# Mylonakis v. The M/T Georgios M.

> District Court, S.D. Texas · December 4, 2012 · 909 F. Supp. 2d 691

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8704250

## Case

- **Full name:** Ioannis MYLONAKIS v. The M/T GEORGIOS M., her engines, tackle, etc., in rem STYGA Compania Naviera S.A. Helford Marine Inc. Kyriakos Mamidakis Nikolaos A. Mamidakis Alexandros N. Mamidakis and Alexandros G. Prokopakis
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** December 4, 2012
- **Citations:** 909 F. Supp. 2d 691; 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171649; 2012 WL 6042197
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Lake
- **Judges:** Lake
- **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
SIM LAKE, District Judge.
Plaintiff brings this action against defendants, M/T Georgios M., her engines, tackle, etc., in rem (“the Vessel”); STYGA Compañía Naviera S.A. (“STYGA”), Helford Marine Inc. (“Helford”), Kyriakos Mamidakis, Emmanuel A. Mamidakis, Nikolaos A. Mamidakis, Alexandras N. Mamidakis (collectively, “the Mamidakis Defendants”), and Alexandras G. Prokopakis, for violation of the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (“APPS”), 33 U.S.C. § 1910 , general maritime claims for unseaworthiness, negligence, intentional misrepresentation, breach of the duty to defend, maintenance and cure, double wages under 46 U.S.C. § 10313 , and pendent state law claims for malicious prosecution, breach of fiduciary duty, and gross negligence. Plaintiff seeks statutory civil penalties and attorney’s fees for his APPS claims and seeks compensatory and exemplary damages for his other claims. Pending before the court are plaintiffs Emergency Motion to Sanction Certain Defendants for Perjured Deposition Testimony (Docket Entry No. 79); Defendant Nikolaos A. Mamidakis’ Amended Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue (Docket Entry No. 88); STYGA Compañía Naviera S.A. and Helford Marine Ine.’s Amended Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue (Docket Entry No. 89); Defendant Kyriakos Mamidakis’ Amended Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue (Docket Entry No. 90); Alexandras G. Prokopakis’s Amended Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue (Docket Entry No. 91); Defendant Emmanouil A. Mamidakis’ Amended Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue (Docket Entry No. 92); and Defendant Alexandras N. Mamidakis’ Amended Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue (Docket Entry No. 93); Defendants’ Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Claims Under 33 U.S.C. § 1910 a/k/a Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (Docket Entry No. 94); Defendants’ Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Claims for Maintenance & Cure and Penalty Wages Under 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (Docket Entry No. 95); Defendants’ Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Claim of Malicious Prosecution Under Texas Law (Docket Entry No. 96); Defendants’ Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Claim for Breach of the Duty to Defend (Docket Entry No. 97); and Defendants’ Objections to Evidence Offered by Plaintiff (Docket Entry No. 115).
For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs Emergency Motion to Sanction Certain Defendants for Perjured Deposition Testimony (Docket Entry No. 79) will be denied as to the individuals defendants and granted in part and denied in part as to the corporate defendants; STYGA and Helford’s Amended Motions to Dismiss for *700 Lack of Personal Jurisdiction and Improper Venue (Docket Entry No. 89) will be granted in part and denied in part; and the Mamidakis Defendants’ Amended Motions to Dismiss will be granted for lack of personal jurisdiction and moot as to improper venue (Docket Entry Nos. 88, 90-93). Defendants’ Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Claims Under 33 U.S.C. § 1910 a/k/a Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (Docket Entry No. 94) will be granted; Defendants’ Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Claims for Maintenance & Cure and Penalty Wages Under 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (Docket Entry No. 95) will be denied; Defendants’ Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Claim of Malicious Prosecution Under Texas Law (Docket Entry No. 96) will be granted; Defendants’ Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs Claim for Breach of the Duty to Defend (Docket Entry No. 97) will be granted; and Defendants’ Objections to Evidence Offered by Plaintiff (Docket Entry No. 115) will be declared moot.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff is a citizen and resident of Greece. 1 On or about November 24, 2008, in Athens, Greece, plaintiff entered into a Seaman’s Contract of Employment with STYGA. 2 From November 29, 2008, to March 1, 2009, plaintiff served as Chief Engineer onboard the M/T GEORGIOS M., 3 a merchant vessel registered in Malta. 4 At all times material to this action the M/T GEORGIOS M. was owned by Helford, a business entity organized under the laws of Liberia that did not have a regular place of business in Texas. 5 At all times material to this action STYGA was a business entity organized under the laws of Panama that managed and operated the M/T GEORGIOS M. for Helford and did not have a regular place of business in Texas. 6 Plaintiff alleges that the “MAMI-DAKIS DEFENDANTS were the beneficial owners and persons who controlled HELFORD, STYGA, and the M/T GEORGIOS M.” 7 Defendants acknowledge that
[defendant Kyriakos Mamidakis, a resident citizen of Greece, was the President *701 and a member of the Board of Directors of both STYGA and Helford. (See Decl. of Kyriakos Mamidakis, attached hereto as Ex. 3, at ¶¶ 2 and 11.) Defendant Emmanouil A. Mamidakis, a resident citizen of Greece, was the Treasurer and a member of the Board of STYGA and Helford. (See Decl. of Emmanouil A. Mamidakis, attached hereto as Ex. 4, at ¶¶ 2 and 12.) Defendant Nikolaos A. Mamidakis, a resident citizen of Greece was the Vice President of STYGA and a member of the board of directors of STYGA. (See Decl. of Nikolaos A. Mamidakis, attached hereto as Ex. 5, at ¶¶ 2 and 11.) Defendant Alexandras N. Mamidakis, a resident citizen of Greece, was a member of the board of directors of STYGA. (See Decl. of Alexandras N. Mamidakis, attached hereto as Ex. 6, at ¶¶ 2 and 11.) Defendant Alexandras G. Prokopakis, a resident of Greece and a citizen of the United States, was the Secretary of Helford and a member of the board of directors of both STYGA and Helford. (See Decl. of Alexandras G. Prokopakis, attached hereto as Ex. 7, at ¶¶ 2 and 7.) 8
On or about November 29, 2008, plaintiff arrived at Puerto Limón, Costa Rica, to board the M/T GEORGIOS M. and replace Argyrios Argyropoulos (“Argyropoulos”) as Chief Engineer. 9
On February 19, 2009, at the port of Texas City, Texas, the United States Coast Guard (USCG) initiated an investigation into alleged unlawful discharges of oily waste from the M/T GEORGIOS M. This investigation caused the United States to file criminal charges against STYGA as manager and plaintiff as Chief Engineer of the M/T GEORGIOS M. 10 The criminal charges arose from discovery of a bypass pipe also known as a “magic pipe” onboard the vessel used to discharge overboard engine room oily waste in violation of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, known as MARPOL, and its United States codification known as the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships (APPS), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. 11
On February 25, 2009, STYGA and Helford entered into an Agreement on Security with the USCG pursuant to which the United States agreed to release the M/T GEORGIOS M. in exchange for STYGA and Helford’s agreement to post a surety bond and to provide for the care, salaries, lodging, per diem and needed transportation for crew members from the M/T GEORGIOS M. — including plaintiff — who the USCG required to stay in the Southern District of Texas until the criminal investigation concluded. 12
On August 20, 2009, a federal grand jury indicted plaintiff on two counts of violating the APPS, 33 U.S.C. § 1908 (a), for failing “to maintain an Oil Record Book for the M/T Georgios M in which all disposals of oil residue, overboard discharges, and disposals of oily bilge waste water were required to be fully recorded.” 13 The Indictment also charged the plaintiff with two counts of False Statements in violation *702 of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (a)(2), 14 and one count of Obstruction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 . 15
On September 2, 2009, STYGA’s Board of Directors resolved “[t]hat STYGA ... is authorized to waive its right to indictment with regards to the investigation by the United States Attorney for the Southern District of Texas.” 16 An Information dated October 8, 2009, charged STYGA with violating the APPS by failing “to maintain an Oil Record Book for the M/T Georgios M in which all disposals of oil residue, overboard discharges, and disposals of bilge water were required to be fully recorded.” 17 The Information alleged that STYGA
maintained an Oil Record Book that: (1) falsely and affirmatively claimed discharges of bilge waste had been made through the use of an Oil Water Separator and that sludges had been incinerated; (2) failed to disclose overboard discharges of oily sludge and bilge waste made through bypass equipment and without the use of a properly functioning Oil Water Separator and oil monitoring equipment and incinerator; (3) failed to record all tank to tank transfers, including transfers from the bilge tank into the drain oil tank; and (4) that created the overall false and misleading impression that the vessel was being operated properly and was fully maintaining an accurate Oil Record Book:
COUNT ON OR ABOUT IN THE PORT OF
1 _December 19, 2006 Houston. Texas_
2 _January 15, 2009 Corpus Christi, Texas
3 _February 19, 2009 Texas City, Texas
All in violation of Title 33, United States Code, Section 1908 (a), Title 18, United States Code, Section 2 , and Title 33, Code of Federal Regulations, Section 151.25. 18
On October 21, 2009, STYGA entered a written plea agreement with the United States pursuant to which STYGA pleaded guilty to the October 8, 2009, Information and agreed to (1) pay a criminal fine in the amount of $1,000,000.00; (2) pay an organizational community service payment in the amount of $250,000.00; (3) serve a thirty-six-(36)-month term of probation that in-eludes as a condition of probation the implementation of an Environmental Compliance Plan (ECP); and (4) cooperate in the government’s ongoing investigation and prosecution of individual crew members from the M/T GEORGIOS M., including the plaintiff in this action. 19 Attached to STYGA’s Plea Agreement is a Joint Factual Statement dated October 6, 2009, stipulating “that this Joint Factual Statement is a true and accurate statement of the Defendant’s criminal conduct and that it provides a sufficient basis for the Defendant’s plea of guilty to Counts One, Two, and *703 Three of the Information in this case.” 20 The Joint Factual Statement states, inter alia:
7. From at least December 19, 2006, through February 19, 2009, senior engineering officers and other crew members aboard the Georgios M, including three Chief Engineers, acting on behalf of and for the intended benefit of Styga, installed and used a bypass pipe, also referred to as a “magic pipe” or a “magic hose,” consisting of a large section of metal pipe, secreted beneath the engine room deck plates of the ship, and connected to a flexible rubber hose of certain length with flanges at either end to bypass pollution prevention equipment on board the Georgios M. In order for sludges to be discharged through the “magic hose,” the ship’s engineers removed internal components from a check valve in the sludge discharge system which allowed for fluid to flow in both directions, in contradiction of the ship’s classification society approved piping system drawings.
8. From at least December 19/2006, through February 19, 2009, the senior engineers on board the Georgios M, including three Chief Engineers, often directed junior engineering crewmembers to connect the so-called “magic pipe” and deliberately discharged sludges and oily bilge wastes directly into the sea.
9. From at least December 19, 2006, through February 19, 2009, the senior engineers on board the Georgios M knowingly failed to make required entries in the vessel’s ORB, including the fact that sludge and oily wastes were discharged through the bypass pipe directly into the ocean, circumventing the pollution prevention equipment required by MARPOL. Senior engineers also made false entries in the ORB indicating that oily wastes were processed using the vessel’s pollution prevention equipment when in fact, as the engineering officers and engine room crew members well knew at the time, the equipment was not used. 21
On April 28, 2010, at the conclusion of a trial, the plaintiff was acquitted of all the charges made against him in the indictment dated August 20, 2009. 22
Plaintiff initiated this action on August 24, 2010, by filing his Original Verified Complaint (Docket Entry No. 1).
II. Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction
Plaintiff alleges that “[a]t all times material hereto, all acts and omissions complained of occurred either within the State of Texas or had their impact within the State of Texas in this Federal judicial district.” 23 Defendants argue that all of plaintiffs claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction because
STYGA, Helford, and the Mamidakis defendants lack contacts with Texas or the United States to support either specific or general jurisdiction. To the extent that Mylonakis’ claims arise out of the Vessel’s calls to port in the United States, such calls were outside the control of the Defendants and were isolated *704 and sporadic in nature. 24
Plaintiff argues that defendants’ contacts with Texas are sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction.
A. Standard of Review
When .a foreign defendant moves to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), “the plaintiff ‘bears the burden of establishing the district court’s jurisdiction over the defendant.’ ” Quick Technologies, Inc. v. Sage Group PLC, 313 F.3d 338, 343 (5th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 814 , 124 S.Ct. 66 , 157 L.Ed.2d 29 (2003) (quoting Mink v. AAAA Development LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 335 (5th Cir.1999)). “When the district court rules on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction ‘without an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff may bear his burden by presenting a prima facie case that personal jurisdiction is proper.’ ” Id. (quoting Wilson v. Belin, 20 F.3d 644, 648 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 930 , 115 S.Ct. 322 , 130 L.Ed.2d 282 (1994)). “In making its determination, the district court may consider the contents of the record before the court at the time of the motion, including ‘affidavits, interrogatories, depositions, oral testimony, or any combination of the recognized methods of discovery.’ ” Id. at 344 (quoting Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir.1985)). The court must accept as true the uncontroverted allegations in the plaintiffs complaint and must resolve in favor of the plaintiff any factual conflicts. “Absent any dispute as to the relevant facts, the issue of whether personal jurisdiction may be exercised over a nonresident defendant is a question of law to be determined ... by th[e C]ourt.” Ruston Gas Turbines, Inc. v. Donaldson Co., Inc., 9 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir.1993). However, the court is not obligated to credit conclusory allegations, even if uncontroverted. Panda Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 869 (5th Cir.2001).
B. Applicable Law
Exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with federal due process guarantees when the nonresident defendant has established minimum contacts with the forum state, and the exercise of jurisdiction “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, Office of Unemployment Compensation and Placement, 326 U.S. 310 , 66 S.Ct. 154, 158 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 , 61 S.Ct. 339, 343 , 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940)). Once a plaintiff satisfies these two requirements, a presumption arises that jurisdiction is reasonable, and the burden of proof and persuasion shifts to the defendant opposing jurisdiction to present “a compelling case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 , 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2185 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). For claims arising under state law, federal courts “may assert personal jurisdiction if: (1) the state’s long-arm statute applies, as interpreted by the state’s courts; and (2) if due process is satisfied under the [Fourteenth [A]mendment to the United States Constitution.” Johnston v. Multidata Systems International Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 609 (5th Cir. 2008). For claims arising under federal law courts may assert personal jurisdiction over defendants who lack sufficient contacts to satisfy the due process concerns of any particular state’s long-arm statute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) when the defendant has suffi *705 cient contacts with the nation as a whole to justify the imposition of United States’ law. See World Tanker Carriers Corp. v. M/V Ya Mawlaya, 99 F.3d 717, 720 (5th Cir.1996).
Texas courts may assert personal jurisdiction “over a nonresident if (1) the Texas long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction, and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with federal and state constitutional due process guarantees.” Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Tex.2007) (citing Schlobohm v. Schapiro, 784 S.W.2d 355, 356 (Tex.1990)). The Texas long-arm statute authorizes service of process on nonresidents “[i]n an action arising from a nonresident’s business in this state.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code § 17.043.
In addition to other acts that may constitute doing business, a nonresident does business in this state if the nonresident:
(1) contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in this state; [or]
(2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state; or
(3) recruits Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in this state, for employment inside or outside this state.
Id. at § 17.042. The Texas Supreme Court has stated that “the long-arm statute’s broad doing-business language allows the statute to ‘reach as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will allow.’ ” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (quoting Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance, Ltd. v. English China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.1991)). See also Schlobohm, 784 S.W.2d at 357 (holding that the limits of the Texas long-arm statute are coextensive with the limits of constitutional due process guarantees).
C. Minimum Contacts Analysis
“There are two types of ‘minimum contacts:’ those that give rise to specific personal jurisdiction and those that give rise to general personal jurisdiction.” Lewis v. Fresne, 252 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir.2001). Defendants argue that this action should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction because plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of presenting prima facie evidence that they purposefully established “minimum contacts” with Texas that are sufficient to give rise to either “specific” or “general” jurisdiction. Plaintiff responds that the court has both specific and general jurisdiction over both the corporate and the individual defendants. 25
1. General Jurisdiction
General jurisdiction “exists when a non-resident defendant’s contacts with the forum state are substantial, continuous, and systematic.” Johnston, 523 F.3d at 609 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 , 104 S.Ct. 1868, 1872-74 , 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)). “The ‘continuous and systematic contacts test is a difficult one to meet, requiring extensive contacts between a defendant and a forum.’ ” Id. (quoting Submersible Systems, Inc. v. Perforadora Central, S.A. de C.V., 249 F.3d 413, 419 *706 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1055 , 122 S.Ct. 646 , 151 L.Ed.2d 564 (2001)). “[E]ven repeated contacts with forum residents by a foreign defendant may not constitute the requisite substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts required for a finding of general jurisdiction ...” Id. (quoting Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir.2002)). Moreover, a defendant may “not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of ‘random,’ ‘fortuitous,’ or ‘attenuated’ contacts, ... or of the ‘unilateral activity of another party or third person.’ ” Burger King, 105 S.Ct. at 2183 (citations omitted). In other words, the only contacts that matter for personal jurisdiction must “result from actions by the defendant himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum state.” Id. at 2184.
The seminal general jurisdiction case is Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 , 72 S.Ct. 413 , 96 L.Ed. 485 (1952), in which the Supreme Court first articulated the idea that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based on general business operations within the forum state. The Supreme Court upheld the district court’s exercise of general personal jurisdiction in Ohio over a Philippine corporation whose president and general manager relocated to Ohio during the Japanese occupation of the Philippine Islands. While in Ohio, the president maintained a corporate office where he kept the records of the corporation, conducted director’s meetings, and made all key business decisions. The corporation also distributed salary checks drawn on two Ohio bank accounts and engaged an Ohio bank to act as a transfer agent. In light of these activities the Court held that Ohio could exercise jurisdiction over the corporation because the president had “carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the company.” Id. at 419.
By contrast, in Helicópteros the Supreme Court held that the defendant’s general business contacts with Texas were insufficient to support an exercise of general jurisdiction despite the fact that the defendant had purchased equipment from a company in the forum state. 104 S.Ct. at 1873-74 . Over a six-year period the defendant purchased helicopters (approximately 80% of its fleet), spare parts, and accessories for more than $4 million from a Texas company; sent its prospective pilots to Texas for training; sent management and maintenance personnel to Texas for technical consultations; and received a check for over $5 million that was drawn upon a Texas bank. Nevertheless, the Court held that none of the contacts were substantial enough standing alone or taken together to support the assertion of general jurisdiction.
The Court explained that the mere purchase of goods from a state, even at regular intervals and in substantial amounts, was not enough to warrant the assertion of general jurisdiction over a non-resident on a cause of action unrelated to those purchases. Nor was the Court persuaded that the fact that the defendant sent personnel to Texas for training in connection with the purchases enhanced the nature of the contacts. Instead, the Court concluded that this was merely one aspect of the package of goods and services that the defendant had purchased. Finally, the Court concluded that the receipt of a check drawn from a Texas bank was of no consequence because the bank from which payment was made was caused by the fortuitous “unilateral activity” of a third party. Id. The Fifth Circuit has consistently imposed the high standard set by the Supreme Court in Helicopteros when ruling on general jurisdiction issues. See, e.g., Central Freight Lines Inc. v. APA Transport Corp., 322 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir.2003) *707 (finding no general jurisdiction even though the defendant routinely arranged and received shipments to and from Texas and regularly sent sales people to Texas to develop business, negotiate contracts, and service national accounts). In Access Telecom, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 197 F.3d 694, 717 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 917 , 121 S.Ct. 275 , 148 L.Ed.2d 200 and 531 U.S. 917 , 121 S.Ct. 292 , 148 L.Ed.2d 200 (2000), the Fifth Circuit emphasized that in order to confer general jurisdiction a defendant must have a business presence in Texas.
Application of the standards shows that none of the defendants in this action have sufficient systematic and continuous contacts with Texas to establish general jurisdiction. See also Johnston, 523 F.3d at 611 (reaffirming that a defendant must have a “business presence in Texas” before general jurisdiction will attach). As to the corporate defendants, plaintiff acknowledges that since the claims alleged against STYGA and Helford arise from their activity in this forum, “it is not necessary for Plaintiff to invoke general jurisdiction in the circumstances of this case.” 26 As to the individual defendants, plaintiff asserts that “[t]he court has both specific jurisdiction and, arguably, general jurisdiction over the individual [defendants.” 27 However, plaintiff has not provided the court any basis for concluding that the individual defendants are subject to general jurisdiction. Instead, plaintiff bases his assertion of personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants on their alleged alter ego relationship to the corporate defendants, arguing that “[t]he acts and omission of the Corporate Defendants in the forum are, for this reason, the acts and omissions of the Individual Defendants.” 28 Because plaintiffs assertion of personal jurisdiction over the individual defendants is based on their alter ego relationship to the corporate defendants, because plaintiff has acknowledged that “it is not necessary for Plaintiff to invoke general jurisdiction [against the corporate defendants] in the circumstances of this case,” 29 and because plaintiff has not offered any alternative basis for the assertion of general jurisdiction over the individual defendants, for the same reasons that the court has concluded that there is no basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction over the corporate defendants, the court concludes that there is no basis for the exercise of general jurisdiction over the individual defendants.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the lawsuit arises from or relates to the defendant’s contact with the forum state. See ICEE Distributors, Inc. v. J & J Snack Foods Corp., 325 F.3d 586, 591 (5th Cir.2003). Specific jurisdiction exists where a defendant “purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Burger King, 105 S.Ct. at 2183 (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 , 78 S.Ct. 1228, 1239-40 , 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958)). There are three parts to a purposeful availment inquiry. First, only the defendant’s contacts with the forum are relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or a third person. Second, the contacts relied upon must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated. *708 Finally, the defendant must seek some benefit, advantage, or profit by availing itself of the jurisdiction. A defendant may purposefully avoid a particular forum by structuring its transactions in such a way as to neither profit from the forum’s laws nor subject itself to jurisdiction there. Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 575 (citing Burger King, 105 S.Ct. at 2181-85 ). Since specific jurisdiction is claim specific, “[a] plaintiff bringing multiple claims that arise out of different forum contacts of the defendant must establish specific jurisdiction for each claim.” See Seiferth v. Helicopteros Atuneros, Inc., 472 F.3d 266, 274 (5th Cir.2006).
(a) The Corporate Defendants Are Subject to Specific Jurisdiction on All But One of Plaintiffs Claims
Citing Asarco, Inc. v. Glenara, Ltd., 912 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.1990), STYGA and Helford argue that “[precedent [involving [Chartered [vjessels [flavors [dismissal” 30 because
[wjhen the Vessel arrived at the Port of Texas City on February 1, 2009, the Vessel was chartered to ST Shipping under a long-term time charter party agreement ... Under this charter party, ST Shipping directed the ports of call for the vessel and Helford [and STYGA] had no control over whether the Vessel would call at U.S. ports. 31
STYGA and Helford argue that they are not subject to specific jurisdiction because, as manager and owner, respectively, of the time-chartered vessel, they were not involved in decisions affecting the vessel’s ports of call and did not direct the vessel to any specific port. STYGA and Helford rely on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Asarco, 912 F.2d at 784 , for the proposition that a vessel’s manager and owner do not purposefully avail themselves of the jurisdiction of a port of call that was chosen solely by the vessel’s time-charterer.
In Asarco cargo was loaded in Australia and lost at sea long before the vessel ever reached Louisiana, where the plaintiff sued the owner and manager of the vessel. 912 F.2d at 785 . The vessel had been time-chartered to a third party, who directed the vessel to carry the cargo to Louisiana. Id. The vessel’s manager was a Hong Kong corporation named Anglo-Eastern Management Services Limited (“Anglo-Eastern”). Id. Anglo-Eastern and the vessel’s owner successfully argued to the Louisiana district court that it lacked personal jurisdiction over them. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, observing the general rule that “[e]ven a single, substantial act directed toward the forum can support specific jurisdiction,” but finding that the plaintiff had failed to show that either the vessel’s owner or Anglo-Eastern had directed an act toward Louisiana. Id. at 786 .
This case is distinguishable from Asarco. Here, unlike Asarco, plaintiffs claims against STYGA and Helford are not all based on acts committed outside the forum. Instead, Plaintiff alleges that the two corporate defendants were responsible for the MARPOL/APPS violations found aboard the M/T GEORGIOS M. while the vessel was physically present in Texas, and that these defendants and/or them agents committed other acts in Texas that harmed him. If the nonresident corporate defendants committed the liability-producing acts while physically present in the forum state, such conduct will support personal jurisdiction in lawsuits arising from those acts.
*709 This principle is most frequently encountered in cases involving torts committed by nonresidents while temporarily in the State. See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 , 47 S.Ct. 632 , 71 L.Ed. 1091 (1927); Elk-hart Engineering Corp. v. Dornier Werke, 343 F.2d 861, 868 (5th Cir.1965) (“We therefor hold that Alabama may, consistent with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, assert jurisdiction over a non-resident, non-qualifying corporation in suits on a claim of liability for tortious injury arising out of activity of the non-resident within the state, even though only a single transaction is involved, and regardless of whether the activity is considered dangerous.”).
Thus, if STYGA and Helford are responsible for the allegedly tortious actions of the vessel’s crew while in Texas, they are subject to personal jurisdiction in Texas. See Ortega v. Seaboard Marine Ltd., 400 F.Supp.2d 987, 990 (S.D.Tex.2005) (“Because Patt Manfield employed the captain and crew, it cannot escape litigation arising out of the allegedly tortious acts of those employees acting within the scope of their employment.”).
STYGA and Helford describe their activities in Texas as follows:
1. The Georgios M presented an Oil Record Book to the U.S. Coast Guard (“USCG”) that failed to contain required entries concerning the management of sludges and oily wastes in violation of the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq.
2. On February 25, 200[9], the Defendants entered into the Agreement on Security with the U.S. Coast Guard and the United States to post a surety bond and to provide for the care, salaries, lodging, per diem and needed transportation for certain crew members from the Georgios M that the USCG required to be retained in this District pending the conclusion of the Government’s criminal investigation in order to obtain the release of the Georgios M from the hold placed on it by the USCG preventing it to leave the District.
3. Following negotiations with the Department of Justice, STYGA entered into a written Plea Agreement with the United States and an attached Joint Factual Statement on October 6, 2009, which imposed certain obligations on STYGA, including the payment of the cost of the transportation to and from the Southern District of Texas and to continue to provide for the care, salaries, lodging, per diem and needed transportation of the crew members still retained pursuant to the Agreement on Security.
4. Defendants appointed an agent to perform the obligations to care for the retained crew created by the Agreement on Security and the Plea Agreement and paid for the performance of those obligations.
5. Defendants paid the fees and expenses of the Plaintiffs lead criminal defense attorney. 32
STYGA and Helford argue that
[o]f these activities, only the presentment of the Oil Record Book containing false information can be considered as being purposefully directed at the forum or that it constituted a purposeful availment of the benefits of the laws of the forum. All of the activities following the initial assertion [of] charges were carried out under a level of compulsion and duress, and should not be considered to reach the level of activity upon which *710 personal jurisdiction can be predicated, at least to persons, such as the Plaintiff, who were not the object of the activities. 33
(1) The Corporate Defendants Are Subject to Specific Jurisdiction on Plaintiffs Claims for APPS Violations, and General Maritime Claims for Unseaworthiness, and Negligence
STYGA and Helford’s acknowledgment that while in Texas the M/T GEORGIOS M. presented an Oil Record Book to the USCG that failed to contain required entries concerning the management of sludges and oily wastes in violation of the APPS, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq., provides a sufficient basis for the court to assert personal jurisdiction over them for plaintiffs claims that they violated the APPS. Moreover, in light of the duties that the charter party agreement imposed upon the vessel’s owner, i.e., Helford, the court concludes that STYGA and Helford’s acknowledgment that the vessel presented an improperly maintained Oil Record Book to the USCG in Texas also provides a sufficient basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over Helford and its agent, STYGA, for plaintiffs general maritime claims for unseaworthiness and negligence.
General maritime law imposes duties to avoid unseaworthiness, Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 , 80 S.Ct. 926 , 4 L.Ed.2d 941 (1960), and negligence, Leathers v. Blessing, 105 U.S. 626 , 26 L.Ed. 1192 (1881), and “nonfatal injuries caused by the breach of either duty are compensable.” Norfolk Shipbuilding & Drydock Corp. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811 , 121 S.Ct. 1927, 1929-30 , 150 L.Ed.2d 34 (2001) (citing Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 , 64 S.Ct. 455, 458-59 , 88 L.Ed. 561 (1944) (unseaworthiness), and Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Dahl, 266 U.S. 449 , 45 S.Ct. 157, 158 , 69 L.Ed. 372 (1925) (negligence)). The elements of an unseaworthiness claim are (1) that the defendant provided a vessel or equipment that was not reasonably fit for its intended purpose, and (2) that “the unseaworthy condition played a substantial part in bringing about or actually causing the injury and that the injury was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the unseaworthiness.” Phillips v. Western Co. of North America, 953 F.2d 923, 928 (5th Cir.1992). To prevail on a claim of negligence under maritime law the plaintiff must prove (1) a duty was owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (2) the duty was breached, (3) the plaintiff suffered injury, and (4) a causal connection existed between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiffs injury. In re Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. LLC, 624 F.3d 201, 211 (5th Cir.2010). “Determination of the tortfeasor’s duty is a question of law and thus a function of the court ...” Id. (quoting Mississippi Department of Transportation v. Signal International LLC, 579 F.3d 478, 490 (5th Cir.2009)). “Under maritime law, a plaintiff is owed a duty of ordinary care under the circumstances.” Id. (citing Daigle v. Point Landing, Inc., 616 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir. 1980)). “[A] defendant’s failure to fulfill a duty of care under maritime law ‘does not breach that duty, ... unless the resultant harm is reasonably foreseeable.’ ” Id. at n. 10 (quoting Daigle, 616 F.2d at 827 ).
The charter party agreement between Helford and ST Shipping requires the vessel’s owner, i.e., Helford, to provide a vessel that is “in good order and condition, *711 and in every way fit for the service,” 34 to crew the vessel, 35 to “exercise due diligence to maintain or restore the vessel,” 36 and to
warrant that the vessel does, and will, fully comply with all applicable conventions, laws, regulations and ordinances of any international, national, state entity having jurisdiction including, but not limited to, the U.S. Port and Tanker Safety Act, as amended, the U.S. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, MARPOL 1973/1978 as amended and extended ... 37
In light of these provisions in the charter party agreement the vessel’s presentation of an improperly maintained Oil Record Book to the USCG is an act that violated MARPOL and an act that can only be attributed to Helford and/or its agent, STYGA, because the charter party agreement required the owner, not the charterer, to crew the vessel and to maintain the vessel in compliance with MARPOL. It is undisputed that the presentation of an improperly maintained Oil Record Book to the USCG not only violated MARPOL but also occurred in Texas. It is also undisputed that the USCG’s investigation of the M/T GEORGIOS M. in Texas revealed at least one additional MARPOL violation, i.e., the installation of a “magic pipe” used to discharge untreated oily waste overboard. Plaintiffs claims for unseaworthiness and negligence are both based on allegations that STYGA and Helford failed to properly maintain the M/T GEORGIOS M. in compliance with MARPOL. 38 The court concludes that the requirements for exercising personal jurisdiction over STY-GA and Helford on plaintiffs claims for unseaworthiness and negligence under maritime law are satisfied because the MARPOL violations on which these claims are based allegedly occurred in Texas by employees of Helford and/or STYGA who were acting within the scope of their employment and seeking to benefit, advantage, or profit Helford and/or STYGA by causing an improperly equipped vessel to enter a Texas port and present an improperly maintained Oil Record Book to the USCG.
(2) The Corporate Defendants Are Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction on Plaintiff’s Claim for Intentional Misrepresentation
Plaintiffs claim for intentional misrepresentation is based on allegations that when he arrived in Costa Rica to join the M/T GEORGIOS M. as Chief Engineer the vessel’s officer in charge of the engine department, Argyrios Argyropoulos, acting as the corporate defendants’ agent, not only failed to disclose that the ship’s International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate and several other documents referring to the ship’s machinery space arrangements and condition contained false information, but also affirmatively misrepresented to plaintiff that none of these deficiencies and non-conformities existed. Plaintiff alleges that he relied on Argyropoulos’s representations and consented to take over as Chief Engineer, and that by virtue of his position as Chief Engineer he became entangled in the USCG investigation that began on or *712 about February 19, 2009, in Texas City, Texas. Although plaintiff alleges that he discovered the defendants’ misrepresentations while he and the M/T GEORGIOS M. were in Texas, he has not alleged that any of the misrepresentations occurred in Texas. Instead, plaintiff alleges that
[t]he non-disclosures and other affirmative misrepresentations of the Defendants occurred onboard the M/T GEORGIOS M at sea, and were material to Plaintiffs acceptance and assumption of his duties as Chief Engineer of the M/T GEORGIOS M, as Plaintiff relied on same believing that he was assuming such a post and duties onboard a properly and lawfully operated merchant vessel. 39
Because plaintiffs allegations show that he did not join the M/T GEORGIOS M. and/or assume the position of Chief Engineer in Texas but, instead, in Costa Rica, the acts underlying the plaintiffs claim for intentional misrepresentation do not show any contact with the forum state of Texas. Accordingly, the court concludes that there is no basis on which to assert personal jurisdiction over either of the two corporate defendants on plaintiffs claim for intentional misrepresentation.
(3) The Corporate Defendants Are Subject to Specific Jurisdiction on Plaintiffs Claims for Breach of Duty to Defend, Maintenance and Cure, Double Wages Under 46 U.S.C. § 10313 , Malicious Prosecution, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Gross Negligence
Plaintiffs claims for breach of the duty to defend, maintenance and cure, double wages under 46 U.S.C. § 10313 , malicious prosecution, breach of fiduciary duty, and gross negligence are based on acts and communications that occurred in Texas as a result of the USCG’s investigation and discovery of MARPOL/APPS violations onboard the M/T GEORGIOS M. Although STYGA and Helford argue that the acts and communications that occurred as a result of the USCG’s investigation and discovery of MARPOL/APPS violations onboard the M/T GEORGIOS M. are insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction because those acts and communications occurred under duress, STYGA and Helford have not cited any authority in support of this argument, and the court does not find it persuasive. On the contrary, the court concludes that STYGA and Helford’s acknowledgment that they entered into an Agreement on Security with the USCG and the United States that included an obligation
to provide for the care, salaries, lodging, per diem and needed transportation for certain crew members from the Georgios M that the USCG required to be retained in this District pending the conclusion of the Government’s criminal investigation in order to obtain the release of the Georgios M from the hold placed on it by the USCG preventing it to leave the District, 40
is sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction over these defendants for claims arising from" acts performed pursuant to that agreement because by entering the Agreement on Security STYGA and Helford purposely availed themselves “of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” Burger King, 105 S.Ct. at 2183 . Because plaintiffs claims *713 for breach of duty to defend, maintenance and cure, double wages under 46 U.S.C. § 10313 , malicious prosecution, breach of fiduciary duty, and gross negligence all arise from acts performed pursuant to the Agreement on Security, the court concludes that the requirements for exercising personal jurisdiction over STYGA and Helford are satisfied for these claims.
Plaintiffs breach of the duty to defend claim arises from allegations that the defendants undertook various acts in Texas in an effort to pressure plaintiff into accepting responsibility for the various MARPOL/APPS violations found to exist onboard the M/T GEORGIOS M. in Texas. 41 Plaintiffs maintenance and cure claim arises from allegations that defendants failed to provide medical care for an illness that arose while the plaintiff was in Texas. 42 Plaintiffs claim for double wages under 46 U.S.C. § 10313 arises from allegations that STYGA and Helford failed to pay plaintiff severance pay that accrued when plaintiff was discharged from his employment whiíe he and the vessel on which he served were in a Texas port. 43 Plaintiffs claim for malicious prosecution arises from allegations that STYGA and Helford entered into plea bargain negotiations with the United States for the purpose of settling their exposure to criminal liability for the MARPOL/APPS violations that the USCG found onboard the M/T GEORGIOS M., and that during the course of the negotiations, these defendants agreed to blame plaintiff for the violations and agreed to cooperate with the United States by providing witnesses and documents for use in the plaintiffs criminal prosecution, 44 and that these defendants entered these agreements “even though they ... knew or would have learned upon conducting a rudimentary investigation that [pjlaintiff was never at any time involved with the MARPOL and APPS violations onboard the M/T GEORGIOS M. 45 Plaintiffs claims for breach of fiduciary duty and gross negligence arise from allegations that STYGA. and Helford’s plea negotiations with the United States and their dealings with him while he was detained in Houston, Texas, at the request of the United States government constitutes either an intentional breach of the fiduciary duty that an employer owes to an employee and/or gross negligence. 46 Because each of these claims arises from acts that the defendant corporations performed and/or directed to the forum state of Texas — e.g., the termination of plaintiffs employment, the detention of the plaintiff in the Southern District of Texas pursuant to the Agreement on Security that was performed in Texas, and defendants’ collaboration in plaintiffs criminal prosecution in the forum — the court concludes that STY-GA and Helford each have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum for the court to assert personal jurisdiction oyer them,
(b) The Mamidakis Defendants Are Not Subject to Specific Jurisdiction on Any of Plaintiffs Claim
Plaintiff bases his assertion of personal jurisdiction over the Mamidakis Defendants on an alter ego relationship to the corporate defendants, by alleging that
^jurisdiction over Defendants KYRIAEOS, EMMANUEL, NIEOLAOS, ALEXANDROS, and PROEOPAEIS exists by virtue of intentional acts they *714 committed in the name of Defendants STYGA and/or HELFORD who were at all times material hereto their agents and/or instrumentalities and/or alter epos. 47
The Mamidakis Defendants argue that the claims asserted against them in this action are subject to dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and that the court should not consider the forum contacts of STYGA and Helford when deciding their challenges to personal jurisdiction. In support of this argument the Mamidakis Defendants contend that the alter ego allegations in the plaintiffs complaint are conclusory and that plaintiff is unable to adduce evidence for piercing the corporate veil. 48 In response to defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff argues that “[personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants may also exist under and by virtue of the Security Agreement with the U.S. government whereby their alter egos STYGA and HELFORD specifically waived personal jurisdiction.” 49
As a general rule, “an individual’s transaction of business within the state solely as a corporate officer does not create personal jurisdiction over that individual though the state has in personam jurisdiction over the corporation^]” Stuart v. Spademan, 772 F.2d 1185, 1197 (5th Cir. 1985) (identifying this “general rule” as the “fiduciary shield doctrine”). The general rule does not apply when a corporation is the alter ego of the individual officer, i.e., when the corporation is simply a facade for the individual officer’s interests and activities. Id. at 1198 . In such cases “courts attribute to an individual the corporation’s contacts with the forum states.” Id.
Plaintiff argues that the Individual Defendants are the alter egos of STYGA and Helford, and that STYGA and Helford’s actions may therefore be attributed to the Mamidakis Defendants for purposes of personal jurisdiction. In Stuart the Fifth Circuit cited with approval the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Management, Inc., 519 F.2d 634 (8th Cir.1975), where the court
considered the following factors in determining whether a corporation was the alter ego of its dominant shareholder: “[A] corporation’s existence is presumed to be separate, but can be disregarded if (1) the corporation is undercapitalized, (2) without separate books, (3) its finances are not kept separate from individual finances, individual obligations are paid by the corporation, (4) the corporation is used to promote fraud or illegality, (5) corporate formalities are not followed or (6) the corporation is merely a sham.” ... In Lakota, the Eighth Circuit held that the jury’s finding that the corporation was the individual’s alter ego was supported by ample evidence, including evidence that the in *715 dividual was the sole shareholder and sole incorporator, that he alone made loans to and borrowed from the corporation, that he and his wife owned the building housing the company and received rental payments, and that he used a corporation-purchased automobile for both business of the corporation and incidental personal business.
Stuart, 772 F.2d at 1197 (quoting Lakota, 519 F.2d at 638 ). The Court observed that in Dudley v. Smith, 504 F.2d 979 (5th Cir.1974), the Fifth Circuit “found jurisdiction to exist essentially by attributing the defendant’s contacts as a corporate representative to him individually.” Stuart, 772 F.2d at 1198 . The Court noted that
the alter ego test for attribution of contacts, i.e., personal jurisdiction, is less stringent than that for liability ... Accordingly, for jurisdiction to exist, there need not be both the existence of a mere shell corporation and fraud. Rather, either factor, a shell corporation or fraud is sufficient by itself to justify jurisdiction.
Id. at n. 12 (citations omitted).
Since Stuart the Fifth Circuit has identified a number of factors for courts to consider when making an alter ego determination. See United States v. Jon-T Chemicals, Inc., 768 F.2d 686, 691-92 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014 , 106 S.Ct. 1194 , 89 L.Ed.2d 309 (1986). While these factors, sometimes referred to as the “Jonr-T factors,” were designed for reviewing a parent-subsidiary relationship, they can be modified to determine whether a corporation is the alter ego of an individual. See Century Hotels v. United States, 952 F.2d 107 , 110 & n. 5 (5th Cir.1992). Relevant here, for example, are: (1) whether the Mamidakis Defendants completely control the corporate defendants; (2) the level of financial integration between the Mamidakis Defendants and the corporate defendants; (3) whether the corporate defendants operate with grossly inadequate capital; (4) whether the Mamidakis Defendants use the corporate defendants’ property as their own personal property; (5) whether the Mamidakis Defendants use the corporate defendants to pay personal obligations; and (6) whether the Mamidakis Defendants act as if the' corporate defendants are extensions of their own personal interests. See also Bollore S.A. v. Import Warehouse, Inc., 448 F.3d 317 , 325 (5th Cir.2006) (“Under Texas law, ‘[ajlter ego applies when there is such unity between corporation and individual that the separateness of the corporation has ceased and holding only the corporation liable would result in injustice.’ Castleberry v. Branscum, 721 S.W.2d 270, 277 (Tex.1986).”). The Fifth Circuit has directed lower courts making such determinations to examine the “totality of the circumstances,” Century Hotels, 952 F.2d at 110 , and to bear in mind that “the alter ego test for attribution of contacts, i.e., personal jurisdiction, is less stringent than that for liability.” Stuart, 772 F.2d at 1198 n. 12.
Here, plaintiff does not provide specific facts to show that either of the corporate defendants is simply a facade for any individual defendant’s interests and activities. Plaintiff' offers evidence that Helford has not observed all corporate formalities, but this evidence is not enough to show that Helford was merely a shell corporation. Moreover, plaintiffs contention that Helford is merely a shell corporation is negated by copies of minutes from at least some of Helford’s corporate meetings attached as Exhibit 18 to the Deposition of Helford’s secretary, Alexander Prokopak *716 is. 50 Plaintiff has made no showing that any of the individual defendants engaged in any conduct that courts typically use to evaluate the existence of an alter ego relationship. For example, plaintiff has made no showing that any individual Mamidakis defendant was the sole shareholder and sole incorporator of STYGA or Helford, that any Mamidakis defendant made loans to and borrowed from STYGA or Helford, that any Mamidakis defendant owned real estate leased to STYGA or Helford and received rental payments from STYGA or Helford, or that any Mamidakis defendant used corporation-purchased resources for both business of the corporation and personal purposes. See Stuart, 772 F.2d at 1197 . Absent such evidence, the court concludes that the fiduciary shield doctrine applies, and that neither STYGA nor Helford’s contacts with the forum can be imputed to any of the Mamidakis defendants to create personal jurisdiction over them.
D. Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction Over Corporate Defendants is Fair and Reasonable
Because the individual defendants all lack minimum contacts with Texas, this court need not determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction over them would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. See Felch v. Transportes Lar-Mex SA DE CV, 92 F.3d 320 , 329 n. 20 (5th Cir.1996) (“As Felch failed to establish sufficient ‘minimum contacts’ with Texas, we need not address whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case would offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”). Since the court has concluded that the two corporate defendants, STYGA and Helford, have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over them for claims arising from- those contacts, the burden shifts to them to show that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them would not be fair and reasonable. See Seiferth, 472 F.3d at 271 . Analysis of this issue is based on five factors:
(1) the burden on the nonresident defendant; (2) the interests of the forum state; (3) the plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief; (4) the interstate judicial system’s interest in the most efficient resolution of controversies; and (5) the shared interests of the several states in furthering fundamental social policies.
Id. at 276 (quoting Nuovo Pignone, SpA v. STORMAN ASIA M/V, 310 F.3d 374, 382 (5th Cir.2002)).
1. The Burden on Nonresident Defendants is Small
Corporate defendants contend that they will be burdened in bringing their witnesses and documents from Liberia and Panama, respectively, and because many material documents are in the Greek language. Defendants’, contention that they will be burdened by having to bring witnesses and documents from Liberia and Panama is not persuasive because neither of these defendants maintain an actual presence or conduct business from these seats, of their incorporation. Defendants’ contention that they will be burdened by having to translate documents from Greek to English is similarly unpersuasive because documents relating to the operation and management of the M/T GEORGIOS M. are in English, as are the records of the related cases in this court. Moreover, the court has already considered both of these arguments and ruled against the de *717 fendants by denying their motion to dismiss on forum non-conveniens. 51
2. The Interest of the Forum State is Significant
The corporate defendants contend that there is no forum interest in adjudicating this dispute because it is a dispute between foreigners that does not involve residents of the forum and concerns events that likely occurred in international waters. This contention is not persuasive because plaintiffs claims arise from events that occurred in the Southern District of Texas, and because two of plaintiffs claims arise under federal statutes, the APPS, 38 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq., and the Penalty Wage Statute, 46 U.S.C. § 1Ó313. Accordingly, the court concludes that the forum has a significant interest in adjudicating the plaintiffs claims.
3. The Plaintiff’s Interest in Obtaining Relief is Significant
The corporate defendants contend that plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief is addressed and governed by the plaintiffs contract of employment, which provides for conflicts arising thereunder to be adjudicated in Greece. As the court has already stated with respect to the defendants’ motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens,
the forum selection clause in plaintiffs employment contract covers disputes between plaintiff and his employer ... [“jpertaining to the performance of the present contract!.”] This clause does not govern the plaintiffs claims in this action, which arose after the contract had been terminated and which deal with federal statutory and Texas law claims, not the parties’ performance under the employment contract. 52
Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiffs interest in obtaining relief on the claims asserted is significant and that the corporate defendants have failed to show otherwise:
4. The Interstate Judicial System’s Interest in the Most Efficient Resolution of Controversies Favors Exercise of Jurisdiction Over the Corporate Defendants
The claims alleged in this action are related to cases that were recently before this court involving the same parties, the same events, the same evidentiary materials, the same common nucleus of operative facts, and the same laws. Accordingly, the court concludes that the interstate judicial system’s interest in the most efficient resolution of controversies favors exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendants in this forum.
5. The Shared Interests of the Several States in Furthering Fundamental Social Policies Favors Exercise of Jurisdiction Over the Corporate Defendants
The two corporate defendants contend that “[n]o fundamental substantive social *718 policy of the several states or of the United States would be furthered by the retention of this case in the United States.” 53 This contention is not persuasive because plaintiffs claims are based on allegations that defendants deliberately caused their ship to enter this forum in a state that violated the laws of this forum and that, prompted by their subsequent prosecution, the defendants sought to impose liability on the plaintiff for their violations of this forum’s laws. Under these circumstances the court concludes that shared interests of the several states in furthering fundamental social policies represented by the fair enforcement of this forum’s laws favors exercise of personal jurisdiction over the corporate defendants.
6. Conclusions as to Existence of Personal Jurisdiction Over the Corporate Defendants
Exercise of personal jurisdiction over STYGA and Helford for all of plaintiffs claims except the claim for intentional misrepresentation is fair and reasonable under the facts of this case because by sailing the M/T GEORGIOS M. into the forum with MARPOL/APPS violations, negotiating a guilty plea in the forum pursuant to which these defendants incriminated the plaintiff, and agreeing to aid in his prosecution even though they knew or would have learned upon conducting an investigation that plaintiff was not responsible for the MARPOL and APPS violations on-board the M/T GEORGIOS M„ STYGA and Helford should not be surprised to be haled into court to answer for their conduct.
E. Conclusions
STYGA and Helford’s amended motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction will be granted as to plaintiffs claim for intentional misrepresentation because plaintiffs allegations reflect that the actions underlying this claim did not occur in this forum, and will be denied as to plaintiffs remaining claims for APPS violations, unseaworthiness, negligence, breach of the duty to defend, maintenance and cure, penalty wages under 46 U.S.C. § 10313 , malicious prosecution, breach of fiduciary duty, and gross negligence because plaintiff has alleged facts capable of establishing specific jurisdiction for these claims, and defendants have failed to adduce facts and/or arguments capable of persuading the court that exercising personal jurisdiction over them will violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The amended motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction filed by each of the five individual defendants, Nikolaos A. Mamidakis, Kyriakos Mamidakis, Alexandras G. Prokopakis, Emmanouil A. Mamidakis, and Alexandras N. Mamidakis, will be granted because plaintiff has failed to allege facts capable of establishing either general or specific jurisdiction. The Mamidakis Defendants’ arguments that plaintiffs claims should be dismissed for improper venue are moot.
III. Amended Motions for Partial Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs’ Original Verified Complaint asserts a claim for violation of the APPS, 33 U.S.C. § 1910 , general maritime claims for unseaworthiness, negligence, intentional misrepresentation, breach of the duty to defend, maintenance and cure, and double wages under 46 U.S.C. § 10313 , and pendent state law claims for malicious prosecution, breach of fiduciary duty, and gross negligence. Defendants seek summary judgment on plaintiffs APPS claims under 33 U.S.C. § 1910 , plaintiffs claims for maintenance and cure and penalty wages *719 under 46 U.S.C. § 10313 , plaintiffs claims for malicious prosecution under Texas law, and plaintiffs claims for breach of the duty to defend.
A. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is authorized if the movant establishes that there is no genuine dispute about any material fact and the law entitles it to judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Disputes about material facts are “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Supreme Court has interpreted the plain language of Rule 56(c) to mandate the entry of summary judgment “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 , 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). If the moving party meets this burden, Rule 56(c) requires the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or other admissible evidence that specific facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 , 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110 , 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). To obtain summary judgment, defendants were required to establish that there was no genuine dispute about any material fact and that the law entitles them to judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Disputes about material facts are “genuine” if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 , 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Supreme Court has interpreted the plain language of Rule 56 to mandate the entry of summary judgment “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 , 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
If the moving party meets this burden, Rule 56(c) requires the nonmovant to go beyond the pleadings and show by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, or other admissible evidence that specific facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc). In reviewing the evidence “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 , 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110 , 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).
B. Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships
Defendants argue that they are entitled to partial summary judgment on plaintiffs APPS claims because (1) plaintiff “does not have standing to bring such a claim as APPS only allows a person ‘having an interest which is, or can be, adversely affected ... ’ by a violation of the APPS to institute a claim;” 54 (2) “the alleged false *720 statements contained in the Joint Factual Statement in Criminal Action No. 09-572 are not the type of statements subject to the record keeping requirement imposed by APPS, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1903 and 1908, and the applicable regulations thereunder, 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 ;” 55 and (3) “such a claim is prohibited where, as is the case in this matter, the USCG or the EPA has ‘commenced enforcement or penalty action with respect to the alleged violation and is conducting such procedures diligently.’ ” 56
1. Applicable Law
APPS, 33 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq., represents Congress’s- implementation of two related marine environmental treaties to which the United States is a party: the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and the Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, generally referred to together as MARPOL 73/78. These treaties are intended to prevent oil pollution in the sea. APPS is the statute enacted by Congress that prohibits violations of MAR-POL, APPS, and the regulations promulgated thereunder by United States flagged vessels and foreign flagged vessels operating or docked within the United States. See United States v. Jho, 534 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir.2008). APPS authorizes the United States to impose criminal and civil penalties on polluters and also contains a citizen’s suit provision.
APPS authorizes the imposition of criminal penalties for knowing violations: “A person who knowingly violates the MAR-POL Protocol, ... or the regulations issued thereunder commits a class D felony. In the discretion of the Court, an amount equal to not more than % of such fine may be paid to the person giving information leading to conviction.” 33 U.S.C. § 1908 (a). APPS also authorizes the imposition of civil penalties payable to the United States for any violation, whether knowing or not against
[a] person who is found by the Secretary, or the Administrator as provided for in this chapter, after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, to have—
(1) violated the MARPOL Protocol ... this chapter, or the regulations issued thereunder shall be liable to the United States for a civil penalty, not to exceed $25,000 for each violation; or
(2) made a false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation in any matter in which a statement or representation is required to be made to the Secretary, or the Administrator as provided for in this chapter, under the MARPOL Protocol ... this chapter, or the regulations thereunder, shall be liable to the United States for a civil penalty, not to exceed $5,000 for each statement or representation.
33 U.S.C. § 1908 (b)(l)-(2). Section 1908(b) also provides that
Each day of a continuing violation shall constitute a separate violation. The amount of the civil penalty shall be assessed by the Secretary, or the Administrator as provided for in this chapter or his designee, by written notice. In determining the amount of the penalty, the Secretary, or the Administrator as provided for in this chapter, shall take into account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the prohibited acts committed and, with respect to the viola *721 tor, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, ability to pay, and other matters .as justice may require. An amount equal to not more than /£ of such penalties may be paid by the Secretary, or the Administrator as provided for in this chapter, to the person giving information leading to the assessment of such penalties.
Id. APPS provides that “[t]he Secretary may compromise, modify, or remit, with or without conditions, any civil penalty which is subject to assessment or which has been assessed.” 33 U.S.C. § 1908 (c).
In addition to the criminal and civil penalties that APPS authorizes the United States to seek, APPS provides a private right of action pursuant to which
any person having an interest which is, or can be, adversely affected, may bring an action on his own behalf—
(1) against any person alleged to be in violation of the provisions of this chapter, or regulations issued hereunder ...
33 U.S.C. § 1910 (a)(1). APPS’s private right of action is subject to the following limitations:
No action may be commenced under subsection (a) of this section—
(1) prior to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice, in writing and under oath, to the alleged violator, the Secretary concerned, or the Administrator, and the Attorney General; or
(2) if the Secretary or the Administrator has commenced enforcement or penalty action with respect to the alleged violation and is conducting such procedures diligently.
33 U.S.C. § 1910 (b).
2. Plaintiff Lacks Constitutional and Statutory Standing to Pursue His APPS Claims
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs APPS claims because plaintiff does not satisfy the requirements of prudential standing. Citing Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 , 117 S.Ct. 1154 , 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997), plaintiff responds that the APPS’s citizen’s suit provision contains features that evidence Congress’s “intent to eliminate any prudential standing barrier to parties whose interests are or may be adversely affected.” 57 Consequently, plaintiff argues that he only needs to satisfy Article Ill’s requirements for constitutional standing, which he asserts are satisfied in this case. 58
Standing questions “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 , 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The standing “inquiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limitations on its exercise.” 59 Id. A plaintiff must first satisfy constitutional standing requirements stemming from the case or controversy requirement of Article III of the United *722 States Constitution. Once constitutional standing is established a court considers whether there exist any “judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now ("ACORN") v. Fowler, 178 F.3d 350, 356 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting Bennett, 117 S.Ct. at 1161 ). Because the Supreme Court has held that a court may not address the issue of prudential standing before determining that constitutional standing exists, the court must independently assess the issue of constitutional standing. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 , 118 S.Ct. 1003, 1011-16 , 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (rejecting the practice of assuming constitutional standing and proceeding directly to the merits). See also Ford v. NYLCare Health Plans of Gulf Coast, Inc., 301 F.3d 329, 333 (5th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 923 , 123 S.Ct. 1574 , 155 L.Ed.2d 313 (2003) (“The question of Article III standing must be decided prior to the prudential standing ... issuef ].”).
(a) Constitutional Standing
Article III of the United States Constitution limits the judicial power of the federal courts to resolution of actual cases and controversies. United States Constitution Art. Ill, § 2. See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 , 88 S.Ct. 1942, 1949 , 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968).
In its constitutional dimension, standing imports justiciability: whether the plaintiff has made out a “case or controversy” between himself and the defendant within the meaning of Art. III. This is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of the court to entertain the suit.
Warth, 95 S.Ct. at 2205 . To establish constitutional standing, the party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish three elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact” — an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized ... and (b) “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical’ ”... Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of — the injury has to be “fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” .. Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be “redressed by a favorable decision.”
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 , 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992) (citations omitted). “To have standing at the summary judgment stage, [a plaintiff] must present evidence of specific facts that, if true, would demonstrate an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling.” Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201, 212 (5th Cir.2012) (citing Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 ).
(1) Defendants’ Allegedly Illegal Conduct Injured the Plaintiff
“Article III requires the party who invokes [the] court’s authority to ‘show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of [the] putatively illegal conduct of [the] defendant.’ ” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 , 102 S.Ct. 752, 758 , 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 , 99 S.Ct. 1601, 1608 , 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979)). The injury must be “concrete and particularized,” “actual or *723 imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’ ” and must “affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.” Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 & n. 1. The Fifth Circuit has stated that “[i]f an individual’s statutory or constitutional rights have been violated, and that right is cognizable by the courts, he has suffered an injury.” Cramer v. Skinner, 931 F.2d 1020, 1026 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 907 , 112 S.Ct. 298 , 116 L.Ed.2d 242 (1991). In Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167 , 120 S.Ct. 693 , 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000), the Supreme Court held that “[t]he relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing ... is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.” Id. at 704. The Court explained that the “injury in fact” requirement in environmental cases is satisfied if an individual adequately shows “that they use the affected area and are persons ‘for whom the aesthetic and recreational values of the area will be lessened’ by the challenged activity.” Id. at 705. See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 , 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1366 , 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972) (“Aesthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.”);
Plaintiff asserts that
[i]t hardly needs argument Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact. He was detained and his movements were restricted within the Southern District of Texas for more than one (1) year. See First Declaration of Mylonakis at ¶¶ 31 [and 38]. He was deprived of his freedom. Id. He was deprived of the society of his family and friends, and was required to reside in a country which is to him foreign. Id. He was forced to undergo the anxieties and rigors of criminal proceedings which could have resulted in his imprisonment for several years. Id. His professional reputation has been ruined. See Second Declaration of Mylonakis at ¶ 17. 60
The injuries of which plaintiff complains are injuries that arise from his detention in the United States and his criminal prosecution for MARPOL/APPS violations existing on the M7T GEORGIOS M. Although the plaintiffs injuries are not the type of injuries typically experienced by plaintiffs asserting claims under environmental statutes, the evidentiary support provided by plaintiffs declarations satisfy the court' that plaintiff has satisfied the first requirement for constitutional standing, i.e., the plaintiff has submitted evi *724 dence capable of establishing that he has suffered injuries that are concrete, particularized, and actual, not conjectural or hypothetical, that affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way. See Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 .
(2) Plaintiffs Injuries Are Not Traceable to the Defendants’ Alleged Violations of the APPS
The “case or controversy” limitation of Article III requires that a federal court act only to redress injury that can fairly be traced to the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court. Lujan, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (citing Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 , 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1926 , 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)). To prove causation the plaintiff must connect his alleged injuries-in-fact to the defendants’ alleged illegal conduct. Simon, 96 S.Ct. at 1927 .
Plaintiff has asserted APPS claims against Helford and the individual Mamidakis Defendants, but not against STYGA. 61 The allegedly illegal actions of Helford and the Mamidakis Defendants that plaintiff contends caused his injuries-in-fact are MARPOL/APPS violations on the M7T GEORGIOS M. before and during the three months that he served as the vessel’s Chief Engineer, i.e., from November 29, 2008, to March 1, 2009, and the defendants’ allegedly false attribution of those violations to him. Therefore, to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to causation, plaintiff must present evidence capable of establishing that but for MARPOL/APPS violations and/or the false attribution of those violations to him traceable to Helford and/or the Mamidakis Defendants, he would not have suffered the injuries about which he complains, i.e., (1) being detained within the Southern District of Texas for more than one year, (2) being deprived of his freedom, (3) being deprived of the society of his friends and family, (4) being forced to undergo the anxieties and rigors of criminal proceedings, and (5) having his professional reputation ruined.
Asserting that his “injuries are directly traceable to the Defendants’ conduct,” 62 plaintiff explains that defendants’
vessel operated for years with an impermissible modification installed that provided a permanent unauthorized overboard discharge rendering the vessel’s IOPP certificate invalid. The Defendants’ guilty knowledge is evidenced by the complete absence of a mandatory major non-conformity record that they should have maintained and should have produced, as they were required under the ISM Code. 63
Plaintiff states that
STYGA’s President!, defendant Kyriakos Mamidakis,] testified that he didn’t know that it was Plaintiff who had installed the permanent “magic pipe,” but nevertheless signed the board resolution authorizing the entry of a Joint' Factual Statement that blamed Plaintiff, because the lawyers thought that it would be appropriate to do so, and he paid the lawyers a lot of money. 64
The evidence that plaintiff cites is sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding a causal connection between the injuries about which he com *725 plains and the conduct of defendant Kyriakos Mamidakis. Plaintiffs failure to cite any evidence linking the conduct of Helford or any of the other Mamidakis Defendants either to the MARPOL/APPS violations or to the false accusations that he alleges caused his injury-in-fact, lead the court to conclude that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the second requirement for constitutional standing with respect to any defendant other than Kyriakos Mamidakis.
(3) Plaintiffs Injuries Are Not Likely to Be Redressed by a Favorable Ruling
The redressability “inquiry focuses ... on whether the injury that a plaintiff alleges is likely to be redressed through the litigation.” Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc., 554 U.S. 269 , 128 S.Ct. 2531, 2542 , 171 L.Ed.2d 424 (2008). See Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 704 (redressability requirement of standing requires a plaintiff to show that “it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision”). The specific items of relief sought must serve either to reimburse the plaintiff for losses caused by the defendant’s wrongful act, or to eliminate any effects of that act upon the plaintiff. See Steel Co., 118 S.Ct. at 1018 .
Plaintiffs APPS claims seek imposition of civil penalties on Helford and the Mamidakis Defendants for wholly past violations of MARPOL/APPS:
42. Plaintiff, in accordance with the provisions of 33 U.S.C. § 1910 , brings this action ... to: enforce the provisions of APPS against HELFORD and the MAMIDAKIS DEFENDANTS; assess civil penalties against them for their systematic serial violations of APPS by the said Defendants and each of them, for each day that the vessel had called at U.S. ports in a state of deliberate noncompliance with APPS, and for [ ] making false fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations by the said Defendants and their instrumentality STYGA; assess civil penalties commensurate with the egregiousness of the violations of APPS by the Defendants, their ability to pay, and such “other matters as justice may require,” which in the circumstances should include the willingness of the said Defendants to scapegoat and falsely accuse and blame Plaintiff; in the Court’s discretion, award Plaintiff a sum not to exceed half (jk) of the civil penalties to be assessed against the said Defendants.
■43. For the period of the year 2008, Plaintiff estimates that over ten (10) calls were made by the M/T GEORGIOS M to U.S. ports of approximately five (5) days duration each, and an appropriate civil penalty would be the respective amounts set out in 33 U.S.C.1908(b)(l) . and (2) — i.e. $30,000 daily for a total of fifty (50) days, i.e. $1,500,000.00 over and above the $1,250,000.99 fine STYGA agreed to pay as part of its criminal “deal” in this matter. 65
Plaintiff argues that “[assessing an appropriate civil penalty in the circumstances would redress Plaintiffs injury by holding Defendants liable for their misuse of their employees and damages caused to [him].” 66
The Supreme Court set the standard for redressability in cases such as this in Steel Co., 118 S.Ct. at 1003 . The citizen-suit plaintiff in that case sought to impose civil penalties on the defendant for past viola *726 tions of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (“EP-CRA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001 et seq. Steel Co., 118 S.Ct. at 1008-09 . The EPCRA requires users of toxic and hazardous chemicals to file annual chemical inventory forms with local and state authorities. The EPCRA authorizes citizen suits against violators if the EPA fails to pursue an administrative or civil action against the violator after 60 days of receiving notice of the violations and authorizes civil penalties to be paid to the United States Treasury. The citizen-plaintiff discovered that the defendant, a user of toxic chemicals, had not filed the required forms from 1988 through 1995. The plaintiff notified the EPA and the defendant of the violation. Before the 60-day window had lapsed, the defendants filed all the appropriate forms, thereby complying with the statute. The EPA declined to bring an enforcement action, so the plaintiff sued.
Focusing only on the redressability prong of the standing inquiry, the Supreme Court held that civil penalties stemming from a past injury to a citizen-suit plaintiff, but not payable to the United States, do not redress any legitimate Article III injury to a private plaintiff. Id. at 1018-19. The Court reasoned that civil penalties “might be viewed as a sort of compensation or redress to [the plaintiff] if they were payable to [the plaintiff],” id. at 1018, but that when civil penalties are payable to the United States, they can only serve an “ ‘undifferentiated public interest’ in faithful execution of EPCRA.” Id. The Court explained that
although a suitor may derive great comfort and joy from the fact that the United States Treasury is not cheated, that a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or that the Nation’s laws are faithfully enforced, that psychic satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy because it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury.
Id. at 1019 (citing, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 , 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3326-27 , 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984), and Valley Forge Christian College, 102 S.Ct. at 763-65 ). Observing that “[rjelief that does not remedy the injury suffered cannot bootstrap a plaintiff into federal court,” id., the Court held that the citizen-suit plaintiff lacked constitutional standing to seek civil penalties for violations that have abated by the time of suit. Id. See Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 707-708 (“Steel Co. established that citizen suitors lack standing to seek civil penalties for violations that have abated by the time of suit ... In short, Steel Co. held that private plaintiffs, unlike the Federal Government, may not sue to assess penalties for wholly past violations ... ”). See also Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49 , 108 S.Ct. 376, 382 , 98 L.Ed.2d 306 (1987) (“the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in the present or the future, not in the past”), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Glazer v. American Ecology Environmental Services Corp., 894 F.Supp. 1029 (E.D.Tex. 1995).
Like the citizen plaintiff in Steel Co. who sought civil penalties payable to the United States for wholly past violations of the EPCRA, the plaintiff in this action seeks civil penalties payable to the United States for wholly past violations of the APPS. The civil penalties that plaintiff seeks in this action are authorized by 33 U.S.C. § 1908 (b), which provides that violators “shall be held liable to the United States for a civil penalty.” As the Supreme Court recognized in Steel Co., by requesting civil penalties payable to the United States plaintiff “seeks not remediation of [his] own injury — reimbursement for the [damages he] incurred as a result of the [MARPOL/APPS violations alleged] — but *727 vindication of the rule of law — the ‘undifferentiated public interest’ in faithful execution of [the APPS].” Steel Co., 118 S.Ct. at 1018 . Although § 1908(b) provides that “[a]n amount equal to not more than ]é of such penalties may be paid by the Secretary, or the Administrator as provided for in this chapter, to the person giving information leading to the assessment of such penalties,” plaintiff has neither alleged nor argued, and the court has found no authority stating, that the APPS — or any other comparable environmental statute — authorizes a court in a citizen suit — as opposed to the Secretary or the Administrator in an administrative proceeding — to award any amount of civil penalties assessed against a violator to a private party.
The Supreme Court revisited the availability of civil penalties in citizen suits in Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 706-08 . There, the plaintiff sued under the provisions of the Clean Water Act, which like the citizen-suit provisions of the EPCRA and the APPS, required civil penalties to be paid to the United States. The plaintiff alleged that Laidlaw, the operator of a wastewater treatment plant, had failed to comply with mercury discharge limits in its Clean Water permit. Laidlaw, unlike the defendant in Steel Co., continued certain violations after the plaintiff filed suit; however, at some point during the course of litigation, Laidlaw “achieved substantial compliance with the terms of its discharge permit.” Id. at 700. Due to Laidlaw’s compliance the district court denied the plaintiffs request for injunctive relief. The court, however, did assess a civil penalty, finding that the total deterrent effect of the penalty would be adequate to forestall future violations. Id. at 703. Both parties appealed the ruling on civil penalties, but neither party appealed the ruling on- injunctive relief. ■ See id. The court of appeals found that, even assuming the plaintiff had standing at the start of the suit, the case became moot once Laidlaw came into compliance with the Clean Water Act. See id. The court believed “that the elements of Article III standing — injury, causation, and redressability — must persist at every stage of review, or else the action becomes moot.” Id. Relying on Steel Co. the appeals court held “that the case had become moot because ‘the only remedy currently, available to [the plaintiff] — civil penalties payable to the government— would not redress any injury [plaintiff had] suffered.’ ” Id. (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 149 F.3d 303, 306 (4th Cir.1998)).
The Supreme Court reversed. On the issue of standing the Court held that the plaintiffs interest in deterrence was sufficient to satisfy redressability. The Court explained that
[t]o the extent that [civil penalties] encourage defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them from committing future ones, [civil penalties] afford redress to citizen plaintiffs who are injured or threatened with injury as a consequence of ongoing unlawful conduct.
120 S.Ct. at 706-707 (emphasis added). But the Court reiterated that where the violations at issue are not ongoing but wholly past the holding in Steel Co. that citizen suitors lack standing to seek civil penalties for violations that have abated by the time of suit is controlling. ’ Id. at 707 (citing Steel Co., 118 S.Ct. at 1024-25 ). The Court explained that “[w]e specifically noted in that case that there was no allegation in the complaint of any continuing-or imminent violation, and that no basis for such an allegation appeared to exist.” Id. (citing Steel Co., 118 S.Ct. at 1024-25 , and Gwaltney, 108 S.Ct. 376 (“the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in the present or.the future, not the past”)). *728 The Court distinguished Steel Co. based on when the offending conduct stopped; in Steel Co. the violations had wholly abated by the time the plaintiff filed suit. See id. at 708.
In the present case the plaintiff neither alleges nor presents any evidence that the MARPOL/APPS violations for which he seeks the imposition of civil penalties on Helford and the Mamidakis Defendants were ongoing and were not past violations that had abated by the time he filed suit. As demonstrated by the following excerpts from the Original Verified Complaint, the only MARPOL/APPS violations alleged in the Original Verified Complaint are wholly past violations that occurred prior to the date this suit was filed, i.e., August 24, 2010:
28. At all times material hereto, and specifically between November 29, 2008 and March 1, 2009, Plaintiff, having signed ship’s articles onboard the Maltese flag Motor Tanker GEORGIOS M, was employed as the vessel’s Chief Engineer ...
29. At all times material hereto, Defendants in their respective capacities owned Plaintiff a duty to provide a workplace onboard a lawful ship conforming with all international conventions to which the vessel’s flag state— Malta — was a party, including but not limited to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships known as MARPOL, and its U.S. codification known as The Act to Prevent Pollution [from]- Ships, 33 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. (hereinafter “APPS”).
30. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, but known to Defendants, the GEORGIOS M did not meet the requirements of MARPOL or APPS in several respects in that it possessed an International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate (“IOPP”) that incorrectly and untruthfully reflected the arrangements and workings of the oil pollution prevention equipment and appliances onboard, which had been modified and rigged in such a way allowing for same to be bypassed, to directly discharge overboard oily sludge and oily bilge water.
31. Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, at all times material hereto, but known to Defendants, the GEORGIOS M had been for a number of years, operating in violation of MARPOL, intentionally discharging overboard engine room oily waste, including sludge and untreated oily bilge water and was using for this purpose certain unlawful permanent installations purposely concealed under the engine room floor plates.
33. On February 19, 2009, at the port of Texas City, Texas, the United States Coast Guard, as a result of confessions made by some of crewmembers who had actively participated in carrying on the 'unlawful discharge of oily waste overboard, commenced an investigation, which eventually led into a criminal investigation of STYGA by the U.S. Department of Justice.
34. In the course of the pursuit of its investigation the U.S. Department of Justice entered in plea bargaining negotiations with STYGA and agreement was reached for STYGA to: plead guilty and pay a fine [] in the total amount of $1,250,000; participate in a compulsory pollution management compliance plan; and, significantly for purposes of this action, cooperate with the government in the criminal prosecution of Plaintiff, who had not been indicted yet during the plea bargaining negotiations.
35. As part of its negotiated guilty plea, STYGA agreed to sign a joint factual statement, that would specifically blame Plaintiff, among other shipboard *729 personnel, for the MARPOL and APPS violations occurring onboard ' the GEORGIOS M, with the knowledge and/or consent of Defendants. (A copy of the said joint factual statement is hereto attached as EXHIBIT 1). The signing of the said factual statement on behalf of STYGA was expressly authorized by each of STYGA’s directors, who are the MAMIDAKIS DEFENDANTS. (A copy of the relevant authorization is hereto attached as EXHIBIT 2).
36. In the course of the investigation of the MARPOL and APPS violations, and the plea bargaining on behalf of STYGA, Defendants intentionally violated 33 U.S.C. § 1908 by making false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements and/or representations to the government regarding the authorship of and responsibility for the MARPOL and/or APPS violations onboard. More particularly, Defendants falsely represented the violations as actions of the Plaintiff, when in actual fact the violations had existed for some time with the knowledge and approval of Defendants.
37. On information and belief, in negotiating STYGA’s plea of guilty, in violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1908 , Defendants made false,' fictitious or fraudulent statements to the government misrepresenting: the actual business and economic relationship and arrangements between STYGA (a privately owned company with limited assets); HELFORD (the owner holding legal "title to the vessel); the MAMIDAKIS DEFENDANTS; and their privately wholly owned and controlled company JETOIL (as beneficial owners of STYGA, HELFORD, and the GEORGIOS M).
38. By means of their aforementioned false, fictitious or fraudulent statements and/or representations, the MAMIDAKIS DEFENDANTS and HELFORD, succeeded in escaping any and all liability for their repetitive criminal conduct. Instead, STYGA — a company with minimal assets and little to lose — was thereby used as a lightning rod to deflect all responsibility, from the other Defendants, and was required to pay a relatively nominal fine, under an “installment plan.” The agreed fine is disproportionately small considering the magnitude of the actual wealth of the MAMIDAKIS DEFENDANTS and HELFORD.
39. By contrast, Plaintiff, who at all times material hereto was innocent, was indicted on August 20, 2009, and on September 1, 2009, was arraigned and entered a plea of “not guilty” on all counts.
40. Though fully and completely exonerated and acquitted in a jury trial of all charges, Plaintiff nevertheless, as a result of the Defendants’ actions complained of herein, sustained injury in fact attributable to the Defendants’ unlawful conduct, and violations of APPS that includes, but is not limited to: his detention and loss of freedom over a period exceeding fourteen (14) months within the confines of the Southern District of Texas, first due to his wrongful detention by Defendants; then, as a purported material witness and subsequently, following his indictment as an accused awaiting trial; his criminal prosecution for Defendants’ MARPOL violations; loss of his employment as Chief Engineer of the GEORGIOS M; loss of valuable sea .service during the period of his detention that would have counted toward his retirement and pension; loss of his medical insurance for him and his family, for which actual service onboard a vessel as a seafarer is a sine qua non condition; damages and deterioration to his health during the period of his detention, damage to his good name and reputation as a chief *730 engineer; and other losses and damages 67
The court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs APPS claims are based on allegations of past violations is corroborated by the plaintiffs response to the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment on the APPS claims where plaintiff argues that:
Paragraph 36 of the Complaint, refers to three (3) distinct failures of the GEORGIOS M to conform to the relevant laws of the United States and MARPOL, on each occasion the Vessel called at ports of the United States while Plaintiff was employed on board as Chief Engineer. First, as pled in paragraph 30 of the Complaint, the vessel’s IOPP (International Oil Pollution Prevention Certificate) was invalid as “significant alterations ha[d] taken place in the construction, equipment, fittings, or arrangements required by the pollution prevention requirements.” See Complaint, D.E. # 1, 130; see also 33 CFR § 151.19 (e)(1). Namely, the installation of a branch line that diverted sludge from following the route to the international shore connection and allowing it, through a “fiddled” check valve, to travel the route of unlawful overboard discharge in contravention of 33 CFR § 155.430 (a). Second, the presence onboard and showing to port state control authorities of an Oil Record Book containing false entries for the entire month of June of 2007, and half of May of the same year. Finally, the failure of the Defendants to have on-board the vessel a truthful and accurate record, as dictated by the International Safety Management Code (“ISM Code”), of the major non-conformity of the broken down incinerator for a period exceeding one month, and the installation onboard of unlawful equipment, such as the permanent magic pipe. The false statements referred to in paragraph 36 of the Complaint include the three distinct violations just noted, in addition to ■ the false statements in STYGA’s Joint Factual Statement. See Complaint, D.E. # 1, 5136.
By reason of these and other MAR-POL/APPS violations found onboard the GEORGIOS M, Defendants’ failure to own-up to same, and their false statements to the authorities and to Plaintiff, Defendants made Plaintiff a suspect, caused his detention, and procured his indictment and prosecution. 68
Because the only MARPOL/APPS violations that are either alleged in plaintiffs Original Verified Complaint or evidenced in response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the APPS claims are past violations that plaintiff alleges occurred either during the three months that he was employed on the M/T GEORGIOS M. from November 2008 to March 2009, or prior to that time, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to adduce any evidence capable of establishing that the violations for which he seeks to have civil penalties imposed on Helford and the Mamidakis Defendants were ongoing at the time this action was filed. Thus, based on the Supreme Court’s holding in Steel Co., 118 S.Ct. at 1018-19 , that citizen suitors lack standing to seek civil penalties for violations that have abated by the time of suit, and the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of that holding in Laidlaw, 120 S.Ct. at 707 , the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the third requirement for constitutional standing, i.e., that a *731 favorable ruling on the plaintiffs APPS claims for civil penalties would redress the plaintiffs injuries-in-fact.
(4) Conclusions as to Constitutional Standing
For the reasons stated in § III.B.2(a)(2), above, the court concludes that plaintiff has failed to cite any evidence capable of establishing a causal connection between the APPS violations allegedly committed by Helford or any of the Mamidakis Defendants except Kyriakos Mamidakis. For the reasons stated in § III.B.2(a)(3), above,.the court concludes that plaintiffs alleged injuries are not likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling on his APPS claims because the only APPS violations for which the plaintiff seeks relief are wholly past violations that are not actionable under the APPS’s prospectively worded citizen-suit provision and because the civil penalties that plaintiff seeks for those violations are payable to the United States. Because the plaintiff has failed to cite evidence capable of establishing that a favorable ruling on his APPS claims is likely to redress the injuries-in-fact that he alleges arise from the defendants’ APPS violations, the court concludes that plaintiff lacks constitutional standing to assert APPS claims and that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider those claims.
(b) Statutory Standing
Citing Gwaltney, 108 S.Ct. at 376 , defendants argue that plaintiffs APPS claims are barred because they rest on wholly past violations that are not action-ably under the APPS citizen-suit provision. 69 The citizen-suit provision of the APPS provides that “any person having an interest which is, or can be, adversely affected, may bring an action on his own behalf — (1) against any person alleged to be in violation of the provisions of this chapter, or regulations issued thereunder.” 33 U.S.C. § 1910 (a). Citizen-suit provisions in other environmental statutes containing the phrase, i.e., “alleged to be in violation,” have been construed to bar claims based on wholly past violations, i.e., violations that are not ongoing when suit is filed.
In Gwaltney the Virginia State Water Control Board issued a NPDES permit to Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. in 1974 authorizing Gwaltney to discharge seven pollutants, including fecal coliform, chlorine, and total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN), from the company’s meat-packing plant on the Pagan River in Smithfield, Virginia. Id. at 379-80 . Between 1981 and 1984 the company repeatedly violated the conditions of the permit by exceeding effluent limitations on five of -the seven covered pollutants. Id. at 379 . In March of 1982 the company installed new equipment to improve its chlorination system, and the last reported chlorine violation occurred in October of 1982. Id. The new chlorination system also helped control the discharge of fecal coliform, the last of which occurred in February of 1984. Id. In October of 1983 the company upgraded its wastewater treatment system,, and the last reported TKN violation occurred on May 15, 1984. Id. .
The respondents, two environmental groups, sent notice in February of 1984 to the company, the EPA, and the Virginia Board of their intent to file a citizen suit under the CWA based on the company’s violations of its permit conditions. Id. at 380 . The respondents filed suit in June of 1984. Id. The company moved to dismiss *732 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the CWA, arguing that the language of 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (a), which allows private citizens to bring suit — against any person “alleged to be in violation” of the CWA, required the defendant to be violating the CWA at the time of suit. Id. The company contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction over the action because its last recorded violation occurred several weeks before the respondents filed their complaint. Id.
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that “[t]he most natural reading of ‘to be. in violation’ is a requirement that citizen-plaintiffs allege a state of either continuous or intermittent violation — that is, a reasonable- likelihood that a past polluter will continue to pollute in the future.” Id. at 381 . The Court observed that “the pervasive use of the present tense ■ throughout § [1365],” id. at 382, especially in the definition of “ ‘citizen’ as ‘a person ... having an interest which is or may be adversely affected’ by the defendant’s violations of the Act,” id. (quoting § 1365(g)), made plain that “the harm sought to be addressed by the citizen suit lies in the present or future, not in the past.” Id. The Court reasoned in relevant part that
[a]ny other conclusion would render incomprehensible § [1365’s] notice provision, which requires citizens to give 60 days’ notice of their intent to sue to the alleged violator as well as to the Administrator and the State. § 1365(b)(1)(A). If the Administrator or the State commences enforcement action within that 60-day period, the citizen suit is barred, presumably because governmental action has rendered it unnecessary. § 1365(b)(1)(B). It follows logically that the purpose of notice to the alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring itself into complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise render unnecessary a citizen suit. If we assume, as respondents urge, that citizen suits may target wholly past violations, the requirement of notice to the alleged violator becomes gratuitous.
Id. at 382-83. The Court further observed that
[a]dopting respondents’ interpretation of § [1365’s] jurisdictional grant would create a second and even more disturbing anomaly. The bar on citizen suits when governmental enforcement action is under way suggests that the citizen 'suit is meant to supplement rather than to supplant governmental action. The legislative history of the Act reinforces this view of the role of the citizen suit. The Senate Report noted that “[t]he Committee intends the great volume of enforcement actions [to] be brought by the State,” and that citizen suits are proper only “if the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their enforcement responsibility.” S.Rep. No. 92-414, p. 64 (1971), [1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3730,] reprinted in 2 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, ,p. 1482 (1973) (hereinafter Leg. Hist.). Permitting citizen suits for wholly past violations of the Act could undermine the supplementary role envisioned for the citizen suit. This danger is best illustrated by an example. Suppose that the Administrator identified a violator of the Act and issued a compliance order under § 309(a). Suppose further that the Administrator agreed not to assess or otherwise seek civil penalties on the condition that the violator take some extreme corrective action, such as to install particularly effective but expensive machinery, that it otherwise would not be obliged to take. If citizens could file suit, months or years later, in order to seek the civil penalties that the Administrator chose to forgo, then the Adminis *733 trator’s discretion to enforce the Act in the public interest would be curtailed considerably. The same might be said of the discretion of state enforcement authorities. Respondents’ interpretation of the scope of the citizen suit would change the nature of the citizens’ role from interstitial to potentially intrusive. We cannot agree that Congress intended such a result.
Id. at 383.
Notwithstanding its conclusion that § 1365 does not permit citizen suits for wholly past violations, the Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings because the respondents had also alleged that the company was continuing to violate its NPDES permit when they filed suit. Id. at 385. The Supreme Court concluded that § 1365 confers jurisdiction over citizen suits when the citizen-plaintiffs make a good-faith allegation of continuous or intermittent violation. Id. The Court rejected the company’s argument that this construction of § 1365 would permit citizen-plaintiffs to pursue their suits to conclusion even if their allegations of ongoing noncompliance became false at some later point in the litigation because the defendant begins to comply with the Act, reasoning that “[ljongstanding principles of mootness” would prevent maintenance of suit when there was no reasonable expectation of recurrence. Id. at 386.
Like the citizen-plaintiffs in Gwaltney, plaintiff in this action did not file his federal complaint until after the last recorded violation, and after the defendant polluters had entered the ECP intended to bring the M/T GEORGIOS M. into compliance with MARPOL/APPS. As in Gwaltney, the defendants’ remedial efforts were not prompted by the plaintiffs citizen suit; indeed the remedial actions preceded the plaintiffs citizen suit. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s concern in Gwaltney that citizen suits for wholly past violations would undermine the supplementary role envisioned by Congress is equally applicable here. By the time plaintiff filed his federal action STYGA and the United States had entered into and enforced an ECP requiring STYGA to implement a corrective action plan to bring the M/T GEORGIOS M. into compliance with MARPOL/APPS, and the defendants were on track to expend over a $1 million to that end. By the terms of STYGA’s Plea Agreement the United States agreed to forgo civil penalties on the condition that the violator — STYGA—take corrective action, i.e., to enter the ECP, that it otherwise would not be obliged to take. Gwaltney, 108 S.Ct. at 383 . Thus, the true nature of plaintiffs suit in this case is not “interstitial” but “potentially intrusive” because the United States had not failed to exercise its enforcement responsibility. In short, all of the concerns expressed in Gwaltney are present in this case and point to the conclusion that, given the unique facts of this case, plaintiff lacks statutory standing to file suit.
Gwaltney also recognized that standing is conferred by good-faith allegations of continuous or intermittent violations. Id. at 385. However, as explained above, the Original Verified Complaint alleges only past violations that had abated by the date that the plaintiff filed this action on August 24, 2010; and plaintiffs response to defendants’ motion for summary judgment cites evidence of only past violations that predate the filing of this action. Therefore, plaintiff has neither alleged nor cited any evidence of a continuing violation. See id. (holding that the plaintiffs’ complaint satisfied the jurisdictional requirements of § 1365 and conferred standing because their complaint alleged in good faith that “Gwaltney was continuing to violate its NPDES permit when plaintiffs filed suit”). *734 Accordingly, the court concludes that plaintiff lacks statutory standing to assert the APPS claims alleged in his complaint. See Brown v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 663 F.3d 759, 769 (5th Cir.2011), cert. denied sub nom Cunningham v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2103 , 182 L.Ed.2d 868 (2012) (recognizing that a prospectively worded citizen-suit provision, like the APPS’s, requires that “the harm sought to be addressed ... lie[ ] in the present or the future, not in the past,” and that the failure to allege and/or provide evidence of violations that are ongoing when suit is filed deprives the plaintiff of statutory standing).
C. Malicious Prosecution
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim because he cannot establish that any “information provided to the Government by the Defendants caused or resulted in the indictment or prosecution of the Plaintiff.” 70 Asserting that plaintiffs malicious prosecution claim is based on the Joint Factual Statement and the Plea Agreement executed by STYGA, and that neither of these documents existed when a grand jury indicted plaintiff on August 20, 2009, 71 defendants argue that plaintiffs prosecution could not have been caused by false statements in those documents. 72 Defendants also assert that
none of the corporate officers of Defendants nor any of the STYGA Board of Directors provided grand jury testimony to the U.S. Government as part of their indictment of Plaintiff. Specifically, all of the information used to indict Plaintiff came from the testimony of USCG Special Agent Douglas Moore, engine room crew members of M.T. Georgios M, documents seized aboard the M.T. Georgios M, and the physical evidence of the magic pipe. 73
Plaintiff argues that defendants’ motion for summary judgment on his malicious prosecution claim should be denied because whether a causal connection exists between defendants’ actions and his prosecution “is a complex issue of fact.” 74
1. Applicable Law
The tort of malicious prosecution of criminal proceedings occurs when one citizen initiates or procures the initiation of criminal proceedings against an innocent person, for an improper purpose and without probable cause therefor, if the proceedings terminate favorably for the person thus prosecuted.
Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945 (5th Cir.2003) (en banc), cert. denied, 543 *735 U.S. 808 , 125 S.Ct. 31 , 160 L.Ed.2d 10 and 543 U.S. 808 , 125 S.Ct. 33 , 160 L.Ed.2d 10 (2004). To prevail on his claim for malicious prosecution under Texas law the plaintiff must establish that (1) a criminal action was commenced against him; (2) the prosecution was caused, initiated, or procured by the defendant or with his aid; (3) the action terminated in the plaintiffs favor; (4) the plaintiff was innocent; (5) the defendant acted without probable cause; (6) the defendant acted with malice; and (7) the criminal proceeding damaged the plaintiff. Richey v. Brookshire Grocery Co., 952 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex.1997).
Causation is an indispensable element of a malicious prosecution claim. Causation is established by proof that a person initiates or procures a prosecution. See King v. Graham, 126 S.W.3d 75, 78 (Tex.2003) (per curiam). See also Browning-Ferris Industries v, Lieck, 881 S.W.2d 288, 292 (Tex.1994). A defendant initiates a prosecution when he or she files formal charges against the plaintiff. Lieck, 881 S.W.2d at 293 . A defendant procures a prosecution when its
actions were enough to cause the prosecution, and but for [its] actions the prosecution would not have occurred. [The defendant] does not procure a criminal prosecution when the decision whether to prosecute is left to the discretion of another, including a law enforcement official or the grand jury, unless the person provides information which he knows is false.
Lieck, 881 S.W.2d at 293 . See also Dangerfield v. Orrnsby, 264 S.W.3d 904, 910 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2008, no pet.) (explaining that to establish procurement, the defendant’s desire must be the “determining factor in the official’s decision to commence the prosecution”). Thus, “proof that a complainant has knowingly furnished false information is necessary for liability when the decision to prosecute is within another’s discretion. But such proof is not sufficient.” King, 126 S.W.3d at 76 . Instead, “there must be proof that the prosecutor acted based on, the false information and that but for such false information the decision [to prosecute] would not have been made.” Id. Therefore,
a person who knowingly provides false information to the grand jury or a law enforcement official who has the discretion to decide whether to prosecute a criminal violation cannot be said' to have caused the prosecution if the information was immaterial to the decision to prosecute. If the decision to prosecute would have been made with or without the false information, the complainant did not cause the prosecution by supplying false information.
Id. at 78 . See First Valley Bank of Los Fresnos v. Martin, 144 S.W.3d 466, 470 (Tex.2004).
2. Application of the Law to the Facts
Plaintiff does not assert that defendants initiated his prosecution by filing a formal complaint. Instead, plaintiff argues that the defendants procured his prosecution by providing false information to the government and by withholding “critical” information from the government. Plaintiffs argument is based on his contention that
(1) the Defendants withheld from the government critical information that clearly implicated Defendants in MAR-POL/APPS irregularities onboard the GEORGIOS M.; (2) that Defendants made a “deal” with the government just the day before the grand jury received witness testimony and returned an indictment against him; (3) that the deal between the government and STYGA is summarized in the Plea Agreement *736 (EXHIBIT 3) and the Joint Factual Statement (EXHIBIT 4) that unequivocally blames Plaintiff for MARPOL violations onboard the GEORGIOS M. 75
Plaintiff asserts that “[t]hese facts are sufficient reason for allowing Plaintiffs claim to proceed so that he will have an opportm nity to provide full proof for the jury to consider whether or not there was causation.” 76
As evidence that the defendants withheld from the government “critical” information that caused his prosecution plaintiff asserts that
Defendants deceived both the Plaintiff and the government by keeping from them critical information about the problems the GEORGIOS M had had with her incinerator, for an extended period of time more than one year before Plaintiff joined the GEORGIOS M as her chief engineer. STYGA’s and the vessel’s record, of non-conformities, mandatory under the International Safety Management Code, failed to record these major non-conformities. See (FIRST EM, p. 84,11 23 through p. 85,11 25). Defendants kept the truth to themselves. They disclosed an avalanche of papers to the government but the critical information was missing. The critical information was missing because STYGA failed to report the malfunctions to DNV, the classification society that certified the vessel and its own technical personnel did not enter the information in the vessel’s and the company’s ISM records. (CHDRV, p. 177, 11 9 through p. 181, 11 16); (CHDRV, p. 129, 11 15 through p. 134, 11 20). The reason the information was missing was probably to cover up a history of unlawful disposal of oily waste overboard in violation of MARPOL when the ship’s incinerator was out of order. See (CHDRV, p. 189, 11 6 through p. 192, 11 10; p. 126 11 3 through p. 127,1113). 77
The deposition testimony of Emmanuel Mamidakis and Christos Dravillas that plaintiff cites in support of his argument tha

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8704250. Public record. Not legal advice.