# Peters v. Woodbury County

> District Court, N.D. Iowa · October 25, 2013 · 979 F. Supp. 2d 901

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8712349

## Case

- **Full name:** Shannon M. PETERS v. WOODBURY COUNTY, IOWA Glenn J. Parrett, Individually and as Sheriff of Woodbury County, Iowa and Michelle Risdal, Lee Blanchard, Jonathan Hatfield, and Carlos Lucero, Individually and as Deputy Sheriffs/Jailers of Woodbury County, Iowa
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Iowa
- **Decided:** October 25, 2013
- **Citations:** 979 F. Supp. 2d 901; 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153449; 2013 WL 5775027
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Bennett
- **Judges:** Bennett
- **Cited by:** 17 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8712349

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- discussing difference in standards between excessive-force claims under Fourth Amendment and those under Eighth Amendment
- explaining Berry v. City of Detroit , 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994)

## Opinion text

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY AND REPORT OF DONALD LEACH, II, AND DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MARK W. BENNETT, District Judge.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION........................................................910
A. Factual Background For Summary Judgment..........................910
1. Peters’s arrest and booking.......................................911
2. Events upon arrival at the holding cell............................912
3. Escalation of the incident in the holding cell.......................912
4. Subsequent events...............................................913
B. Factual Background For The Motion To Exclude Expert Evidence.....914
C. Procedural Background..............................................916
1. Peters’s claims..................................................916
2. The pending motions.............................................917
II. PETERS’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY AND TO STRIKE EXPERT REPORT...........................................917
*909 A. Arguments Of The Parties............................................918
B. Analysis............................................................918
1. Applicable standards.............................................918
2. Application of the standards......................................920
a. Peters’s “reliability” challenge................................920
b. Peters’s “relevancy” challenge................................921
C. Summary...........................................................925
III. THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.............925
A. Summary Judgment Standards................ 926
B. Challenges Based On Qualified Immunity............ 926
1. Standards for qualified immunity.................................926
2. The “violation of privacy rights” claim............................929
a. Source of the right...........................................930
i. Arguments of the parties...............................930
ii. Analysis..............................................930
b. Nature of the conduct.........................................931
i. Arguments of the parties...............................931
ii. Analysis..............................................932
iii. Summary.............................................940
c. Violation of the right.........................................940
i. Arguments of the parties...............................940
ii. Analysis..............................................941
iii. Summary.............................................945
d. “Clearly established” right ...................................945
i. Arguments of the parties...............................945
ii. Analysis............................. 946
e. Summary....................................................948
3. The “excessive force” claim............................... 948
a. Source of the right ...........................................948
b. Violation of the right.........................................949
i. Arguments of the parties.............................., 949
ii. Analysis..............................................950
iii. Summary.............................................962
c. “Clearly established” right...................................963
/. Arguments of the parties...............................963
ii. Analysis..............................................963
d. Summary....................................................964
4. The “First Amendment retaliation” claim .........................964
a. Arguments of the parties......................................965
b. Analysis.....................................................966
c. Summary....................................................970
C. Challenges To Claims Based On The Iowa Constitution.................971
1. Arguments of the parties .........................................971
2. Analysis........................................................971
D. Challenges To “Monell Liability”.....................................971
1. Arguments of the parties .........................................972
2. Analysis ........................................................972
IV. CONCLUSION..........................................................973
Did male and female county jail officers cross a constitutional line when they forcibly removed clothing from a female arrested for a misdemeanor offense who refused to answer “suicide” questions during booking and refused to change into a jail uniform in front of a female officer? In this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , the female arrestee asserts that the defendant jail officers “strip searched” her without reasonable suspicion and in an unconstitu *910 tional manner, used “excessive force” in doing so, and did so in retaliation for her vociferous complaints about the order to strip in front of a female officer, all in violation of the United States and Iowa Constitutions. She also contends that the defendant county and the defendant former county sheriff are subject to “Monell liability” for the jail officers’ constitutional torts. The defendants have moved for summary judgment on the plaintiffs claims, primarily on the ground that the defendant jail officers are entitled to qualified immunity, but also on the ground that there is no cause of action for a violation of rights under the Iowa Constitution and that there is no basis for “Monell liability” of the county and the former county sheriff. As a preliminary matter, the plaintiff seeks to exclude the testimony and report of the defendants’ expert, because she argues that the expert has applied the wrong legal standard to her “excessive force” claim and has opined on legal conclusions that are within the province of the court. Although I find that the pending motions present some knotty issues, I conclude that the appropriate disposition of these motions is clear.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Factual Background For Summary Judgment
My determination of what facts are actually disputed in this case — and then whether those disputes are genuine — has been complicated by the parties’ submissions and, sometimes, by the lack thereof. In the first instance, the factual background stated here is drawn primarily from the defendants’ Joint Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts In Support Of Their Motions For Summary Judgment (docket no. 42-1) and the plaintiffs Response To Defendants’ Joint Statement Of Undisputed Facts In Support Of Their Motions For Summary Judgment (docket no. 53-3). The plaintiff did not submit a statement of additional material facts that she contends preclude summary judgment, however, as required by N.D. IA. L.R. 56(b)(3). Even so, the parties apparently agree that the defendants’ Joint Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts and the plaintiffs Response are not exhaustive of factual issues material to the defendants’ Motions For Summary Judgment, because both the defendants and the plaintiff repeatedly recite and rely on additional facts in their briefs, both with and without adequate citations to the parties’ appendices or other portions of the record. A further problem here is that the plaintiff has failed to respond to several of the defendants’ individual statements of material facts by expressly admitting or denying them, and she has sometimes made what appear to be denials without any references or only imprecise references to parts of the record supporting her refusal to admit the stated facts, contrary to the requirements of N.D. IA. L.R. 56(b). Thus, some of the facts are deemed undisputed because of the plaintiffs failure to respond appropriately to the defendants’ pertinent statements of undisputed facts. See N.D. Ia. L.R. 56(b). 1
*911 Thus, unless otherwise indicated, the facts stated below are from the defendants’ Joint Statement Of Undisputed Material Facts, and the plaintiff has expressly-admitted them.
1. Peters’s arrest and booking
Sioux City police officers arrested plaintiff Shannon Peters on May 27, 2012, for violation of a no contact order. The defendants elsewhere assert, and Peters does not dispute, that she was arrested after police stopped a speeding car, in which Peters’s boyfriend, against whom she had obtained a no contact order, was the driver and Peters was a passenger. Peters elsewhere asserts, and told the Defendant Officers at the time of her booking, that she believed that the no contact order had been dropped, but she now admits that she was mistaken. Peters was taken to the Woodbury County Jail, and, upon arrival there, she was taken to the booking counter, where defendant Officer Michelle Risdal and defendant Officer Jon Hatfield were already present. Peters was crying while she was at the counter. 2 At the time that she arrived at the jail, Peters was wearing a swimsuit under her shirt and sweat pants.
Citing a video of Peters’s booking, the defendants contend that, while at the booking counter, after several minutes of sobbing, Peters suddenly became agitated and upset and repeatedly shouted, “This is bullshit” at the officers, then refused to answer all of the booking questions, including the medical and “suicide” questions. Peters denies these allegations, citing the same video. Sergeant Lee Blanchard came into the booking area and directed the officers to terminate the booking process prior to completion. 3 Officer Risdal, the only female officer present, escorted Peters to a holding cell, and two male officers, Officer Hatfield and Sergeant Blanchard, followed.
*912
2. Events upon arrival at the holding cell
Officer Risdal and Peters entered a holding cell, but Officer Hatfield remained outside in the hallway. The parties agree that Sergeant Blanchard was also in the hallway, but dispute whether he could see into the holding cell and whether or not there was “screaming” at that point. The defendants assert that Sergeant Blanchard went to the doorway of the cell and asked Officer Risdal- if Peters had answered the “suicide” questions, and Officer Risdal then repeated three “suicide” questions. The defendants assert that Peters refused to answer and, instead, turned to Officer Risdal and yelled, “Why the fuck would I wanna hurt myself!” Peters admits only that she responded, “Why the fuck would I want to hurt myself,” but denies the rest of these facts, apparently including the defendants’ allegation of the question that prompted this response. Unfortunately, the video of the hallway to the holding cells, on which both parties in part rely, does not show the inside of the holding cell in which Peters was placed, so that it does not allow me to determine beyond dispute precisely what happened, and the audio on the recording does not allow me to determine beyond dispute precisely what was said during this exchange.
• In the holding cell, Officer Risdal explained to Peters that Peters would have to take off her swimsuit. In her deposition, Officer Risdal explained that she directed Peters to do so, because the swimsuit had strings on it that'Peters could use to harm herself. At this point, Sergeant Blanchard left the cell and joined Officer Hatfield in the hallway, so that the only officer in the cell with Peters was a female officer, Officer Risdal. Petérs refused to remove her clothing. 4
3. Escalation of the incident in the holding cell
Peters continued to scream at Officer Risdal and to refuse to remove her clothing, and when Sergeant Blanchard looked back into' the cell, he saw Peters standing facing Officer Risdal in what he considered an aggressive manner. 5 Sergeant Blanchard and Officer Hatfield then reentered the cell, and Sergeant Blanchard instructed Peters to stop screaming and to follow Officer Risdal’s instructions. 6 Peters screamed at Sergeant Blanchard, “Don’t you get in my face!” 7 Blanchard took Peters’s right hand and turned it away from him, pushing or resulting in Peters *913 falling face down onto two mattresses on the bunk in the holding cell. There is no dispute that Peters remained face down on the bunk thereafter. Officers Risdal and Hatfield then helped to restrain Peters in order to get her under control, and defendant Officer Carlos Lucero, who had entered the cell when he saw Sergeant Blanchard and Officer Hatfield quickly reenter the cell, also assisted in restraining Peters. 8
The parties apparently agree that an officer brought a paper jumpsuit to the cell and placed it over Peters, but they dispute whether the paper jumpsuit covered Peters from approximately mid-back to behind her knees and covered her private areas “entirely,” as the defendants allege, or whether it failed to cover Peters “in any significant way,” as Peters alleges. They agree that Peters’s clothes, consisting of her top, swimsuit top, sweat pants, and swimsuit bottoms, were then removed by Officer Risdal. Peters continued to resist and to attempt to disobey the officers’ directions, and Sergeant Blanchard applied a mandibular angle control measure with his right thumb below Peters’s left ear. 9 After Officer Risdal had removed Peters’s clothing and had ensured that all of the strings were removed, Sergeant Blanchard continued to restrain Peters in order to allow the other officers to exit the cell. Sergeant Blanchard was then able to back out of the cell, and Peters was left in the cell with a paper jumpsuit.
4. Subsequent events
Booking photos of Peters were taken the next day, May 28, 2012, at 9:38 a.m. The parties dispute — in their briefs — whether or not those photos show any injuries to Peters resulting from the incident in the holding cell.
Peters pleaded guilty to the charge of violating the no contact order and was sentenced to seven days in jail. The parties agree that Peters applied to serve her sentence by electronic monitoring, and the defendants assert that she was initially approved. Peters denies that she was ever approved, but cites in support of this contention only the Woodbury County Sheriffs Office’s criteria for offender qualification for and removal or revocation from the electronic monitoring program, without identifying which specific criteria purportedly demonstrate that she was never approved.
The defendants contend that, prior to Peters serving her sentence, but after she was accepted to the electronic monitoring *914 program, she failed a urinalysis drug test by testing positive for marijuana. Peters admits that she failed a urinalysis test, but contends that is why she was not approved for electronic monitoring, because approval comes after, not before, the drug test. Again, she cites the procedures established by the Woodbury County Sheriffs Office for the electronic monitoring program, but does not cite any specific provisions of those procedures establishing that approval comes only after a drug test. 10
The defendants assert, and Peters admits, that an offender removed from the electronic monitoring program is ineligible for “good time” credit, but Peters asserts that her 7-day sentence was not “doubled,” as required, if she had been approved for the electronic monitoring program. The defendants assert that Peters was revoked from the program, so that she was not eligible for “good time” credit. They also assert that, although Peters was told that she would be given “good time” credit — because a correctional officer, Levi Harry, who is not a defendant, made an error in entering her information into the computer — after the mistake was discovered, Officer Harry explained to Peters why she would not be receiving “good time” credit and documented their discussion with a handwritten note about Peters’s release date signed by Peters. Although Peters disputes the facts stated in the preceding two sentences, she cites only generally reports from November 11, 2012, by various officers apparently concerning inquiries by her or on her behalf about her release date, with no citation to any specific statements in any report contradicting the defendants’ factual allegations.
The defendants allege that none of the Defendant Officers had any involvement with the decision to deny Peters “good time” credit. They also allege that, on November 11, 2012, Sergeant Blanchard was working at the jail, where Peters was serving her sentence, and that Peters asked to speak with him about why she was not being given “good time” credit. They allege that Sergeant Blanchard had not been involved with this issue prior to that time, so that he called his superior for background information, and it was then that Sergeant Blanchard first learned that Peters had been denied “good time” credit for failing her drug test, which he then discussed with Peters. Peters denies the allegations in this paragraph, but, again, she cites only generally reports from November 11, 2012, by various officers, without citation to any specific statements in any report contradicting the defendants’ factual allegations.
B. Factual Background For The Motion To Exclude Expert Evidence
As explained, below, Peters seeks to exclude expert testimony and to strike the expert report of defendants’ expert, Donald Leach II. Peters did not submit with her motion challenging the expert’s evidence a copy of the challenged expert’s report, even though she refers to it as her “Exhibit 1.” She also cites to portions of the depositions of various parties and wit *915 nesses, but did not attach any of those deposition excerpts to her motion, and I ordinarily would not have access to them. In response to Peters’s motion challenging their expert, however, the defendants provided an appendix including the challenged expert’s report, the plaintiffs expert’s report, various deposition excerpts, and some other documents.
For purposes of providing the factual background to Peters’s challenge to the defendants’ expert, it is sufficient to quote certain portions of Mr. Leach’s expert report. Mr. Leach states the following concerning “use of force issues,” in Section X of his report, entitled “Comments And Basis For Opinion”:
I relied on my training and knowledge as a correctional administrator regarding the use of force as presented by the U.S. Supreme Court in Hudson v. McMillian (1992) and further recently reinforced in Wilkins v. Gaddy (2010) in evaluating circumstances involving the use of force. The attempt is to determine whether the use of force was “wanton and unnecessary” or “applied in good faith effort” to enforce facility rules and regulations. The five elements I use to make this determination, and as described by Mr. Collins in his Guide [are]:
1. What was the need for the use of force?
2. What was the threat reasonably perceived by the officers?
3. How much force was used in relation to the need?
4. What efforts were made to temper the use of force?
5. What injuries did the inmate sustain?
This “need” includes a legitimate governmental interest in compelling the inmate to follow rules, regulations and reasonable officer directives. The failure to comply with an officer[’s] directives can reasonably form the basis for the escalation in the use of force from officer directives to some form of physical control.
County Defendants’ Appendix In Support Of Their Resistance To Plaintiffs Motion To Exclude Expert Testimony And Strike Expert Report Of Donald Leach II (Defendants’ Appendix Regarding Expert) (docket no. 48-2), 98-99 (Leach Expert Report, 17-18) (footnotes omitted).
Although Mr. Leach referred to a “wanton and unnecessary” standard as the basis for his opinion on “use of force” issues, he summarized his opinion on the “use of force” issue in the following terms:
2. The force used in conducting the search of Ms. Peters was reasonable and necessary given Ms. Peters’ refusal to comply with the Deputies’ directives, becoming physically threatening and resistive, and the legitimate governmental interest in removing her clothing for her protection from potential self harming behaviors. This is a routine and acceptable correctional practice in jails.
Defendants’ Appendix Regarding Expert at 95 (Leach Expert Report at 14).
In Section XI (“Analysis”), subsection B (“Use of Force on Ms. Peters”) of his report, Mr. Leach offered various more specific opinions, none of which refer to a “wanton and unnecessary” standard. First, he opined that “Ms. Peters’ refusal to comply with officer directives coupled with her defiant and physically threatening behavior resulted in the officers needing to use of [sic] force to effect compliance.” Id. at 111 (Leach Expert Report at 30). Next, he opined that “[i]t was reasonable given Ms. Peters[’] prior behaviors for Sergeant Blanchard to perceive Ms. Peters’ [sic] to *916 be physically threatening him.” Id. at 112 (Leach Expert Report at 31). He also opined,
The officers used sufficient force to maintain control of Ms. Peters once she was down on the bunk. The officers!”] use of force was pinning her to the bunk while her clothing was removed after she refused to comply with earlier instructions allowing her to remove the clothing without officer intervention.
Defendants’ Appendix Regarding Expert at 113 (Leach Expert Report at 32). Mr. Leach opined, further,
Ms. Peters responded by to [sic] Officer Risdal by repeatedly refusing to follow her directives. The attempts by the officers were reasonable. The attempts to calm her were met with resistance and verbal abuse. The officers had a legitimate governmental] interest in enforcing their directives in the face of Ms. Petersf] continued noncompliance and aggressive behaviors.
Defendants’ Appendix Regarding Expert at 114 (Leach Expert Report at 33). After concluding that there was no indication that Peters sustained injuries requiring medical care, id. at 114-15 (Leach Expert Report at 33-34), Mr. Leach offered the following conclusion:
The use of force was reasonable and acceptable in light of Ms. Peters’ refusal to follow the officers’s [sic] directives and her threatening actions toward staff members.
Defendants’ Appendix Regarding Expert at 115 (Leach Expert Report at 34).
Finally, in Section XII (“Report Conclusion”), Mr. Leach opined, in pertinent part, as follows:
The Woodbury County Sheriffs Office had a legitimate governmental interest in obtaining information from newly arrested individuals regarding their propensity for demonstrating self harming behaviors. The refusal of Ms. Shannon Peters to respond to queries regarding self harming behaviors justified the removal from her of potential instruments of self harm. Ms. Petersf] subsequent refusal to follow the directives of the staff in removing her clothing and donning jail attire, coupled with her physically threatening and belligerent behavior, developed the exigent circumstances that resulted in the reasonable and acceptable use of force in enforcing facility rules, regulations and officer directives.
Defendants’ Appendix Regarding Expert at 124 (Leach Expert Report at 43).
C. Procedural Background
1. Peters’s claims
Peters filed a Complaint (docket no. 2) initiating this action on July 17, 2012. The current version of her claims, however, is in her Amended Complaint (docket no. 20), filed December 20, 2012. In her Amended Complaint, Peters named Woodbury County and Glenn J. Parrett, then-Sheriff of Woodbury County, in his individual and official capacities (the County Defendants), as well as Deputy Sheriffs/Jailers Michelle Risdal, Lee Blanchard, Jonathon Hatfield, Carlos Lucero, Andrew Vogt, and Zachary Lux, in their individual and official capacities (the Defendant Officers).
In Count I of her Amended Complaint, Peters alleges an unreasonable “strip search,” in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 8, of the Iowa Constitution, against all defendants. In Count II, she alleges violation of her right to freedom of speech and her right to petition the government guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 7, of the Iowa Constitution against all defendants. In Count III, she alleges use of “excessive *917 force” in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 8, of the Iowa Constitution against all defendants. Finally, in Count IV, she alleges an “unreasonable search” of her cell phone and purse in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 8, of the Iowa Constitution against the County Defendants. The County Defendants and the Defendant Officers filed separate Answers (docket nos. 21 and 22) to Peters’s Amended Complaint on December 28, 2012, and the County Defendants filed an Amended Answer (docket no. 27) on March 18, 2013.
On May 6, 2013, the parties filed a Stipulation For Dismissal Of Defendants Zachary Lux and Andrew Vogt (docket no. 30), and on June 17, 2013, the parties filed a Stipulation Of Dismissal Of Count IV Of plaintiffs Amended Complaint (docket no. 37). Thus, those defendants and that count are no longer involved in this action.
2. The pending motions
As to pertinent procedural matters here, on July 1, 2013, Peters filed her Motion To Exclude Expert Testimony And Strike Expert Report Of Donald Leach, II (Motion To Exclude Expert) (docket no. 39). The County Defendants filed a Resistance (docket no. 48) to the Motion To Exclude Expert on July 15, 2013, and the Defendant Officers filed a Joinder (docket no. 49) in the County Defendants’ Resistance that same day.
On July 8, 2013, the Defendant Officers and the County Defendants filed separate, but nearly identical Motions For Summary Judgment (docket nos. 42 and 44), both raising issues of qualified immunity. The only significant difference between the two motions was that the County Defendants added challenges to claims against them based on “Monell liability.” Peters filed her Combined Resistance To Motion For Summary Judgment By [The Defendant Officers] and Motion For Summary Judgment By [The County Defendants] (docket no. 53) on August 30, 2013. On September 16, 2013, the Defendant Officers and the County Defendants filed separate Replies (docket nos. 59 and 60). In their Reply, the County Defendants joined in the Defendant Officers’ Reply, adding only their own reply arguments concerning “Monell liability.”
The defendants requested oral arguments on their Motions For Summary Judgment, but Peters did not request oral arguments on her Motion To Exclude Expert Testimony. I have found the parties’ written submissions on all three motions sufficient to address the issues raised. Moreover, my crowded schedule has not permitted the timely scheduling of oral arguments. Therefore, I have resolved the pending motions on the parties’ written submissions.
II. PETERS’S MOTION TO EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY AND TO STRIKE EXPERT REPORT
In her Motion To Exclude Expert Testimony And Strike Expert Report Of Donald Leach, II (docket no. 39), Peters asserts that Mr. Leach’s opinions regarding her “excessive force” claim fail to meet the minimum admissibility requirements of Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, because they rely on the incorrect legal standard and constitute inadmissible legal conclusions. I will take up this motion first, because it pertains to the proper record in the case, even though a ruling on any part of the defendants’ Motions For Summary Judgment ultimately may not turn on the admissibility of the challenged expert’s opinions. My analysis of this motion begins with a summary of the parties’ arguments.
*918
A. Arguments Of The Parties
Peters argues that Mr. Leach has opined that Eighth Amendment principles, and, more specifically, the Eighth Amendment “wanton and unnecessary” standard, governs her “excessive force” claim. She notes that both of the cases from which Mr. Leach extracts this standard involved use of force against convicted prisoners, which is governed by an Eighth Amendment standard, not use of force against arrestees or pretrial detainees, like her. She contends that it is not certain under Eighth Circuit precedent whether a Fourth Amendment “objectively reasonable” standard or a Fourteenth Amendment “shocks the conscience” standard applies to the use of force against her, where she argues that she was “in transition” from arrestee to pretrial detainee at the time that force was used against her. Whatever standard is applicable, however, she argues that it is not the Eighth Amendment standard applied by Mr. Leach. Thus, she argues, Mr. Leach’s opinions concerning use of force are fundamentally unsupported and are not admissible pursuant to Rule 702. She also asserts that, even if Mr. Leach applied the proper legal standard, he improperly states inadmissible legal conclusions, because he opines as to the ultimate liability question of whether the Defendant Officers’ use of force was “reasonable.” She contends that legal conclusions and instructions on the applicable law are for the court.
In response, the defendants argue that Mr. Leach’s opinions are admissible under Rule 702. They argue that Mr. Leach’s opinions, in this case focus, on the Defendant Officers’ directives to Peters to remove her clothing and don jail attire and the force employed by the Defendant Officers when Peters refused to comply with those directives. They assert that Mr. Leach’s opinions address whether these activities comport with reasonable, necessary, routine, and acceptable correctional practices in jails, based, in large part, on his training and expertise as a correctional administrator and instructor. They argue that courts have held that such expert opinions about institutional practices and standards are admissible. They represent that they do not intend to proffer expert testimony from Mr. Leach as to the legal analysis to be employed in assessing the Defendant Officers’ conduct, even though they contend that Peters’s expert will purportedly testify that Peters’s right to be free of an unreasonable search and seizure was violated. 11 The defendants also argue that Mr. Leach will provide helpful information to the jurors by discussing what are routine, reasonable, necessary, and acceptable correctional practices in jails and whether the defendants’ conduct and policies comport with those acceptable correctional practices. The defendants argue that, just because one aspect of Mr. Leach’s proffered testimony might be inadmissible — such as what constitutional standards are applicable and whether the Defendant Officers acted reasonably — his testimony should not be excluded in its entirety. Indeed, they assert that Peters’s challenges are more properly raised in a motion in limine than in a motion to strike.
B. Analysis
1. Applicable standards
A district judge’s decision to exclude or allow expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Schwarck, 719 F.3d 921, 923-24 *919 (8th Cir.2013) (stating the “abuse of discretion” standard of review for allowing expert testimony); Russell v. Whirlpool Corp., 702 F.3d 450, 455 (8th Cir.2012) (stating the “abuse of discretion” standard of review for “[d]eeisions concerning the admission of expert testimony”); United States v. Chaika, 695 F.3d 741, 746 (8th Cir.2012) (“We review this issue [of the admissibility of expert testimony] for abuse of discretion, according ‘substantial deference’ to the district court’s decision to admit expert testimony.” (citing United States v. Roach, 644 F.3d 763, 763-64 (8th Cir.2011))). “The proponent of the expert testimony bears the burden to prove its admissibility.” Menz v. New Holland North America, Inc., 507 F.3d 1107, 1114 (8th Cir.2007) (citing Lauzon v. Senco Prods., Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir.2001)).
Rule 702 provides,
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
fed. R. Evid. 702. In short, “ ‘[u]nder the Rules the trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.’” Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564, 570 (8th Cir.2009) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). To do so, courts apply a three-part test when screening expert testimony, that is, “evidence based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge”: (1) the evidence must be useful or helpful to the finder of fact in deciding an ultimate issue of fact, which is “the basic rule of relevancy”; (2) the expert must be qualified to assist the finder of fact, a “reliability” rule; and (3) the expert’s evidence “must be reliable or trustworthy in an evidentiary sense, so that, if the finder of fact accepts it as true, it provides the assistance the finder of fact requires.” Polski v. Quigley Corp., 538 F.3d 836, 839 (8th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
In Lee v. Andersen, 616 F.3d 803 (8th Cir.2010), an “excessive force” case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained the scope of permissible expert opinions under the “relevancy” requirement, as follows:
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 permits a qualified expert to give opinion testimony if the expert’s specialized knowledge would allow the jury to better understand the evidence or decide a fact in issue. United States v. Arenal, 768 F.2d 263, 269 (8th Cir.1985). “The touchstone for the admissibility of expert testimony is whether it will assist or be helpful to the trier of fact.” McKnight [ex rel. Ludwig v. Johnson Controls, Inc.], 36 F.3d [1396,] 1408 [(8th Cir.1994) ].
Lee, 616 F.3d at 808 . As to “reliability,” the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained that an expert’s testimony may be excluded if it is “‘so fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no assistance to the jury.’ ” Polski, 538 F.3d at 839 (quoting Wood v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 112 F.3d 306, 309 (8th Cir.1997)).
Rule 704(a) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, concerning “opinion on an ultimate *920 issue,” adds another wrinkle to the “helpfulness/relevancy” analysis. That rule provides as follows:
(a) In General — Not Automatically Objectionable. An opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.
Fed.R.Evid. 704(a). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,
Rule 704(a) provides that expert evidence is not inadmissible because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury. If the subject matter is within the jury’s knowledge or experience, however, the expert testimony remains subject to exclusion “because the testimony does not then meet the helpfulness criterion of Rule 702.” Arenal, 768 F.2d at 269 . Opinions that “merely tell the jury what result to reach” are not admissible. Fed.R.Evid. 704 advisory committee’s note.
Lee v. Andersen, 616 F.3d 803, 808-09 (8th Cir.2010); United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.1993) (noting that, although Rule 704(a) allows expert testimony that “embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact,” it does not allow “[ojpinions that are ‘phrased in terms of inadequately explored legal criteria’ or that ‘merely tell the jury what result to reach’ ” (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 704, advisory committee’s note)).
2. Application of the standards
a. Peters’s “reliability” challenge
Peters’s first challenge to Mr. Leach’s expert testimony is a “reliability” challenge, based on her assertion that Mr. Leach’s testimony is wholly unreliable, because it is legally unsupported. Peters contends that this is so, because Mr. Leach purportedly stated the wrong standard for “excessive force” claims in a case involving an arrestee or a pretrial detainee.
As noted above, an expert’s testimony may be excluded on “reliability” grounds if it is “ ‘so fundamentally unsupported that it can offer no assistance to the jury.’ ” Polski, 538 F.3d at 839 (quoting Wood, 112 F.3d at 309 ). Whatever standard is applicable here, Mr. Leach’s reference to an Eighth Amendment “wanton and unnecessary” standard is wrong, because that standard applies to an “excessive force” claim by a convicted prisoner, but does not apply to an “excessive force” claim by either an arrestee or pretrial detainee, like Peters. Compare, e.g., Santiago v. Blair, 707 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.2013) (reiterating its holding in Johnson v. Bi-State Justice Center/Arkansas Dep’t of Corrections, 12 F.3d 133 , 136 (8th Cir.1993), that application of a Fourth Amendment legal standard, instead of an Eighth Amendment standard — asking whether the force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm,” and thus, involved “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” — to a convicted state prisoner’s “excessive force” claim was reversible error); United States v. Miller, 477 F.3d 644, 647-48 (8th Cir.2007) (stating the same standard for a convicted prisoner’s “excessive force” claim); with, e.g., LaCross v. City of Duluth, 713 F.3d 1155, 1158 (8th Cir.2013) (reiterating that the appropriate inquiry for an arrestee’s “excessive force” claim is under the Fourth Amendment, and asks “whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ ” (internal quotations and citations omitted); Montoya v. City of Flandreau, 669 F.3d 867, 870-71 (8th Cir.2012) (stating that the test for an arrestee’s “excessive force” claim is the “reasonableness” standard under the Fourth Amendment); Hicks v. Norwood, 640 F.3d 839, 842 (8th Cir.2011) (“It is settled in this circuit that the Fourth Amendment’s ‘objective reasonableness’ standard for arrestees gov *921 erns excessive-force claims arising during the booking process.”); Andrews v. Neer, 253 F.3d 1052, 1060 (8th Cir.2001) (“The evaluation of excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees, although grounded in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than the Fourth Amendment, also relies on an objective reasonableness standard.”).
However, excluding Mr. Leach’s opinions in their entirety and striking his expert report are extreme responses to an incidental misstatement of the applicable legal standard—particularly where it is for the court to determine and instruct the jury on the applicable legal standard. As noted above, where Mr. Leach actually states an opinion about the use of force in this case, he applies a “reasonableness” standard like the Fourth Amendment standard that is applicable under controlling law. I will not exclude either Mr. Leach’s testimony or his report, in its entirety, on this ground.
b. Peters’s “relevancy” challenge
Peters is correct that the bigger problem with Mr. Leach’s opinions is that he opines on the ultimate legal question of whether or not the Defendant Officers used “excessive force,” in violation of Peters’s rights, so that at least some of his testimony would be inadmissible on “relevancy” grounds. Problems with expert opinions on either factual or legal issues may run into “relevancy” problems.
For example, in Lee , the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that an images analyst’s expert opinion on a factual matter—that the person shot by a law enforcement officer did not have a gun in his hand—was properly excluded under Rule 702, because that opinion would not have assisted the jurors, who were entirely capable of analyzing the images and determining whether the victim had anything in his hands. 616 F.3d at 809 ; see also Westcott v. Crinklaw, 68 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir.1995) (“[A]n expert may not go so far as to usurp the exclusive function of the jury to weigh the evidence and determine credibility.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In Schmidt v. City of Bella Villa, 557 F.3d 564 (8th Cir.2009), a “strip search” case, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals considered the relevance of an expert’s opinion on a legal matter:
The district court found that Russo’s expert opinions regarding the reasonableness of the evidence collection and strip search procedures were impermissible legal conclusions. Russo’s report consisted of his opinions regarding the overall reasonableness of the procedures used and, as such, were not fact-based opinions. See Peterson v. City of Plymouth, 60 F.3d 469, 475 (8th Cir.1995) (expert testimony on reasonableness of police behavior in light of Fourth Amendment standards is statement of legal conclusions and not admissible). In addition, Russo’s report is devoid of any standards and explanations that would assist the trier of fact in contextualizing his opinions. See United States v. Ellsworth, 738 F.2d 333, 336 (8th Cir.1984) (expert’s “conclusory statement” properly excluded for lack of foundation). Accordingly, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to admit Russo’s testimony regarding the reasonableness of police procedures.
Schmidt, 557 F.3d at 570 ; see also Cavataio v. City of Bella Villa, 570 F.3d 1015, 1022 (8th Cir.2009) (holding that a police officer’s expert testimony would not have assisted the trier of fact in understanding that a policeman should not squeeze an elderly woman’s breast).
The defendants argue that courts have generally held that expert opinions *922 regarding industry or institutional practices and standards are admissible, citing Southern Pine Helicopters, Inc. v. Phoenix Aviation Managers, Inc., 320 F.3d 838, 841 (8th Cir.2003). I agree with the defendants that police or jail standards, practices, and procedures are matters outside the scope of most lay jurors’ knowledge or experience, so that expert testimony about them is likely to be helpful to the jurors, and, thus, satisfies the “basic rule” or the “touchstone” of relevancy. Polski, 538 F.3d at 839 ; accord Lee, 616 F.3d at 808-09 . Nevertheless, in Southern Pine Helicopters, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals made clear that what was admissible was expert testimony “on what these [practices or standards] are.” 320 F.3d at 841 (emphasis added). The court explained that the case before it was not about practices and standards; rather, “[t]h[at] ease was about whether federal law was contravened, and expert opinion as to that was simply inadmissible.” Id. Thus, Southern Pine Helicopters teaches that an expert may opine on what institutional practices are, although an expert may not testify that federal law was contravened. The decision in Southern Pine Helicopters does not answer the question of whether an expert may opine that practices or standards were followed or contravened in the case before the jury to assist the jurors with their “reasonableness” determination.
Some review of the decisions of other Circuit Courts of Appeals on the admissibility of expert testimony in “excessive force” cases is instructive. These cases distinguish between testimony about an “ultimate issue,” which is permissible under Rule 704(a), and testimony about a “legal conclusion,” which is not permissible under that rule. For example, in Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir.1994), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:
Although an expert’s opinion may “embrace[ ] an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact[,]” Fed.R.Evid. 704(a), the issue embraced must be a factual one. The expert can testify, if a proper foundation is laid, that the discipline in the Detroit Police Department was lax. He also could testify regarding what he believed to be the consequences of lax discipline. He may not testify, however, that the lax discipline policies of the Detroit Police Department indicated that the City was deliberately indifferent to the welfare of its citizens.
It would have been easy enough for the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence to have said that a properly qualified expert may opine on the ultimate question of liability. They did not do so. When the rules speak of an expert’s testimony embracing the ultimate issue, the reference must be to stating opinions that suggest the answer to the ultimate issue or that give the jury all the information from which it can draw inferences as to the ultimate issue. We would not allow a fingerprint expert in a criminal case to opine that a defendant was guilty (a legal conclusion), even though we would allow him to opine that the defendant’s fingerprint was the only one on the murder weapon (a fact). The distinction, although subtle, is nonetheless important.
Furthermore, “deliberate indifference” is a legal term, as the questioning of Postill [an expert in the case] indicated. It is the responsibility of the court, not testifying witnesses, to define legal terms. The expert’s testimony in this regard invaded the province of the court.
Berry, 25 F.3d at 1353 . Thus, Berry suggests the answer to the question left open *923 in Southern Pine Helicopters: an expert’s opinion may embrace an ultimate issue of fact, including what are standards or practices applicable to the incident involving Peters, and whether or not certain standards or practices were met by the conduct of the Defendant Officers in the incident involving Peters, but an expert may not testify that following or failing to follow certain standards met or failed to meet the applicable legal standard, such as “reasonableness” of the Defendant Officers’ use of force against Peters. Id.
In United States v. Perkins, 470 F.3d 150 (4th Cir.2006), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also discussed when the line is crossed between permissible expert testimony on an ultimate issue and impermissible expert testimony expressing a legal conclusion. In Perkins , the defendant police officer, charged with a criminal felony offense of depriving a motorist of his constitutional right to be free from unreasonable force, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 242 , argued that the district court had erred in admitting both expert and non-expert testimony regarding the reasonableness of the police officer’s use of force on the ground that such testimony impermissibly stated a legal conclusion. Id. at 157 .
In Perkins , the court first explained that an expert may respond to hypothetical or abstract questions about the reasonableness of the force used in stated circumstances. Perkins, 470 F.3d at 156 (explaining that, while an expert may so testify, pursuant to Rule 702, a lay witness may not offer opinions based on secondhand accounts, because the lay witness would lack the personal knowledge required for lay opinions by Rule 701). Ultimately, the court concluded as follows:
[United States v.] Mohr[, 318 F.3d 613 (4th Cir.2003),] suggests that the challenged testimony in this case did not transgress Rule 704(a). Like in Mohr, the officers here testified that they saw “no reason” for Perkins’s use of force. Cf. id. Taking helpfulness to the jury as our guiding principle, we conclude that the district court did not err in admitting the challenged portions of [non-expert witness] Officer House’s and [expert witness] Inspector Burnett’s testimony. While a very close question, we conclude that the Government’s questions were phrased in such a manner so as to avoid the baseline legal conclusion of reasonableness. See Torres [v. County of Oakland], 758 F.2d [147,] 151 [(6th Cir.1985) ]. The officers’ responses that they personally saw no reason for Perkins’s kicks provided the jury with concrete examples against which to consider the more abstract question of whether an “objectively reasonable officer” would have employed the same force. The Government’s questions were not couched in terms of objective reasonableness; instead, they honed in on Officer House’s and Inspector Burnett’s personal assessments of Perkins’s use of force. We recognize that this distinction is a fine one. When the common and legal meanings of a term are not easily unfurled from each other, however, as is certainly the case with “reasonable,” it is difficult for us to conclude that testimony was unhelpful to the jury unless the testimony actually framed the term in its traditional legal context. In this case, then, Rule 704 justifies differentiating between the officers’ testimony that they saw no “law enforcement” or “legitimate” reason for Perkins’s kicks and testimony that Perkins’s actions were “objectively unreasonable.” To be sure, this distinction must be measured in inches, not feet. Nevertheless, we cannot hold that the officers’ testimony was necessarily unhelpful, nor can we say that it merely *924 told the jury what verdict to reach or “supplant[ed] [the] jury’s independent exercise of common sense.” Kopf [v. Skyrm], 993 F.2d [374,] 377 [(4th Cir.1993) ].
Perkins, 470 F.3d at 159-60 (footnotes omitted; first emphasis added, second emphasis in the original). In a footnote, the court in Perkins recognized that its conclusion was different from that of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Hygh v. Jacobs, 961 F.2d 359 (2d Cir.1992), an “excessive force” case, in which the Second Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the expert’s testimony that “in his opinion, the use of a baton or flashlight to strike a person in the head would constitute ‘deadly physical force’ that would not be ‘justified under the circumstances’ ” violated Rule 704(a), even though it did not use the language of the ultimate legal standard. Id. at 160 n. 13 (citing Hygh, 961 F.2d at 363 ).
Thus, Perkins teaches the following: (1) an expert may provide opinions that are phrased in such a manner as to avoid the baseline legal conclusion, for example, the “reasonableness” of the force used, id. at 159 ; (2) an expert may also respond to hypothetical or abstract questions about the reasonableness of the force used in stated circumstances, id. at 156 ; (3) an expert may also offer a personal assessment of the use of force, such as that the expert did or did not see any reason for the force used in the incident in question, id. at 160 ; but (4) an expert may not opine that the conduct in question transgressed the applicable legal standard, such as “objective reasonableness,” id.
Like the Sixth and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that expert testimony about the “reasonableness” of the force used, in that case, a shooting by police, violated Rule 704(a), because “[r]easonableness under the Fourth Amendment or Due Process Clause is a legal conclusion.” United States v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423, 435 (5th Cir.2003). Similarly, in Cavanaugh v. Woods Cross City, 718 F.3d 1244, 1250 (10th Cir.2013), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals explained that one way to “ensure that the jury connected the dots from the objective facts to the conclusion that force was warranted” was that “[a] police practices expert could have testified that under the circumstances faced by [the officer who applied the allegedly “excessive force”] a reasonable officer would have concluded that [the victim] was a threat and used similar force.” 718 F.3d at 1251 . This is not the same, of course, as allowing a police practices expert to testify that the Defendant Officers’ use of force in the particular case was “reasonable,” which is an ultimate legal conclusion. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously reiterated, “ ‘Generally, an expert may not state his or her opinion as to legal standards nor may he or she state legal conclusions drawn by applying the law to the facts.’ ” Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d 1270, 1283 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting Okland Oil Co. v. Conoco Inc., 144 F.3d 1308, 1328 (10th Cir.1998)).
With these principles in mind, assuming that Mr. Leach is properly qualified and that proper disclosures of his opinions have been made, Mr. Leach would and would not be allowed to testify to the following matters in this case. First, Mr. Leach would not be allowed to opine on a factual matter on which the jurors are entirely capable of making a determination — such as what force was used by the officers, see Lee, 616 F.3d at 809 ; Westcott, 68 F.3d at 1076 , nor would he be allowed to base his opinion on what he believes the correct version of the facts to be. Westcott, 68 F.3d at 1076 . On the *925 other hand, if he is properly qualified, Mr. Leach would be allowed to explain the kind of force applied, such as whether or not Sergeant Blanchard actually applied a “mandibular angle restraint,” and even whether or- not Sergeant Blanchard applied that restraint properly, as well as whether using that particular restraint was appropriate in the circumstances presented, under recognized standards and practices for jail administration. Cf. Southern Pine Helicopters, 320 F.3d at 841 ; Berry, 25 F.3d at 1353 . Also, Mr. Leach could permissibly, testify as to what routine and acceptable correctional practices in jails are, based on his training and expertise as a correctional administrator and instructor. Id. I note that Mr. Leach’s expert report does make permissible general references to certain statements of standards concerning “use of force” for the administration of jails or prisons. See Defendants’ Appendix In Resistance To Motion To Exclude Expert a 98-99 (Leach Expert Report at 17-18 & nn. 9-10). Mr. Leach would be allowed to respond to abstract or hypothetical questions by opining that the force described was or was not reasonable in the circumstances described in the question, and would even be permitted to opine as to whether he personally believed that the force used against Peters was reasonable under the circumstances, but he would not be allowed to opine that the use of force satisfied the legal standard of “reasonableness.” Perkins, 470 F.3d at 159-60 .
I note, however, that Mr. Leach’s report makes no express reference to the purportedly generally applicable standards for jail administration in his analysis of the application of force to Peters, a topic on which the defendants contend that he will testify. Rather, he repeatedly states what may be prohibited legal opinions, rather than permissible personal opinions, that the Defendant Officers’ application of force against Peters was “reasonable.” To the extent that his references to “reasonableness” are opinions purportedly cast in terms of the applicable legal standard, they are inadmissible. Furthermore, he may not testify to any opinions about whether the legal standard was met, particularly where he frames that legal standard incorrectly as an Eighth Amendment “wanton and unnecessary” use of force standard. I also see little in Mr. Leach’s report that could be considered an attempt to “ensure that the jury connected the dots from the objective facts to the conclusion that force was warranted,” such as this purported jail practices expert’s opinions “that under the circumstances faced by [the Defendant Officers] a reasonable officer would have concluded that [Peters] was a threat and used similar force,” stopping short of stating an opinion framed in terms of the ultimate legal question and the applicable legal standard. Cavanaugh, 718 F.3d at 1251 .
C. Summary
I will not grant Peters’s Motion To Exclude Expert Testimony And Strike Expert Report Of Donald Leach, II, to the extent of excluding Mr. Leach’s testimony and report in their entirety. I will grant that Motion, however, to the extent that I will limit Mr. Leach’s trial testimony in the ways described above.
III. THE DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In their Motions For Summary Judgment, the defendants assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on each of Peters’s remaining claims on the ground that the Defendant Officers are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to those claims. They also contend that Peters cannot assert claims based on alleged violations of the Iowa Constitution, that the *926 Defendant Officers are entitled to summary judgment on claims based on jail policy, and that the County Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on claims based on “Monell liability.” I will consider these contentions in turn. I will first summarize the standards applicable to a motion for summary judgment, as those standards are applicable to all of the defendants’ challenges to Peters’s claims.
A. Summary Judgment Standards
Summary judgment is only appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c) (emphasis added); see Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.2005) (“Summary judgment is appropriate if viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); see generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,
“On a motion for summary judgment, ‘facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute as to those facts.’ ” Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 , 129 S.Ct. 2658, 2677 , 174 L.Ed.2d 490 (2009) quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 , 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (internal quotations omitted). “Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 , 120 S.Ct. 2097 , 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” and must come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 , 106 S.Ct. 1348 , 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). “ ‘Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.’ ” Ricci, 129 S.Ct. at 2677 , quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 , 106 S.Ct. 1348 .
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042-43 (8th Cir.2011) (en banc). Summary judgment is particularly appropriate when only questions of law are involved, rather than factual issues that may or may not be subject to genuine dispute. See, e.g., Cremona v. R.S. Bacon Veneer Co., 433 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir.2006).
B. Challenges Based On Qualified Immunity
1. Standards for qualifíed immunity
In this case, the defendants seek summary judgment on Peters’s claims, in the first instance, on the basis of qualified immunity. “The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 , 129 S.Ct. 808 , 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)); see Burton v. St. Louis Bd. of Police Cmm’rs, 731 F.3d 784, 791-92 (8th Cir.2013) (quoting Winslow v. Smith, 696 F.3d 716, 730 (8th Cir.2012)); *927 Johnson v. Carroll, 658 F.3d 819, 825 (8th Cir.2011); Fields v. Abbott, 652 F.3d 886, 890 (8th Cir.2011). In Pearson , the United States Supreme Court offered this explanation of the reasoning behind the concept of qualified immunity:
Qualified immunity balances two important interests — the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably. The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is “a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 , 124 S.Ct. 1284 , 157 L.Ed.2d 1068 (2004) (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (quoting Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), for the proposition qualified immunity covers “mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law”).
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 , 129 S.Ct. 808 . To put it another way, “[w]hen properly applied, [qualified immunity] protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2085 , 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 , 106 S.Ct. 1092 , 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)). The doctrine “allows officers to make reasonable errors so that they do not always err on the side of caution for fear of being sued.” Amrine v. Brooks, 522 F.3d 823, 831 (8th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord al-Kidd, — U.S. at -, 131 S.Ct. at 2085 (“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal questions.”).
Furthermore, “[qualified immunity is ‘an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, [so that] it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial.’ ” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 231 , 129 S.Ct. 808 (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 , 105 S.Ct. 2806 , 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). Thus, the Supreme Court has “ ‘repeatedly ... stressed the importance of resolving immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation.’ ” Id. (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 , 112 S.Ct. 534 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) (per curiam.))
The Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have explained that “[e]valuating a claim of qualified immunity requires a ‘two-step inquiry: (1) whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.’ ” Burton, 731 F.3d at 791 (quoting Winslow, 696 F.3d at 730 , with internal quotation marks and citations omitted); accord Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232 , 129 S.Ct. 808 ; Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001), overruled in part by Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 , 129 S.Ct. 808 ; Johnson, 658 F.3d at 825 ; Fields, 652 F.3d at 890 ; Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 564 (8th Cir.2009). The official is entitled to qualified immunity unless the answer to both of these questions is yes. Burton, 731 F.3d at 791 (quoting Winslow, 696 F.3d at 730 , with internal quotation marks and citations omitted); Krout, 583 F.3d at 564 .
Considering the two prongs of the test in a little more detail, “[i]f the allegations and undisputed facts do not amount to a constitutional violation, ‘there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity.’ ” Habhab v. Hon, 536 F.3d 963, 969 (8th Cir.2008) (quoting Sau *928 cier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151 ). Thus, the court must consider whether the factual record, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, supports a conclusion that the defendant officer or officers violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights. S.L. ex rel. Lenderman v. St. Louis Metro. Police Dep’t Bd. of Police Commis., 725 F.3d 843, 850 (8th Cir.2013).
As to the “clearly established law” prong, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,
“ ‘[I]n the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of the official’s action] must be apparent.’ ” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 , 122 S.Ct. 2508 , 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002), quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). “Qualified immunity would be defeated if an official knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the plaintiff[s].” Gordon ex rel. Gordon v. Frank, 454 F.3d 858, 862 (8th Cir.2006) (alterations omitted) (emphasis in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see Sisney v. Reisch, 674 F.3d 839, 847 (8th Cir.2012) (explaining that officials receive qualified immunity if they lacked “fair notice” that their actions were unlawful). “Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing bright lines.” Davis v. Hall, 375 F.3d 703, 712 (8th Cir.2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Scott v. Baldwin, 720 F.3d 1034, 1036 (8th Cir.2013).
Moreover, as the Supreme Court has rejected the adequacy of prior recognition of a generalized right to satisfy the “clearly established right” prong of the analysis:
We have repeatedly told courts — and the Ninth Circuit in particular, see Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198-199 , 125 S.Ct. 596 , 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (per curiam) — not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality. See also, e.g., Wilson [v. Layne], [ 526 U.S. 603 ,] 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692 [, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)]; Anderson [v. Creighton], [ 483 U.S. 635 ,] 639-640, 107 S.Ct. 3034 [, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)]; cf. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 236 , 110 S.Ct. 2822 , 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990). The general proposition, for example, that an unreasonable search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment is of little help in determining whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 201-202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001); Wilson, supra, at 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692 .
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 2083 , 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011). This does not mean, however, that prior precedent exactly on point is required to demonstrate that the unconstitutionality of the officer’s actions was “clearly established”:
“A general constitutional rule already identified in the decisional law may apply with obvious clarity to the specific conduct in question, even though the very action hi question has not previously been held unlawful.” Shekleton [v. Eichenberger], 677 F.3d [361,] 367 [(8th Cir.2012) ] -(internal alteration marks omitted). “[T]he unlawfulness must merely be apparent in light of preexisting law, and officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.” Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 531 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
*929 Winslow v. Smith, 696 F.3d 716, 738 (8th Cir.2012). Whether a constitutional right at issue was “clearly established” is a question of law for the court to decide. Bishop v. Glazier, 723 F.3d 957, 961 (8th Cir.2013) (citing Rohrbough v. Hall, 586 F.3d 582, 586 (8th Cir.2009)).
Under Pearson , I have the discretion to decide “which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 , 129 S.Ct. 808 (holding that the sequence of the two-prong test as set forth in Saucier, while often appropriate, is not mandatory); Johnson, 658 F.3d at 825 ; Fields, 652 F.3d at 890 . Indeed, the full two-step protocol “should not be regarded as mandatory in all cases,” even though “it is often beneficial.” Id. The Court reiterated in Pearson that “ ‘[i]t often may be difficult to decide whether a right is clearly established without deciding precisely what the existing constitutional right happens to be.’ ” Id. (quoting Lyons v. Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 581 (6th Cir.2005) (Sutton, J., concurring)). On the other hand, considering both questions “sometimes results in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case,” because “[t]here are cases in which it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact there is such a right.” Id. at 236-37, 129 S.Ct. 808 . Specifically, in Pearson , the Court found that the “clearly established right” prong of the analysis was fully dispositive of the case before it, because it established that the officers involved were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at 243-45 , 129 S.Ct. 808 ; accord Bishop, 723 F.3d at 961-62 (starting and ending its analysis of qualified immunity with the second prong of the analysis, the “clearly established right” determination); Hess v. Ables, 714 F.3d 1048, 1051 (8th Cir.2013) (“If [the law] was not clearly established, regardless of whether [the plaintiff] has articulated a constitutional violation, the [defendants] are entitled to qualified immunity.”).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reviews de novo a decision granting summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. Burton, 731 F.3d at 791 -92 (quoting Winslow, 696 F.3d at 730 , with internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
2. The “violation of privacy rights” claim
12
In Count I of her Amended Complaint, Peters alleges that the Defendant Officers violated her Fourth Amendment rights when they engaged in an unlawful “strip search” of her, because they lacked reasonable suspicion that she was concealing contraband or a weapon, and conducted the “strip search” in an unlawful manner, because there was no authorization under the United States Constitution or the Iowa Constitution for any officer (male or female) to be present in the holding cell while she changed into a jail jumpsuit. Amended Complaint, Count I, ¶ 42. She also alleges that the “[defendants have established, maintained, and enforced policies, regulations, official decisions, customs, or usages which unconstitutionally deprive its citizens of the right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 8, of the Iowa Constitution.” Id. at ¶ 44. The defendants deny that Peters *930 was subjected to a “strip search” and assert that they are entitled to summary judgment on this claim, however it is denominated, under the proper constitutional standard, on both prongs of the qualified immunity analysis. -
As to the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, whether there was a violation of Peters’s constitutional rights when the Defendant Officers stripped her, the defendants argue that it is unclear whether Peters’s rights stem from and are subject to a Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard or a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment “due process” standard, where Peters was stripped during the booking process after her arrest. The defendants also argue that, on the undisputed record, there was no “strip search” at all, only a “clothing exchanges.” These arguments necessitate a determination of the source of the right allegedly violated and the nature of the conduct at issue in Peters’s claim in Count I.
a. Source of the right
i. Arguments of the parties
The defendants argue that Peters is “quick” to allege that the alleged “strip search” during the booking process violated a Fourth Amendment right, despite the open question of which constitutional amendment controls her claim. They contend that the Fourth Amendment governs the conduct of law enforcement officials at the time of an arrest, but that, once an arrestee becomes a pretrial detainee, the due process standard of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments applies and that this standard considers whether the defendants’ actions amounted to “punishment.” The defendants argue that, while Circuit Courts of Appeals are divided on when an arrestee becomes a pretrial detainee, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied a Fourth Amendment standard to claims of an arrestee who was restrained after becoming violent and disruptive during the booking process. They contend that, at the very least, Peters was “in transition” from an arrestee to a pretrial detainee. Peters argues that there is no uncertainty that the Fourth Amendment is the source of the right at issue.
ii. Analysis
As to the source of the right at issue— and, hence, the applicable constitutional standard — the defendants’ attempts to create confusion are unavailing, because the cases they cite as applying a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments “due process” standard are inapposite. Specifically, the defendants assert that, after an individual becomes a pretrial detainee, the “due process” standard of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments applies, citing Johnson-El v. Schoemehl, 878 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (9th Cir.1989), but Johnson-El is a “conditions of confinement” case, not a case involving allegations of improper searches or other violation of privacy rights. Id. at 1048 (“Unlike convicted prisoners, the state has no right to punish [pretrial detainees], [and] [ijheir confinement conditions are analyzed under the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments rather that the Eighth Amendment’s ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ standard which is used for convicted prisoners.” (internal citations omitted; emphasis added)). The decision in Morris v. Zefferi, 601 F.3d 805 (8th Cir.2010), on which the defendants also rely, is inapposite for the same reasons. See 601 F.3d at 807 (explaining that the plaintiffs claim was that an officer “violated [his] constitutional rights when [the officer] transported [the plaintiff], who at the time was a pretrial detainee, in a dog cage in a K-9 vehicle during a ninety-minute drive from the Crawford County Jail to the Pulaski County Courthouse”); id. at 809 (“Because [the plaintiff] was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged violation of his constitutional rights, we *931 analyze [his] claim against [the defendant officer] under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment.”). Neither Johnson-El nor Morris can be read for the blanket proposition that all claims by a pretrial detainee are governed by a Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment “due process” standard that considers whether the officers’ conduct amounted to “punishment,” but only that conditions of confinement claims by pretrial detainees are governed by such a standard, rather than the Eighth Amendment “cruel and unusual punishment” standard. Although the defendants acknowledge that, in Moore v. Novak, 146 F.3d 531 (8th Cir.1998), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied a Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” test to the claim of an arrestee who became disruptive during the booking process, that case is also inapposite, because the claim at issue concerned use of “excessive force,” not a search or other violation of privacy rights. 146 F.3d at 535 .
More apposite are decisions of the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concluding that claims arising from intrusions on the privacy rights of an arrestee or a pretrial detainee during booking or detention are governed by a Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard. For example, in Maryland v. King, — U.S. -, 133 S.Ct. 1958 , 186 L.Ed.2d 1 (2013), the Supreme Court concluded,
DNA identification of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a routine booking procedure. When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
King , — U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1980 ; see also Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1510 , 182 L.Ed.2d 566 (2012) (applying Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standards (via the Fourteenth Amendment) to claims of pretrial detainees arising from invasive search procedures absent reasonable suspicion of a concealed weapon or other contraband). Similarly, in Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d 899 (8th Cir.2002), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standards to a claim of a female pretrial detainee that her right to privacy was violated when a male guard required her to disrobe in his presence before placing her in a padded cell for her own safety after she became loud and violent during booking procedures. 311 F.3d at 903.
Of course, Fourth Amendment standards are applicable against state actors via the Fourteenth Amendment. See Florence, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1510 ; Burlison v. Springfield Public Schools, 708 F.3d 1034, 1039 (8th Cir.2013) (“The Fourth Amendment protects the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fourteenth Amendment extends this constitutional guarantee to searches and seizures by state officers.”). Thus, Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standards are applicable to Peters’s claim in Count I, rather than other “due process” or “punishment” standards, even if the applicability of a Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard is via the Fourteenth Amendment.
b. Nature of the conduct
i. Arguments of the parties
As to the nature of the conduct at issue, the defendants argue that Peters was not *932 “strip searched” as a matter of law, because the removal of Peters’s clothes involved only incidental viewing of her body, not an inspection of her body or body cavities for contraband. Indeed, they contend that other Circuit Courts of Appeals have called incidents involving directions that an arrestee change into jail attire in front of an officer, resulting in only incidental observation of the arrestee’s .body, “clothing exchanges.” The defendants argue that, while Peters arguably may have been subjected to a “search,” she was clearly not subjected to a “strip search.” Peters argues that the conduct of the officers in removing her clothes during the booking process was a “strip search,” within the meaning of both an Iowa statute and federal case law, because she was not only observed from a distance of, say, five feet, but was forced face down on a bunk by three officers, two of whom were male, and her clothes were removed with sufficient force to rip some of them.
ii. Analysis
Whether the conduct of the Defendant Officers upon which Peters’s claim in Count I is based was a “strip search,” or a “search,” or merely a “clothing exchange” is important, because, as explained below, it determines the precise content of the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” inquiry applicable to this claim. As the parties are also no doubt aware, labeling conduct a “strip search” necessarily invites a greater- emotional response from jurors than labeling it a “search” or a “clothing exchanges.”
The determination of the nature of the conduct at issue in Peters’s purported “strip search” claim in Count I is complicated by the lack of a clear line between the conduct at issue in this claim, and the conduct at issue in Peters’s “excessive force” claim in Count III. I will attempt to draw that line more clearly, both for the purposes of coherent analysis and for the purposes of coherent presentation of the claims to a jury, if Peters’s claims proceed to trial.
Specifically, I will construe Peters’s claim in Count I as involving the question of the reasonableness of forcibly removing Peters’s swimsuit, in the presence of both male and female officers, under the circumstances presented. Construing Peters’s claim in Count I in this way is consistent with her allegations in that count that the defendants engaged in an unlawful “strip search” of her, because they lacked reasonable suspicion that she was concealing contraband or a weapon, and conducted the “strip search” in an unlawful manner, because there was no authorization under the United States Constitution or the Iowa Constitution for any officer (male or female) to be present in the holding cell while she changed into a jail jumpsuit. Amended Complaint, Count I, ¶ 42. These specific allegations focus on the removal of Peters’s clothing, albeit forcibly, in the presence of officers (male or female), in response to a direction from officers to remove her clothes and her refusal to do so'. In contrast, I will construe Peters’s “excessive force” claim in Count III as involving the question of the reasonableness of the force actually used to effect removal of Peters’s swimsuit. Construing Peters’s claim in Count III in this way is consistent with her allegations in that count that the defendants “use[d] excessive force in strip searching Peters in violation of both the Constitutions of the United States, Fourth Amendment, and the State of Iowa, Article 1, Section 8,” and that certain Defendant Officers “all touched, shoved, grabbed[,] hit and/or struck Peters in an unreasonable and unnecessary manner, causing her physical and emotional injury.” Amended Complaint, Count III, ¶ 65. These allegations *933 focus on the amount of force used in removing Peters’s clothes.
I turn, next, to the question of whether the conduct at issue in Count I, as I have construed that claim, constituted a “strip search.” The standard for a “strip search” of an arrestee or pretrial detainee is informed, if not ultimately controlled, by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders of Cnty. of Burlington, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 1510 , 182 L.Ed.2d 566 (2012). As I explained in Rattray v. Woodbury County, Iowa, 908 F.Supp.2d 976 (N.D.Iowa 2012), I read Florence to state the following legal rule: “Reasonable suspicion is not required to strip search detainees, subject to possible, but as-yet not fully defined, exceptions.” 908 F.Supp.2d at 993 (citing Florence , — U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1522-25 ). In Rattray , I concluded that this statement of the legal rule overruled the prior circuit legal rule that adult detainees cannot be searched without reasonable suspicion, regardless of the circumstances. Id. at 995 .
Unfortunately, the decision in Florence did not fully clarify the circumstances in which a “strip search” would still require “reasonable suspicion” to be “reasonable.” Peters — like the plaintiffs in Rattray— reads Florence narrowly, to stand for the proposition that prior circuit law requiring “reasonable suspicion” for a “strip search” still applies, unless the detainee would be admitted to the “general population” of the jail, or required to share a holding cell, or required to have “substantial contact” with other detainees. In other words, Peters argues that the limited scope of Florence means that prior circuit precedent, which required “reasonable suspicion” for most “strip searches,” is applicable here, because that precedent was left untouched by Florence’s elimination of a “reasonable suspicion” requirement only for “strip searches” in certain specific circumstances. If Peters’s reading of Florence is correct, and the conduct at issue here was a “strip search,” and Peters was not admitted to “general population” of the jail or otherwise required to have “substantial contact” with other detainees, then the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard required that the Defendant Officers have “reasonable suspicion” to “strip search” Peters. Of course, I need not settle the question of the circumstances in which a “strip search” still requires “reasonable suspicion” after Florence , if there was no “strip search” in this case, as a matter of law.
Whatever the correct reading of Florence’s partial elimination of a “reasonable suspicion” requirement for “strip searches” may be, that decision provides guidance for this case on the question of whether or not Peters was subjected to a “strip search.” As to the definition of a “strip search,” the Supreme Court explained in Florence :
The term is imprecise. It may refer simply to the instruction to remove clothing while an officer observes from a distance of, say, five feet or more; it may mean a visual inspection from a closer, more uncomfortable distance; it may include directing detainees to shake their heads or to run their hands through their hair to dislodge what might be hidden there; or it may involve instructions to raise arms, to display foot insteps, to expose the back of the ears, to move or spread the buttocks or genital areas, or to cough in a squatting position. In the instant case, the term does not include any touching of unclothed areas by the inspecting officer.
Florence , — U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1515 . Peters contends that she was subjected to a “strip search” within the scope of this definition. On the other hand, the *934 defendants assert that Peters’s claim in Count I involved only a “clothing exchange,” not a “strip search,” so that “reasonable suspicion” plays no part in the analysis.
In Kelsey v. County of Schoharie, 567 F.3d 54 (2d Cir.2009), a pre-Florence decision on which the defendants rely for their argument that Peters was only subjected to a “clothing exchange,” not a “strip search,” the Second Circuit Court of Appeals observed,
Various terms are used to describe the inspection of a naked body, and the terms are distinguished by the degrees of intrusion involved in the search for contraband. The term “strip search” is used generally to describe any inspection of the naked body. See N.G. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225 , 228 n. 4 (2d Cir.2004). An individual being strip searched may be required to move his body in various ways to permit a more complete inspection. Id. A “visual body-cavity search” is a strip search that entails the specific examination of the genitals and anus, without any bodily contact by the inspector. Id. Finally, a “manual body-cavity search” is a strip search that involves a naked body examination, including a viewing of the genitals and anus, by touching or probing with an instrument. Id.
Kelsey, 567 F.3d at 62 . Thus, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals suggested different terms for the various degrees of intrusion that fall within the scope of a “strip search,” which it identified as the generic term for “any inspection of the naked body.” Compare Florence, — U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1515 (explaining the scope of conduct recognized as constituting a “strip search”).
The court in Kelsey then considered the incident at issue, which it concluded was merely a “clothing exchange,” not a “strip search” involving any of the higher degrees of intrusion:
We first observe that the plaintiffs make no claim that they were subjected to visual or manual body cavity searches. Plaintiff Kelsey testified that a corrections officer stood in front of him during the brief period when he removed his street clothes and put on the jail uniform. Kelsey testified that he “assume[d]” that the officer “saw [his] genitals” during that time. Kelsey was not asked to manipulate his body in any way or to assume any particular position. Nor was he prevented from protecting his privacy by turning away from the officer as he undressed, by concealing the lower half of his body behind the half-wall in front of which he was standing, or by using the towel that was available to him during the “clothing exchanges”. In any event, briefly “seeing” a man’s genitals during a “clothing exchanges” does not amount to a strip search.
Kelsey, 567 F.3d at 63 (footnote omitted).
The court in Kelsey concluded that, not only was a “clothing exchange” not a “strip search,” but that there had been no “search” at all as to at least one plaintiff:
Plaintiff Wright’s characterization of the “clothing exchanges” as a search is even more attenuated. According to Wright, the “clothing exchanges” took place in a holding cell, where he disrobed in one minute as a corrections officer stood in front of him. Wright testified that he undressed “[a]t somewhat of an angle” to the officer but could not “recall 100 percent which way [he] was facing.” As best he could describe it, “[it] was like sort of facing toward the officer.” Apparently, a towel was available to him as he disrobed, and he took the towel with him as he went to take a shower before returning to the holding *935 cell with the towel. Back in the cell, he dressed in the jail uniform. According to Wright’s version of events, no officer was present when he put on the jail uniform. Also, as with Kelsey, Wright was not required to move or display his body in any particular way.
Corrections Officer Kenyon, who supported the testimony of plaintiff Wright, at least to the extent of indicating that the “clothing exchanges” took place in a holding cell (rather than behind the half-wall), declared that “the purpose of the “clothing exchanges” process, as far as I know, is simply to get inmates into the jail uniform and secure their street clothing.” Nevertheless, a necessary function of any corrections officer is to observe inmates at all times, whether the inmate is eating, sleeping, showering, undertaking recreational activity or engaging in any other activity within the confines of any jail.
Kelsey, 567 F.3d at 63-64 (footnote omitted).
Thus, the court in Kelsey identified the following differences in purposes and degrees of intrusion between a “clothing exchange” and a “strip search”: A “strip search” is conducted for the purpose of discovering contraband, and involves some level of scrutiny of the detainees’ naked body, possibly including inspection of genitals or body cavities, see id. at 62 ; accord Florence, — U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1515 , but a “clothing exchange” is conducted for the purpose of placing detainees in jail attire and retaining their street clothing, and involves only incidental viewing of the detainees’ naked body and genitals. Id. at 63-64. As I suggested, above, a further distinction is that a “strip search” may or may not require “reasonable suspicion,” depending upon the circumstances in which it is conducted, see Florence, — U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1522-25 , but “reasonable suspicion” is not required for a “clothing exchange.” Kelsey, 567 F.3d at 65 (concluding that circuit precedent holding that “reasonable suspicion” was necessary for a “strip search” “d[i]d not control” a case involving only a “clothing exchange”).
The court in Kelsey concluded that a “clothing exchange,” like a “strip search,” is subject to Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standards. Id. at 64 . In deciding whether this “reasonableness” standard had been met, the court considered the legitimacy of the goals behind the “clothing exchanges” and the degree of the intrusion upon the detainees’ privacy. Id. at 64-65 (ultimately concluding that those standards were not violated in the case before it, because that case involved only “incidental observation of the body of an arrestee during a required “clothing exchanges” ”). The content of this “reasonableness” analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court’s recognition in Florence of the general Fourth Amendment standard for “reasonableness,” which requires assessment of the need for a particular “search” or “intrusion on an inmate’s privacy” balanced against the resulting invasion of personal rights, but does not require “reasonable suspicion” in all circumstances. Florence , — U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1516 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)).
In another pre-Florence decision, Stanley v. Henson, 337 F.3d 961 (7th Cir.2003), on which the defendants also rely, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a “clothing exchange” was a “search” subject to the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” requirement, whether or not it was also a “strip search,” but that it was not a “search” requiring “reasonable suspicion.” 337 F.3d at 963-67 . In that case,
*936 Stanley [the plaintiff] was then required to go through the jail’s clothing-exchange procedure. Officer Henson [a female] directed her to a small, doorless room near the booking area. The room was partially divided by a cinderblock wall approximately four feet in height, behind which a toilet was located. Mounted on the wall near the booking area was a video camera, which Ms. Stanley initially believed was filming the area in which she was changing (she subsequently learned that the camera does not film that area). Officer Henson provided Ms. Stanley with a jail-issued uniform and told her to remove all her street clothing, except for her underpants, to change into the uniform. Ms. Stanley was not wearing a brassiere at that time, requiring her to expose her breasts as she changed. While Ms. Stanley disrobed (in the front portion of the room, not behind the cinder-block wall), Officer Henson remained in the room, continuously observing her until she was dressed in the jail uniform, but at no time did Officer Henson touch Ms. Stanley nor did she conduct any visual inspection of Ms. Stanley’s body cavities. The entire exchange process took approximately two minutes. Ms. Stanley was then taken to a cell where she remained with several other women, but she was never introduced into the jail’s general population.
Stanley, 337 F.3d at 962 .
The court in Stanley noted that the defendant officer argued that the “clothing exchange” was not a “strip search,” because it was simply a “‘routine security and admission procedure at a detention facility.’ ” Id. at 964 (quoting the defendant’s argument). The court did not fully accept this argument, however, concluding,
The presence of a jail officer who continuously observed Ms. Stanley as she exchanged her clothing, however, suggests that this was more than an administrative procedure for changing into a jail uniform; it implies that the officer’s purpose was to watch over Ms. Stanley to ensure that nothing illicit was brought into or out of the jail.
Stanley, 337 F.3d at 964 . Nevertheless, the court concluded that “[w]hether we further label this process a ‘strip search’ or merely a ‘search’ is unimportant, as the analysis remains the same,” and, indeed, that “[w]hether the procedure at issue here was a ‘strip search’ or just a ‘search’ more appropriately goes to the question of the scope or manner of the intrusion involved.” Id. at 964 & n. 2. As in Kelsey , the court in Stanley concluded that the standard for assessing the “reasonableness” of this “search” required “ ‘a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.’ ” Id. (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 ). The court in Stanley , also like the court in Kelsey , did not consider “reasonable suspicion” to be part of the Fourth Amendment analysis, where the intrusion was “relatively minimal.” Id. at 967.
Here, Peters argues that she was subjected to a “strip search” within the meaning of Iowa Code § 702.23 . That state statute defines a “strip search” as “having a person remove or arrange some or all of the person’s clothing so as to permit an inspection of the genitalia, buttocks, anus, female breasts or undergarments of that person or a physical probe of any body cavity.” Although Peters contends that she was forced face down on a concrete bunk by three officers, including two male officers, and that her clothes were removed from her with sufficient force to rip some of them, Peters has failed to generate any genuine issues of material fact that she was subjected to any “inspection” of *937 her private parts or any “physical probe of any body cavity,” as required for the Defendant Officers’ conduct to be a “strip search” within the meaning of § 702.23. See Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43 (explaining that, in response to a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovant “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,” and must come forward with “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial”). Specifically, Peters cites to no portion of the record indicating that any officer inspected — or even saw— her private parts, and no portion of the record indicating that any officer physically probed any of her body cavities. Forcibly removing her clothes does not make the incident a “strip search” under this state statute.
Perhaps more importantly, the Supreme Court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have repeatedly recognized that federal courts “ ‘d[o] not look to state statutes to assess the validity of an arrest, search, or seizure under the Fourth Amendment.’” United States v. Burtton, 599 F.3d 823, 828 (8th Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Bell, 54 F.3d 502, 504 (8th Cir.1995)); accord United States v. McIntyre, 646 F.3d 1107, 1113 (“‘[S]tate law violations do not necessarily offend the Federal Constitution.’ ” (quoting Burtton, 599 F.3d at 828 ))); Rose v. City of Mulberry, Ark., 533 F.3d 678, 680 (8th Cir.2008) (“ ‘Just as a search authorized by state law may be an unreasonable one under [the Fourth Amendment], so may a search not expressly authorized by state law be justified as a constitutionally reasonable one.’ ” (quoting Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61 , 87 S.Ct. 788 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967)). Thus, Iowa Code § 702.23 does not establish that Peters was subjected to a “strip search,” let alone that she was subjected to an “unreasonable” invasion of her Fourth Amendment privacy rights.
On the other hand, Peters has generated genuine issues of material fact that the Defendant Officers engaged in a “strip search” within the broadest definition of that “imprecise term” identified in Florence — that is, that she was “instructed] to remove clothing while an officer [female Officer Risdal] observe[d] from a distance of, say, five feet or more.” Florence , — U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1515 (emphasis added). This conclusion does not mean, however, that Peters has established that the search required “reasonable suspicion” to satisfy the Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standard.
Specifically, the decision in Florence addressed only the kind of “strip search” involving the next higher degree of intrusion, “visual search procedures” involving “visual inspection from a closer, more uncomfortable distance [than five feet].” Id. at 1515 (majority opinion) (emphasis added), at 1522-24 (separate concurring opinions). Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality in Florence, not only distinguished this kind of search from more “invasive” searches, but from the less invasive instruction to remove clothing while an officer observes from a distance of, say, five feet or more, at issue here. Id. at 1522-23 (Kennedy, J., writing for the plurality). Similarly, Justice Alito, in his concurrence, described the “strip search” to which the Court’s ruling in Florence applied as involving “visual inspection” of nude detainees, during which “the arrestees may be required to manipulate their bodies.” Id. at 1524 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Again, Peters has not generated any genuine issues of material fact that she was subjected to any “visual inspection” of her naked body at all, which might have required “reasonable suspicion” even after Florence , where she cites to no portion of the record indicating that any officer inspected — or even saw— *938 her private parts, ■ or that she was ever required to manipulate her body, let alone that she was subjected to any of the “more invasive” kinds of conduct within the meaning of a “strip search” described in Florence , — U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1515 , to which “reasonable suspicion” might apply, at least under certain circumstances. In short, because the Court in Florence held that “reasonable suspicion” was not required for a more invasive search, “reasonable suspicion” was not required for the less intrusive impingement of Peters’s privacy rights in this case, as a matter of law.
Furthermore, Peters has not identified any pre-Florence decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals requiring “reasonable” or “individualized” suspicion to justify a search involving no more than law enforcement officers’ observation of an inmate changing clothes or law enforcement officers’ merely incidental observation of an inmate’s naked body or genitalia during such a change of clothes. Compare Schmidt, 557 F.3d at 572 (rejecting the notion that merely photographing a tattoo was equivalent to a “strip search,” and unreasonable without “reasonable suspicion” that the arrestee was concealing contraband, because cases requiring “individualized suspicion” to justify a “strip search” “were much more intrusive”); Richmond v. City of Brooklyn Center, 490 F.3d 1002, 1005-06 (8th Cir.2007) (noting that there was no dispute that officers had “reasonable suspicion” to perform a “strip search” involving pulling the arrestee’s pants and underwear down and visually inspecting his genitalia and buttocks, without touching him). As explained, above, the pre Florence, out-of-circuit decisions in Kelsey, 567 F.3d at 62-64 , and Stanley, 337 F.3d at 967 , specifically stand for the proposition that a “clothing exchange” observed by an officer, even if it constitutes a “search,” does not require “reasonable suspicion” to satisfy Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” standards.
Thus, I conclude that, as a matter of law, Peters was not subjected to a “strip search” or any other intrusion, however denominated, requiring “reasonable suspicion.”
I acknowledge that Officer Risdal’s insistence on observing the “clothing exchanges” implies, or raises genuine issues of material fact, that Officer Risdal’s purpose was to watch over Peters to ensure that nothing illicit was brought into the jail — specifically, the strings of Peters’s swimsuit top with which Officer Risdal believed that Peters might have been able to hurt herself — and that this is conduct that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has described as a “search,” albeit not a “strip search.” See Stanley, 337 F.3d at 964 . I also acknowledge that a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs when “ ‘the government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.’ ” Arnzen v. Palmer, 713 F.3d 369, 372 (8th Cir.2013) (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-33 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 , 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001)). This definition of “search” is not in terms of any particular purpose of the officers’ conduct, or even any particular conduct, such as “inspecting” or even looking for anything, but is only in terms of “violation of a subjective expectation of privacy.” Such a “violation of a subjective expectation of privacy” at least arguably occurs in any circumstances in which an arrestee or detainee is required to disrobe or is disrobed in front of others. In this specific sense, Peters has generated genuine issues of material fact that she was subjected to a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Ultimately, however, as the parties argue, nomenclature is not the legal issue; *939 the proper constitutional standard to evaluate Peters’s claim is the legal issue. Cf. Stanley, 337 F.3d at 964 & n. 2 (observing that “[wjhether we further label this process a ‘strip search’ or merely a ‘search’ is unimportant, as the analysis remains the same,” and that “[wjhether the procedure at issue here was a ‘strip search’ or just a ‘search’ more appropriately goes to the question of the scope or manner of the intrusion involved”). I agree. The proper constitutional standard here is a Fourth Amendment standard of “reasonableness,” determined by “a balancing of the need for the particular [intrusion] against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 ; accord King, — U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1970 (explaining that the validity of a search of an individual taken into custody under the Fourth Amendment requires that courts “‘balance the privacy-related and law enforcement-related concerns to determine if the intrusion was reasonable’ ” (quoting Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331 , 121 S.Ct. 946 , 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001))); Florence, — U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1516 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 , for this general Fourth Amendment standard); Schmidt, 557 F.3d at 572 (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 ); Stanley, 337 F.3d at 964 (same). In the circumstances of this ease, however, this standard for determining the “reasonableness” of a “search” does not require “reasonable suspicion.”
For my part, I believe that describing the incident in which Peters was stripped as a “strip search” or even as a “search” is, at best, misleading, and at worst, invites jurors to decide the case on an improper, emotional basis. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 403, and advisory committee comment. This is so, even if calling the incident at issue here a “search” is technically correct under the definition in Arnzen. See 713 F.3d at 372 (quoting Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31-33 , 121 S.Ct. 2038 ). Specifically, I reiterate that Peters has failed to generate any genuine issues of material fact that she was stripped for the purpose of inspecting her naked body or genitalia for concealed contraband, rather than for the purpose of changing her into jail attire. Cf. Schmidt, 557 F.3d at 572 (rejecting the notion that merely photographing a tattoo was equivalent to a “strip search,” because a “strip search” is “much more intrusive”); Richmond, 490 F.3d at 1005-06 (recognizing conduct involving pulling the arrestee’s pants and underwear down and visually inspecting his genitalia and buttocks, without touching him, as a “strip search”); see also Kelsey, 567 F.3d at 62-64 . The record shows beyond dispute that the officers removed Peters’s clothes only after Peters refused to answer the “suicide” questions, became disruptive, and refused to remove her clothes herself, not because they had any concern that she was concealing a weapon or other contraband, even if the parties dispute whether or not the Defendant Officers actually believed that Peters was a threat to herself. Moreover, the record shows beyond dispute that the officers involved in the incident attempted to cover Peters’s body with a paper jumpsuit while the remainder of her street clothes (her swimsuit top and bottom) were removed by a female officer, even if the parties dispute the extent to which the paper jumpsuit effectively covered Peters’s body, that the officers removed Peters’s clothes while Peters was face down on a bunk, and that Peters has failed to generate any genuine issues of material fact that the Defendant Officers ever had a frontal view of her breasts and genitalia. Also, as noted twice before, Peters has not generated any genuine issues of material fact that she was subjected to any “visual inspection” of her naked body at all, where she cites to no portion of the record indicating *940 that any officer inspected her naked body or inspected — or even saw — her private parts, or that she was ever required to manipulate her body, or subjected to any probe of her body cavities.
Although nomenclature is not the ultimate legal issue, it seems to me that a far less misleading description of Peters’s claim in Count I — that is, one that recognizes both the conduct and the right at issue, without the potential for misleading the jurors or inviting a decision based on an emotional response — is “violation of privacy rights” protected by the Fourth Amendment or “intrusion on privacy” in violation of the Fourth Amendment, based on an “intrusion” rather than a “search.” Such a description of this claim is consistent with Hill v. McKinley, 311 F.3d 899 (8th Cir.2002), in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals described claims that a female detainee was required to disrobe in the presence of a male officer, required to walk through the jail nude in the presence of male officers, and restrained nude on a restrainer board in the presence of male officers as claims of “violation of privacy rights” in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See 311 F.3d at 903. I will not insist upon the use of these labels for Peters’s claim in Count I by all parties at all times from this point forward in the litigation, but I will use them in this decision.
iii. Summary
As a matter of law, the applicable constitutional standard for Peters’s claim of “violation of privacy rights” in Count I is a Fourth Amendment standard of “reasonableness,” determined by “a balancing of the need for the particular [intrusion] against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 . In the circumstances of this case, however, that standard does not require “reasonable suspicion” as a matter of law.
c. Violation of the right
i. Arguments of the parties
The defendants argue that, whatever the nature of the constitutional right involved in this claim, the answer to the first inquiry in the qualified immunity analysis— whether, taking the facts in the record in the light most favorable to Peters, there was a violation of her rights — is “no.” Moré specifically, the defendants argue that the Defendant Officers were justified by interests in jail security and safety in requiring Peters to change her clothing and that no “reasonable suspicion” was required. They argue that the legitimate motivating factor for removing Peters’s clothing was a concern that she could possibly hurt herself, where she refused to answer the “suicide” questions and presented herself in an uncontrolled and disruptive manner by screaming at officers. They point out that the Defendant Officers testified that they understood that detainees could use strings on clothing to hurt themselves or to attempt to commit suicide, so that they were justified in removing Peters’s swimsuit top, which had such strings, and that Officer Risdal was justified in insisting that she remain in the cell while Peters changed, in order to maintain security and safety.
The defendants also argue that the search was conducted in a reasonable manner, to protect Peters’s safety, given Peters’s emotional and aggressive demeanor. They point out that Officer Risdal first requested that Peters remove her clothing to change into jail garb, and only when Peters refused Officer Risdal’s lawful and reasonable order to do so in Officer Risdal’s presence and acted aggressively towards Officer Risdal was force used by the Defendant Officers to remove Peters’s clothing. The defendants also argue that the assistance of the male officers was *941 reasonably necessary to enforce Officer Risdal’s order and that none of the male officers observed Peters’s private body parts.
In response, Peters argues that, at a minimum, she has generated genuine issues of material fact that her Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the forcible removal of her swimsuit in the presence of male and female officers. She argues that her “strip search” required “reasonable suspicion,” an argument that I rejected, above. Assuming a “fallback” position, that only a more general Bell standard is applicable, Peters asserts that the Defendant Officers lacked any legitimate justification for the “strip search.” This is so, Peters argues, because the defendants have admitted that there were only two reasons for officers to watch a detainee undress: (1) suspicion that the detainee was concealing contraband or a weapon and needed to be strip-searched; and (2) concern that the detainee was a suicide risk and needed to be placed in a paper suit, but as to the second justification, the only one asserted here, Peters argues that the record here does not support that justification.
Specifically, Peters argues that her allegedly “belligerent” behavior did not demonstrate that she was a “suicide risk”; the booking form did not indicate any tearfulness, need for medical attention, violent, anxious, or embarrassed behavior, or any other behavior suggesting a risk of suicide; and that, although the booking form was changed after the incident in which she was stripped, it was only changed to indicate that the reason for placing her in a paper suit was that she was “belligerent,” not that she was “suicidal.” She also points out that she yelled at the Defendant Officers, “Why the fuck would I wanna hurt myself?” which the Defendant Officers have admitted is a negative answer to the question about whether she wanted to hurt herself. She also contends that the record shows that it was a foregone conclusion that she was never going to be allowed to change into jail attire in private. She also contends that the record shows that the required checks, at required intervals, on the condition of a “suicidal” detainee were not conducted in her case.
Peters also contends that the “search” was conducted in an unnecessarily abusive manner in the presence of male officers who physically restrained her. Peters denies that she engaged in any sufficiently aggressive or disruptive behavior to warrant being forcibly stripped and restrained by and in the presence of male officers.
In reply, the defendants reiterate that “reasonable suspicion” was not required and that the forcible removal of Peters’s clothing was legitimately motivated by a concern that she might hurt herself with the strings of her swimsuit. They argue that it would have been unreasonable for them to “wait and see” if an emotional and disruptive detainee would actually attempt to harm herself before removing clothing with which she could do so. They contend that requiring inmates to disrobe, even in front of officers of the opposite sex, in order to change into jail attire is not necessarily unreasonable in manner, and that it was not unreasonable here.
ii. Analysis
The first inquiry in the qualified immunity analysis is whether, taking the facts in the record in the light most favorable to Peters, there was a violation of her rights. See Burton, 731 F.3d at 791 (“Evaluating a claim of qualified immunity requires a ‘two-step inquiry: (1) whether the facts shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional or statutory right, and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.’ ” (quoting Winslow, 696 *942 F.3d at 730 , with internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); accord Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232, 129 S.Ct. 808 . Thus, as explained, above, I must consider whether the factual record, viewed in the light most favorable to Peters, supports a conclusion that the Defendant Officers violated Peters’s constitutional rights. S.L. ex rel. Lenderman, 725 F.3d at 850 . This question, of course, is answered by applying the “reasonableness” standard determined just above, involving “a balancing of the need for the particular [intrusion] against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails,” Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 , or at least, on a motion for summary judgment, determining whether there are genuine issues of material fact on this inquiry. For the reasons explained above, “reasonable suspicion” is not part of the inquiry or a requirement for “reasonableness” in this case, however.
Determination of the “need for the particular intrusion” requires consideration of the following factors:
(1) the justification for initiating the [intrusion], (2) the scope of the particular intrusion, (3) the place in which the [intrusion] is conducted, and (4) the manner in which it is conducted. [Bell,] 441 U.S. at 559 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 .
Schmidt, 557 F.3d at 572 . “These factors are used to balance the need for a particular [intrusion] with the rights of the individual [subjected to the intrusion].” Id. (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 559 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 ). As to “the rights of the individual,” the Supreme Court recently reiterated,
The expectations of privacy of an individual taken into police custody “necessarily [are] of a diminished scope.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 557 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 . “[B]oth the person and the property in his immediate possession may be searched at the station house.” United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 803 , 94 S.Ct. 1234 , 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974). A search of the detainee’s person when he is booked into custody may “ ‘involve a relatively extensive exploration,’ ” [United States v.] Robinson, 414 U.S. [218,] 227, 94 S.Ct. 467 [, 38 L.Ed.2d 427 (1973)], including “requiring] at least some detainees to lift their genitals or cough in a squatting position,” Florence , 566 U.S. at -, 132 S.Ct. at 1520 .
King , — U.S. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1978 . Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has also stated that it “do[es] not underestimate the degree to which [highly invasive intrusions] may invade the personal privacy of inmates.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 560 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 .
In deciding whether Peters has generated genuine issues of material fact that there was insufficient “need for the particular [intrusion]” to outweigh her privacy interests, I must first consider “the justification for initiating the [intrusion].” Schmidt, 557 F.3d at 572 (identifying pertinent factors). The defendants assert that the justification for forcibly changing Peters out of her swimsuit and into jail attire was to protect her from self-harm. The defendants point to evidence that Peters refused to answer the “suicide” questions and, instead, became tearful, belligerent, and aggressive, so that Officer Risdal legitimately believed that Peters might pose a threat of harming herself, which required removal of Peters’s clothing in Officer Risdal’s presence. Peters does not dispute that protecting a detainee from self-harm is a legitimate justification for an officer’s conduct, but she disputes that it was the actual justification in this case. She argues that the record belies this justification, because her booking intake form did not indicate any of the indicia of suicidal tendencies; that, even after the incident, the booking form was not changed to indicate that she was placed in a paper suit *943 because she was suicidal, but because she was “belligerent”; and that the checks, at specified intervals, on the condition of a potentially suicidal detainee, as required by jail policy, were not conducted in her case, according to jail records and the videotape of the detention area.
I conclude that, notwithstanding the evidence identified by Peters concerning the posi-incident conduct of the Defendant Officers, no reasonable juror could conclude that, at the time of the forcible removal of Peters’s swimsuit, doing so was not because of a concern that Peters needed to be protected from potentially harming herself with the strings on her swimsuit. Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43 (“Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Peters has pointed to nothing in the record that undermines Officer Risdal’s testimony that, where a detainee refuses to answer the “suicide” questions, the detainee must be treated as posing a potential for self-harm, and that the detainee’s street clothing must be removed in an officer’s presence to minimize that potential. Nor has Peters pointed to anything in the record that undermines Officer Risdal’s testimony that her belief that she was required to treat Peters as posing a risk of self-harm was the motivation for Officer Risdal’s order for Peters to remove her street clothes in Officer Risdal’s presence. Thus, this factor, “the justification for initiating the [intrusion],” Schmidt, 557 F.3d at 572 , shows only that there was sufficient (or at least “objectively reasonable”) “need for the particular intrusion.”
As to the third factor, “the place in which the [intrusion] is conducted,” id., Peters does not complain that the intrusion occurred in a holding cell. Rather, she complains about the presence of the Defendant Officers, male and female, and the forcible removal of her clothing, which are ma

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8712349. Public record. Not legal advice.