# State v. Hitchcock > Hawaii Supreme Court · July 30, 2010 · 123 Haw. 369 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/870641 ## Case - **Full name:** STATE of Hawai'i, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sean K. HITCHCOCK, Defendant-Appellant - **Court:** Hawaii Supreme Court - **Decided:** July 30, 2010 - **Citations:** 123 Haw. 369; 235 P.3d 365; 2010 Haw. LEXIS 168 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion - **Judges:** Moon, Nakayama, Duffy, Recktenwald, Acoba - **Cited by:** 9 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/870641 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating that "a defendant's right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation can be deemed satisfied if the record clearly demonstrates the defendant's actual knowledge of the charges against him or her" ## Opinion text L¢BRAHY * °" * FOR PUBLICATION * " * in West’s Hawai‘i Reports and the Pacific Reporter IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAFI --- 000 --- STATE oF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellee, VS. SEAN K. HITCHCOCK, Defendant-Appellant. l€ §§ uv as ?rzre-;:siiz NO. 29847 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT '= * * Fok PUBLICATI.3a at 196 (citing ma §§ 1-15(1) and 1-15(2) (1993) (Q0verning the construction of ambiguous words and phrases)). Accordingly, we look to the context of the word “designate” in the ordinance and the “reason and spirit” of ROH § 10-l.2(a)(l3). with regard to context, we observe that “designate” is used in section 10-l.2(a)(2), which prohibits Y[c]limb[ing] onto any tree, except those designated for climbing,” (Emphasis added.) it is also used in ROH § 10-1.7, which governs “[a]nimals in public parks.” ROH § 10-1.7(b) provides in relevant part that [t]he director [of parks and recreation] is authorized to designate areas in public parks for use by persons having custody and control of dogs on a leash and to desigpate public parks for use as off-leash parks for dogs. in desigaating parks as off-leash parks and in designating parks or areas therein for leashed dogs, the director shall consider the park's size, location, and frequency of use by members of the public, as well as the primary actual or designed use of each park or area included in the desigaation. The director shall post signs that notify the public of such desigpation that describe or map the park or park areas so desigpated. _30_ * a »'= F0R PUBLICATIGN * * * in West’s Hawai‘iRepoits andthe Pacific Reporter (Emphases added.) Because such ordinance requires the director to (l) consider size, location, frequency of use, and original design for the park prior to making a designation and (2) inform the public of the designation, providing them with adequate notice of the location of areas “so designated,” the director's designation appears to be one that is intended to be of a lasting and permanent nature. in other words, using a common sense approach, a “designation” by the director of a dog park (or, as here, a “campground”), although not entirely unalterable, is likely unchanged by periodic closures due to maintenance or other proffered reasons. ` ' For example, if the director were to post a sign in designated dog parks stating that the presence of dogs for two days each week is prohibited due to the need for maintenance, such prohibition would not change the desigpation of the park as a “dog park” -- that is, the park would not lose its designation as a “dog park” merely because a temporary restriction on the presence of dogs in the park had been imposed. indeed, once the maintenance was finished, the use of the park for dogs would resume and would not require a new tdesignation” or approval from the director. Similarly, the terms of Hitchcock's camping permit, prohibiting camping on wednesdays and Thursdays, do not change the “designation” of the beach park as a campground. To the contrary, Keaeu Beach Park, or at least specific areas therein, _3]_._ a a a FoR PUBLICATIQN a a a in West’s Hawai‘i Reports and the Paciiic Reporter remained “designated as a campground” during those two days and that the beach park (like the dog park merely became temporarily unavailable to the public for camping, indeed, it would be nonsensical to conclude that the beach park is “designated as a 4 campground” for five days out of the week and not so “designated” during the other two days. As to the “reason and spirit” of the ordinance, ROH § 10-l.2(a)(13) is contained in chapter 10, which governs the use of public parks. surrounding provisions in ROH § 10-1.2 similarly prohibit certain activities in a public park, including, but not limited to: (l) willful damage or injury to property, ROH § 10-1.2(a)(1); (2) polishing or repairing a car, ROH § 10-1.2(a)(1l); (3) entering or remaining during the night hours that the park is closed, ROH § 10-1.2(12); and (4) building or kindling of a fire, other than in'a grill or brazier, ROH § 10-1.2(a)(4). Given the nature of the surrounding prohibitions, section 10-1.2 seems to set forth rules primarily designed to protect the safety of park users, as well as preserve the integrity of public park areas. `Accordingly, the prohibition against camping in any park “not designated as a campground” in ROH § 10-1.2(a)(13) is a rule designed to promote safety and protect public parks and their users. Such interpretation is supported by the broad definition of “public park” included in ROH § 10-1.1. The ordinance defines public park as “any park, park roadway, ...32._ a a a Foiz PUBLICATIQN a a a in West’s Hawai‘i Reports and'the Paciiic Reporter playground, athletic field, beach, beach right-of-way, tennis court, golf course, swimming pool} or other recreation area or facility under the control, maintenance[,] and management of the department of parks and recreation.” Applying such definition to the ordinance at issue, it is reasonable to infer that the prohibition of camping in “any park not designated as a campground” was enacted to prevent persons from sleeping on park roadways, golf courses, tennis courts, and other places that are arguably unsafe for persons to occupy overnight and/or for any length of time. As a result, it appears that ROH § 10-1.2(a)(13) was promulgated to prohibit persons from occupying areas that' were never intended for use as a campground, i.e., for overnight occupancy. However, as previously indicated, the evidence adduced at trial established that Keaéu Beach Park was designated as a campground and, thus, intended for use as a campground. indeed, Officer Carino admitted that there are campground areas and restroom facilities at the beach park and testified that the park does not have any #closed hours,” even at night. Hitchcock additionally indicated that the city had been providing Hitchcock permits to camp at the beach park for almost two years. As a result, it would be consistent with the “reason and spirit” of the ordinance, iiai, safety of park users, to interpret the phrase “designated as a campground” as a continuing _33__ " * * * FOR PUBLICATION "' * * in West’s Hawai‘i Reports and_the Paciiic Reporter classification, even when periodic restrictions are imposed on camping for maintenance purposes;' Based on the foregoing, we agree with Hitchcock that, although Officer Carino’s testimony that permits were not valid on the day that Hitchcock was cited may show that Hitchcock violated the terms of a permit issued to him, it “is not material to the issue . . . whether Keaeu.Beach Park was designated as a campground so as to support his conviction for the offense the prosecution elected to charge.”7 we, therefore, conclude that there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to show that Hitchcock illegally camped “in any park not designated as a campground” because: (1) the evidence at trial established that (a) the beach park was designated as a campground and (b) Hitchcock was in the designated camping area on the night he was cited; (2) the park's “designation” as a campground did not change on wednesdays and Thursdays; and (3) the prosecution relied solely on the wednesday/Thursday camping prohibition to prove that the beach park was “not designated as campground” on the day that Hitchcock was cited. Consequently, we hold that the trial court erred in convicting Hitchcock for illegal camping pursuant to ROH § 10-1.2(a)(13). 7 As noted supra note 5, there are other provisions within ROH Chapter 10, Article 1 that could have been applicable to his conduct. _34_ *' * * 'FOR PUBLICATION * * * in West’s Havvai‘i Reports and the Paeific Reporter lV. CONCLUSION Based on the foregoing, we reverse the trial court's April 27, 2009 judgment convicting Hitchcock of illegal camping under ROH § 10-1.2(a)(13).8 Karen T. Nakasone, 1 (:;7 Deputy Public Defender, for defendant-appellant ' James M. Anderson, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, mnaE.DNg&, . for plaintiff-appellee @} d` 13¢,._,.,¢,1,, n_“v\aa