# Coleman v. State

> Montana Supreme Court · August 28, 1981 · 194 Mont. 428

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/877465

## Case

- **Full name:** DEWEY EUGENE COLEMAN, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE OF MONTANA, Respondent and Respondent
- **Court:** Montana Supreme Court
- **Decided:** August 28, 1981
- **Citations:** 194 Mont. 428; 633 P.2d 624; 1981 Mont. LEXIS 821
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Harrison, Morrison, Shea, Haswell, Weber, Lessley, Sheehy, Martin
- **Cited by:** 51 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/877465

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the Montana postconviction procedure is civil in nature and independent of the underlying criminal cause

## Opinion text

No. 81-115
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MOEJTANA

1981

DEWEY EUGENE COLEMAN,

Petitioner and Appellant,
-vs-
STATE OF MONTANA,

Respondent and Respondent.

Appeal from: District Court of the Sixteenth Judicial District,
In and for the County of Rosebud, The Honorable
A. B. Martin, Judge presiding.

Counsel of Record:

For Appellant:
. -
Moses Law Firm, Billings, Montana
Charles Moses argued, Billings, Montana
For Respondent:
Hon. Mike Greely argued, Attorney General, Helena,
Plontana
John Maynard argued, Asst. Atty. General, ~ e l e n a ;
Montana
John S. Forsythe argued, County Attorney, Forsyth,
Montana

Submitted: April 29,' 1981

Decided :AUG 2 8 1981

Filed: .4UG 1 8 1981
Mr. J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of
the Court.
Coleman a p p e a l s from a Rosebud C o u n t y D i s t r i c t C o u r t

d i s m i s s a l of h i s p e t i t i o n f o r p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n relief. Title

4 6 , C h a p t e r 2 1 , Montana Code A n n o t a t e d .

None o f the i s s u e s p r e s e n t e d by p e t i t i o n e r on t h i s

appeal a r e based in the underlying f a c t s of the criminal
cause. Therefore, the facts surrounding Coleman's

c o n v i c t i o n f o r t h e d e a t h of Peggy Lee H a r s t a d w i l l n o t be
recited. A f u l l t e x t of t h e s e f a c t s c a n be found i n our

d e c i s i o n o f a n e a r l i e r a p p e a l , S t a t e v . Coleman ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7
Mont. 1, 5 7 9 P.2d 732. O p e r a t i v e p r o c e d u r a l f a c t s w i l l be
d i s c u s s e d w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o s p e c i f i c i s s u e s o f f e r e d by t h e
petitioner.
Petitioner Coleman presents eight issues for

r e s o l u t i o n by t h i s C o u r t :
1. Is p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f a new c i v i l a c t i o n o r a

c o n t i n u a t i o n of t h e p r e v i o u s c r i m i n a l c a u s e ?
2. S h o u l d t h e j u d g e h a v e r e c u s e d h i m s e l f when h i s

t e s t i m o n y is r e q u i r e d a s t o c e r t a i n c l a i m e d v i o l a t i o n s ?
3. Is petitioner not entitled to post-conviction

r e l i e f because he h a s been s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h ?

4. Are c l a i m s o f c o n s t i t u t i o n a l v i o l a t i o n s b a r r e d by
res judicata because t h e y were d e c i d e d i n e a r l i e r Coleman

appeals?
5. Were t h i r t e e n o f C o l e m a n ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a i m s
properly dismissed because "they include vague new
a l l e g a t i o n s , t h e y a r e t o o vague t o s t a t e new c l a i m s , o r a r e
unsupported by authority and therefore barred by -
res
judicata"?
6. Were seven of Coleman's constitutional claims
properly dismissed because the "new authority cited is

either inapplicable to petitioner's case or clearly

distinguishable from it leaving the claims barred by -
res

judicata"?

7. Were five of Coleman's constitutional claims

waived " b e c a u s e he f a i l e d t o r a i s e them i n h i s d i r e c t a p p e a l

and b e c a u s e t h e y a r e w i t h o u t m e r i t " ?

I. POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AS CIVIL OR C R I M I N A L ACTION

T h i s Court r e c o g n i z e s t h e unique n a t u r e of t h e p o s t -

conviction remedy. Montana law does not label the

proceeding a s e i t h e r c i v i l or c r i m i n a l , although t h e chapter

providing post-conviction relief is in the criminal

procedure title. Title 46, Chapter 21, Montana Code

Annotated.

The Montana p r o v i s i o n s o f s e c t i o n 46-21-101 e t seq.,

MCA, a r e d e r i v e d from t h e Uniform P o s t C o n v i c t i o n P r o c e d u r e

A c t and a r e e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r t o the federal statute (28

U.S.C. 52255). The f e d e r a l c o u r t s have c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d

that an action under 28 U.S.C. S2255 is a civil action,

indepe n d e n t of t h e o r i g i n a l c r i m i n a l c o n v i c t i o n . See H e f l i n

v. United States (1959), 358 U.S. 415, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3

L.Ed.2d 407. The same r u l e h a s been a d o p t e d i n o t h e r s t a t e s

which h a v e a d o p t e d t h e u n i f o r m a c t . C l a r k v. State (1969),

92 I d a h o 827, 452 P.2d 54.

In those s t a t e s with similar provisions not neces-

s a r i l y d e r i v i n g from t h e uniform a c t , t h e c o u r t s have been

consistent in their view that post-conviction relief is

civil in nature and independent of the criminal action.

S t a t e v. Hannagan ( A l a s k a 1 9 7 7 ) , 559 P.2d 1059; Noble v.
State (1973), 109 A r i z . 537, 514 P.2d 458; State v.

Richardson (1965), 194 Kan. 471, 399 P.2d 799; Smith v.

State ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 79 N . M . 450, 444 P.2d 961; Noble v. Sigler

(8th Cir. 1 9 6 5 ) , 351 F.2d 673, c e r t . d e n i e d , 385 U.S. 853,

87 S . C t . 98, 17 L.Ed.2d 81, (held only t h a t post-conviction

a p p l i c a t i o n s a r e c i v i l i n n a t u r e ) ; People v. Jones (1975),

30 Ill.App.3d 706, 332 N.E.2d 411; State v. Smith (Mo.

1 9 5 9 ) , 324 S.W.2d 707; T o l a r v . S t a t e ( F l a . 1 9 6 7 ) , 1 9 6 So.2d

1.

Clearly, t h i s is n o t i n t e n d e d t o be a n o t h e r form o f

appeal from a criminal case, but a separate c i v i l action

aimed a t v a c a t i n g , s e t t i n g aside or correcting a sentence.

There i s no Montana case interpreting the nature of the

post-proceeding petition, but the proceeding could be

c l o s e l y analogized t o t h a t seeking a w r i t of habeas corpus

which t h i s Court decided i n 1927 was a n independent c i v i l

proceeding. A u g u s t v . B u r n s ( 1 9 2 7 ) , 79 Mont. 198, 213, 255

P. 737, 741.

I t i s i m p o r t a n t t o n o t e t h a t w e do n o t h e r e i n t e n d t o

erode the fundamental principle discussed below that the

s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t is t h e p r o p e r c o u r t f o r t h e p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n

petition. W a r e mindful t h a t a p a r t y t o a c i v i l a c t i o n is
e

e n t i t l e d t o two s u b s t i t u t i o n s of p r e s i d i n g j u d g e s . Section

3-1-801-4, MCA ( a d o p t e d by o r d e r o f t h i s C o u r t on December

29, 1 9 7 6 , 34 S t . R e p . 26). However, b e c a u s e a n a p p l i c a n t f o r

post-conviction relief is directed by the more specific

provisions of the post-conviction statute to bring the

p e t i t i o n in t h i s Court or i n t h e c o u r t t h a t s e n t e n c e d him,

w e f i n d t h a t t h e two j u d g e d i s q u a l i f i c a t i o n g r a n t o f s e c t i o n

3-1-801-4, MCA, is unavailable to the post-conviction
petitioner. In Montana, when a general statute is in

c o n f l i c t with a s p e c i f i c a c t , the s p e c i f i c s t a t u t e w i l l take

precedence. S e c t i o n 1-2-102, MCA; I n Re C o l e m a n ' s Estate

( 1 9 5 7 ) , 1 3 2 Mont. 339, 317 P.2d 880.

We hold that the Montana post-conviction relief

procedure is civil in nature and independent of the

underlying criminal cause. W w i l l proceed t o consider t h e
e

i s s u e s r a i s e d on t h e a p p e a l t o t h i s C o u r t . Coleman c o n t e n d s

t h a t i t was e r r o r t o d e n y v a r i o u s o f h i s r e q u e s t s w i t h o u t a n

evidentiary hearing. I t is n o t e r r o r t o d e n y an a p p l i c a t i o n

for post-conviction r e l i e f w i t h o u t an e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g i f

the allegations are without merit or would otherwise not

e n t i t l e the petitioner to relief. Clark v. State, supra;

T r a m e l v . S t a t e ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 92 I d a h o 6 4 3 , 448 P.2d 649; D o n n e l l y

v. S t a t e ( A l a s k a 1 9 7 3 ) , 516 P.2d 396 ( a l l e g a t i o n s in post-

c o n v i c t i o n p e t i t i o n were t o o vague and i l l u s o r y t o warrant

e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g ) ; Widermyre v . S t a t e ( A l a s k a 1 9 6 9 ) , 452

P.2d 885; People v. Lyons ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 196 Colo. 384, 585 P.2d

916; Cook v . S t a t e ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 220 Kan. 223, 552 P.2d 9 8 5 .

The decision to admit or deny an application for

post-conviction relief i s a d i s c r e t i o n a r y o n e and o n e t h a t
w i l l n o t be d i s t u r b e d by t h i s C o u r t a b s e n t a c l e a r a b u s e o f

discretion. S e c t i o n 46-21-201, MCA; S t a t e v. Ybarra ( 1 9 7 4 ) ,

22 A r i z . A p p . 330, 527 P.2d 107; Brudos v . Cupp ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 3 1

0r.App. 25, 569 P.2d 680; S u l l i v a n v . S t a t e ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 222 Kan.

222, 564 P.2d 455.

11. RECUSAL OF THE SENTENCING J U D G E

Coleman n e x t m a i n t a i n s t h a t t h e d i s t r i c t j u d g e s h o u l d

have recused himself as presiding judge over his petition
for post-conviction relief i n l i g h t o f t h e f a c t t h a t h e was

the sentencing judge . Petitioner observes that in a

post-conviction proceeding, the sentencing judge would
l i k e l y be c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y a s t o , i n t e r a l i a , t h e p r o p r i e t y

of t h e death sentence. C i t i n g 46 Am.Jur .2d J u d g e s , S91 a t
1 5 8 , Coleman s u b m i t s t h a t a j u d g e s h o u l d e x c u s e h i m s e l f a s a
m a t t e r of c o u r s e i f i t a p p e a r s t h a t h e may be c a l l e d a s a

witness. W disagree.
e

Coleman f a i l s t o r e c o g n i z e t h e c o m p e l l i n g p u r p o s e and
policy considerations behind that portion of the statute

( s e c t i o n 46-21-103, MCA) which d i r e c t s t h a t a p e t i t i o n f o r
post-conviction relief be filed in either the court of

conviction or t h i s Court. S e e a l s o s e c t i o n 46-21-101, MCA

("may p e t i t i o n t h e c o u r t which imposed t h e s e n t e n c e .. .").

H i s t o r i c a l l y , having t h e s e n t e n c i n g judge p r e s i d e a t
t h e s u b s e q u e n t p r o c e e d i ng h a s been e a r n e s t l y advocated f o r
the following reasons: (1) i t reduces the burden on the
D i s t r i c t C o u r t a t t h e p l a c e of c o n f i n e m e n t ; ( 2 ) it reduces

the cost of the proceeding since most of the witnesses
l i k e l y t o be c a l l e d a r e probably in the l o c a l e where t h e

trial occurred; and, (3) the convicting court is more
familiar with t h e t o t a l i t y of t h e f a c t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s
surrounding the case. Commissioners' Comment, 11 U . L . A .

Post Conviction Procedure §3 (1974). Still another

important consideration was enunciated by Idaho Supreme
Court J u s t i c e Donaldson i n S t i l l v . S t a t e ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 95 I d a h o

"Although it d o e s n ' t m a t t e r whether t h e
p r o c e e d i n g is denominated a s one f o r habeas
c o r p u s o r f o r p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n r e l i e f , i t is
s t i l l n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h e p r o c e d u r e s of t h e
Uniform P o s t - C o n v i c t i o n P r o c e d u r e Act b e
followed. The A c t was d e s i g n e d t o q i v e t h e
..................................... n i t i a l
d i s t r i c t c o u r t w h i c h made t h e i
d e t e r m i n a t i o n s a chance t o c o r r e c t anv
mistakes or i r r e q u l a r i t i e s t h a t occurred i n
t h a t court. In addition, t h a t court has
b e f o r e i t a l l t h e f a c t s r e q u i r e d t o make s u c h
a determination. f here fore, t h e a p p l i c a t i o n
o r p e t i t i o n f o r r e l i e f m u s t be f i l e d i n t h e
d i s t r i c t c o u r t where t h e c o n v i c t i o n o c c u r r e d .
I . C . § 19-4902." (Emphasis added.)
This Court is also of the view that the post-
conviction court judge should only recuse himself if the

petitioner shows t h a t t h e j u d g e is t h e source of m a t e r i a l
evidence otherwise unobtainable. A t r i a l judge's f a m i l i a r i t y
with a case does not automatically make him a material

witness in post-conviction proceedings. Bresnahan v. Luby

( 1 9 6 6 ) , 160 Colo. 455, 418 P.2d 1 7 1 , 22 A.L.R.3d 1193. The
Bresnahan c o u r t a l s o emphasized t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e t r i a l

judge's f a m i l i a r i t y with t h e c r i m i n a l c a s e which i s b e i n g

c o l l a t e r a l l y a t t a c k e d by t h e c i v i l a c t i o n . The c a s e a t b a r
involved thousands of p a g e s of testimony, briefs, motions

and t r i a l c o u r t r e c o r d s . W a r e mindful of
e t h e d e l a y and
burden on the efficient administration of justice which

would o c c u r if another judge were r e q u i r e d to familiarize
himself or herself with t h i s record for the purposes of a

post-conviction evidentiary hearing. Such d e l a y c a n o n l y be

justified by the strongest showing of materiality and
unavailability of evidence sought t o be adduced from t h e
s e n t e n c i n g judge .
In this case, petitioner never makes it entirely
c l e a r t o t h i s C o u r t j u s t what t e s t i m o n y h e hoped t o e l i c i t
from the district judge. Abstract excursions into the
m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s o f t h e s e n t e n c i n g j u d g e do n o t j u s t i f y t h e
p r o forma r e c u s a l of a j u d g e who i s f u l l y a c q u a i n t e d w i t h
the case. I t a p p e a r s t h a t a t b e s t p e t i t i o n e r was a t t e m p t i n g
to embark on a fishing trip, hoping to uncover damaging

testimony about the fairness of the sentence. Such a

d i s c o v e r y p r o c e d u r e would n o t b e allowed w i t h any w i t n e s s

b u t i s e s p e c i a l l y s u s p e c t when d i r e c t e d a t t h e t r i a l j u d g e .

S e e Moore v . P e o p l e ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 174 C o l o . 570, 485 P.2d 1 1 4 .

We find, therefore, that unless some specific and

compelling evidence is sought to be adduced from the

testimony of t h e s e n t e n c i n g j u d g e and s u c h e v i d e n c e c a n be

f o u n d nowhere e l s e , f o r many s u b s t a n t i a l reasons the t r i a l

judge should also preside over a petition for post-

conviction r e l i e f . The A c t itself lends credence t o t h i s

l i n e of reasoning, and it c a n be e a s i l y i n f e r r e d t h a t t h e

legislature, in providing that a post-conviction petition

s h o u l d be filed i n t h e c o u r t of conviction, intended t h a t

the sentencing judge preside over the post-conviction

proceeding. The s t a n d a r d o f proof regarding the necessity

of a sentencing judge's testimony is high; only the

s t r o n g e s t showing o f m a t e r i a l i t y and u n a v a i l a b i l i t y w a r r a n t s

recusal. S e e I n R e C o n t i n e n t a l V e n d i n g Machine C o r p . (2nd

Cir. 1976), 543 F.2d 986. The reasons a d v a n c e d by p e t i -

tioner for recusal of the trial judge were simply not

s u f f i c i e n t t o j u s t i f y a s u b s t i t u t i o n of judges.

111. APPLICABILITY OF POST-CONVICTION PROCEDURE TO CAPITAL
CONVICTIONS

I n r e g a r d t o t h e t h i r d i s s u e , s e c t i o n 46-21-101, MCA,

recites in applicable part:

" C i r c u m s t a n c e s i n which v a l i d i t y o f s e n t e n c e
may be c h a l l e n q e d . A p e r s o n adTudged g u i l t y
o f an o f f e n s e i n a c o u r t o f r e c o r d who h a s no
a d e q u a t e remedy o f a p p e a l . . .may p e t i t i o n
t h e c o u r t which imposed t h e s e n t e n c e , t h e
supreme c o u r t , o r a n y j u s t i c e o f t h e supreme
court t o vacate, s e t aside, or correct the
sentence."

T h i s Court has n o t s p e c i f i c a l l y addressed t h e ques-

t i o n of whether c a p i t a l l y - s e n t e n c e d defendants a r e e n t i t l e d

t o t h e p r o t e c t i o n s of t h e post-conviction r e l i e f s t a t u t e , or

whether t h e a u t o m a t i c s e n t e n c e r e v i e w s t a t u t e , s e c t i o n 46-

18-307 e t s e q . , MCA, s t a n d s i n t h e p l a c e of post-conviction

relief. W e a r e a w a r e o f t h e l a n g u a g e o f Mr. J u s t i c e S h e e h y

i n S t a t e v. Coleman ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont. , 605 P.2d 1000,

1006, 36 S t . R e p . 1134, 1135, cert. denied, - U.S. 1

100 S . C t . 2952, L.Ed.2d , w h e r e i n he w r i t e s :

" B e c a u s e t h e r e v i e w c o n d u c t e d by t h i s C o u r t
[pursuant t o t h e automatic review p r o v i s i o n s
o f s e c t i o n 46-18-307 t h r o u g h s e c t i o n 46-18-
3 1 0 , MCA] s t a t u t o r i l y s t a n d s i n p l a c e o f a n y
r e c o u r s e t o t h e S e n t e n c e Review D i v i s i o n , t h e
c o m p l e t i o n o f t h i s r e v i e w w i l l mark t h e end
o f s t a t e a c t i o n upon t h i s c a u s e , e x c e p t i n g
a n y a c t i o n upon a p e t i t i o n f o r r e h e a r i n g . "
(Emphasis added. )

But c f . , S t a t e v . McKenzie ( 1 9 7 8 ) , 1 7 7 Mont. 280, 322, 581

That language, a s noted, only specifically pertains

t o t h e s e n t e n c e r e v i e w p r o c e d u r e and o n l y g e n e r a l l y c o u l d i t

be interpreted to represent a bar to the utilization of

post-conviction procedure. The p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n s t a t u t e does

n o t l i m i t its p r o v i s i o n s t o noncapitally-sentenced persons,

nor does t h e automatic review s t a t u t e herald itself a s an

e x c l u s i v e remedy. Such a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n would h a v e t o be

inferred from the nature of the statutes and policies

involved. W do n o t b e l i e v e t h a t s u c h a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n c a n
e

be g i v e n t o t h e s e s t a t u t e s .

In arriving a t t h i s conclusion, t h e p l a i n meaning o f

the post-conviction s t a t u t e is p a r t i c u l a r l y p e r s u a s i v e . The

statute provided that "a person adjudged guilty of an
o f f e n s e " is e n t i t l e d t o a c c e s s t o t h e p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p r o c e -

dure. If the legislature intended this statute to be
a p p l i e d o n l y i n n o n c a p i t a l s e n t e n c e s , w e must c o n c l u d e t h a t

i t would h a v e e x p r e s s l y done s o . The t e r m s o f " a p e r s o n " o r

" a n y p e r s o n " and " a c r i m e " o r " a n y c r i m e " a r e g e n e r i c t e r m s

e n c o m p a s s i n g a v e r y b r o a d s p e c t r u m o f a c t s and a c t o r s . Any
l i m i t a t i o n on t h e g r a n t o f r e v i e w i n p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n proce-
d u r e s m u s t b e made by t h e l e g i s l a t u r e . It is c l e a r l y n o t
t h e power of t h i s Court t o i n t e r p r e t t h e l a w i n a manner
contrary t o legislative intent. S e e American L i n e n S u p p l y

Co. v . DOR ( 1 9 8 0 ) , Mont. , 617 P.2d 1 3 1 , 37 S t . R e p .
1 7 0 7 ; Dunphy v . Anaconda Co. ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 1 5 1 Mont. 7 6 , 438 P.2d

Although t h e S t a t e a r g u e s p e r s u a s i v e l y r e g a r d i n g t h e
l e g i s l a t u r e ' s i n t e n t r e g a r d i n g f i n a l i t y o f s e n t e n c e s , we do

not believe that the "plain meaning" of the statute
demonstrates its inapplicability t o capitally-sentenced
offenders. Though aware of these competing legislative

interests, t h i s C o u r t d o e s n o t h a v e t h e power t o g o beyond

t h e c l e a r and u n e q u i v o c a l p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e l a w .

IV. APPLICABILITY OF RES J U D I C A T A TO PETITION FOR POST-
CONVICTION R E L I E F

Montana l a w is b e r e f t of any d e c i s i o n on w h e t h e r t h e
d o c t r i n e o f r e s j u d i c a t a is a p p l i c a b l e t o a p r a y e r f o r p o s t -
conviction r e l i e f . A s a g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n , we h a v e h e l d :

"The d o c t r i n e o f r e s j u d i c a t a s t a t e s t h a t a
f i n a l judgment on t h e m e r i t s by a c o u r t o f
competent j u r i s d i c t i o n is c o n c l u s i v e a s t o
c a u s e s of a c t i o n o r i s s u e s t h e r e b y l i t i g a t e d ,
a s t o t h e p a r t i e s and t h e i r p r i v i e s , i n a l l
o t h e r a c t i o n s i n t h e same o r a n y o t h e r
j u d i c i a l t r i b u n a l of concurrent jurisdic-
tion." Meagher Co. Water D i s t . v . W a l t e r
( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 9 Mont. 358, 361, 547 P.2d 8 5 0 ,
The d o c t r i n e b a r s r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f a n i s s u e i f f o u r
elements a r e present: " ( 1 ) t h e p a r t i e s or t h e i r p r i v i e s must

b e t h e same; ( 2 ) the subject-matter of t h e a c t i o n must be
t h e same; ( 3 ) t h e i s s u e s m u s t be t h e same, and m u s t r e l a t e

t o t h e same s u b j e c t - m a t t e r ; and ( 4 ) t h e c a p a c i t i e s of the
p e r s o n s m u s t be t h e same i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h e s u b j e c t - m a t t e r

and t o t h e i s s u e b e t w e e n t h e m . " Brannon v . Lewis and C l a r k
C o u n t y ( 1 9 6 3 ) , 1 4 3 Mont. 200, 207-208, 387 P.2d 706, 711.

A s i d e from t h e b a r of res judicata, t h i s Court has

consistently refused t o allow r e l i t i g a t i o n i n a c o l l a t e r a l
proceeding of i s s u e s determined i n a d i r e c t appeal, I n Re
Q u i g g ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 6 8 Mont. 5 1 2 , 544 P.2d 441, and S p u r l o c k v .

C r i s t (1980), Mont. , 614 P.2d 4 9 8 , 501, 37 S t . R e p .
1146, in some cases by reaffirming the prior holdings.

D i g i a l l o n a r d o v. B e t z e r ( 1 9 7 3 ) , 1 6 3 Mont. 1 0 4 , 1 0 5 , 515 P.2d

705. Accord, Orricer v. State (1970), 8 5 S.D. 293, 181
N.W.2d 461.
I n l i g h t of t h e d e a r t h , i f n o t complete absence, of

g u i d i n g Montana c a s e law i n t h i s r e g a r d , a r e v i e w o f t h e l a w
a s i t h a s e v o l v e d and d e v e l o p e d w i t h r e g a r d t the applica-
k. r3&
b i l i t y o f r e s j u d i c a t a t o t h e F e d e r a l Act,-;;I..2-'U.S.C. S2255,

w i l l aid.
H i s t o r i c a l l y the p r i n c i p l e of res judicata was n o t

seen t o apply t o w r i t s of habeas corpus or p e t i t i o n s f o r

relief under S2255. See, Sokol, Federal Habeas Corpus
S21.5; cf ., K e l l e y , F i n a l i t y and H a b e a s C o r p u s , 78 W.Va. Law
Rev. 1 (1975). However, a new r u l e h a s been recognized
r e g u l a t i n g s u c c e s s i v e f e d e r a l m o t i o n s on g r o u n d s p r e v i o u s l y
h e a r d and d e t e r m i n e d . I n Sanders v. United S t a t e s ( 1 9 6 3 ) ,
373 U.S. 1, 83 S . C t . 1 0 6 8 , 1 0 L.Ed.2d 148, t h e Court s t a t e d :

" C o n t r o l l i n g w e i g h t may be g i v e n t o d e n i a l of
a p r i o r a p p l i c a t i o n f o r f e d e r a l habeas corpus
o r 52255 r e l i e f o n l y i f ( 1 ) t h e same g r o u n d
p r e s e n t e d i n t h e s u b s e q u e n t a p p l i c a t i o n was
d e t e r m i n e d a d v e r s e l y t o t h e a p p l i c a n t on t h e
p r i o r a p p l i c a t i o n , ( 2 ) t h e p r i o r determina-
t i o n was on t h e m e r i t s , and ( 3 ) t h e e n d s o f
j u s t i c e would n o t be s e r v e d by r e a c h i n g t h e
m e r i t s of t h e su b s e q u e n t a p p l i c a t i o n . " 373
U.S. a t 1 5 .
Where a t r i a l o r a p p e l l a t e c o u r t h a s d e t e r m i n e d t h e
f e d e r a l p r i s o n e r ' s c l a i m , d i s c r e t i o n may i n a p r o p e r c a s e be

e x e r c i s e d a g a i n s t t h e g r a n t o f a 52255 h e a r i n g . Where t h e

trial or appellate court has considered and decided a

f e d e r a l p r i s o n e r ' s c l a i m , i t may be o p e n t o t h e 52255 c o u r t

t o determine t h a t , on t h e b a s i s o f t h e m o t i o n s , f i l e s and
records, the prisoner is entitled to no relief. See
Thornton v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1 9 6 6 ) , 368 F.2d 822

( d i s s e n t i n g o p i n i o n of W r i g h t , J . ) .
The r e s j u d i c a t a r u l e h a s now come t o a p o i n t i n i t s
e v o l u t i o n where i t c a n be s a i d w i t h c e r t a i n t y t h a t a " g r o u n d

for relief previously considered on a p p e a l from a f e d e r a l
prisoner 's conviction cannot be reconsidered on a motion

attacking sentence under 28 U . S . C . S . 52255." Torcia,

Wharton's Criminal Procedure, S649 a t 401 ( 1 9 7 6 ) and c a s e s

cited therein.
Res j u d i c a t a c a n n o t be a p p l i e d i n s u c h a manner a s t o
deprive Coleman of the right to file a post-conviction

p e t i t i o n and t o u s e p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n p r o c e d u r e . However, res
j u d i c a t a c a n be u s e d t o b a r t h e r e h e a r i n g o f i s s u e s a l r e a d y
l i t i g a t e d under the rule in Sanders. This interpretation
preserves the Montana post-conviction remedy by requiring
judicial i n q u i r y i n t o t h e p r o p r i e t y o f t h e s e n t e n c e and o f

the detention, while preventing abuse of t h e p r o c e d u r e by
relitigation of a claim previously considered and found

insufficient. A s discussed i n S a n d e r s , r e l i t i g a t i o n would
mean a w a s t e o f j u d i c i a l e f f o r t , r i s k i n g a c l u t t e r i n g o f t h e
court's limited resources with collateral attacks already
decided on the merits. As one court put it, "judicial

economy d i c t a t e s r e s t r i c t i v e l i m i t a t i o n s on r e r u n s . " United

S t a t e s e x r e l . Townsend v . Twomey ( 7 t h C i r . 1 9 7 1 ) , 452 F.2d
3 5 0 , 3 5 7 , c e r t . d e n i e d , 409 U.S. 854. Some s t a t e s h a v e g o n e

beyond S a n d e r s and statutorily prohibit more than one
c o l l a t e r a l a t t a c k on a s i n g l e c o n v i c t i o n . See 111.Ann.Stat.
C. 3 8 , 9 122-3 ( 1 9 6 4 ) ; M0.Sup.Ct.R. 2 7 . 2 6 ( d ) ; Wyo.Stat.Ann.

Tit. 7 , S 7-408.3 (1963).
We, therefore, adopt the Sanders criteria as

p r e v i o u s l y quoted i n t h i s opinion. W e a f f i r m t h e holding of

t h e D i s t r i c t Court t h a t the following twenty-seven issues

h a v e b e e n c o n s i d e r e d p r e v i o u s l y and d e c i d e d by t h i s C o u r t

and Coleman h a s a l l e g e d no new f a c t s o r l a w w i t h r e s p e c t t o
t h e s e i s s u e s which r e q u i r e a d d i t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : F, G ,

H , I , J , L , M , N , P , R , S , T , V , W , Y , Z , A A , D D , G G , H H ,

11, J J , K K , L L , MM, NN, and P P .

V. VAGUENESS AS BAR TO EVIDENTIARY H E A R I N G
The l o w e r c o u r t d e n i e d t h i r t e e n of Coleman's c l a i m s

because t h e y were t o o vague to s t a t e new c l a i m s o r were
u n s u p p o r t e d by a u t h o r i t y and w e r e , t h e r e f o r e , b a r r e d b y r e s
judicata. The State argued in the District Court that
" v a g u e new a l l e g a t i o n s " d o n o t p r e s e n t a p r o p e r b a s i s f o r
review. W agree.
e
Vague r e h a s h i n g s o f i s s u e s p r e v i o u s l y a d j u d i c a t e d by

a c o u r t of competent j u r i s d i c t i o n will n o t make u n w o r t h y
claims magically meritorious. Naked a l l e g a t i o n s of injus-

t i c e c a n n o t c o n s t i t u t e new g r o u n d s o r p r o v i d e any b a s i s f o r

relief. Cf. Hooker v. People ( 1 9 7 0 ) , 173 Colo. 226, 477

P.2d 376. Again, we m u s t d e f e r t o t h e d i s c r e t i o n of the

District Court i n determining if the claims made in the

petition are valid or merely previously decided issues in

disguise. Andrews v. Morris (Utah 1 9 8 0 ) , 607 P.2d 816,

cert. denied, 446 U.S. 949, 101 S.Ct. 254, 66 L.Ed.2d 120.

Moreover, t h i s Court w i l l not disturb the post-conviction

court's judgment in this regard absent a clear abuse of

discretion. S e e Redd v. State ( 1 9 6 7 ) , 199 Kan. 431, 429

P.2d 925 (emphasizing great discretion in the post-

conviction court to make initial judgments regarding

v a l i d i t y and s u b s t a n c e o f c l a i m s ) .
W a f f i r m t h e h o l d i n g of t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t t h a t t h e
e

following thirteen issues or claims a r e dismissed as -
res

j u d i c a t a b e c a u s e t h e vague new a l l e g a t i o n s do n o t a f f e c t t h e

v a l i d i t y of t h e p r i o r d e t e r m i n a t i o n of t h i s Court: B, E, K,

Q, U , X, CC, EE, FF, 0 0 , QQ, RR, and X X .

VI. APPLICABILITY OF NEWLY DEVELOPED AUTHORITY

W n e x t c o n s i d e r Coleman's c o n t e n t i o n
e t h a t seven of

h i s c l a i m s were n o t p r o p e r l y d i s m i s s e d on t h e g r o u n d s t h a t

t h e new a u t h o r i t y c i t e d was e i t h e r inapplicable or c l e a r l y

distinguishable, l e a v i n g t h e c l a i m s b a r r e d by r e s j u d i c a t a .

C a s e s h a v e r e c o g n i z e d t h a t a 1t h o u g h p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e s have

been a d d r e s s e d and d e t e r m i n e d a d v e r s e l y t o a p r i s o n e r on a

direct appeal, a post-conviction court may nevertheless

consider such m a t t e r s where there has been a substantial

change i n t h e a p p l i c a b l e law. United S t a t e s v. Sorenson (D.
N.Y. 1 9 7 0 ) , 308 F.Supp. 1 2 6 8 ; Robson v . U n i t e d S t a t e s (1st

Cir. 1975), 526 F . 2 d 1145. As t o t h e s e s e v e n claims, we

n o t e t h a t no e v i d e n t i a r y h e a r i n g i s r e q u i r e d s i n c e t h e s e a r e
questions of law o n l y which a r e i n v o l v e d . A c o u r t may, of
course, conclude that the changes in the law are

inapplicable to petitioner's case. Robinson v. United
States (D. Ky. 1967), 264 F.Supp.146, aff'd, (6th Cir.
1968), 394 F.2d 8 2 3 , c e r t . d e n i e d , 3 9 3 U.S. 1057, 89 S.Ct.
698, 2 1 L.Ed.2d 698, reh. denied, 393 U.S. 1124, 89 S . C t .
9 9 7 , 22 L.Ed.2d 133.

W e h a v e r e v i e w e d C o l e m a n ' s s e v e n c l a i m s and f i n d t h a t

the cases cited by Coleman are distinguishable. We
therefore affirm the District Court's holding that the
f o l l o w i n g s e v e n c l a i m s a r e b a r r e d b y r e s j u d i c a t a a s t h e new
a u t h o r i t y c i t e d is i n a p p l i c a b l e o r c l e a r l y d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e :
A, C, D , 0 , BB, TT, a n d W.

VII. DISMISSAL ON GROUNDS OF WAIVER AND LACK OF MERIT
The D i s t r i c t C o u r t h e l d t h a t f i v e o f C o l e m a n ' s claims

w e r e d i s m i s s e d b e c a u s e h e f a i l e d t o r a i s e them on h i s d i r e c t

appeal. The District Court further found that the five
claims were without merit. Because the post-conviction
procedure is a new civil remedy, the failure t o present

claims in earlier proceedings would not bar them from
p r e s e n t a t i o n a t t h i s time. However, w e have reviewed t h e
c l a i m s and f i n d t h e same t o b e u n m e r i t o r i o u s . I t was not
e r r o r f o r t h e c o u r t t o d e n y them s u m m a r i l y . Sanders, supra;
Widermyre v . State ( A l a s k a 1 9 6 9 ) , 452 P . 2 d 885; S t a t e v.
Richmond ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 114 A r i z . 1 8 6 , 560 P.2d 4 1 , c e r t . d e n i e d ,
433 U.S. 915, 97 S . C t . 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1101; People v.
Trujillo ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 190 C o l o . 497, 549 P.2d 1 3 1 2 ; Andrews v .
Morris, supra.

W a f f i r m t h e d i s m i s s a l by t h e D i s t r i c t C o u r t o f t h e
e
f o l l o w i n g c l a i m s on t h e b a s i s t h a t t h e y a r e w i t h o u t m e r i t :

SS, U U , WW, Y Y , and Z Z .
Two hearings were held, with petitioner an6 his
attorney present, on t h e f o l l o w i n g d a t e s , J u n e 1 4 , 1978 and

J u l y 1 6 and 1 9 , 1 9 7 8 . A t t h e J u n e 14 h e a r i n g , counsel for
petitioner noted t o t h e c o u r t t h a t i n view of the fact a

p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t had b e e n p r e p a r e d , h e was n o t p r e s e n t i n g
an a d d i t i o n a l r e p o r t . The p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t c o n t a i n e d t h e
i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t p e t i t i o n e r had n e v e r b e e n c o n v i c t e d o f a n y
prior felony prior to the present charge. Counsel for
p e t i t i o n e r noted:

"May t h e r e c o r d show t h a t on b e h a l f o f t h e
d e f e n d a n t , we a r e n o t g o i n g t o c a l l t h i s
g e n t l e m a n [ p r o b a t i o n o f f i c e r Thomas L o f l a n d ]
t o t h e stand a t t h i s time f o r examination.
T h a t d o e s n o t mean we a g r e e w i t h t h e r e p o r t ,
s i m p l y t h a t we a r e n o t g o i n g t o c a l l him a s a
witness.

"THE COURT: Very w e l l . Now t h e announcement
t h a t t h e defense does n o t intend t o produce
any ... c a l l any w i t n e s s e s t o e s t a b l i s h any
mitigating circumstances, the Court has
b e f o r e it a l l m a t t e r s d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of
t h e t r i a l , heard t h e testimony r e l a t i n g t o
t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and a l s o some
mitigating circumstances . . ."
Thereafter, t h e c o u r t requested each s i d e t o submit
proposed f i n d i n g s of fact, conclusions of law and b r i e f s .

Both the petitioner and t h e S t a t e having submitted their
b r i e f s and f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s , t h e c o u r t h e l d a s e c o n d
h e a r i n g on J u l y 1 0 , 1 9 7 8 .
At t h e beginning of the July 10 h e a r i n g , the t r i a l
judge submitted t o p e t i t i o n e r ' s c o u n s e l and S t a t e c o u n s e l

his findings and conclusions and thereafter counsel for
petitioner read into the record a prepared statement in

mitigation. With t h i s r e c o r d b e f o r e u s , w e c a n n o t f a u l t t h e
t r i a l c o u r t i n t h e s e n t e n c i n g of p e t i t i o n e r . Petitioner, a t
the f i r s t hearing, did not t e s t i f y in mitigation, declined
t o examine t h e o f f i c e r who p r e p a r e d t h e p r e s e n t e n c e r e p o r t ,
and was g i v e n a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o s u b m i t b o t h f u r t h e r b r i e f s

on t h e s e n t e n c i n g and h i s p r o p o s e d f i n d i n g s and c o n c l u s i o n s .
To now allege that he was denied due process and an
o p p o r t u n i t y t o p r e s e n t h i s a r g u m e n t is w i t h o u t m e r i t .

H e r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t was f a c e d w i t h some f o r t y - n i n e

separate claims for relief. While Carter v. Illinois
( 1 9 4 6 ) , 329 U.S. 1 7 3 , 67 S . C t . 2 1 6 , 9 1 L.Ed. 172, holds t h a t

s t a t e s are free t o devise their own s y s t e m s o f review of
c r i m i n a l c a s e s , t h e s y s t e m , a s i l l u s t r a t e d i n t h i s c a s e , now
a l l o w s p e t i t i o n e r two a p p e a l s , a r e s u l t n o t c o n t e m p l a t e d by
the legislature. The J u l y 1 0 h e a r i n g indicates that the

t r i a l judge, i n pronouncing s e n t e n c e , s t a t e d :
" I n pronouncing s e n t e n c e I do want t h e
p a r t i e s t o know t h a t t h i s i s e x t r e m e l y
a g o n i z i n g f o r t h e c o u r t t o make. I have n o t
looked a t t h e p o i n t s t h a t have been r a i s e d
l i g h t l y , b u t many o f t h e a r g u m e n t s r a i s e d by
t h e d e f e n s e , of c o u r s e have been c o n s i d e r e d
h e r e t o f o r e , and t h e j u r y h a s f o u n d f r o m t h e
f a c t u a l s t a n d p o i n t t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t was
g u i l t y , beyond a r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t , and I do
not disagree with t h a t conclusion of t h e
jury. One m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e i s t h a t
t h e defendant has n o t p r i o r t o t h i s t i m e been
c o n v i c t e d o f any f e l o n y , b u t i n v i e w o f t h e
e n o r m i t y o f t h e c r i m e c o m m i t t e d , and t h e
c o u r t ' s f e e l i n g t h a t t h i s one c i r c u m s t a n c e
d o e s n o t overcome t h e a g g r a v a t e d circum-
s t a n c e s , I h a v e made t o t h e e f f e c t , w r i t t e n
f i n d i n g s a s r e q u i r e d by l a w . Also I have
made c o n c l u s i o n s and judgment which h a v e been
f u r n i s h e d t o t h e d e f e n d a n t and t h e s t a t e a t
t h i s t i m e , and I w i l l o n l y a t t h i s t i m e r e a d
t h e c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s and j u d g m e n t . "

The s e n t e n c e and judgment a r e a f f i r m e d . The D i s t r i c t
C o u r t is d i r e c t e d t o s c h e d u l e a new d a t e f o r e x e c u t i o n .

W concur:
e

8L-Ld. q - i f i Q - 7 ~
Chief J u s t i c e

/
Justices

ono or able"^. ~4 L
D i s t r i c t Judge, s
p l a c e o f Mr. ~ u s t i c kJ o h n C.
Sheehy
Mr. J u s t i c e Frank B . Morrison, J r . , d i s s e n t i n g :

I respectfully dissent.

The f i r s t problem w i t h t h i s c a s e i s t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s

c o n v i c t i o n was based upon accomplice t e s t i m o n y which was n o t

s u f f i c i e n t l y c o r r o b o r a t e d by i n d e p e n d e n t e v i d e n c e . The

t r i a l c o u r t s h o u l d have d i r e c t e d a v e r d i c t i n d e f e n d a n t ' s

b e h a l f a t t h e t i m e of t r i a l . I w i l l q u o t e e x t e n s i v e l y from

t h e t r a n s c r i p t t o show t h a t t h e s t a t e ' s c a s e f a i l e d .

The second p a r t of t h e d i s s e n t w i l l d e a l w i t h i m p o s i t i o n

of t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y . That discussion concerns aggravating

c i r c u m s t a n c e s v e r s u s m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s and t h e c o n d i t i o n s

under which t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y may be imposed.

The d e f e n d a n t , Dewey Eugene Coleman, and R o b e r t Nank

met a t t h e V e t e r a n ' s H o s p i t a l i n S h e r i d a n , Wyoming. Coleman

was b e i n g t r e a t e d f o r d e p r e s s i o n . Nank had a h i s t o r y of

mental i l l n e s s .

Coleman and Nank were d i s c h a r g e d from t h e V e t e r a n ' s

H o s p i t a l and came t o Montana on Nank's m o t o r c y c l e . They

" r a n o u t of g a s " between Roundup, Montana and F o r s y t h ,

Montana, d u r i n g t h e e v e n i n g h o u r s of J u l y 4 , 1974. Coleman

t e s t i f i e d t h a t they unsuccessfully t r i e d t o hitchhike t o the

n e a r e s t town f o r t h e p u r p o s e of s e c u r i n g some g a s o l i n e . It

began t o g e t d a r k and Coleman s t a t e d t h a t , s i n c e Coleman was

b l a c k , he was i m p a i r i n g t h e i r a b i l i t y t o o b t a i n a r i d e and

Nank d i r e c t e d him t o h i d e h i m s e l f . Thereafter, according t o

Coleman, Nank was a b l e t o s t o p a v e h i c l e and o b t a i n a r i d e .

Coleman t e s t i f i e d t h a t Nank l e f t w i t h t h e d r i v e r and headed

i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of F o r s y t h . Coleman s a i d t h a t Nank r e t u r n e d

d r i v i n g t h e c a r sometime l a t e r and t h a t he was w e t and

emotionally upset. Nank i n s t r u c t e d Coleman t o remove t h e i r

t h i n g s from t h e m o t o r c y c l e and come w i t h him. Coleman
obeyed. They d r o v e , what was l a t e r d e t e r m i n e d t o be t h e

H a r s t a d v e h i c l e , p a s t F o r s y t h i n t h e d i r e c t i o n o f Rosebud.

Nank s t o p p e d between F o r s y t h and Rosebud and p i c k e d up

something which a p p e a r e d t o be a b l a n k e t . He a l s o s t o p p e d

a t a b a r i n Rosebud and o b t a i n e d two Cokes. He a d v i s e d

Coleman t h a t he had k i l l e d a woman. Nank headed back toward

F o r s y t h and t h e H a r s t a d v e h i c l e " r a n o u t of g a s " . According

t o Coleman, Nank went i n t o a f i e l d and h i d something.

Coleman was d i r e c t e d t o c a r r y a woman's p u r s e , which he d i d .

Coleman looked i n t h e p u r s e , found no money and, p u r s u a n t t o

Nank's d i r e c t i o n s , threw t h e p u r s e i n t o a c u l v e r t . The two

t h e n walked t o F o r s y t h , a r r i v i n g t h e r e i n t h e e a r l y morning

hours. Nank o b t a i n e d g a s o l i n e i n a can and h i t c h h i k e d back

t o t h e m o t o r c y c l e . Nank r e t u r n e d f o r Coleman and t h e y l e f t .

Coleman s t a t e d t h a t t h e y e v e n t u a l l y went t o B o i s e , I d a h o ,

where t h e y r e n t e d a n a p a r t m e n t and l i v e d u n t i l t h e t i m e of

their arrest. Coleman s t a t e d t h a t he d i d n o t r e p o r t Nank t o

t h e a u t h o r i t i e s b e c a u s e h e was a f r a i d of Nank and b e c a u s e he

was a f r a i d of b e i n g i m p l i c a t e d .

Nank's t e s t i m o n y d e p a r t s from Coleman's a t t h e p o i n t

t h a t t h e v i c t i m , Peggy H a r s t a d , s t o p p e d t o g i v e Nank a r i d e .

I n c o n t r a s t t o Coleman's t e s t i m o n y t h a t Nank l e f t a l o n e w i t h

t h e young woman, Nank t e s t i f i e d t h a t Coleman went w i t h him.'

He t e s t i f i e d t h a t Coleman was s e a t e d i n t h e r i g h t f r o n t s e a t

and h e , Nank, was i n t h e middle n e x t t o t h e d r i v e r . Nank

s t a t e d t h a t a s t h e y proceeded toward F o r s y t h he asked Peggy

H a r s t a d t o s t o p t h e v e h i c l e s o t h a t he c o u l d u r i n a t e . He
s t a t e d t h a t he and Coleman g o t o u t of t h e v e h i c l e and u r i n a t e d

b e s i d e i t . They t h e n r e t u r n e d t o t h e v e h i c l e and headed

towards F o r s y t h . A s t h e y approached F o r s y t h , Nank t e s t i f i e d

t h a t he t u r n e d t h e i g n i t i o n key o f f and maneuvered t h e

v e h i c l e t o t h e s i d e of t h e r o a d . Nank t i e d Peggy ~ a r s t a d ' s
hands t o g e t h e r w i t h a y e l l o w nylon r o p e . He removed h e r

c l o t h i n g e x c e p t f o r h e r b l o u s e . He a t t e m p t e d t o have s e x u a l

i n t e r c o u r s e with her b u t could n o t maintain an e r e c t i o n . He

t e s t i f i e d t h a t Coleman t h e n " g o t i n t h e b a c k s e a t " w i t h Peggy

H a r s t a d and had s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h h e r w h i l e Nank, now

s t a n d i n g on t h e o u t s i d e o f t h e c a r , h e l d o n t o h e r f o o t .

Nank t e s t i f i e d t h a t he t h e r e a f t e r d r e s s e d t h e v i c t i m

and t h e y d r o v e around d e c i d i n g what t o do. E v e n t u a l l y Nank

s t a t e d t h a t Coleman d e c i d e d t o k i l l Peggy H a r s t a d . Nank

t h e n claimed t h a t he threw t h e v i c t i m o v e r h i s s h o u l d e r ,

w i t h h e r hands s t i l l t i e d , and headed down toward t h e Yellowstone

River. He s t a t e d t h a t Dewey Coleman h i t h e r on t o p of t h e

head c o n t i n u o u s l y w i t h a m o t o r c y c l e h e l m e t and t h a t t h e n

Coleman a t t e m p t e d t o s t r a n g l e h e r w i t h t h e y e l l o w nylon

rope. H e s t a t e d t h a t when t h i s d i d n o t k i l l t h e v i c t i m t h a t

h e , Nank, h e l d h e r head under w a t e r i n t h e Yellowstone R i v e r

u n t i l s h e drowned.

Nank a l s o r e l a t e d how h e and Coleman went t o B o i s e ,

I d a h o , o b t a i n e d a n a p a r t m e n t and c o n t i n u e d t o l i v e u n t i l t h e

t i m e of t h e a r r e s t . Following t h e i r a r r e s t , Nank and t h e

d e f e n d a n t were i n t e r r o g a t e d by law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c i a l s i n

B o i s e , Idaho. Coleman m a i n t a i n e d h i s i n n o c e n c e , b u t Nank

c o n f e s s e d and a g r e e d t o t e s t i f y a g a i n s t Coleman.

The t e s t i m o n y of a n accomplice i s viewed w i t h s u s p i c i o n

b e c a u s e t h e r e i s a s t r o n g motive f o r l y i n g . In t h i s case a

number of law e n f o r c e m e n t t e c h n i q u e s were used t o o b t a i n a

c o n f e s s i o n from Nank. A p o l i c e o f f i c e r admitted t e l l i n g

Nank, though i t was n o t t r u e , t h a t he had w i t n e s s e d a hanging

and t h a t i t was gruesome. He f u r t h e r t o l d Nank, though i t
was n o t t r u e , t h a t Coleman had c o n f e s s e d and blamed ~ a n k o r
f

t h e murder. Nank t h e r e a f t e r e x h i b i t e d a w i l l i n g n e s s t o

c o n f e s s , b u t would o n l y do s o w i t h some a s s u r a n c e t h a t he
would n o t hang. He was a s s u r e d by law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c i a l s

t h a t t h e y would make e v e r y e f f o r t t o s e e t h a t he would n o t

hang and Nank t h e r e a f t e r gave a c o n f e s s i o n i m p l i c a t i n g

Coleman.

Nank was c h a r g e d w i t h d e l i b e r a t e homicide, s e x u a l

i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h o u t c o n s e n t , and a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g .

Only t h e l a t t e r o f f e n s e c a r r i e d t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y . Nank was

p e r m i t t e d t o p l e a d g u i l t y and r e c e i v e n o n c a p i t a l s e n t e n c e s

f o r d e l i b e r a t e homicide and r a p e . The a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g

c h a r g e , which c a r r i e d t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y , was h e l d i n abeyance

u n t i l Nank t e s t i f i e d a g a i n s t Coleman a t t h e t r i a l . After

Coleman's t r i a l t h e a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g c h a r g e a g a i n s t

Nank was d i s m i s s e d .

I t i s o b v i o u s why a n a c c o m p l i c e ' s t e s t i m o n y must be

viewed w i t h d i s t r u s t . Before a c r i m i n a l charge a g a i n s t a

d e f e n d a n t c a n s u r v i v e a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t and be s u b m i t t e d t o

a jury, t h e r e must be i n d e p e n d e n t c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e

i m p l i c a t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t i n t h e crime. That corroborating

e v i d e n c e "must r a i s e more t h a n a s u s p i c i o n of t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s

involvement i n , o r o p p o r t u n i t y t o commit, t h e c r i m e c h a r g e d . "

S t a t e v. Warren ( 1 9 8 1 ) , -Mont. -, 628 P.2d 292, 295, 38

St.Rep. 773, 776 ( q u o t i n g from S t a t e v. Kemp ( 1 9 7 9 ) , -Mont. -I

The f o l l o w i n g e x c e r p t i s t a k e n from t h e f i r s t Coleman

c a s e , S t a t e v. Coleman (Decided A p r i l 26, 1 9 7 8 ) , 177 Mont.

" I n S t a t e v. Keckonen, ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 107 Mont. 2 5 3 , 84
P.2d 341, we h e l d t h a t w h e r e t h e a l l e g e d c o r r o b o r a -
t i v e evidence i s e q u a l l y consonant w i t h a reasonable
e x p l a n a t i o n p o i n t i n g toward i n n o c e n t c o n d u c t on .the p a r t
of t h e d e f e n d a n t , t h e n such e v i d e n c e d o e s n o t t e n d
t o c o n n e c t him w i t h t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e
and i s i n t h e r e a l m of s p e c u l a t i o n , n o t c o r r o b o r a -
tion. Where t h e c l a i m e d c o r r o b o r a t i o n shows no more
t h a n an o p p o r t u n i t y t o commit a c r i m e and s i m p l y
proves suspicion, i t i s n o t s u f f i c i e n t corrobora-
t i o n t o j u s t i f y a c o n v i c t i o n upon t h e t e s t i m o n y of
a n accomplice. S t a t e v . J o n e s ( 1 9 3 3 ) , 9 5 Mont. 317,
26 P.2d 341."

I n a p p l y i n g t h e r u l e , t h e Supreme C o u r t h e l d , i n t h e

Coleman o p i n i o n c i t e d above, t h a t t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t

c o r r o b o r a t i o n of Nank' s t e s t i m o n y t o s u s t a i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s

conviction. The c o u r t found t h e c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e t o

be: A c r a c k i n d e f e n d a n t ' s m o t o r c y c l e h e l m e t ; a h a i r of

Peggy H a r s t a d found on t h e r o p e b e l o n g i n g t o t h e two men;

t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s on Peggy H a r s t a d ' s c a r and i n h e r p u r s e ;

Negroid p u b i c h a i r s s i m i l a r t o d e f e n d a n t ' s and Negroid head

h a i r found i n t h e v i c t i m ' s v e h i c l e ; t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t t h e

d e f e n d a n t and Nank were s e e n t o g e t h e r on t h e same r o a d a t

a p p r o x i m a t e l y t h e same t i m e t h a t Peggy H a r s t a d d i s a p p e a r e d .

The C o u r t h e l d t h a t t h i s e v i d e n c e s u f f i c i e n t l y c o n n e c t e d t h e

d e f e n d a n t t o t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e s c h a r g e d t o a l l o w

t h e conviction t o stand.

The e v i d e n c e t h a t d e f e n d a n t was on t h e r o a d w i t h Nank

i n t h e v i c i n i t y where Peggy H a r s t a d d i s a p p e a r e d d o e s n o t

c o r r o b o r a t e t h e t e s t i m o n y of Nank anymore t h a n i t c o r r o b o r a t e s

t h e t e s t i m o n y of Coleman. Coleman t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was

w i t h Nank on t h e e v e n i n g i n q u e s t i o n . The same i s t r u e of

Coleman's f i n g e r p r i n t s i n t h e p u r s e and i n t h e v e h i c l e .

Coleman t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was i n t h e H a r s t a d v e h i c l e a f t e r

Nank r e t u r n e d w i t h t h e v e h i c l e . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t Nank t o l d

him t o d i s p o s e o f t h e p u r s e . H e t e s t i f i e d t h a t he f i r s t

went t h r o u g h t h e p u r s e and examined i t s c o n t e n t s . The

e x i s t e n c e of Coleman's f i n g e r p r i n t s on t h e p u r s e ' s c o n t e n t s

and i n t h e v e h i c l e c o r r o b o r a t e t h e t e s t i m o n y of t h e d e f e n d a n t

a s w e l l a s t h e t e s t i m o n y of Nank. Therefore, t h i s evidence

i s " e q u a l l y consonant with t h e reasonable explanation p o i n t i n g

toward i n n o c e n t c o n d u c t on t h e p a r t of t h e d e f e n d a n t " a s i t

i s p o i n t i n g toward g u i l t , and t h e r e f o r e , d o e s n o t q u a l i f y
a s corroborating evidence.

I f t h e r e i s any c o r r o b o r a t i n g e v i d e n c e s u f f i c i e n t t o

t a k e t h i s c a s e t o t h e j u r y i t must be found i n t h e c r a c k e d

m o t o r c y c l e helmet o r i n r e l i a b l e t e s t i m o n y t h a t Coleman's

p u b i c h a i r s were found i n t h e v i c t i m ' s v e h i c l e . A careful

r e a d i n g of t h e t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t shows t h a t s u f f i c i e n t c o r r o -

boration did not exist.

There w a s a c r a c k i n Dewey Coleman's s i l v e r c o l o r e d

m o t o r c y c l e helmet. The p r o s e c u t i o n contended t h a t t h i s

c o r r o b o r a t e d Nank' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t Coleman r e p e a t e d l y s t r u c k

Peggy H a r s t a d on t o p of t h e head w i t h h i s m o t o r c y c l e helmet.

There was no f o u n d a t i o n t o show t h a t such a s t r i k i n g c o u l d

o r would c r a c k a m o t o r c y c l e helmet. There was no t e s t i m o n y

t o show t h a t t h e helmet c o u l d be c r a c k e d i n such a f a s h i o n

w i t h o u t c r a c k i n g t h e s k u l l of t h e v i c t i m . T h i s v i c t i m had

no s k u l l f r a c t u r e a t a u t o p s y .

I f t h e c r a c k i n t h e helmet had any c o r r o b o r a t i v e s i g n i -

f i c a n c e , i t was d e s t r o y e d by t h e p a t h o l o g i s t ' s t e s t i m o n y .

Dr. John P f a f f , board c e r t i f i e d f o r e n s i c p a t h o l o g i s t , was

c a l l e d t o t e s t i f y by t h e S t a t e t o p r o v e t h a t t h e decomposed

remains which he examined a t a u t o p s y were t h o s e of Peggy

Harstad. H e did so. He was t h e n q u e s t i o n e d a b o u t h i s

f i n d i n g s i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e t i s s u e which covered t h e

skull. He t e s t i f i e d t h a t i f trauma o c c u r r e d t o t h e t o p of

t h e head, he would e x p e c t t o s e e b l e e d i n g i n t o t h e t i s s u e ,

b u t t h a t he saw none. The f o l l o w i n g e x c e r p t s a r e t a k e n from

his t e s t i m o n y :

". . . I c o u l d f i n d no e v i d e n c e of bony f r a c t u r e
i n any of t h e s k e l e t a l remains t h a t I examined.
I n t h e s k u l l t h e r e was no b r a i n t i s s u e remaining.
The f i b r u s l i n i n g membrane which c o v e r s t h e b r a i n
and s e p a r a t e from t h e s k u l l bones was s t i l l i n -
tact. T h i s i s s i g n i f i c a n t b e c a u s e i n c a s e s of
s k u l l f r a c t u r e o r serious i n j u r y t o the s k u l l , it
may become d e t a c h e d and c o n t a i n b l e e d i n g o r blood
extravasation. Such was n o t o b s e r v e d i n t h i s c a s e .
" Q u e s t i o n : And w i t h i n t h a t s c a l p t i s s u e , d i d you
f i n d any e v i d e n c e o f a n i n c i s e d wound, a l a c e r a -
t i o n o r a hemorrhage?

"Answer: I d i d n o t .

" Q u e s t i o n : Did you examine t h a t d u r a l l i n i n g t o
d e t e r m i n e and a s c e r t a i n w h e t h e r t h e r e was any wound,
l a c e r a t i o n o r hemorrhage?

"Answer: I d i d .

" Q u e s t i o n : And what d i d you f i n d ?

"Answer: I found none.

" Q u e s t i o n : D o c t o r , w i t h r e s p e c t t o a s u b d u r a l hema-
toma, i s i t y o u r t e s t i m o n y t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e t o
have a s u b d u r a l hematoma w i t h o u t i n j u r y t o t h e s c a l p ,
w i t h o u t i n j u r y o r f r a c t u r i n g o f t h e s k u l l and w i t h o u t
i n j u r y o r hemorrhage t o t h e s u b d u r a l l i n i n g , i s t h a t
possible?

"Answer: I t ' s p o s s i b l e , b u t t h e r e i s u s u a l l y i n j u r y
t o the scalp. T h e r e may b e no i n j u r y t o t h e bone,
b u t i f t h e r e i s a blow s t r u c k t o t h e s c a l p t h e r e i s
u s u a l l y evidence of t h a t i f t h e p a t i e n t i s l i v i n g .
(Emphasis added. )

" Q u e s t i o n : A l l r i g h t . Now i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e
d i d you f i n d a n y e v i d e n c e t o s u b s t a n t i a t e i n j u r y t o
t h e head o r t o t h e f a c e ?

"Answer: I n t h e t i s s u e I examined, I found none.

" Q u e s t i o n : W e l l , w h a t e v e r you d i d i n t h a t a u t o p s y
e x a m i n a t i o n , w h a t e v e r was a v a i l a b l e t o you, w h a t e v e r
p r o c e d u r e t h a t you u s e d , w h a t e v e r s c i e n t i f i c method
t h a t you employed, d i d you f i n d a n y i n j u r y t o t h e
head o r t o t h e f a c e ?

"Answer: I d i d n o t . " ( T r i a l T r a n s c r i p t Vol. 111,
pp. 572, 603, 605, 633.)

The o n l y r e m a i n i n g e v i d e n c e c l a i m e d f o r c o r r o b o r a t i o n

i s t h a t p u b i c h a i r s s i m i l a r t o Dewey Coleman's w e r e found i n

t h e Harstad vehicle.

The r e c o r d r e v e a l s t h a t h a i r s a m p l e s w e r e t a k e n from

t h e d e f e n d a n t and s u b j e c t e d t o m i c r o s c o p i c e x a m i n a t i o n .

Both head h a i r and p u b i c h a i r b e l o n g i n g t o d e f e n d a n t w e r e

a v a i l a b l e f o r t h a t examination. The v i c t i m ' s c a r was vacuumed
and numerous h a i r samples o b t a i n e d from t h a t vacuuming.

These samples were a l s o s c r u t i n i z e d m i c r o s c o p i c a l l y and

compared t o t h e h a i r samples of d e f e n d a n t .

I t s h o u l d be remembered t h a t d e f e n d a n t t e s t i f i e d he was

i n t h e v i c t i m ' s v e h i c l e a f t e r Nank r e t u r n e d d r i v i n g t h e

v e h i c l e . T h e r e f o r e , t h e e x i s t e n c e of d e f e n d a n t ' s h a i r i n t h e

c a r c o r r o b o r a t e s d e f e n d a n t a s w e l l a s Nank and d o e s n o t

provide independent corroborating evidence s u f f i c i e n t t o

s u s t a i n a c o n v i c t i o n . However, t h e S t a t e p l a c e s g r e a t r e l i a n c e

upon t h e f a c t t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s p u b i c h a i r was a l l e g e d l y

found i n t h e v i c t i m ' s v e h i c l e . The r e c o r d does n o t s u p p o r t

the State ' s position.

I n an e f f o r t t o c o r r o b o r a t e t h e S t a t e ' s c a s e , t h e

prosecution c a l l e d an e x p e r t witness t o prove t h a t t h e h a i r

found i n t h e v i c t i m ' s v e h i c l e w a s c o n n e c t e d t o t h e d e f e n d a n t .

B e f o r e q u o t i n g e x c e r p t s from t h e e x p e r t ' s t e s t i m o n y , i t i s

i m p o r t a n t t o t a k e c o g n i z a n c e of t h e e v i d e n t i a r y r u l e h e r e

applicable. The o f f e r e d t e s t i m o n y must be based upon a

" r e a s o n a b l e d e g r e e of s c i e n t i f i c p r o b a b i l i t y " and i s i n a d -

m i s s i b l e i f t h e t e s t i m o n y i s based upon a mere " p o s s i b i l i t y " .

Moen v. Decker Coal Co. (1980), -Mont. -, 6 0 4 P.2d 765,

36 St.Rep. 2 2 2 0 ; Azure v . C i t y o f B i l l i n g s ( 1 9 7 9 ) , -Mont. - I

596 P.2d 460, 36 St.Rep. 968; F a r r i s v . C l a r k ( 1 9 7 1 ) , 158

Mont. 3 3 , 487 P.2d 1307; S t o r d a h l v . Rush Implement Company

( 1 9 6 6 ) , 148 Mont. 1 3 , 417 P . 2d 95.

The f o l l o w i n g e x c e r p t s a r e t a k e n from t h e S t a t e ' s

expert witness:

" Q u e s t i o n : Did you make a comparison of t h e Q-2
h a i r t h a t you have mentioned a s having come from
t h e a u t o m o b i l e , and t h e K - 2 a s you have mentioned
a s coming from t h e head of Dewey Coleman?

"Answer: Y e s , I did.

" Q u e s t i o n : And what w e r e your f i n d i n g s ?
"Answer: I found t h a t t h e r e were some s i m i l a r i t i e s
between t h e s e h a i r s , b u t a l s o t h e r e were some d i f -
f e r e n c e s between t h e s e h a i r s .

" Q u e s t i o n : A s a r e s u l t of t h a t , what was your f i n a l
conclusion?

"Answer: I r e a c h e d no c o n c l u s i o n a s t o whether o r
n o t t h e s e h a i r s c o u l d have come from t h e same s o u r c e .

"Question: . . . Did you compare t h e p u b i c h a i r s ,
t h e known p u b i c h a i r s from Dewey Coleman w i t h t h e
Q-29 h a i r s t h a t were removed from t h e d e b r i s from
Peggy H a r s t a d ' s v e h i c l e ?

"Answer: Y e s , I did.

" Q u e s t i o n : And what w e r e your f i n d i n g s ?

"Answer: I found t h a t t h e - - t h e two b l a c k Negroid
p u b i c h a i r s i n t h e vacuumings from t h e v e h i c l e ,
which m i c r o s c o p i c a l l y match t h e h a i r s which w e r e
s u b m i t t e d t o m e a s b e i n g from t h e p u b i c a r e a of
M r . Coleman.

" Q u e s t i o n : W i l l you e x p l a i n t h a t f u r t h e r p l e a s e ?

"Answer: W e l l , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e h a i r s w e r e micro-
s c o p i c a l l y a l i k e allowed m e t o conclude t h a t they
c o u l d -----same s o u r c e . The two p u b i c
have come from t h e
- - t h e two b l a c k Negroid p u b i c h a i r s from t h e va-
c u u m i n g ~o f t h e v i c t i m ' s v e h i c l e c o u l d --
have come
from t h e p u b i c - -of M r . Coleman.
-- area -

" Q u e s t i o n : You d o n ' t s a y i t d o e s come from t h e same
s o u r c e , --- p o s s i b l e -a t i t c o u l d have
you s a y i t ' s th -
--- s o u r c e , r i g h t ?
come from t h a t

"Answer: T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . " ( T r i a l T r a n s c r i p t Vol.
V I I I , pp.
1802, 1805, 1806, 1905, 1906.) (Emphasis
added. )

Under w e l l e s t a b l i s h e d law i n Montana, t h i s t e s t i m o n y

was t o o s p e c u l a t i v e t o be r e c e i v e d i n e v i d e n c e , and once

r e c e i v e d , c o u l d n o t be r e l i e d upon a s s u f f i c i e n t l y c o r r o b o r -

a t i v e t o sustain a conviction.

T h i s C o u r t ' s d e c i s i o n i n S t a t e v . Coleman, s u p r a ,

wherein t h e C o u r t i d e n t i f i e d t h e c o r r o b o r a t i v e e v i d e n c e ,

a l s o r e l i e d upon t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e v i c t i m ' s h a i r was found

embedded i n t h e y e l l o w nylon r o p e . Though t h e e x i s t e n c e of

s u c h h a i r would o n l y c o r r o b o r a t e t h a t t h e r o p e was used i n

k i l l i n g t h e v i c t i m , and would n o t c o r r o b o r a t e Nank's t e s t i m o n y
t h a t Coleman was p r e s e n t , t h e e v i d e n c e i t s e l f was i n s u f f i c i e n t .

The same e x p e r t w i t n e s s s o u g h t t o r e l a t e h a i r found on t h e

r o p e w i t h t h e h a i r of t h e v i c t i m . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e r e

was brown Caucasian h a i r embedded i n t h e f r a y e d e n d s of t h e

rope. He a g a i n t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e h a i r found i n t h e r o p e

c o u l d --
have been t h e h a i r of Peggy H a r s t a d .
- Under t h e r u l e

above e n u n c i a t e d such t e s t i m o n y c o u l d n o t be r e l i e d upon f o r

corroboration. Additionally, t h i s expert witness t e s t i f i e d

t h a t he c o u l d n o t d e t e r m i n e t h e s e x of t h e p e r s o n from whom

t h e h a i r came. Nank a l s o had brown C a u c a s i a n h a i r .

Interestingly, t h i s same h a i r e x p e r t , t e s t i f i e d t h a t he

had examined h a i r t a k e n from t h e b l a n k e t l a t e r d e t e r m i n e d t o

be a b l a n k e t which Peggy H a r s t a d had i n h e r c a r when s h e

l e f t home. Brown C a u c a s i a n h a i r was found on t h e b l a n k e t .

Nank had t e s t i f i e d t h a t he and Coleman were on t h e b l a n k e t

smoking c i g a r e t t e s a f t e r t h e y had k i l l e d Peggy H a r s t a d .

Coleman t e s t i f i e d t h a t he knew n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e b l a n k e t and

had had no p h y s i c a l c o n t a c t w i t h i t . The e x a m i n a t i o n r e v e a l e d

no Negroid h a i r upon t h e b l a n k e t .

There simply was no c o r r o b o r a t i o n s u f f i c i e n t t o l e n d

c r e d e n c e t o t h e t e s t i m o n y of Nank. The t r i a l c o u r t r e a l i z e d

this. A t t h e time t h e prosecution r e s t e d , and t h e d e f e n s e

moved f o r a d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t , t h e t r i a l c o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t

t h e r e w a s no c o r r o b o r a t i o n b u t s t a t e d he would a l l o w t h e

Supreme C o u r t t o r u l e on t h e q u e s t i o n .

A f t e r t h e d e f e n s e made a motion f o r d i r e c t e d v e r d i c t

because t h e r e w a s n o t s u f f i c i e n t corroboration f o r an accomplice's

t e s t i m o n y , t h e p r o s e c u t i o n r e s i s t e d and t h e f o l l o w i n g d i s c u s -

s i o n was had:

"THE COURT: Well, I t r e a t t h i s a s a r e a l s e r i o u s
motion.

"MR. OVERFELT: I n what r e g a r d ?
"THE COURT: Well, I am n o t going t o g r a n t t h e
motion, b u t I s a y i t h a s some m e r i t .

"MR. OVERFELT: I f r a n k l y d o n ' t t h i n k i t h a s any.
W c o u l d have g o t t e n t o t h e J u r y on c i r c u m s t a n t i a l
e
e v i d e n c e a l o n e , Your Honor, and I ' m c o n f i d e n t of
that.

"THE COURT: Well, a l l you have shown i s t h e oppor-
t u n i t y f o r t h i s b l a c k boy t o do i t . You have shown
p l e n t y of o p p o r t u n i t y . " ( T r i a l T r a n s c r i p t Vol.
I X , pp. 2106-2107.)

A s previously noted, c o r r o b o r a t i v e t e s t i m o n y showing

o n l y o p p o r t u n i t y i s i n s u f f i c i e n t t o a l l o w t h e c a s e t o go t o

t h e jury. Though t h e t r i a l c o u r t found, a s I have found,

t h a t t h e r e was no c o r r o b o r a t i o n , he n e v e r t h e l e s s a l l o w e d t h e

c a s e t o go t o t h e j u r y s o t h a t t h e Supreme C o u r t would have

a n o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e v i e w t h e complete r e c o r d and make a

determination.

I am g r e a t l y b o t h e r e d by t h i s c a s e . The o n l y e v i d e n c e

t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t i s g u i l t y of t h e c r i m e s charged comes

from a n accomplice who was a s e l f - p r o c l a i m e d l i a r and who

had e v e r y r e a s o n t o p e r j u r e h i m s e l f . This accomplice,

though he had a h i s t o r y of v i o l e n c e and s e x u a l d e v i a t i o n ,

was g i v e n a n o n c a p i t a l s e n t e n c e . The d e f e n d a n t , whose g u i l t

was n o t proven by competent e v i d e n c e , had no p r e v i o u s f e l o n y

r e c o r d and y e t was s e n t e n c e d t o d e a t h .

The d e a t h s e n t e n c e i n Montana i s governed by t h r e e

s t a t u t e s which a r e h e r e i n a f t e r q u o t e d i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y :

" A g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s . Aggravating circum-
s t a n c e s a r e any of t h e f o l l o w i n g :

" ( 1 ) The o f f e n s e was d e l i b e r a t e homicide and was
committed by a p e r s o n s e r v i n g a s e n t e n c e of i m -
prisonment i n t h e s t a t e prison.

" ( 2 ) The o f f e n s e was d e l i b e r a t e homicide and was
committed by a d e f e n d a n t who had been p r e v i o u s l y
c o n v i c t e d of a n o t h e r d e l i b e r a t e homicide.

" ( 3 ) The o f f e n s e was d e l i b e r a t e homicide and was
committed by means of t o r t u r e .

" ( 4 ) The o f f e n s e was d e l i b e r a t e homicide and was
committed by a p e r s o n l y i n g i n w a i t o r ambush.
" ( 5 ) The o f f e n s e was d e l i b e r a t e homicide and was
committed as a p a r t of a scheme o r o p e r a t i o n which,
i f completed, would r e s u l t i n t h e d e a t h of more
t h a n one p e r s o n .

" ( 6 ) The o f f e n s e w a s d e l i b e r a t e homicide a s d e f i n e d
i n s u b s e c t i o n (1)( a ) of 45-5-102, and t h e v i c t i m
was a p e a c e o f f i c e r k i l l e d w h i l e p e r f o r m i n g h i s
duty.

" ( 7 ) The o f f e n s e was a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g which
r e s u l t e d i n t h e d e a t h o f t h e v i c t i m . " ( S e c t i o n 46-18-
304, MCA.)

" ~ i t i g a t i n g ircumstances.
c Mitigating circumstances
a r e any of t h e f o l l o w i n g :

" ( 1 ) The d e f e n d a n t h a s no s i g n i f i c a n t h i s t o r y of p r i o r
criminal activity.

" ( 2 ) The o f f e n s e was comrnited w h i l e t h e d e f e n d a n t
was under t h e i n f l u e n c e of extreme m e n t a l o r emo-
t i o n a l disturbance.

I' ( 3 ) The d e f e n d a n t a c t e d under e x t r e m e d u r e s s o r
under t h e s u b s t a n t i a l domination of a n o t h e r p e r s o n .

" ( 4 ) The c a p a c i t y of t h e d e f e n d a n t t o a p p r e c i a t e
t h e c r i m i n a l i t y of h i s c o n d u c t o r t o conform h i s
c o n d u c t t o t h e r e q u i r e m e n t s of law was s u b s t a n t i a l l y
impaired.

" ( 5 ) The v i c t i m was a p a r t i c i p a n t i n t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s
conduct o r consented t o t h e a c t .

" ( 6 ) The d e f e n d a n t was an accomplice i n an o f f e n s e
committed by a n o t h e r p e r s o n , and h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n
was r e l a t i v e l y minor.

" ( 7 ) The d e f e n d a n t , a t t h e t i m e of t h e commission
of t h e c r i m e , was less t h a n 18 y e a r s of a g e .

" ( 8 ) Any o t h e r f a c t e x i s t s i n m i t i g a t i o n of t h e
p e n a l t y . " ( S e c t i o n 46-18-304, MCA.)

" E f f e c t - a g g r a v a t i n g - m i t i g a t i n g circum-
of and
stances. I n d e t e r m i n i n g whether t o impose a sen-
t e n c e of d e a t h o r imprisonment, t h e c o u r t s h a l l
t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e a g g r a v a t i n g and m i t i g a t i n g
c i r c u m s t a n c e s enumerated i n 46-18-303 and 46-18-
304 and s h a l l impose a s e n t e n c e of d e a t h i f i t
f i n d s one o r more of t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s
and f i n d s t h a t t h e r e a r e no m i t i g a t i n g circum-
stances sufficiently substantial t o c a l l for
leniency. I f t h e c o u r t d o e s n o t impose a s e n t e n c e
o f d e a t h and one of t h e a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e s
l i s t e d i n 46-18-303 e x i s t s , t h e c o u r t may impose
a s e n t e n c e o f imprisonment f o r l i f e o r f o r any
t e r m a u t h o r i z e d by t h e s t a t u t e d e f i n i n g t h e o f -
f e n s e . " ( S e c t i o n 46-18-305, MCA.)
Under t h e above q u o t e d s t a t u t e s t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y i s

imposed i f t h e r e i s a n a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e and m i t i g a t i n g

c i r c u m s t a n c e s do n o t c a l l f o r l e n i e n c y . The f i r s t s i x

s u b s e c t i o n s of s e c t i o n 46-18-303, MCA, are inapplicable t o

t h i s defendant. The o n l y a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e t o be

found under t h e s t a t u t e , i f i n d e e d one e x i s t e d , would be

rooted i n subsection ( 7 ) . There i s a b s o l u t e l y no c o r r o b o r a t i n g

e v i d e n c e t o show t h a t t h i s d e f e n d a n t was i n v o l v e d i n a g g r a v a t e d

kidnapping r e s u l t i n g i n t h e d e a t h of t h e v i c t i m . Even i f

one were t o a c c e p t t h e " h a i r t e s t i m o n y " o f f e r e d by t h e

e x p e r t , i t would o n l y c o r r o b o r a t e t h a t d e f e n d a n t committed

t h e a c t of s e x u a l i n t e r c o u r s e . T h i s a c t c o u l d n o t have

r e s u l t e d i n t h e d e a t h of t h e v i c t i m . There i s no t e s t i m o n y

c o r r o b o r a t i n g Nank ' s t e s t i m o n y t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t p a r t i c i p a t e d

i n a n a c t which r e s u l t e d i n t h e d e a t h of t h e v i c t i m .

A v e r y s t r o n g m i t i g a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e e x i s t s under 46-

18-304, MCA. T h i s d e f e n d a n t h a s no f e l o n y r e c o r d . Furthermore,

under s u b s e c t i o n ( 8 ) of t h e s t a t u t e , any f a c t e x i s t i n g i n

m i t i g a t i o n , must be c o n s i d e r e d by t h e c o u r t . The q u e s t i o n a b l e

g u i l t o f t h e d e f e n d a n t i s c e r t a i n l y such a m i t i g a t i n g f a c t o r .

W e have s e e n t h a t t h e r e i s n o t c o r r o b o r a t i v e t e s t i m o n y

t o s u p p o r t Nank's v e r s i o n of t h i s m a t t e r . I would l i k e t o

examine Nankl s t e s t i m o n y i t s e l f t o show t h e t o t a l u n r e l i a b i l i t y

of t h a t t e s t i m o n y . The purpose of such e x a m i n a t i o n i s t o

show t h e weakness of t h e S t a t e 1s c a s e , t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t

t h e d e f e n d a n t i s i n n o c e n t , and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e d e a t h

p e n a l t y s h o u l d n e v e r be imposed i n such a c i r c u m s t a n c e .
Though t h e j u r y c o n v i c t e d Coleman, t h e t r i a l judge

s h o u l d c o n s i d e r t h e c e r t a i n t y of Coleman's g u i l t b e f o r e

imposing t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y . There was no c o n f e s s i o n from

t h e defendant. There w e r e no d i s i n t e r e s t e d w i t n e s s e s d i r e c t l y

c o n n e c t i n g Coleman t o t h e commission of t h e o f f e n s e s c h a r g e d .
A s previously discussed, t h e r e was no i n d e p e n d e n t c o r r o b o r a t i n g

e v i d e n c e o f any k i n d . I f Nank's t e s t i m o n y l a c k e d c r e d i b i l i t y ,

t h e e v i d e n c e of Coleman's i n v o l v e m e n t becomes e v e n more

speculative. The f o l l o w i n g e x c e r p t s from t h e r e c o r d b e a r

upon Nank' s v e r a c i t y :

"Answer: She d r o v e t h e p i c k u p t h r o u g h t h e d r i v e -
way and o v e r down w i t h i n maybe f i v e f e e t of t h e
bike. I then tipped t h e motorcycle r i g h t s i d e
up and I p r o c e e d e d t o f i l l t h e g a s t a n k up. I
l i e d t o her. T h i s i s g o i n g back t o t h e c r i m e and
I was a l w a y s t r y i n g t o make up s t o r i e s . You know.

" Q u e s t i o n : Did you t e l l them t h e same t h i n g t h a t
you have t o l d t h e j u r y h e r e i n t h e l a s t two d a y s ?

"Answer: No, I l i e d t o M r . Brake.

" Q u e s t i o n : I n what r e s p e c t d i d you l i e t o M r .
Brake?

"Answer: I l i e d . I t o l d M r . Brake t h a t Dewey t i e d
Peggy Hars t a d up and I t o l d him t h a t Dewey un-
d r e s s e d her i n s t e a d of m e .

" Q u e s t i o n : So t h a t any s t a t e m e n t i n a n y r e c o r d t h a t
you t o o k LSD 25 o r 30 t i m e s would b e a l i e ?

"Answer: I t was i n a l i e i n s o much t h a t maybe a t
t h a t t i m e I was g o i n g t o t r y t o u s e t h a t a s a n
e x c u s e t o b e a d m i t t e d f o r my c r i m e i n t o a s t a t e
h o s p i t a l i n s t e a d o f g o i n g t o p r i s o n , and s o t h a t
i s maybe t h e r e a s o n t h a t I made t h a t s t a t e m e n t , and
I d i d l i e because I heard of c a s e s l i k e t h i s b e f o r e ,
s o I may have l i e d , y e s .

" Q u e s t i o n : So now you d i d t e l l somebody t h a t you
had u s e d LSD 25 o r 30 t i m e s , b u t e v e n though you
l i e d a b o u t i t , you t h o u g h t you m i g h t b e a b l e t o
g e t o f f o r g e t i n t o a s t a t e h o s p i t a l o r something,
is that right?

" T h a t would b e t h e p u r p o s e o f i t , y e s .

" Q u e s t i o n : W e l l , d i d you g i v e them a n y examples
o f a n y a g g r e s s i v e b e h a v i o r on your p a r t ?

"Answer: I d o n ' t know, I d i d a l o t of l y i n g s o
I c a n n o t s t a t e n o t h i n g t r u t h f u l l y a b o u t what I
s a i d t h e r e and g e t a c o r r e c t a n s w e r . . . ."
( T r i a l T r a n s c r i p t Vol. V , pp. 1056, 1057, 1102,
1103, 1 1 3 0 . )
Nank's t e s t i m o n y on t h e s t a n d was a l s o c o n t r a r y t o t h e

t e s t i m o n y of Law enforcement o f f i c e r s . Nank t e s t i f i e d t h a t he

was t e l l i n g t h e t r u t h and t h e law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s were

lying. One of t h e law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s who o r i g i n a l l y

i n t e r r o g a t e d Nank f o l l o w i n g h i s a r r e s t i n B o i s e , I d a h o ,

s t a t e d t h a t Nank t o l d him he became u p s e t w i t h Peggy H a r s t a d

b e c a u s e s h e s a i d something t o h u r t h i s ego. Nank, d u r i n g

t h e Coleman t r i a l , a c c u s e d t h e law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r of

lying about t h i s matter. The f o l l o w i n g e x c e r p t i s t a k e n

from t h e t r a n s c r i p t :

" Q u e s t i o n : And do you r e c a l l t h a t he s a i d , ' I b e t
you t h a t s h e p r o b a b l y s a i d something t o you t h a t
e i t h e r h u r t your ego, made you v e r y mad, ex-
t r e m e l y u p s e t ' , o r something l i k e t h a t , and d i d
you d r o p your head and n o t make any comment t o
t h a t question?

"Answer: I d i d n o t make any comment b e c a u s e I
knew t h a t h e was t r y i n g t o make m e make some k i n d
of a statement.

" Q u e s t i o n : And t h e n he s a i d , 'Did s h e s a y some-
t h i n g t o i n f u r i a t e you o r h u r t your e g o ' , o r t h i s
t y p e of t h i n g , and you s a i d , 'Yes, Y e s , s h e d i d . '

"Answer: No, I n e v e r d i d s a y t h a t . M r . Brake l i e d
and I a l s o t o l d Judge M a r t i n when I w a s i n a n e a r -
I.ier c o u r t hearing before about t h a t .

"Question: M r . Brake l i e d ?

"Answer: M r . Brake d i d l i e . " ( T r i a l T r a n s c r i p t Vol.
V, p. 1 0 9 1 , 1092.)

Law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r Brake had a l s o t e s t i f i e d t h a t a t

t h e t i m e Nank and Coleman w e r e a r r e s t e d i n t h e i r a p a r t m e n t

i n B o i s e , t h a t Nank t o l d t h e p o l i c e t o " ~ e your a s s o u t of
t

here". Nank, d u r i n g t h e Coleman t r i a l , a g a i n a c c u s e d t h e

law e n f o r c e m e n t o f f i c e r s of l y i n g . The f o l l o w i n g e x c e r p t i s

t a k e n from t h e r e c o r d .

" Q u e s t i o n : And d i d you when you were a r r e s t e d t e l l
t h e B o i s e p o l i c e , t o ' G e t your a s s o u t of h e r e ' ?

"Answer: No. M r . Brake l i e d a b o u t t h a t , and I a l s o
t r i e d t o e x p l a i n t h a t t o Judge M a r t i n i n an e a r l i e r
c o u r t h e a r i n g t h a t I s a i d t h a t M r . Brake l i e d .
T h a t ' s one t h i n g , I have never--I have n e v e r
I I

a ' , '
..

c a l l e d a policeman a name. He l i e d a b o u t t h a t
t o o . " ( T r i a l T r a n s c r i p t Vol. V , p. 1227.)

Again, o f f i c e r Brake t e s t i f i e d t h a t h e r e a d t h e c o n s t i -

t u t i o n a l r i g h t s t o Nank a t t h e t i m e of h i s a r r e s t . Nank,

w h i l e t e s t i f y i n g d u r i n g t h e Coleman c a s e , d i s p u t e d t h i s .

Nank t e s t i f i e d :

" Q u e s t i o n : Did he v e r b a l l y - - d i d M r . Brake v e r b a l l y
a d v i s e you o f your r i g h t s a s soon a s you were
p l a c e d under a r r e s t ?

"Answer: Not a t t h a t time. Not a t t h a t p a r t i c u l a r
t i m e , no.

" Q u e s t i o n : You h e a r d M r . Brake s a y t h a t he d i d ad-
v i s e you of your r i g h t s , and t h a t ' s a l i e a c c o r d i n g
t o you?

"Answer: H e d i d n o t a t t h a t t i m e when w e were a r -
r e s t e d v e r b a l l y a d v i s e u s of o u r r i g h t s a t t h a t
t i m e , no, h e d i d n o t .

" Q u e s t i o n : You h e a r d him t e s t i f y t h a t h e d i d ?

"Answer: He d i d n o t do i t .

" Q u e s t i o n : Well t h e n , he l i e d ?

"Answer: H e l i e d . " ( T r i a l T r a n s c r i p t Vol. V ,
p. 1227.)

Nank's t e s t i m o n y i t s e l f was r i d d l e d w i t h i n c o n s i s t e n c y .

Though t h e r e c o r d i s r e p l e t e w i t h examples, t h e f o l l o w i n g i s

illustrative. When t e s t i f y i n g a b o u t who u n d r e s s e d t h e

v i c t i m , Nank gave t h e f o l l o w i n g t e s t i m o n y :

" Q u e s t i o n : You took h e r s h o e s o f f d i d n ' t you?

"Answer: Y e s , I did.

" Q u e s t i o n : You u n d r e s s e d h e r ?

"Answer: Dewey d i d . " ( T r i a l T r a n s c r i p t Vol. V ,
p. 1189.)

The f o l l o w i n g t e s t i m o n y i s t a k e n from page 1210, Vol.

V, of t h e t r i a l t r a n s c r i p t .

" Q u e s t i o n : And d i d you u n d r e s s h e r ?

"Answer: Yes I d i d .

" Q u e s t i o n : And d i d you d r e s s h e r up a g a i n ?

"Answer: Y e s I d i d . "
And from p a g e 1223 and 1224, Vol. V , of t h e t r i a l

t r a n s c r i p t s , t h e following testimony i s taken:

" Q u e s t i o n : Do I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t Dewey n e v e r t o o k
her clothes o f f ?

"Answer: Dewey d i d n o t t a k e h e r c l o t h e s o f f .

" Q u e s t i o n : Do I u n d e r s t a n d t h a t you t o o k h e r c l o t h e s
off?

"Answer: I d i d t a k e h e r c l o t h e s o f f .

" Q u e s t i o n : And t h a t i n c l u d e d h e r p a n t s ?

"Answer: She had o n - - w e l l , some k i n d o f m o r e l e s s
t r o u s e r s o r whatever.

" Q u e s t i o n : Did t h a t i n c l u d e u n d e r p a n t s ?

"Answer: I d o n o t remember i f s h e was w e a r i n g underwear a t
t h a t t i m e o r not.

" Q u e s t i o n : Did you p u t h e r c l o t h e s back on?

"Answer: I p u t h e r b l u e j e a n s back on. I think
w i t h what s h e was w e a r i n g , I p u t them back o n ,
yes.

" Q u e s t i o n : So t h a t you w e r e t h e o n l y o n e t h a t
dressed o r undressed h e r , i s t h a t c o r r e c t ?

"Answer: Y e s , that's correct."

I n t h e f i r s t s t a t e m e n t Nank g a v e t o l a w e n f o r c e m e n t

o f f i c i a l s h e s a i d Coleman u n d r e s s e d t h e v i c t i m . On t h e

s t a n d Nank t e s t i f i e d t h a t Coleman u n d r e s s e d t h e v i c t i m and

t h e n changed t h e t e s t i m o n y and t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was t h e

o n l y o n e who had u n d r e s s e d t h e v i c t i m . H i s testimony, to

s a y t h e l e a s t , was i n c r e d i b l e .

Nank had a h i s t o r y o f v i o l e n c e b e g i n n i n g w i t h h i s

childhood. Though t h e r e c o r d s show t h a t h e a t t a c k e d h i s

mother w i t h a b u t c h e r k n i f e , h e t e s t i f i e d t h a t i t was h i s

m o t h e r who a t t a c k e d him w i t h t h e k n i f e . Nank r e l a t e d t h e

f o l l o w i n g t e s t i m o n y d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e o f Coleman's t r i a l :

" Q u e s t i o n : Now you s t a t e d t h a t y o u r m o t h e r , M r s .
Nank--Mary, was t h a t h e r f i r s t name?

"Answer: Margaret.
" Q u e s t i o n : M a r g a r e t . A t one t i m e when you were 18
y e a r s of a g e , h e l d a b u t c h e r k n i f e a t your t h r o a t
and chased you around t h e house w i t h a poker b e a t i n g
you upon t h e head and s h o u l d e r s and t h e n t e a r i n g t h e
f r o n t of h e r d r e s s and going o u t i n t h e s t r e e t and
t e l l i n g o t h e r p e o p l e t h a t you had a t t a c k e d h e r sex-
u a l l y ; d i d s h e do t h a t ?

"Answer: NO, you s t a t e d t h a t wrong, s i r .

"Question: W e l l , d i d she hold a butcher k n i f e a t
your t h r o a t ?

"Answer: Y e s , she did.

" Q u e s t i o n : And d i d s h e c h a s e you around t h e house
w i t h a poker?

"Answer: Y e s , she did.

" Q u e s t i o n : Did s h e h i t you a b o u t t h e head and
s h o u l d e r s w i t h a poker?

"Answer: Yes, s h e d i d .

" Q u e s t i o n : Did s h e t e a r t h e f r o n t of h e r d r e s s ?

"Answer: The f r o n t of h e r b l o u s e .

" Q u e s t i o n : And d i d s h e t e l l o t h e r p e o p l e t h a t you
had a t t a c k e d h e r s e x u a l l y ?

"Answer: No, s h e d i d n o t .

" Q u e s t i o n : She d i d n o t ?

"Answer: She d i d n o t r u n o u t i n t h e s t r e e t and
h o l l e r a t p e o p l e , no, s h e d i d n o t .

" Q u e s t i o n : Did s h e t e l l o t h e r p e o p l e t h a t you
had a t t a c k e d h e r s e x u a l l y ?

"Answer: I t h i n k s h e m i g h t have t o l d a d o c t o r .
I do n o t know." ( T r i a l T r a n s c r i p t Vol. V , pp.
1074, 1075.)

Though t h e r e c o r d s show t h a t Nank had a t t a c k e d h i s

mother w i t h a b u t c h e r k n i f e and i n d i c a t e t h a t he may have

a t t a c k e d h e r s e x u a l l y , he took t h e w i t n e s s s t a n d i n t h e

Coleman c a s e and s a i d t h a t h i s mother i n f a c t had been t h e

a g g r e s s o r and h e t h e v i c t i m .

Nank had been i n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d i n m e n t a l h o s p i t a l s on

four previous occasions. H e had a h i s t o r y of v i o l e n c e

i n c l u d i n g v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t b o t h h i s mother and h i s s i s t e r .

H e had a f e l o n y r e c o r d .
On t h e o t h e r hand, Coleman had no h i s t o r y of v i o l e n c e

and no f e l o n y r e c o r d . Coleman was a homosexual.

A psychologist t e s t i f i e d with r e s p e c t t o a r a p i s t ' s

typical characteristics. T h i s t e s t i m o n y showed t h a t Nank

f i t t h e p a t t e r n b u t Coleman d i d n o t . In f a c t , t h i s witness

t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e i n c i d e n t s of homosexuals b e i n g i n v o l v e d

i n r a p e was " p r a c t i c a l l y z e r o " .

I n m n i n e t e e n y e a r s a t t h e bench and b a r I have seldom
y

been s o d e e p l y d i s t u r b e d by t h e i n j u s t i c e of a r e s u l t . A

d e f e n d a n t i s h e r e s e n t e n c e d t o d i e where t h e r e i s p r a c t i c a l l y

no c r e d i b l e e v i d e n c e c o n n e c t i n g t h e d e f e n d a n t t o t h e commission

of t h e c r i m e . There a r e s t r o n g r e a s o n s t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e

d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t commit t h e c r i m e f o r which t h e d e a t h

p e n a l t y was imposed. And y e t t h i s C o u r t i s a u t h o r i z i n g t h e

i m p o s i t i o n of t h a t i r r e v o c a b l e s a n c t i o n . I implore t h e

f e d e r a l c o u r t s t o examine t h i s r e c o r d , and upon f i n d i n g i t

t o be a s wanting as I do, t o i n t e r v e n e and p r e v e n t t h i s

gross injustice.
Mr. Justice Daniel J. Shea dissenting:

Although the death penalty should be vacated in any
event, I would also reverse the convictions for the reasons
stated in my dissent, and for the reasons stated in the
dissent of Justice Frank B. Morrison. Although dismissal is
the proper ruling, even in the event of a failure to dismiss,
the evidence of corroboration of accomplice Nank's testimony
is so thin that a death penalty should not be imposed. I
also join Justice Morrison in his dissent relating to imposition
of the death penalty.
With the exception of parts I, 11, 111 and a portion
of part IV of the majority opinion, the opinion decides the
issues in such a wholesale and summary manner that we have
ourselves denied Coleman the due process to which he is
entitled. The opinion fails to mention, let alone discuss,
the issues raised in Coleman's final attempt to get justice
in the state court system. How does one write a dissent
to such a nonopinion? How does one know where to begin?
In part I11 of the opinion, the majority holds that
post-conviction relief is available to a defendant sentenced
to death, and with this I wholeheartedly agree. It would be
unthinkable that either the legislature or this Court would
or could foreclose the availability of relief. Unfortunately,
however, the rest of the holding seems to give carte blanche
to a district court to deny any and all applications for
post-conviction relief, and that decision will be automatically
affirmed by this Court by our refusal to even state or discuss
the issues. The District Court's treatment of Coleman's
application for post-conviction relief is appalling, and this
Court's handling of Coleman's appeal from that order is even
more appalling.
In the normal case, I would agree with part I1 of the
majority's opinion that the trial judge and the sentencing
judge should also preside over an application for post-
conviction relief. But that general rule must give way
to a situation where one under a death penalty is seeking
post-conviction relief. For reasons which I state in
detail in part I11 of my dissent, the post-conviction relief
judge here should have called in another judge to preside
over Coleman's application for post-conviction relief. His
failure to do so made a mockery of any meaningful considera-
tion of the claims presented to the court. Minimally, this
Court should have ordered a new hearing before another district
judge.
I agree, however, with part I of the majority opinion
in its conclusion that post-conviction relief is essentially
a new civil action. And even though it is somewhat illogical
to hold that the judge who presided over the criminal case
also should preside over the application of post-conviction
relief, there are sound reasons, except in a death penalty
case, for the same judge presiding over both proceedings.
Finally, I agree with a part of the majority opinion
in part IV--that part of the opinion holding that res
-
judicata may be applied to a petition for post-conviction
relief if the criteria of Sanders v. United States (1963),
373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148, are followed in
making this decision. But the majority has, in the remainder
of part IV, and in other parts of the opinion, totally
negated those very criteria set out in Sanders, by its
wholesale and summary treatment of the issues.
United States v. Sanders is concerned with the extent a
federal court in a post-conviction relief proceeding such as
habeas corpus, can give controlling weight to a previous
denial of habeas corpus. Although it is procedurally
inapplicable to the case before us, nonetheless Sanders does
adopt sound and workable standards that can apply to a
petition for post-conviction relief after there has been a
direct appeal. But the majority here has failed to recognize
that we must consider each criteria before we can justly say
that res judicata should bar the claim. This Court must
decide first that the same ground was presented at another
proceeding and determined adversely. Second, this Court
must then determine whether the previous decision was on the
merits. And third, this Court must decide whether the ends
of justice require that we again reexamine the issue. By
this third criteria, the Court can refuse to apply res
judicata even if the issue has been previously decided on
the merits--if the ends of justice require it.
The majority here has failed miserably in applying
these criteria, for there is no way of determining from the
opinion how or if the criteria were applied. So much for
Sanders.
I have divided my dissent into eight parts, and they
are at best arbitrarily divided. But these divisions do give
some semblance or order to the presentation of my views
concerning this appeal. This case on appeal was aided neither

by Coleman's brief nor by his counsel's arguments at the
hearing. When this situation occurs, the situation is, of
course, complicated even more. Coleman raised in the trial
court and before this Court 52 issues. Counsel lettered the
issues A through Z, and then started again at the beginning
of the alphabet and went through the alphabet once more,
lettering the issues AA through Z Z - - 5 2 issues. Needless to
say, it is more than a little difficult for any appellate
court to concern itself with 52 issues on appeal. That
process is complicated even more when the briefs and oral
arguments are so poor.
I have chosen to concentrate on those issues which
I believe to have most merit. This is not to say that I
believe at least some of the other issues not to have
merit, but time constraints require me to concentrate on
those issues I feel are most worthy of discussion.
This dissent is divided into eight parts, divided as
follows: Part I, Improper Empanelling of Jury Panel; Part
11, Unanimous Jury Verdict Requirement; Part 111, Recusal
of Sentencing Judge; Part IV, Retroactive Application of
Death Penalty Statutes; Part V, Unconstitutional Shifting
of Burden of Proof to Defendant; Part VI, Right to Jury Trial
on Question Whether Death Penalty Should be Imposed; Part VII,
Right to Evidentiary Hearing on Question of Whether Death by
Hanging Constitutes Cruel and Unusual Punishment; Part VIII,
Denial of Meaningful Appellate Review.
Because the majority opinion has totally failed to
mention the issues, other than to refer to them by the
letters as designated in the petition for post-conviction
relief and in the appeal, I append the trial court's order
to this dissent as Exhibit A. The order disposes of each
of the issues raised, although at times it is difficult to
determine exactly what issue was decided. - further emphasize
I

--order
that this - - word-for-word adoption - - the proposed
is a of -
findings and conclusions - - presented - - State.
of law by the For
this reason, it can hardly be considered as being the careful
analysis of a trial judge judiciously carrying out his duties.
I dissented in both Coleman - (1978), 177 Mont. 1, 39 to 43,
I
579 P.2d 732, 754 to 756, and Coleman - (1979), - Mont
I1 . I
605 P.2d 1000, 1022 to 1051, 36 St.Rep. 2237, 2248 to 2249,
and I still adhere to those views. On some of these issues,
however, I do expand more on my views in this dissent.
PART I
IMPROPER EMPANELLING OF JURY PANEL.
By Issue F, covered in the omnibus holding of the
majority opinion in Part IV, the defendant claims he was
deprived of his right to have a jury that was properly
selected and empanelled. In Coleman - 579 P.2d 732, the
I,
majority held against him. I dissented on this issue, 579
P.2d '754-756,and for this reason alone, I would grant
defendant a new trial.
The majority has cut real corners and did not reach
the real issue in deciding this issue in Coleman - and
I,
for this reason, I would again review it by application of
the Sanders criteria. It seems that all the majority is
concerned about is whether there were 12 jurors present to
try the case and not how the 12 jurors happened to be there
in the first place. In my dissent, I pointed out the improper
procedures used in calling in the panel of jurors, of which

- least some of the 12 jurors were called in the manner
at
described.
PART I1
THERE IS NEITHER ASSURANCE THAT THE JURY REACHED A UNANIMOUS
VERDICT ON ONE OR MORE THEORIES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
SUBMITTED TO THE JURY, NOR ARE ALL THEORIES SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Issue UU, an issue not raised in Coleman's first two
appeals, claims that all three convictions must be reversed
because there is no assurance that the jury reached unanimous
agreement on one or more of the alternative theories of
criminal responsibility submitted to the jury on each charge.
Without this assurance, Coleman claims that he has been denied
his right to unanimous jury verdict as guaranteed by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
and as guaranteed by Article 11, B 26, Montana Constitution.
Counsel has raised this issue without a genuine attempt
to analyze the issue and apply it to this case. The same
issue has been raised in the Fitzpatrick and McKenzie cases
now before this Court, and undoubtedly Coleman's counsel has
been the recipient of some cross-fertilization. I believe,
nonetheless, that Coleman has raised an issue deserving of
careful review by this Court, and that Coleman's convictions
should be reversed because there is no assurance that the jury
reached unanimity on a single theory of statutory responsibility.
My position is not based on the fact that this is a death
penalty cause; the issue is a serious one even if the death
penalty were not the underlying issue. But the fact that
Coleman has been sentenced to hang requires all courts, and
especially this Court, to carefully consider the merits of
this claim. But the trial court and this Court have failed
miserably in treating the issue as virtually frivolous.
The United States Supreme Court, in the aftermath of
its decision upholding the constitutionality of the death
penalty, has emphasized the need to be sure not only that the
death penalty is the properly penalty, but that the guilt
finding process has been scrupulously adhered to. In Beck
v. Alabama (1980), 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d
392, the Supreme Court stated:
"To insure that the death penalty is . . . imposed
on the basis of 'reason rather than caprice or
emotion,' (the courts) have invalidated procedural
rules that tended to diminish the reliability of
the sentencing determination. - - reasoning
The same
must apply to rules that diminish the reliability
of the guiltdetermination." (Emphasis added.)
7-

And the Supreme Court has long recognized that the
question of whether a verdict was unanimous in a death penalty
case must not be left to guesswork.
In Andres v. United States (1948), 3 3 3 U.S. 740, 68
S.Ct. 880, 92 L.Ed. 1055, the trial court failed to instruct
the jury that it must be unanimous as to both guilt and as
to a sentence recommendation. Under the statute involved, a
conviction required the death penalty to be imposed unless
the jury directly stated in its verdict that it should not
be imposed. The court held that where a statute requires
jury input on sentencing, unanimity is required, and the
jury had not been expressly instructed that it must also
reach unanimity as to whether it made no recommendation
(thereby triggering mandatory imposition of the death penalty),
or whether it made a recommendation that the death penalty
not be imposed. Because there was no assurance that the
jury knew of the unanimity requirement with respect to
sentencing, the Supreme Court reversed, stating: "In death
cases, doubts such as these presented here [doubts as to
unanimity] should be resolved in favor of the accused." 333

U.S. at 752.
In the third McKenzie case, State v. McKenzie (1979),
Mont . , 608 P.2d 425, 474, 36 St.Rep. 2157, in
discussing the impact of the unconstitutional Sandstrom-type
jury instructions on the jury verdicts, I raised the added
spector that McKenzie may also have been the victim of less

than unanimous jury verdicts because of the many alternative
charges to the jury, and because of the failure of the
verdicts returned to specify the underlying basis for the
conviction. I cited and quoted from United States v. Gipson
5th Cir.
y1977), 553 F.2d 453, 457-458, which held that: "[rlequiring
the vote of twelve jurors to convict a defendant does little
to insure that his right to a unanimous verdict is protected
unless this prerequisite of jury concensus as to the defendant's
course of action is also required."
The spector of a nonunanimous verdict in a death
penalty case has now been raised here.
Coleman was charged with three distinct crimes: count
I, deliberate homicide; count 11, aggravated kidnapping; and
count 111, sexual intercourse without consent. For each of
these crimes charged, the jury was instructed that it could
reach a verdict based on several alternative theories of
criminal responsibility. Under count I, the jury was instructed
it could find Coleman guilty of deliberate homicide by use
of the felony-murder rule, or by finding that he purposely
and knowingly killed Lana Harding. But under the felony-
murder rule the jury was given the choice of several felonies,
including unspecified felonies, to apply in determining
whether Coleman was guilty of felony-murder. Under count
11, aggravated kidnapping (which conviction triggered the
death penalty here) the jury was given several choices of
what felony Coleman had in mind to commit when he held or
secreted Lana Harding. Furthermore, several - these choices
of
are unsupported - substantial evidence.
by Under count 111,
sexual intercourse without consent, the jury was given two
choices as to proof of the issue of "without consent." One

- those choices - unsupported by substantial evidence.
of is -
The trial court gave the jury only a general instruction
on unanimity, applicable to all three charges, which stated
that ". . . such verdict must be unanimous, which means that
all of you must agree on the verdicts." The trial court
failed, however, to instruct the jury that its verdict on
each charge must be unanimous on one or more of the theories
of criminal responsibility. The verdict forms given to the
jury by the trial court, provide no basis to determine the
underlying statutory theory or theories applied by the jury
in finding Coleman guilty.
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three charges,
but the verdicts specified only that Coleman was guilty of
count I, deliberate homicide; that he was guilty of count
11, aggravated kidnapping; and that he was guilty of count
111, sexual intercourse without consent. It is impossible
to determine from these verdicts whether the jury was unanimous
on one or more theories of criminal responsibility for an
essential element of the crime. In addition, at least one
theory of "without consent" submitted to the jury on the
charge of sexual intercourse without consent (count 111) is
unsupported by substantial evidence. But more important,
several theories submitted to the jury on the charge of
aggravated kidnapping (count 11) are not supported by substantial
evidence. It remains for those more knowledgeable than me
to explain how any appellate court can approve the death
penalty for the conviction of aggravated kidnapping even
though several theories of criminal responsibility as charged
in that offense, are not supported by substantial evidence.
Both the trial court and the majority have sloughed off
this issue as essentially frivolous.
In adopting verbatim the State's proposed finding or
conclusion, the trial court ruled:
"UU. Petitioner contends that he was denied his
right to a unanimous jury verdict. But when the
instructions are read as a whole, as they must under
Coleman 11, 605 P.2d at 1052, the claim fails. See
Cupp v. Naughton, 414 U.S. 141, 147. In addition,
petitioner's reliance on the federal constitution is
misplaced in that the federal constitution does not
guarantee the right to a unanimous jury verdict in
state felony jury trials. Apodoca v. Oregon, 404
U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 404 U.S. 356
(1972)."
This ruling treats the issue in a most summary fashion,
evading rather than meeting the question raised, But the
majority opinion is even worse, for it fails even to identify
the issue, let alone to analyze the issue with respect to
the procedural context of the charges, the instructions, and
the verdicts returned. The majority disposes of this claim
by another omnibus ruling in Part VII of its opinion, disposing
of this and four more issues:
". . . Because the post-conviction procedure is
a new civil remedy, the failure to present claims
in earlier proceedings would not bar them from
presentation at this time. However, we have
reviewed the claims and find the same to be
unmeritorious. It was not error for the court
to deny them summarily . . ."
The trial court's reliance on Johnson v. Louisiana (1972),
uoc.
.8gq U.S. 356, and Apodoca v. Oregon (1972), 404 U.S. 404,
is misplaced. It is true that both cases hold that a state
court is not required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to guarantee a unanimous jury verdict. But this holding
ignores the fact that Montana's Constitution, Art. 11, S 26
("In all criminal actions, the verdict shall be unanimous"),
guarantees a unanimous verdict to all defendants charged in
state court, whether it be a felony or even a misdemeanor.
In light of our own constitution, the United States Supreme
Court would clearly not permit this Court to sanction a
death penalty conviction where the verdict may have been
less than unanimous. If we did not assure that Coleman had
unanimous jury verdicts, we would, in effect, deny him equal
protection of law. And that is a federal question.
This Court cannot, without denying equal protection of
the law, distinguish between a situation where a defendant
is charged with one crime and one statutory theory of criminal
responsibility, and a situation where a defendant is charged
with one or several crimes, but where he is also charged
with multiple statutory theories of criminal responsibility.
In the first situation, a general instruction on unanimity,
in addition to a guilty verdict returned on the only charge
and only statutory theory of responsibility for that charge,
would assure unanimity. But that is not so in the second
situation where a defendant is charged with three crimes,
but also charged with committing those crimes in several
alternative ways. In this situation, a general instruction
as to unanimity will not suffice. Rather, the jury must be
instructed that its verdict must be unanimous on any one or
more statutory theories applied in reaching its verdict.
Further, the verdicts returned should disclose the statutory
basis on which the jury reached its verdict. If these
requirements are not fulfilled, a defendant charged in such
a situation is deprived of equal protection of the law.
This situation is especially grievous, where, as here, the
defendant has been sentenced to death.
THE UNANIMOUS VERDICT REQUIREMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
CHARGES FILED: FAILURE OF THE STATE TO FOLLOW STATUTORY
PROCEDURES
First, we must recognize that in charging Coleman by
alleging several statutory theories for the same offense,
the State failed to follow proper statutory guidelines. If
it had done so, the problems we face here would not exist.
The applicable statute, section 46-11-404, MCA, clearly sets
out the procedure for the filing of alternative charges,
that is, ". . . different versions - - -
of the same offense."
Section 46-11-404,(1),MCA, states in relevant part:
"(1) An indictment, information, or complaint
mav charae - or more different offenses
- .-
. .
J.
two - -
-
2 -
-

connected together in their commission, different
statements - - -
of the same offense, or two or more
different offenses of the same class under
separate counts.. .. The prosecution is not
required to elect between the different offenses
or counts set forth in the indictment, information
or complaint, and the defendant may be convicted
of any number of the offenses charged. Each offense
of which the defendant is convicted must be stated
- --
in theerdic-ffinding -
-- - ~ - - court."
of the
(Emphasis added.)
Although the statute uses the word "may", the message
is that the prosecutor should charge in the manner stated
in order to avoid problems such as exist in this case. The
prosecutor did charge three separate crimes, and this statute
permits him to do so, But the statute also states that if
"two or more statements of the same offense" are charged, that
it be done so "under separate counts." If that had been done
here, the jury could have returned a verdict on each of the
separate counts, and therefore the basis for its decision
would be specified. The statute also clearly contemplates
this procedure by stating that the prosecutor is not required
to elect on his theories, but that "each offense of which the
--
defendant is convicted must be stated - - verdict
in the . . ."
I read this last sentence to mean, in context with the
entire subsection, that if a defendant is charged in separate
counts with a different statement of the same offense, a
verdict form must be prepared for that separate statement,
and the jury must return a verdict on that particular state-
ment of the offense. If this procedure had been followed in
this case, we would know the precise basis on which the jury
reached its verdict on each charge. It is the State then,
who must assume the responsibility for improperly charging
Coleman and for setting in motion the ambiguous verdicts.
The State's error in not following this statute, is
magnified by the failure of the trial court to instruct the
jury that its verdict must be unanimous on each statutory
theory of criminal responsibility presented to it by the
instructions. Again, that fault must be laid to the State
and to the trial court. Furthermore, the trial court provided
the ambiguous verdicts for the jurys' case.
I proceed next to a discussion of the general law in
relation to the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict, and
then I will discuss the charges, the jury instructions, and
the verdicts returned in this case.
DETERMINING JURY UNANIMITY WHERE STATUTORY THEORIES OF THE
CRIMES ARE CHARGED ALTERNATIVELY IN THE SAME COUNT
If only one crime is charged in one count, and if
only one statutory theory of that crime is pleaded, the
unanimity requirement normally presents no problem. It is
sufficient to instruct the jury that it must reach a unanimous
verdict. But the problem is entirely different where a
defendant is charged with one crime in one count, but where
in the same count, he is charged with committing that crime
alternatively in several different ways.
For example, if a defendant is charged with aggravated
kidnapping with a purpose to commit the felony of sexual
intercourse without consent, or the felony of aggravated
assault, it is not sufficient if six jurors believe that the
defendant kidnapped the woman for the purpose of sexual
intercourse without consent, and the six other jurors believe
that the defendant kidnapped the woman for the purpose of
committing aggravated assault upon her. If a jury returns
a verdict on this basis, they are not in unanimous agree-
ment, and the verdict cannot stand. In this situation, it
is not a question of whether substantial evidence supports
both theories, it is a question of whether the jury unanimously
agreed to at least one theory. It is up to the jury to reach
unanimity and the function of the appellate court is to
determine if the jury in fact reached unanimity.
DETERMINING JURY UNANIMITY--FUNCTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The appellate court, of course, cannot read the jurys'
mind, and so review necessarily involves an examination of
the charges filed, the instructions given defining the
elements of those charges, the instructions given with regard
to the requirement of unanimity, and the verdicts actually
returned by the jury. Obviously, if the verdict specifies
the theory used by the jury in finding guilt, no problem is
presented. It is then only a question of examining the
evidence to determine if the theory used is supported by
the evidence. The question, therefore, nearly always arises
where the verdict form is ambiguous and only the jurors know
what was actually decided.
Ambiguous jury verdicts in criminal cases are frequently
the result of a failure to properly charge a crime or crimes,
and of a failure to give the jury proper instructions and
verdict forms. For example, if a defendant is charged in
count I with two or more crimes, what does a jury verdict
reveal where it finds that defendant is guilty of count I?
Did the jury convict the defendant of one crime or both?
Was the jury unanimous with respect to either? United States

v. Starks (3rd Cir. 1975), 515 F.2d 112, 116-117. Also see,
United States v. Uco Oil Co. (9th Cir. 1976), 546 F.2d 833, 835,
cert.den. (1977), 430 U.S. 966, 97 S.Ct. 1646, 52 L.Ed.2d
357. And, of course, the same questions can be asked,
although in a slightly different context, if a defendant
is charged in count I with one crime, but where several
alternative theories are also alleged in that count. If
the jury returns a guilty verdict to count I, the questions
arise as to whether the jury convicted defendant under one

-51-
alternative theory, or more than one alternative theory, or
under all alternative theories. In addition, the question
arises aso to whether the jury reached unanimous agreement on
at least one theory? No one knows.
One of the first questions is to determine how the jury
was instructed on the question of unanimity. Some courts have
held that a general instruction on unanimity is sufficient.
For example, see, State v. Arndt (1976), 87 Wash.2d 374, 553
P.2d 1328; United States v. Natelli (2nd Cir. 1975), 527 F.2d
311; State v. Williams (Iowa 1979), 285 N.W.2d 248; State v.
Souhrada (1948), 122 Mont. 377, 204 P.2d 792. On the other
hand, other courts have held that a general instruction is
not sufficient; rather, the jury must be specifically instructed
that it must reach unanimous agreement on any one or more
statutory theories of criminal responsibility as charged by
the State.
The defect of a general instruction has been pointed
out in United States v. Gipson, supra:
"The unanimity rule thus requires jurors to be
in substantial agreement as to just what a
defendant did as a step preliminary to determining
whether the defendant is guilty of the crime
charged. Requiring the vote of twelve jurors
to convict a defendant does little to insure that
his right to a unanimous verdict is protected
unless this prerequisite of jury concensus as
to the defendant's course of action is also required."
553 F.2d at 457-458.
Implicit in this ruling is a requirement that the trial
court instruct the jury that it must reach unanimity on
any theory used as a basis to find guilt.
Several state courts have held that a jury must be
instructed that its verdict be unanimous on one or more of
the alternative theories submitted to the jury for its decision.
See, for example, State v. Bleazard (1943), 103 Utah 113,
133 P.2d 1000, 1003; People v Thompson (1956), 144 Cal.App.
.
2d 854, 301 P.2d 313. And more recently, in cases involving
the alternative theories of premeditated murder and felony-
murder, Michigan and Washington have held that the jury must
be instructed that its verdict be unanimous on at least one
of the theories. State v. Golliday (1979), 78 Wash.2d 121,
137, 470 P.2d 191, 201; People v. Embree (1976), 68 Mich.App.
40, 241 N.W.2d 733; People v. Olsson (1974), 56 Mich.App.
500, 507, 224 N.E.2d 691, 693-694.
In Olsson, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed a
conviction because jury instructions failed to distinguish
between felony murder and premeditated murder, and because
the jury was not instructed that it must unanimously agree
on the same statutory theory in order to reach a verdict.
224 N.W.2d 693-694. And in Embree, the Michigan Court of
Appeals again warned trial courts that they must instruct
juries that their verdict must be unanimous on the question
of whether the alleged murder was premeditated or whether it
was committed in a situation calling for application of the
felony-murder rule. 68 Mich.App. 384, 246 N.W.2d at 7.
Finally, in Golliday, the Washington Supreme Court held that
"instructions must clearly distinguish between the alternative
theories and require the necessity for a unanimous verdict
on either of the alternatives. 470 P.2d at 201.
As I shall later demonstrate in detail, each of the
charges involved here was based on alternative allegations.
Yet the jury was not told that its verdict must be unanimous

as to any one or more theories. In addition, there is no
way of telling which theory or theories the jury used to
convict Coleman of all three offenses--one of which triggered
the imposition of the death penalty.
WHY THE CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED
Those decisions holding a general unanimity instruction
to be sufficient, fail to go beyond this general statement.
They ignore the actual doubt that inheres in such a position.
Further, they ignore the fact that it is a defect in the
judicial system that has created the problem; it is not a
problem created by the defendant. The defect can be charged
to the State in failing to properly charge the defendant in
separate counts, the defect can be charged to the trial court
in failing to instruct the jury that its verdict must be
unanimous as to any statutory theory or theories of criminal
responsibility, and the defect can be charged to the trial
court in failing to provide clear verdict forms. Because
these decisions ignore these failures in the judicial system,
and assume unanimity, analysis is confined solely to reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence support each theory submitted
to the jury.
Obviously, if the theory of criminal responsibility is
clear, and the verdict is clear, review can then center on
the sufficiency of the evidence. If the appellate court can
state that the jury applied a particular theory or theories
in reaching its decision, the court can then confine itself
to examining the evidence to determine its sufficiency. If
it is sufficient, it can affirmed; not, the conviction
must be reversed.
But what does the appellate court do if the verdict
fails to disclose the statutory theory on which the jury
based its decision? An analysis of all theories to determine
their sufficiency clearly proceeds on the assumption that
whatever theory or theories the jury used, the jury was unanimous.
Without this assumption of unanimity, the conviction would be
reversed precisely because of the inability of the court to
say that the jury verdict was unanimous.
But an assumption of unanimity should never be made in
a case such as the one involved here, unless the jury has
been specifically instructed that it must be unanimous on
any statutory theory or theories on which the State has based
its prosecution. Failure to give this instruction is cause
for reversal. In this event, appellate review would then be
confined to determining whether all theories are supported by
substantial evidence. If all were so supported, the judgment
would be reversed and a new trial ordered under all theories.
If not so supported, the case would be reversed with retrial
only on those theories supported by substantial evidence.
Where the appellate court rests on an assumption of
unanimity, however, reversal is required only if all theories
are not supported by substantial evidence. But the reason
for reversal is not that the jury was less than unanimous on
a theory or theory on which it based its conviction, for
unanimity is assumed. Rather, the reason for reversal is
that the jury may have been unanimous on a theory not supported
by the evidence. Uncertainty as to the theory used is the
reason for reversal. This rationale is much the same as that
used to reverse a jury verdict where the jury is given
inconsistent instructions on an important point of law.
Reversal is based on a fundamental policy rule that if the
appellate court cannot tell whether the jnry followed the
correct or incorrect instruction, and it would be unfair to
affirm a verdict based on an erroneous instruction. See,
for example, my dissent in State v. Price (1980), Mont .
,
- 622 P.2d 160, 37 St-Rep. 1926, where I thoroughly
developed this theory of appellate review. The impelling
reason for reversal in both situations is uncertainty as to
what the jury did where it may have followed an evidentiary
theory not supported by the evidence, or an erroneous
instruction, and therefore uncertainty is created as to
whether a correct verdict was reached.
Where several alternative theories of criminal respon-
sibility are presented to the jury, and where the verdict is
ambiguous as to which theory or theories were applied, review
of necessity rests on an implicit recognition that no one
knows what theory the jury actually followed in reaching its
verdict. If the jury had been instructed, however, that it
must be unanimous on any theory applied to reach a decision,
then an appellate court should assume that the jury was in
fact unanimous. But where there is no such instruction, the
appellate court should not make this assumption. The question
boils down to one of policy--how much leeway can a jury be
permitted in reaching its decision? If due consideration is
given to the fact that a defendant's liberty or even his life
is at stake, that policy should come down on the side of
reversal.
In a case such as this, a general unanimity instruction
should not enshrine the verdict with unanimity. Either an
assumption that the jury reached unanimous agreement, or an
assumption that the jury did not reach unanimous agreement,
without further analysis, fails to deal with the basic problem.
An assumption either way still rests on an implicit recognition
that the appellate court cannot tell how the jury actually

decided the case. In addition to the actual uncertainty
resulting from the ambiguous verdict, reversal should also
be mandated because the State, not the defendant, caused the
problem. The defendant should not suffer from a defect of
the judicial system.
In charging alternatively in one count rather than
charging alternatively in separate counts (see section 46-11-404
MCA, supra) the State initiated the problem of ambiguity.
The trial court then compounded the ambiguity by failing to
instruct the jury that its verdict must be unanimous on one
or more of the alternative theories of criminal responsibility
as alleged by the State. And finally, the trial court added
again to the problem by submitting to the jury the ambiguous
verdict forms. Doubt surely inheres in this situation. This
situation was created by the State (the prosecution and the
court) and the benefit of this doubt should be given to the
defendant. United States v. Andres, supra. In any criminal
case, fundamental due process impels a reversal; in a death
penalty case such as this fundamental due process mandates
a reversal.
ANALYSIS OF THE CHARGES FILED, THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN, AND
THE VERDICTS RETURNED IN THIS CASE
The formal charge for each count, the instructions
for each count, and the verdict forms for each count, present
essentially the same problems. The instructions for count
I, the deliberate homicide charge, for count 11, the aggravated
kidnapping charge, and for count 111, the sexual intercourse
without consent charge, respectively gave the jury several
alternative statutory theories on which the jury could base
its verdict. The jury was given a general unanimity instruction
designed to apply to all three counts. But the jury was not
instructed that it must unanimously agree to any one or more
of the alternative statutory theories. Furthermore, the verdict
forms required nothing more than a determination that the
defendant was guilty or not guilty of deliberate homicide,
guilty or not guilty of aggravated kidnapping, and guilty or
not guilty of sexual intercourse without consent.
The general instruction on unan

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/877465. Public record. Not legal advice.