that the suit is maintainable if the threatened action sought to be enjoined is action to enforce or in pursuance to an unconstitutional statute? It was so decided because the sole basis of the action sought to be enjoined was the unconstitutional statute, and, this being so, the state officers sued had no right to take it, and the taking thereof would be a wrong to the plaintiff. In other words, it was so decided because the action which the defendants were threatening to take would, if taken, be a wrong to the plaintiff, .or what they were sought to be enjoined from doing was the commission of a threatened wrong to plaintiff.
The threatened action sought to be enjoined in the Bank of the United States and the Tyler Cases was the seizure of the plaintiff’s property in payment .of a tax. The statute imposing the tax was unconstitutional. This being so, the defendants had no right to take the action, and the taking thereof would be a wrong to the plaintiff. • It would deprive it of its property without right. One who deprives another of his property without right commits a wrong against him. That sought to be enjoined in the McComb Case was the delivery of a portion of a certain issue of state bonds in breach of a contract of the state with plaintiffs, holders of the other portion thereof. It was authorized by a statute which was unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of that contract. This being so, the defendants had no right to take the action, and the taking thereof would be a wrong to plaintiffs. It would depreciate the value of the 'bonds which they held, and hence would in this way deprive them of their property. That sought to be enjoined in the Gray and McConnaaghy Cases was the issue of land grants in the name of the state covering land previously granted to plaintiffs. The issue thereof was to be pursuant to a statute which was unconstitutional as impairing the obligation of the contract contained in the previous grants to the plaintiffs. The statute being unconstitutional, the defendants had no right to take the action, and the taking thereof would be a wrong to plaintiff. It would cast a cloud on the title to the land covered by his grant and thereby deprive him of his property. That in the Ames, Starr, Young, W. U. Tel. Co,., and Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. Cases was the institution and prosecution of suits and other proceedings against the plaintiff for failure to comply with a certain statute. This statute was unconstitutional, *388 and hence the plaintiff was not liable to be so proceeded against for such failure. This being so, the defendants had no right to institute and prosecute the suits and other proceedings, and, because of the multiplicity thereof, the institution and prosecution thereof would be a wrong to plaintiff. In defending same it would be deprived of its property. It is possible for one to wrong another by instituting and prosecuting a suit or other proceeding against him. If he so does with malice and without probable cause, he can be made to respond in damages at law. If he institutes and prosecutes a multiplicity of suits/ all involving the same question, and groundless, he also commits a wrong; and it is such as equity will enjoin. It was such a wrong as this, i. e., the institution and prosecution of a multiplicity of groundless suits, all involving the same question, that was sought to be enjoined in these five cases, and because thereof the suits were held maintainable. The suits and other proceedings enjoined were groundless because they were to enforce an unconstitutional statute, i. e., to recover penalties for failure to comply therewith. To no other extent did the unconstitutionality of the statute affect the maintainability of the suits.
Such then being the reason why it was decided in these ten cases that the suit was maintainable, it follows therefrom that - any suit is maintainable in a federal court against state officers to enjoin them from taking any action which they threaten to take if they have no right to take such action and the taking thereof will be a wrong to' the plaintiff. It is not essential that the action be to enforce, or in pursuance of, an unconstitutional statute. Nor is it essential that it be action to enforce or in pursuance to an unconstitutional act on the part of some state officers or officer. It is sufficient that they have no right to' take the action and that the taking thereof will be a wrong to the plaintiff. But the wrong must be such as equity will enjoin. It is not otherwise material what may be the character of the action. Such then I take to be the whole truth as to what follows from what was decided in those ten cases. The same principle which underlay what was decided therein underlies what was decided in the Farmers’ Toan & Trust Co. and Atlantic Coast Tine Co. Cases, and the same result follows therefrom. The threatened action sought to be enjoined therein was the institution and prosecution of suits and other proceedings for failure to comply with the act of a Railroad Commission under a constitutional statute, which was unconstitutional because confiscatory, and thereby to enforce such act. The act of the Railroad Commission being unconstitutional, the plaintiff was not liable to such suits and proceedings, the defendants had no right to institute and prosecute them, and the institution and prosecution thereof would be a wrong to plaintiff and that such as equity will enjoin. It was on this ground that the suits were held maintainable. Here then are twelve cases in the Supreme Court from the decisions in which it follows that a suit is maintainable in a federal court against state officers to enjoin them from committing a threatened wrong to the plaintiff if the wrong is such as equity will enjoin.
That in order to the maintainability of the suit there is no other essential characteristic of the threatened wrong than that it be such as *389 equity will enjoin is made certain by the following cases in that court, to wit: Allen v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 114 U. S. 311 , 5 Sup. Ct. 925, 962, 24 L. Ed. 200 ; Scully v. Bird, 209 U. S. 481 , 28 Sup. Ct. 597, 52 L. Ed. 899 ; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U. S. 605 , 32 Sup. Ct. 340, 56 L. Ed. 570 , in each of which, except the Philadelphia Company Case, a suit in a federal court against state officers to enjoin action which they threatened to take in the name and for the state and under color of their offices was held maintainable. In the Philadelphia Company Case the suit was not against state officers but against United States officers. Though the eleventh amendment could not apply to such a case, the common-law rule that a sovereign is not suable could, and this raised the same question as to the maintainability of the suit. It was held to be maintainable. The threatened wrong sought to be enjoined in the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company Case was the seizure of the rolling stock, etc., of a railroad to collect a valid tax after a tender of tax receivable coupons in payment thereof. The threatened wrong sought to be enjoined in the Scully Case was the taking of certain action by a dairy and food commissioner under cover of his office, but alleged to be a violation of the state laws, which if taken would injuriously affect the reputation and sale of certain products manufactured by plaintiff. And the threatened wrong sought to be enjoined in the Philadelphia Company Case was the institution and prosecution of criminal proceedings against the plaintiff because of its reclamation and occupation of its land within certain harbor lines in the harbor of Pittsburgh, Pa. It is to be noted as to this case that an injunction against such proceedings was not the only relief sought therein. It was also sought to have the harbor lines which had been established by the Secretary of War set aside. In so far, no doubt, the suit was not maintainable. But no notice seems to have been taken of this. The fact is that a suit in a federal court against state officers to enjoin them from committing a threatened wrong in the name and for the state and under color of their offices depends as to its maintainability on no more than 'what is essential to the maintainability of a suit against them to enjoin them from committing a threatened wrong in-their individual capacities. In such a suit it is essential that the wrong be such as equity will enjoin. This and nothing more is required. That they are threatening to commit the wrong in the name and for the state, under color of their offices, without any personal interest in the matter, is of no significance whatever.
The conclusion thus reached as to the maintainability of suits against state officers in a federal court to enjoin them from taking action which they so threaten to take has been reached from a consideration of the case in the Supreme Court involving such action. The same conclusion follows from a consideration of two other classes of cases in the Supreme Court—those involving past action on the part of state officers, in the name and for the state and under color of their offices, and those involving present action of this character. Cases belonging to the first'-of these two classes are the following, to wit: Mitchell v. Harmony, 13 How. 115 , 14 L. Ed. 75 ; Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 234 , 24 L. Ed. 471 ; White v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 307 , 5 Sup. Ct. 923, 962, *390 29 L. Ed. 199 ; Chaffin y. Taylor, 114 U. S. 310 , 5 Sup. Ct. 924, 962, 29 L. Ed. 198 ; Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10 , 16 Sup. Ct. 443, 40 L. Ed. 599 ; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58 , 17 Sup. Ct. 265, 41 L. Ed. 632 ; Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636 , 31 Sup. Ct. 654, 55 L. Ed. 890 , 35 L. R. A. (N. S.) 243. In each of these cases, except the Hopkins Case, the suit was against an officer or officers, state or federal, to recover damages for action which they had so taken. The action taken had been taken in the name and for the state and under color of their offices, believing in good faith that they had the right to take it. They had no personal interest in the matter whatever. But in each case also they had no right to take the action and the taking of same was a wrong to plaintiff. The Hopkins Case was not a suit against state officers, but against a private corporation, which may be said to have been a state agent, which had acted in its own name, but under authority of the state and possibly may be said to have acted on its own behalf. The suit was held maintainable in each case. In the Clark Case Mr. Justice Miller said that one cannot protect himself “by orders emanating from a source which is itself with- , out authority.”. In the Schild Case the claim for damages was asserted in a suit for an injunction against- threatened action, and the decision was that it should have been asserted at law.
Cases belonging to the other class are as follows, to wit: United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196 , 1 Sup. Ct. 240, 27 L. Ed. 171 ; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270 , 5 Sup. Ct. 903, 962, 29 L. Ed. 185 ; Tindal v. Wesley, 167 U. S. 204 , 17 Sup. Ct. 770, 42 L. Ed. 137 . In each of these cases present action on the part of the officer or officers sued was complained of. It consisted of withholding from plaintiff the possession of property to which he was entitled and the withholding of which was a wrong to him. In the Lee and Wesley Cases the property withheld was real estate and in the Poindexter Case personal estate. The withholding was in the name and for the state and under color of their offices in the belief in good faith that they had a right to withhold it. They had no personal interest in the matter whatever. The suit was to recover possession of the property withheld. In each case it was held that the suit was maintainable. The Bank of the United States Case, heretofore placed in the class having to do with threatened wrongs, also belongs here, in so far as the amended bill against the State Treasurer to compel him to -restore to the plaintiff the $100,000 in- money which the Auditor’s appointee had, after the preliminary injunction was granted against him, on the original bill, forcibly taken from it and turned over to the Treasurer, but which the latter had not mingled with the state’s funds, -was concerned, which was held maintainable.
Now here are three classes of cases exactly alike in certain particulars. In each class the action complained of is action on the part of the officers sued in the name and for the state and under color of their offices in the belief that they .had or have the right to take it and without any personal interest in the matter whatever. And in each class that action was a wrong against the plaintiff of which he had a right to complain. They differed only in this: That in one class *391 of cases the action was threatened; in the other, past and over; and, in the other, then on hand. There is nothing whatever in this- 'difference that could have any bearing on the question of the maintainability of the suit in relation thereto except that, as the relief against the threatened action sought in the first class of cases could only be obtained in equity, the action had to be such as equity will enjoin. It is therefore a legitimate inference from the maintainability of suits having to do with past and present wrongs that suits having to do-with threatened wrongs are maintainable if the wrongs complained of are such as equity will enjoin. They are no more suits against the state and forbidden by the .eleventh amendment than are suits which have to do with past or present wrongs.
Thus far I have limited myself to cases in the Supreme Court in which suits in a federal court against state officers have been held maintainable and have gathered from them that such a suit is maintainable to enjoin them from taking action which they threaten to take in the name and for the state and under color of their offices, if they have no right to take such action and the taking thereof will be a wrong to plaintiff, such as equity will enjoin. There are a number of cases in which suits in a federal court against state officers have been held not to be maintainable. It should be considered whether these cases or any of them are against this conclusion. Such are the following cases, to wit: Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U. S. 711 , 2 Sup. Ct. 128, 27 L. Ed. 448 ; Cunningham v. Macon, etc., R. Co., 109 U. S. 446 , 3 Sup. Ct. 292, 609, 27 L. Ed. 992 ; Hagood v. Southern, 117 U. S. 52 , 6 Sup. Ct. 608, 29 L. Ed. 805 ; In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 , 8 Sup. Ct. 164, 31 L. Ed. 216 ; Christian v. Atlanta & N. C. R. Co., 133 U. S. 233 , 10 Sup. Ct. 260, 33 L. Ed. 589 ; Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10 , 16 Sup. Ct. 443, 40 L. Ed. 599 ; Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U. S. 516 , 19 Sup. Ct. 269, 43 L. Ed. 535 ; Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436 , 20 Sup. Ct. 919, 44 L. Ed. 1140 ; International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U. S. 601 , 24 Sup. Ct. 820, 48 L. Ed. 1134 .
I have heretofore considered the Schild Case, in so far as it had to do with the right to recover damages for a past wrong. It is classed here so far as it had to do with the right to enjoin a future or threatened wrong. The decisions in these cases that the suits were not maintainable do not conflict with the cases heretofore considered, and they are not against the conclusion which I have gathered therefrom, except the Schild, and possibly the Postal Supply, Cases. As I read the Schild Case, the relief sought, other than for damages, was' against the continued use of the patented caisson gate, for the past use of which the damages were claimed, and the destruction thereof. In so far as the relief sought included the destruction of the gate, undoubtedly plaintiff was not entitled to it. The gate had been made by the Union Iron Works of San Francisco, and then put in place and continued to be used by the defendants acting on behalf of the United States. Though the making and use of the gate was an infringement of the patent, and therefore wrongful, the title to the gate was in the United States. It owned the gate and was entitled to its possession, subject to the right of destruction which plaintiff had. It had this *392 right in order to prevent its use in derogation of the patent. It, however, was a right which plaintiff could not assert in a suit against the United States, because it was not suable; and it was not a right which could, be asserted against the officers sued in that case, because they had no interest in the matter whatever, and the decreeing of destruction of the gate would not be the granting of relief as against them, the only relief which could be granted. • But I am unable to see why the plaintiff was not entitled to the injunction against the continued us.e of the gate by the officers sued. The use thereof was a wrong to plaintiff for which in the past it was held they were liable in damages.
The case so far seems to be based on the English case of Vavasseur v. Krupp, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 351. It was there held by the Chancery Court of England that a suit was not maintainable by an English patentee against the agents of a foreign sovereign stationed in England and in possession of shells, the making and use of which was an infringement of the patent, to enjoin the agents from delivering them to the sovereign. But a delivery of the shells to the sovereign was not a use of them in violation of the patent. The foreign sovereign owned the shells and was entitled to their possession. The patentee’s sole right was to have the shells destroyed. But that was a right which could not be asserted in a suit against the agents. This case supports the decision in the Schild Case in so far as it held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a destruction of the gate. It does not support it in so far as it was held that the officers sued were not enjoinable from further using the gate. The Postal Supply Company Case was based on the decision in the Schild Case. Mr. Justice Holmes approved the holding therein that a patentee is not entitled to an injunction against the officers of the United States enjoining them from using an article infringing a patent. In referring to the Schild Case, he said:
“It was pointed out that the defendants had no personal interest in the continuance of the use, and that so far as the injunction was concerned the suit was really against the United States. Of course, if those defendants were enjoined, other persons attempting to use the caisson gate would be, and thus the injunction would practically work a prohibition against its use by the United States.”
But' this is what happened in all cases above referred to in which suits have been held maintainable against the officers of a state enjoining them from acting on behalf of the state. The injunction granted in effect prevented the state from so* acting, or rather its officers from so acting, on its behalf. The Postal Supply Company Case, however, apart from this feature of it, would seem to have been decided right. It appeared that the Syracuse postmaster, who was sued, had himself never used the canceling and postmarking machine. It had only been used by two subordinates in the office. Of course, if any, one was to be enjoined, it should have been those guilty of using it, and not the postmaster.
In none of the other cases had the state officials sued either committed any wrong against the plaintiff, or were they then committing any wrong against them, or were they threatening to commit any wrong against them. In the Cunningham and Christian Cases no relief even *393 was sought against the state officers sued. In each case the suit was to subject property, the title to which was in the state, to the payment of an indebtedness on its part. In the Cunningham Case the property was the railroad which the state of Georgia had purchased under the first mortgage and the title to which it had acquired, and it was sought to be subjected to the payment of second mortgage bonds indorsed by the state. In the Christian Case the property was stock in a certain railroad and dividends thereon owned by the state and in the possession of the State Treasurer, and they were sought to be subjected to payment of the bonds of the state to whose payment they had been pledged. Such relief was not relief against the Governor and Treasurer of the state, defendants in the one case, or against the Treasurer of the state, defendant in the other case; but in each case the relief sought was against the state whose officers or officer alone had been sued.
In the Jumel, Southern, and Smith Cases, though relief was sought against the state officers sued, it was not to make compensation for a past wrong or to cease withholding property owned by plaintiff and which they were withholding from him, or to enjoin them from committing a threatened wrong. It was to compel the state officers to do something which the plaintiffs had no right to have them do, i. e., to take funds of the state over which they had more or less control and pay the-state’s debts with them. There was no statute in force imposing the duty on the state officers sued of doing that which it' was sought to compel them to do. The relief sought was to compel the state whose officers were sued to pay their debts by acting on those officers.
The Ayers and -McGhee Cases, of all these cases where it was rightly held that the suits were not maintainable, are probably the most difficult to distinguish from those where it has been held that the suit was maintainable'. The Ayers Case is one of a number of cases in the Supreme Court of the United States known.as the “Virginia Coupon Cases.” The state of Virginia had issued bonds containing a provision that the bonds and coupons should be receivable in payment of taxes due on it. The state desired to repudiate the bonds, and, in order to understand the Ayers Case, a brief résumé of the means resorted to by the Legislature of the state to embarrass and prevent the use of the coupons cut from these bonds in payment of taxes will be helpful. The first step was an enactment that only gold or silver coin or United States treasury or national bank notes should be receivable in payment thereof. This act was held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Virginia. The Legislature then enacted that the bonds should be subject to a certain tax and the tax collectors should deduct this tax from the coupons when tendered and credit only balance of the coupons on the taxes. This was overthrown by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Hartman v. Greenhow, 102 U. S. 672 , 26 L. Ed. 271 . The suits in which the legislation down to this last act had been invalidated were suits in mandamus, and by them, notwithstanding such legislation, the tax collectors were compelled to accept the coupons in payment of taxes. The' Legislature then directed *394 its attention to suits in mandamus in such cases. It provided for troublesome proceedings for the establishment of the genuineness of the coupons before the writ could issue. This legislation was upheld by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769 , 2 Sup. Ct. 91, 27 L. Ed. 468 . The result was that the taxpayers quit resorting to mandamus proceedings. They tendered their coupons and then rested on their oars. This forced the tax collectors to take' action, for the state wanted its taxes. Suits could not be brought to collect them, for there was no legislation authorizing suits> and there had to be such legislation in order that suits might be brought. The only action which they could take whs to dis-train and levy for taxes, and this they did.
Thereupon arose the White and Chaffin Cases, hereinbefore cited, which were suits in trespass by taxpayers against the tax collectors to recover damages, and the Poindexter Case, hereinbefore cited, which was.a suit by a taxpayer against the tax collector to recover the property levied on, which suits were held maintainable as heretofore shown. It was evidently these decisions which brought about the legislation out of which arose the Ayers Case. That legislation authorizéd suits to be brought for the recovery of taxes in the name of the state and^ provided further that, if the defendant relied on a tender of coupons as payment of the taxes, the burden should be on him to prove both the tender and the genuineness of the bonds. The legislation was valid.. No fault was or could have been found with it. The collection’ of taxes by suit may be authorized, and the taxpayers had no right to' tender in payment of their taxes coupons unless they were genuine. There had been, however, previous legislation providing that in suits where the tender of coupons was involved the taxpayer should produce the original bonds from which they were cut, and that expert evidence as to genuineness was not admissible, and the claim on behalf of the state was that this legislation applied to suits for the collection of taxes authorized by this subsequent legislation. Thereupon a suit was brought in the United States Circuit Court for Virginia against the Attorney General of that state and certain other officers charged with the bringing of such suits to enjoin them from so doing, on the ground that the previous legislation practically cut off the defense 'that genuine coupons had been tendered, and hence impaired the obligation of the contract under which they had been issued and accepted. That court having granted a restraining order and confined the Attorney General for disobeying it, the matter was brought before the Supreme Court by writ of habeas corpus. It held that the lower court had no right to make the restraining order and released the Attorney General.
It is to be noted that the suit had been brought, not by any taxpayer, but by an Englishman who had bought up the coupons on a speculation and sold them to taxpayers. He therefore had no direct interest in the matter of enjoining the bringing of the suits against the taxpayer. His interest was consequential solely—the effect that the right to bring such suits and to hamper the defense to them would have upon the coupons which -he still had. He had no right to bring the *395 suit, as had been held in the previous case of Marye v. Parsons, 114 U. S. 325 , 5 Sup. Ct. 932, 962, 29 L. Ed. 205 . But, this apart, the Attorney General and other prosecuting officers had the right to bring suits the bringing of which was sought to be enjoined. The statute authorized it and was valid. The tender of the coupons was a good defense only in case the coupons tendered were genuine and the state had the right to litigate the matter. The question of the application of the previous legislation as to the production of the bonds from which the coupons had been cut and exclusion of expert evidence and the validity thereof could come up in these suits and there be disposed of. The suits, therefore, which the officers were sought to be enjoined from bringing, were not groundless suits, but suits which they had a right to bring. In bringing them no wrong would be done the taxpayer. The threatened action which was sought to be enjoined would not, if taken, be a wrong to the plaintiff. Besides each taxpayer was threatened with but a single suit. Hence it was properly held that suit against the state officers was not maintainable. The ground of the decision, therefore, was not that the suit was against the state, but because the state officers were not about to do that which would be a wrong to the plaintiff.
In the McGhee Case the Legislature of Alabama had passed an act fixing maximum rates of toll for passage over a certain bridge and provided penalty for any charge in excess thereof, recoverable by the person overcharged. No other than the person overcharged had any right to sue for the penalty. There was a general statute making it an offense for any bridge company, or any of its officers or agents, to charge tolls in excess of those authorized by its charter, or, if the charter did not specify the amounts to be charged, in excess of a reasonable toll, and prescribing a fine for so doing. Prosecutions under this statute were by indictment in the name of the state. After the passage of the special act, a large number of indictments—100 or more—were found against the bridge company’s tollgate keeper. They were and could only have been found under the general statute. The suit as originally brought was against the state of Alabama, the Governor and Attorney General thereof as such—they being called on to answer on behalf of the state—and the state’s attorney for the county wherein the indictments were found. The bill claimed that the special act was unconstitutional in that the rates fixed thereby were confiscatory. Subsequently the case was dismissed as to the state, and the call on the Governor to answer on behalf of the state was stricken out. Pending the suit, a preliminary injunction was granted against the Attorney General restraining him from instituting proceedings in mandamus to compel the bridge company to charge tolls in accordance with the special act or forfeiting its charter for charging in excess thereof and also one against the state’s attorney restraining the prosecution of the indictments. The final decree adjudged the special act unconstitutional and made the preliminary injunctions perpetual. The decree was reversed and the lower court directed to dismiss the bill. The sole ground upon which it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a decree against the state’s attorney having in charge the pros *396 ecution of the indictments enjoining him from prosecuting them was that they were criminal proceedings. This much of the holding was not placed on the ground that, in so far, the suit was one against the state of Alabama. It might also have been placed on the ground that the state’s attorney had the right to prosecute those indictments. The statute under which they had been found was not, and was not claimed to be, unconstitutional. What he was about to do, therefore, was not a wrong to the plaintiff. The ground upon which it was held that plaintiff was not entitled to any relief as to the Attorney General does not so clearly appear. The confusion, if such there is, grows out of the uncertainty as to what relief other than an injunction restraining the prosecution of the indictments the bill was construed as seeking. There is room to think that all the other relief which the bill was construed as seeking was an adjudication that the special act was unconstitutional. Of course, if such was the case, no relief whatever was sought against the Attorney General; and as was said by Mr. Justice Peckham in the Young Case:
“A state superintendent of schools might as well have been made a party.”
It is possible, however, that it was construed as seeking an injunction against the Attorney General in the matter of suits to recover penalties for excess charges of tolls under the special act and further restraining him from instituting a proceeding in mandamus to compel obedience to the act or one forfeiting its charter for disobedience thereof. If it was construed as seeking an injunction against him in the matter of suits to recover the penalties, the ground upon which it was held—that the suit, in so far, was not maintainable—undoubtedly was that the Attorney General had and could have no connection with the bringing of those suits. The penalties were recoverable only by the person overcharged. That the bill should have been construed as seeking an injunction against the Attorney General restraining him from instituting mandamus or forfeiture proceedings cannot be questioned, for the bill expressly prayed therefor, and one of the preliminary injunctions made perpetual was to that effect. The doubt as to whether the bill was construed as seeking such an injunction is due to the fact that no mention of this feature of the bill is„made in Mr. Justice Harlan’s opinion. If it was so construed, the ground upon which it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to such relief must have been that such a proceeding was a single proceeding which the plaintiff had no equity to prevent being instituted. Though groundless, it was not an equitable wrong to plaintiff for the Attorney General to bring it, and hence not enjoinable. There is nothing in the Young Case against this holding in this particular being, sound. For, though in that case the Attorney General disclaimed any intention to institute any proceedings besides the mandamus proceedings, it was possible for him to subject the plaintiff to a multiplicity of suits and he had no right to expect plaintiff to rely on his intentions. In the McGhee Case it was not possible for the Attorney General to institute any proceeding but the single proceeding in mandamus or forfeiture, There is therefore nothing in the Ayers and McGhee Cases in conflict *397 with the cases involving suits against state officers having to do with past, present, or threatened action on their part constituting a wrong to plaintiff. Possibly there are expressions in the opinions therein which it may be difficult to harmonize with those cases. But in so far as those expressions are in conflict therewith they will have to be ignored.
A consideration, therefore, of all the cases in the Supreme Court of the United States in which the question as to the maintainability of a suit in a federal court against officers of a state has arisen—in many of which the suit has been held maintainable, in others of. which it has been held not maintainable—leaves no room for doubt as to the maintainability of such a suit where the relief sought is against a threatened wrong such as equity will enjoin, just as much so as where it is based on a past or present wrong. The whole matter is well put by Mr. Justice Lamar in the Hopkins Case. He there said:
“But immunity from suit is a high attribute of sovereignty, a prerogative of the state itself, which cannot be availed of by public agents when sued for their own torts. The eleventh amendment was not intended to afford them freedom from liability in any case where, under color of their office, they have injured one of the state’s citizens. To grant them such immunity would be to create a privileged class free from liability for wrongs inflicted or injuries threatened. Public agents must be liable to the law, unless they are to be put above the law.”
Again he said: .
“The many claims of immunity from suit have therefore been uniformly denied, where the action was brought for injuries done or threatened by public officers.”
And again he said.
“Neither a state nor an individual can confer upon an agent authority to commit a tort so as to excuse the perpetrator. In such cases the law of agency has no application; the wrongdoer is threatened as a principal and individually liable for damages inflicted and subject to injunction against the commission of the acts causing irreparable injury.”
And in this connection it is to be distinctly noted that the maintainability of the suit in such a case to no extent depends upon whether the state will be affected by its maintenance. In all the cases where complaint was made of a threatened wrong and in which it was held that the suit was maintainable, it was so held notwithstanding the state was so affected by the granting of the relief sought that no action at all, in such particular, could be taken on its behalf. The state was also seriously affected in the suits where complaint was made of 'the present wrong of withholding property from plaintiff and in which the suit was held maintainable. Its officers were deprived of the possession of the property which they held for it. It was only in the cases where complaint was made of a past wrong that the state was not affected by the maintainability of the suit. It was not otherwise affected than thereby other state officers would be deterred from committing like wrongs on its .behalf. In order then for a suit in a federal court against state officers seeking relief against threatened wrong not to be maintainable, it is not sufficient that the state be affected thereby, no matter to how great extent.
*398 But though, as I think, there cannot be the slightest doubt that a suit is maintainable in a federal court against state officers seeking relief against a threatened wrong such as equity will enjoin, notwithstanding all action in that particular on behalf of the state will thereby be prevented and the state to this extent will be affected by the maintenance of the suit, for many years great uncertainty has existed as to the maintainability of such a suit. To a certain extent this uncertainty has been removed by the Young and subsequent cases, and yet it has not been entirely removed. The positions of the parties hereto is evidence of this. The defendants with much earnestness and sincerity of conviction contend that this suit is not maintainable. The plaintiff has too narrow an idea as to the maintainability of such a suit. Had it the true view, it would not have appended to the names of the defendants in the caption of its bill the title of the offices held by them, respectively, which I treat as mere, descriptio personarum. According to the true view of the matter, no reference should have been made in the caption to their official capacities, thereby giving room for the impression that they are sued in such capacities. They are not so sued. They are sued in their individual capacities to enjoin them from committing a threatened wrong under cover of their official capacities. Other striking evidence of' this may be noted. In the Young Case Mr. Justice Peckham said:
“It cannot be stated that tbe case before us is entirely free from any possible doubt, nor that intelligent men may not differ as to the correct answer to the question we are called upon to decide.”
But it seems to me that a correct observation, classification, and generalization ,of the previous relevant cases in the Supreme Court rendered the case then before the Supreme Court entirely free from doubt and left no room for intelligent men to differ as to the question it was then called upon to decide. The effort was made in that case to settle the law on the subject for all time to come, and yet the Supreme Court has had the subject before it since in five cases, to wit, the Scully, the Atlantic Coast Line Company, the W. U. Tel. Company, the Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., and the Philadelphia Company Cases, and in the last case it deemed it proper to make another survey of the previous relevant cases. It has even found it necessary since then to review all the previous relevant cases in a case where the wrong with which the suit had to do was a past wrong, to wit, in the Hopkins Case, where there would seem to be very little room for difference of opinion. In the Schild Case it was held that officers could be made to respond in damages for a past infringement of a patent, but could not be enjoined from present and future infringement. That they could not be so enjoined was upheld in the Postal Supply Co. Case and the reason which Mr. Justice Holmes gave for the position really undermined the many previous cases in which it had been held that threatened action might be enjoined, notwithstanding the effect thereof was to prevent any action in that particular on behalf of the state. The course of Mr. Justice Harlan in reference to the matter indicates considerable confusion of thought in regard to the matter. Prior to the McGhee Case he had *399 been a radical in favor of the maintainability of suits against state officers. He had dissented from the decisions in the Jumel, Cunningham, Southern, Ayers, and Schild Cases, i. e., in all the cases prior to the McGhee Case where it had been held that the suit was not maintainable except the Christian Case. As I view it his dissent was sound in the Schild Case but unsound in the others. In the McGhee Case he said in his opinion on behalf of the court that the matter had “so frequently been the subject of consideration by the court” that “nothing of importance” remained “to be suggested on either side of the question,” and that it was only necessary in each case as it arose “to ascertain whether it falls on one side or the other of the line marked out” in the former decisions. Yet nothing has done more to unsettle what had been settled before, and to create confusion' in regard to the matter, than the way he handled that case and fcertain expressions in his opinion therein. Thereafter he became a radical against the maintainability of such suits.
In his dissent in the Young Case he claimed that his position was in substantial accord with what the court had theretofore decided— that the opinion of the majority “departed from principles previously announced by it upon full consideration”—and that he proposed “to adhere to former decisions of the court, whatever may have been once” his opinion “as to certain aspects of this general question.” An indication of the confusion of thought under which he was laboring is to be found in the position that he took as to what followed from the decision therein that the suit was maintainable. He said that it followed therefrom that a suit against a state grand jury, a state judge, and a state petit jury to enjoin them from having to do with the proceedings that Young, the Attorney General, had been enjoined from instituting and prosecuting would be maintainable. But that did not follow. The state judge and juries in trying and disposing of the pro'ceedings would commit no wrong against the plaintiff; whereas, Young, the Attorney General, in instituting and prosecuting them, would. He would thereby subject the plaintiff to a multiplicity oí groundless suits all involving the same question. That Mr. Justice Harlan went to his grave thinking that his dissent in the Young Case was sound is evident from his dissent in the Hopkins Case, the last case before the court prior to his death involving the question as to the maintainability of suits against state officers or a state agent in any form.
This condition of things has led me to reflect on the probable cause of this uncertainty and confusion of thought. It occurs to me that there are two main sources thereof.. One thing that has had much to do with it is a departure from one of the positions Mr. Chief Justice Marshall took as to the maintainability of a suit in the federal court where the sole defendants to the record were state officers, in his masterly opinion in the Bank of the United States Case, the pioneer case on the subject. That position was that in no contingency was such a suit against the state and forbidden by the eleventh amendment. This was so because the state, not being a party to the record, was not sued. He said:
*400 “It may, we think, be laid down as a rule which admits of no exception that, in all eases where the jurisdiction depends on the party, it is the party named in the record. Consequently, the eleventh amendment, which restrains the jurisdiction granted by the Constitution over suits against states, is, of necessity, limited to those suits in which a state is a party on the record. The amendment has its full effect, if the Constitution be construed as it would have been construed, had the jurisdiction of the court never been extended to suits brought against a state by citizens of another state) or aliens.”
Mr. Justice Swayne took the same position in the case of Davis v. Gray, supra. He said:
“In deciding who are parties to the suit, the court will not look beyond the record. Making a state officer a party does not make the state a party, although her law may have prompted his action, and the state may stand behind him as the real party in interest. A state can be made a party only by shaping the bill- expressly with that view, as where individuals or corporations are intended to be put in that relation.”
The departure from this position was taken by Mr. Justice Matthews in the Poindexter Case. He said:
“The question whether a suit was within the prohibition of the eleventh amendment is not always determined by reference to the nominal parties - on the record. The provision is to be substantially applied in furtherance of its intention, and not to be evaded by 'technical and trivial subtleties.”
He put the matter stronger in the Ayers Case. He said:
“It must be regarded as the settled doctrine of this court, established by its recent decisions, ‘that the question whether a suit was within the prohibition of the eleventh amendment is not always determined by reference to the nominal parties on the record.’ ”
And further:
“This, it is true, is not in harmony with what was said by Chief Justice Marshall in Osborne v. Bank of United States.”
He .was led to this departure by the decision in the case of New, Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U. S. 76 , 2 Sup. Ct. 176, 27 L. Ed. 656 , where it was held that the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction, by virtue of the third article of the Constitution conferring jurisdiction upon it of controversies between two or more states, of a suit by one state against another to collect an indebtedness of the latter to a citizen of the former assigned to it for the purpose of collection. The decision, however, in that case was not because the suit was not a suit between the two states, but was in fact a suit between the assignor of the indebtedness and the defendant state, but because a party plaintiff to a suit has no right to enforce the cause of action of another against the defendant, thereto. He can only enforce his own cause of action. Mr. Chief Justice Waite said:
“One state cannot create a controversy with’another state within the meaning of that term as used in the judicial clauses of the Constitution, by assuming the prosecution of debts owing by the other state to its own citizens.”-
Mr. Justice Matthews, in thus departing from this position of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, seems to have thought that it was essential to do so in order that a suit.in which relief was sought against the state might not be rendered maintainable by the trick of not making the state a party defendant to the record. But such a suit could not thereby be *401 made maintainable; for, though the eleventh amendment or the common-law rule against suability of a sovereign would not be against its maintenance, the rule that a suit is not maintainable in the absence of indispensable parties would. And in such a case the state would be an indispensable party. So it was that Mr. Chief Justice Marshall supplemented his position that the eleventh amendment did not apply if the state was not a defendant to the record by the further position that, when the state was not such defendant and the suit was-against state officers only, the test of the maintainability of the suit was whether the state was an indispensable party to the suit. He said:
“The state not being a party on the record, and the court having jurisdiction over those who are parties on the record, the true question is, not one of jurisdiction, but whether, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the court ought to make a decree against the defendants; whether they are to be considered as having a real interest, or as being only nominal parties.”
. That the indispensableness of the state as a party is the test of the maintainability of a suit against its officers was recognized by Mr. Justice Miller, in the Cunningham Case. He said:
“Whenever it can be clearly seen that the state is an indispensable party to enable the court, according to the rules which govern its procedure, to grant the relief sought, it will refuse to take jurisdiction.”
Judge Marshall took care to point out that it was the fact that the state was an indispensable party to the suit which alone would render it not maintainable. It was not sufficient that the state was a proper party to the suit. The absence of a proper party to the suit, if for any reason he cannot be made such, as, for instance, he is out of the . jurisdiction, or if it is a state and cannot be sued, is not in the way of the maintenance of the suit. This principle has found expression in the old 47 equity rule. In the Bank of the United States Case he said:
“The direct interest of the state in the suit, as brought, is admitted; and, had it been in the power of the bank to make it a party, perhaps, no decree ought to have been pronounced in the cause, until the state was before the court. But this was not in the power of the bank.”
This was a clear recognition, as was the decision in that case, that the fact that á state will be affected by a suit against state officers is not a consideration against the maintainability of the suit. The result of the decision therein prevented the collection on behalf of the state of Ohio of the tax which its officers tried to collect from the bank and from thereby driving the bank out of the state, which was the motive behind the enactment of the unconstitutional statute imposing the tax.
[2] But it seems to me that the better test as to the maintainability of a suit in a federal court against state officers is to be found in a consideration of the relief sought therein. If the relief sought is relief against the state, it is not maintainable. Such relief may be the only relief sought as in the Cunningham and Christian Cases, or it may be sought through relief against the officers, as in the Jumel, Southern, and Smith Cases. If, however, the sole relief sought is relief against the state officers, it is maintainable. Such it is if it seeks compensation for a past wrong, recovery of possession of property wrongfully withheld, constituting a present wrong, or an injunction against a threat- *402 ened wrong such as equity will enjoin. This is the better test because it is the test of whether the state is an indispensable party. It is the ultimate test, and it is always best to think in ultimates.
The way in which this departure from Mr. Chief Justice Marshall’s position, that a state was not sued within the eleventh amendment unless it was a defendant to the record, has contributed to the uncertainty and confusion of thought to which I have alluded, is that the position that the state can be said to be sued when not a defendant to the record within the eleventh amendment has lent color to the idea that, in order for it to be so said, it is sufficient that the state will be affected by the maintenance of the suit and not essential that the relief therein sought be against it, which we have seen is not true. And the matter has been helped along by the fact that in taking this position the Supreme Court has not made it clear that, in order for a suit to be against the state when not a party defendant to the record, it is essential that the relief therein sought be against it, and that it is not sufficient that the state may be merely affected by its maintenance. As it has now to be accepted that a suit may be a suit against a state though it is not a party defendant to the record, it should be clearly understood that in order to this end the one thing is essential and the other not sufficient.
The other source of uncertainty and confusion of thought to which I have referred is the fact that most of the cases in the Supreme Court, involving suits in a federal court to enjoin state officers from taking action which they threaten to take, have been suits where the threatened action sought to be enjoined was action to enforce an unconstitutional statute, and, in stating the law as to the maintainability of such suits in the opinions therein, it has been given a partial cast. Take, for instance, the quotation from the opinion of Mr. Justice Peckham in the Young Case heretofore made, which is taken as the kernel of his opinion therein. In this quotation he undertakes to state the law to be gathered from the various cases in the Supreme Court considered by him. He states that it is to,the effect that a suit to enjoin proceedings to enforce an unconstitutional act violating the federal Constitution is maintainable. The parties hereto take it that by “unconstitutional act” he meant an unconstitutional statute. But it is by no means certain that he intended to so limit those words. He may have intended to include an unconstitutional act on the part of any state officer. Whichever he meant, as we have seen, the statement was only a partial statement of the law. The law is that a suit to enjoin the commission of any threatened wrong is maintainable. It is because a multiplicity of proceedings to enforce an unconstitutional act is a threatened wrong, and a suit to enjoin such proceedings is a suit to enjoin the commission of a threatened wrong, that such a suit is maintainable. It follows from this that a suit to enjoin any threatened wrong, no matter what may be its character, provided that it is such as equity will enjoin, is maintainable. For some reason the law was not put in this general and ultimate form. Quotations from other opinions in this partial form might be made. So stating the law was calculated to mislead, especially one whose thinking may be superficial, into supposing that such is the whole law on the subject of the maintainability of suits to enjoin threatened action.
*403 [3] Applying the law on this subject, as I have felt constrained to hold it to be, how then is it as to the maintainability of this suit? Is. the relief sought relief against the state of Kentucky, and is the state an indispensable party to the suit ? If not, and the relief sought is relief against the state officers sued, will the threatened action sought to be-enjoined, if taken, be a wrong to plaintiff, and such a wrong as equity will enjoin? It is clear that no relief is sought against the state of Kentucky. The sole relief sought is against the state officers sued. They are sought to be enjoined from taking certain action which they threaten to take. It is certain, also, that, if the assessment complained of is void on either ground relied on, the threatened action sought to be enjoined, if taken, will be a wrong to the plaintiff such as equity-will enjoin. That action is the institution and prosecution of a multiplicity of groundless suits and the taking of steps which, if taken, will result therein. This action, if taken, will be a wrong to plaintiff and such as equity will enjoin. It may sound strange to the defendants that in taking such action they will commit a wrong against plaintiff; but, if the claim that the assessment complained of is void on either ground relied on is correct, such is the legal conception of their action.
I must not leave this feature of the case without taking notice of the cases of Coulter v. Weir, 127 Fed. 897 , 62 C. C. A. 429 , and Coulter v. L. & N. R. Co., 196 U. S. 599 , 25 Sup. Ct. 342, 49 L. Ed. 615 . Each of these cases was an appeal from a decree, entered by me, one to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the other to the Supreme Court-Each was a suit complaining of an assessment-made by the same board that made the assessment complained of herein and under the same statute. That complained of in the first case was against the Adams Express Company, and in the second one against the plaintiff herein. In each case the decree entered was in favor of the plaintiff and, in each, on the appeal the decree was reversed, in the first case only in part. In each case it was held that I had erred in upholding a suit against the state in violation of the eleventh amendment. In view of this experience it is quite important that I should not fall into the.same error again. And this necessitates a somewhat careful consideration of both those cases.
In the Weir or Adams Express Company Case, the person then Auditor of the State was the sole defendant. The relief decreed by me was that the defendant be enjoined from apportioning or certifying the assessment complained of in excess of a certain amount for local taxation and from collecting any state taxes thereon, those on the amount thereof not complained of having been paid, and that the assessment in excess thereof be set aside and held for naught. The portion of the decree affirmed was in so far as it enjoined the defendant from apportioning or certifying the excess portion of the assessment for local taxation. It was held that in so far the suit was maintainable and the plaintiff entitled to relief. Judge Eurton said:
“This suit is clearly maintainable so far as it seeks to enjoin the defendant from certifying the assessment complained of to the county court clerks. The suit to that extent is a suit against Coulter as au individual, and the object is to restrain him from certifying the assessments made by the state board, which he claims he is required to do by the law of the state, but which the *404 complainants say is not a valid authority. Coulter must therefore justify himself by showing, if he can, that the authority under which he claims to act is sufficient.”
He cited in support of this decision the prior decision of that court in the case of Taylor v. L. & N. R. Co., 88 Fed. 350 , 31 C. C. A. 537 , and the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Stone, Auditor, v. Farmers’ Bank, 174 U. S. 409, 19 . Sup. Ct. 880, 43 L. Ed. 1027 . The portion of the decree reversed was in so far as it related to state taxes, i. e., set aside and held for naught the assessment in excess of a certain sum and enjoined the defendant from collecting state taxes on such excess. It was held that in so far as the decree set aside and annulled the assessment it was relief against the state of Kentucky, and hence erroneous. Judge Burton said:
“The court in this exceeded its jurisdiction, for jurisdiction over the defendant did not give it jurisdiction over the state of Kentucky, as the decree seems to assume.”
Undoubtedly in so far the judgment was 'erroneous, and for the reason if none other, it was not relief against the defendant. This feature of the decree escaped my attention, and I cannot say now that, had I noticed it, the result would have been different. The ground upon which the decree was held to be erroneous in so far as it enjoined the defendant from collecting any taxes on the excess was that the defendant had nothing to do with collecting state taxes. Judge Burton said:
“Counsel representing the appellee have not pointed out any provision of law under which the defendant, as Auditor, had any power or authority to coerce the payment of the tax so assessed, and we have searched in vain for any remedy against recalcitrant taxpayers of such a franchise tax, so far as same is due the state, other than those found in sections 4091 and 113, Kentucky Statutes 1903.”
He expressly recognized that, if the defendant had anything to do with the collection of state taxes, the suit was maintainable against him to enjoin him from attempting to collect them, the samé as it was maintainable against him to enjoin him from apportioning or certifying the assessment for local taxation, which there was no question it was his function to do. He said:
“If the defendant had been about to take some step under color of the law tending to complete the assessment, or if he had been authorized to seize property and was about to do so, then he was, assuming the case to be with the complainant on the merits, about to commit a trespass for which he would be individually liable, and in a proper case equity might enjoin his proposed action upon the ground of his want of legal authority. But this is not the case made in respect to the tax due the state, and the bill, so far as it sought relief against the state tax, must be dismissed without regard to the merits.”
There are provisions in the statutes of Kentucky making it the duty of the Auditor to enter in account as a demand payable at the treasury such state taxes, to report to the Attorney General a delinquency arising from a failure to pay them, and to cause proceedings to be instituted because of the failure, to which the court’s attention was not called and which it did not find in its research. They are sections *405 144, 145, and 152, Kentucky Statutes. Had the court known of these provisions, it would have upheld the decree in so far as it enjoined the defendant from taking steps to collect state taxes as well as in so far as it enjoined him from apportioning or certifying the assessment for local taxation.
Here no relief against the assessment is sought. It is not sought to have it set aside and held for naughc. And the Auditor is not the sole defendant. The Attorney General and prosecuting officers having to do with the institution and prosecution of proceedings against plaintiff because of- its delinquency in payment of state taxes are defendants also, and it is also unquestionable that the institution of a multiplicity of groundless suits involving the same question is such a wrong as equity will enjoin. So the decision in this case is an authority in support of the maintainability of this suit as to both state and local taxes, instead of being against its maintainability to any extent. In the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company Case the same position was taken as in the Weir or Adams Express Company Case. It was held that the suit was maintainable in so far as it sought to enjoin the apportionment and certification for local-taxes, but not in so far as it sought to enjoin the collection of state taxes. The latter holding was based on the Weir or Adams Express Company Case. Mr. Justice Holmes said:
“We need not stop to show that so much of the bill as seeks an injunction against Collecting the,state tax, and the portion of the decree which orders a receipt to be executed on the part of the state, cannot be maintained. See Coulter v. Weir, 127 Fed. 897, 906, 912 [ 62 C. C. A. 429 ]. On the other hand, in a proper case, a bill may be brought to restrain apportionment and certification to the counties. Fargo v. Hart, 193 U. S. 490, 495, 503 [24 Sup. Ct. 498, 48 L. Ed. 761 ].”
The suit was against not only the Auditor, but the members of the Board of Valuation and Assessment. Undoubtedly the decree in so far as it ordered a receipt to be executed on the part of the state was erroneous. I do not recall that I saw the decree after handing down my opinion in the case, and I cannot say that it would have made any difference had I seen it. My opinion in the case, reported in 131 Fed. 282 , however, shows that as I viewed the matter the sole relief sought was to enjoin the apportionment and certification of the assessment for local taxation. It is certain that there is nothing in this decision against the maintainability of this suit in toto. So far as the decision as to state taxes was concerned, it took for granted what had been held in the Weir or Adams Express Company Case, that the Auditor had nothing to do with collecting state taxes, and the Attorney General and other prosecuting officers were not defendants, and no injunction was sought against institution and prosecution of proceedings for delinquency in payment of state taxes. There is therefore nothing in this decision in support of the contention that this suit is not maintainable because it is a suit against the state.
Finally, it is to be noted that, if this suit had been brought in the state court, instead of this court,-it would have been held maintainable. The Court of Appeals has frequently sustained suits in the state court against state officers in which complaint was made of assess *406 ment made by the Board of Valuation and Assessment under the statute in question here, and relief was sought against state as well as local taxes. The following are cases of this sort, to wit: Coulter v. Louisville Bridge Company, 114 Ky. 42 , 70 S. W. 29 ; Ætna Life Ins. Co. v. Coulter, 115 Ky. 787 , 74 S. W. 1050 ; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Coulter, 115 Ky. 805 , 74 S. W. 1053 ; Hager v. American Surety Co., 121 Ky. 791 , 90 S. W. 550 ; James v. Kentucky Refining Co., 132 Ky. 353 , 113 S. W. 468 ; James v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 133 Ky. 299 , 117 S. W. 406 ; James v. American Surety Co., 133 Ky. 313 , 117 S. W. 411 . The suits in the Ætna Life Insurance Company, Fidelity & Casualty Company, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, and the last of the two American Surety Company cases were suits against the members of the Board of Valuation and Assessment to enjoin them from making an assessment. The suits in the Louisville Bridge Company and Kentucky Refining Company Cases were suits against the Auditor to enjoin him from collecting the state taxes due on assessments made by the Board of Valuation and Assessment. And the first American Surety Company Case was a suit against the members of the Board of Valuation and Assessment and the Auditor, brought, after a final assessment had been made by the board, to enjoin the members of the board from making the assessment and the Auditor from .collecting the state taxes due on the assessment. In each one of these seven cases, except the Kentucky Refining Company Case, the plaintiff was held entitled to judgment, and in the Kentucky Refining Company Case it was denied judgment on the merits only. In no one of them was it intimated that the members of the board or the Auditor were, not' suable. If this suit is not maintainable because it is a suit against the state, then no one of those suits were' maintainable on the same ground. For though the eleventh amendment has no application to suits in the state court, the common-law rule that a sovereign is not suable, of which that amendment was an embodiment, has, and is just as effective against the maintenance of a suit against the state as it is, and there was no statute permitting such suits to be brought. And the Louisville Bridge Company, first American Surety Company, and Kentucky Refining Company Cases are authorities against the position taken by Judge Lurton in the Weir or Adams Express Company Case that I had erred in holding that the Auditor had anything to do with collecting state taxes which he could be enjoined from doing. In view then of all that I have said, I think that I am warranted in holding that defendant’s preliminary contention is not sound and in being confident that my position will be able to stand against just criticism. _ ,
[4] 3. This brings me to the merits of the case, to wit, the claim of plaintiff that the assessment is void. I will consider first the claim that' it is void because the board did not follow the statute. As I make it, there are three particulars in which it is claimed that the board did not so do. As stated, plaintiff’s, property is a physical and organic unit covering 13 states.- That which was assessable by the board was not that part of this unit which is in this state but that part of the intangible part thereof located therein, which I designate as its *407 franchise therein. The method by which it valued and assessed it ivas this: It apportioned, to this state a part, of the total value of. the whole unit and then deducted therefrom the assessed value of that part of its tangible property in this state, assessed by the Railroad Commission, another body, whose function it is to assess it. The balance it fixed as the value of that part of plaintiff’s franchise in this state and is the assessment complained of. The apportionment of a part of the total value to this state was not made on a mileage basis. Roughly speaking, the Kentucky mileage is in round numbers 25 per cent, of the total mileage. It apportioned, according to the presentation before me, 35 per cent, thereof, or 10 per cent, more than the mileage proportion. It obtained this percentage by averaging the gross receipts proportion and the net income proportion, as it determined them to be, respectively, with the mileage proportion. The plaintiff claims'that this method was not in accordance with the statute. Its claim is that the board before apportioning to this state any part of the total value should have deducted therefrom the value of plaintiff’s tangible property everywhere, i. e., in this state and elsewhere, then apportioned to this state a part of this balance, and that it should have made this apportionment on .a mileage basis. There were therefore, according to plaintiff, two particulars in which the board did not follow the statute in the method which it pursued in making the assessment. One was in not first deducting from the total value the value of all the tangible propérty. And the other was in not apportioning what was apportioned to this state on a mileage basis. The other particular in which it is claimed the board did not follow the statute has to do with the hearing'thereby provided.
■ To fully appreciate these claims of plaintiff and to dispose of them correctly, a general survey of the statutory provisions under which the board acted will be helpful. They are, as heretofore stated, sections 4077 to 4081, inclusive, and 4083, Kentucky Statutes. Such a survey will bring out a number of imperfections therein and show that it is a rather crude piece of legislation. It originated at the first session of the Legislature held after the adoption of the present Constitution. Certain sections of that Constitution had provided, with a note of emphasis, that taxes should be uniform" on all property in the state;, that all property not thereby specifically exempted should be assessed for taxation at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale; that all property, whether owned by natural persons or corporations, should be taxed in proportion to its value; and that all corporate property should pay the same rate of taxation paid by individual property. In compliance with these provisions, an act entitled “An act in relation to revenue and taxation” was passed at that session of the Legislature and became law November 11, 1892. The first five and the seventh sections of article 3 thereof are, with the exception of certain changes made by subsequent amendments, to some of which reference will be made, the same as the sections of the Kentucky Statutes above referred to. , Section 4083 relates to the matter of the hearing and will be passed by for the time being.
Section 4077 provided for the payment annually by 18'enumerated *408 corporations, companies, or associations, of which “every railroad company or corporation” is the first named, and “every like company, corporation or association, also every other corporation, company or association, having or exercising any special or exclusive privilege or franchise‘not allowed by law, to natural persons, or performing any public service,” of a tax on its franchise, to the state and to the subordinate jurisdiction in which it may be exercised, in addition to the other taxes imposed on it by law, and for the fixing and apportionment to the subordinate jurisdiction of the value of such franchise by the Auditor, Treasurer, and Secretary of State, who were constituted a Board o'f Valuation and Assessment for that purpose.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky has held the following companies, no.t amongst those enumerated, to be covered by the general language used, to wit, race track, tank car, and refrigerator car companies. Latonia A. & S. Association v. Donnelly, 106 Ky. 325 , 50 S. W. 251 ; Louisville Tank Line Co. v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 81 , 93 S. W. 635 ; Morrell Refrigerator Car Co. v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 447 , 108 S. W. 926 .
It has held the following companies not to be covered thereby, to wit, ordinary business corporations, insurance companies, and title companies. Louisville Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Commonwealth, 106 Ky. 165 , 49 S. W. 1069 , 57 L. R. A. 33; Ætna Life Insurance Co. v. Coulter, 115 Ky. 787 , 74 S. W. 1050 ; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Coulter, 115 Ky. 805 , 74 S. W. 1053 ; Hager v. Louisville Title Co. (Ky.) 85 S. W. 182 .
As to the companies covered by the section, those enumerated and those held by the Court of Appeals to be within the general language used, it is to be noted that all of them except one conduct and operate their business along fixed and definite lines. The one that does not so operate and conduct its business is a guaranty or security company. The lines of a number of those who so operate and conduct their business are limited to this state, and most of these usually, if not always, to a single subordinate jurisdiction therein. They are gas, water, street railroad, electric power, turnpike, and race track companies. The lines of most of them cover other states as well as this state. They are a railroad, ferry, bridge, express, telegraph, press dispatch, telephone, palace car, dining car, sleeping car, chair car, tank car, and refrigerator car companies. Of these a ferry company and a bridge company are limited to only one other state. The properties of a railroad company, bridge, telegraph, and telephone companies constitute physical and organic units; those of the other companies organic units only. These companies may be placed in three classes, to wit,' companies which operate and conduct their business wholly in this state, companies which operate and conduct their business partly in this state and partly elsewhere, and companies which operate and conduct their business wholly elsewhere. So far as the first two classes are concerned, it is immaterial where they were organized.' It is sufficient that they wholly or partly operate and conduct their business in this state. So far as the last class is concerned, it is essential that they be organized in this state; for, as they operate and *409 conduct their business wholly elsewhere, there is no other basis of jurisdiction. Each of these three classes of compánies may be subdivided into companies which operate and conduct their business along definite and fixed lines and those which do not. But it is not material to note this except in case of the second class, i. e., companies which operate and conduct their business partly in this state and partly elsewhere.
Section 4078 provides for all the companies covered by section 4077 making and delivering to the Auditor a statement as to certain enumerated facts essential to enable the board to fix the value of the franchise which it is required to assess. The facts as to which they-are required to make statement are as follows, to wit: Name and principal place of business;, kind of business; amount of capital stock, preferred and common; number of shares of each amount of stock paid up, par and real value thereof; highest price at which such stock was sold at a bona fide sale within 12 months next before the 30th of June of the year in which the statement is made; amount of surplus funds and undivided profits, and all other assets; total amount of indebtedness as principal; amount of gross or net earnings or income, including interest on investments and incomes from all other sources for 12 months next preceding the 30th of June of the year in which the statement is made; amount and kind of tangible property in this state, and where situated, assessed, or liable to assessment in this state; and fair cash value thereof estimated at price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale. It provides further that they shall make a statement as “to such other facts as the Auditor may require.”
Section 4079 is twofold in character. It consists of three sentences. The last sentence is divided into two parts by. the word “provided,” which seems to have been used without significance. The first two sentences and the first part of the last sentence relate to the statement which is the subject-matter of section 4078. Each of the first two sentences provide for its covering additional facts. The first sentence is in these words:
“Where the line or lines of any such corporation, company or association' extend beyond the limits of the state or county, the statement shall, ih addition to the other facts heretofore required, show the length of entire lines operated, owned, leased or controlled in this state, and in each county, incorporated city, town or taxing district, and the entire line operated, controlled, leased or owned elsewhere.”
This sentence has application to the first two classes of companies of the three into which I have divided the companies covered by section 4077, to wit, those which operate and conduct their business wholly in this state and those which so do partly in this state and partly elsewhere. It does not have application to all the companies in those two classes. It has application to those only of the first class which operate and conduct their business along definite and fixed lines, where the ’lines extend beyond the limits of one county and to those only of the second class which so do along such lines. It requires the companies to which it- has application to make statement as to the-additional facts therein referred to.
*410 The second sentence is in these words, to wit:
“If the corporation, company or association he organized under the laws of any other state or government or organized and incorporated in this state, but operating and conducting its business in other states as well as in this state, the statement shall show the following facts in addition to the facts hereinbefore required: the gross and net income or earnings received in this state and out of this state, on business done in this state, * * * and elsewhere during the twelve months next before the thirtieth day of June of the year in which this assessment is required to he made.”
This sentence, too, like the first, requires the companies to which it has-application to make statement as to certain additional facts. Literally it may be said that it has application to all companies of the second class, i. e., which operate and conduct their business in this state and elsewhere. Literally also the place of organization has something to do with’distinguishing the companies to which this statement applies. But, as it covers companies organized both in this state and elsewhere, i. e., all possible places of organization, it is apparent that so much of the sentence is without significance and mere surplusage. And though the letter of the sentence makes it applicable to all companies .of the second class, it is clear that it has application to only such of those companies as do not operate and conduct their business along definite and fixed lines. The first sentence of the section provides as to what additional facts such of those companies as so do along such lines shall make statement; and, as we proceed, an additional consideration will be noted which makes it conclusive that it was not intended that it should have application to such of those companies as operate and conduct their business along definite and fixed lines.
The first part of the third sentence of section 4079 permits the . board to excuse a statement as to any of the facts required, where it is impossible to make a correct statement as to it, or it will not afford valuable information in determining the value of the franchise to be taxed. .
The last part of the third sentence of section- 4079, section 4080, and section 4081 are alike, in that each has to do with prescribing a method or methods for fixing the value of the franchise of companies covered by section 4077 to be followed by the board. In so far as the methods thus prescribed apply, the board is limited to them. It cannot do otherwise than follow them. Together they prescribe four methods—section 4079 one, section 4080 one, and section 4081 two. Literally section 4080 prescribes two, but they are alternative methods applicable to the same companies; but the Court of Appeals, in the case of James v. American Surety Company, 133 Ky. 313 , 117 S. W. 411 , has held that they prescribe but one method. Originally section 4081 prescribed but one method. The other or fourth and last method was prescribed March IS, 1906 (Laws 1906, c. 22), when the whole act on the subject of revenue’and taxation was re-enacted with certain changes. Theretofore no method had been prescribed for assessing the franchise of companies of the third class, covered by section 4077, to wit, companies which operate and conduct their business wholly elsewhere, but have been organized in this state. The method so prescribed is applicable to those companies, and it is not important to set *411 forth in detail that method. Our attention will be limited to the first,, second, and third methods, prescribed respectively in the last part of. the third sentence of section 4079, section 4080, and section 4081. The last part .of the third sentence of section 4079 is the same' as it was when originally enacted in 1892 (Laws 1891-92-93, c. 103). It is in these words:
“That said board, from said statement, and from such, other evidence as it may have, if such corporation, company or association be organized under the laws of this state, shall fix the value of the capital stock of the corporation, company or association, as provided in the next succeeding section, and frorii the amount thus fixed shall deduct the assessed value of all tangible property assessed in this state, or in the counties where situated. The remainder thus found shall be the value of its corporate franchise subject to taxation as aforesaid.”
[11] Literally the application of the method so prescribed is not determined by the classification I have made of the companies covered by section-4077, but by the place of organization, which is not a feature of that .classification. So considered, i. e., literally, it applies only to companies organized in this state and to all companies so organized. But it cannot have application to all companies so organized because to so construe it would render it unconstitutional. The first step in the method is to fix the value of the capital stock of the company. The words “capital stock,” as used in this and the other sections of the statutory provisions under consideration, have been construed to mean the entire property of the company, tangible and intangible, and when used in the course of this opinion that is the .sense in which they are used. In case then of a company organized in this state, but owning property elsewhere, this property would be included in fixing the value 'of the capital stock, and, as the next and only other step is to deduct the assessed value of the tangible property in this state, the balance to be the value of the franchisé, the assessment thereof would include the property 'elsewhere. Such an assessment would deprive the company of its property without due process of law and hence would be unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky upheld an assessment of such a company, where this method had been applied, in the case of Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Company v. Com., 108 Ky. 717 , 57 S. W. 624, 626 . The company there was a Kentucky corporation operating a ferry between Kentucky and Indiana and owning a ferry franchise in both states. The ferry franchise in Indiana was included in the assessment. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, it held that the assessment was invalid .and reversed the judgment of the lower court. Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry Co. v. Com., 188 U. S. 385 , 23 Sup. Ct. 463, 47 L. Ed. 513 . The letter of this portion of section 4079. would include all companies of the third class, i. e., which operate and conduct their business wholly elsewhere, but are organized in this state, like the Southern Pacific Railway Company. If, then, this method is limited to companies organized in this state, to render it constitutional, it must be limited further to such of those companies as operate and conduct their business and have their property wholly in this state, i. e., to, all companies of the first class organized in this state. Under this construction it has no *412 application to companies organized elsewhere whio also operate and conduct their business and have their property wholly in this state, and, as we shall see, the other two methods have no application to them, no method has been prescribed for assessing their franchise. . And either this position will have to be taken, or the words .as to organization in this state will have to be disregarded, and so much of section 4079 construed to have application to all companies of the first class, i. e., which operate and conduct their business and have their property wholly in this state.
Section 4080 prescribed the second method. As originally enacted it was as follows, to wit:
“If the corporation, company or association be organized under the laws of any other state or government, except as provided in the next section, the board shall fix the value of the capital stock as hereinbefore provided and will determine from the amount of the gross receipts of such corporation, company or association in this state and elsewhere the proportion which the gross receipts in this state, within twelve months next before the fifteenth of September of the year in which the assessment was made, bears to the entire gross receipts of the company, the same proportion of the value'of the entire capital stock, less the assessed value of .the tangible property assessed, or liable to assessment, in this state, shall be the correst value of the corporate franchise of such corporation, company or association for taxation in this state.”
It was amended by the revision act of March 15, 1906, hereinbefore referred to, and, as amended and as it now is, it is as follows, to wit:
“If the corporation, company or association be organized under the laws of any other state or government, except as provided in the next section, the board shall fix the capital stock in this state by capitalizing the net income derived in this state, or it shall fix the capital stock as hereinbefore provided, and will determine from the amount of the gross receipts of such corporation, company or association in this state and elsewhere, the proportion which the gross receipts of this state, within the twelve months next before the thirtieth day of June of the year in which the assessments were made, bears to the entire gross receipts of the company, the same proportion of the value of the entire capital stock or the capitalizing of the net earnings in this state, less the. assessed value of the tangible property assessed, or liable to assessment, in this state, shall be the correct value of the corporate franchise of such corporation, company or association for taxation in this state.”
This section as originally and as amended is like so much of section 4079 as prescribes the first method in that according to its letter the place of organization has to do with determining the companies to which it is applicable. It, however, is not the sole factor in so determining. The character of the method prescribed shows that it has application only to companies of the second class, i. e., companies which operate and conduct their business partly in this state and partly elsewhere, and, in view of the third method prescribed by section 4081, it must be held to have application to such companies only as do not so do along definite and fixed lines. If then the place of organization is a factor in determining the companies to which it has application, no method has been prescribed for assessing the franchise of companies of the second class which do not operate and conduct their business along definite and fixed lines and which have been organized in this state. That the intention was that this method should have ap *413 plication to companies organized in this state as well as those organized elsewhere is to be inferred from the fact that the second sentence of section 4079, which provides for the statement to be filed by the companies to which it applies, containing certain facts in addition to those set forth in section 4078, and which information is essential to enable the second method to be applied and was enacted for that purpose, is not limited to companies organized elsewhere than in this state, but covers those organized in this state as well as those organized elsewhere. This second method then should be construed as applicable to all companies of the second class who do not operate and conduct their business along definite and fixed lines, without reference to whether they were organized elsewhere or in this state or it has to be accepted that no method has been prescribed for assessing the franchise of such of those companies as have been organized in this state.
As originally enacted, the section treated the property of the companies to which it had application as a unit and provided -for an apportionment of apart thereof to this state on a.gross receipts basis, i. e., of the same proportion of the value of the capital stock which the gross receipts in this state is of the whole gross receipts. In the case of Hager v. American Surety Co., 121 Ky. 791 , 90 S. W. 550 , it was held that the board in assessing the franchise of a company to which section 4080 applied was restricted to this method and had nó right to treat the part of the franchise in this state as an independent whole in itself and fix its value by a capitalization of the net earnings in this state. This was the occasion of the change in section 4080 made by the revision act of March 15, 1906. According to the section as changed, what was done was to prescribe an additional method and to give the board the right to choose between them. This at least was the letter of the change. And the alternative method which it prescribed was to treat the part of the franchise in this state as an independent whole in itself and fix its value by a capitalization of the net earnings therein. The Court of Appeals, however, as heretofore stated, in the Kentucky Refining Company Case, held that the Legislature did not so intend, but intended that both methods should be used at the same time and that to make the letter conform to such intent the word “and” should be substituted for the word “or.” The two methods are opposites. By the original method the part was to be treated as a part of a larger whole, and by the new method it was to be treated as an independent whole in itself. According to this construction, therefore, we have what may be characterized as an enforced “harmony of opposites.” The decision is bottomed on' the idea that the Legislature in empowering a tribunal to assess property must prescribe the method by which it is to value it. Of course, if this is so, it has no power to leave to that body the discretion of making a choice between two alternative methods. But I submit that this idea is not sound. The Legislature does not have to prescribe the method by which such a tribunal is to .value the property which it is its duty to assess. It can leave to it the matter of adopting a' reasonable or suitable method. The authorities relied on as supporting the position do *414 not, in my opinion, do so. It is against the position that the statute does not, as we shall see, prescribe the method of valuing the capital .stock, the first step in each of the three methods, and it has been recognized b3 the Court of Appeals from the beginning of this legislation that the board has the right to choose between two methods of so valuing, i. e., the stock and bond and the capitalization methods. The later decision in the case of Southern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Commonwealth, 134 Ky. 410 , 120 S. W. 309 , is against it. It was there held as to a company of the third class, i. e., organized in this state, but operating and conducting its business wholly elsewhere prior to March 15, 1906, when ho method had been prescribed for assessing the franchise in this state of such a company, that the board had the power to assess it and to adopt a reasonable and suitable method for so doing. There was therefore no reason for holding that the Legislature did not mean what it said and to leave it to the board to adopt whichever method was most advantageous to the state.
Section 4081 prescribes the third method with which we have to do in this case. As originally enacted, it is in these words, to wit:
“If the corporation organized under the laws of this state or some other state or government be a railroad, telegraph, telephone, express, sleeping, dining, palace or chair car company, the lines of which extend beyond the limits of this state, the said board will fix the value of the capital stock as herein-before provided, and that proportion of the value of the capital stock, which the length of the linos operated, owned, leased or controlled in this state bears to the lines owned, leased or controlled in this state and elsewhere, shall be the value of the corporate franchise of such corporation liable for taxation in this state; and such corporate franchise shall be liable for taxation in each county, incorporated city, town or district through, or into which, such lines pass or are operated, in the same proportion that the length of the line in such county, city, town or district bears to the whole length of lines in the state, less tire value of any tangible property assessed or liable to assessment in any such county, city, town or taxing district.”
The section has been amended twice since its original enactment. The first amendment was made at the same session of the Legislature, near its close, it being a long one, i. e., June 9, 1893 (Laws 1891-92-93, c. 217). It consisted simpfy in inserting the words “considered in fixing” between the words “shall be” and “the value of the corporate franchise,” so that it provided, instead of as originally, that the part apportioned to this state should be the value of the franchise in this state, that it should be considered in fixing such value. The other amendment was by the revision act of March 15, 1906a It omitted the concluding clause, to wit, “less the value of any tangible property assessed, or liable to assessment, in any such county, city, town or taxing district,” and added two other clauses. One was the words “or a corporation performing afiy other public service” inserted after the words “chair car company,” the last of the eight companies enumerated therein, so that it would not be limited thereto. The other prescribed the fourth method of assessment hereinbefore referred to applicable to companies organized under the laws of this state which operate and conduct their business along definite and fixed lines entirely elsewhere. As thus changed, and as it was at the time when the assessment complained of was made, the section was as fellows, to wit:
*415 “If the corporation organized under the laws of this state, or some other state or government be a railroad, telegraph, telephone, express, sleeping, dining,-palace or chair car company or a corporation performing any other public service, the lines of which extend beyond the limits of the state, the said board will fix the value of tile capital stock as hereinbefore provided, and that proportion of the value of the'capital stock which the length of the lines operated, owned, leased, of controlled in this state, bears to the total length of the lines owned, leased or controlled in this state and elsewhere, shall be considered in fixing the value of the corporate franchise of such corporation liable for taxation in this state; and such corporate franchise shall be liable to taxation in each county, incorporated city, town or district through or into which such lines pass, or are operated, in the same proportion that the length of the line in such county, city, town or district bears to the whole length of lines in this state; but if any such railroad or other corporation organized under the laws of this state have all of its lines outside of this state, the said board shall fix the value of its entire capital stock as hereinbefore provided, and apportioned to this state for taxation therein the proper proportion and not less than one per cent, of its said capital stock, and the amount so apportioned shall be the value of its intangible property, including its corporate franchise, stocks, bonds, securities and dioses in action, subject to taxation in tins state and in the county, city, town and district where its principal place-of business in this state may be located.”
In determining the companies to which this method has application' here, as in the case of the other two methods, apparently the place of their organization is a factor. But as here the language used covers both this state and elsewhere as places of organization, there can be no question that, however it may be as to the other two methods, the place of organization is not a determining factor as to the application of the third method. As originally enacted, it applied to such of the companies of the second class as were enumerated, being eight in number, which companies operate and conduct their business both in this state and elsewhere along definite and fixed lines. By the amendment of March 15, 1906, the section was changed so as to make the third method applicable to all such companies as performed an'y other public service than that performed by the eight enumerated companies.
It is clear then that down to the revision act of March 15, 1906, no method was prescribed for assessing the franchise in this state of certain of the companies covered by section 4077. This was the case of all companies of the third class, i. e.y companies organized in this state and operating and conducting their business wholly elsewhere. It was the case as to all companies of the second class, i. e., companies operating and conducting their business partly in this state and partly elsewhere along definite and fixed lines not included by the eight companies enumerated in section 4081. This was the case as to all bridge and ferry companies so operating and conducting their business. And it is now the case as to all such companies not included by those eight companies or performing any other public service. It is now and always has been the case as to companies of the first class, that is, companies which operate and conduct their business wholly in this state but organized elsewhere, if that portion of section 4079 prescribing the first method limits it to such companies as have been organized in this state, and, as to companies of the second class, i. e., companies which operate and conduct their business partly in this state and part *416 ly elsewhere, but not along definite and fixed lines, but organized in this state, if section 4080 prescribing the second method limits it to such companies as have been organized elsewhere. The Court of Appeals has had to deal with the question as to how companies covered by section 4077, as to which no method of assessment was so prescribed, should be assessed. It had to deal with it in the Southern Pacific'Railroad Company Case, hereinbefore referred to, and I have indicated how it dealt with the question there. The case was decided after March 15, 1906, when the act- prescribing a method for such cases became the law, but it involved years prior thereto. That court had to deal with it in the case of Morrell Refrigerator Car Co. v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 447 , 108 S. W. 926 . The company there involved was a refrigerator car company which operated and conducted its business partly in this state and partly elsewhere along definite and fixed lines, but which was not one of t;he eight companies enumerated in section 4081 and was not regarded as performing a public service. It was not dealt with as it was in the subsequent Southern Pacific Railroad Co. Case, but section 4081 was construed to apply not only to the companies covered by its language, but all companies like those enumerated, and hence that that method was applicable to it. The earlier case of Louisville Tank Line Co. v. Commonwealth, 123 Ky. 81 , 93 S. W. 635 , involved the question; but it does not seem to have been raised there.
The true view of the matter seems to me to be this: Section 4077 expressly provides that all the companies covered by it shall pay a franchise tax and empowers the board to make the assessment. The fact that no method has been prescribed for making the assessment of any compány does not relieve it from assessment and from the tax. There is simply no method of assessment prescribed. This leaves the matter so that the board can adopt a reasonable method. .And it should be taken that the Legislature so intended. And a reasonable method is one similar to that prescribed in analogous cases, if there are such, and, if not, such as is reasonable under the circumstances. A similar line of reasoning was taken by me in the field of federal jurisdiction in the case of Kentucky Coal Lands Co. v. Mineral Development Co. (C. C.) 191 Fed. 899 . The first sentence of the first section of the jurisdictional acts of 1887 and 1888 (Acts March 3, 1887, c. 373, 24 Stat. 552 and Act Aug. 13, 1888, c. 866, 25 Stat. 433 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 508]) confers essential jurisdiction on the Circuit Courts of the United States in certain cases. The middle clause of the second section thereof—the venue clause—distributes that jurisdiction amongst those courts. It does not distribute all of it: It leaves a portion thereof undistributed, such as suits against aliens and suits of a local nature. I there pointed out that the fact that a portion of such jurisdiction so conferred was not distributed did not deprive the Circuit Courts of jurisdiction thereof. The sole effect of its not being distributed was that it must be treated as distributed along reasonable lines.
If then this position is sound and the first method of ¡assessment is to be confined to companies organized under the laws of this state *417 in accordance with the letter of section 4079, so that no method is prescribed for assessing companies organized under the laws of other states which operate and conduct their business and have their property wholly in this state, it should be taken that the board has the right to adopt a reasonable method and a reasonable method is that prescribed in section 4079, as it is an analogous case. And if the second method is to be restricted to companies organized under the laws- of other states in accordance with the letter of section 4080, so that no method is prescribed for assessing companies which operate and conduct their business partly in this state and partly out of it, but not on definite and fixed lines, the same course is to be pursued.
So much then as to the methods of assessment prescribed, their applicability, and the course to be pursued where no applicable method has been prescribed. It is now in order to consider the methods themselves.
The first step in the first, second, and third methods is exactly the same. It is to fix the value of the capital stock of the company. It is not important to deal with the method of fixing such value. It is sufficient to note that the statute prescribes none. It is true that section 4079 says that the board shall fix it “as provided in the next succeeding section.” But the next succeeding- section, to wit, section 4080, provides that the board, if it adopts the third method, shall fix it “as hereinbefore provided.”' These two clauses cancel each other' and leave no method prescribed. So section 4081 says that it shall fix the value of capital stock “as hereinbefore provided.” But as there is no prior provision on this subject, this clause is also without meaning. The board therefore, in taking this first step in these three methods, is left' to adopt a reasonable method of fixing such value. After the taking of this first step, the three methods part company. According to the first method, the next step is to deduct from the valuation so fixed the assessed value of the entire tangible property which is all in this state. The provision then is that the remainder thus found shall be the value of the company’s franchise. This method, therefore, consists of but two steps, fixing the value of the entire property and deducting the assessed value of the entire tangible property. By it the board does not directly fix the value of the franchise. That results automatically from the taking of these two steps.
The several steps of the original second and the third methods are alike, in that neither consists of a deduction of tangible property, like the second step in the first method, but of an apportionment of the value of the entire property. They differ from each other in the manner of apportionment which is prescribed. The apportionment in the original second method is on a gross receipts basis, and that in the third method on a mileage basis. In the nature of things the apportionment in the original second method cannot be on a mileage basis, because the companies to which it is applicable do not operate and conduct their business on definite and fixed lines. According to it the ratio of -the gross receipts in this state to the total receipts determines what part of the total value shall be apportioned to this state and that absolutely so.
The third and last step in the original second method is to deduct *418 from the part of the total value thus apportioned to this state the assessed value of the tangible property in this state. The balance is to be taken as the value of the franchise therein. This method, therefore, consists of three distinct steps—valuation of the entire property in and. out of this state, apportionmen

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8790034. Public record. Not legal advice.