# In re Live Concert Antitrust Litigation

> District Court, C.D. California · October 22, 2007 · 247 F.R.D. 98

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8750099

## Case

- **Full name:** In re LIVE CONCERT ANTITRUST LITIGATION
- **Court:** District Court, C.D. California
- **Decided:** October 22, 2007
- **Citations:** 247 F.R.D. 98; 2007 WL 4291967
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Wilson
- **Judges:** Wilson
- **Cited by:** 22 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8750099

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing the distinction between demonstrating the fact of damages and the amount of damages, and determining that while the latter does not preclude class certification, the former does.
- holding that the fact that “some potential class members are unlikely to recover because of a unique defense” is “not relevant to typicality”
- holding that unique defenses against some class members do not make a class representative atypical

## Opinion text

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION [79] AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS [74]
STEPHEN V. WILSON, District Judge.
I. INTRODUCTION
This Multi-District Litigation (“MDL”) consists of twenty-two class actions from across the country against Defendant Clear Channel Communications, Inc. and its subsidiaries. 1 The Plaintiffs, individuals who *100 purchased tickets to live rock concerts, allege that Clear Channel and its subsidiaries engaged in unlawful and anticompetitive activities to acquire, maintain, and extend its monopoly power in various regional ticket markets for live rock concerts. In each of the twenty-two class actions, the Plaintiffs filed substantively identical complaints which allege three causes of action: (1) monopolization in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2 ; (2) attempted monopolization in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2 ; and (3) unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief.
For purposes of efficiency, the Court ordered that discovery be initially limited to the five regional markets of Boston, Chicago, Denver, Los Angeles, and New Jersey/New York. See (Order Narrowing the Scope of Class Discovery, Nov. 1, 2006.) The Court ordered the Plaintiffs to file motions for class certification in these five markets pursuant to an attached discovery schedule. (Id.)
Plaintiffs filed motions for class certification in the five test cities on March 7, 2007. Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiffs’ second cause of action on March 6, 2007. The Court held a hearing on June 4, 2007 at which time both parties presented expert testimony. The Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefing concerning class certification following the hearing. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants also supplemented the class certification record with additional evidence following the hearing.
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
The Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Clear Channel engaged in unlawful and anticom-petitive activities to acquire, maintain, and extend its monopoly power in various regional markets for live rock concerts.
A. The Parties
Plaintiff Malinda Riley is a resident of Chicago, Illinois. (Riley Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff Margaret Thompson is a resident of Los Angeles, California. (Thompson Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff Lauren Hammer is a resident of Boulder, Colorado. (Hammer Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff Kevin MacLaughlan is a resident of Medford, Massachusetts. (MacLaughlan Compl. ¶ 9.) Plaintiff Hayes Young is a resident of New Jersey. (Young Compl. ¶ 9.) All of the Plaintiffs purchased one or more tickets to rock concerts promoted by Defendants in their respective regions during the defined class period. (Riley Compl. ¶ 9; Thompson Compl. ¶ 9; Hammer Compl. ¶ 9; Young Compl. ¶ 9; MacLaughlan Compl. ¶ 9.)
Defendant Clear Channel Communications, Inc. (“Clear Channel Communications”) was incorporated in Texas with its principal place of business in Texas. (Riley Compl. ¶ 10.) 2 Defendant Clear Channel Radio, Inc. (“Clear Channel Radio”) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Clear Channel Communications. (Riley Compl. ¶ 12.) Clear Channel Radio was incorporated in Nevada with its principal place of business in Kentucky. (Riley Compl. ¶ 12.) Defendant Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc. (“Clear Channel Broadcasting”) was incorporated in Nevada with its principal place of business in Texas. (Riley Compl. ¶ 13.)
SFX Entertainment, Inc. (“SFX”) was one of the world’s largest promoters and venue operators for live entertainment events in the late 1990s. (Riley Compl. ¶ 14.) Clear Channel Communications acquired SFX in 2000 and changed SFX’s name to Clear *101 Channel Entertainment, Inc. (“Clear Channel Entertainment”) in July 2001. (Riley Compl. ¶¶ 11, 14.) Clear Channel Entertainment is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Clear Channel Communications and was incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in New York., (Riley Compl. ¶¶ 11,-14.) In December 2005, Clear Channel Communications spun-off Clear Channel Entertainment as a publicly traded company named Live Nation, Inc. (“Live Nation”). Live Nation was incorporated in Delaware with its headquarters in California. (Riley Compl. ¶ 14.) When all of the Defendants are referenced collectively, the Court will refer to them as “Clear Channel.”
B. The Concert Promotion Industry
Musical artists contract with booking agents to serve as the artists’ authorized representatives concerning the booking of live concerts. (Riley Compl. ¶ 19.) Booking agents “sell” concerts to concert promoters. (Id.) The concert promoter subsequently “resells” the concert to the public in the form of a concert ticket. (Id.)
The concert promoter is financially responsible for the concert. For example, the concert promoter is responsible for advertising and marketing the concert (e.g. promoting the concert on the radio). (Id. ¶20.) Also, the concert promoter is responsible for concert expenses such as transportation, hotel costs, sound and lighting equipment, security, ushers, ticket takers, and stage managers. (Id.) Additionally, the concert promoter is responsible for securing the venue for the concert. (Id.) Whether the promoter earns a profit depends on the revenue generated from ticket sales and other sources of income such as sponsorship deals, food and beverage sales, and merchandise sales. (Id. ¶ 21.)
C. Overview of Clear Channel Communications
Clear Channel Communications is a publicly-traded, multimedia corporation. Clear Channel is the largest owner of radio stations in the United States. (Riley Compl. ¶ 24.) The 1200 radio stations owned or programmed by Defendant dwarfs its next largest radio competitor, Infinity Broadcasting Corp., which operates only 183 stations. (Id.) Clear Channel’s radio stations reach more than 110 million listeners nationwide each week. (Riley Compl. ¶ 25.)
As noted above, Clear Channel entered the live entertainment business in August 2000 when it acquired SFX Entertainment, Inc. 3 (Riley Compl. ¶ 23.) SFX was one of the largest national concert promoters following SFX’s acquisition of several independent concert promoters in 1997. (Id. ¶ 23.) With the acquisition of SFX, Clear Channel generates approximately 70% of concert ticket revenue in the United States. (Id. ¶28.) Clear Channel produces more than 26,000 live entertainment events per year, and owns or controls more than 135 live entertainment venues. (Id. ¶ 24.) Clear Channel produced major music tours including U2, Madonna, Janet Jackson, N’SYNC, Britney Spears, Backstreet Boys, Dave Matthews Band, The Rolling Stones, and Tina Turner. (Id. ¶ 28.)
Clear Channel also operates more than 700,000 outdoor advertising displays, such as billboards, and owns or operates more than 19 television stations. (Riley Compl. ¶24.)
D. Alleged Anticompetitive Conduct
Plaintiffs allege that “Clear Channel has engaged in a vast array of anticompetitive, predatory and exclusionary practices in the course of acquiring, maintaining and extending its monopoly power in the relevant market.” (Riley Compl. ¶ 35.) First, Plaintiffs claim that Clear Channel substantially eliminated competition in the radio and concert promotion markets. For example, Clear Channel increased its market power through the acquisition or merger of primary competitors such as the AM7FM and SFX mergers. (Id. ¶ 36.)
Second, Plaintiffs allege that Clear Channel has leveraged its market power in the radio market to increase its market power in the concert promotion market. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that “Clear Cannel repeatedly has used it [sic] size and clout to coerce artists — including artists who had pre-exist- *102 ing business relationships with competitors— to use Clear Channel to promote their concerts or else risk losing airplay and other on-air promotional support on radio stations owned or otherwise controlled by Clear Channel.” 4 (Id. ¶ 41.) Airplay of music and concert promotion on radio stations can determine the financial success of a concert. (Id. ¶ 40.)
Similarly, Plaintiffs claim that Clear Channel Radio has limited advertising availability, charged excessive advertising rates, and misrepresented the availability of advertising to competing promoters and artists not promoted by Clear Channel. 5 (Id. ¶ 48.)
Finally, Plaintiffs allege that Clear Channel bids up the fees for artists to levels at which competing promoters cannot compete. For example, Plaintiffs claim that Clear Channel will guarantee artists more than 100 percent of gross sales in exchange for the right to promote the artist’s concert. (Id. ¶ 46.) As a result, competing producers must either pass on such artists or promote the artists at a guaranteed loss. 6 (Id.)
E. Alleged Effects of Clear Channel’s Conduct
Plaintiffs claim that Clear Channel’s conduct had various anticompetitive effects on the concert promotion industry. For example, Plaintiffs allege that Clear Channel’s conduct has restrained potential competitors from entering and competing in the market. (Riley Compl. ¶ 49.) Plaintiffs claim that they suffered damage by being charged supra-competitive ticket prices by Clear Channel. (Riley Compl. ¶¶ 64, 68.)
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. New York Litigation
In 2002, Plaintiff Melinda Heerwagen filed a civil antitrust action against Defendant Clear Channel in the Southern District of New York. Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Entm’t, Inc., 2003 WL 24467832 , at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.13, 2003). Heerwagen alleged that Clear Channel engaged in unlawful and anticompetitive activities to acquire, maintain, and extend its monopoly power in the national ticket market for live rock concerts. The district court ruled that the relevant market was local, rather than national, and therefore denied the petition for class certification. The court explained that proof specific to individual putative class members in different geographic markets would predominate over common questions of law and fact. Id.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of class certification based on the plaintiffs failure to show that the live rock concert ticket market was national. Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Communications, 435 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir.2006). Because the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate live rock concerts constitute a single geographic market national in scope, the Second Circuit did “not address the issue of whether the rock concert ticket market is a single product market.” Id.
B. MDL Litigation
On September 12, 2005, Plaintiff Margaret Thompson filed a complaint against Defendant Clear Channel in this Court. Margaret Thompson v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., et al., CV 05-6704-SW (RCx) (Southern California Region). Similar to Heerwagen, Plaintiff Thompson alleged that Clear Channel and its subsidiaries engaged in unlawful and anticompetitive activities to acquire, maintain, and extend its monopoly power in various regional ticket markets for live rock concerts. The only difference between Thompson’s complaint and Heerwagen is that Thompson defined the putative class *103 as encompassing the Southern California region whereas the putative class in Heerwagen was national.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407 , the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred related actions pending outside the Central District of California to this Court on April 19, 2006. (Transfer Order, Apr. 19, 2006.) A total of twenty-one cases were eventually transferred to this Court. See infra n. 1. In each of the twenty-two class actions, the Plaintiffs filed substantively identical complaints.
For purposes of efficiency, the Court ordered that discovery be initially limited to the five regional markets of Boston, Chicago Denver, Los Angeles, and New Jersey/New York. See (Order Narrowing the Scope of Class Discovery, Nov. 1, 2006.) Plaintiffs filed motions for class certification in the five test cities on March 7, 2007. Defendant filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on Plaintiffs’ second cause of action on March 6, 2007.
IV. CHOICE OF LAW
A difficult initial question is determining which circuit’s law applies when resolving questions of federal law in this multi-district litigation. 7 The Manual for Complex Litigation (4th ed.2004) provides the following instruction about choice of law:
Complexities may arise where the rulings turn on questions of substantive law. In diversity cases, the law of the transferor district follows the ease to the transferee district. Where the claim or defense arises under federal law, however, the transferee judge should consider whether to apply the law of the transferee circuit or that of the transferor court’s circuit, keeping in mind that statutes of limitations may present unique problems.
§ 20.132.
Prior to 1987, numerous courts applied the law of the transferor jurisdiction in MDL proceedings involving federal law. See In re The Dow Company “Sarabond” Prods. Liab. Litig., 666 F.Supp. 1466 , 1468 n. 3 (D.Colo. 1987) (listing eases applying law of the trans-feror jurisdiction). In 1987, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the law of the transferee applies when construing federal law in an opinion authored by then Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg. In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C.Cir.1987). Specifically, the D.C. Circuit held:
The federal courts spread across the country owe respect to each other’s efforts and should strive to avoid conflicts, but each has an obligation to engage independently in reasoned analysis. Binding precedent for all is set only by the Supreme Court, and for the district courts within a circuit, only by the court of appeals for that circuit ____ the law of a transferor forum on a federal question — here, the law of the Second Circuit — merits close consideration, but does not have stare decisis effect in a transferee forum situated in another circuit.
Id. at 1176 . The D.C. Circuit based its determination on four grounds. First, the Court determined that prior federal courts had based their decision on an inapplicable Supreme Court opinion involving state choice-of-law issues rather than federal choice-of-law issues. Id. at 1173-1175 . Second, the Court found that “[ajpplying divergent interpretations of the governing federal law to plaintiffs, depending solely upon where they initially filed suit, would surely reduce the efficiencies achievable through consolidated preparatory proceedings.” Id. at 1175 . Third, the Court determined that it would be “inherently self-contradictory” and “logically inconsistent to require one judge to apply simultaneously different and conflicting interpretations of what is supposed to be a unitary federal law.” Id. at 1175-76 . Finally, the Court explained that “ ‘[i]f ... more than one interpretation of federal law exists, the Supreme Court of the United States can finally determine the issue and restore uniformity in the federal system.’ ” Id. at 1176 (quoting In re Korean Air Line Disaster of *104 Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F.Supp. 1488, 1489 (D.D.C. 1987)).
Following the D.C. Circuit’s decision, circuit and district courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have uniformly applied the law of the transferee circuit in MDL proceedings involving federal law. See, e.g., Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir.1994); Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implant Recipients v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 97 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir.1996); Murphy v. F.D.I.C., 208 F.3d 959 , 964-65 (11th Cir.2000); Bradley v. United States, 161 F.3d 777 , 782 n. 4 (4th Cir.1998); Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36 , 40-41 (2d Cir.1993); Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, 8 F.3d 1121, 1126 (7th Cir.1993). See also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 2005 WL 106936 at *4 n. 37 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.18, 2005) (listing examples of district court opinions holding that questions of federal law are governed by the law of the transferee circuit). For example, in Newton the Ninth Circuit held that “when reviewing federal claims, a transferee court in this circuit is bound only by our circuit’s precedent.” 22 F.3d at 1460 . The Court follows the approach mandated by Newton and Korean Air Lines Disaster, 8 Therefore, the Court will give the precedent of transfer- *105 or circuits “close consideration,” but the Court is only bound by Ninth Circuit and Supreme Court precedent.
V. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
Plaintiffs filed a motion for class certification in each of the 7 five test eases: Chicago, Los Angeles, Denver, Boston, and New York/ New Jersey. Plaintiffs proposed class in the Chicago case is “All persons who purchased tickets to any live rock concert in the Chicago Region directly from any of the Defendants or their affiliates or predecessors or agents during the period from June 19, 1998 to the present.” (Pl.’s Mem. at 1.) The definitions for the other test cases are identical except for the geographic region. 9
A. General Standard for Class Certification
Rule 23(a) provides that a class member may sue as a representative party on behalf of all class members if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). If the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) are satisfied, Plaintiff must also satisfy Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3). Plaintiff seeks to certify the class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). Rule 23(b)(3) provides that “An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition ... the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.”
“The party seeking certification bears the burden of showing that each of the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and at least one requirement of Rule 23(b) have been met.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 , 1224 (9th Cir.2007).
B. Assessment of the Evidence in a Motion Certification
A significant issue in resolving Plaintiffs’ motion is determining whether the Court may make factual findings in determining whether the requirements of Rule 23 are satisfied. Plaintiffs contend that the Court may not engage in a “battle of the experts” and must certify the class so long as Plaintiffs’ expert has “employed a well-accepted methodology to reach his opinions ... and his testimony has a reliable basis in knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline.” (Pis.’ Post-Hearing Brief at 3-4.) (quoting Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1227). In contrast, Defendants contend that “analysis of the merits is permissible to determine if Rule 23 Requirements are met.” (Defs.’ Post-Hearing Brief at 2.)
As discussed below, Rule 23 is silent on this issue, the Supreme Court has never directly addressed this issue, and the Circuits appear to be split on this issue.
1. Text and Amendments to Rule 23
Rule 23 does not provide what standard of proof a Plaintiff must satisfy in order to *106 obtain class certification. Nor does Rule 23 explain whether a district court may make factual findings in determining whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied. However, the 2003 amendments to Rule 23 arguably support the inference that a district court is not permitted to engage in a more extensive inquiry in determining whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied.
First, the amendments to Rule 23 eliminated the prior Rule 23(c)(1)(C) provision that allowed the conditional granting of class certification. Second, Rule 23(c)(1)(A) previously stated that a class certification decision be made “as soon as practicable.” The amendments changed Rule 23(c)(1)(A) to state that a decision should be made “at an early practicable time.” Finally, the Advisory Committee notes provide that a “court that is not satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they have been met.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(c)(1)(C) Adv. Comm. Notes 2003. The Committee further explains that
[a]lthough an evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits is not properly part of the certification decision, discovery in aid of the certification decision often includes information required to identify the nature of the issues that actually will be presented at trial. In this sense it is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery into the “merits,” limited to those aspects relevant to making a certification decision on an informed basis.
Id.
Based on these amendments and comments, the Second Circuit has noted that a district court may be permitted “a more extensive inquiry into whether Rule 23 requirements are met than was previously appropriate.” In re Initial Public Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 39 (2d Cir.2006). However, for reasons discussed below, the Ninth Circuit has apparently rejected the holding of In re IPO Securities Litigation. See Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1227. Therefore, it is unclear whether the Second Circuit’s view of the effect of the 2003 amendments carries any weight in the Ninth Circuit.
2. Supreme Court Treatment of Rule 23
The first major Supreme Court case to address this issue was Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 , 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974). In Eisen , the district court determined that the Rule 23 class certification requirements were satisfied. Id. at 161 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 . In determining which party should bear the cost of providing notice to the class, the district court reasoned that it was unfair to impose the cost of notice on the defendants unless the plaintiffs showed a probability of success on the merits. Id. at 167-68 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 .
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the plaintiffs were required to bear the cost of notice to the class because it found “nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.” Id. at 177 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 . Additionally, the Court reasoned that a preliminary inquiry into the merits was improper because it would provide the plaintiffs with a determination on the merits “without any assurance that a class action may be maintained,” and might “color the subsequent proceedings,” and “place an unfair burden on the defendant.” Id. at 177-78 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 .
As an analysis of Eisen shows, however, the issue concerned a “preliminary inquiry into the merits” for purposes of the apportionment of the cost of notice rather than a determination of the Rule 23 requirements. However, the statement “has led some courts to think that in determining whether any Rule 23 requirement is met, a judge may not consider any aspect of the merits, and has led other courts to think that a judge may not do so at least with respect to a prerequisite of Rule 23 that overlaps with an aspect of the merits of the case.” In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 33 . See, e.g., Alba v. Papa John’s USA, Inc., 2007 WL 953849 , at *5 (C.D.Cal. Feb.7, 2007) (“In deciding a motion to certify a class, the court may not evaluate whether the plaintiff is likely to prevail on the merits of the stated claims.”) (citing Ei-sen, 417 U.S. at 177-78 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 .)
*107 The Supreme Court further addressed Rule 23 requirements in Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 , 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). The Supreme Court explained that “[A] Title VII class action, like any other class action, may only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.” Id. at 161 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 . The Supreme Court also stated that “actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains ... indispensable.” Id. at 160 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 . Finally, the Supreme Court observed that “the class determination generally involves considerations that are enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiffs cause of action.” Id. (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469 , 98 S.Ct. 2454 , 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978)). The Court concluded that “sometimes it may be necessary for the court to probe behind the pleadings before coming to rest on the certification question.” Id. Therefore, several propositions can be gleaned from Gen. Tel. Co.: (1) class certification required a “rigorous analysis,” (2) a court may not simply presume conformance with the Rule 23 requirements, and (3) a court may sometimes need to look beyond the pleadings in determining the certification issue. However, the import of the Supreme Court’s statement that a class determination involves considerations “enmeshed in the factual and legal issues” is unclear and has been interpreted in disparate ways by the lower courts. See In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 33 .
3. Treatment by the Ninth Circuit prior to 2007
In Blackie v. Barrack, the Ninth Circuit established its standard concerning a district court’s evaluation of the Rule 23 factors:
The court is bound to take the substantive allegations of the complaint as true, thus necessarily making the class order speculative in the sense that the plaintiff may be altogether unable to prove his allegations. While the court may not put the plaintiff to preliminary proof of his claim, it does require sufficient information to form a reasonable judgment. Lacking that, the court may request the parties to supplement the pleadings with sufficient material to allow an informed judgment on each of the Rule’s requirements.
524 F.2d 891 , 901 n. 17 (9th Cir.1975). The Ninth Circuit also cited Eisen even though Blackie involved a determination of the Rule 23 requirements rather than the apportionment of the cost of providing notice to class members:
The Court made clear in Eisen [ ] that that determination does not permit or require a preliminary inquiry into the merits, 417 U.S. at 177-178 [, 94 S.Ct. 2140 ]; thus the district judge is necessarily bound to some degree of speculation by the uncertain state of the record on which he must rule. An extensive evidentiary showing of the sort requested by defendants is not required. So long as he has sufficient material before him to determine the nature of the allegations, and rule on compliance with the Rule’s requirements, and he bases his ruling on that material/his approach cannot be faulted because plaintiffs’ proof may fail at trial.
Id. at 901.
Blackie provides little guidance on whether a district court may resolve factual disputes in determining whether the Rule 23 requirements are satisfied. 10 Some of Blackie’s lan *108 guage suggests that a district court may not resolve factual disputes. For example, Blackie mandates that a district court take the factual allegations as true. Id. at 901 n. 17. Such an inference seems to bar a district court from resolving factual disputes against the plaintiff so long as the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to create a dispute. 11 Additionally, Blackie precludes a district court from putting a plaintiff “to preliminary proof of his claim.” Id. Finally, Blackie cites Eisen for the proposition that a court may not make a preliminary inquiry into the merits. Id. at 901. This extension of Eisen beyond the notice context suggests that the Ninth Circuit intended to preclude a weighing of evidence at the class certification stage.
However, other language in Blackie suggests the opposite conclusion. Blackie states that a motion for class certification requires “sufficient information to form a reasonable judgment.” Id. at 901 n. 17. A judge is permitted to request supplemental material so that an “informed judgment” may be made. Id. While an “extensive evidentiary showing” is not required, the district court may “rule on compliance” and base its ruling on the supplemental material. Id. at 901. The use of the phrases “ruling based on that material,” “informed judgment,” and “reasonable judgment” suggest that a district court may make a factual determination when the pleadings have been supplemented with additional material. Additionally, a request for supplemental material would be meaningless if the court were precluded from making factual determinations concerning these submissions. Therefore, the Court concludes that Blackie is ambiguous as to whether a court may resolve factual disputes in determining whether the Rule 23 requirements are satisfied.
The Court recognizes the hundreds of courts that have cited Blackie's language concerning motions for class certification. Most courts simply quote a substantial portion of the two paragraphs but do not attempt to resolve the issue discussed above. See, e.g., L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 662463 , at *13 (E.D.Cal. Feb.28, 2007); Westways World Travel, Inc. v. AMR Corp., 218 F.R.D. 223, 231 (C.D.Cal.2003); Levine v. SkyMall, Inc., 2002 WL 31056919 , at *2-3 (D.Ariz. May 24, 2002); Joyce v. City and County of San Francisco, 1994 WL 443464 , at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug.4, 1994); In re Unioil Sec. Litig., 107 F.R.D. 615, 618 (C.D.Cal. 1985); Schwartz v. Harp, 108 F.R.D. 279, 280 (C.D.Cal.1985). Other courts have reworded Blackie, but refrained from deciding whether a court may resolve factual disputes. See, e.g., In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 691 F.2d 1335, 1342 (9th Cir.1982) (“Although in determining whether to certify the class, the district court is bound to take the substantive allegations of the complaint as true, the court is also required to consider the nature and range of proof necessary to establish those allegations.”); Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind v. Target Corp., 2007 WL 1223755 , at *3 (N.D.Cal. Apr.25, 2007) (“However, in adjudicating a motion for class certification the court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true so long as those allegations are sufficiently specific to permit an informed assessment as to whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been satisfied.”); Kirkpatrick v. Ironwood Communications, Inc., 2006 WL 2381797 , at *3 (W.D.Wash. Aug.16, 2006) (“The court may assume the truth of Plaintiffs’ substantive allegations, but should consider extrinsic evidence regarding whether the action is appropriate to treat as a class.”); Rogers v. NationsCredit Fin. Servs. Corp., 233 B.R. 98, 102-103 (N.D.Cal.1999) (“Not *109 withstanding the general prohibition against examining the merits, some canvassing of the facts is permissible.”); Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co. 183 F.R.D. 672, 681 (S.D.Cal.1999) (“Reasonable judgments cannot be made out of thin air; sufficient information to make such a judgment is a required preliminary step.”).
One of the few decisions to address whether a court may resolve factual disputes is Osmer v. Aerospace Corp., 1982 WL 488 , at *1 (C.D.Cal. Oct.20, 1982). In Osmer , the plaintiff alleged that the defendant applied certain discriminatory policies on a class-wide basis. 1982 WL 488 , at *2. The plaintiff submitted affidavits and statistical studies based on a regression analysis of data “on employee advancement and salary.” Id. at *2 n. 2. Defendant submitted declarations “asserting that plaintiffs expert opinion is statistically unsound, that management level personnel made their decisions in a nondiscriminatory manner, and affidavits of various female employees who claim they were not held back by any policy of defendant.” Id. at *4 . The Court held that “[tjaking the representations alleged by plaintiff in the complaint, and the statistical proof offered, along with the affidavits, the plaintiff has presented common questions capable of resolution in the context of a class suit.” Id. The Court observed that it was not ruling “on’ whether the contrary affidavits of defendant are sufficient to prevail on the merits ... [but instead] that, under the test mandated by Blackie, 524 F.2d at 901, the plaintiff has shown that questions of fact which would be common to the whole class are presented by the pleadings and material submitted.” Id.
4. Dukes v. Wal-Mart
The Ninth Circuit recently issued an opinion which may have resolved the uncertainty discussed above. In Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., female Wal-Mart employees alleging sex discrimination brought a Title VII class action against Wal-Mart. 474 F.3d 1214 (9th Cir.2007). The district court certified the class for certain of plaintiffs’ claims and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Id.
One of the principal issues raised by Wal-Mart on appeal was whether the plaintiffs
had satisfied Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality requirement by presenting evidence that Wal-Mart engaged in discriminatory practices that affected all plaintiffs in a common manner. Id. at 1225. To establish commonality, plaintiffs submitted factual evidence, expert opinions, expert statistical evidence, and anecdotal evidence. Id. For example, plaintiffs’ expert sociologist explained that “Wal-Mart has and promotes a strong corporate culture — a culture that may include gender stereotyping.” Id. at 1226. Plaintiffs’ expert concluded “(1) that Wal-Mart’s centralized coordination, reinforced by a strong organizational culture, sustains uniformity in personnel policy and practice; (2) that there are significant deficiencies in Wal-Mart’s equal employment policies and practices; and (3) that Wal-Mart’s personnel policies and practices make pay and promotion decisions vulnerable to gender bias.” Id.
Wal-Mart argued that the expert’s third conclusion was vague, imprecise, and failed to satisfy Daubert. However, the district court rejected Wal-Mart’s argument, explaining that Wal-Mart’s challenges “ ‘are of the type that go to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of the evidence.’ ” Id. at 1227 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 189, 191-92 (N.D.Cal.2004)). The Ninth Circuit agreed, explaining that “[t]he district court was on very solid ground here as it has long been recognized that arguments evaluating the weight of evidence or the merits of a case are improper at the class certification stage.” Id. (citing Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177 , 94 S.Ct. 2140 (“We find nothing in either the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action.”); Selzer v. Bd. of Educ. of City of New York, 112 F.R.D. 176, 178 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (“A motion for class certification is not the occasion for a mini-hearing on the merits.”)). The Ninth Circuit also stated that “courts need not apply the full Daubert ‘gatekeeper’ standard at the class certification stage.” 474 F.3d at 1227. “Rather, ‘a lower Daubert standard should be employed at this [class certification] stage of the proceedings.’ ” Id. (quoting Thomas & Thomas *110 Rodmakers, Inc. v. Newport Adhesives & Composites, Inc., 209 F.R.D. 159, 162 (C.D.Cal.2002)).
Similarly, Plaintiffs’ expert statistician presented statistical evidence of class-wide discrimination based on data collected at a regional level. 474 F.3d at 1228. Wal-Mart claimed that “the district court erred by not finding Wal-Mart’s statistical evidence more probative than Plaintiffs’ evidence because, according to Wal-Mart, its analysis was conducted store-by-store” rather than at a regional level. Id. at 1229. The Ninth Circuit rejected Wal-Mart’s argument that class certification should not have been granted because 6 Wal-Mart’s statistical evidence was more probative:
[O]ur job on this appeal is to resolve whether the “evidence is sufficient to demonstrate common questions of fact warranting certification of the proposed class, not whether the evidence ultimately will be persuasive” to the trier of fact. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 135 (2d Cir.2001). Thus, it was appropriate for the court to avoid resolving “the battle of the experts” at this stage of the proceedings. See Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283, 292-93 (2d Cir.1999) (noting that a district court may not weigh conflicting expert evidence or engage in “statistical dueling” of experts).
474 F.3d at 1229.
Thus, Dukes appears to have established three propositions. First, the Dukes majority explains that challenges to expert opinions constitute merits determinations that go to the weight of the evidence rather than admissibility. Id. at 1227. Thus, a district court is not permitted to discount the testimony of a plaintiff expert merely because the defendant has challenged some aspect of the expert’s opinion. Id.
Second, Dukes extended the holding of Eisen to determinations involving Rule 23 requirements. Id. As discussed above, numerous courts have extended Eisen beyond its original holding, including the Ninth Circuit in Blackie.
Finally, the Dukes majority held that a court may not weigh conflicting evidence in determining whether the Rule 23 requirements are satisfied. Id. at 1229. Where both plaintiffs and defendants have proffered expert testimony, the court must avoid resolving a “battle of the experts” in a motion for class certification. Id. Therefore, at a minimum, Dukes establishes that a court may not resolve factual conflicts concerning expert opinions in a motion for class certification. Read more broadly, Dukes could be interpreted as holding that a district court may not resolve any factual disputes in determining whether the Rule 23 requirements are satisfied.
Such a reading of Dukes is essentially required in light of Dukes’ reliance on the Second Circuit cases of Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 191 F.3d 283 (2d Cir.1999) and In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.2001).
a. Caridad
In Caridad , present and former employees of the defendant brought a Title VII race discrimination action. 191 F.3d at 286 . The plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of current and former African-American employees of Metro-North. Id. To establish commonality, plaintiffs submitted numerous statistical analyses which were analyzed by the plaintiffs’ expert. Id. at 288 . Based on an analysis of company-wide statistics, the plaintiffs’ expert concluded that the Metro-North’s company-wide policies for discipline and promotion were exercised in a discriminatory manner. Id.
Metro-North’s expert, Dr. Evans, criticized the conclusions of plaintiffs expert. Id. Specifically, Dr. Evans argued that the plaintiffs’ expert’s analysis was flawed because it was conducted on a company-wide basis rather than a position-by-position basis. Id. For example, Dr. Evans noted that out of the thirty-seven different departments at the employer, no disciplinary action was taken in twenty-five of the departments. Id. Additionally, Dr. Evans explained that there was significant variation in discipline from job to job within those departments where disciplin *111 ary action was taken. Id. Dr. Evans pointed out similar flaws regarding plaintiffs’ expert’s analysis of promotions. Id. at 289 . Therefore, Dr. Evans concluded that “‘an organization-wide pattern and practice of discrimination is ... implausible’ ” and the plaintiffs were “‘at best, typical of only a fraction of the [defendant’s] workforce.’” Id. at 288 .
Relying on the analysis of Dr. Evans, the district court denied class certification. Id. at 289-90 . The Second Circuit reversed and criticized the district court’s reliance on Dr. Evans:
The District Court relied on the report of Metro-North’s statistical expert, Dr. Evans, to conclude that the Class Plaintiffs’ statistics were inadequate because they failed to take into account the fact that various Metro-North positions have materially different rates of discipline and promotion. Though Metro-North’s critique of the Class Plaintiffs’ evidence may prove fatal at the merits stage, the Class Plaintiffs need not demonstrate at this stage that they will prevail on the merits. Accordingly, this sort of “statistical dueling” is not relevant to the certification determination. See, e.g., Krueger v. New York Telephone Company, 163 F.R.D. 433, 440-41 (S.D.N.Y.1995). We conclude that the Class Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence supports a finding of commonality on the issue of discipline with respect to those African-American employees who were disciplined while working in one of the 48 positions in which African-Americans are more likely to be disciplined than Whites. In addition, the statistical evidence supports a finding of commonality on the promotion claim. The Class Plaintiffs submitted evidence that tends to establish that being Black has a statistically significant effect on an employee’s likelihood of being promoted; indeed, being Black reduces an employee’s likelihood of promotion by approximately 33 percent. In conducting her analyses, the Class Plaintiffs’ expert controlled for various factors that one would expect to be relevant to the likelihood of disciplinary action and promotion. These statistical disparities are not insignificant. Cf. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95, 108 S.Ct. 2777 , 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988). More detailed statistics might be required to sustain the Plaintiffs’ burden of persuasion, see Wards Cove Packing Company v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 650-55 , 109 S.Ct. 2115 , 104 L.Ed.2d 733 (1989), but this report, in conjunction with the anecdotal evidence, satisfies the Class Plaintiffs’ burden of demonstrating commonality for purposes of class certification.
Id. at 292-93.
The Ninth Circuit explicitly relied on Cari-dad in concluding that a court may not resolve a “battle of the experts” at the class certification stage. Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1229. Therefore, Dukes establishes that the court may not weigh evidence from Defendants’ expert against evidence from Plaintiffs’ expert in determining whether the Rule 23 requirements are satisfied.
b. Visa Check
In In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., various retailers, merchants, and retail associations brought an antitrust action against defendants Visa and MasterCard. 280 F.3d at 129 . The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had created a tying arrangement in violation of the Sherman Act by requiring stores accepting their credit cards to also accept their debit cards. Id. at 129-30 . Plaintiffs sought to certify a class consisting of “ ‘all persons and business entities who have accepted Visa and/or MasterCard credit cards and therefore are required to accept Visa Check and/or MasterMoney debit cards under the challenged tying arrangements.’ ” Id. at 131 .
Plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Carlton, asserted that a large number of retailers would have refused to accept Visa Check and MasterMo-ney in the absence of the alleged tying arrangement. Id. at 133 . Carlton reasoned that the defendants would have lowered interchange fees in response. Id. Thus, Carlton concluded that consumers paid higher interchange fees than they would have absent the tying arrangement. Id.
Defendants’ expert asserted that “Carlton’s model of how the debit card market would operate absent the alleged tie did not *112 adequately take into account [several] consequences that would have accompanied the cessation of the tie.” Id. at 134 . Relying on Carlton’s report, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Id. at 132 .
On appeal, defendant argued that “the district court erroneously relied on Carlton’s report in granting plaintiffs’ class certification motion because, according to defendants, the district court improperly limited its scrutiny of the report and Carlton’s expert opinion ‘failed to provide a credible basis for class certification.’ ” Id. at 134 . The Second Circuit rejected defendants’ criticism of plaintiffs’ expert and held that so long as the expert’s methodology was not “fatally flawed,” such methodology “was sufficiently reliable for class certification purposes.” Id. at 135 . The Second Circuit’s conclusion was based on its reasoning that a court may not examine the merits at the class certification stage:
Defendants contend that the district court erroneously relied on Carlton’s report in granting plaintiffs’ class certification motion because, according to defendants, the district court improperly limited its scrutiny of the report and Carlton’s expert opinion “failed to provide a credible basis for class certification.” Although a trial court must conduct a “rigorous analysis” to ensure that the prerequisites of Rule 23 have been satisfied before certifying a class, “a motion for class certification is not an occasion for examination of the merits of the case.” Caridad, 191 F.3d at 291 (internal quotation marks omitted). A district court must ensure that the basis of the expert opinion is not so flawed that it would be inadmissible as a matter of law. See Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 8099, 1998 WL 812045 , at *4 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.18, 1998) (disregarding expert report submitted in support of motion for class certification because the report was “fatally flawed”), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 202 F.3d 560, 573 (2d Cir.2000) (“[Plaintiff] has not shown that the court abused its discretion in finding the report methodologically flawed.”); accord In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 182 F.R.D. 85, 91 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (granting class certification upon finding that “plaintiffs’ econometric methodologies have a reasonable probability of establishing” plaintiffs’ claims by common proof); In re Disposable Contact Lens Antitrust Litig., 170 F.R.D. 524, 531-32 (S.D.Fla.1996) (granting class certification upon finding that “Plaintiffs have demonstrated at least a ‘colorable method’ of proving [common injury] at trial”); In re Potash Antitrust Litig., 159 F.R.D. 682, 687 (D.Minn.1995) (stating that “in assessing whether to certify a class, the Court’s inquiry is limited to whether or not the proposed methods are so insubstantial as to amount to no method at all”). However, a district court may not weigh conflicting expert evidence or engage in “statistical dueling” of experts. Caridad, 191 F.3d at 292-93 . The question for the district court at the class certification stage is whether plaintiffs’ expert evidence is sufficient to demonstrate common questions of fact warranting certification of the proposed class, not whether the evidence will ultimately be persuasive. Id. at 292-93 .
To the extent that defendants’ contention is that the court did not sufficiently examine whether Carlton’s methodology was fatally flawed, and thus inadmissible even for class certification purposes, we reject this argument as meritless. The district court, in an almost fifty page opinion, thoroughly considered each of defendants’ criticisms of Carlton’s theory and Carlton’s response to each of those criticisms and concluded in each case that Carlton’s response sufficiently addressed the criticism. The district court correctly noted that its function at the class certification stage was not to determine whether plaintiffs had stated a cause of action or whether they would prevail on the merits, but rather whether they had shown, based on methodology that was not fatally flawed, that the requirements of Rule 23 were met. In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. [68] at 76, 79 [(E.D.N.Y.2000)]. As for defendants’ claim that plaintiffs’ expert evidence failed to provide a reliable basis for class certification, the district court’s finding that Carlton’s methodology *113 was not fatally flawed, and therefore, was sufficiently reliable for class certification purposes, does not constitute an abuse of its discretion.
Id. at 134-35.
The Ninth Circuit explicitly relied on In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig. in concluding that a court should determine whether “ ‘evidence is sufficient to demonstrate common questions of fact warranting certification of the proposed class, not whether the evidence ultimately will be persuasive’ to the trier of fact.” Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1229 (quoting In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d at 135 ). Even if Dukes does not implicitly adopt the “fatal flaw” standard, its reliance on In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig. establishes that the court cannot deny a motion for class certification simply because experts disagree over the proper methodology.
c. In re Initial Public Offerings Sec. Li-tig.
The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Caridad and In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig. is particularly significant because these cases were overruled by the Second Circuit prior to Dukes. In In re IPO Sec. Litig., plaintiffs brought class action securities fraud lawsuits against some of the nation’s largest underwriters in connection with a series of initial public offerings. 471 F.3d 24 , 27 (2d Cir.2006). The district court granted plaintiffs’ motions for class certification in six “focus cases.” Id.
The Second Circuit determined that the “appeal primarily concerns the issue ... as to what standards govern a district judge in adjudicating a motion for class certification.” Id. at 26. First, the Second Circuit examined the Supreme Court cases discussed above as well as Second Circuit precedent. Id. at 32-37. Next, the Second Circuit overruled Caridad and In re Visa Check/Master-Money Antitrust Litig. with respect to their standards for class certification:
[W]e can no longer continue to advise district courts that “some showing,” Caridad, 191 F.3d at 292 , of meeting Rule 23 requirements will suffice ... or that an expert’s report will sustain a plaintiffs burden so long as it is not “fatally flawed,” see Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 135 ....
471 F.3d at 40 . 12
The Second Circuit clarified that a district court must make factual findings to the extent such findings are necessary to determine if a requirement is met:
It would seem to be beyond dispute that a district court may not grant class certification without making a determination that all of the Rule 23 requirements are met. We resist saying that what are required are “findings” because that word usually implies that a district judge is resolving a disputed issue of fact. Although there are often factual disputes in connection with Rule 23 requirements, and such disputes must be resolved with findings, the ultimate issue as to each requirement is really a mixed question of fact and law. A legal standard, e.g., numerosity, commonality, or predominance, is being applied to a set of facts, some of which might be in dispute. The Rule 23 requirements are threshold issues, similar in some respects to preliminary issues such as personal or subject matter jurisdiction. We normally do not say that a district court makes a “finding” of subject matter jurisdiction; rather, the district court makes a “ruling” or a “determination” as to whether such jurisdiction exists. The judge rules either that jurisdiction exists or that it does not. Of course, in making such a ruling, the judge *114 often resolves underlying factual disputes, and, as to these disputes, the judge must be persuaded that the fact at issue has been established. The same approach is appropriate for Rule 23 requirements. For example, in considering whether the numerosity requirement is met, a judge might need to resolve a factual dispute as to how many members are in a proposed class. Any dispute about the size of the proposed class must be resolved, and a finding of the size of the class, e.g., 50,100, or more than 200, must be made. At that point, the judge would apply the legal standard governing numerosity and make a ruling as to whether that standard, applied to the facts as found, establishes numerosity-
Id. at 40 .
Finally, the Second Circuit held that a court must make requirement determinations even if such determinations overlap with merits issues:
The more troublesome issue arises when the Rule 23 requirement overlaps with an issue on the merits. With Eisen properly understood to preclude consideration of the merits only when a merits issue is unrelated to a Rule 23 requirement, there is no reason to lessen a district court’s obligation to make a determination that every Rule 23 requirement is met before certifying a class just because of some or even full overlap of that requirement with a merits issue. We thug align ourselves with Szabo, Gariety, and all of the other decisions discussed above that have required definitive assessment of Rule 23 requirements, notwithstanding their overlap with merits issues. As Gariety usefully pointed out, the determination as to a Rule 23 requirement is made only for purposes of class certification and is not binding on the trier of facts, even if that trier is the class certification judge. 368 F.3d at 366.
471 F.3d at 41 . 13
Therefore, the Second Circuit concluded “(1) that a district judge may not certify a class without making a ruling that each Rule 23 requirement is met and that a lesser standard such as ‘some showing’ for satisfying each requirement will not suffice, (2) that all of the evidence must be assessed as with any other threshold issue, (3) that the fact that a Rule 23 requirement might overlap with an issue on the merits does not avoid the court’s obligation to make a ruling as to whether the requirement is met, although such a circumstance might appropriately limit the scope of the court’s inquiry at the class certification stage.” Id. at 27 .
The Second Circuit observed that its conclusions were consistent with the conclusions of the case law in most of the Circuits. For example, in Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir.2001), Judge Easterbrook explained that “a judge should make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23.” Judge Easterbrook also stated that “the judge would receive evidence (if only by affidavit) and resolve the disputes before deciding whether to certify the class.” Id. The Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits have all followed Szabo. Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir.2004) (relying on Szabo); Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154 , 166 (3d Cir.2001) (relying on Szabo); Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 322-23 (5th Cir.2005) (relying on Gariety). Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has held that “in ruling on class certification, a court may be required to resolve disputes concerning the factual setting of the case ... [including] the resolution of expert disputes concerning the import of evidence,” Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 575 (8th Cir.2005), and the Eleventh Circuit has stated that
[w]hile it is true that a trial court may not properly reach the merits of a claim when determining whether class certification is warranted, this principle should not be tal-ismanically invoked to artificially limit a trial court’s examination of the factors? necessary to a reasoned determination of *115 whether a plaintiff has met her burden of establishing each of the Rule 23 class action requirements.
Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). 14
If this Court were free to craft its own standard, it would follow the standard established by In re IPO Sec. Litig. The Court finds the reasoning of IPO persuasive and consistent with the views of nearly every other Circuit. However, as discussed in Part IV, for purposes of the MDL this Court is only bound by Ninth Circuit precedent. A plain reading of Dukes, coupled with Dukes’ reliance on standards articulated by the overruled Caridad and In re Visa Check/Master-Money Antitrust Litig. decisions rather than In re IPO Sec. Litig. (or a decision from any other Circuit), clearly demonstrates that the Ninth Circuit intended to prohibit district courts from weighing conflicting evidence when determining whether the Rule 23 requirements are satisfied. 15
5. Post-Dukes Caselaw
Although the opinion in Dukes was issued only six months ago at least one district court has interpreted Dukes similarly to this court. In L.H. v. Schwarzenegger, 2007 WL 662463 , at *1 (E.D.Cal. Feb.28, 2007), plaintiff juvenile parolees in California alleged that California has a policy and practice of denying class members with disabilities their statutory rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The defendants argued that the class plaintiffs were not in fact disabled, and therefore neither of the plaintiffs satisfied the typicality requirement. Id. at *12 . In support of their position, the defendants submitted educational records of the plaintiffs. Id.
First, the district court noted that “although the allegations in the complaint must be taken as true for the purposes of class certification ... the court is ‘at liberty' to consider evidence that relates to the merits if such evidence also goes to the requirements of Rule 23.” Id. at *10 . However, the district court went on to reject the defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs were not typical because the plaintiffs were not in fact disabled. Id. at *12 . The court explained that “arguments evaluating the weight of evidence or the merits of a case are improper at the class certification stage” and “plaintiffs need only provide sufficient information for the court to form a reasonable judgment about whether plaintiffs’ claims are typical.” Id. at *12-13 (quoting Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1227). The court concluded that “[i]n examining the allegations set forth in the complaint, as well as the evidence submitted by both plaintiffs and defendants, the court finds that there is sufficient information to conclude that plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the class.” Id.
Therefore, under one reading of Dukes, the scope of the Court’s analysis is so limited that certification is virtually inevitable. Review of a motion for class certification would be similar to review of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion because class certification would be granted so long as the Plaintiffs submitted expert testimony in support of each of the Rule 23 requirements. Much of the analysis detailed in the remainder of the opinion would be irrelevant under such a standard.
While Dukes may impose such a restricted review, Dukes possibly permits a limited inquiry that still allows the Court — without too much probing — to examine Plaintiffs’ Rule 23 showing. 16 Therefore, the Court proceeds *116 with a more detailed analysis to determine whether Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23. 17
C. Application of Rule 23(a) Factors
Rule 23(a) provides that a class member may sue as a representative party on behalf of all class members if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). The plaintiff has the burden of establishing that all four factors are satisfied. In re N. Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD, Prods. Liability Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 854 (9th Cir.1982) (citing Doninger v. Pac. Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1308-09 (9th Cir.1977)).
1. The Class is So Numerous that Join-der of All Class Members Is Impracticable
The first requirement of Rule 23(a) is that the class be so numerous that joinder of all members individually would be impracticable. Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(1). The Supreme Court has cautioned that “[t]he numerosity requirement requires examination of the specific facts of each ease and imposes no absolute limitations.” General Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 446 U.S. 318, 330 , 100 S.Ct. 1698 , 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). Moreover, “the absolute number of class members is not the sole determining factor in whether joinder will be impracticable.” Buttino v. Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 1992 WL 12013803 , at *1 (N.D.Cal. Sept.25, 1992). Hum v. Dericks, 162 F.R.D. 628, 634 (D.Hawai’i 1995) (“There is no magic number for determining when too many parties make joinder impracticable.”).
The Supreme Court has held that a class of fifteen is too small to satisfy the numerosity requirement. General Tel. Co. v. EEOC,
446 U.S. 318, 330 , 100 S.Ct. 1698 , 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). However, some courts have found the numerosity requirement satisfied when the class comprises as few as 40 members. See, e.g., Ansari v. New York Univ., 179 F.R.D. 112, 114 (S.D.N.Y.1998); Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 47 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir.1995). The Ninth Circuit has noted that classes with fewer than 70 members have been certified in numerous cases. Jordan v. County of Los Angeles, 669 F.2d 1311 , 1320 n. 10 (9th Cir.1982), vacated on other grounds, 459 U.S. 810 , 103 S.Ct. 35 , 74 L.Ed.2d 48 (1982) (noting that classes with fewer than 70 members have been certified in numerous cases).
In each of the five class actions, the Plaintiff alleges that there are thousands of class members in the relevant region that are geographically dispersed. (Riley Compl. ¶ 52); (Thompson Compl. 1152); (Hammer Compl. ¶ 52); (MacLaughlan Compl. ¶ 52); (Young Compl. ¶ 52). Defendants do not contest Plaintiffs’ allegation that there are thousands of purchasers of rock concert tickets. Instead, Defendants argue that the class is not ascertainable because “rock” cannot be defined. Regardless of how the market is defined, the class will consist of thousands of individuals. For example, even if the each concert were defined as a single market, the class would still consist of the thousands of class members who attended that concert. Therefore, the numerosity requirement is satisfied.
2. Are There Questions of Law or Fact Common to the Class?
Rule 23(a)(2) requires that there be “questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(2). “The commonality preconditions of Rule 23(a)(2) are less rigorous than the companion requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).” Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir.1998). The Ninth Circuit has explained that “All questions of fact and law need not be common to satisfy the rule ... shared legal *117 issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.” Id. “The commonality test is qualitative rather than quantitative — one significant issue common to the class may be sufficient to warrant certification.” Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 474 F.3d 1214 , 1225 (9th Cir.2007). Common questions of law or fact alleged by Plaintiffs include:
1. Whether the relevant market consists of the market for the sale of tickets to live rock concerts in the [relevant] region;
2. Whether Defendants have monopolized and attempted to monopolize the relevant market;
3. Whether Defendants intentionally and unlawfully excluded competitors and potential competitors from the relevant market;
4. Whether Defendants’ unlawful conduct caused Plaintiff and the Class members to pay more for concert tickets than they otherwise would have paid;
5. Whether Plaintiff and members of the Class are entitled to declaratory, equitable and/or injunctive relief; and
6. Whether Plaintiff and the Class have been damaged and the amount of such damages.
(Riley Compl. ¶ 55.)
Although Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the requirements of Rule 23(a)(2), Defendants conflate this analysis with their Rule 23(b)(3) analysis. (Def.’s Opp. at 11.) Regardless, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have demonstrated substantial shared legal issues and the existence of a common core of salient facts. See Part V.D (examining common issues such as market definition, monopoly power, anticompetitive conduct, and casual antitrust injury). Therefore, Plaintiffs have satisfied the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2).
3. Are the Claims or Defenses of the Representative Parties Typical of the Claims or Defenses of the Class?
The “claims or defenses of the class representative must be 4 typical of the claims or defenses of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(3). The Ninth Circuit has explained that Rule 23(a) is satisfied “if [Plaintiffs’] situations share a ‘common issue of law or fact,’ and are ‘sufficiently parallel to insure a vigorous and full presentation of all claims for relief.’ ” CRLA v. Legal Services Corp., 917 F.2d 1171 , 1175 (9th Cir.1990) (citing Blackie, 524 F.2d at 904). Plaintiffs’ injuries may be typical even if the amount of injury is different from other class members, Rosario v. Livaditis, 963 F.2d 1013, 1018 (7th Cir. 1992) or if other class members suffered their injury at a different time. Mullen v. Treasure Chest Casino, LLC, 186 F.3d 620, 625 (5th Cir.1999). Plaintiffs’ claim may not be typical where their claim is subject to a unique defense that could not be asserted against other members of the class. Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 837 F.2d 980, 990 (11th Cir.1988).
The class representatives’ claims are not only typical, but virtually identical with the rest of the class members. The representatives’ and class members’ claims all arise from the same course of conduct — Clear Channel’s alleged monopolization and anti-competitive practices in the rock concert market — and all of the Plaintiffs seek identical relief.
However, Defendants contend that the ticket price for each concert is the result of a unique negotiation between the artist and the promoter. (Id.) As a result, Defendants assert that “the named Plaintiffs’ proof that they were overcharged for the concerts they attended would not prove that absent class members were overcharged for the different concerts they attended.” (Id.) Therefore, Defendants conclude that “the named Plaintiffs’ claims are not typical of the proposed class.” (Id.)
In essence, Defendants contend that some class members may have been injured and some class members may not have been injured. As a result, Defendants seem to contend that some potential class members are unlikely to recover because of a unique defense. However, the fact that some prospective plaintiffs may ultimately fail to prove damages once the merits are considered is not relevant to typicality. If Defendants are correct that each concert must be individual *118 ly examined in order to determine how the ticket price was negotiated, this is potential defense common to all of the claims. Thus, while Defendants’ argument may relate to whether individual issues will predominate, see Section V.D, typicality is unaffected. Therefore, the Court holds that the representatives’ claims are typical of the claims of the rest of the class members.
U. Will the Representative Parties Fairly and Adequately Protect the Interests of the Class ?
Under Rule 23(a)(4), the named representative must “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a)(4). “This factor requires: (1) that the proposed representative Plaintiffs do not have conflicts of interest with the proposed class, and (2) that Plaintiffs are represented by qualified and competent counsel,” Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1233. See also Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir.2003) (same); In re Mego Fin. Corp. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 462 (9th Cir.2000) (same); Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020 . Occasionally the Ninth Circuit divides these two 28 questions down into four components: 1) qualifications of counsel for the representatives; 2) absence of antagonism; 3) sharing of interests between representatives and absentees; and 4) unlikelihood that the suit is collusive. See Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 955 (9th Cir.2003); Local Joint Executive Bd. of Culinary/Bartender Trust Fund v. Las Vegas Sands, Inc., 244 F.3d 1152 , 1162 (9th Cir.2001); Walters v. Reno, 145 F.3d 1032, 1046 (9th Cir.1998). None of these cases impose a knowledge requirement on the part of the class representatives, and the Court cannot locate any other Ninth Circuit decision imposing such a requirement.
However, relying on Fifth Circuit cases, Defendants argue that Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the class representatives possess heightened knowledge about the ease. (Def.’s Opp. at 20-21) (citing Berger v. Compaq Computer Corp., m F.3d 475, 482-83 (5th Cir.2001); Horton v. Goose Creek Indep. Sch. Dist., 690 F.2d 470 , 484 (5th Cir.1982)). Specifically, Defendants contend that Rule 23(a)(4) imposes a three part inquiry: (1) whether the class representatives “know more than that they were involved in a bad business deal,” (2) whether the class representatives’ knowledge of the case is “limited to derivative knowledge acquired solely from counsel,” and (3) whether the class representatives are willing and able to “take an active role in and control and to protect the interests of absentees.” (Def.’s Opp. at 20-21) (quoting Berger, 257 F.3d at 482-83).
Even if the Court were to consider these Fifth Circuit cases, Berger is clearly inapplicable to this case. In Berger, the plaintiffs alleged violations of §§ 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. 257 F.3d at 477. The Fifth Circuit held that the PSLRA raised the “adequacy” threshold for class representatives by imposing a knowledge requirement on the representatives. Berger, 257 F.3d at 483. The Fifth Circuit explained:
Any lingering uncertainty, with respect to the adequacy standard in securities fraud class actions, has been conclusively resolved by the PSLRA’s requirement that securities class actions be managed by active, able class representatives who are informed and can demonstrate they are directing the litigation. In this way, the PSLRA raises the standard adequacy threshold.
Id. at 483 (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit concluded that “in complex class action securities eases governed by the PSLRA, the adequacy standard must reflect the governing principles of the Act and, particularly. Congress’s emphatic command that competent plaintiffs, rather than lawyers, direct such cases.” Id. at 484. Therefore, it appears that Berger’s heightened requirement for knowledge only applies to securities fraud class actions.
With respect to Horton, the Fifth Circuit did not require more than a basic knowledge of the ease because the court deemed the proposed class representative as adequate because he was familiar with the complaint and the concept of a class action lawsuit. Horton, 690 F.2d at 484. While the Court is not bound to follow Horton, some district courts within the Ninth Circuit have stated that the knowledge of the class representa *119 tives is a factor to be considered based on citations to authority outside of the Ninth Circuit. See, e.g., In re Communications Sys., Inc., 2003 WL 21383824 , at *4 (N.D.Cal. Feb.24, 2003) (relying on district court opinions from the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits); In re Emulex Corp. Sec. Litig., 210 F.R.D. 717, 721 (C.D.Cal.2002) (relying, as Defendants do here, on the Berger case from the Fifth Circuit); In re THQ, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2002 WL 1832145 , at *6 (C.D.Cal. March 22, 2002) (citing a district court opinion from the Second Circuit); In re Pilgrim Sec. Litig., 1996 WL 742448 , at *6-7 (C.D.Cal. Jan.23,1996) (citing a district court opinion from the Third Circuit); Loma Linda Univ. Med. Ctr. Inc. v. Farmers Group, Inc., 1995 WL 363441 at *6 (E.D.Cal. May 15, 1995) (relying on an opinion from the Third Circuit); In re Quarterdeck Office Sys. Litig., 1993 WL 623310 , at *5-6 (C.D.Cal. Sept.30, 1993) (relying on a district court opinion from the Eighth Circuit); In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754 F.Supp. 785, 803 (S.D.Cal.1990) (relying on district court opinions from the Third and Eighth Circuits).
i. Representatives’ Individual Interests
To find adequacy of representation, the representatives’ individual interests must be the same or similar to the interests of other class members rather than antagonistic to the interests of class members. Gen. Tel. Co. of Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 157 , 102 S.Ct. 2364 , 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982); Jordan, 669 F.2d at 1323 . For example, the Supreme Court has held that the conflict in interests between current and future claimants in the Amchem asbestos litigation prevented the class representatives from providing adequate representation. Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 , 117 S.Ct. 2231, 2251 , 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997). Also, Plaintiffs must allege and show that “they personally have been injured.” Lierboe v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 350 F.3d 1018, 1022 (9th Cir.2003). Finally, Plaintiffs’ claims must not be subject to unique defenses not relevant to other class members. Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 508 (9th Cir.1992). However, “regarding potential conflicts, ‘courts have generally declined to consider conflicts, particularly as they regard damages, sufficient to defeat class action status at the outset unless the conflict is apparent, imminent, and on an issue at the very heart of the suit.’ ” Winkler v. DTE, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 235, 242 (D.Ariz.2001) (quoting Blackie, 524 F.2d at 909.)
For example, in Hanlon the Ninth Circuit explained that “[ejxamination of potential conflicts of interest has long been an important prerequisite to class certification” and cases should be given heightened scrutiny where “class members may have claims of different strength.” 150 F.3d at 1020 . In finding that the representation was adequate, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Potential plaintiffs are not divided into conflicting discrete categories, such as those with present health problems and those who may develop symptoms in the future. Rather, each potential plaintiff has the same problem: an allegedly defective rear latchgate which requires repair or commensurate compensation. The differences in severity of personal injury present in Amchem are avoided here by excluding personal injury and wrongful death claims. Similarly, there is no structural conflict of interest based on variations in state law, for the named representatives include individuals from each state, and the differences in state remedies are not sufficiently substantial so as to warrant the creation of subclasses. Representatives of other potential subclasses are included among the named representatives, including owners of every minivan model. However, even if the named representatives did not include a broad cross-section of claimants, the prospects for irreparable conflict of interest are minimal in this case because of the relatively small differences in damages and potential remedies.
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1021 .
Plaintiffs argue that there are no actual or potential conflicts of interest between the proposed class members and the representative Plaintiffs because each class member was allegedly harmed by the same conduct in the form of artificially inflated ticket prices. (Pl.’s Mot. at 16-17.) Defendant does not *120 argue that there are potential or actual conflicts of interests between class members. (Def.s’ Opp. at 20-21.)
ii Qualifications and Experience of the Representative’s Attorney
In evaluating whether class plaintiffs are represented by qualified and competent counsel, courts examine counsels’ litigation experience in this type of action. For example, in Molski the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Rule 23(a)(4) satisfied based on its finding that “class counsel had significant experience litigating ADA eases.” 318 F.3d at 955 . See also Dunnigan v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 214 F.R.D. 125 (S.D.N.Y.2003). Other factors include the proposed counsel’s motivation, competence, support personnel, and other professional commitments. See, e.g., Gomez v. Illinois State Bd. of Education, 117 F.R.D. 394, 400-02 (N.D.Ill.1987); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 99 F.R.D. 16, 33-34 (S.D.Ga.1983). Plaintiffs’ counsel possess experience in antitrust litigation. See (Miller Decl. Ex. 2, 3, 4.)
Another factor in assessing proposed counsel’s competence appears to be counsel’s pri- or experience in class action litigation. See, e.g., Coco v. Incorporated Village of Belle Terre, 233 F.R.D. 109 (E.D.N.Y.2005) (finding counsel competent to act as counsel for 800 member class where firm had experience in class action litigation at state level involving large classes); In re Natural Gas Commodities Litig., 231 F.R.D. 171 (S.D.N.Y.2005) (counsel adequate where they had previously represented classes); Jeffreys v. Communications Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 212 F.R.D. 320 (E.D.Va.2003). Plaintiffs’ counsel have significant experience in class action litigation. See (Miller Decl. Ex. 2, 3, 4.)
Finally, courts can evaluate the performance of counsel in prior stages of the instant case. See, e.g., Hatch v. Reliance Ins. Co., 758 F.2d 409 (9th Cir.1985); Mechigian v. Art Capital Corp., 612 F.Supp. 1421 (S.D.N.Y.1985); Zeffiro v. First Pennsylvania Banking & Trust Co., 96 F.R.D. 567 (E.D.Pa.1983); Twyman v. Rockville Housing Authority, 99 F.R.D. 314 ; Armstrong v. Chicago Park Disk, 117 F.R.D. 623 (N.D.Ill. 1987). The Court finds that Plaintiffs’ counsel has performed competently to date. Therefore, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are represented by qualified and competent counsel, and determines that the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) are satisfied.
Hi Knowledge of Class Representatives
As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit has never imposed such a knowledge requirement. However, because some district courts within the Ninth Circuit have imposed such a requirement, the Court will consider this factor.
Defendants argue that the proposed class representatives do not “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” due to the representatives’ “abdication to counsel.” (Id. at 20.) Specifically, the Defendants assert that proposed representatives lack knowledge about the basis for the lawsuits, the representatives’ knowledge about the suits is solely derivative knowledge acquired from counsel, and the representatives had no input in drafting the complaint and took no steps to confirm that the allegations in the complaint were true. (Id. at 21.)
The district courts which have imposed this requirement have recognized that the threshold for sufficient knowledge is not high. All that is necessary is a “rudimentary understanding of the present action and ... a demonstrated willingness to assist counsel in the prosecution of the litigation.” Thomas & Thomas, 209 F.R.D. at 165 ; see also In re THQ, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2002 WL 1832145 , at *6 (“[U]nfamiliarity with the suit does not itself require denial of class certification.”). The degree of knowledge required is lowered if the ease involves complicated legal issues. See In re Communications Sys., Inc., 2003 WL 21383824 , at *4; In re THQ, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2002 WL 1832145 , at *6; In re Emulex Corp. Sec. Litig., 210 F.R.D. at 721 ; In re Pilgrim Sec. Litig., 1996 WL 742448 , at *6-7; Kassover v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 1992 WL 509995 , at *3 (D.Idaho Sept.2, 1992); In re MDC Holdings Sec. Litig., 754 F.Supp. at 803 . As one court explained, imposing a heightened knowledge require *121 ment “would render the class action device an impotent tool.” Kassover, 1992 WL 509995 , at *3. This threshold may be reduced even more if there are many class representatives. See In re Pilgrim Sec. Litig., 1996 WL 742448 , at *7 (“Although Defendants have asserted that several of the class representatives may not have sufficient knowledge of the case, the large number of class representatives will assure that the attorneys associated with the case will be adequately supervised.”).
Consequently, the plaintiffs knowledge must be severely lacking in order to find the representatives inadequate. In re THQ, Inc. Sec. Litig., 2002 WL 1832145 , at *6; see also Yamner v. Boich, 1994 WL 514035 at *6-7 (N.D.Cal. Sept.15, 1994) (holding that Plaintiff was an adequate class representative because he had “a basic understanding of the allegations,” despite the fact that he was unaware of the case’s legal history and had probably not read the complaint). In the one district court case within the Ninth Circuit in which the representatives were determined to be inadequate, the court found that the plaintiffs did not seem to care about the case, did not know that several defendants had been dropped, and were unsure as to who was representing them in the case. In re Quarterdeck Office Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 1993 WL 623310 , at *5-6 (C.D.Cal. Sept.30, 1993). Other examples from outside the Ninth Circuit include a woman who did not know who she was suing or what a “defendant” was, In re CBC Cos., Inc. Collection Letter Litig., 181 F.R.D. 380, 383-84 (N.D.Ill.1998), and a man who had never seen the complaint and could not recall ever seeing any of the representations made in the complaint, Hillis v. Equifax Consumer Servs., Inc., 237 F.R.D. 491, 502 (N.D.Ga.2006).
Having reviewed the deposition transcripts of the class representatives, the Court finds that the representatives demonstrated an understanding of the basic theory for the case. See, e.g., (Rosen Dep. at 18-21, 53-57, 112— 114); (MacLaughlan Dep. at 50-59); (Thompson Dep. at 19-20); (Riley Dep. at 4, 14-21); (Young Dep. at 28-33; 113); (Hammer Dep. at 21, 106-111, 159-160). The representatives also evidenced an understanding of their duties as class representatives and a willingness to participate in the litigation. See, e.g., (Rosen Dep. at 17-26, 51-53, 142-143); (MacLaughlan Dep. at 50); (Young Dep. at 24, 37-38). Because the representatives demonstrated sufficient knowledge of the litigation and a willingness to assist counsel, the Court holds that the representatives meet the knowledge requirement that some district courts in this Circuit have imposed. See 209 F.R.D. at 165 . Because the Plaintiffs have made a sufficient showing that representatives do not have conflicts of interest with the proposed class, that Plaintiffs are represented by qualified and competent counsel, and that the representatives have adequate knowledge about the litigation, the Court finds that the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) are satisfied.
In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have satisfied all four Rule 23(a) requirements. Therefore, the Court proceeds to analyze whether Plaintiffs have satisfied Rule 23(b).
D. Rule 23(b) Factors
Plaintiffs must also satisfy Rule 23(b)(1), (b)(2), or (b)(3). Plaintiff seeks to certify the class pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). (Pl.’s Mem. at 17.) Rule 23(b)(3) requires that “the court fínd[ ] that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy” (emphasis added). Factors to be considered in this determination include:
• “the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;”
• “the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class;”
• “the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;” and
*122 • “the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.”
Id.
The predominance inquiry of Rule 23(b)(3) differs from the commonality inquiry of Rule 23(a)(2) in that “[t]he Rule 23(b)(3) analysis ‘presumes that the existence of common issues of fact or law have been established pursuant to Rule 23(a)(2),’ and instead ‘focuses on the relationship between the common and individual issues.’” In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 2006 WL 1207915 , at *9 (W.D.Wash. May 3, 2006) (quoting Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1022 ). Throughout this analysis, the Court’s focus must be “whether the ‘evidence is sufficient to demonstrate common questions of fact warranting certification of the proposed class, not whether the evidence ultimately will be persuasive’ to the trier of fact.” Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1229 (quoting In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d at 135 ).
1. Questions of Law or Fact Common to Members of the Class Predominate Over Any Questions Affecting Only Individual Members
“In order to state a claim for monopolization under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, a plaintiff must prove: (1) Possession of monopoly power in the relevant market; (2) willful acquisition or maintenance of that power; and (3) causal antitrust injury,” Pacific Exp., Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 959 F.2d 814, 817 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Movie 1 & 2 v. United Artists Communications, Inc., 909 F.2d 1245, 1254 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1230 , 111 S.Ct. 2852 , 115 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1991)); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.1995) (same). See also, United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-571 , 86 S.Ct. 1698 , 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966) (“The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident.”); Heerwagen, 435 F.3d at 226-27 (same). 18
Plaintiffs argue that common issues predominate because common or generalized proof will predominate at trial with respect to the essential elements of the antitrust claims. (Pl.’s Mot. at 17-18.) For example, Plaintiffs contend that each member of the class would introduce exactly the same evidence to demonstrate the scope of the relevant market, possession of monopoly power in the market, and the alleged illegality of Defendants’ actions under the Sherman Act. (Id. at 18.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs argue that the scope of the relevant product market is a common issue to the members of each regional class, the scope of the relevant geographic market is a common issue to the members of each regional class, and the demonstration of antitrust impact will be proven based on common evidence and methods. (Id. at 19-23.) Defendants argue that common issues do not predominate because there is no common product market, no common anticompetitive conduct, and no common injury. (Def.s’ Opp. at 11-18.)
i. Market Definition
The first step in evaluating market power is defining the relevant market. Plaintiffs’ expert asserts that the relevant product market is all rock concerts in a given geographic region. Defendants’ experts claim that rock concerts are highly differentiated products competing in more than a single product market. (Def.s’ Opp. at 15.) Defendants argue that the “class cannot be certified if the putative class members did not purchase in the same product market because it would be impossible to assess whether the defendant’s conduct affected them all on a common basis.” (Id.)
*123 “The relevant market is the field in which meaningful competition is said to exist.” Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1202-1203 (9th Cir. 1997). “Generally, the relevant market is defined in terms of product and geography.” Id. Defendants do not contest that the relevant geographic market is a common issue to the members of each regional class.
“For antitrust purposes, a ‘market is composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced — price, use and qualities considered.’ ” Paladin Associates, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 328 F.3d 1145, 1163 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242, 250 , 79 S.Ct. 245 , 3 L.Ed.2d 270 (1959)); see also Oltz v. St. Peter’s Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1446 (9th Cir.1988) (“The product market includes the pool of goods or services that enjoy reasonable interchangeability of use and cross-elasticity of demand.”); Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶560 (“A product grouping constitutes a market if a hypothetical defendant controlling its output could maximize profits by charging significantly more than the competitive price for a significant period.”); Id. ¶ 530a (“[A] market is the arena within which significant substitution in consumption or production occurs.”).
Calculating the cross-elasticity of demand is often the first step in defining a market. See, e.g., Lucas Automotive Engineering, Inc. v. Bridgestone, 275 F.3d 762, 767 (9th Cir.2001); SuperTurf, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 660 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir.1981); United States Department of Justice and the Federal Trace Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 1.11 (1997) [hereinafter “Merger Guidelines”]. 19 Cross-elasticity of demand measures the substitutability of two products by determining whether consumers will shift from one product to another in response to changes in the relative costs of the two products. Bridgestone, 275 F.3d at 767 ; Super-Turf, 660 F.2d at 1278 . Cross-elasticity of demand is calculated based on changes in the quantity demanded in response to changes in price:
The responsiveness of demand to changes in the price of another product is called the cross elasticity of demand. It is denoted gxy and defined as follows:
gxy = (% change in quantity demanded of X) / (% change in price of Y)
The change in the price of good Y causes the demand curve for good X to shift. If X and Y are substitutes, then an increase in the price of Y leads to an increase in the demand for X. If X and Y are complements, then an increase in the price of Y leads to a reduction in demand for X. In either case, we hold the price of X constant. We therefore measure the change in the quantity demanded of X (at its unchanged price) by measuring the shift of the demand curve for X.
Lipsey, Richard G. et ah, Microeconomics, 99 (12th ed.1998); see also Mansfield, Edwin, Microeconomics: Theory/Applications, 128 (6th ed. 1988) (“The cross elasticity of demand is defined as gxy = (AQx/Qx) / ( Py/Py) where APy is the change in the price of good Y, Py is the original price of good Y, Qx is the resulting change in the quantity demanded of good X, and Qx is the original quantity demanded of good X.”) “A high cross elasticity of demand indicates that products are close substitutes, and should probably be treated as part of the same market. A low or zero cross elasticity of demand is evidence that products do not compete in the same relevant market.” For-syth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1483 (9th Cir.1997) (Wallace, C.J., coneurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part).
*124 Areeda and Hovenkamp explain that sub-stitutability can also be determined by analyzing cross-elasticity of supply:
Two products, A and B, are in the same relevant market if substitutability at the competitive price is very high as measured from either the demand side or the supply side. To have separate markets, one must find that a significant price increase beyond the competitive level in the A price would neither induce customers of A to buy B instead, nor induce B producers to make A. Thus, although not close substitutes for each other on the demand side, two products produced interchangeably from the same production facilities are in the same market.
Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 561 (emphasis in original). Numerous courts consider cross-elasticity of supply in defining the relevant market, not simply cross-elasticity of demand. See, e.g., Rebel Oil Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1436 (9th Cir.1995); AD/SAT v. Associated Press, 181 F.3d 216, 227 (2d Cir.1999); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., 532 F.2d 674, 691 (9th Cir.1976); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 532 F.2d 674, 691 (9th Cir.1976); Rothery Storage Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 218 (D.C.Cir.1986); Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406 , 1410-11 (7th Cir.1995); United States Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Industries, Inc., 7 F.3d 986 , 995 (11th Cir.1993); National Bancard Corp. (NaBanco) v. VISA U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.Supp. 1231, 1257 (S.D.Fla.1984); Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 311 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1081 (D.Colo. 2004); Bauer, Joseph P. & Page, William H., Kinter Federal Antitrust Law, § 10.4 (2002 ed.).
However, while cross-elasticities of demand and supply provide the most reliable measures of market definition, “it is ordinarily quite difficult to measure cross-elasticities of supply and demand accurately.” U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F.3d 986 , 995 (11th Cir.1993). Therefore, courts consider a wide range of evidentiary sources in evaluating substitutability and estimating cross-elasticity of demand. In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that courts could determine the boundaries of an antitrust market “by examining such practical indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity, the product’s peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct customers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes, and specialized vendors.” 370 U.S. 294, 325 , 82 S.Ct. 1502 , 8 L.Ed.2d 510 (1962). Although Brown Shoe involved the definition of submarkets, the Ninth Circuit has held that the Brown Shoe factors “are relevant even in determining the primary market to be analyzed for antitrust purposes.” Olin Corp. v. F.T.C., 986 F.2d 1295, 1299 (9th Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 449-55 , 84 S.Ct. 1738 , 12 L.Ed.2d 953 (1964)). See also H.J., Inc. v. Intemat’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 867 F.2d 1531 , 1540 (8th Cir.1989) (citing Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 518.1 at 311-15 (1987 Supp.)); Nobody in Particular Presents, 311 F.Supp.2d at 1082-83 (compilation of cases which have held that a plaintiff may define a relevant market without a cross-elasticity of demand analysis so long as sufficient evidence of other indicia of market definition is introduced).
a. Plaintiffs’ Expert
Plaintiffs rely on the expert report of Professor Owen Phillips in support of their claim that the relevant product market is “live rock concerts” in a given geographic region. 20 Phillips contends that the relevant product market in this case is “live rock music concerts.” (Id. ¶ 29.) Although Phillips does not attempt to calculate the cross-elasticities of demand or supply for particular rock concerts, Phillips claims that rock concerts constitute a single product market for several reasons. First, Phillips asserts that rock music is an identifiable genre. (Id.) Phillips notes that Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary defines rock music as “popular *125 music played on electronically amplified instruments and characterized by a persistent heavily accented beat, [with] much repetition of simple phrases.” (Id) Phillips highlights that rock music is identified as a distinct genre by industry radio guides such as Arbi tron and Duncans, and by industry sources such as Billboard and Radio & Records. (Id. ¶¶ 31, 33.) Phillips also states that “bands, artists, record labels, and fans have no difficulty distinguishing between rock music and other types of music, such as jazz, classical, and country and western.” (Id. ¶ 34.)
Second, Phillips argues that “[s]ubstituta-bility (or interchangeability) across rock artists is common sense.” (Id. at 9.) In support of this argument, Phillips emphasizes that the musical tastes of the class representatives demonstrates that substitutability exists between rock concerts. (Phillips Rebuttal report at 9-10.) For example, Phillips points out that Plaintiff Riley has attended concerts by U2, Bob Dylan, Madonna, and Pearl Jam. (Riley Depo. at 8, 9, 22.). See also (Hayes Depo. at 30-57) (attended concerts by Bruce Springsteen, Roger Waters, Crosby Stills Nash & Young, Indigo Girls, Prince, Eric Clapton, Elton John, Billy Joel, Bob Sieger, Melissa Ethrdige, and the Who); (Young Depo. at 18-27) (attended concerts by Bruce Springsteen, Elvis Costello, and the Rolling Stones).
Third, Phillips concedes that cross-elasticities of demand vary across concerts for individual buyers. However, Phillips contends that this fact does not prevent rock concerts from being defined as a market because the Court must examine the market collectively:
In any market the collection of buyers or the class is made up of individuals with different tastes. The definition of the market still rests on the fundamental concept that it is a good collection of goods that consumers find to be good substitutes. It is a collection of goods, which if sold by one vendor, would generate higher revenues with a small price increase. As "with any market there will be individuals who have strong opinions about quality. Just as some automobile buyers have strong preferences between a Ford and Chevy, buyers in the relevant rock concert will have strong opinions about the difference in quality between U2 and Metallica. These individual tastes do not destroy the definition of a market, nor do they destroy the definition of a class of buyers harmed by high ticket prices.
(Id. ¶ 38.)
Finally, Phillips notes that he was the plaintiffs expert in Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. v. Clear Channel Communications, Inc., 311 F.Supp.2d 1048 (D.Colo.2004). In that case a rock concert promoter in Denver named Nobody in Particular Presents, Inc. (“NIPP”) sued Clear Channel in 2001. Similar to the allegations in the MDL, the concert promoter alleged that Clear Channel violated the Sherman Act “by conditioning air-play of an artist’s songs and promotional support for the artist’s concerts on the artist’s use of SFX/Clear Channel Entertainment or Clear Channel Concerts/Clear Channel Radio Festivals for the artist’s eon-cert-promotions needs in the Denver market.” Id. at 1091 . With respect to both the monopolization and attempted monopolization claims, NIPP argued that the relevant product market “is the market for tickets to rock music concerts, where the seller is the music concert promoter and the buyer is the concert-going public.” 21 Id. at 1077 .
Defendant Clear Channel filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. The first step in the Colorado district court’s analysis of the Sherman Act claims was to “examine the reasonable interchangeability of the rock concerts and non-rock concerts to the concert-going public in order to determine whether NIPP sets forth sufficient evidence to define the scope of the relevant market for the monopolization and attempted monopolization claims.” Id. at 1078 . The court noted that “[t]here is only one relevant market definition for NIPP’s monopolization and attempted monopolization claims, despite *126 the fact that numerous inputs are implicated.” Id. n.5.
The court’s market definition analysis involved consideration of cross-elasticity of demand, cross-elasticity of supply, and examination of practical indicia. Id. at 1080-85. While the court observed that NIPP’s expert witness, Dr. Phillips, failed to perform an economic analysis of cross-elasticity of demand, the court found that Phillips had analyzed other practical indicia of the relevant market. Id. at 1083. Phillips’ analysis of other indicia included: (1) assimilation of “data supporting the assertion that the industry and the public view rock concerts as a separate and distinct market from non-rock concerts,” (2) the presentation of “evidence that rock concerts have uses and qualities distinctive from non-rock concerts,” and (3) the presentation of “evidence of distinct price and of pricing patterns for rock concerts.” Id. at 1083-84. The district court concluded that “NIPP has set forth evidence of the practical indicia necessary to define the relevant market as tickets for rock concerts.” 22 Id. at 1084.
b. Defendants’Experts
Defendants argue that Phillips’ market definition analysis is flawed in several respects. Defendants submitted an expert report prepared by Professor Richard J. Gilbert. 23 Gilbert asserts that the 9 “relevant product markets appropriate to the analysis of the allegations in these cases are significantly narrower than the ‘all rock concerts’ product market alleged by plaintiffs and their expert.” (Gilbert Report ¶ 10.) Gil-berts posits that “there are many relevant product markets, each one much narrower than the market defined by plaintiffs.” (Gilbert Report ¶ 33.)
Gilbert explains that “[a] relevant product market contains products that consumers consider to be close substitutes for each other.” (Gilbert Report ¶20.) Thus, Gilbert’s analysis is based solely on consumers alleged views of the substitutability of rock concerts. For example, Gilbert argues that “[b]ecause the potential purchasers of rock concert tickets do not consider all or most rock concerts to be close substitutes, it is inappropriate to group them within a single relevant product market.” (Gilbert Report ¶21.) Similarly, Gilbert states that “when individual tastes differ enough for two products, then they are not in the same relevant product market.” (Gilbert Report ¶ 22.)
1. Cross-elasticity conclusions based on testimony of class representatives
Gilbert relies on statements made by the respective class representatives during their depositions in support of his contention that individuals do not consider rock concerts to be substitutes. For example, Adam Rosen, the representative for the proposed Boston Region, stated that he “wouldn’t just go to a concert for the sake of going because it was less expensive than another.” (Rosen Depo. at 68:25-69:15.) Gilbert concludes that Ro-sen’s comment “is equivalent to Mr. Rosen saying that for him there is no cross-price elasticity between concerts by different artists and thus he does not consider a concert by any one artist to be a close substitute for a concert by other artists.” (Gilbert Report ¶ 23.) Similarly, Gilbert points out that Manish Bhatia, the named representative for the proposed Chicago Region class, does not consider Creed or Rush to be acceptable substitutes for Pearl Jam. (Bhatia Depo. at 71:3-74:2.) Gilbert explains that the fact that “Bhatia would not see Rush even at a much cheaper price than Pearl Jam is equivalent to there being no cross-price elasticity between the concerts of Pearl Jam and Rush from his perspective.” (Gilbert Report ¶24.) See also (Gilbert Report ¶¶ 25-26) (interpreting statement by other class representatives as indicating that there is no cross-price elasticity between various rock concerts.) Defen *127 dants also submit declaration from various Live Nation executives and artists managers in support of Defendants’ argument that cross-elasticity of demand between bands is low. See (Campana Decl. ¶ 2) (“If a fan does not like a particular artist or band, she will not switch her preference to that artist merely because of that artist’s concert ticket price.”); (Guernot Decl. ¶7) (“the fans of each one of my clients would very likely list only a small number of artists whom they would consider seeing in concert instead of my client.”); (Innamorato Decl. ¶ 13) (“In my experience, a higher or lower ticket price for one artist will not influence a person to change his or her mind and go see another artist on the same night.”); (Lavoisne Decl. ¶ 6) (“[I]f Barenaked Ladies tickets are $20 cheaper than Coldplay tickets, that will not cause Barenaked Ladies fans to go see Cold-play instead.”)
Gilbert’s conclusion that rock concerts are not close substitutes based on his analysis of statements by class representatives is questionable for several reasons. First, as stated by Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp, the “least reliable” evidence in predicting the effects of a hypothetical price increase is “ ‘subjective’ testimony by customers that they would or would not defect in response to a given price increase.” Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 538b. See also F.T.C. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 186 F.3d 1045 , 1054 (8th Cir.1999). “Though not irrelevant, such statements are often unreliable, especially when the question is oversimplified.” Areeda, supra, ¶ 538b.
Setting aside the unpersuasive nature of the evidence on which Gilbert bases his opinion, Gilbert’s analysis is more fundamentally flawed because he bases his conclusions about cross-elasticity of demand on the consumption decisions of individual purchasers. For example, Gilbert concludes that representative Rosen’s comment that he “wouldn’t just go to a concert for the sake of going because it was less expensive than another ... is equivalent to Mr. Rosen saying that for him there is no cross-price elasticity between concerts by different artists and thus he does not consider a concert by any one artist to be a close substitute for a concert by other artists.” (Gilbert Report ¶ 23.) However, when calculating the cross-elasticity of demand, economists examine the aggregate demand of consumers as represented by a demand curve rather than the purchasing decisions of an individual consumer. See, e.g., Mansfield, Edwin, Microeconomics: Theory ¡Applications, 128 (6th ed. 1988) (“Holding constant the commodity’s own price (as well as the level of money incomes) and allowing the price of another commodity to vary, there may be important effects on the quantity demanded in the market for the commodity in question.”) (emphasis added). See also Lipsey, Richard G. et ah, Microeconomics, 88-100 (12th ed.1998). Thus, whether or not various rock concerts are close substitutes for representative Rosen does not demonstrate whether the aggregate quantity demanded in the market for one concert will be affected by a price increase for another concert. 24
2. Cross-elasticity conclusions based on a comparison of prices
Gilbert also concludes that the cross-price elasticity between concerts is “zero or very low” based on analysis of the average price of a concert ticket for twenty-one various artists in 2001. (Gilbert Report ¶¶ 29-30, Figure 1.) Gilbert observes that the average *128 prices range from $12.67 for the group “Seven Nations” to $189.04 for Cream. (Gilbert Report ¶29.) Gilbert concludes that “[t]he broad range of average prices shown in Figure 1 reflects the great variation across artists in the ‘willingness to pay’ of consumers for tickets to those artists’ concerts ... [and] suggests that cross-price elasticity between concerts with very different prices is often zero or very low.” (Gilbert Report ¶30.) Gilbert supports this conclusion with the following reasoning:
For example, if there were any cross-price elasticity between the concerts of Cream (average 2005 price = $189.04) and the concerts of Modest Mouse (average 2005 price = $23.49), so many concert goers would have decided to see Modest Mouse at its much lower price instead that the concert halls for Cream would have been nearly empty. Instead, Cream sold over 56,000 tickets to its three sold-out shows at the Madison Square garden Arena.
(Gilbert Report ¶ 31.)
Gilbert’s conclusion that the substantial difference in prices demonstrates that cross-elasticity of demand is low is economically flawed. As discussed above, cross-price elasticity of demand is “[t]he responsiveness of demand [for one product] to changes in the price of another product.” Cross-elasticity of demand is calculated as follows: gxy = (% change in quantity demanded of X) / (% change in price of Y). Thus, the difference in price between the two products is irrelevant — the only relevant price is the change in price of product Y. Consequently, the fact that Cream sold over 56,000 tickets at three concerts even though its ticket price was $189.04 and the price of Modest Mouse tickets was $23.49 reveals nothing about the cross-elasticity of demand between the two concerts. 25
Similarly flawed arguments have been condemned by the Ninth Circuit. For example, in Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles O. Finley & Co., Inc., the Ninth Circuit stated that “the scope of the relevant market is not governed by the presence of a price differential between competing products.” 512 F.2d 1264 , 1274 (9th Cir.1975). The Ninth Circuit noted that in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., the Supreme Court included cellophane in the flexible wrapping market even though the cost of cellophane was two to three times more than the other products in the market. Id. (citing 351 U.S. 377, 401 , 76 S.Ct. 994 , 100 L.Ed. 1264 (1956)).
S. Failure to consider cross-elasticity of supply
Gilbert admits that “[f]rom the perspective of a promoter, concerts by two very different rock artists such as John Mayer and Nine Inch Nails might indeed be close substitutes, because both might be able to satisfy the promoter’s need to have a concert which the promoter can sell tickets, fill a venue, and make a profit.” (Gilbert Report ¶ 19 n. 11.) Thus, Gilbert concedes that the cross-elasticity of supply may be quite high. However, Gilbert contends that the Court need not analyze the market from the perspective of a promoter because the MDL cases were brought by consumers rather than promoters. (Gilbert Report ¶ 19 n. 11.)
The Ninth Circuit has stated that “defining a market on the basis of demand considerations alone is erroneous” because “[a] reasonable market definition must also be based on ‘supply elasticity.’ ” Rebel Oil, 51 F.3d at 1436 (citing Virtual Maintenance, Inc. v. Prime Computer Inc., 11 F.3d 660, 664 (6th Cir.1993) and Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 533f.). Defendants have failed to point the Court to any case or treatise stating that the nature of the plaintiff dic *129 tates how the court should analyze market definition.
Ip. Differentiation does not preclude market definition
Gilbert argues that rock concerts for each artist might constitute a separate market because each rock concert is a differentiated product. However, Defendants’ contention that rock concerts are differentiated products does not necessarily compel the conclusion that rock concerts, when aggregated, cannot be defined as a single market. Areeda and Hovenkamp define product differentiation:
Product differentiation ordinarily describes narrower differences that at least some buyers value. Identical grocers a few blocks apart may differ in the minds of buyers closer to one of the other. Consumers may favor one brand over another of physically identical or similar aspirin. Many machines performing the same function — such as copiers, computers or automobiles — differ not only in brand name but also in performance, physical appearance, size, capacity, cost, price, reliability, ease of use, service, customer support, and other features. Nevertheless, they generally compete with one another sufficiently that the price of one brand is greatly constrained by the price of others. In one sense, any item is differentiated when any buyer distinguishes among the offerings of different sellers. But this extreme definition has little utility. The differences may be trivial: that all buyers would pay a penny more for a particular computer hardly matters to anyone. Differences may be substantial and yet “wash out” when buyer preferences for a certain feature of any item are offset by disutilities of other features of that item. Even net preferences by some buyers of one seller’s version of a product may be balanced by opposite preferences by other buyers. In that event, sellers regard themselves as competing on more or less equal terms for market shares____For antitrust purposes, we apply the differentiated label to products that are distinguishable in the minds of buyers but not so different as to belong in separate markets.
Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 563a. Areeda and Hovenkamp conclude that “[t]he answer is almost uniformly negative” whether “the degree of power inherent in each differentiated product [is] sufficient to make each brand a separate market.” Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 533e.
For example, courts have defined the presumptive market to include various rival products which could be differentiated by brand. See, e.g., Theatre Party Assoc., Inc. v. Shubert Org., Inc., 695 F.Supp. 150, 154-55 (S.D.N.Y.1988) (rejecting argument that the Broadway show Phantom of the Opera constituted its own product market because “other forms of entertainment, namely other Broadway shows, the opera, ballet or even sporting events” would provide “adequate substitute’ products”); Belfiore v. The New York Times Co., 826 F.2d 177, 180 (2d Cir. 1987) (rejecting claim that the New York Times newspaper constituted its own market because substitutes included all “general circulation daily newspapers”); Package Shop, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 675 F.Supp. 894, 943-45 (D.N.J.1987) (finding rival beers to presumptively be in same product market); Coast Cities Truck Sales, Inc. v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Co., 912 F.Supp. 747, 766-67 (D.N.J.1995) (finding all medium and heavy duty trucks to constitute a single market); Domed Stadium Hotel, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480, 487-88 (5th Cir.1984) (finding hotel rooms in general, rather than Holiday Inn hotel rooms, to constitute the relevant market); Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atlantic & Pac. Tea Co., Inc., 614 F.2d 832 (2d cir.1980) (defining product market to include private label and brand name frozen waffles); Liggett & Myers, Inc. v. FTC, 567 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir.1977) (defining market to include premium and lower quality canned dog food); United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F.Supp. 129 (N.D.Cal.1966), aff'd per curiam 385 U.S. 37 , 87 S.Ct. 240 , 17 L.Ed.2d 35 (finding private label and premium beer to share the same market); Shaw v. Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc., 673 F.Supp. 674, 679 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (“This Court does not need protracted discovery to state with confidence that Rolex watches are reasonably interchangeable with other high quality timepieces.”); Deep South Pepsi-Cola Bottling *130 Co., Inc. v. Pepsico, Inc., 1989 WL 48400 , at *8 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 1989) (“There can be no serious dispute that Pepsi-Cola products are in competition with many other soft drinks.”); Global Discount Travel Services, LLC v. Trans World, Airlines, Inc., 960 F.Supp. 701, 705 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (explaining that the argument that a differentiated product constitutes a single market “is analogous to a contention that a consumer is ‘locked into’ Pepsi because she prefers the taste, or NBC because she prefers ‘Friends,’ ‘Seinfeld,’ and ‘E.R.’ A consumer might choose to purchase a certain product because the manufacturer has spent time and energy differentiating his or her creation from the panoply of products in the market, but at base, Pepsi is one of many sodas, and NBC is just another television network.”). Therefore, the claim that each rock concert is a differentiated product does not necessarily compel the conclusion that each concert constitutes a single product market.
5. Evidence of Similar Price Trajectories
Finally, one of Defendants’ own exhibits supports the inference that rock concerts belong in a single market. Figure 3 of Gilbert’s expert report is a graph depicting the average concert ticket price for selected artists between 1981 and 2006. (Gilbert Report Figure 3.) The graph contains data for a wide range of disparate artists from various genres such as Madonna, the Rolling Stones, and Garth Brooks. (Id.) The graph illustrates how the average ticket prices for these various artists have followed roughly the same upward trajectory over the past twenty years. (Id.) “When the prices of two products (or. of the same product in two regions) change in the same direction and by similar amounts over a substantial period of time, they are presumptively in the same market.” 26 Areeda & Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 534c.
c. Market Definition Involves Similar Questions of Law and Fact
Defendants argue that the Court should find that individual issues predominate because rock concerts do not constitute a single market. However, as the Court’s analysis demonstrates, there is considerable disagreement between the experts about whether rock concerts constitute a single market. For example, based on essentially the same set of data, the experts form different conclusions about the cross-price elasticities of demand. The experts also draw different inferences about the substitutability of rock concerts based on the testimony of class plaintiffs. Finally, the analyses of both experts may be flawed in various respects, such as failing to consider cross-elasticity of supply, and calculating cross-elasticity of demand merely by comparing the prices for two different products.
Despite vigorous argument from both parties, the Court cannot resolve this dispute over market definition in a motion for class certification. Defining the “[rjelevant market is a factual issue which is decided by the jury.” Syufy Enterprises v. American Multicinema, Inc., 793 F.2d 990, 994 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm’n v. N.F.L., 726 F.2d 1381 , 1392 (9th Cir.1984)); see also Morgan, Strand, Wheeler & Biggs v. Radiology, Ltd., 924 F.2d 1484, 1489 (9th Cir.1991) (“Ordinarily, the relevant market is a question of fact for the jury”); Agron, Inc. v. Lin, 2004 WL 555377 , at *8 (C.D.Cal.2004) (same); Rebel Oil Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 133 F.R.D. 41, 44 (D.Nev.1990) (“The Ninth Circuit has established that both market definition and market power are essentially questions of fact appropriate for jury consideration”); Nobody in Particular Presents, 311 F.Supp.2d at 1083 (“The scope of the market is usually a question of fact for the jury.”) (citing Telecor Comm., Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002)). As discussed in Part V.B, a district court could resolve this issue to the extent necessary to evaluate the Rule 23 requirements in some circuits. However, this court is precluded from resolving such issues pursuant to Dukes.
Moreover, as discussed at length in Part V.B, the Court must “avoid resolving ‘the *131 battle of the experts’ at this stage of the proceedings.” Dukes, 474 F.3d at 1229. Thus, the Court cannot weigh the various expert testimonies and define the relevant product market as a matter of law. Based upon this limited inquiry permitted by Dukes, the Court cannot determine that each rock concert constitutes an individual market at this stage in the proceedings. Therefore, the Court cannot conclude that individual issues will predominate due to the lack of a single product market.
Instead, for purposes of resolving the motion for class certification, the nature of the Court’s inquiry centers on determining the extent to which a definition of the relevant product market will involve common questions of law and fact. As the above analysis illustrates/ the process of defining the product market will be predominated by common questions. The analysis involves the same data, the same experts, the same industry analyses, and the same application of the same economic tests. It would be incredibly inefficient to duplicate this analysis in thousands of individual cases.
Defendants’ argument that individual questions will predominate is misleading because Defendants’ argument presumes that the Court will define each concert as an individual market. However, the Court is not concerned with the outcome of the analysis — how the market is defined is to be determined by the jury. 27 Instead, the Court’s focus is the process of defining the relevant market, and this process will clearly be predominated by common questions of law and fact. Therefore, the Court finds that common issues of law and fact predominate with respect to market definition. 28
ii. Possession of Monopoly Power in the Relevant M

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8750099. Public record. Not legal advice.