# Pride Communications Ltd. Partnership v. WCKG, Inc.

> District Court, N.D. Illinois · January 26, 1994 · 851 F. Supp. 895

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8707748

## Case

- **Full name:** PRIDE COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, a limited partnership of the State of Illinois v. WCKG, INC., a Delaware corporation, Cox Broadcasting, Incorporated, a Delaware corporation, Cox Communications Incorporated, a Delaware corporation, and Cox Enterprises, Inc., a Delaware corporation
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. Illinois
- **Decided:** January 26, 1994
- **Citations:** 851 F. Supp. 895; 30 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1185; 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 755; 1994 WL 184960
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Roszkowski
- **Judges:** Mahoney, Roszkowski
- **Cited by:** 3 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8707748

## Opinion text

ORDER
ROSZKOWSKI, District Judge.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PROCEDURAL HISTORY.908
LEGAL STANDARDS.909
STUDENT TRACKING AND ABILITY GROUPING.912
SEGREGATION OF STUDENTS BY RACE WITHIN SCHOOLS.915
STUDENT ASSIGNMENT.917
FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT DISPARITIES.919
1989 REORGANIZATION PLAN .922
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION.923
STAFF ASSIGNMENT.924
INEQUITABLE ACCESS TO TRANSPORTATION.925
DISCRIMINATORY CONDITIONS IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD ... 926
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES.928
BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND OTHER EDUCATIONAL DISCRIMINATION ISSUES AFFECTING HISPANICS.929
SPECIAL EDUCATION.929
CONCLUSION .980
ORDER.933
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the court on the plaintiffs’ motion for a permanent injunction. Hearing was held before Magistrate Judge P. Michael Mahoney, who issued a Report and Recommendation making extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, ultimately concluding that the defendant had violated the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection under the law by separating public school children on the basis of race. The plaintiffs, the defendant, and the intervenor-defendants have all filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. The parties have all extensively briefed the issues and the court hereby makes its findings of fact and conclusions of law.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This lawsuit was filed on May 11, 1989. It was filed by the plaintiffs, People Who Care, et al., as a reaction to the 1989 Reorganization Plan that had been adopted by the defendant, Rockford Board of Education School District #205, in January and February of 1989. The lawsuit not only attacks the 1989 Reorganization Plan, but also alleges that the school district historically has engaged in a pattern of intentional segregation and discrimination on a systemwide basis.
Approximately two months into the litigation, the parties entered into an Interim Settlement in response to the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Interim Settlement dealt mainly with the 1989 Reorganization Plan. The settlement was embodied in an Interim Agreed Order entered by the court on July 7,1989. That order provided for certain modifications of the Reorganization Plan and for other remedial steps to be taken by the District.
A Second Amended Complaint was filed on November 9, 1989. On April 24, 1991, the plaintiffs and the defendant agreed to, and the court approved and entered, a Second Interim Order. The Second Interim Order was a more comprehensive interim remedial plan. The Second Interim Order did not resolve the plaintiffs’ underlying liability claim and the District made no admission of liability in connection with either of the Interim Remedial Orders. Certain parts of the Second Interim Order were subsequently stricken by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 961 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.1992).
*909 On June 29, 1992, this court, by Minute Order, referred all matters pertaining to the plaintiffs’ motion for a supplemental remedial order to Magistrate Judge P. Michael Maho-ney for ruling. By Order of September 8, 1992, this court, pursuant to Local Rule 1.71(c)(4) of the General Rules of the Northern District of Illinois, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (a), (b) and (c), transferred to the Magistrate Judge all “matters currently pending.”
On April 8, 1993, this court reiterated the referral to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B), and in April of 1993 the Magistrate Judge commenced hearing the motion for a permanent injunction.
The injunction hearing began April 2,1993. Approximately thirty witnesses testified on behalf of the plaintiffs, and approximately nine witnesses testified on behalf of the defendant and the intervenor-defendants. Over 3,600 pages of testimony were taken over the twenty-four days of the hearing. In addition, the court has taken into consideration 150 depositions presented to the court as evidence in lieu of testimony, as well as the literally thousands of pages of documents that have been presented to the court.
Pursuant to an “Agreement of Plaintiffs, Defendant Rockford School District 205 and Intervenor-Defendants Concerning the Liability Hearing Adjudication Process and Certain Remedial Matters,” dated May 5, 1993, all parties stipulated that the Magistrate Judge would make a Report and Recommendation to this court which would then rule upon the permanent injunction and liability issues. Pursuant to the May 5th Agreement, the parties agreed that all present and future remedial matters in this case, without limitation, would be referred to the Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c)(1) and (c)(3), and under the rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. The Agreement also allowed the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint which conformed to the proofs presented. This Third Amended Complaint was filed June 23, 1993.
On May 5,1993, pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Second Interim Order, and Paragraph 13 of the May 5 Agreement, this court appointed Dr. Eugene E. Eubanks as Special Master.
The permanent injunction hearing ended on May 13, 1993. The parties submitted post-hearing briefs as well as proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On November 3,1993, Magistrate Judge P. Michael Mahoney issued his Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge made extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law, recommending that the defendant be found liable for violating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiff class, and that the court enter an appropriate injunction and declaratory order against the defendant. All parties have filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and have extensively briefed their objections.
Pursuant to Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C), any party may serve and file written objections to a Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings of fact and recommendation. The statute further provides, in pertinent part:
A judge of the court shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions.
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C).
The standard calls for a de novo determination, not a de novo hearing. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674 , 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2411 , 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). In making its de novo determination of the record, the court is entitled to afford the Magistrate Judge’s credibility findings “such weight as their merit commands and the sound discretion of the judge warrants.” Id. at 683 , 100 S.Ct. at 2416 .
LEGAL STANDARDS
Fourteenth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu *910 nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, '§ 1.
This ease is based upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs have alleged thajrthe defendant has separated public schooFchildren by race and has discriminated against African-American and other minority school children because of their race>~?For almost forty years, federal law on this issue has been clear. “[I]n the field of public education, the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 , 74 S.Ct. 686, 692 , 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954).
The elements for a prima facie case of intentional discrimination against a school district requiresmatTheré be segregation or discrimination, causation and intent. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Col., 413 U.S. 189, 208 , 93 S.Ct. 2686, 2697 , 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973); Diaz v. San Jose Unified School Dist., 733 F.2d 660, 662 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1065 , 105 S.Ct. 2140 , 85 L.Ed.2d 497 (1985). The Equal Protection Clause requires State and local governments to treat similarly situated groups of people in a similar fashion if that government classifies individuals in the distribution of particular benefits and burdens. Hooper v. Bernalillo County Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618 , 105 S.Ct. 2862, 2866 , 86 L.Ed.2d 487 (1985). Classifications which burden a discrete and insular minority group are inherently suspect and are subject to “strict” judicial scrutiny. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 , 152 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778 , 783 n. 4, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938). Racial classifications are inherently suspect and are presumptively invalid absent an extraordinary justification. Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 , 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292-93 , 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979). Even facially neutral state action violates the Equal Protection Clause when such action is intended to have a racial effect and does, in fact, have such an effect. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240-41 , 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-48 , 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976).
The fact that racially segregated schools exist is not automatically a constitutional violation. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Panache, 443 U.S. 449, 464 , 99 S.Ct. 2941, 2950 , 61 L.Ed.2d 666 (1979). It is a violation when intentional governmental conduct has created or perpetuated the segregative conditions. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 213-14 , 93 S.Ct. at 2699-2700 . Absent statutory segregation in a state, a school district violates the constitution when “school authorities have carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers, and facilities within the school system.” Id. at 201 , 93 S.Ct. at 2694 . To establish unconstitutional racial imbalance within a school system, the plaintiff must show that the governmental authorities created or maintained racial segregation in the schools and that their actions were motivated by segregative intent. Id. at 208 , 93 S.Ct. at 2697 ; Diaz, 733 F.2d at 662 .
Absolute segregation is certainly prohibited, as well as substantial segregation and racially identifiable schools. Pursuant to Green v. County School Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 , 88 S.Ct. 1689 , 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968), the court must examine the ethnic and racial composition of the schools as well as “every facet of school operations—faculty, staff, transportation, extra-curricular activities and facilities.” Id. at 435 , 88 S.Ct. at 1693 . The court will also consider the quality of education provided to both white and minority students. See Freeman v. Pitts, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 1446 , 118 L.Ed.2d 108 (1992).
Causation is established when it is showm that the defendant’s conduct contributed in a substantial manner to the creation or perpetuation of racial segregation. In other words, the defendant’s conduct must have more than a de minimis impact. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 624 F.Supp. 1276, 1379 (S.D.N.Y.1985), aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2nd Cir.1987); Berry v. School Dist. of Benton Harbor, 442 F.Supp. 1280, 1292 (W.D.Mich.1977).
*911 Second, the plaintiff must show segregative intent. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to establish segregative intent. Diaz, 733 F.2d at 662 . Types of proof which support an inference of segregative intent include: discriminatory impact of acts, omissions or policies of the defendant; the history of events leading to conduct maintaining or exacerbating racial imbalance in schools; departures from regular procedures and policies used by the decision-makers; and evidence concerning the decision-making process. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 , 97 S.Ct. 555, 563-65 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). Upon a showing of a prima facie ease of intentional segregation, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the same segregative conduct would have occurred “even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.” Id. at 271 n. 21, 97 S.Ct. at 566 n. 21.
Injunctive Relief
For a permanent injunction to issue from the court, the plaintiffs must prevail on the merits of their claim and establish that equitable relief is appropriate. Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westerner, 359 U.S. 500, 506-07 , 79 S.Ct. 948, 954-55 , 3 L.Ed.2d 988 (1959). Beacon Theaters implies that the factors considered for a permanent injunction are the same as those considered for a preliminary injunction, with victory on the merits replacing a reasonable likelihood of success. See e.g., United States v. Rural Electric Convenience Co-Op. Co., 922 F.2d 429, 432 (7th Cir.1991). Those other factors in the balance of equities are: an inadequate remedy at law; irreparable harm to the plaintiffs absent in-junctive relief; the degree of hardship on the defendant; the public interest served; and the ability to fashion an appropriate injunction. The Magistrate Judge found each of those factors favored the plaintiffs and recommended that appropriate injunctive relief be entered against the defendant.
Objections to Evidence
Hearing on the motion for a permanent injunction was held before Magistrate Judge P. Michael Mahoney pursuant to this court’s referral order under 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Rule 1.71(c)(4) of the General Rules of the Northern District of Illinois (“Local Rules”). Pursuant to the referral, the Magistrate Judge entered a report and recommendation for review by the court. The district court has de novo review over such a report. “A judge of the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1).
As an initial matter, the parties have objected to various rulings made by the Magistrate Judge. A substantial number of depositions and affidavits were received in evidence in lieu of live testimony at the hearing. The Magistrate Judge allowed the submission of this evidence with the provision that specific objections made to deposition testimony would be ruled upon, and ruled upon those objections in an order dated June 23, 1993. The plaintiffs have objected to those rulings arguing that the defendant has waived those objections, that the court has previously rejected such objections, and that those objections are meritless. The defendant argues that its objections were based on the Federal Rules of Evidence and were hot waived, based on an agreed order of the parties and approved by the court, allowing the defendant to preserve its objections to deposition testimony. Although the Magistrate Judge did overrule many of the defendant’s motions in limine, a part of the basis for his ruling was that the defendant’s objections were too generalized to identify to what the defendant had objected. Furthermore, some of the defendant’s objections, once specified to particular portions of evidence, were meritorious. The defendant’s objections to parts of the depositions focused on relevant , matters such as whether the testimony was based on personal knowledge, whether there, was proper foundation, whether the testimony was hearsay or multiple hearsay, whether the testimony related to post-1989 conduct, or whether the testimony was improper opinion testimony.
The depositions and affidavits were admitted into evidence subject to objections, which *912 were made to specific portions of testimony, rather than the generic, generalized objections made in the defendant’s motions in limine. Having reviewed the depositions and affidavits and the plaintiffs’ objections, and the Magistrate Judge’s rulings, the court cannot find that the Magistrate Judge was clearly erroneous in any of those rulings. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ objections to the rulings on the defendant’s objections to depositions and affidavits are overruled. The depositions and affidavits are admitted, except for the portions of those depositions and affidavits which have had objections sustained to them.
The defendant’s primary objection throughout its briefs is that the Magistrate Judge erred in concluding that the defendant intentionally discriminated against minority students. The defendant argues that the plaintiffs failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant engaged in purposeful and intentional discrimination and that the Magistrate Judge improperly jumped to that conclusion. The defendant further argues that the Magistrate Judge improperly gave too much weight to evidence it characterizes as “[isolated incidents of conduct by school officials” and that “almost all' evidence favorable to the District has been excluded from the proposed findings.” The defendant correctly points out, as the court has stated earlier, that this court is reviewing the evidence de novo. The court is mindful of the burdens of proof in this case and is also aware of the degree of circumstantial evidence presented. As stated earlier here, and in the Magistrate Judge’s Report, circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to infer the defendant’s intent.
The court has reviewed all the evidence in this case in considering the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. The following discussion should be read in conjunction with the corresponding sections of the Magistrate Judge’s opinion.
The court will not attempt to answer each and every objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and'Recommendation filed by the parties, but will briefly comment on some of those objections. The parties have filed a multitude of objections, many of which have no basis in the record. Those objections not discussed here are rejected as meritless.
As stated earlier, the standard that guides the court in a case such as this, is that this court must make a de novo determination of the record. As the courts have consistently held a de novo hearing is not required. Furthermore, the court is entitled to accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge, and to afford his credibility findings such weight as their merit commands and the sound discretion of the court warrants. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 674-76 , 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2411-13 , 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). The excellent Report and Recommendation submitted by the Magistrate Judge evidences a thorough understanding of both the law and the facts and how those facts apply to the law. In making its de novo determination in this case, the court has given due consideration to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation in conjunction with the evidence.
STUDENT TRACKING AND ABILITY GROUPING
The Magistrate Judge found that the ability grouping and tracking practices of the Rockford School District (hereinafter RSD) did not represent a trustworthy enactment of any academically acceptable theory or practice and that the RSD tracking practices skewed enrollment in favor of whites and to the disadvantage of minority students. The Magistrate Judge further found that it was the policy of the RSD to use tracking to intentionally segregate white students, and that the policy existed in 1989 and had existed for many years prior thereto.
The defendant’s principal objection to this finding is that the Magistrate Judge relied, to a large extent, on the testimony of the plaintiffs expert witness, Dr. Jeanne Oakes. The Magistrate Judge stated that “the most devastating witness testifying on behalf of the plaintiffs was Dr. Jeanne Oakes.” Report and Recommendation at 940. '
The defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding because, the defendant asserts, “Dr. Oakes neither visited a single *913 school, nor spoke with a solitary student, administrator, or member of the Rockford community. She completed all of her analysis relative to the District through reliance on hearsay without ever personally viewing any of the Rockford Public Schools.” Further, the defendant seems to question the Magistrate Judge’s acceptance of Dr. Oakes as an expert witness, questioning her qualifications to state her opinions, based on her qualifications.
The court rejects the defendant’s contentions. The Magistrate Judge’s conclusion on this point is convincingly supported by the evidence.
First, Dr. Oakes is clearly qualified to testify on the subject of tracking 1 and her testimony is entitled to great weight, as the Magistrate Judge found. Dr. Oakes’s expertise, integrity and credentials were acknowledged by the defendant’s counsel. Tr. at 818, 322. Her conclusions were supported, at least in part, by the defendant’s own expert, Dr. James Heald. Tr. 3293. 2
Furthermore, contrary to the defendant’s contention, Dr. Oakes’s analysis was not based on hearsay. As the Magistrate Judge stated in his Report and Recommendation, her analysis is based upon an examination of a wide range of materials, which are documents obtained from- the defendant’s files. 3
In addition, Dr. Oakes’s testimony is wholly corroborated by the testimony of the defendant’s personnel who are intimately acquainted with the tracking practice of the District. Specifically, see the testimony of Mr. William Bowen (Report and Recommendation at 947) and Mr. Nathaniel Martin’s (Report and Recommendation at 948) both veteran administrators of the District, with many years of experience in observing the operation of the District’s tracking method.
The defendant also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the defendant’s tracking practices “did not represent a trustworthy enactment of any academically acceptable theory or practice.” This conclusion is supported by the testimony of Dr. Oakes and, in large part, by the testimony of Dr. Willis.
The Magistrate Judge further found that “it was the policy of RSD to use tracking to intentionally segregate white students from minority students.” Report and Recommendation at 940. The defendant objects on the grounds that “no evidence was adduced at the hearing which demonstrated that the defendant was motivated on the basis of race to track or ability group students according to their race or had the invidious intent to do so.” As the plaintiffs correctly point out, the defendant’s intent is what is at issue here, not its motivation. 4
Furthermore, there is ample evidence to support the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion on this point, including but not limited to: the assignment of minority students to lower track classes in consistently disproportionate numbers (Report and Recommendation at 946, 950-53), knowledge of these racial disproportions and woefully inadequate efforts *914 to correct them (Report and Recommendation at 999), placing black students whose achievement scores qualified them for two or more tracks in lower tracks (Report and Recommendation at 959) and corroboration by District personnel (Report and Recommendation at 947-48).
The defendant also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that children were publicly labelled when they were “tracked.” Contrary to the defendant’s objections, the evidence clearly supports this finding, including the testimony of Dr. Oakes and the incredibly insensitive practice of the District of labelling the students by color-coding them for all of the student body to see. Not only is this evidence compelling, it is astonishing, and completely uncontroverted.
The defendant also attacks Dr. Oakes’s expertise on statistical analysis, although it presented no statistical expert in order to impeach her analysis, which it could have done. The defendant’s claim is without merit.
The defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the matters contained in Dr. Oakes’s charts and tables are true and correct and his adopting them as findings of the court. The Magistrate Judge further found that “the record is replete with situations where, there were students (usually white) who scored below the national mean and who were still placed in the honors classes and, incredibly, there were students (usually minority) who scored in the ninety-ninth percentile who were placed in basic classes.” This finding is amply supported by the record in this case. It is significant that the defendant offered no evidence to rebut the plaintiffs’ proof, presumably because it could not do so.
The defendant also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the defendant did not track students objectively and had a rigid tracking program. The defendant attributes these inequities to “mistakes” and not “intentional discrimination.” The evidence on this point is replete with statistical, documentary and anecdotal support which establishes that the defendant was aware of the problem, but chose to do nothing to correct it. It is supported by the record in this ease.
The Magistrate Judge found that the tracking systems used by the RSD did not remedy differences or ameliorate disparities in achievement among racial groups, nor did it function to move students out of the low-level track or move minority students into high-level tracks.
The ability grouping used by the RSD, therefore, cannot be justified as an attempt to target minority students with the hope of advancing them to higher achievement levels. The grouping practices used created racially identifiable classrooms, provided unequal opportunities to learn and served no remedial function for minority students. These practices did not even enable minority students to sustain their position relative to white students in the district achievement hierarchy.
Report and Recommendation at 999.
The defendant’s objections to this finding seem to be that since the plaintiffs failed to prove that all minorities were improperly placed, no intent to discriminate can be found. The court finds such a suggestion to be incongruous and without any legal foundation. It would obviously be an impossible burden in any discrimination case to require the plaintiffs to demonstrate that every act of the District was discriminatory.
Furthermore, the record reflects that the evidence supports that groups of higher track students whose scores fell within a range that would qualify them for participation in either a higher or lower track were consistently “whiter” than groups of students whose scores fell within the same range but who were placed in the lower track and in a number of cases, high track classes included exceptionally low-scoring white students, but this was rarely the case for blacks. Conversely, quite high-scoring blacks who were often excluded from high track classes, were often found instead in low track classes. This was seldom the case for white students. Report and Recommendation at 959.
The defendant apparently contends that these disparities show that since the District mistracked both black and white students, no racial discrimination is shown. Contrary to the defendant’s position, the evidence pre *915 sented reveals that while blacks were misplaced “down” (i.e. into lower classes), whites were misplaced “up” (i.e. into higher classes).
The evidence clearly supports a finding that the mistracking resulted in unfavorable treatment for minority students. The ultimate result of this mistracking was that minority students whose achievement scores qualified them for regular and basic tracks were far more, likely to be placed in the lower than the higher track for which they qualified, and white students were far more likely to be placed in the higher track than the lower track when their achievement scores qualified them for both tracks. Report and Recommendation at 977.
As to the defendant’s contention that socioeconomic factors account for the disparate treatment of minorities in track placement in the District, there is little, if anything, in the record supporting the defendant’s position.
The defendant raises additional objections to the Magistrate Judge’s findings under the heading “Student Tracking and Ability Grouping.” The court finds that those objections are without merit and adopts the finds of the Magistrate Judge on those issues.
SEGREGATION OF STUDENTS BY RACE WITHIN SCHOOLS
In conjunction with the segregative practices involved in the tracking of students, the Magistrate Judge also found further use of special programs to separate children by race within Rockford public schools. During the periods when the RSD was involved with the Illinois State Board of Education (ISBE) and the QUEFAC lawsuit, 5 the RSD took actions which were purported to have de-segregative effects. The Magistrate Judge found that those actions did not bring about any real racial interaction and instead, used programs which included intact busing and part-time programs, which had little, if any, desegregative effect. Those programs were subsequently rejected by the QUEFAC court and the ISBE in the mid-1970’s.
The RSD then began to use both full-site and partial-site programs. Full-site programs included focus centers and open enrollment. Partial-site programs included such programs to place students in classrooms separate from the regular students in a school where the transfer students would not have much contact with the regular students. The use of the so-called “high status” partial-site programs, those with academic entrance requirements, placed groups of white students in minority schools, but the structure of the programs prevented the students from interacting with the minority students of the host school. The use of these kinds of programs allowed the District to count desegregation in terms of numerical percentages without consideration of continued separation of students within individual schools.
Furthermore, prior to the filing of this lawsuit, the RSD used voluntary alternative programs for desegregation which were primarily composed of white students. Desegregation programs for minority students were primarily mandatory transfers and often included mandatory busing. The alternative programs created isolated classrooms of white students in predominantly black schools in which children were in the same buildings, but had no interaction.
The defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s findings on the basis that they are not supported by the evidence and because many of the programs discussed were done with the approval of the QUEFAC court. The QUEFAC court did not make a finding that the RBE violated the rights of minority students. The case was, in fact, dismissed pursuant to a voluntary dismissal. Plans such as the Grade Exchange Plan and the Special Interest Centers were not ordered by the court. The Grade Exchange Plan was rejected because it effected no true integration. The plan for Special Interest Centers was allowed to proceed although Judge Bauer had serious reservations about the plan. He allowed the plan to go forward *916 only because there was no time in which to implement an alternative.
In 1977, the ISBE placed the RSD on probation because the plan it had submitted was found not to comply with the ISBE rules. Although these rules were held invalid by the Illinois Supreme Court, they did place the RSD on notice of the concern other governmental agencies had about its practices.
The defendant also objects to the findings regarding the partial-site programs stating that the separation between the gifted students and the regular students occurred because the students would “necessarily be located in different classrooms.” The court finds this position meritless. The evidence supports the conclusion that minority students were excluded from the programs, with the resulting segregation among classrooms.
The Grade Exchange Plan provided for the transfer of students and their teachers from predominantly white schools to predominantly minority schools and vice versa. Each class transferred remained intact at the receiving school. Again, this was a program to effect the appearance of integration without actually mixing minority and majority students. The defendant argues the evidence does not support this conclusion; however, the evidence is clear from the minutes of the school board and from the proceedings in QUEFAC.
After the rejection of the Grade Exchange Plan, the District began using “Interest Centers” in 1975 to attempt to mix racially diverse students. The Interest Centers were designed to provide a course specific curriculum, but only for a five or ten day period during the school year. The plan was to provide a means to mix students while educating them in one particular field. The evidence shows, however, that classes were transferred en masse; minority classes were placed within an all white school, but were still kept separate.
The evidence also supports the Magistrate Judge’s findings that even when minority students were placed in white schools, they were still kept separate from white students. The conclusion is supported by the discussion of student tracking, as well as the uncontra-dicted testimony of William Bowen and Keith Wilson. Further, the evidence supports the conclusion that many of the minority transfer students were part of Chapter I pull-out programs, who were then “pulled-out” of white classrooms to attend separate classes for significant portions of the day. The defendant asserts that this was not intentional segregation, but rather a means to maximize the District’s funding under Chapter I. The defendant offers no evidence to support its argument. This objection is also contradicted by Dr. Stolee’s testimony that there were no funding incentives to keep minority students in minority schools.
In conjunction with the full-site magnet programs, the District used partial-site alternative programs which were highly segregated. The defendant objects stating that the evidence does not support the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions regarding the Focus Centers and Alternative Programs. The defendant states no basis for its objection. In 1987, the District changed its transportation policy, restricting eligible bus service to the school, which forced some minority students to drop out of the program because of the lack of transportation. Further, Dr. Greene’s testimony about his experiences at Haskell School is evidence of the District’s failure to support the Focus Center there and is not contradicted by the defendant. The RAES and RAMS showed promise as desegregative programs but were changed to partial-site programs and moved from the Lincoln Park school building. In 1982, RAES and RAMS were discontinued. The defendant argues that the closing of those programs does not show intent. The court disagrees. As the Magistrate Judge found, the use of these magnet programs showed that white students would participate in these types of desegregation programs.
In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, the RSD created partial-site magnet programs, “Alternative Programs”, and full-site programs called “Focus Centers.” In 1982, the RSD cancelled transportation to the Focus Centers, and effectively shut them down. The partial-site programs were of two types: the so-called “high status” programs such as *917 the Gifted Program, CAPA, Montessori, and the Arts Alternative Program; and “low status” programs such as GIT and CASS. The Magistrate Judge found that the alternative programs were used as a means to emphasize and reinforce racial separation. The court agrees. Over time, the high status programs became more segregated white, while the low status programs continued with disproportionately high minority enrollments through the 1980’s. The District also created a “Minority Gifted Program”, but did not allow minority students to enter the all-white Gifted Program, even though the Program’s Director stated the minority gifted students were capable of performing just as well in the regular Gifted Program. The defendant’s objections that those findings are not supported by the evidence are without merit and the court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s findings regarding these programs.
Within school segregation by intentional conduct is the same as intentional conduct resulting in systemwide segregation. This internal segregation is unlawful. Reed v. Rhodes, 607 F.2d 714, 731 (6th Cir.1979); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F.Supp. 401, 511-14 (D.D.C.1967), aff'd sub. nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C.Cir.1969). Such internal segregation may even be more invidious because its effects are observable to the students every school day. Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., New York School Dist. #21, 383 F.Supp. 699, 740 (E.D.N.Y.1974), aff 'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2nd Cir.1975). The Magistrate Judge concluded, as does the court, that the RSD engaged in intentional and purposeful discrimination in the operation of the District’s purported desegregation programs, tracking system, bilingual education programs, magnet school programs, and the various alternative education programs. The defendant’s objections to these findings are dismissed.
STUDENT ASSIGNMENT
The Magistrate Judge’s section on Student Assignment found that over the years the RSD manipulated school attendance areas to separate majority students from minority students. When state and federal agencies pressured the RSD to change its practices, the changes had limited effects and often placed a disparate burden on the minority students. The section covers a long period of time, from the late 1950’s through the 1980’s. The defendant initially objects to the admission of evidence prior to 1973 as too remote in time to have any relevancy. The court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence based on remoteness. Cason v. Texaco, Inc., 621 F.Supp. 1518, 1527 (C.D.La.1985); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 521 F.2d 465 , 473 (10th Cir.1975). The plaintiffs presented this historical evidence to show long-standing practices in the District, as such, their evidence is admissible. The defendant’s objection goes only to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.
The defendant also argues that the Magistrate Judge’s findings are not supported by the evidence. This objection is meritless. The defendant has offered nothing to contradict the substantial evidence presented by the plaintiffs regarding the movement of students in school assignment. The defendant also suggests that the QUEFAC court did not find the RSD had intentionally discriminated. The court is fully aware of that fact and of the fact that no findings were made because of a voluntary dismissal. No disposition was made on the merits. The court does not infer anything against the defendant based on QUEFAC, but does examine the total sum of evidence, including those time periods.
Similarly, the defendant has objected to evidence dealing with actions taken with the ISBE and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the ISBE. The ISBE Rules dealing with desegregation efforts were determined to be unconstitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court in Aurora East Public School Dist. No. 131 v. Cronin, 92 Ill.2d 313 , 66 Ill.Dec. 85 , 442 N.E.2d 511 (1982). The Magistrate Judge found, as does the court, that evidence of resistance or failure to comply with state law provisions can be evidence of unlawful intent. Diaz, 733 F.2d 660, 666 ; Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 585 (1st Cir.1974) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 , 95 S.Ct. 1950 , 44 L.Ed.2d 449 (1975); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School District, 339 *918 F.Supp. 1315, 1342 (N.D.Cal.1971), vacated on other grounds, 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir.1974). As in QUEFAC, the District worked with the ISBE to formulate desegregation programs. Although the rules and regulations of the ISBE were found to be an unconstitutional exercise of authority by a state agency, the actions taken by the RSD while those rules were in effect is probative of the pattern of segregative practices which the plaintiffs have alleged. Therefore, the defendant’s objection is dismissed.
Most of the evidence presented here, as in the rest of this case, has been gleaned from the RSD’s own records. Changes in the school attendance boundaries and attendance patterns were established by the RSD’s School Boundary Descriptions, Student Attendance Maps, Board Minutes, RSD Memo-randa, RSD correspondence with the United States Department of Justice, RSD correspondence with the- ISBE, and the various RSD plans and reports, including the 1989 Reorganization Plan and the Individual Building Analysis. Additional support was provided by the testimony of former Superintendent Dr. Thomas Shaheen, former Board Member Marcella Harris, Pupil Placement Committee Member Robert Kufalk, Rev. William Collins, Bill Page, former Board Member Jo Minor, former ISBE Member Dr. Justine Walhout, M. Dickover and RBE Equity Consultant Dr. Harriet Doss Willis. Further documentary support included reports from the Community Desegregation Committee and the Pupil Placement Committee, the record of Quality Education For All Children, Inc. v. School Board, 362 F.Supp. 985 (N.D.Ill.1973) and ISBE • Reports. The defendant offered nothing to contradict this evidence. In fact, most of the evidentiary basis has been stipulated to by the defendant. The defendant argues that the evidence does not support the Magistrate Judge’s findings. The court, however, finds the evidence amply supports the Magistrate Judge’s findings.
Although the Magistrate Judge adopted a substantial portion of the plaintiffs’ proposed findings, the plaintiffs’ have objected to the Magistrate Judge’s failure to adopt certain findings they proposed.
Specifically, the plaintiffs object to the Magistrate Judge’s failure to adopt findings regarding the Teacher Development Center (TDC) and the study done by the American Association of University Women and the League of Women Voters. The court finds the Magistrate Judge properly rejected those proposed findings. Although the TDC was subsequently dropped by the Board, the plaintiffs have not sufficiently established that it was done with segregative intent. As to the plaintiffs’ objection to the study of the American Association of University Women and the League of Women Voters, the Magistrate Judge properly rejected findings regarding the study. The plaintiffs failed to establish the reliability of the methods and procedures used. The court rejects these objections to the Report and Recommendation as well as the plaintiffs’ other objections to the Magistrate Judge’s failure to adopt their proposed findings.
School districts have often been found to have developed attendance boundaries in which racial segregation in school assignments resulted. See Report and Recommendation at 1078 (and citations therein). The court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s findings and conclusions regarding school attendance zones as well as the conclusions that those attendance zones were used to create and maintain separate school systems based upon race. The court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the RSD’s policy of maintaining neighborhood schools was, in fact, a policy of maintaining neighborhood white schools. Report and Recommendation at 1079. Furthermore, the RSD also used feeder patterns for student assignment at the District high schools as well as satellite zones for elementary students to maintain segregation in the schools.
The use of optional attendance zones also contributes to the segregative conditions in a school district. United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530, 540-43 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 , 96 S.Ct. 361 , 46 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). The result of giving majority and minority students the option of attending predominantly majority or minority schools is often student choices which will create or intensify student segregation. The *919 court finds that the RSD’s open enrollment policy did not aid desegregation. Rather, the open enrollment policy benefited majority students with access to alternative programs, while burdening minority students through mandatory one-way busing.
The RSD’s policies in the construction of new schools or school additions and the closing of old schools also contributed to segre-gative conditions in student assignments. See Report and Recommendation at 1079-80. The court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s findings and conclusions that the RSD maintained segregative conditions when schools were closed so that white students were assigned to racially-identifiable white schools and minority students were assigned to racially-identifiable minority schools. Further, in the construction of school additions, the RSD intentionally added facilities to promote and maintain segregation within the school system.
The court further finds that the RSD manipulated school capacities and student transfer policies to maintain segregative conditions in the District. Racially-identifiable white schools were operated at overcapacity levels to avoid transferring white students to racially-identifiable minority schools. Transfer policies in the RSD allowed special transfers for majority students even when those transfers had a segregative effect on the schools involved.
The court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the RSD was aware of desegregation plans which would have integrated the District. The RSD rejected those proposed plans and adopted plans which burdened minority students and benefited majority students.
FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT DISPARITIES
In his Report and Recommendation, the Magistrate Judge concluded that:
Systemwide disparities in facilities, equipment, materials and supplies between minority and predominantly white schools is unlawful. Such policies and practices of the RSD clearly indicate intentional discrimination.
Report and Recommendation at 1081. The Magistrate Judge further found that system-wide disparities in facilities and in equipment, materials and supplies between predominantly minority and predominantly majority schools existed during the past two decades.
The defendant’s objections to these findings are: 1) that they are unsupported by the evidence, and 2) while the evidence covered a period of forty years, the Magistrate Judge’s finding that disparities existed applies to only twenty years.
At no time did the defendant offer any evidence to counter the evidence produced by the plaintiffs on this issue. There is ample testimony in the record to support such a finding.
The defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on the testimony of certain witnesses, specifically Carl Towns, a former Board Member; Eloise Beals, a former teacher; Pat Redmond, a former student; Marcella Harris, a former Board Member; Hiram Gregory Luna, a former member of the School Desegregation Committee; Michael Bozym, a former teacher; Dr. Thomas Shaheen, the former superintendent of the District, and Dr. Joanne Shaheen, his wife, who was also a teacher in the District; and Mary Williams, a former teacher in the District. The gist of the defendant’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on the testimony of all these witnesses seems to be that the testimony was hearsay, that it was based on observations of events which occurred prior to the last two decades and that any opinions were the opinions of lay witnesses and were, therefore, inadmissible.
The court rejects the defendant’s objections. First, all of these witnesses testified as to their personal observations which are clearly admissible, whether they are the observations of lay or expert witnesses. Second, even though they may have been evidence of events which occurred prior to the last two decades, such evidence may be probative of the attitude and practices of the defendant over an extended period of time. Third, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a lay witness may state opinions, provided that such testimony is limited to those opin *920 ions or inferences which are: (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. 6 In each of these instances, the objection goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
All of the witnesses relied upon by the Magistrate Judge testified to their own personal observations and any opinions 7 they may have had were based on the rational perception of the witness and their opinions were helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’ testimony or the determination of the fact in issue.
The defendant also objects to the following Magistrate Judge’s finding in his Report and Recommendation:
Chart I shows the mean ranking of the physical systems by school type (African-American, integrated, white), ranked on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being the lowest and 4 being the highest. African-American schools had a mean ranking with regard to physical systems of 2.45. Integrated schools had a mean of 2.51, and white schools a mean of 2.57.
Report and Recommendation at 1082. The defendant’s principal objection seems to be on the grounds that it is simply a subjective judgment concerning “physical systems” broken down by “school type.” The defendant contends that without any type of explanation, such a finding cannot support a conclusion that the defendant intentionally discriminated with respect to physical facilities.
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the chart was based on the District’s own document, entitled “District Facility Plan.” Furthermore, the defendant stipulated to the chart. In view of the stipulation and the fact that the data used in the preparation of the chart was obtained from documents prepared by the District, it is difficult to see how the defendant can object to the Magistrate Judge’s finding.
The defendant also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s findings, that: 1) for each category of equipment, as the percentage of African-American students in the school increased, the number of pieces of equipment allocated to the school declined, and 2) that the equipment disparities revealed by defendant’s January 2, 1990, Facilities and Equipment Evaluation were known to the School District through' an annual equipment inventory process conducted by the District. Report and Recommendation at 1084, 1090. In short, the defendant states that “the analysis provided simply counted objects with no consideration for the factors noted above. Without addressing these other factors, a finding of intentional discrimination based on such an incomplete and inconclusive analysis is without merit and cannot withstand review.”
The court notes that the 1990 Facilities and Equipment Evaluation was prepared from the District’s own data for the purpose of evaluating equipment disparities between predominately white and predominately minority schools. Furthermore, the defendant presented no evidence as to why these equipment disparities existed or the reasons for the disparities. The court can only conclude that no such evidence was presented because none existed.
The defendant also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that:
Defendant’s failure to produce pre-lawsuit inventory lists makes precise evaluation of equipment allocation to African-American schools at the time this suit was filed impossible. However, even defendant’s post-lawsuit equipment evaluations, performed after some remedial measures were taken, showed strong disparities in equipment allocation.
Report and Recommendation at 1090. The defendant’s objection is that:
*921 One cannot conclude that, in the absence of inventory data for thirty years, the inventory data gathered after the filing of this lawsuit are dispositive of defendant’s intent prior to the filing of the lawsuit. No correlation was drawn by the Magistrate Judge. Furthermore, on November 28, 1993, the Magistrate Judge entered an order on three issues related to implementation of the Second Interim Order, such Order stating, inter alia, that:
[A]s near as the court can tell, as of the date of this order the Board is substantially in compliance with and has engaged in no intentional violation of the Second Interim Order.
Specifically, the defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the District’s annual inventories are both probative of the usefulness of equipment and of the defendant’s knowledge of the disparities in equipment.
As to the knowledge which may be imputed to the defendant, the court notes that the inventory process was prepared, or at least coordinated, by the defendant’s Director of Purchasing. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to see how such knowledge cannot be imputed to the Director’s principal, the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s own forms called for comments on the condition of the various equipment. As to the defendant’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on post-filing inventory, the court finds that under the circumstances here, the Magistrate Judge was entitled to rely on the data and to draw reasonable inferences therefrom, since they were the only inventories made available by the defendant.
The defendant also objects to the following finding of the Magistrate Judge:
Prior to its closing in 1973, Muldoon School, a predominantly African-American school in the Southwest Quadrant, was in dire need of renovation. Muldoon was an old, previously closed Catholic girls’ school, that was purchased by the RSD and operated for only one year, housing 4th, 5th and 6th grade children from Ellis. In response to parent protests, the RSD allocated a small sum of money for repair work for the school year 1972-73.
Report and Recommendation at 1092-93.
The court is amazed that the defendant would even mention the conduct of the District as it relates to this finding. The Magistrate Judge’s finding, was, in fact, very understated in view of the circumstances attending the so-called “restoration” of Mul-doon School. In fact, the evidence revealed that the defendant received a life safety report which outlined an expenditure of $350,-000.00 for necessary restoration and repairs. In response to the parents’ protests, the District expended a total sum of $3,700.00, approximately one percent (1%) of the amount recommended, which failed to include a fire alarm or new heating system. 8 The court finds it incredible that the defendant would now point to such actions as “positive steps.” Although it is true that the students were housed in this building for only one year, the District is fortunate to have averted a tragedy during that year.
The defendant also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the RSD’s private gifts policy contributed to EMS disparities. Specifically, the Magistrate Judge found that:
For twenty-five years, the RSD consistently operated in a manner that allowed parent gifts and other private gifts to provide a much better educational experience for white students than for minority students. Schools serving middle and upper income students received more gifts from their PTAs, PTOs and other third-parties, than schools serving lower income students. Accordingly, the schools serving middle and upper income students had far more equipment, materials and supplies.
Report and Recommendation at 1094.
The defendant objects to these findings on the basis that private acts of non-state officials (e.g. PTO, PTA, etc.) do not support state action sufficient to prove a violation of *922 the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant further contends that knowledge of a twenty year history of accepting gifts cannot be imputed to each School Board and that no one Board had the benefit of knowledge of acts of its predecessory Boards so as to understand the impact of a policy on gifts accepted over a twenty year history. With respect to the chart contained on page 1096 of the Report and Recommendation and the statistics cited on page 1095, the defendant objects on the basis that these percentages were never “stipulated to by the parties, as is stated in footnote number 14.”
Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the District’s practice in allocating these gifts was an exercise of its discretion, an affirmative state action. Furthermore, the Board was put on notice many times over a long period of years that its private gift practice had a disparate impact on predominately minority schools. 9
As to the defendant’s denial that it did not stipulate to the by-quadrant gift figures, the plaintiff has filed an affidavit of one of its counsel, which is unrebutted, confirming the stipulation.
The defendant raises some minor additional objections relative to the “Facilities and Equipment Disparities” section of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. The court rejects those objections as without merit and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s findings as its own.
1989 REORGANIZATION PLAN
The complaint in this case was filed shortly after the RSD adopted a District-wide reorganization plan on February 28, 1989, entitled “Together Toward a Brighter Tomorrow.” (“The 1989 Reorganization Plan” or “Plan”) The immediate effects of the Plan as proposed were to close the naturally integrated West High School, resegre-gate District elementary schools and impose extreme disparate burdens on minority students.
Some aspects of the Plan were implemented, many others were not. For the purposes of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, and this opinion, the court evaluates the Plan in terms of the effects the RSD anticipated at the time of adoption, primarily through enrollment and program projections the RSD had on February 28, 1989, and projections made through May 11, 1989, the date this lawsuit was filed.
The defendant’s initial objections are that because the Plan was never fully implemented, the court cannot use it as a basis for a finding of intentional discrimination. The court examines the intent of the defendant at the time of the filing of the lawsuit. This includes past and present actions of the RSD. In this instance, the court is examining the completed action of the Board, namely, the adoption of the Reorganization Plan. Also, the Magistrate Judge often referred to proposals in the Plan as completed actions. As noted in the Report and Recommendation, however, and made clear throughout his discussion, the Magistrate Judge was looking at projected effects had the Plan been fully implemented from the time of the filing of the lawsuit to determine the defendant’s intent. In evaluating the Plan, the Magistrate Judge also considered evidence of earlier versions of the Plan. The defendant objects, arguing that those versions were not implemented and that public protest from portions of the community does not evidence intentional discrimination. The court finds that the events preceding the defendant’s decision is relevant to intent. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-69 , 97 S.Ct. at 563-69 . Furthermore, the defendant’s responsiveness to public comment on its actions and foreseeability of the impact of its decisions are also relevant to the defendant’s intent.
The defendant also objects to former Superintendent Maurice Sullivan’s testimony as an “ ‘after-the-fact’ criticism of the deliberative process.” The court finds Dr. Sullivan competent to offer testimony as an experienced school administrator and educator. He has a broad base of knowledge about the *923 District and its practices. The court finds Dr. Sullivan well qualified to offer Ms opinions regarding the considerations taken in formulating the Reorganization Plan.
Prior to the Reorganization Plan, the RSD had the following distribution of elementary schools:
% of # of
Schools Schools
36% Racially-identifiable white 14
Desegregated 15
Racially-identifiable minority 10 26%
Total 39 100%
At that time, the percentage of elementary students attending each type of school was as follows:
African-American/ Hispanic Students White Students
Racially-identifiable white 5% 42%
Desegregated 39% 43%
Racially-identifiable minority 57% 16%
Report and Recommendation at 1099.
The Plan contained proposals for individual schools which District staff themselves had classified as de jure segregation. The Plan also proposed the creation of the so-called “mega schools” at Wilson and Washington schools. Wilson was projected to have 1227 elementary students, over twice the number of students than at any previous school in the District, and four times the size of the average elementary school in the District in 1988-89. Report and Recommendation at 1107. Evidence supports the conclusions that there was no educational justification for such a mega-school and the lack of such justification supports an inference of the defendant’s intent to adopt such changes to promote segregation.
The defendant has also objected to the admission of the 1981 Individual Building Analysis report. The court finds that this report was a valid analysis made by RSD staff- in wMch staff reported that proposed measures for individual schools would constitute de jure segregation. The defendant argues that these standards were used by laypersons who were not using the term de jure segregation in its proper legal sense. The court does not take the conclusions in the report as legal conclusions, but as evidence of segregative effects within the District and as evidence of knowledge of segregative effect.
The court finds the evidence supports the Magistrate Judge’s findings regarding the effects of the 1989 Reorganization Plan. The court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s findings that “the 1989 Reorganization Plan would have had a devastating impact of the Rockford School District’s minority commumty. The impact of this Plan is evidence that the Board intentionally sought to racially isolate minority elementary students in the Rockford School District.” Report and Recommendation at 1125. The court also finds that the Plan closed the naturally integrated West High School for the pretextual reason of cost savings. The closing of West was not cost effective and increased the burdens placed on minority students. The court concludes that the 1989 Reorganization Plan was adopted with the intent to discriminate against the plaintiff class, and rejects the defendant’s objections.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
The Magistrate Judge found the RSD failed to meet minority hiring goals over the last twenty years. The Magistrate Judge found the District failed to effectively recruit minority applicants and failed to remedy underrepresentation of minorities in upper levels of the District administration.
The defendant objects arguing that those findings do not support a finding of intentional discrimination against the minority students of the District. The defendant does not dispute the factual basis of the Magistrate Judge’s findings. The RSD set forth minority hiring goals, and those goals were not realized. The court must consider what the evidence means with regard to the allegations of intentional discrimination against minority students.
Discrimination in recruitment, hiring, and promotion of staff is properly considered in determining whether the rights of minority students have been violated. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401, 432 (1st Cir.), cert. de *924 nied, 426 U.S. 935 , 96 S.Ct. 2648 , 2649, 49 L.Ed.2d 386 (1976). Because the court is considering the rights of the students, a strict employment discrimination analysis is not applied. Morgan v. O’Bryant, 671 F.2d 23 , 27 (1st Cir.1982) (proof of individual hiring discrimination irrelevant).
The evidence establishes that since at least 1973, the RSD was aware that minorities were underrepresented in the District’s work force. At that time, the RSD formally decided to redress this underrepresentation. The defendant set a goal of 15% minority employment at all levels and set a timetable of achieving this goal within three to five years. The RSD never met its goals. In fact, the percentage of minority certified staff was approximately the same in 1991-92 as it was in 1973, approximately 7%. In itself, failure to meet those goals is not necessarily evidence of discrimination, however, neither the defendant nor defendant-intervenor has provided evidence disputing the appropriateness of the District goal or evidence that the goal was unachievable. Absent such evidence, the court may properly consider the hiring goal and the failure to meet the stated goal. See Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d at 432-34 .
In adopting the Magistrate Judge’s findings, the court does not comment on the dedication or abilities of the District teaching staff. In fact, the evidence supports the conclusion that most teachers were extremely dedicated to providing a quality education to all of their students. The court finds, however, that the RSD’s failures in meeting hiring goals did contribute to the overall disparities in the District.
STAFF ASSIGNMENT
Closely related to the section on employment discrimination is the Magistrate Judge’s discussion of staff assignment. The Magistrate Judge found minority teachers were predominantly assigned to racially identifiable minority schools. The Magistrate Judge found the same pattern existed for minority staff. The defendant objects to the findings stating that the evidence does not support them. The court finds the evidence does support the Magistrate Judge’s factual findings and adopts them. The defendant and defendant-intervenors also object to the use of those findings to support the conclusion of intentional discrimination. In that regard, the court agrees and must reject several of the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions.
As an initial matter, the defendant objected to certain findings which were based upon evidence of minority staff and staff percentages after the filing of the lawsuit. The court previously affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s ruling that such post-1989 evidence is properly admitted in the discretion of the court when there is a sufficient showing of a direct relationship between the post-1989 evidence and discriminatory intent of the defendant prior to 1989. The court finds the data charts the defendant objects to properly include data after the filing of the lawsuit. The data shows a continuation of the patterns of the previous years of conditions in the assignment of minority employees and is properly considered.
Although the data does indicate a disparity in the distribution of District staff, the plaintiffs have not established that this was caused with intent to discriminate against students. As the defendant-intervenors point out, the District was under certain obligations through collective bargaining agreements with District employees. These agreements gave teachers rights in their assignment based upon seniority and qualifications. Experience remained a qualification for promotional transfers. In cases where applicants had substantially equal qualifications, the selection was then based on seniority.
The plaintiffs have not established the statistical disparities in staff assignment contributed to the intentional discrimination against minority students. Furthermore, the District employees had rights through their union contracts. Absent a finding of intentional discrimination, the District could not disturb the assignment agreements with the unions to reassign employees based upon race. People Who Care v. Rockford Board of Education School District #205., 961 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.1992). The court finds that although employee' assignments in the District show some racial disparity, the plaintiffs *925 have not established these disparities were done in furtherance of an intent to discriminate against the plaintiff class:
INEQUITABLE ACCESS TO TRANSPORTATION
The Magistrate Judge found the RSD placed disparate transportation burdens on minority students as opposed to minor burdens placed on majority students. The defendant objects arguing that the cutbacks in transportation it made were due to serious financial troubles in the District and the cutbacks were made equal for all students. The defendant further argues in its brief that when there were transportation burdens placed on minority students, the District had the tacit, if not express, approval of either the ISBE or the QUE FAC court to impose such burdens. The court finds the evidence does not support the defendant’s objections.
The defendant argues that the cutbacks were because of financial constraints throughout this case. The defendant has not provided a factual basis for this argument. As found in the section dealing with the 1989 Reorganization Plan, the court found the arguments of financial constraint were based on faulty projections of the need within the District. The defendant also does not establish that it acted on the basis of this financial constraint. The closing of West High School required a substantial increase in transportation costs. The defendant has not shown the court evidence in the record that transportation cutbacks were inevitable.
The defendant also argues that cutbacks were made affecting minority and majority students equally. The defendant has provided no evidence to support that argument. For example, the 1981-82 elimination of transportation for open enrollment transfers had a distinct segregative effect. Also, the cutbacks in transportation to full-site alternative programs had a disparate negative impact on minority students. Report and Recommendation at 1154.
The defendant’s remaining objections primarily are that the Magistrate Judge’s findings are not supported by the evidence. The court finds the defendant’s objections to be without merit. The defendant further argues that there was no evidence that the Board ever received the notes and memoranda supporting the disparities in transportation. The District’s liability is based on a pattern of discriminatory conduct over time and a governmental entity is liable for unconstitutional acts of its employees when there is a continuing widespread pattern of such unconstitutional conduct. See Yonkers, 624 F.Supp. at 1447 n. 12; Brown v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 928 F.2d 1474, 1480-81 (11th Cir.1991).
The defendant has also objected to inferences the court made regarding notations made on various District records. The defendant has stipulated to most of these records and has stipulated to the appearance of the notations on District records. For example, a “mass transit only” notation appears next to many “minority open enrollment” and “bilingual focus” categories while “mass transit only” never appears next to a majority open enrollment or majority focus category. See Report and Recommendation at 1157-58. The notations are corroborative of evidence of disparate treatment based on race. When there is an explicit racially conscious classification, the conduct is suspect and the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a compelling justification for the classification. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 , 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1882-83 , 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984); Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 , 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2292 , 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979). The defendant has not overcome its burden and has not offered a compelling justification for providing majority desegregation participants more favorable transportation than minority participants.
The evidence establishes that there were numerous transportation problems for students in the open enrollment programs. These problems were related to the defendant’s provision of transportation, the defendant had notice and knowledge of the problems, and the problems in transportation had an adverse effect on minority open enrollment.
The court further finds the Magistrate Judge’s findings regarding the burdens of *926 RMTD travel as opposed to RSD provided bus service to be supported by the evidence. See Report and Recommendation at 1165. The RSD’s rule to provide transportation for children living more than 1.5 miles from their assigned school had a racially discriminatory result in its application. Further, majority students were provided transportation by the RSD, while minority students “were required to bear the cost of RMTD transportation and to suffer the qualitative differences of transportation provided to majority schools.” Report and Recommendation at 1171.
The court also finds the evidence supports the Magistrate Judge’s findings regarding the so-called “privy stops” to provide transportation to selected students had a racially discriminatory application. The court finds the disparate effect of the privy stops indicative of discriminatory intent, and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s findings.
The court must consider the way a school district provides transportation to and from school to its students in a case alleging racial discrimination. Transportation has become a major factor in how students are distributed within a district and is named in Green as one of the major factors considered in determining whether there is intentional discrimination. Both the benefits and the burdens of transportation must be operated in a unitary and non-discriminatory fashion. The court finds the RSD had a longstanding practice requiring the mandatory assignment of minority' students to schools outside their neighborhoods for desegregative purposes without imposing a similar burden on majority students. The court finds this practice to be unfair and unconstitutional. More generous transportation services were provided to the predominantly majority students in voluntary integration programs, as opposed to the involuntary integration students who were predominantly minority. The court further adopts the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions that the RSD’s argument of cost as a justification for transportation cutbacks was pretextual, and that the RSD’s opposition to mandatory busing for desegregation was in fact opposition to the mandatory busing of white students for desegregation.
DISCRIMINATORY CONDITIONS IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD
The defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the RBE intentionally maintained an electoral system that.it knew would minimize minority participation on the Board. The Magistrate Judge found that fi-om 1965 through 1989 substantial evidence exists showing that the RBE intentionally pursued a policy to keep the Southwest Quadrant underrepresented on the Board.
The defendant’s specific objections to this finding may be summarized as follows: 1) as a matter of law, 10 the Board could not, by itself, make the decision to move to a system of electing board members by sub-districts; 2) since white voters dominated the District, and therefore the “at large” election process, placing the issue before the voters would be futile, since such a proposition would be defeated; 3) that there is no evidence that the defendant was in violation of the Voting Rights Act; and, 4) that the Magistrate Judge has exceeded his authority in addressing these issues.
As to the defendant’s first objection, namely that the Board was not responsible for maintaining a discriminatory electoral system because it was the voters, and not the Board, who were responsible for ultimately determining the type of system to be used in electing Board members, the court rejects the defendant’s contention. The defendant *927 misconstrues the Magistrate Judge’s finding on this issue. What the Magistrate Judge found was that despite having had the statutory power to do so (105 ILCS 5/9-22), with one exception (1976), the Board failed to place the issue on the ballot for a vote by the public. This was true despite the fact that the Board has been requested to do so on many occasions. Report and Recommendation at 1179.
The defendant’s assertion that placing the issue on the ballot would have been futile is refuted by the fact that the electorate passed a referendum in 1989 approving sub-district voting. Furthermore, the defendant offered little evidence, other than the defeat of the 1975 referendum, to support its position on this issue.
The defendant’s third objection is clearly without merit. No separate Voting Rights Act claim is necessary to support a claim of segregation and discrimination in education. See Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 , 88 S.Ct. 1689 , 20 L.Ed.2d 716 (1968).
The defendant’s further objection encompasses the Magistrate Judge’s finding regarding the “RBE Gerrymandering of Sub-district Electoral Boundaries.” The defendant objects to these findings on the basis that there is a valid consent decree in force in these proceedings and the Magistrate Judge does not have the authority to alter a consent decree through his findings or conclusions.
The Magistrate Judge found that subsequent to the 1989 referendum, the Board adopted an electoral map that interfered with the voting and representational rights of minority voters in the District. Also, after passage of the subdistrict referendum in November 1989, and prior to the first election by subdistrict in November 1991, Board member Holzworth, on several occasions during Board or Board committee meetings, urged the RBE to gerrymander the new subdistriet to avoid creating a subdistrict with a majority of African-Americans. 11
The defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s findings in this area on the grounds that: 1) the Magistrate Judge ruled on pre-1989 conduct in violation of this court’s previous order; 12 2) that two members out of five appointed from 1965-1989, were minorities, making the Magistrate Judge’s finding on this issue unsupported by sufficient evidence; 3) that there was an insufficient basis for the Magistrate Judge to conclude that the defendant intentionally created discriminatory conditions in drawing an effective and legal map, given the inherent difficulties encountered in drawing such a map.
Finally, the defendant points to a portion of this court’s order of September 12, 1991, as supporting its contention that it was acting in good faith in attempting to adopt a conforming map. 13
Although the court agrees with the overall finding of the Magistrate Judge that there was substantial evidence of intentional discrimination on the issue of the make-up of the Board, the court disagrees with the Magistrate Judge’s findings that the Board deliberately gerrymandered the District in drawing the map which was submitted to the court. Although it is true that this court rejected that map and ultimately adopted the map which was jointly agreed to by the plaintiffs and the defendant, the evidence supports, and the court finds that, insofar as the production of the map is concerned, the District was acting in good faith in attempting to develop a conforming map.
In addition, the court does not agree with or adopt the finding of the Magistrate Judge insofar as it seems to impute the actions and comments of one Board member, Mr. *928 Holzworth, to other members of the Board. On the contrary, it appears to the court that the majority of the members of the Board, at that time, acted in good faith in attempting to correct some of the many inequities of the past. Although the Board did initially submit a deficient map which was rejected by this court, that is not to say that the court is of the view that the other Board members shared Mr. Holzworth’s views. In fact, it appears that the opposite was true, at least as to the majority of the members. Board member Josephine Minor testified that she ignored Mr. Holzworth’s “rantings and ravings” and that she did not believe any other Board member took Mr. Holzworth seriously. Minor Dep. at 47. The court rejects this finding of the Magistrate Judge.
Finally, with reference to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the Board’s failure to appoint minority members to the Board constituted intentional discrimination, the evidence on this point is simply insufficient to support such a finding. As the defendant correctly points out, only five Board members were appointed to the Board between 1965 and 1989, and two of them were African-American constituting 40% of all vacancies, hardly sufficient evidence supporting the conclusion that there were efforts to exclude minority applicants for vacancies on the Board. Williams Dep. at 7. The court rejects this finding of the Magistrate Judge and strikes the references to that finding.
Although the court disagrees with some of the Magistrate Judge’s findings on the issue of discriminatory conditions in the composition of the Board, that is not to say that the court disagrees with his conclusion that from 1965 through 1989 substantial evidence exists showing that the defendant intentionally pursued a policy to keep the Southwest Quadrant underrepresented on the Board. Indeed, the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that substantial evidence exists that the defendant intentionally pursued a policy to keep the Southwest Quadrant underrepresented on the Board.
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES
The defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the defendant did not provide children in the District with equal opportunities in extracurricular activities. Specifically, the defendant objects to the Magistrate Judge’s reliance on various statements of certain minority students on the grounds that such statements are unfounded hearsay, without foundation, and inflammatory. The defendant further contends that the Magistrate Judge recognized a complete absence of discrimination in the RSD’s extracurricular athletic activities.
Although the defendant’s objection to some of the testimony of certain students and parents on hearsay grounds has merit, the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion on this issue is supported by the record on two grounds: 1) the District’s failure to provide equal access to transportation; and, 2) Superintendent Bowen’s testimony regarding the selection process at East High School.
The Magistrate Judge’s finding regarding after-school transportation is fully supported by the record. The evidence easily supports the conclusion that the defendant created inequitable travel demands on minority students. The defendant’s statement, that after-school student transportation was not provided to any students, ignores the fact that it was the defendant’s one-way busing policy that required the minority students to attend schools far away from their homes. Although it is true, as the defendant contends, that some minority students were able to make alternative transportation arrangements, this does not excuse the District’s policy on this point. The record supports the conclusion that minority students were saddled with disproportionate and discouraging travel burdens.
As to Mr. Bowen’s testimony regarding his observations and the changes he made in the selection of cheerleaders while he was Principal at East High School, this finding of the Magistrate Judge is clearly supported by the very credible testimony of Mr. Bowen.
Insofar as some of the testimony of certain students and parents are unsupported hearsay and uncorroborated, that testimony may be stricken. However, much of that testimony, particularly that which is based upon the observations of those witnesses, may stand.
*929 The objections of the defendant to the Magistrate Judge’s findings that the defendant did not provide children in the District with equal opportunities in extracurricular activities are overruled. The Magistrate Judge’s conclusion on this issue is adopted by the court.
BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND OTHER EDUCATIONAL DISCRIMINATION ISSUES AFFECTING HISPANICS
The Magistrate Judge found the RSD engaged in discriminatory conduct with regard to the District’s Bilingual Program and with regard to other educational issues affecting Hispanic students. The Magistrate Judge found the RSD moved the location of the Bilingual Program four times in a twelve year period. The involuntary movement of the bilingual students was for the stated purpose of desegregation. The moves placed transfer burdens on those students while placing no similar burdens on majority students. The Magistrate Judge also found inferior transportation was provided to the bilingual students as compared to voluntary white desegregation students. Once in the program, the Magistrate Judge found the bilingual students were segregated within the receiving schools and provided an inferior education as compared to white students.
The defendant objects to the use of evidence regarding the relocations of the Bilingual Program in support of a finding of discrimination. The defendant points to the fact that the program was moved only four times since its inception in 1972. However, that objection ignores that fact that the first relocation occurred in school year 1977-78 and thereafter was moved every three years, on the average, from Barbour and King schools to Whitehead, from Whitehead school to New Milford and Gregory, from New Milford school to Walker and from Walker school to Nashold in 1989-90.
The defendant states these. moves were necessitated by desegregation directives from the ISBE and facility constraints within the District. The evidence does not support the defendant’s argument. There is no indication that relocation of the Bilingual Program was necessitated by the ISBE nor that it was the only way to achieve integration. The one alternative of pairing Barbour school with a majority school was ignored by the RSD. The RSD used the Bilingual Program as a desegregation device without placing any similar burdens on majority students.
The defendant also argues that there was community support for relocation of the Bilingual Program, however, there ⅛ no evidence supporting the defendant’s argument. The evidence supports the findings that parents expressed many concerns about relocation, especially moving the program away from the Hispanic area in which it was originally located. The court finds the relocations of the Bilingual Program placed undue burdens on the bilingual students where no similar burden was placed on majority students for desegregation purposes.
The court further finds the segregation of bilingual students by using the Bilingual Program as a full-time program rather than a part-time pull-out program is fully supported by the evidence and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s findings. Additionally, the inequities in transportation for bilingual students as compared to majority students is supported by the evidence discussed in the Magistrate Judge’s opinion in this section and the section dealing with transportation. The court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s findings on those issues as well.
The goal of these types of language remediation programs is to integrate Spanish-speaking students into English language classrooms. Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 , 998 n. 4 (5th Cir.1981). They should not be used to isolate students. Id. The court finds the RSD operated the Bilingual Program in violation of the constitutional rights of the bilingual students. The court finds the defendant’s objections to be meritless and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s findings and conclusions in full.
SPECIAL EDUCATION
The Magistrate Judge found that Special Education students should be exempt from desegregation programs, finding that those students have enough problems without being moved around in order to make a *930 building appear numerically integrated. The Magistrate Judge further found that in the school year 1988-89, the District assigned 99.6% of the Southwest Quadrant elementary students to non-southwest schools. The Magistrate Judge concluded that he was not convinced that the assignment was an act of intentional discrimination and that the RSD should continue to exempt special education students from desegregation programs.
The plaintiffs object to the Magistrate Judge’s general conclusion that “the court has not been convinced that the assignment was an act of intentional discrimination” and state that regardless, “in the context of the 1989 Reorganization Plan which the Magistrate Judge found to be ‘a plan to resegre-gate Rockford’s schools’, (see Report and Recommendation at 1125), the continuation of the disparate burdens on the RSD’s Southwest Quadrant minority students was clearly an act of intentional discrimination because even though it was stipulated by the parties that it was specifically called to the RSD’s attention by its own special education staff, no corrective action was taken by the RSD in the 1989 plan.”
The court agrees with the plaintiffs’ contention. It is difficult to see how the defendant’s conduct could not have been intentional. The Magistrate Judge found that in the 1980-81 school year, full-time SCSE students were much more likely to be assigned to non-southwest side schools. See Report and Recommendation at 1193. While the southwest side schools constituted roughly a third of all elementary schools, they received only 13.6% of the SCSE students. As a result, non-southwest schools had an average number of full-time elementary SCSE students that was roughly double that for southwest schools (an average of 42 versus an average of 22, respectively).
Although the court agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that the RSD should continue to exempt special education students from the desegregation programs, it is difficult to conclude, in the face of the record before the court, that the assignment of Special Education students was not an act of intentional discrimination. To the extent that the Magistrate Judge concluded that those acts were not intentional, the court declines to adopt the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. Because of their unique position, however, the District should continue to exempt special education students from desegregation programs.
CONCLUSION
In the preparation of this order, this court has examined hundreds of documents and reports, and read numerous depositions and transcripts of the testimony of various witnesses. The court has also examined, in great detail, the excellent Report and Recommendation prepared and submitted by Magistrate Judge P. Michael Mahoney. In addition, the court has read and considered carefully the objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and the supporting briefs submitted by the plaintiffs, the defendant, and the intervenor-de-fendants. The court has previously commented on those objections and will, therefore, make no further comments on those specific objections. The court is impressed by the Magistrate Judge’s statement of the law of educational segregation and its application to the evidence and will not repeat the thorough analysis prepared by the Magistrate Judge. The court will, however, attempt to summarize the law of the case and the conclusions it draws from the law and the facts as they apply here.
In Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 , 74 S.Ct. 686 , 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954), the United States Supreme Court held that “in the field of public education, the doctrine ‘separate but equal’ has no place”, and that “separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” Id. at 495 , 74 S.Ct. at 692 . The court further observed that “[t]o separate [minority children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.” Id. at 494 , 74 S.Ct. at 691 .
The law governing liability in a school desegregation ease can be summarized in one sentence: a state or local authority may not intentionally segregate or discrimi *931 nate against minority students because of their race. A prima facie case establishing liability contains three elements: 1) “segregation or discrimination” (minority students must, in fact, experience either segregated conditions or suffer the detrimental effects of discriminatory conduct—or both); 2) “causation” (school authorities must have caused, created or maintained such segregation or discrimination); and, 3) “intent” (the conduct of school officials must have been undertaken “intentionally”).
This standard derives from the Equal Protection Clause that provides that “[n]o state ... shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1.
Cases subsequent to Brown, have clearly established that government conduct that leads to racial imbalance in school systems violates the Constitution. A constitutional violation occurs in school districts that have never been subject to statutorily-mandated racial segregation where “school authorities have carried out a systematic program of segregation affecting a substantial portion of the students, schools, teachers, and facilities within the school system.” Keyes, 413 U.S. at 201 , 93 S.Ct. at 2694 . In order to prove unconstitutional racial imbalance in a school system, a plaintiff must show that: 1) the governmental authorities created or maintained racial segregation in the schools and, 2) their actions were motivated by segre-gative intent. Id. at 208 , 93 S.Ct. at 2697 ; Diaz at 733 F.2d at 662 .
In addition to proving that the defendant’s conduct created or maintained racial imbalance in the schools, a plaintiff must show that the conduct was motivated by segre-gative intent, the second Keyes factor. Ordinarily, only circumstantial evidence is available to establish segregative intent. Diaz, 733 F.2d at 662 . Evidence of the discriminatory impact of acts, omissions or policies is one type of circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of segregative intent. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 , 97 S.Ct. 555, 563-64 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). Other types of circumstantial evidence relevant to proving segregative intent include: 1) the historical background and sequence of events leading up to the conduct maintaining or exacerbating racial imbalance in the schools; 2) departures from typical procedural sequences or substantive criteria normally considered important by the decisionmaker; and, 3) contemporaneous evidence concerning the decision-making process. Id. at 267-68 , 97 S.Ct. at 564-65 . If a plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case of intentional segregation, the burden then shifts to the defendant to establish that the same segre-gative conduct would have occurred “even had the impermissible purpose not been considered.” Id. at 271, n. 21 , 97 S.Ct. at 566, n. 21 .
Further, a finding of intentionally segregative school board conduct in a meaningful portion of a school system creates a presumption that other segregated activity within the school system is not coincidental. Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208 , 93 S.Ct. at 2697 . This presumption places a burden upon the defendant to show that segregation in other schools and activities within the system have not resulted from intentionally segregative conduct. Id. In discharging this burden, the school authorities must rely upon more than some allegedly logical, racially neutral explanation for their actions. Id. at 210 , 93 S.Ct. at 2698 . The school district’s burden is to adduce proof sufficient to support a finding that segregative intent was not among the factors that motivated its actions. Id.
The issue of the presence or absence of unlawful intent is one of fact. Armstrong v. O’Connell, 451 F.Supp. 817, 822 (E.D.Wis.1978). The ultimate determination of segre-gative intent rests upon examination of the record as a whole, including the multiplicity and cumulative effect of the defendant’s policies and practices. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F.Supp. 410, 479 (D.C.Mass.1974). A plaintiff may prove intent by direct, indirect, or circumstantial evidence. Armstrong, 451 F.Supp. at 826 ; Berry, 442 F.Supp. at 1291 ; NAACP v. Lansing, 429 F.Supp. 583, 590 (D.C.Mich.1976). Since direct evidence is difficult to obtain, ordinarily only circumstantial evidence is available to establish segre-gative intent. Diaz, 733 F.2d at 662 .
*932 In the context of school desegregation cases, courts have cited a myriad of factors that by themselves or in combination with other facts support an inference of discriminatory intent. Evidence of the foreseeable segregative impact of decisions is one type of circumstantial evidence supporting an inference of segregative intent. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 , 97 S.Ct. at 563-64 . Arlington Heights identifies several other types of evidence this court has used that supports the inference of intent:
1) “[T]he historical background of the decision ..., particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes;”
2) “the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision;”
3) “contemporary statements by members of the decision making body, minutes of its meetings or reports;”
4) “departures from the normal procedural sequence;”
5) “substantive departures [from prior policies] ... particularly if the factors usually considered important by the decision maker strongly favor a decision contrary to the one reached;” and,
6) “[t]he legislative or administrative history ... especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the decision making body, minutes of its meetings, or reports.”
Id. at 266-69 , 97 S.Ct. at 563-66 . The Supreme Court explicitly recognized this list as being non-exhaustive of the potential factors probative of intent. Id. at 268 , 97 S.Ct. at 565 .
Separated from all of its rhetoric, the defendant’s purported defense in this case seems to be that even if the District is guilty of the conduct charged in the plaintiffs’ complaint, they did not intend to violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights, and, therefore, should not be held liable in this case. The court rejects the defendant’s argument on this issue. In any case, whether criminal or civil, where proof of intent is involved, it is a rare circumstance indeed, where a defendant admits that there was an intention to violate the law. Indeed, that is the usual defense in such cases. The courts, in both civil and criminal cases, have consistently made clear that proof of facts and circumstances which support an inference that the defendant is guilty of violating the law is sufficient to support a finding of an intentional violation. Here, the cumulative evidence overwhelmingly supports such a finding.
In segregation cases, such as this one, the courts have held that segregative intent should not be confused with evil motive. 14 Instead, the required intent is simply the intent to keep the races separate. Furthermore, conduct motivated by such intent is actionable even when there is no desire to inflict educational harm upon any racial group.
In this ease, proof of intent is shown not by evil motive or a desire to inflict educational harm on the minority community; instead, a pattern of facts and circumstances occurring over a long period of time clearly supports a finding of intentional conduct by the defendant, as recommended by the Magistrate Judge. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation contains a thorough discussion and analysis of those facts and circumstances and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that no finder of fact, be it judge, jury or administrative body could have reached any other conclusion than the one reached by Magistrate Judge Mahoney. 15 *933 Indeed, a jury selected at random from citizens of the District would, in the opinion of the court, have reached the same conclusion based on the evidence contained in the record of this case.
The court finds that the Rockford Board of Education is a public body created by the State of Illinois to administer and supervise its public schools within its statutorily-defined area and, under the laws of the State of Illinois, may sue and be sued. The court further finds that the current racial segregation of students in the public schools in Rockford was caused, in substantial part, by the acts and omissions of the defendant. Specific practices of the defendant that unlawfully segregated students on the basis of race and ethnic origin include, but are not limited to:
(1) The tracking of students by race into various educational programs offered by the RSD;
(2) The drawing and alteration of school attendance area boundaries in such a way as to create, maintain or increase racial or ethnic segregation of students;
(3) The maintenance of racially and ethnically segregated branches of schools;
(4) The failure to design and implement an effective desegregation plan even when ordered to do so by a Federal Court and by the ISBE;
(5) The provision of inequitable transportation and access to transportation to students based upon their race and ethnic origin;
(6) The disproportionate placing of the burdens of desegregation on minority students;
(7) The disparate placement of facilities and equipment so as to burden minority students and not provide them with an equal educational opportunity;
(8) The perpetuation of discriminatory conditions in the make-up of the Rockford Board of Education; and,
(9)The disproportionate burdens placed on minorities in the assignment of special education students.
These practices, among others discussed in this order, occurred over a substantial period of time and in a substantial portion of the Rockford public schools and constituted a system-wide attempt to separate the races. As discussed, the objections of the plaintiffs, the defendant, and the defendant-intervenors are granted in part and denied in part. Except as otherwise noted herein, the court agrees with the findings and conclusions contained in the Report and Recommendation. The court hereby accepts and adopts, as modified, the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation.
The court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that equitable relief is appropriate in this case. 16 Accordingly, the court enters the order set forth below.
ORDER
1) The plaintiffs have prevailed on the merits of their claim and have established that the defendant has violated the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs;
2) The plaintiffs have demonstrated that the balance of equities weighs in favor of the grant of injunctive relief, inasmuch as:
a) The plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law;
b) The plaintiffs face irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief;
e) No undue or unnecessary hardship is placed on the defendant by requiring it to carry out its affirmative duty to remedy the effects of its intentionally segre-gative and discriminatory acts; and,
d) The public interest is best served by granting permanent injunctive relief.
3) There are no inherent difficulties in shaping injunctive relief that is appropriate, *934 narrowly tailored and adequate to protect the plaintiffs’ rights.
The parties are directed to submit an appropriate Agreed Injunction and Declaratory Order, consistent with this decision, for approval by the court within ten days from the entry of this order. If the parties ’ cannot agree to such an order, they are each directed to submit a proposed order and the court will prepare an order which is consistent with the court’s opinion in this case.
Inasmuch as the parties have concurred and voluntarily consented that all present and future remedial matters in this ease, without limitation, shall be referred to the Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c)(1) and (c)(3), and under the Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, this matter is hereby referred to the Magistrate Judge for all present and future remedial matters.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.939
PROCEDURAL HISTORY.939
STUDENT TRACKING AND ABILITY GROUPING.940
INTRODUCTION.940
FINDINGS OF FACT .940
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 999
1001 SEGREGATION OF STUDENTS BY RACE WITHIN SCHOOLS.
1001 INTRODUCTION.
1002 FINDINGS OF FACT .
1002 Within-School Segregation In Mid-1970 “Desegregation Programs” ..
1002 Intact Busing: The Grade Exchange Plan.
1003 Within-School Segregation Through Part-Time Programs.
1004 Segregation Of Minority Transfer students Within Receiving Schools
1004 Elementary Schools.
1005 Segregation Of Students Within Schools By Tracking.
1005 Segregation Of Elementary Bilingual Students.
1006 Segregation Of Special Education Students...
1006 The RSD’s De-Emphasis Of Full-Site Magnet Programs.
1006 May 1972 One-Week Magnet Schools.
1006 Bloom Focus Center.
1008 Haskell Focus Center.
1009 The Alternative Middle and Elementary Schools.
1009 Purposeful Creation Of Segregated Partial-Site Alternative Programs
1011 The Gifted Program.
1013 Partial Desegregation, Followed by ReSegregation, of the Gifted Program, 1977-1986.
The RSD’s 1987 Report and Personnel Testimony Revealing Gifted Program Segregation. T—i o t—I
Continuing Segregation of the Gifted Program Up Through 1989.... T—1 o r—I
1017 Physical Segregation of Gifted from Regular Students Within the Schools.
1017 The RSD’s Separate “Minority” Gifted Program
1018 RSD’s “Satellite” Gifted Programs.
1020 The Creative And Performing Arts Program (CAPA)
1022 Montessori.
1023 The Academies Plus Program.
1023 Arts Alternative.
1024 Low-Status Alternative Programs.
1024 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
STUDENT ASSIGNMENT 1026
INTRODUCTION. 1026
*935 FINDINGS OF FACT .1027
Student Assignment and School Boundaries Prior to the QUEFAC Lawsuit and the ISBE Investigation.1027
Student Assignment in the Late 1950’s and Early 1960⅛.1027
Attempts By Superintendent McIntosh to Re-Assign Students.1028
Assignment of Northeast Quadrant Students to Guilford Rather Than West High School.1030
Conversion of Jefferson Junior High School to a Senior High School.. 1030
West Side Elementary School Boundaries—Late 1950’s—Early 1960’s.. 1031
Refusal to Reassign Students to Balance School Utilization in 1965.... 1031
Assignment of Morris Kennedy and Nashold Ninth Graders From School District 125 to Auburn High School.1032
“Rockford Team” 1967 Integration Proposals.1032
The Pupil Placement Committee (PPC) .1033
The Middle Schools Proposal.1036
The Veritas, REA and the RSD Principals’ 1970 Redistricting Proposals.. 1038
New School Construction in 1969-71 . 1038
1969 Elementary School Attendance Area Boundary Changes and Reassignments.1039
Walker and Carlson Busing of Public Housing Children.1040
Construction of John F. Kennedy and Eisenhower Junior High Schools.. 1041
Proposals in 1966-67 to Close Old Schools in the Central Rockford Area.. 1042
Closing of Hall School. 1043
Closing of Montague School.1043
Construction of Martin Luther King School .1044
Closing of Franklin School.1045
Packing of White Schools to Maintain Segregation in the 1970’s and 1980’s.1045
Closing of Morris Kennedy Elementary School in 1971 . 1047
Packing of African-American Schools to Maintain Segregation.1048
Student Assignment and School Boundaries During the QUEFAC Lawsuit and the ISBE Investigation.1048
The Community Desegregation Committee.1050
Closing of Muldoon School and Clustering.1051
Reassignment of Lincoln Park Sixth Grade and Use of Portable Classrooms .;.1052
Noncomplianee With The ISBE Rules in September of 1973. 1052
1973 QUEFAC Proceedings.1052
Grade Exchange Plan.1053
REA Intervention in the QUEFAC Litigation .1054
Interest Center Implementation .1056
The RSD’s Knowledge of Successful Integration Efforts.1056
The RSD 1975 Integration Plan.1057
Mandatory Assignment of African-American Students From Satellite Attendance Zones.1058
Open Enrollment Policies.1058
1975 Status Report on Integration.1060
The RSD’s Refiisal to Comply With The ISBE’s 1976 Rules.1061
Alternative School Programs: Failures, Disparate Burdens and Benefits.. 1062
1976 RSD Integration Plans.1065
ISBE Finding of Noncomplianee.1065
October 1976 Revised Integration Plan.1066
1977 ISBE Finding of Noncompliance and Probationary Sanction.1067
May 1977 Integration Plan.1067
Revisions of the May 1977 Plan.1068
Construction of New Jefferson High School.1069
Noncompliance With The ISBE Rules in The Late 1970’s.1070
The ISBE 1980 Finding of RSD Noncompliance.1071
The RSD Defiance of The ISBE Rules—Opposition to Student Assignment Goals.1071
*936 Disparate Burdens on African-American Students By Continuing Mandatory Assignment to Eastside Schools.1071
Student Assignment and School Boundaries Subsequent to the QUEFAC Lawsuit and the ISBE Investigation. 1073
1980 Student Reassignments and Closing of Schools.1073
Integration Efforts of the RBE in 1981 . 1075
1983 School Closings .1076
Dismantling of Alternative Programs.1077
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.1077
FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT DISPARITIES.1081
INTRODUCTION. 1081
FINDINGS OF FACT .1081
Systemwide Disparities In Facilities And EMS .1081
Data Demonstrating Systemwide Disparities.1082
Witness Testimony.1090
Disparity Examples At Individual Schools.1092
The RSD’s Private Gifts Policy Contributed To EMS Disparities.1094
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.1097
THE 1989 REORGANIZATION PLAN.1098
INTRODUCTION.1098
FINDINGS OF FACT . 1098
The Extent Of Segregation In The School System Prior To The Reorganization Plan.1098
The January Version Of The 1989 Reorganization Plan.1099
The Revised February 1989 Reorganization Plan.1100
The Deliberative Process In Adopting The 1989 Plan Was Seriously Deficient.. 1102
The Effects Of The Reorganization Plan On the RSD Elementary Schools;. 1102 The Reorganization Plan Resegregated The District’s Elementary Schools
And Students In Terms Of School Enrollments.1103
Resegregation of Southwest Quadrant Students.1103
Resegregation of Non-Southwest Schools.1103
Systemwide Resegregation of African-American/Hispanic Elementary Students.1104
Systemwide Resegregation of White Elementary Students.1104
The 1989 Plan Resegregated Schools By Adopting Measures That The District Itself Had Identified As Constituting De Jure Segregation___ 1104
De Jure Segregation Criterion in 1981 IBA Report.1104
Church School.1105
Dennis School.1105
Stiles School.■.1105
Ellis School. 1105
McIntosh School .1106
The New Wilson Elementary School.1106
King and Barbour Schools.1106
Haskell School.1106
Garrison School.1107
Resegregation of Non-Southwest White Schools.1107
The 1989 Plan Resegregated African-American/Hispanic Students By Placing Them In Huge Warehouse Schools, Without Promised Educational Support .1107
The 1989 Plan Segregated The Schools By Promising, But Not Delivering, Educational Improvement Measures For African-American/Hispanic Students . 1109
The 1989 Plan Resegregated the Schools by Sharply Restricting Voluntary Transfer Opportunities.,... 1110
The 1989 Plan Resegregated The System By Removing The Alternative Programs From Southwest Elementary Schools.1111
The Plan, As Initially Adopted And Implemented, Created Segregated Academics Plus Alternative Programs.•.1111
*937 The Pattern Of Elementary School Closings Imposed Disparate Burdens On Minority Students And Neighborhoods.1112
Complete Closures of Schools.1112
Partial Closures Through Split Grade Structures.1112
Closings and Pairings as a Percentage of Schools in a Quadrant.1113
Under The Plan, The Schools In The Southwest Quadrant Were Overcrowded And No Space Was Available For Special Programs.1113
The Effects Of The 1989 Reorganization Plan On RSD Secondary Schools.. 1114
The 1988 Level Of Desegregation In the RSD Secondary Schools.1114
High Schools.1114
High School Attendance Areas As Of 1988 . 1114
Middle School Attendance Areas As Of 1988 . 1115
Recommendations Of The Ad Hoc Citizens’ Committee.1115
The Board’s Goals For The Reorganization Plan And Criteria For School Closings.1116
Information Before The Board In Its Deliberations. 1116
The Administrative Staffs January 17 Recommendations To The Board .. 1117
The January 24 Reorganization Plan.1118
Public Reaction To The January Plan.1119
Reconsideration Of The West High Closing.1119
The RSD’s February Reorganization Plan.1122
Option Zones In The Final February 28 Secondary Boundaries.1124
The 1989 Plan Promoted Segregated Conditions In Secondary Schools By Eliminating Voluntary Transfer Opportunities For Minority Students .... 1124
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.1125
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION to N r—( r—(
INTRODUCTION. to N t—I r-H
FINDINGS OF FACT . to (M r—i t—I
Failure To Meet QUEFAC-Era Hiring Goals And Other Affirmative Action Obligations. to _l C7T CO
1980-1989: Direct Restriction of Open Enrollment Transportation. i— 1 J-A Cn 00
Discriminatory Transportation Policies and Practices As Between Minority Integration Participants and White Integration Participants. )—*• o* to
Transportation Costs As Pretext For Anti-Busing Stance. l— 1 as crc
*938 938 851 FEDERAL SUPPLEMENT
Additional Transportation Inequities (“Privy Stops”).1169
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.1171
DISCRIMINATORY CONDITIONS IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD .. 1171
INTRODUCTION.1171
FINDINGS OF FACT .1172
Board Members: 1965-1989 . 1172
Basie information.1172
Board Member Residency.1175
Board Member Race .1175
Electoral System: The RBE’s Role In Maintaining An Electoral System That Had A Disparate Impact On Minority Representation On the Board
Of Education.1178
' RBE Gerrymandering of Subdistrict Electoral Boundaries.1179
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.1181
EXTRACURRICULAR ACTIVITIES.1181
INTRODUCTION.1181
FINDINGS OF FACT .!.. 1181
Historical Discrimination In The Selection of Cheerleaders.1182
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.1183
BILINGUAL EDUCATION AND OTHER EDUCATIONAL DISCRIMINATION
ISSUES AFFECTING HISPANICS.1184
INTRODUCTION.-.1184
FINDINGS OF FACT .1184
Disproportionate Desegregation Burdens Placed On Hispanic-American Students ...1184
Segregation Of Elementary Bilingual Students.1187
Transportation Discrimination.1187
Educational Deficiencies... 1187
State of Illinois And U.S. Department of Education Findings of Deficiencies.. 1187 Failure to Provide Effective Special Education to Non-' and Limited-
English-Speaking Students.1190
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.1191
SPECIAL EDUCATION.1192
INTRODUCTION.1192
FINDINGS OF FACT .1192
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 1196
THE LAW OF EDUCATIONAL SEGREGATION AND ITS APPLICATION TO
THE EVIDENCE.1196
Overview of the Law.1196
Causation—The First Keyes Factor.1198
Intent—The Second Keyes Factor.1199
The Scope of Liability—Once the Keyes Factors Have Been Established.1208
Liability For The Conduct Of Agents And Employees.1203
Natural Residential Segregation/Neighborhood Schools Defense.1204
Incremental Segregative Effect.1206
Equitable Relief Is Appropriate .1206
CONCLUSION .1207
DEFINITIONS.1207
ADDENDUM: SCHOOL HISTORIES ........_
*939
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MAHONEY, United States Magistrate Judge.
INTRODUCTION
In the greatest dissent ever written, the first Justice Harlan stated:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievement, in education, in wealth and in power.... But in the view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country, no superi- or, dominant ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our Constitution is color blind and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law. The humblest is the peer of the most powerful. The law regards man as man and takes no account of his surroundings or of his color when his civil rights, as guaranteed by the supreme law of the land, are involved. It is, therefore, to be regretted that this high tribunal, the final expositor of the fundamental law of the land, has reached the conclusion that it is competent for a state to regulate the enjoyment by citizens of their civil rights solely upon the basis of race.
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 , 16 S.Ct. 1138, 1146 , 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896). Justice Harlan was dissenting from a decision of the United States Supreme Court that was later used to allow the separation of races in education. That decision was overturned by a later Supreme Court in the case of Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 , 74 S.Ct. 686 , 98 L.Ed. 873 (1954). In Brown v. Board of Education, a unanimous Supreme Court pointed out:
In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. .Such an opportunity, when the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be available to all on equal terms.
Id. at 493 , 74 S.Ct. at 691 .
The following opinion relates the activities of a school district that has consistently and massively violated the dictates of Brown v. Board of Education. It is the story of a school district that, at times, has committed such open acts of discrimination as to be cruel and committed others with such subtlety as to raise discrimination to an art form.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This lawsuit was filed on May 11,1989. It was filed by Plaintiffs as a reaction to the 1989 Reorganization Plan that had been adopted by Defendant, Rockford School District # 205, in January and February of 1989. The lawsuit not only attacks the 1989 Reorganization Plan, but also alleges that the school district historically has engaged in a pattern of intentional segregation and discrimination on a system-wide basis.
Approximately two months into the litigation, the parties entered into an Interim Settlement in response to Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction. The Interim Settlement dealt mainly with the 1989 Reorganization Plan. The settlement was embodied in an Interim Agreed Order entered by the court on July 7, 1989. That order provided for certain modifications of the Reorganization Plan and for other remedial steps to be taken by the District.
A Second Amended Complaint was filed on November 9,1989. On April 24,1991, Plaintiff and Defendant agreed to, and the court approved and entered, a Second Interim Order. The Second Interim Order was a more comprehensive interim remedial plan. The Second Interim Order did not resolve Plaintiffs underlying liability claim and the District made no admission of liability in connection with either of the Interim Remedial Orders. Certain parts of the Second Interim Order were stricken by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. See People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ., 961 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir.1992).
On June 29, 1992, District Court Judge Stanley J. Roszkowski, by Minute Order, referred all matters pertaining to Plaintiffs motion for a supplemental remedial order to the Magistrate Judge for ruling. By Order *940 of September 8, 1992, Judge Roszkowski, pursuant to Local Rule 1.71(c)(4) of the General Rules of the Northern District of Illinois, and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (a), (b), (c), transferred to Magistrate Judge P. Michael Mahoney all “matters currently pending.”
On April 8,1993, Judge Roszkowski reiterated the referral to the Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C) and in April of 1993 the Magistrate Judge commenced hearing the motion for a permanent injunction.
The injunction hearing began April 2,1993. Approximately thirty witnesses testified on behalf of Plaintiff and approximately nine witnesses testified on behalf of Defendant and Intervenor-Defendants. Over 3,500 pages of testimony were taken over the twenty-four days of trial. In addition, the court has taken into consideration 150 depositions presented to the court as evidence in lieu of testimony, as well as the literally thousands of pages of documents that have been presented to the court.
Pursuant to an “Agreement of Plaintiffs, Defendant Rockford School District 205 and the Intervenor-Defendants Concerning the Liability Hearing Adjudication Process and Certain Remedial Matters,” dated May 5, 1993, all parties stipulated that the Magistrate Judge would make a Report and Recommendation to Judge Roszkowski, who would then rule upon the permanent injunction and liability issues. Pursuant to the May 5th Agreement, the parties agreed that all present and future remedial matters in this case, without limita

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8707748. Public record. Not legal advice.