# O'Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC

> District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania · April 2, 2003 · 214 F.R.D. 266

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8735716

## Case

- **Full name:** Joseph A. O'KEEFE v. MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 2, 2003
- **Citations:** 214 F.R.D. 266; 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5715; 2003 WL 1826501
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Antwerpen
- **Judges:** Antwerpen
- **Cited by:** 61 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8735716

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that plaintiffs satisfied predominance inquiry where they alleged, inter alia, that defendants violated states’ unfair-trade-practices law by engaging in common course of fraud
- noting that “[t]he Third Circuit also recommends using a less exacting version of the lodestar to cross-check the fee award’s reasonableness” and stating that the types of arguments made by the defendant in regard to the lodestar “lead to the demise of the lodestar method”
- noting that a $4,896,783 award, 15% of $32,645,220, yields a multiplier of "2.95 using class counsel's estimated reasonable hours and 6.08 using [the defendant's] estimated reasonable hours"; concluding that neither multiplier seems unreasonable

## Opinion text

OPINION AND ORDER
VAN ANTWERPEN, District Judge.
This class action case has been brought to settlement within just sixteen months due to the hard work and skill of both Plaintiff and Defense counsels. Presently before this court is Plaintiff and Defendant’s Joint Motion for Approval of the Proposed Settlement filed on November 11, 2002. We held a settlement hearing on December 20, 2002. Arguments were heard from Plaintiffs counsel, Defendant’s counsel and several attorneys representing various objectors. Over one-hundred docket entries have been submitted since the Joint Motion for Approval of the Proposed Settlement was filed in August 2002. This Memorandum and Order will certify the proposed settlement class, approve the settlement and set the attorney’s fees. None of objectors’ arguments have altered the certification process, the settlement or the attorney’s fees award. Although it can be helpful to have opposing counsel probe the issues, the objectors in this case have only succeeded in lengthening our memorandum and unnecessarily requiring class counsel and *271 the Defendant to expend additional resources.
I. Background & Procedural History
On May 4, 2001, Plaintiff Joseph A. O’Keefe filed a class action suit against Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“MBUSA”) in the Court of Common Pleas for Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania. The complaint alleged violation of the Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Laws, 73 P.S. § 201-1 (“UTPCPL”), breach of express and implied warranties, fraudulent concealment and declaratory relief on behalf of a class of all persons in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania who purchased or leased 1998 or 1999 model year Mercedes-Benz vehicles equipped with a Flexible Service System (“FSS”). Plaintiff claimed that MBUSA failed to disclose that vehicles equipped with FSS would “evidence premature and/or bearings wear, and other internal defects.” See Def.’s Notice of Removal filed on June 12, 2001: Ex. 2 at 2 (May 4, 2001).
On June 12, 2001 the ease was removed to this court based upon diversity of citizenship. After removal, Plaintiff amended his complaint pursuant to our December 17, 2001 Order. The complaint added a claim under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and expanded the proposed class to include all persons throughout the United States who purchased or leased 1998 or 1999 Mercedes-Benz vehicles equipped with the FSS. In January 2002, we dismissed Plaintiffs newly added Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act claim without prejudice because we lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d)(3)(C). See O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 01-CV-2902, 2002 WL 377122 (E.D.Pa. Jan.31, 2002). Section 2310(d)(3)(C) prohibits class actions under Magnuson-Moss in federal court when there are less than 100 named plaintiffs. Id. at *4 .
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Class Action Complaint on July 23, 2002. As the case stands now, Plaintiffs complaint contains four counts against MBUSA: (1) violation of various state consumer protection statutes; (2) breach of express warranty; (3) breach of implied warranty; and (4) unjust enrichment. The complaint alleges that MBUSA made intentional misrepresentations as part of a fraudulent scheme. Plaintiff seeks actual damages, reasonable attorney’s fees, punitive or treble damages and any other relief that the Court deems appropriate. More importantly, the Second Amended Complaint altered the proposed class to include “[a]ll persons throughout the United States (including Puerto Rico and U.S. territories) who own or lease a model year 1998, 1999, 2000 or 2001 (first purchased or leased before March 31, 2001) Mercedes-Benz vehicle equipped with the FSS.” See Pl.’s Second Amended Class Action Complaint at 19 filed on July 23, 2002. To date, we have not ruled on our subject matter jurisdiction over the newly proposed class.
The Second Amended Class Action Complaint alleges that:
[tjhrough a common and uniform course of • conduct utilizing common documents, defendant manufactured, supplied, promoted, sold and leased vehicles when it knew or should have known that its vehicles equipped with the FSS would experience premature and/or abnormal rod bearings wear, excessive oil consumption, sludge buildup, and other internal defects, if the FSS oil service intervals recommended by defendant utilizing Mercedes-Benz approved conventional motor oils were strictly followed by the owners and lessees of the vehicles.
Second Am. Compl. at 112.
The FSS monitors the car’s driving conditions. It then determines when the vehicle requires an oil change. A dashboard panel indicator lights up to inform the driver that a service is needed. The alleged problem occurs when the driver uses conventional oil instead of synthetic oil with the FSS system. Typically the FSS recommends oil changes somewhere between 10,000 and 20,000 miles with a 12,000 mile average depending on each vehicle’s operation and driving conditions. Allegedly, conventional oil will cause engine damage when used for FSS recommended drain intervals. In March 2001, MBUSA sent all vehicle owners a letter that strongly recommended switching over to pure synthetic oils for all FSS equipped vehicles to prevent excessive oil consumption and oil sludging.
The parties reached a settlement and submitted it for approval in August 2002. Un *272 der the terms of the agreement, MBUSA has agreed to provide the class with three main benefits. First, MBUSA will give the owners and lessees of 1998 and 1999 Maintenance Service Certificates which will entitle class members to a thirty-five dollar discount off a scheduled service which includes an oil change. See Global Class Action Settlement Agreement, at If 12. Owners and lessees of 2000 and 2001 vehicles will not receive the certificates because these class members are still covered by MBUSA’s Maintenance Program whereby MBUSA bears the cost of routine maintenance. See Pl.’s Mem. of Law in Support, at 6 filed on Aug. 7, 2002 [61-1]. The voucher is tied to the each vehicle’s Vehicle Identification Number (“VTN”) and can be transferred to its subsequent owners or lessees. The vouchers expire in December 2004. See Parties’ Joint Motion for Preliminary Approval, at 9-10 filed Aug. 7, 2002 [60-1] [hereinafter “Joint Approval”]. O’Keefe and MBUSA agree that, the vouchers are worth $12.3 million to the class. t See Def.’s Post-Hearing Br., at 23, filed Feb. 5, 2002[150—1]; Pl.’s Post-Hearing Br., at 48, filed Jan. 22, 2003 [144-1].
Second, MBUSA will provide a unique warranty that “will cover engine damage caused by use of API SH or SJ conventional motor oil” in the FSS equipped vehicles. The warranties, like the vouchers, are tied to the vehicle and are transferable. The warranty coverage will apply up to 10 years or 150,000 miles. See Joint Approval at 8-9. O’Keefe claims that this is a limited “extended warranty.” See Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact, at 12, filed Jan. 22, 2003 [143-1]. MBUSA labels the warranty a “coverage program.” See Def.’s Proposed Findings of Fact, at 9-10, filed Feb. 5, 2002 [149-1]. Whatever the label, the Extended Warranty Coverage Program only covers damage associated with the allegedly defective FSS system caused by using conventional motor oil instead of synthetic motor oil.
Third, MBUSA has agreed pay to certain litigation expenses that are normally borne by the class in Rule 23(b)(3) class actions. MBUSA agreed to pay class counsel reasonable court awarded attorney’s fees and not appeal any fee award under $7.5 million. See Joint Approval at 14-15. Additionally, MBUSA paid for the printing and initial mailing of notifications to the class members. It also paid for the re-mailing that was necessitated by a database error was discovered. See Pl.’s Proposed Findings of Fact, at 14-15.
In exchange, the class has released MBU-SA from most but not all claims. It states as follows:
[A]U Class members who do not opt out of the proposed Settlement Class, ..., hereby releases and forever discharges MBUSA from any and all claims, demands, causes of action of eery kind nature, obligations, damages, losses and costs, whether known or unknown, actual or potential, suspected or unsuspected, contingent or fixed, that were or could have been asserted or sought in the Actions, relating to the use of conventional motor oil in Vehicles equipped with the FSS, including, but not limited to, claims for negligence, strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty, and violation of state consumer protection or deceptive trade practices statutes.
Joint Approval, at 13-14. The release is not a general release because it does not release personal injury claims. 1 The parties doubt that any personal injuries would result because the type of potential damage in this case is unrelated to vehicle safety. We discussed this topic when we denied Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction. See O’Keefe, 2002 WL 377122 , at *2-4. We found it unlikely that irreparable harm would result because the alleged defect was not a safety concern. Id. at *3 . We also found that public *273 interest considerations did not weigh in favor of an injunction because the alleged defect did not pose a safety problem to vehicle occupants or the public. Id. at *4 .
This court held a Settlement Hearing on December 20, 2002 which included: (1) Plaintiffs counsel; (2) Defendant’s counsel; (3) counsel for Objectors Ronald Pitts, Sandra Pitts, Shoals Provision and Horace Con-nor (collectively “Pitts”); 2 (4) counsel for Objector Nicole Yatooma; and (5) counsel for Objectors Arthur Haberberger, Joanne Haberberger, David Irmer and Martha Inner (collectively “Haberbergers”). The oral arguments covered both the proposed settlement and the petition for attorney’s fees.
After receiving and reviewing the post-hearing briefs, we sought additional argument and briefing on the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Pursuant to our February 14, 2003 Order, oral argument regarding subject matter jurisdiction was heard on February 20, 2003 from: (1) Plaintiffs counsel; (2) Defendant’s counsel; and (3) counsel for Objectors Pitts.
II. Jurisdiction
We have subject matter jurisdiction over the proposed class’s claims. This court has spent a considerable amount of time on this issue because we are a court of limited jurisdiction that has a duty to question whether our subject matter jurisdiction has been properly invoked. The February 20, 2003 oral argument and the accompanying briefs sufficiently resolved our concerns.
Plaintiff has put forth four alternative theories supporting our subject matter jurisdiction over the class member’s claims. First, O’Keefe argues that subject matter jurisdiction exists because it existed at the time of removal. We agree in part. Second, O’Keefe claims to have perfected the Magnuson-Moss class action and it is now properly within our jurisdiction. We disagree and will remand the Magnuson-Moss class action. Third, jurisdiction exists because each class member is asserting a claim under the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. 3 We decline to *274 conduct a full choice of law analysis at this time because the parties have agreed to settle the case to avoid the potential risks such a decision might mean for both sides. See Gunter v. Ridgewood Energy Corp., 164 F.R.D. 391, 399 (D.N.J.1996) (stating that choice of law issues were premature and did not prevent class certification). Fourth, O’Keefe argues that jurisdiction may be founded upon the class member’s common law claims for unjust enrichment and fraud pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 . 4 We agree. We have supplemental jurisdiction over each proposed class member’s state consumer protection and deceptive trade practices act pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a) because they form part of the same case and controversy as the common law consumer unjust enrichment and fraud claims.
A. Removal and Subject Matter Jurisdiction in General
Any civil action brought in state court may be removed by the defendant to the federal district court in the district where such action is pending, if the district court would have original jurisdiction over the matter. See 28 U.S.C. 1441(a); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust for S. Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 7-8 , 103 S.Ct. 2841 , 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983); U.S. Express Lines Ltd. *275 v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388-89 (3d Cir. 2002). Where removal is based on diversity jurisdiction, the matter must be a case which the federal courts would have had original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 . Diversity jurisdiction is properly invoked in cases where there is complete diversity of citizenship between plaintiffs and defendants and where the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 . See Development Fin. Corp. v. Alpha Housing & Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 1995) (“It is axiomatic that the federal judiciary’s diversity jurisdiction depends on complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all defendants.”) (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 , 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806)).
1. Removal Was Proper for O’Keefe’s Claims
We have subject matter jurisdiction over O’Keefe’s claim pursuant to § 1332. This action was removed from the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (a). Removal was proper. Subject matter jurisdiction existed at the time of removal because O’Keefe and MBUSA were diverse and there was more than $75,000 in controversy. O’Keefe resides in Fleetwood, Pennsylvania and is a citizen of Pennsylvania. Mercedes-Benz is incorporated in Delaware with its principle place of business in Montvale, New Jersey. Under Pennsylvania’s UTPCPL, O’Keefe’s may seek damages equal to treble the purchase price of his vehicle. O’Keefe’s vehicle cost $34,950.00, which equals $137,300.00 when trebled.
2. The UTPCPL Allows Consumers to Seek Treble Damages
The UTPCPL states in pertinent part:
Private Actions, (a) Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by any person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by section 3 of this act, may bring a private action to recover actual damages or one hundred dollars ($100), whichever is greater. The court may, in its discretion, award up to three times the actual damages sustained, but not less than one hundred dollars ($100), and may provide such additional relief as it deems necessary or proper. The court may award to the plaintiff, in addition to other relief provided in this section, costs and reasonable attorney fees.
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 73 § 201-9.2 (West 2003) (emphasis added). The statute clearly allows the court to award treble damages when the act is violated. The statute places no express limit or control on the court’s discretion.
A Third Circuit panel in Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661 (2002), held that Pennsylvania’s common law economic loss doctrine trumped Pennsylvania’s statutory consumer protection statute. The panel held that consumers who allege they were intentionally defrauded may only recover actual damages. We cannot follow the panel’s decision when it is not in harmony with Pennsylvania state law because: (1) in Pennsylvania common law may not overrule legislative intent and violate a statute; (2) Pennsylvania courts have refused to apply the economic loss doctrine in consumer common law intentional fraud suits; (3) Pennsylvania courts have allowed treble damage awards in consumer fraud cases pursuant to the UTPCPL without reference to the economic loss doctrine; (4) Pennsylvania courts since Werwinski have continued to do so; and (5) the panel based its decision entirely on a U.S. District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin case applying Wisconsin law which is not binding on Pennsylvania courts.
First, Pennsylvania’s statutory construction statute clearly bars applying common law doctrine to overturn legislative acts enacted after September 1, 1937. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1 § 1921 (‘When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1 § 1928(a) (“The rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed, shall have no application to the statutes of this commonwealth ____”) (emphasis added); cf. N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 50:05 *276 (6th ed. 2000) (“[G]eneral and comprehensive legislation, where course of conduct, parties, things affected, limitations and exceptions are minutely described, indicates a legislative intent that the statute should totally supersede and replace the common law dealing with the subject matter.”). The court may not simply ignore part of a statute. See Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 1 § 1922(2) (“In ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly in the enactment of a statute the following presumptions, among others, may be used____(2) That the General Assembly intends the entire statute to be effective and certain.”). The court may not ignore the clear intent of the legislature to allow the court, in its discretion, to award treble damages for violations of the statute. See Commonwealth v. Sitkin’s Junk Co., Inc., 412 Pa. 132, 138 , 194 A.2d 199 (1963) (“[W]e have repeatedly said in the construction of a statute that presumably every word, sentence and provision therein is intended for some purpose, and accordingly must be given effect.”). The common law doctrine of economic loss may not overrule the UTPCPL because the UTPCPL was enacted in December 1968 and the UTPCPL’s Private Actions subsection must be given its clear legislative intent.
Second, before the Werwinski panel’s decision, Pennsylvania’s Common Pleas Courts were apparently unanimous in refusing to apply the economic loss doctrine even in common law intentional fraud claims. See e.g., Oppenheimer v. York Intern., No. 4348, 2002 WL 31409949 , at *6 (Pa.Comm.Pl. Oct. 25, 2002) (“[T]his Court has not extended the economic loss doctrine to cover intentional torts;” “This court does not believe that intentional misrepresentation and outright dishonesty, if they can indeed be proven, are properly redressed by breach of contract or warranty action.”); Zwiercan v. General Motors Corp., No. 3235, 2002 WL 31053838 , at *6 (Pa.Comm.Pl. Sept. 11, 2002) (“In declining to extend the application of the economic loss doctrine to intentional fraud claims, this Court noted, there is an absence of Pennsylvania case law on the subject, but found support for the proposition that the doctrine should not bar claims where the representation is intentionally false.”); Worldwideweb Networx Corp. v. Entrade, Inc., 2002 WL 1472336 , at *3 (Pa.Comm.Pl. June 20, 2002) (“[T]he economic loss doctrine does not apply to intentional tort claims.”); Teledyne Tech. Inc. v. Freedom Forge Corp., No. 3398, 2002 WL 748898 , at *11 (Pa.Comm.Pl. Apr. 19, 2002) (“[I]f Pennsylvania law were to apply, the economic loss doctrine would not bar the plaintiffs intentional misrepresentation claim.”); Amico v. Radius Communications, No. 1793, 2001 WL 1807924 (Pa.Comm.Pl. Jan 9, 2001) (holding that economic loss doctrine does not apply to intentional fraud claims); First Republic Bank v. Brand, 50 Pa. D. & C. 4th 329 , 2000 WL 33394627 (Pa.Comm.Pl. Dec. 19, 2000) (holding that the economic loss doctrine does not apply to fraudulent misrepresentation claim). If the Common Pleas Courts did not apply the common law doctrine of economic loss to common law intentional torts, we do not believe they would have applied it to statutory intentional torts or consumer protection statutes. Pennsylvania’s Supreme Courts and appellate courts have not addressed the issue.
Third, before the Werwinski panel decision, both of Pennsylvania’s appellate courts upheld decisions where a consumer recovered treble damages under the UTPCPL when the consumer suffered only monetary or property damage caused by defendant’s misrepresentations or fraudulent scheme. See Johnson v. Hyundai Motor Am., 698 A.2d 631, 637-40 (Pa.Super.Cit.1997) (affirming treble damage award under the UTPCPL when car manufacturer violated warranty; and stating that Pennsylvania courts are not bound by earlier federal court cases that declined to award treble damages after exercising discretion); see also, e.g., McCauslin v. Reliance Fin. Co., 751 A.2d 683, 684 (Pa.Super.Ct.2000) (trebling damages under the UTPCPL for “actual damage sustained” but not emotional distress or attorney’s fees in pursuit thereof when finance company accelerated payments); Baker v. Cambridge Chase Inc., 725 A.2d 757, 766-67 (Pa.Super.Ct.1999) (Since plaintiffs “bring their fraud claim under the UTPCPL, they may, therefore, be entitled to treble damages and attorney’s fees in addition to restitution,” when purchasers of unfinished townhouse brought fraud claim); Metz v. Quaker Highlands, Inc., 714 A.2d 447 (Pa.Super.Ct.1998) *277 (granting land purchasers rescission and treble damages); Sewak v. Lockhart, 699 A.2d 755, 761-63 (Pa.Super.Ct.1997) (affirming treble damage award when seller was found to have fraudulently concealed the fact that a support column was removed from the house); Hammer v. Nikol, 659 A.2d 617, 619-20 (Pa.Commw.Ct.1995) (affirming award of double damages and attorney’s fees under the UTPCPL when towing company fraudulently failed to disclose true towing and storage fees before customer signed contract). In each of these cases, the plaintiff never alleged personal injury and the court did not require a showing of personal injury. The court never considered applying the economic loss doctrine in these eases.
Fourth, since the Werwinski panel decision, Pennsylvania’s appellate courts continue to allow treble damages under the UTPCPL even when the plaintiff suffered no personal injury. See Conner v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 820 A.2d 1266 (Pa.Super.Ct.2003) (finding plaintiff has statutory right to request treble damages or attorney’s fees for UTPCPL violations when defendant refused to make repairs to used vehicle still under warranty, but denying them because plaintiff failed to request such relief before the arbitration board who heard the dispute); Skur- nowicz v. Lucci, 798 A.2d 788, 796-97 (Pa.Super.Ct.2002) (upholding treble damage award under the UTPCLP when home buyer suffered property damage after seller lied about history of past drainage problems).
Fifth, the Werwinski panel made its decision without reference to Pennsylvania case law or statutory construction, principles. The court cited one unpublished foreign U.S. District Court opinion in support of its holding. See Werwinski, 286 F.3d at 681 (citing to Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 1998 WL 469913 , at *5 (W.D.Wis. June 11, 1998)). 5
As this is a diversity case where Pennsylvania substantive law controls, we must predict how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule on the question of whether intentional fraud may be barred by the economic loss doctrine by “giving ‘proper regard’ to the relevant rulings of other courts of the state.” Robertson v. Allied Signal, Inc., 914 F.2d 360, 378 (3d Cir.1990). “In the absence of guidance from the state’s highest court, we are to consider decisions of the state’s intermediate appellate courts for assistance in predicting how the state’s highest court would rule.” Gares v. Willingboro Twp., 90 F.3d 720, 725 (3d Cir.1996); see also U.S. Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 90, 93 (3d Cir.1996) (“The rulings of intermediate appellate courts must be accorded significant weight and should not be disregarded absent persuasive indication that the highest court would rule otherwise.”). We do not believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would defy the overwhelming and unanimous precedence of its appellate and trial courts or the clear language of the UTPCPL and adopt the reasoning of a foreign federal court’s unpublished decision applying Wisconsin state law. See Commonwealth v. Clark, 551 Pa. 258 , 710 A.2d 31, 39 (1998) (“[I]t is axiomatic that decisions of our federal brethren are not binding on this Court.”); Johnson, 698 A.2d at 637-40 (stating that Pennsylvania courts are not bound by earlier federal court cases regarding the.UTPCPL).
Pennsylvania’s economic loss doctrine “prohibits plaintiffs from recovering in tort economic losses to which their entitlement flows only from a contract.” Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604 , 618 (3d Cir.1995). In Pennsylvania, the purpose of the economic loss doctrine is to maintain the separation between the law of contract and the law of tort. New York State Elec. & Gas Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 387 Pa.Super. 537 , 564 A.2d 919, 925 (1989); Blue Mountain Mushroom Co. v. Monterey Mushroom, 246 F.Supp.2d 394, 401-402 (E.D.Pa.2002). The economic loss *278 doctrine originally applied only to product liability claims, with the expectation that parties could recover purely economic damages under contract theory. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871 , 106 S.Ct. 2295 , 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (1986). The expanded reach of the doctrine to cover negligence has been justified on the basis that parties can protect themselves by negotiating the terms of a manufacturer’s liability. Id. at 872-73 , 106 S.Ct. 2295 . Pennsylvania courts addressing the economic loss doctrine have accepted the Supreme Court’s rationale and focused on the ability of the purchaser to recover economic harm under a breach of warranty claim. REM Coal Co. Inc. v. Clark Equipment Co., 386 Pa.Super. 401 , 563 A.2d 128 (1989) (en banc). Thus, “negligence and strict liability theories do not apply in an action between commercial enterprises involving a product that malfunctions where the only resulting damage is to the product itself.” REM Coal, 563 A.2d. at 134 (emphasis added). Pennsylvania’s economic loss doctrine bars negligence or strict liability claims between commercial enterprises when the duties between the parties lie in contract. See East River, 476 U.S. 858 , 106 S.Ct. 2295 , 90 L.Ed.2d 865 (applying doctrine in admiralty law and defining doctrine); Lower Lake Dock Company v. Messinger Bearing Corp., 395 Pa.Super. 456 , 577 A.2d 631, 634-34 (1990); REM Coal, 386 Pa.Super. 401 , 563 A.2d 128 (1989).
The economic loss doctrine is inapplicable to O’Keefe’s claims. O’Keefe is alleging a statutory claim in addition to his common law claims. O’Keefe is claiming that MBUSA’s actions were part of a fraudulent scheme. Pennsylvania’s economic loss doctrine is inapplicable to intentional torts. O’Keefe’s entitlement does not stem solely from contract law, because his entitlement to recovery also stems from Pennsylvania statutory law under the UTPCPL. His allegations of fraudulent behavior by MBUSA clearly take this case out of the reach of Pennsylvania’s economic loss doctrine. Additionally, O’Keefe is not a commercial entity. He is a consumer.
Moreover, as we recently stated in Air Prods. Chems., Inc. v. Eaton Metal Prods. Co., _ F.Supp.2d _, 2003 WL 1825069 (E.D. Pa.2003) (Van Antwerpen, J.):
[W]e find that the underlying purposes of the economic loss doctrine suggest that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would rule that it does not apply to this kind of fraudulent misrepresentation. As noted above, the economic loss doctrine is premised on the notion that parties to a contract may protect themselves from negligence or defective products by negotiating the liability terms of the contract. East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. [at] 872-73[, 106 S.Ct. 2295 ]. We believe that in both theory and practice, it is impracticable, if not impossible, for parties to negotiate terms regarding what happens if one of them is intentionally deceiving the other. Indeed, if there were deception in the inducement to agree to such terms, we foresee an endless series of sub-agreements as to what happens if one party has intentionally deceived the other into signing an intentional-deception clause. The notion that parties are free to allocate risks of negligence or defect fails when one party is intentionally deceiving the other. First Republic Bank v. Brand, 50 Pa. D. & C. 4th 329, 344 (Pa.Comm.Pl. Dec. 19, 2000) (“A party to a contract cannot rationally calculate the possibility that the other party will deliberately misrepresent terms critical to that contract. Public policy is better served by leaving the possibility of an intentional tort suit hanging over the head of a party considering outright fraud.”) (internal citations omitted).
We have original subject matter jurisdiction over O’Keefe’s claims. His claim meets the amount in controversy requirement because O’Keefe has properly requested treble damages under the UTPCPL.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction, Removal, Amended Complaints, and New Claims
The parties correctly stated that subject matter jurisdiction is to be determined at the time of removal and that in diversity cases “it is well-settled that there is very little that a plaintiff can do that will defeat federal subject matter jurisdiction and force a remand to state court.” See 14B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3721 at n. 97 (3d ed.1998), quoted in Parties’ Joint *279 Supp. Br. on Subject Matter Jurisdiction, at 4 filed on Feb. 20, 2003 [156-1].
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs Complaint is Determined at the Time of Removal
The plaintiffs complaint at the time of removal controls a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction inquiry when the case is based on diversity jurisdiction. See St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 , 58 S.Ct. 586 , 82 L.Ed. 845 (“[T]he status of the case as disclosed by the plaintiffs complaint is controlling in the case of a removal.... ”); Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 666 (3d Cir.2002) (“A district court’s determination as to the amount in controversy must be based on the ‘plaintiffs complaint at the time the petition for removal was filed.’ ”) (quoting Steel Valley Auth. v. Union Switch and Signal Div., 809 F.2d 1006, 1010 (3d Cir.1987)); Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir.1999) (determining amount in controversy at time of removal). This mirrors the rule in originally filed cases “where the inquiry is directed to the time when the complaint is filed.” Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 217 (3d Cir.1999) (citing Pullman v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 , 59 S.Ct. 347 , 83 L.Ed. 334 (1939)).
Any post-removal event, 6 whether a result of plaintiffs own volition or outside of plaintiffs control, that reduces the amount in controversy below 28 U.S.C. § 1332’s jurisdictional floor will not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. See Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. at 293 , 58 S.Ct. 586 ; Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 703 (2d Cir.1985) (“Amendment of a pleading in an effort to rescind jurisdiction over an issue on which a court has already acted is not permitted.”); Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 531 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir.1976). This long held rule protects the defendant’s statutory right of removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 . See Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. at 293 , 58 S.Ct. 586 . Without solidifying subject matter jurisdiction at the time of removal, the plaintiff would be able to thwart federal jurisdiction by reducing the prayer for relief. 7 This would render the defendant’s statutory right of removal “subject to the plaintiffs caprice.” Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. at 293 , 58 S.Ct. 586 (“If the plaintiff could, no matter how bona fide his original claim in the state court, reduce the amount of his demand to defeat federal jurisdiction the defendant’s supposed statutory right of removal would be subject to the plaintiffs caprice.”); Albright v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 531 F.2d 132, 135-36 (3d Cir.1976) (finding district court has jurisdiction when plaintiff amended complaint post removal to reduce the amount in controversy).
Nothing we heard at oral arguments, read in the parties’ briefs or read in the objectors’ briefs lead us to question our subject matter jurisdiction over O’Keefe’s claim. O’Keefe never amended his complaint in a fraudulent manner in an attempt to thwart this court’s jurisdiction. He neither lowered the amount he demanded nor attempted to join non-diverse defendants. Subject matter jurisdiction still exists over O’Keefe’s claim because it existed at the time of removal and there has not been subsequent revelation evidencing that removal was improperly granted.
2. The Issue
We were concerned about a different issue when we raised the question of subject matter jurisdiction in our February 14, 2003 Order. After our July 13, 2001 Order, *280 O’Keefe submitted an amended complaint adding a Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act Claim on behalf of the proposed Pennsylvania state class. Defendant moved to dismiss the new claims. Our January 31, 2002 Memorandum and Order dismissed the Magnu-son-Moss Claim “without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction” because of a technical defect. 8 O’Keefe then filed a Second Amended Complaint that proposed a nationwide class instead of a Pennsylvania only class. Shortly thereafter, the parties reached a settlement. We never ruled on our subject matter jurisdiction over the proposed class plaintiffs from other jurisdictions. O’Keefe must demonstrate that each newly proposed class member’s claims meet the jurisdictional minimum of § 1332.
This case presents a novel question regarding removal jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, class actions and post-removal joinder. Does the solidification of subject matter jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs claim in a diversity class action removed to federal court allow the plaintiff to amend his complaint post-removal to propose a nationwide class action without analyzing the subject matter jurisdiction for the newly proposed plaintiffs? Specifically, can the plaintiff include new class members post-removal from jurisdictions where the state law claims against the defendant do not meet § 1332’s amount in controversy? We believe the answer is no.
The issue arises because O’Keefe has proposed to join plaintiffs from jurisdictions where plaintiffs are limited to only recover actual damages under the state’s consumer protection statute. Without the trebling of damages, O’Keefe’s own claim would not meet the requisite amount in controversy to confer diversity jurisdiction his statutory claim.
O’Keefe and MBUSA maintain that we have subject matter jurisdiction over the state law claims of the proposed nationwide class members because we exercised jurisdiction over O’Keefe’s claim when it was removed by MBUSA in our July 13, 2001 Order. 9 The parties rely on the case precedence discussed supra Section II.B.l. We disagree because: (1) our July 13, 2001 Order established subject matter jurisdiction only over claims brought by O’Keefe and the proposed class of Pennsylvania plaintiffs; (2) the joinder of new plaintiffs requires a subject matter jurisdiction inquiry; and (3) subject matter jurisdiction cannot be established indirectly when it could not be established directly.
a. Subject Matter Jurisdiction at the Time of Removal is Limited to Claims Contained in the Removed Complaint.
When a court finds that a diversity case has been properly removed to federal court, the court must also find that it has *281 subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim contained in the complaint 10 at the time of removal. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a) (jurisdiction depends on claims in pleadings); 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1208 (2d ed. 1990) (In diversity cases, “[t]he complaint must affirmatively demonstrate that the claim is within the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court because these tribunals are courts of limited jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added). The court finding does not mean that subject matter jurisdiction will exist over all hypothetical claims that may be later filed during the action’s journey through federal court. This is why a plaintiffs attempt to amend his complaint post-removal by reducing the amount in controversy is dealt with differently then when the plaintiff amends his complaint to join a non-diverse party or cross-claim against a non-diverse third-party. When a party reduces the amount in controversy, he is altering a claim that the court has already established subject matter jurisdiction over. See discussion supra Section II.B.l. In contrast, when the complaint is amended to assert a new claim against a non-diverse party by joinder or third-party practice, the court must analyze it’s subject matter jurisdiction over the new claim because it was not present at the time of removal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (e) (directing district court to use discretion as to whether to remand an action when a claim against a joined defendant would destroy diversity); cf. Smiga, 766 F.2d at 703 (“Amendment of a pleading in an effort to rescind jurisdiction over an issue on which a court has already acted is not permitted”). Subject matter jurisdiction over a new claim is routinely analyzed in diversity cases when it is asserted for or against third parties, 11 a permissively joined party, 12 or a compulsorily joined party. 13 When a new claim is alleged against a non-diverse party in a removed action, the district court is required to analyze jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (e).
Our July 13, 2001 Order found that subject matter jurisdiction existed over O’Keefe’s claim against MBUSA. The Order was limited to the claims originally contained in the removed complaint. Each claim — new or old — must be separately analyzed in a diversity action for the court to invoke subject matter jurisdiction. See Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-95 , 94 S.Ct. 505 , 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973) (requiring each plaintiff to meet the jurisdictional amount when they are bringing separate and distinct claims). This is evident in our January 31, 2001 Memorandum and Order which dismissed the proposed class’s MagnusonMoss claim. Neither party argued at that time that our July 13, 2001 finding of subject matter jurisdiction shielded the new claim from scrutiny. Instead, our January 31, 2001 Memorandum and Order dismissed the claim pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d)(3)(C) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The new claims by the newly defined class, like the previous Magnuson-Moss claims, cannot be shielded from a prior finding of subject matter jurisdiction at the time of removal.
b. Analyzing Jurisdiction Over the Newly Proposed Class Members
The parties were unable to find an analogous situation in the case law where a plain *282 tiff expanded the proposed class from a state-wide to a nationwide class action after the federal court initially exercised jurisdiction pursuant to §§ 1332 & 1441. The cases that the parties have cited in support of their argument all deal with situations where the plaintiff attempted to thwart federal jurisdiction by either lowering the amount in controversy or joining or cross-claiming against non-diverse parties. See, Parties’ Joint Supplemental Br. on Subject Matter Jurisdiction, at 2-4 filed on Feb. 20, 2003 [156-1] (citing, e.g., Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. KN Energy, Inc., 498 U.S. 426, 428 , 111 S.Ct. 858 , 112 L.Ed.2d 951 (1991) (retaining jurisdiction when defendant corporation transferred its interest to a limited partnership that contained non-diverse partners because subsequent change in citizen of the parties does not disturb diversity jurisdiction); Werwinski, 286 F.3d at 665 (denying plaintiffs attempt to remand when plaintiff lowered amount in controversy); BEM I, L.L.C. v. Anthropologie, Inc., 301 F.3d 548, 551 (7th Cir.2002) (same); American Dental Indus. v. EAX Worldwide, Inc., 228 F.Supp.2d 1155, 1157 (D.Or.2002) (same); Poore v. American-Amicable Life Ins. Co., 218 F.3d 1287 , 1290 (same); Albright, 531 F.2d at 135 (same). In some of the cases that the parties cited, the court did remand the action. See Leonard v. Enterprise Rent A Car, 279 F.3d 967, 972 (11th Cir.2002) (remanding case when a reasonable interpretation of the complaint did not allege the requisite amount in controversy); Millar v. Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist., 236 F.Supp.2d 1110, 1119-20 (remanding case when plaintiff voluntarily dismissed federal claim and state law claim did not meet the amount in controversy)). In each of the cases cited by the parties, the court was considering the subject matter jurisdiction over the original or new claims brought by the original plaintiff. In this instance we are only questioning our jurisdiction over the new claims by the new plaintiffs. The claims brought by the original plaintiffs — O’Keefe and the Pennsylvania resident class members — are not at issue.
After an extensive search, we have found only one analogous case. In Indianer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 113 F.R.D. 595 (S.D.Fl.1986), the district court determined that subject matter jurisdiction existed over the Florida-wide class’s claims when the case was removed to federal court. The named plaintiff was from Florida, the defendant was from Illinois, and each class member’s claim met the amount in controversy threshold. See Indianer, 113 F.R.D. at 597 . Thereafter, plaintiff amended the claim to allege a suit on behalf of all defendant’s customers throughout the country. Id. The court stated that, “[b]ecause Plaintiffs attempt to expand the state class into a nationwide class creates new issues which might affect subject matter jurisdiction, we properly address the issue of subject matter jurisdiction de novo at this time.” Id. at 598 n. 3. The court found jurisdiction lacking. Neither the law of the case nor the prior order establishing subject matter jurisdiction prevented the court from re-analyzing subject matter jurisdiction over the named plaintiffs claims or analyzing jurisdiction for the first time over the nationwide class. Id. at 598-605 & n. 3.
We have the same situation in the present case. The proposed nationwide class action is wholly different from the statewide class action in scope and magnitude. We have never asserted jurisdiction over the nationwide class members. We are required to sua sponte question our own jurisdiction because we are a court of limited jurisdiction. See Owen’s Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 , 98 S.Ct. 2396 , 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978) (“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The limits upon federal jurisdiction, whether imposed by the Constitution or by Congress, must be neither disregarded nor evaded.”); Meritcare, 166 F.3d at 217 -18 & n. 3 (warning that a court order is not enforceable if jurisdiction was lacking) (citing Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 905 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir.1990) (obligating courts to consider their own jurisdiction because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction)).
Rule 23(b)(3) class actions are technically joinder vehicles. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 296 , 299-300 & n. 6, 94 S.Ct. 505 (comparing class action and joinder cases; stating that amount in controversy requirement identical in both situations) (citations omitted); Snyder, 394 U.S. at 337, 89 S.Ct. 1053 (same); 7A Wright *283 et al., supra § 1752 (discussing history of Rule 23, spurious class actions and joinder). Each class member’s claim must satisfy § 1332’s amount in controversy. See Zahn, 414 U.S. at 294-95, 301 , 94 S.Ct. 505 (requiring each plaintiff with separate and distinct claims in a 23(b)(3) class action to satisfy the amount in controversy); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594, 596 , 36 S.Ct. 416 , 60 L.Ed. 817 (1916) (requiring each plaintiff with a “separate and distinct demand” in a joinder case to satisfy the amount in controversy); Meritcare, 166 F.3d at 218 (stating that joinder and class action cases both require each plaintiff with a distinct and separate claim to meet the amount in controversy requirement); see also text supra note 9 (discussing the Third Circuit’s adherence to Zahn despite the 1990 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 ).
Expanding the proposed class is a joinder of new plaintiffs to the action through the class action vehicle. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 337 , 89 S.Ct. 1053 , 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (1969). In Snyder , the Supreme Court stated that the rule barring the aggregation of claims among joined plaintiffs to meet § 1332’s jurisdictional minimum should be applied to class actions. See Id. at 336-37, 89 S.Ct. 1053 . The Court found no logical difference between a mass joinder of plaintiffs and a class action of plaintiffs. In both litigation procedures, the requisite amount in controversy must be reached by each plaintiff because each plaintiff is pursuing an individual claim.
The Supreme Court stated that: “Each, plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case — ‘one plaintiff may not ride on another’s coattails.’ ” Zahn, 414 U.S. at 301 , 94 S.Ct. 505 (quoting Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033, 1035 (2d Cir.1972)). This rule cannot be ignored merely because this case was removed to federal court rather than originated in federal court.
We do not have original jurisdiction over the claims brought on behalf of many of the newly defined class members. Because the state law only allows for actual damage, we only have jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332 over class members who paid over $75,000 for their vehicles in Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia or Wyoming. We have diversity jurisdiction over class members who paid over $74,000 for their vehicle in Nevada because the state law allows for actual damages plus $1,000. We have diversity jurisdiction over class members who paid over $37,500 for their vehicle in Wisconsin because the state law allows for double damages. It is a legal certainty that the other class members from these states cannot recover over the jurisdictional minimum on their statutory claims. We have diversity jurisdiction over all claimants from all other jurisdictions because all other state statutory laws allow for punitive, multiple or treble damages. 14
c. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Cannot Be Established Indirectly When it Could Not Be Established Directly
In an attempt to secure our subject matter jurisdiction, litigants cannot do indirectly what they may not do directly. See Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277 , 71 U.S. 277, 325 , 18 L.Ed. 356 (1866) (“The legal result must be the same, if there is any force in the maxim, that what cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly____”); Packard v. Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039 , 1049 (3d Cir.1993) (quoting the maxim to disallow a plaintiff class action lawsuit to change a legal claim into an equitable claim so as to meet § 1332’s amount in controversy requirement of § 1332); Pohl v. NGK Metals Corp., 117 F.Supp.2d 474, 477 (E.D.Pa.2000) (same). Moreover, a plaintiff may only amend a complaint post-removal to assert a claim that could have originated in federal court. Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 451-52 , 63 S.Ct. 1146 , 87 L.Ed. 1509 (1943); 3 James William Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 15.16[5].
*284 O’Keefe could not achieve subject matter jurisdiction over the insufficient claims directly. If O’Keefe had originally filed his claim in federal court and requested certification of a nationwide class action, we would have been bound by the decisions in Zahn and Meritcare to disavow jurisdiction over many of the proposed class members. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1310, 1315 (3d Cir.1990) (“Zahn does not require that an entire class action be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over some class members. Rather, the court is required only to dismiss those class members whose claims appear to a ‘legal certainty to be less than the jurisdictional amount.”). If O’Keefe had originally filed his claim in state court seeking a nationwide class action, upon MBUSA’s subsequent removal, we would have had discretion to remand the entire case or remand only the insufficient claims. See Meritcare, 166 F.3d at -218 (requiring remand of claims that do not meet the amount in controversy); Mehlenbacher v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 207 F.Supp.2d 71 (W.D.N.Y.2002) (concluding that the court could — in the interest of judicial economy and to avoid other complications — remand the proposed class action in its entirety or only the class members whose claims do not meet the amount in controversy); see also 14C Wright et ah, supra § 3725 n. 55-56. Therefore O’Keefe may not do this indirectly.
This holding is guided by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Owen’s Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 , 98 S.Ct. 2396 , 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978). In Kroger , the Iowa plaintiff filed suit in federal court against a Nebraskan electric company in a wrongful death action. The Nebraska defendant filed a third-party complaint joining the company that manufactured the crane that killed plaintiffs husband. The plaintiff amended her complaint to assert a claim against the third-party defendant. It subsequently came to light that the plaintiff and the third-party defendant were not diverse. The Supreme Court held that there was no original or ancillary jurisdiction over the new claim because complete diversity was destroyed. Id. at 374-75 , 98 S.Ct. 2396 (citing Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 , 94 S.Ct. 505 , 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973) passim (requiring each claim by each plaintiff or class member to independently satisfy the minimum jurisdictional amount); Snyder, 394 U.S. 332, 338-39 , 89 S.Ct. 1053 , 22 L.Ed.2d 319 (requiring complete diversity)). Although the court found no collusion between the parties in Kroger , the court was concerned that if ancillary jurisdiction would permit non-diverse cross-claims, then § 1332’s strict requirements would be vitiated. Such a rule would allow a plaintiff to sue only the diverse defendants to gain federal jurisdiction, knowing full well that the defendant would join the non-diverse defendants. Id. at 377, 98 S.Ct. 2396 (“To allow the requirement of complete diversity to be circumvented as it was in this case would simply flout the congressional command.”).
Although we do not believe that O’Keefe intentionally attempted to circumvent § 1332, we must deny his attempt to base diversity jurisdiction on the insufficient state statutes. We must avoid creating a loophole that plaintiffs lawyers could drive a truck through. In the future, a class action plaintiff could file a statewide class action in a state that allowed treble or punitive damages, knowing that the out of state defendant would remove to federal court. The plaintiff would then wait until the district court exercised removal jurisdiction pursuant to §§ 1332 and 1441. Next, Plaintiff would amend his complaint pursuant to Rule 15 and assert a nationwide class action that included class members from states where the state law does not afford plaintiffs over $75,000 in relief. This scheme would only work if either the law of the case or the initial finding of removal jurisdiction prevented the court from analyzing jurisdiction over the newly proposed class members. Federal courts may not allow a Rule 15 amendment to expand jurisdiction in violation of the express language of §§ 1332 and 1447(e). Nor may we permit an amendment that adds claims that lie outside of our original jurisdiction. See Freeman, 319 U.S. at 451-52 , 63 S.Ct. 1146 .
d. Objectors’ Challenge to Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Pitts did not object to subject matter jurisdiction in their original brief objecting to *285 the class settlement. See Objectors’ Memo. Br. in Opp’n to Class Settlement filed Dec. 11, 2002 [123-]. They raised the issue at the December 20, 2002 settlement hearing. See Tr. at 221. Pitts counsel stated that they were questioning subject matter jurisdiction over the class based upon Zahn and Snyder but did not elaborate further. They stated that they wanted to mention subject matter jurisdiction in case they needed to preserve it for appeal. Id.
Objectors submitted three briefs that expanded on their jurisdiction argument. In the first such brief filed on February 11, 2003, the Objectors noted that the UTPCPL does not govern the claims brought by non-Pennsylvania class members. The Pitts cite Zahn and Snyder for the proposition that every class member must meet § 1332’s amount in controversy requirement. See Objectors’ Post-Hearing Br., at 34-35 filed Feb. 11, 2003 [153-1]. Specifically, Pitts stated that the Alabama class members’ claims did not meet the amount in controversy. Id. at 35. '
In our February 14, 2003 Order requiring additional oral arguments, we noted that Pitts was disingenuous about Alabama law. Alabama does in fact allow treble damage awards under its Consumer Protection and Deceptive Practices law:
Up to three times any actual damages, in the court’s discretion. In making its determination under this subsection, the court shall consider, among other relevant factors, the amount of actual damages awarded, the frequency of the unlawful acts or practices, the number of persons adversely affected thereby and the extent to which the unlawful acts or practices were committed intentionally....
AlaCode § 8-19-10(a)(2). Therefore we have subject matter jurisdiction over the Alabama claims pursuant to § 1332.
The Pitts objectors then changed their tune at the February 20th oral arguments. See Tr. of Feb. 20, 2003, at 37-40; Objector’s Post-Heating Brief Regarding Subject Matter Jurisdiction filed on Mar. 28, 2003 [177 — l]. 15 They then claimed that the Alabama claims were barred under Ala.Code § 8 — 19 — 10(f):
A consumer or other person bringing an action under this chapter may not bring an action on behalf of a class; provided, however, that the office of the Attorney General or district attorney shall have the authority to bring action in a representative capacity on behalf of any named person or persons. In any such action brought by the office of the Attorney General or a district attorney the court shall not award minimum damages or treble damages, but recovery shall be limited to actual damages suffered by the person or persons, plus reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.
The Pitts maintain that treble damages are not available in Alabama because the state law bans class actions based on violations of Alabama’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act. We disagree. This is a procedural law and not a substantive law. It is not binding on a federal court under the Erie doctrine. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 , 58 S.Ct. 817 , 82 L.Ed. 1188 , (1938) (holding that when a federal court sitting in diversity enforces state substantive law but federal procedural law). A bar on class actions is a bar to the court’s equitable power to allow joinder in an attempt to conserve judicial economy. Alabama has chosen to bar its courts from allowing any class actions predicated on any state’s deceptive trade practices act in its own state courts. The bar is not limited to class actions alleging violations of Alabama’s statute. For example, in Ex Parte Exxon Corp., 725 So.2d 930 (A1.1998), the Alabama Supreme Court stated that the Alabama state courts could not entertain a class action lawsuit based on a violation of New Jersey’s deceptive trade practices act. The court stated that “plaintiffs are procedurally barred from representing a class” because it would violaté AlaCode § 8-19-10(f)’s bar on class actions in Alabama state court. Id. at 933 (emphasis added). The court interpreted AlaCode § 8 — 19 — 10(f) as a procedural bar and not a substantive bar. *286 There is nothing in the statute that would prevent a federal court from grouping the potentially thousands of Alabama plaintiffs into a class action in order to conserve federal court resources. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 , 58 S.Ct. 817 (“The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy, but no one doubts federal power over procedure.”). Alabama law does not destroy our jurisdiction over Alabama resident class members.
In the Pitts’ third brief covering the issue, they seemed to have dropped their § 8-19-10(f) argument. See Objectors’ Joint Supplemental Memo. Regarding the Court’s Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction filed Mar. 10, 2003 [169-1]. Instead, they provide a more detailed argument along the lines of Zahn and Snyder that they alluded to during the December 20th Settlement Hearing. We have already addressed this argument supra Sections II.B.2 & II.B.2.a-c. Objectors correctly cite the law, albeit in a cursory manner. They did not discuss or rebut the parties’ argument that our prior finding of jurisdiction over O’Keefe’s claims pursuant to §§ 1332 & 1441 barred an inquiry into our subject matter jurisdiction over the newly defined class.
C. The Magnuson-Moss Claim Will Be Remanded
As discussed supra Section II.B.2., we dismissed O’Keefe’s Magnuson-Moss claim because of a technical defect in the pleading. O’Keefe re-filed the claim in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas on February 21, 2003. MBUSA promptly removed the action to federal court. The new complaint was consolidated with this case on February 26, 2003.
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is a federal act with its own amount in controversy requirement separate from 28 U.S.C. § 1332 . It is limited to claims where the amount in controversy equals or exceeds $50,000. 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d)(3)(B). When a Magnuson-Moss class action is originally filed in federal court, the class action must contain 100 named plaintiffs. 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d)(3)(C). No such requirement exists when the suit originates in state court. See O’Keefe, 2002 WL 377122 , at *4 (acknowledging the “strange and unfair” outcomes because of a quirk in the Magnuson-Moss Act).
As stated supra, any civil action brought in state court may be removed by the defendant to the federal district court in the district where such action is pending, if the district court would have original jurisdiction over the matter. See 28 U.S.C. 1441(a); Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 7-8 , 103 S.Ct. 2841 ; U.S. Express Lines Ltd., 281 F.3d 383, 388-89 (3d Cir.2002). In order for a United States court to have jurisdiction over a Mag-nuson-Moss claim, there must $50,000 or more in dispute between the parties and over one hundred named plaintiffs. 15 U.S.C. § 2310 (d)(3). O’Keefe’s own claim does not meet the jurisdictional threshold for a Mag-nuson-Moss claim because his vehicle cost less than $50,000. This new Magnuson-Moss class action still lacks one hundred named plaintiffs. It may not be removed to federal court pursuant to § 1441 because it is not a claim that could have been originally filed in federal court. See Freeman, 319 U.S. at 451-52 , 63 S.Ct. 1146 . The nationwide Mag-nuson-Moss class action will be remanded. While the Magnuson-Moss claim is not before us, the settlement does provide for class release of this claim. The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act does not require that class actions pursuing Magnuson-Moss claims in state court to meet the $50,000 threshold or the one hundred named plaintiff rule.
D. We Have Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Proposed Class Members’ Common Law Fraud and Unjust Enrichment Claims
As with the state consumer statutes, we have had jurisdiction over O’Keefe and the Pennsylvania class members since we exercised removal jurisdiction pursuant to §§ 1332 & 1441. Common law claims for unjust enrichment and fraud have been contained in the original complaint when removed and in the Amended Complaint on behalf of O’Keefe and the proposed Pennsylvania-wide class. The Second Amended Complaint contains sufficient allegations of fraudulent behavior such that the claims have been preserved. The Second Amended Com *287 plaint requests punitive damages and all other relief obtainable on behalf of the class.
The Pitts objected to subject matter jurisdiction based on the unjust enrichment claims. They accurately stated that the class members may not aggregate their individual unjust enrichment claims to meet the amount in controversy. See Tr. of Feb. 20, 2003, at 24-25. This is of course the Snyder rule. See Snyder, 394 U.S. at 335-37 , 89 S.Ct. 1053 . However, O’Keefe is not attempting to aggregate the class members’s individual and distinct claims in an attempt to confer federal jurisdiction. O’Keefe has never attempted to do so. Instead, O’Keefe argues that the availability of punitive damages would ensure that each class members’ individual claim reached the $75,000 threshold.
We believe that the actual damage assessment should be the purchase price of the vehicles. When discussing Pennsylvania law, Judge O’Neill of this Court stated that:
Where an alleged defect relates to a discreet [sic], modular, or incidental part of the vehicle (such as the tires, windshield wipers or stereo), it is unreasonable to use the purchase price as a baseline for measuring the amount in controversy. In such cases, the better measure of damages is the replacement cost of the part in question. However, where an alleged defect relates to an integrated system that is necessary to the safe operation of the vehicle (such as the engine or transmission), it is reasonable to assume that the baseline for damages is the purchase price of the car.
McLaughlin v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 2000 WL 1793071 , at *3 (E.D.Pa.2000) (citations omitted); cited by Werwinski v. Ford Motor Co., 286 F.3d 661, 669 (3d Cir.2002). Although the court’s holding was limited to Pennsylvania law, we believe it is apt for the situation here. The O’Keefe class alleges an engine and computer system defect that may render the entire car inoperable. The class further alleges that defendant fraudulently concealed the defect and deceptively misrepresented the product. Under such circumstances, the vehicle’s entire value is at issue. It is not the situation where an important yet ancillary part, like a tire, contains the defect. We acknowledge that this court must look to state substantive law to determine damages under the Erie doctrine. However, O’Neill’s reasoning is persuasive and unjust enrichment claims at common law are fairly universal. See Singer v. AT & T, 185 F.R.D. 681, 692 (S.D.Fla.1998).
We have original jurisdiction over these claims. The parties are diverse because the named plaintiff and the defendant are diverse. There is over $75,000 in dispute for all class members. Each class members’ vehicle range in price from $30,450 to $137,300. O’Keefe has adequately requested all legal and equitable relief allowed. This includes punitive damages. It would not be unreasonable to assume that a jury may award at least double or treble punitive damages. After taking into account punitive damages, attorney’s fees and cost, the claims exceed the jurisdictional threshold. See In re School Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d at 1315 (“[T]he court is required only to dismiss those class members whose claims appear to a ‘legal certainty’ to be less than the jurisdictional amount.”); Angus v. Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 146 (3d Cir.1993) (measuring the amount “not ... by the low end of an open-ended claim, but rather by a reasonable reading of the value of the rights being litigated.”).
E. We Have Supplemental Jurisdiction Over the State Statutory Claims
We have supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a) over the class members’ state law consumer protection or deceptive trade practice act claims because these claims are part of the same case and controversy as the unjust enrichment and fraud claims.
F. Jurisdiction Conclusion
We have original subject matter jurisdiction over all class members’ unjust enrichment and fraud claims pursuant to § 1332. We have original subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1332 over the state statutory claims when the requisite state statute allows for over $75,000 in treble damages. We have supplemental jurisdiction over the state statutory claims where the requisite state statute allows relief equal to or less than $75,000 *288 pursuant to § 1367(a) because the claims are so related to the original jurisdiction claims.
III. Settlement Class Certification under Rule 23
Settlement classes may be certified pursuant to Rule 23. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 618 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 , 138 L.Ed.2d 689 (1997); In re General Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 792-94 (3d Cir.1995). In order to certify a class under Rule 23, the class representative must fully comply with the four requirements of Rule 23(a) and fulfill the requirements of either Rule 23(b)(1), 23(b)(2) or (b)(3). See Monahan v. City of Wilmington, 49 Fed. Appx. 383, 384 (3d Cir.2002). Rule 23’s main concern is “whether a proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can be fairly bound by decisions of the class representatives.” Amchem, 521 U.S. at 621 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 .
Plaintiff and Defendant jointly move this court to certify a nationwide class under Rule 23(b)(3). This court conditionally certified a settlement class consisting of:
All persons throughout the United States (including Puerto Rico and U.S. territories) who at the time of Final Settlement own or lease a model year 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001 (first purchase or leased on or before March 31, 2001) Mercedes-Benz vehicle equipped with the Flexible Service System.
Case Management Order, at ¶ 2 filed on Aug. 14, 2002 [64-1]. The conditional certification enabled the parties to mail the proposed class members notification regarding of the motion for class certification and settlement proposal. The proposed class is proper and it complies with Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3)’s preconditions for class certification.
A. Rule 23(a)
Class members seeking to represent the class must satisfy the four part test of Rule 23(a): (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of representation. 16 O’Keefe satisfies all four requirements.
1. Numerosity
“The court must find that the class is ‘so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.’ ” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). The proposed class consists of over 630,000 members. Joinder is impracticable.
2. Commonality
Commonality requires that “there are questions of law or fact common to the class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). This is not a terribly demanding standard because “[t]he commonality requirement will be satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.” Baby Neal v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir.1994), quoted in In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 310. There are questions of law and fact in common to the class in the present case. Among them are:
(1) Whether the use of conventional motor oils when used in connection with extended oil drain intervals in FSS vehicles could result in oil sludging or related engine damage;
(2) Whether MBUSA failed to inform Plaintiff and class members of potential engine problems that could be associated with following or exceeding recommended service intervals using conventional oils;
(3) Whether MBUSA made express warranties relating to the FSS and its performance;
(4) Whether MBUSA breached express or implied warranties as a result of using conventional motor oil at FSS intervals; and
(5) Whether MBUSA conducted appropriate, reasonable and adequate pre-sale testing of its FSS equipped vehicles to determine the effectiveness of the system at the recommended FSS intervals; 17
*289 (6) All class members are asserting breach of express and implied warranty;
(7) All class members are asserting claims under their state’s unfair trade practices or consumer protection law which have common elements;
(8) All class members argue in the alternative that New Jersey’s Consumer Protection Statute applies to their claim, as discussed supra Section II n. 3.
The low threshold for commonality is satisfied because numerous factual and legal issues are common to all members of the class and class representative O’Keefe. See Sanneman v. Chrysler, 191 F.R.D. 441 (E.D.Pa.2000) (finding commonality when class alleged that car manufacturer did not disclose latent defects).
S. Typicality
Rule 23 requires that the “claims of the representative party be typical of the claims of the proposed class.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). “The typicality requirement is designed to align the interests of the class and the class representatives so that the latter will work for the benefit of the entire class through the pursuit of their own goals.” In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 311 (citations omitted); Cichonski v. American Inventors Corp., No. 95-CV-04079, 1995 WL 657107 , at *3 (seeking “to ascertain that the interests of the class representatives are closely aligned with those of the class, so as to ensure fair representation of absentee class members.”). The typicality test is not overly demanding. See Sanneman, 191 F.R.D. at 447 ; In re Ford Motor Co. Vehicle Paint Litig., 182 F.R.D. 214, 218 (E.D.La.1998). The typicality requirement may be met despite the existence of factual distinctions between the claims of the named plaintiffs and the claims of the proposed class. See Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 58 ; Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 786 (3d Cir.1985).
O’Keefe’s claims are typical of the class claims. O’Keefe and the class are asserting the same legal claims. O’Keefe and the class members were all allegedly injured by the same allegedly fraudulent behavior on the part of MBUSA. This is identical to the In re Prudential case where the named class representatives and the class members all suffered from the defendant’s fraudulent scheme. See In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 311. “Commentators have noted that cases alleging the same unlawful conduct which affects both the named plaintiffs and the punitive class usually satisfy the typicality requirement irrespective of the varying fact patterns underlying the individual claims.” Baby Neal, 43 F.3d at 58 (finding defendant’s scheme to ignore federal law fulfilled typicality requirement because the named plaintiffs did not have a “unique interest” separating them from absent plaintiffs), quoted in In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 311. O’Keefe is typical of the class because he allegedly suffered from the same fraudulent behavior as other class members. See Sanneman, 191 F.R.D. at 447-48 (finding typicality when named plaintiff and class members all claimed to have been injured by car manufacturer’s failure to disclose a latent defect). Moreover, O’Keefe and most class members have suffered or are at risk of suffering similar engine damage.
A Adequacy of Representation
This requirement is actually a two-part requirement. “First, the adequacy of representation inquiry ‘tests the qualifications of the counsel to represent the class.’ ” In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 312 (quoting In re GMC Truck, 55 F.3d at 800 ). “Second, it ‘serves to uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the class they seek to represent.’ ” Id. (quoting Amchem, 521 U.S. at 594 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 ).
First, class counsel is highly skilled. Both Kenneth Jacobsen and Francis Farina have provided this court with their resumes. Ja-cobsen has had extensive experience dealing with multi-million dollar class actions relating to consumer protection, antitrust, environmental law, and securities litigation. They have both displayed their skill to this court through their well researched, argued and written briefs. They have developed an extensive factual record to support their client’s allegations and legal arguments. Moreover, they displayed their skill to opposing counsel during long and tense negotiations. At the Dec. 20, 2002 hearing, plaintiff class counsel was described as “tenacious” in negotiations *290 and fighting “tooth and nail” over the legal issues. See Reiskin Argument, Tr. of Dec. 20, 2002 at 189 & 256. O’Keefe’s legal counsel provided more than adequate representation to the class by vigorously pursuing the class’s claims.
Second, O’Keefe adequately represents the class. O’Keefe suffered from the same alleged MBUSA scheme as the other class members. To prevail, O’Keefe, like the class members, would have the burden of demonstrating this scheme in court. His interests do not differ from the interests of the class members. The settlement demonstrates his unity with the class. By its terms, O’Keefe will not receive more compensation than other class members. His position in the settlement, like his position in the litigation, is not antagonistic to the other class members. See In re GMC Truck, 55 F.3d at 798 (“Courts adopting this approach require proof only that named plaintiffs’ and class interests are not’ antagonistic.”) (citations omitted); Samuel-Bassett v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 212 F.R.D. 271, 279 (E.D.Pa.2002) (same) (citing Weiss v. York Hospital, 745 F.2d 786, 811 (3d Cir.1984)). MBUSA concedes that O’Keefe adequately represents the class. MBUSA’s counsel, Reiskin, stated at oral argument: “Although Mr. O’Keefe did not testify today, he’s certainly been a more than adequate class representative. We don’t dispute that.” See Tr. of Dec. 20, 2002 at 189.
O’Keefe has fulfilled the requirements of Rule 23(a). The class is too numerous, such that joinder is impractical. O’Keefe’s claims have issues of law and fact in common with the class. O’Keefe’s claims and allegations are typical and not antagonistic to the absent class members. O’Keefe and the class counsel adequately represent the class.
B. Rule 23(b)(3)
Classes where common legal and factual issues predominate over individual issues may be certified under Rule 23(b)(3). 18 After a court finds, that the proposed class complies with Rule 23(a), Rule 23(b)(3) requires the district court to “make two additional findings: predominance and superiority.” See In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 313. “Issues common to the class must predominate over individual issues, and the class action device must be superior to the other means of handling the litigation.” Id. at 313-14.
1. Predominance
The predominance test of Rule 23(b)(3) is more demanding than Rule 23(a)’s commonality requirement. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623 -24 & n. 18, 117 S.Ct. 2231 . Yet, “[predominance is a test readily met in certain cases alleging consumer or securities fraud....” Id. at 625 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 . For a settlement class action, the Rule 23(b)(3) “inquiry trains on the legal or factual questions that qualify each class member’s case as a genuine controversy, questions that preexist any settlement.” Id. at 623 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 .
We have already listed numerous legal and factual issues that are common to the class supra Section III.A.2. We now find that these common issues predominate over the class member’s individual issues. Individual issues may be present and “class members need not be identically situated as to all issues, so long as their claims are not in conflict with each other.” See Kline v. Security Guards, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 261, 272 (E.D.Pa.2000).
Several individual factual and legal issues exist including:
*291 (1) Personal Use: Whether differing driving habits contributed to the damages; and
(2) Damages: Whether each engine sustained damage or signs of future damage; and whether the damage is associated with the use of conventional motor oil at FSS recommended drain intervals; and
(3) Reliance: Whether individual class members heard or saw any FSS advertisements or promotional material, and whether the FSS system was relevant to an individual’s decision to purchase the vehicle. 19
We find that liability issues common to all class members predominate over any individual differences. There is one core liability issue that dominates this ease and predominates over any class member’s individual circumstances. MBUSA is accused of failing to inform its customers about the risks of using conventional oil under the FSS’s extended oil drain intervals, and actively concealing that risk. Such a scheme common to all plaintiffs predominate over individual issues. See In re Warfarin Sodium, Antitrust Litig., 212 F.R.D. 231, 248 (D.Del.2002) (finding that “the allegedly deceptive practices of the defendant” predominated over individual issues); Samu el-Bassett, 212 F.R.D. at 282 (finding that the common design defect present in all vehicles at issues predominate over individual issues); see also In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 314-15 (finding that the common scheme arising out of allegedly deceptive trade practices predominated over individual issues of reliance and damages). The present case is a typical consumer fraud case where liability issues predominate. See Amchem, 521 U.S. at 625 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 .
This case is unlike our prior 23(b)(3) automobile defect class action case, Sanneman v. Chrysler Corp., 191 F.R.D. 441 (E.D.Pa.2000) (Van Antwerpen, J.). The Sanneman plaintiffs alleged that Chrysler concealed a latent defect that caused the top coat of paint to chip off some vehicles. In Sanneman , this court found that individual issues predominated over common issues when the vehicles comprised “at least eight model years, 13 different manufacturing plants and hundreds of different kinds and colors of paint supplied by two different paint companies.” Id. at 449-50 . In the present case, the class consists of only a few car designs produced in a three and one-half year period using one allegedly defective component — the FSS. This is a far cry from the Sanneman case where we worried that certification of a litigation class would require a mini-trial to decide who were members of each sub-class.
Individual issues of product use, damages and reliance do not predominate over the *292 liability issue for this settlement class. First, liability issues predominate over differing driving conditions when the class is not pursuing personal injury claims and the class alleges a design or manufacturing defect or deceptive scheme. See Samuel-Bassett, 212 F.R.D. at 282 . 20 In the present case, issues regarding MBUSA’s behavior predominate over the class member’s driving habits. Plaintiffs allege that MBUSA misrepresented its product and failed to adequately research the FSS’s performance before selling FSS equipped vehicles. Because MBUSA’s behavior was uniform towards all class members, it predominates over class member’s individual behavior.
Second, the necessity of individual damage calculations following a jury trial do not prevent certification under 23(b)(3) when common liability issues predominate over individual liability issues. Yes, individual damage calculations may require time and effort. Where the parties or the court can calculate the individual damages by an objective formula, the damages will not prevent certification. 21 See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, 259 F.3d 154 , 187-89 (3d Cir.2001) (securities case stating that if plaintiff had “devise a formula that would measure damages among the class and serve as a plan for allocation,” then common issues of fact and law would predominate over individual issues on the issue of damages, but denying class certification because individual issues on whether the class member was injured predominated over class issues) (citing Amerinet v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483 , 1494 (8th Cir.1992) (antitrust case stating that proof of damage is separate from proof of the extent of damage)).
At this time, class counsel has not filed a proposed formula for dealing with damage issues. And there are several damage issues which would complicate certification of a litigation class. First, class members own various vehicle models. Second, some class members have sustained serious damage requiring engine replacement or other costly repair services, while other class members may have suffered internal engine wear that is not readily apparent or quantifiable. However, we are certifying a settlement class and not a litigation class. It is appropriate to take the settlement into account to see how the settlement solves individual damage calculation problems. See In re Diet Drugs, 2000 WL 1222042 , at *43 (E.D.Pa. Aug.28, 2000) (“[W]hen taking the settlement into consideration for purposes of determining class certification, individual issues which are normally present in personal injury litigation become irrelevant, allowing the common issues to predominate.”); see also Amchem, 521 U.S. at 619 , 117 S.Ct. 2231 (directing courts to consider the terms of the settlement when certifying a settlement only class). The settlement takes damages into consideration in two ways. MBUSA will refund class members who paid for repairs if the damages were “caused by the use of ... conventional motor oil prior to December 2001 ____” Additionally, the Extended Coverage Program will insulate class members from future repair costs associated with the alleged conventional oil problems. Individual damage calculations will not occur and the court will not speculate on individual damage calculations.
Third, reliance is not a bar to class certification in this case. “Reliance is an issue secondary to establishing the fact of defendant’s liability,” because “all class members must establish the defendant’s complicity and *293 liability, thus, the individual issues are secondary and the class should be certified.” In re Prudential, 962 F.Supp. 450, 511, 516 (D.N.J.1997) (citing Herbert Newberg & Alba Conte, Newberg on Class Actions § 4.26, at 4-104 (3d ed. 1992) (“Challenges based on ... reliance have usually been rejected because [reliance pertains] to the right of a class member to recover in contrast to underlying common issues of the defendant’s liability.”)), aff'd 148 F.3d 283 (3d Cir.1998). As with the individual calculation of damages, the settlement agreement renders this manageability problem moot. If indeed MBUSA were to show that reliance issues complicated the case such that the liability issue did not predominate over individual reliance issues, we could certify a liability only class under 23(c)(4)(A). See text supra nn. 19 & 22. We find that liability issues predominate over individual issues for the O’Keefe settlement class.
2. Superiority
“The superiority requirement asks the court ‘to balance, in terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a class action against those of “alternative available methods” of adjudication.’ ” In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 316 (quoting Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 632 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 757 (3d Cir.1974))). This case is clearly superior to individual suits because over 630,-000 claims are being handled at once. Each class member has relatively small claims that would not likely be litigated on an individual basis. The fact that parties do not know of any other similar claim filed against MBUSA testifies to the improbability of individually litigating these claims. The class action vehicle in this case will provide significant benefits to class members. This is in sharp contrast to pursuing their own negative value claims. See In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 316 (finding the superiority requirement was met because the “relatively modest size of individual claims and the sheer volume of those claims in the aggregate”); SamuelBassett, 212 F.R.D. at 283 (“[I]n view of the fact that the class potentially numbers more than 10,000 and the relatively low cost of the car, we believe that a class action would be superior to and more efficient than adjudicating more than 10,000 individual lawsuits.”); Fry v. Hayt, Hayt & Landau, 198 F.R.D. 461, 470 (E.D.Pa.2000) (“The efficiency of the class action vehicle is demonstrated in this case by the economic or practical impossibility of litigating several, small suits as compared to the eminently feasible alternative of litigating them together.”).
Moreover, the settlement removes the manageability issues that would complicate this litigation. When courts find that a class action is not the superior method for adjudicating multiple claims, it is usually the case that the proposed class failed to meet the manageability requirement of Rule 23(a) or the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). See In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Products Litig., 194 F.R.D. 484, 495 (D.N.J.2000) (finding class action not superi- or because the “Court found that common issues of law and fact do not predominate over individual concerns in this matter.”); Sanneman, 191 F.R.D. at 454-56 (finding class action not superior because the case was unmanageable); Chin, 182 F.R.D. at 462 (finding class action not superior because class was unmanageable and individual issues predominated). This class possesses no manageability issue because it is a settlement only class. See supra note 19. In this case, common issues predominate over individual issues. See supra Section III.B.1. This class action is superior to pursuing thousands of individual claims.
S. The Class Will Be Certified
The proposed settlement class represented by O’Keefe satisfies the numerous, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation requirements of Rule 23(a). The proposed settlement class satisfies the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). We will certify the proposed class in the order accompanying this memorandum.
TV. Proposed Settlement
Rule 23 class action settlements must be approved by the court. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(e). The Third Circuit adopted the Second Circuit’s Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir.1974), as a guide to determine when a class action settlement should be approved. The Girsh factors are:
*294 ... (1) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation ...; (2) the reaction of the class to the settlement ...; (3) the stage of the proceedings and the amount of discovery completed ...; (4) the risks of establishing liability ...; (5) the risks of establishing damages ...; (6) the risks of maintaining the class action through the trial ...; (7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a greater judgment; (8) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of the best possible recovery ...; [and] (9) the range of reasonableness of the settlement fund to a possible recovery in light of all the attendant risks of litigation____
Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975) (quoting Detroit, 495 F.2d at 463 ). “These factors are a guide and the absence of one or more does not automatically render the settlement unfair. Rather, the court must look at all the circumstances of the case and determine whether the settlement is within the range of reasonableness under Girsh.” See In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 176 F.R.D. 158, 184 (E.D.Pa.1997) (citing Pozzi v. Smith, 952 F.Supp. 218, 224 (E.D.Pa.1997)); quoted in In re American Family Enterprises, 256 B.R. 377, 417 (D.N.J.2000). We will also analyze this case under the Third Circuit’s In re GM because one of the settlement’s main components is a voucher.
A. The Complexity, Expense and Likely Duration of the Litigation
The Third Circuit has stated that:
This factor is intended to capture “the probable costs, in both time and money, of continued litigation.” Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 801 (3d Cir.1974). By measuring the costs of continuing on the adversarial path, a court can gauge the benefit of settling the claim amicably.
In re GM Corp., 55 F.3d at 812 . The parties have saved vast amounts of resources by settling this litigation at this stage. If this case had gone to trial, it would have been long, expensive and risky for both parties. Trial preparations would have required additional extensive discovery and depositions. Certification of the class for trial would have been challenged by MB USA which would have resulted in a round of expensive and timely interloculatory appeals. Even if the case then reached trial, Plaintiffs may not have prevailed at trial; or Defendant may have faced substantial punitive or treble damages. In either event, the losing party would have appealed and added additional delay and expense to both sides. See In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc. Securities Litig., 209 F.R.D. 94, 104 (E.D.Pa.2002).
There are complex legal issues remaining, including: (1) a choice of law inquiry; (2) certification of a trial class; 22 (3) motions for summary judgment regarding state customer protection law, federal and state warranty law, common law fraud, and unjust enrichment; and (4) the difficulty that the class will face in establishing damages.
This factor weighs heavily in favor of the proposed settlement.
B. The Reaction of the Class to the Settlement
The reaction of the class “is perhaps the most significant factor to be weighed in considering its adequacy.” Sala v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 721 F.Supp. 80, 83 (E.D.Pa.1989). This factor “attempts to gauge whether members of the class support the settlement” 23 by looking at the “number and vociferousness of the objectors.” In re GM Pick-Up Truck, 55 F.3d at 812 .
1. Optr-Outs
Here, only about 140 of over 667,000 class members have opted out. 24 See Def.’s Supp. *295 Memo. in Support of Final Approval, at 2-8 filed Dec. 17, 2002 [132-1]; Def.’s Memo, in Support of the Joint Motion for Final Approval, at 8-9 filed Nov. 12, 2002 [97-1]; Pl.’s Post-Hearing Br., at 24-25 filed Jan. 22, 2003 [144r-1]. Most of the opt-outs who submitted an explanation tended to object generally to class actions and lawyers. This is a tiny fraction of the class. Such implicit support of the settlement weighs heavily in favor of settlement.
2. Supporters
In addition to the overwhelming implicit support, Plaintiffs have filed copies of twenty-four letters written in support of the settlement and of class counsel’s efforts. See Representative Communications from Class Members Supporting Settlement filed Nov. 12, 2002 [100-1]; Pl.’s Supplemental Compendium of Class Communications filed Dec. 5, 2002 [110-1]. This is a small percentage of the class and it is dwarfed by the number of class members who have not communicated with the court or the parties.
S. Objectors
There are three individual and one small group of formal objectors to the class action. 25 None raise objections that alter our certification of the class or our approval of the settlement. None of the objectors has enhanced the value of the settlement on the class’s behalf. The objectors Yatooma and Pitts have merely submitted canned objections. 26
a. Brian T. Regan
Regan has two objections. First, the $35 voucher is “not equitable.” See Notice of Intention to Appear filed on Oct. 18, 2002 [83-1]. Second, Regan believes the $7.5 million request for attorney’s fees is incongruent to the relief secured for each plaintiff. Id. He does believe that class counsel should be “compensated for the time spent on this case.” Id. 27
In response, Regan seems to have misunderstood the settlement’s true relief to the class. The settlement is the voucher plus the Extended Coverage Program. Regardless of the Extended Coverage Program’s monetary value, it is the core relief offered to the class because it insulates the class from out of pocket expenses associated with the alleged FSS defect.
On the topic of attorney’s fees, we agree with Regan in part. Regan’s misunderstanding of the relief obtained clouds his argument regarding attorney’s fees. Class counsel secured more than simply a $35 voucher and class counsel’s work should be considered in relation to the total relief obtained. On the other hand, we too agree that $7.5 million is excessive. As discussed infra Section V, we will not award $7.5 million.
b. Sheryl L. Dudley
Dudley filed a letter with the this court that does not specifically relate to the settlement. Instead, Dudley attacks the merits of the ease and class counsel with generic comments criticizing plaintiffs lawyers. She *296 does not specifically attack any portion of the settlement or class certification. Her only support for the alleged frivolousness of plaintiffs allegations seems to be her enjoyment of her two Mercedes-Benz vehicles. Dudley’s objections are irrelevant.
c. Nicole Yatooma
We are suspect of Yatooma’s objections because: (1) Yatooma — herself an attorney— is represented by attorneys from Michigan, Kentucky and Pennsylvania; (2) one of her attorneys is a professional objector; 28 and (3) Yatooma has never put conventional motor oil in her leased 2000 Mercedes-Benz. 29 Yatooma provided a laundry list of objections to the settlement.
First, Yatooma claims that the proposed class is unfair, unreasonable and inadequate because synthetic oil costs more than conventional oil; and because class members may be “limited to where they can take their cars for oil changes.” Objections to Class Action Settlement, at 1-2 filed on Nov. 1, 2002 [93-1] [hereinafter “Yatooma Br.”].
In response, Yatooma does not provide evidence that synthetic oil costs vehicle drivers more than conventional motor oils on a per mile or per year basis. Yatooma assumes that synthetic oil costs more than conventional motor oil. Yes, a quart of synthetic motor oil change costs more than a quart of conventional motor oil. But the synthetic oil allows car owners to drive further and longer between oil changes. Perhaps the synthetic oil actually costs less over the vehicle’s life. We don’t know. At the end of the day, this is a settlement. If there is a cost difference between conventional versus synthetic oil over a vehicle’s life, the parties have agreed to settle their claims without reference to the difference. The settlement does not need to provide the class with all the relief a jury may have rewarded. The per quart cost of synthetic oil does not render the settlement unreasonable or inadequate.
Moreover, Yatooma’s car has only used synthetic motor oil and is not at risk to the alleged defect at issue in this case. Yatooma does not even pay for synthetic oil changes because Yatooma’s vehicle is covered by MBUSA’s Maintenance Program for leased vehicles under which MBUSA bears the cost of routine service. See Tr. of Dec. 20, 2002, at 136-37.
Yatooma’ allegation that the settlement limits where car owners may take their vehicle for oil changes is untrue. The settlement contains no such restriction and Yatooma does not cite any portion of the settlement for this proposition. This allegation is groundless.
Second, Yatooma claims the breath of the release is unfair and represents a windfall for the defendant. See Yatooma Br., at 2-3. Yatooma does not expand on this conclusory statement. This objection is not “specific enough or otherwise sufficient to serve as grounds for disapproval.” In re IKON Office Solutions, Inc. Securities Litig., 209 F.R.D. 94, 105 (E.D.Pa.2002).
Third, Yatooma claims that the exclusion of prior owners or lessees is unfair, inadequate and unreasonable because prior owners may have paid for repairs but will not receive compensation under the terms of the settlement. See Yatooma Br., at 3. In response, prior owners and lessees are not members of the class and are not bond by the terms of the settlement. They may pursue their own claims or a separate class ■ action. Moreover, the settlement is not directed at prior owners or lessees because they would not benefit from the Extended Coverage Program or the $35 voucher. Both *297 run with the vehicle’s VIN number and not the owner or lessee.
Fourth, Yatooma argues that the settlement is unfair, inadequate and unreasonable “due to the conflicts between owners and lessees.” Id. at 3-4. Yatooma claims that owners receive greater benefits under the settlement. We do not agree. The settlement does not favor owners over lessees. All 1998 and 1999 vehicle owners and lessees receive identical vouchers. Both owners and lessees receive protection under the Extended Coverage Program because both may choose to drive their vehicles over extended periods. A lessee and an owner may depart with their vehicle before the Extended Coverage Program expires. An owner may sell his or her vehicle. Likewise, both an owner and lessee may choose to drive the vehicle long past the expiration. A lessee may opt to purchase the vehicle at the end of the lease agreement. We see no conflict between owners and lessees because both may or may not continue to operate the vehicle until the Extended Coverage Program expires. The settlement protects current and future owners and lessees with equal force.
Fifth, Yatooma alleges that the settlement is unfair, inadequate and unreasonable because there is no specifically defined procedure for reimbursement for previous repairs. Id. at 4. The settlement creates an informal procedure for MBUSA to reimburse drivers for previous repairs. The settlement requires MBUSA to “err on the side of the Settlement Class Member” regarding a “legitimate dispute as to whether to provide” reimbursement. Global Class Action Settlement Agreement, at 1111.1.6. If owners or lessees are dissatisfied with the outcome of a “look back” application, they are free to pursue compensation through the courts. They may bring an independent suit or a contempt proceeding before this court. The settlement does not release MBUSA from violations of the settlement agreement. See Tr. of Dec. 20, 2002: Reiskin Argument, at 193 (asserting that if “Mercedes says your claim is not related to the use of conventional oil,” then “they can file a lawsuit” because “[t]heir claims are not released” when the settlement’s terms states that only “[c]laims that are released are those that relate to the use of conventional oil in FSS vehicles.”). Moreover, MBUSA already has a warranty claims system. Yatooma does not explain why MBUSA’s current warranty system would be inadequate for adding one more type of warranty claim to its coverage list. The settlement procedures are adequate and reasonable.
Lastly, Yatooma argues that “[i]n light of the deficiencies ..., the attorney’s fees are excessive and also cause [sic] the proposed settlement to be unfair, unreasonable and inadequate.” See Yatooma Br., at 4. As stated previously, we will not award attorney’s fees of $7.5 million. However, we find no deficiencies in the settlement.
d. The Pitts
The Pitts present conflicting objections. On the one hand, the Pitts object to subject matter jurisdiction and believe that thousands of individual lawsuits would be more appropriate. See Objector’s Joint Supplemental Memo. Regarding Subject Matter Jurisdiction filed Mar. 10, 2003 [169-1]; Tr. of Dec. 20, 2002, at 221. On the other hand, the Pitts want to enhance the settlement by objecting to the settlement agreement. See Memo. Br. in Opp’n to Class Settlement filed Dec. 11, 2002 [123-1]; Tr. of Dec. 20, 2002, at 223-24. The Pitts are arguing against the entire settlement at the same time that they are attempting to force more concessions from MBUSA within the settlement. Having stated the odd posture of the Pitts’ arguments, we turn to a detailed review of the Pitts objections made in their canned brief 30 and stated at oral arguments. Their subject matter jurisdiction objections which were addressed in Section II.B. supra. Like Yatoo-ma, the Pitts have submitted a laundry list of objections. Some were timely made in their written brief. Other objections were added at the December 20, 2002 Settlement Hearing.
*298 First, the Pitts object to the settlement as unfair because the class will be awarded only $255 in relief for sustained damages of $18,900 to $29,700. The Pitts seem to imply that the settlement agreement will leave each plaintiff with a $18,645 to $29,445 monetary loss. The Pitts are comparing apples to oranges. The $255 figure represents the $35 coupon plus the class counsel’s estimation that the Extended Coverage Program’s present value is $220. The $18,900 to $29,700 is the potential future repair bill for an engine replacement caused by oil sludging. The warranty insulates class members from ever suffering the $18,900 to $29,700 loss. To accurately compare these figures, the Pitts should have multiplied the estimated damage amount by the probability of suffering the damage. The result equals the present loss expectation. Comparing the present values allows a correct comparison between present and future values. However, we don’t know what the present expectation of future loss is because neither parties truly know the probability of extensive engine damage. The vehicles are still on the road and no accurate sampling has been conducted.
Moreover, the $220 figure is O’Keefe’s estimation of the price the Extended Coverage Program would have cost the class members to purchase on the open market. It is not the exact amount of money that MBUSA will give a class member in the event of an engine failure caused by the use of conventional motor oil in an FSS equipped vehicle. Instead, MBUSA will repair the vehicle for the class member at no charge. We do not see how the Extended Coverage Program is inadequate.
Second, the Pitts object to the $7.5 million attorney’s fee request. See Objector’s Mem. Br. in Opp’n, at 3 [123-1]. Again, this figure will not be awarded. See infra Section IV.
Third, Horace W. Kynard — a Pitts objector — believes that notice was inadequate because he did not receive notice. See id. MBUSA has executed the notice process with diligence and professionalism. MBUSA mailed notice to 667, 544 potential class members. After MBUSA realized there had been an error in the mailing, it acknowledged the mistake and re-mailed the notice to 281,156 class members pursuant to our Amended Case Management Order filed on October 29, 2002 [88-1]. We see no deficiency in the notice procedure. It seems that Kynard did not receive notice of the settlement hearing because he is the vehicle’s second owner and he did not inform MBUSA that the vehicle changed hands. 31 The notice procedure does not violate the class member’s substantive or procedural due process rights, and the Pitts do not cite any relevant authority holding that such a mailing fails constitutional muster.
Fourth, the Pitts claim that O’Keefe does not adequately represent the owners and lessees of vehicles bought or leased after March 2001. See Memo. Br. in Opp’n to Class Settlement, at 3 [123-1]. This argument is without merit because such owners and lessees are not class members. See Global Class Action Settlement Agreement, at 117 (defining class as owners and lessees of MBUSA 1998, 1999, 2000 or 2001 FSS equipped vehicles “first purchased or leased on or before March 31, 2001”). O’Keefe is not required to prove that he adequately represents non-class members.
Fifth, the Pitts make a conclusory remark that individual issues predominate over class issues. See Memo. Br. in Opp’n to Class Settlement, at 4 [123-1]. We disagree with reference to Section III.B.l. supra where we found that class issues predominated.
Sixth, the Pitts argue that state law issues render class certification inappropriate. See Memo. Br. in Opp’n to Class Settlement, at 4-6 [123-1]. Specifically, the Pitts believe that the state law warranty claims would be overly complex. Id. at 4-5. We acknowledge that instructing a jury on every element for each cause of action for every jurisdiction would present a manageability problem. However, manageability problems are not a relevant consideration in settlement only classes. See discussion supra n. 19 and Section III.B.2. Even if this were a manageability issue, we believe that class counsel would *299 be able to create three or four sub-class which group together similar state laws. See discussion supra nn. 19 & 22.
Seventh, the Pitts claim the settlement is inadequate because future owners are left uncompensated. See Memo. Br. in Opp’n to Class Settlement, at 6 [123-1], This is a misguided argument. The Extended Coverage Program runs with the vehicle. Future owners and lessees will be covered by the Extended Coverage Program. 32 The settlement is adequate.
Eighth, the Alabama objectors attack the release as overly broad because it releases personal injury claims. See Tr. of Dec. 20, 2002, at 215-18. This is not true because the release does not release personal injury claims. See supra n. 1 and accompanying text. As for other claims, this is a settlement. It is a give and take compromise. MBUSA would not agree to settlement where it was not released from claims. No right minded defendant would agree to such a settlement where no claims released.
Ninth, the Pitts decry the agreement for not compensating owners for an alleged diminution in value because of the alleged defect. See O’Keefe’s original complaint included a prayer for relief for diminution in value. Class counsel investigated the issue and concluded that no evidence existed. See Tr. of Dec. 20, 2002 at 191-92. Class counsel is not required to pursue dead ends. Moreover, the Extended Coverage Program would combat any alleged diminution in value by protecting the vehicle owner’s investment.
Tenth, the Pitts complain that the settlement does not provide adequate compensation for MBUSA vehicle owners who have already purchased an extended warranty. We understand that this settlement has less value for these customer. The settlement still provides these customers with additional benefits. They receive the $35 voucher, and the Extended Coverage Program offers coverage above and beyond their purchased extended warranty. MBUSA offers different extended warranties but the most extensive extended warranty provides up to eight years or 100,000 on an extensive array of repairs. By comparison, the settlement offers coverage up to ten years and 150,000 miles on one specific problem. The settlement provides longer coverage, while extended warranty provides broader coverage. Extended warranty customers benefit from the settlement, because of the settlement’s longer coverage period. At the same time, the settlement has not rendered their voluntary purchase redundant and wasteful because their Extended Warranty covered more maintenance issues.
Eleventh, like Yatooma, the Pitts attack the settlement for failing to provide a comprehensive claim review structure. Again, we do not find this to be a deficiency because class members who have been denied reimbursement may sue MBUSA directly. See Section IV.B.3.C.
None of the objectors have identified a reason for denying class certification or disapproving the settlement. Objectors have had no effect on the terms of the settlement or the Order accompanying this memorandum.
C. Stage of the Proceedings and the Amount of Discovery Completed
This factor “captures the degree of case development that class counsel have accomplished prior to settlement. Through this lens, courts can determine whether counsel had an adequate appreciation of the merits o the case before negotiating.” In re GMC Truck, 55 F.3d at 813 , quoted in In re Cendant, 264 F.3d at 235.
*300 As discussed supra Section IV.B.l., there is a substantial amount of work that both parties would need to complete in preparation for a trial. At the same time, both parties have conducted substantial discovery. Depositions of key witnesses were conducted and large numbers of documents were produced and reviewed. Class counsel reviewed warranty information, maintenance data, internal MBUSA documents and reports related to the FSS system and conventional oil problems, and external reports complied on behalf of MBUSA for its internal use. The case was pending for over one year before negotiations started. Parties familiarized themselves with the facts of the cases, such that they understand the facts and can accurately estimate the risks and rewards that a trial may bring. The parties have also familiarized the court with the facts of the case through their extensive and voluminous submissions to the court and by producing two witnesses for testimony at oral argument. 33 This factor weighs in favor of settlement because the parties were fully aware of the facts and their positions prior to beginning negotiations. 34
D. Risks of Establishing Liability
“A court considers this factor in order to ‘examine what the potential rewards (or downside) of litigation might have been had the class counsel decided to litigate the claims rather than settle them.’ ” In re Cendant, 264 F.3d at 237 (quoting In re GMC Truck, 55 F.3d at 814 .). While this is an important factor under the Girsh balancing test, the court should not use this factor to conduct a mini-trial on the merits of the case. 35
We note that Plaintiff has laid out persuasive arguments against MBUSA for allegedly violating express and implied warranties, and violating state consumer protection laws. MBUSA claims that liability will not be established if the case goes to trial. Neither party has truly briefed the issue of liability because no summary judgment motions were filed in this case. The risks of establishing liability does not favor or disfavor settlement.
E. Risks of Establishing Damages
Establishing damages is the weakest link in the plaintiffs’ prima facie ease. 36 There *301 are factual and legal impediments that class counsel will need to overcome to establish damages. The greatest challenge to establishing liability is the fact that the majority of class members have not yet experienced oil sludging in their engines. Instead, class members have been exposed to the risks that may cause oil sludging. Most class members may have internal excessive engine wear that may be hard to prove or quantify. Moreover, each engine is at a different level of risk because: (1) some class members used only synthetic oil; (2) class members changed oil at different drain intervals; and (3) certain 2000 and 2001 vehicles were not at risk of oil sludging.
Legally, some members of the class may not be entitled to damages under their state warranty claims or state consumer protection claim. Some state statutes may require that their individual vehicle experience actual defects in order to recover relief and not merely be at risk of defects. See Chin v. Chrysler Corp., 182 F.R.D. 448, 460 (D.N.J.1998) (“In most jurisdictions, the courts recognize that unless a product actually manifests the alleged defect, no cause of action for breach of express or implied warranty or fraud is actionable.”). Plaintiffs face a difficult task of factually and legally establishing damages. On the other hand, if the class were to overcome the legal complexities and convince a jury that damages were sustained, then MBUSA may be exposed to a large jury verdict. This issue weighs heavily in favor of settlement.
F. Risks of Maintaining the Class Action Through the Trial
We agree with MBUSA, that this factor need not be addressed following the Supreme Court’s Amchem decision. See In re Prudential, 148 F.3d at 321. 37 We merely note that the class is very homogenous for a class action. We foresee few if any manageability problems because: (1) there is one alleged defect; (2) all class members are claiming the same allegedly fraudulent behavior caused their injuries; (3) a resulting defect requires similar engine replacement for the affected class members; and (4) this case does not involve personal injury.
G. Ability of the Defendant to Withstand a Greater Judgment
This factor is neutral for this settlement, because it is not applicable to the facts of this case. The defendant’s ability to withstand a greater judgment is only relevant when a reasonable estimate of a judgment would move the defendant towards a critical financial threshold, ie. forcing the defendant to file bankruptcy. This factor seems most appropriate in either limited fund class actions under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), or when the defendant faces large verdicts in multiple cases. Where a defendant has resources to pay a larger judgment, courts often accord this factor little weight. See GMC Truck, 55 F.3d at 818 (agreeing with district court determination that although defendant could withstand a greater judgment, no significance would be attributed to this factor); Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 95 F.Supp.2d 290, 318 (W.D.Pa. 1997) (presuming defendants would have resources to withstand greater judgment but according factor little weight in light of risks that plaintiffs would not be able to achieve greater recovery at trial). “This factor does not require that the defendant pay the maximum it is able to pay.” In re Diet Drugs, 2000 WL 1222042 , at *62 (E.D.Pa. Aug.28, 2000) (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d at 321-22 (finding that defendant’s declining credit rating during litigation supported settlement)). Placing undue emphasis on this factor when the defendant is financially stable may lead to the disapproval of appropriate, fair and reasonable settlements.
For example, the Third Circuit in In re Cendant was concerned with the defendant’s ability to pay because it was approaching bankruptcy. Plaintiffs had sought $8.8 billion in damages, but settled the case for $2.85 billion. The court went on to say that the factor weighted against settlement because *302 the defendant could sustain a higher penalty, but that if the entire $8.8 billion was awarded then the defendant would have entered bankruptcy. See In re Cendant, 264 F.3d at 239-41. In the present case, MBUSA is not facing bankruptcy.
In the Second Circuit’s Detroit v. Grinnell Corp. — where the Girsh factors originated— the court discussed the defendant’s ability to withstand a greater judgment because the defendants were facing multiple suits. Defendants had paid a prior twelve million dollar judgment, agreed to settle the present ease for ten million and still faced additional multi-million dollar antitrust suits. See Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d at 467 .
Neither of these concerns are present in this case. MBUSA would not approach bankruptcy because of these litigation claims and MBUSA is not facing multiple cases over the FSS system seeking high damage awards. This factor is neutral to settlement.
H. The Range of Reasonableness of the Settlement Fund in Light of the Best Possible Recovery and the Range of Rear sonableness of the Settlement Fund to a Possible Recovery in Light of Ml the Attendant Risks of Litigation
“The last two Girsh factors ask whether the settlement is reasonable in light of the best possible recovery and the risks the parties would face if the case went to trial.” In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d at 322. The settlement should represent a discount from the best possible judgment because the class is avoiding litigation risks. Id. The starting point for this analysis is the “economic valuation of the proposed settlement.” See In re Aetna Sec. Litig., No. MDL 1219, 2001 WL 20928 , at *11 (E.D.Pa. Jan.4, 2001).
This has been the most contentious issue between the parties because the value of the settlement is directly tied to the attorney’s fees. 38 For purposes of approving the settlement, we do not need an exact dollar amount.
This is the most contentious issue between O’Keefe and MBUSA. Both parties agree that the vouchers are worth $12.3 million to the class. However, they are about $100 million apart on the Extended Coverage Program’s valuation. While this argument is highly relevant to determining the attorney’s fees because a district court is required to “determine a precise valuation of the settlement on which to base its [fee] award.” In re GMC Truck, 55 F.3d at 822 . For purposes of approving the settlement, an exact figure is not required to evaluate the settlement’s non-monetary benefits. See In re the Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 962 F.Supp. 450, 540-41 (D.N.J.1997) (declining to place a specific value on either the “best possible recovery for plaintiffs in the aggregate” or the settlement’s value to the class, because each class member’s “recovery exceeds the value of the best possible recovery discounted by the risks of litigation.”), aff'd In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Litig., 148 F.3d at 322, 346; see also Weiss, 899 F.Supp. 1297 , 1303-04 & n. 5 (D.N.J.1995) (using an approximation to establish the settlement’s value), af f'd Weiss v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 66 F.3d 314 (3d Cir.1995) (unpublished).
Regardless of the present value of the Extended Coverage Program to the class, the program is specifically designed to meet the class’s concerns. At this time it is unclear: (1) how many vehicles will experience oil sludging due to the use of conventional oil in FSS equipped vehicles; (2) how extensive the damage will be when discovered; and (3) at what mileage the damage will occur. This suit was brought after several thousand vehicles allegedly experienced the problem but while vehicles still at risk are on the road. A warranty system will ensure that no class member will suffer an out of pocket loss if the failure materializes in their vehicle. Under the settlement, MBUSA will reimburse class members who experienced oil sludging in their FSS equipped vehicles and have paid for the repairs. See Joint Approval, at ¶ 11.1.5.-11.1.7.
This settlement is highly tailored to the alleged damage that class members might suffer because it repairs the vehicles. This is unlike the In re GM Truck case where the settlement consisted of only a $1,000 voucher for the purchase of a future GM vehicle. The Third Circuit criticized the settlement because it “made no provision for repairing *303 the allegedly life-threatening defect” in the vehicles. See In re GM Truck, 55 F.3d at 806-07.
If Plaintiffs had gone to trial and if MBU-SA were found liable, damages may have equaled actual damages or even treble damages depending on the state where the vehicle was purchased. O’Keefe’s Complaint, Amended Complaint and Second Amended Complaint do not list a specific dollar amount for the prayer of relief. Regardless of the figure, the Extended Coverage Program insulates class members from suffering actual damage.
The voucher provides the class members with a $35 discount off routine service. Therefore, the settlement provides actual damages plus thirty-five dollars to each class member. The value of the settlement to each class member represents a reasonable discount from the best possible judgment if they were to prevail after a trial.
I. The Appropriateness and Fairness of the Voucher
Settlements that include a voucher require extra scrutiny because non-monetary settlements are a “prime indicator of suspect settlements.” In re GM Truck, 55 F.3d at 803. As discussed briefly supra Section IV.B.8., the In re GM Truck district court approved a settlement where plaintiff class would release the defendant from all non-personal injury related claims in exchange for a $1,000 coupon “towards the purchase of any new GMC Truck or Chevrolet light duty truck.” Id. at 780-81, 783. The Third Circuit overturned the decision and listed several factors to consider when evaluating the appropriateness of vouchers in consumer product class action settlements: (1) does the settlement repair the product; (2) does the voucher require unanticipated future dealings between the parties; (3) can all the class members use the voucher; (4) the price of the item that the voucher discounts; and (5) is there monetary relief if the voucher goes unused. Id. at 806-OS. The Third Circuit noted that the $1,000 vouchers would only be used by class members who could afford a new truck and who wanted to purchase a new GM truck. The high price of a vehicle

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8735716. Public record. Not legal advice.