# United States v. Darnell Brown

> Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · May 24, 2013 · 524 F. App'x 920

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/869772

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darnell Leon BROWN, Defendant-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- **Decided:** May 24, 2013
- **Citations:** 524 F. App'x 920
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Niemeyer, Agee, Hamilton
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/869772

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that, if sentence is reasonable, inquiry ends

## Opinion text

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-4976

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DARNELL LEON BROWN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Anderson. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (8:05-cr-00812-HMH-2)

Submitted: May 8, 2013 Decided: May 24, 2013

Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lora E. Collins, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. Elizabeth Jean Howard, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Darnell Leon Brown appeals the district court’s

judgment revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to

the statutory maximum of eighty-four months’ imprisonment.

Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious issues

for appeal but questioning whether the district court abused its

discretion in revoking Brown’s supervised release and in

imposing sentence. Brown was informed of his right to file a

pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done so. We affirm.

Although we ordinarily review the district court’s

revocation of supervised release for abuse of discretion, see

United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999),

Brown did not object to the district court’s revocation of his

supervised release; we therefore review for plain error. United

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32 (1993) (providing

standard). Because Brown admitted to possessing controlled

substances, firearms, and ammunition, the district court was

obligated to revoke Brown’s supervised release and impose a term

of imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) (2006). Accordingly,

we conclude that the district court did not err—plainly or

otherwise—by revoking Brown’s supervised release.

In examining a sentence imposed upon revocation of

supervised release, this court “takes a more deferential

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appellate posture concerning issues of fact and the exercise of

discretion than reasonableness review for [G]uidelines

sentences.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th

Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). A sentence

imposed upon revocation of supervised release should be affirmed

if it is within the statutory maximum and not plainly

unreasonable. United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437 (4th

Cir. 2006). In reviewing a revocation sentence, “we first

decide whether the sentence is unreasonable,” following the same

general principles we apply to our review of original sentences.

Id. at 438. Only if we find that a sentence is either

procedurally or substantively unreasonable will we determine

whether the sentence is “plainly” so. Id. at 439.

A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if

the district court has considered both the applicable 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a) (2006) factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2006), and

the policy statements set forth in Chapter Seven of the U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) (2012). Crudup, 461 F.3d

at 439. The district court also must provide an explanation of

its chosen sentence, although this explanation “need not be as

detailed or specific” as is required for an original sentence.

United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A

sentence is substantively reasonable if the district court

states a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should

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receive the sentence imposed. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. “[T]he

court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke its previous

sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory

maximum.” Id. at 439 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because Brown did not object to any aspect of his sentence, our

review is for plain error. See United States v. Bennett, 698

F.3d 194, 199-200 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 1506

(2013).

Our review of the record reveals that the district

court committed no procedural error. Although the district

court plainly erred by considering § 3553(a)(2)(A), a prohibited

factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), we conclude that this error

did not affect Brown’s substantial rights. See Olano, 507 U.S.

at 731-32; United States v. Hargrove, 625 F.3d 170, 183-84 (4th

Cir. 2010). When imposing Brown’s revocation sentence, the

district court emphasized Brown’s breach of trust, observing

that Brown had continued to engage in criminal activity after

being charged in both state and federal court. Moreover, the

district court considered several permissible factors under

§ 3583(e), including the need to deter Brown from engaging in

criminal activity and to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(a)(2)(B), (C); Bennett, 698 F.3d at 201 (upholding

sentence when prohibited factor “constituted only a minor

fragment of court’s reasoning” and when court’s “concern with

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[defendant’s] breach of trust . . . far outweighed any other

concerns”). Given the broad discretion to revoke supervised

release and impose a term of imprisonment up to the statutory

maximum, Brown’s sentence is reasonable. See Crudup, 461 F.3d

at 439 (stating that, if sentence is reasonable, inquiry ends).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record

in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court

requires that counsel inform Brown, in writing, of his right to

petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further

review. If Brown requests that a petition be filed, but counsel

believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel

may move in this court for leave to withdraw from

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof

was served on Brown. We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

materials before this court and argument would not aid the

decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/869772. Public record. Not legal advice.
