# R.C. ex rel. Alabama Disabilities Advocacy, Program v. Walley

> District Court, M.D. Alabama · January 16, 2007 · 475 F. Supp. 2d 1118

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8688051

## Case

- **Full name:** R.C. by his next friend, THE ALABAMA DISABILITIES ADVOCACY, PROGRAM, on behalf of himself and those similarly situated v. Page WALLEY, as Commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources
- **Court:** District Court, M.D. Alabama
- **Decided:** January 16, 2007
- **Citations:** 475 F. Supp. 2d 1118; 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3515
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Ment
- **Judges:** Ment
- **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
DE MENT, Senior District Judge.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION.1122
II. JURISDICTION.1123
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW.1123
A. The Standard for Termination of the Consent Decree.1123
1. Generally.1123
2. The Terms of the Consent Decree and its Termination Clause.1124
*1121 a. Implementation of the “System of Care”.1124
b. Termination Clause.1124
e. The Requirements of the Consent Decree .1125
3. Substantial Compliance .1126
B. Evidentiary Hearing.1128
C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.1129
IV. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND .1129
A. Brief Summary of R.C. 1.1129
B. Orders and Pleadings Filed after R.C. I .1130
C. The Court Monitor’s 2006 On-Site Sustainability Reviews.1132
V. DISCUSSION.1134
A. Analysis of Substantial Compliance under the First Prong of the Termination Clause of the Consent Decree.1134
B. Analysis of Substantial Compliance under the Second Prong of the Termination Clause of the Consent Decree.1136
1. Preliminary Findings Concerning the 2006 On-Site Sustainability Reviews and the Parties’ Positions as to What the Reviews Mean in terms of Substantial Compliance.1137
2. Ratings: Overall Child Status and Overall Performance.1138
3. Core Purpose One.1139
Jp. Core Purpose Four.1142
5. Core Purpose Two: Service Delivery and Competent Staff.1145
a. Service Delivery .1145
b. Competent Staff.1146
i. DHR’s Demonstrated Compliance with the Court’s Order on Developing a Licensed Child Welfare Social Worker Workforce.1146
ii. Stakeholders’Reports.1147
Hi. Training.1148
6. Core Purpose Two: Appropriate Caseloads.1148
a. Staffing Allocations and the Child Welfare Staffing Committee... .1150
b. DHR’s Compliance with the Monitoring and Reporting Sections of Court’s 1998 Order.1154
c. The Court Monitor’s Measurements for Ascertaining Substantial Compliance with the Court’s 1998 Order and Examination of the Evidence from the 2006 On-Site Sustainability Reviews.... 1154
i Counties’Average R.C. Workloads.1155
ii. Counties’ Seven-Month Track Record.1156
Hi. Data Pertaining to Percentages of Staff “Over Standards”.... 1157
Findings Regarding Exception Reports.1161
Findings Regarding Staff Turnover.1162
Findings Regarding DHR’s Good Faith.1163
d. The Court’s Overall Findings of Substantial Compliance Concerning Core Purpose Two’s Goal of Compliant Caseloads.... 1164
7. Core Purpose Three.1165
a. Positions of the Parties and the Court Monitor.1166
b. Timely Completion of ISPs.1166
c. Serviceable ISPs.1167
d. The 2006 On-Site Sustainability Reviews.1168
e. Findings.1169
8. Core Purpose Five.1170
9. The 2006 On-Site Sustainability Reviews: The Three Counties Which the Court Monitor Deemed Were Not in Substantial Compliance mth the Consent Decree .1177
a. The Arguments of the Parties.1177
b. DHR Has Detected Problems.1178
10. Other Noteworthy Evidence.1180
*1122 11. The End of Federal Judicial Supervision Does Not Mean the End of Oversight: DHR’s Quality Assurance System and Other Supervision Mechanisms. .1182
VI. CONCLUSION ..1183
VII. ORDER..... 1185
I. INTRODUCTION
This cause is before the court on the second motion for order terminating Consent Decree (Doc. No. 761), filed by the Honorable Page Walley, Ph.D., who by virtue of his position as the commissioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources (“DHR”) is the defendant in this long-running litigation involving institutional reform of DHR’s child welfare system. 1 The first motion for order terminating Consent Decree was denied by the court in a memorandum opinion and order entered on May 13, 2005. See R.C. v. Walley (“R.C.I”), 390 F.Supp.2d 1030 (M.D.Ala.2005). In R.C.I, the court found that “Defendant ha[d] not submitted evidence sufficient to sustain his burden of demonstrating that DHR ‘is’ and ‘will remain’ in substantial compliance with the terms of the Consent Decree and of the Implementation Plan as required for termination of said Decree.” Id. at 1033 .
As grounds for his second motion, Defendant asserts that he has submitted an adequate evidentiary record to support termination of the Consent Decree, which has governed in this case since 1991, and that this evidence addresses and cures the deficiencies outlined by the court in R.C.I. Conversely, Plaintiffs, who opposed the first motion and likewise oppose the instant “second” motion, argue that there is no evidentiary basis for termination of the Consent Decree and that continued judicial oversight is necessary to bring Defendant in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Consent Decree.
After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, the relevant law and the record as a whole, the court finds that DHR successfully has reformed its child welfare system by developing a system of care which substantially complies with the requirements of the Consent Decree and the Implementation Plan and that judicial oversight is no longer necessary to avoid return to the depraved conditions that led to the commencement of this lawsuit in 1988 and to the court’s intervention. 2 The *1123 court finds that Defendant has met his burden of demonstrating DHR’s substantial compliance under the Consent Decree’s two-pronged termination clause and that, accordingly, Defendant’s motion is due to be granted. 3
II. JURISDICTION
The Consent Decree bestows upon the court shared authority with the court monitor to determine compliance with the Consent Decree, but sole authority to terminate the Consent Decree upon motion of Defendant. (Consent Decree ¶¶ 86, 91, 93, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235)), as amended by 1999 Consent Order (Doc. No. 511); R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1034 . A court also maintains inherent jurisdiction over its decrees. See Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 23 F.3d 1013, 1018 (6th Cir.1994); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556, 1568 (2d Cir.1985) (“Consent decrees are subject to continuing supervision and enforcement by the court.”). The court, thus, acts within its jurisdiction in ruling on the present motion to terminate the Consent Decree.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. The Standard for Termination of the Consent Decree
1. Generally
The court begins with the principles, duly emphasized by Defendant, that Consent Decrees “are not intended to operate in perpetuity,” Board of Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248 , 111 S.Ct. 630 , 112 L.Ed.2d 715 (1991), and that ‘‘[returning governmental entities to the control of local authorities ‘at the earliest practicable date is essential to restore their true accountability to our governmental system.’ ” Jordan v. Wilson, 951 F.Supp. 1571, 1580 (M.D.Ala.1996) (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 , 112 S.Ct. 1430 , 118 L.Ed.2d 108 (1992)); see also Reynolds v. McInnes, 338 F.3d 1201, 1219 (11th Cir.2003) (“Federal court oversight of an interference in the operations of a state government department or agency ‘should be as narrow and short-lived’ as fulfilling the duty to eradicate [the violation] allows.”) (quoting Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1574-75 (11th Cir.1994)) (brackets added). The court concurs wholeheartedly with the foregoing principles, and, as the court stated in R.C.I, it “is more anxious than Defendant to return this case to the State[.]” 390 F.Supp.2d at 1059 . At the same time, however, while the goal of achieving state and local autonomy of non-federal public institutions is a substantial one, a parallel goal of obvious equal importance is that the offending party must “remedy the violation” which the consent decree seeks to cure. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489 , 112 S.Ct. 1430 ; Sims v. Montgomery County Com’n, 9 F.Supp.2d 1281, 1288 (M.D.Ala.1998). Stated in slightly different terms, termination of a consent decree is not appropriate unless the decree’s purposes have “ ‘been fully achieved.’ ” U.S. v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497 , 1505 (11th Cir.1993) (citation omitted).
In R.C.I, the court opined that, notwithstanding that the instant Consent Decree had been in effect at that time for almost fifteen years, termination was not warranted because, in essence, Defendant had failed to meet his evidentiary burden of demonstrating that DHR had remedied the violations which the Consent Decree *1124 sought to eliminate. See 390 F.Supp.2d at 1059 . Defendant’s burden is embodied in the two-part termination clause of the Consent Decree, to which the court now turns.
2. The Terms of the Consent Decree and its Termination Clause
“A district court must look to the specific terms of a consent decree in determining whether and when to terminate supervision or jurisdiction over it.” Gonzales v. Galvin, 151 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir.1998). The Consent Decree is a detailed document, forty pages in length, which sets out a comprehensive agreement for transforming the operations of DHR’s child protective services and foster care systems (“child welfare system”). 4 Paragraph 31 of the Consent Decree provides as follows:
Defendant shall ensure that DHR, pursuant to the timetable in the Implementation Plan:
a. Establishes a “system of care” for class members and their families;
b. Operates the “system of care” with the aim of achieving the goals described in Section VII below and in conformity with the “principles” or “standards” set forth in Section VIII below.
(Consent Decree at 13, § VII, ¶ 31 (Doc. No. 235).)
a. Implementation of the “System of Care”
As provided in ¶ 31 of the Consent Decree, above, execution of the “system of care” is governed by specific standards and deadlines set forth in the Implementation Plan, a separate document. 5 (See Order approving Implementation Plan (Doc. No. 265).) The Implementation Plan ultimately was approved by the court on November 1, 1993. (Order approving Implementation Plan (Doc. No. 265)); (Order Regarding Implementation and the Implementation Plan) (Doc. No. 266). The Implementation Plan was developed to effectuate a manageable and cost-effective plan with specified deadlines to achieve the massive reforms required for DHR to incorporate into its child welfare system the goals and principles of the Consent Decree. (Consent Decree ¶¶ 64-68 (Doc. No. 235).) Therein, the parties agreed to a phased-in “conversion” process, meaning that each year specified counties were to be “converted” until all counties achieved “conversion” status. 6 See R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1034 . As discussed in the next section, each of Alabama’s sixty-seven counties has been evaluated, and, at the time of evaluation, each county was declared “converted.”
b. The Termination Clause
The Consent Decree contains a termination clause which provides the ultimate *1125 standard by which the court is to measure whether the required system of care has been established and whether the Consent Decree’s goals and principles have been accomplished. As embodied in the Consent Decree and voluntarily agreed to by Defendant, two questions must be answered in Defendant’s favor in order for the court to terminate the Consent Decree. Specifically, the termination clause of the Consent Decree provides as follows:
On or after October 1, 2002, the defendant may move for termination of this Decree upon a showing that DHR is in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Decree and of the Implementation Plan and that DHR will remain in substantial compliance after termination of the injunction in this case.
(Consent Decree ¶ 93, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235)), as amended by ¶ 10 of Consent Order Extending Time for Compliance, entered Feb. 11, 1999 (“1999 Consent Order”) (Doc. No. 511); see also R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1041 . In order to ascertain whether Defendant has attained the twofold goal of substantial compliance, the court must ascertain the “requirements” of the Consent Decree and of the Implementation Plan. (Consent Decree ¶ 93, as amended by the 1999 Consent Order.)
c. The Requirements of the Consent Decree
The Consent Decree’s requirements are embodied in the “principles” or “standards,” which are set forth in Sections VII and VIII of the Decree. In R.C.I, the court organized these principles into five core purposes. See 390 F.Supp.2d at 1045-46 . Neither party has objected to the court’s categorization. Those five core purposes are as follows:
(1) the prevention of out-of-home placements and the advancement of family unification, but only when at-home placement provides an environment where the child is safe from imminent and serious harm (core purpose one); (2) the delivery of comprehensive services, in a coordinated and therapeutic manner, by competent staff with appropriate caseloads, to class members and families in home-based and community-based settings, devised pursuant to individualized service plans (“ISPs”), for the purposes of facilitating home placement, satisfying the unique physical, emotional, social, educational and other needs of class members, and promoting smooth transitions for class members when they “age out” of the system (core purpose two); (3) active participation by the child, parent and foster parent in the planning and delivery of services, to include informed involvement so that the child, parent and foster parent have full understanding of these services and their rights and options (core purpose three); (4) child safety, encompassing the prevention of sexual abuse and neglect and the timely intervention and investigation of class members believed to be victims of sexual abuse and/or neglect (core purpose four); and (5) stability and permanency in the class members’ living situations, including, if in the children’s best interest, that when children are removed from their homes, siblings are placed together and familial relationships are maintained through visitations and other means (core purpose five).
Id. at 1046 (internal footnote omitted).
The core purposes of the Consent Decree are not subject to precise definition. As recognized by the court monitor, the foregoing “requirements” (or “core purposes,” as phrased by the court) are pliable, and an evaluation of how Defendant is performing in the areas delineated above, at times, requires a measure of discretion and subjectivity. In this regard, the Con *1126 sent Decree “represents] a departure from the more structural approach to system reform that ha[s] been used in other system reform settlements,” (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 5 (Doc. No. 812)), namely, because its provisions do not “speeify[] the precise means for accomplishing [its] ends.” (Consent Decree at 2 (Doc. No. 235), as amended by 1999 Consent Order (Doc. No. 511).) Rather, as set out above, the Consent Decree “lays out a set of ‘operating principles’ or ‘standards’ and directs defendant to ensure that [DHR’s] child protective services and foster care systems comply with these principles or standards by a date certain.’ ” (Id.)
3. Substantial Compliance
Although the Consent Decree does not define “substantial compliance,” that determination has not been made in a vacuum. “An agreed upon measurement process has been used through[out] the duration of the R.C. Consent Decree to evaluate the consistency, quality, and effectiveness of performance in each county of Alabama” during the staggered review process. (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 5 (Doc. No. 783).) In the court monitor’s November 2005 Report and in R.C.I, the “basic framework” employed was summarized. (See id. at 5-7); R.C.I. See 390 F.Supp.2d at 1035 . This framework, with which the parties and the court are very familiar, was used to determine whether the data and other evidence revealed a level of practice in individual counties which substantially complied with the principles of the Consent Decree. Briefly,
[t]he basic framework for measurement of the conversion to practice in accordance with the system of care has been the detailed review of samples of children and families served by the system using a process that is now known as the Quality Service Review (QSR). The process determines whether the practitioners in the system of care are providing services in accordance with the agreed-on standards and with appropriate professional due diligence using a sample of children and families as a test of the system performance (see Appendix A for the specific domains examined). The QSR examines, for example, whether ISPs [individualized service plans] and child teams are operating functionally in the manner intended by the practice principles. In addition to the QSR child reviews, the monitor has tracked quantitative indicators that reflect the performance of system processes and outcome indicators. 7
(Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 5 (Doc. No. 783) (brackets supplied) (internal footnote omitted) (footnote 7 added)); see also R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1035 . On pages 6 and 7 of his November 2005 Report, the court monitor further outlines “[t]he evidence used to determine that a county is ‘converted’ to practicing in accordance with the principles of the system of care[,]” see *1127 supra footnote 6. (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 6-7 (Doc. No. 783).)
As revealed, largely up to this point, the focus of the court, the court monitor and the parties has been on the achievement of substantial compliance in individual counties. That focus has been appropriate because achieving the goal of systemwide substantial compliance in a manageable way necessitated that only a few counties undergo scrutiny each year. (See, e.g., Agreement Regarding Implementation ¶ 22 (mandating “phased implementation by geographic areas, by subgroups of class members or both”).) It, however, is appropriate at this juncture for the court to state that it finds that the Consent Decree’s termination clause employs the phrase “substantial compliance” as a yardstick for measuring systemwide substantial compliance. (Consent Decree ¶ 93, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235), as amended by ¶ 10 of the 1999 Consent Order (Doc. No. 511).) In other words, the court finds that now faced with the ultimate question of termination of the Consent Decree, the assessment of substantial compliance has more of a systemwide, as opposed to an individual county, focus. In pragmatic terms, this means that whether the goal of substantial compliance has been attained systemwide is not necessarily dependent upon every county demonstrating sustained substantial compliance. The court monitor recognized as much in his November 2005 Report, when he stated that substantial compliance with the Consent Decree requires that “most counties” are performing up to par. (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 26 (Doc. No. 783).) DHR also advocates that the emphasis of “substantial compliance” is on systemwide performance. It does not appear that Plaintiffs would disagree; in their brief arguing a different point, Plaintiffs emphasize that the issue for termination of the Consent Decree “was and is statewide compliance.” (Doc. No. 781 at 17 n. 8.)
“Substantial compliance,” the guiding phrase used in the Consent Decree’s termination clause, also has acquired legal meaning from the courts. In R.C.I, the court set out the meaning of “substantial compliance,” as defined and applied by courts faced with motions to terminate consent decrees in institutional reform cases. See 390 F.Supp.2d at 1043-45 . The parties have not objected to those principles of law, and those principles again guide the court’s consideration in resolving the instant motion. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 781 at 4, wherein Plaintiffs describe the court’s legal discussion as the “law of the case”). The court need not repeat those principles here, but reemphasizes that “substantial compliance” is not 100 percent or strict compliance, but, at the same time, “substantial compliance” is not “ ‘susceptible to a mathematically precise definition.’” R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1044 (quoting Joseph A. by Wolfe v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 69 F.3d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir.1995)). Indeed, the court must remain mindful that the standard for termination of consent decrees in governmental institutional reform litigation must be “flexible.” City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1503.
Other factors also bear on the inquiry of whether Defendant has demonstrated substantial compliance with the core purposes of the Consent Decree. Some of these factors were set out in R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1043 , but bear repeating here. One factor is whether Defendant has complied in good faith with the terms of the Consent Decree since it was entered. See id.; City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1503. This factor involves consideration of Defendant’s record of compliance with the Consent Decree and any other positive undertakings by Defendant toward the goal of compliance. See City of Miami, 2 F.3d at 1508. Another factor is whether the purposes of the litigation have been achieved “to the extent practicable.” Id. Relatedly, the court also should consider *1128 whether it is necessary or practical for the court to retain judicial control over DHR in order to achieve compliance with any outstanding orders. See Sims, 9 F.Supp.2d at 1287 . “[T]he length of time a consent decree has been effect” and the “continuing efficacy of the consent decree’s enforcement” are two additional factors of which the court should be informed. Heath v. DeCourcy, 992 F.2d 630, 633 (6th Cir.1993) (citing Dowell, 498 U.S. at 237 , 111 S.Ct. 630 ). To quote City of Miami, “[i]n sum, termination of the consent decree would be appropriate if the district court finds that the decree is clearly no longer necessary either to prevent [the constitutional deficiencies] in the future or to remedy the effect of past [violations].” 2 F.3d at 1508.
B. Evidentiary Hearing
In conjunction with his first motion to terminate the Consent Decree, which was the subject of the court’s ruling in R.C.I, Defendant complained that he was denied an evidentiary hearing and, thus, was denied the opportunity to present evidence in support of that motion, (see, e.g., Doc. No. 825 at 2.) Although Defendant has not expressly requested an evidentiary hearing in connection with the instant “second” motion, given his unrelenting protestations in his present briefs, concerning the court’s prior denial of his request for a hearing, the court finds that it is appropriate to address Defendant’s statements.
When he filed his original motion to terminate the Consent Decree, Defendant did not cite any authority in support of his accompanying request for an evidentiary hearing. He did not point to the Consent Decree as his authority for the obvious reason that there is no requirement therein that the court hold a hearing prior to terminating the Consent Decree. Moreover, Defendant neither made any showing of what type of evidence would be adduced at a hearing, if permitted, nor made a proffer of any material disputed factual issues which would have justified presentation through the format of a hearing. Rather, Defendant generically made a request for a hearing, but otherwise insisted that the court monitor’s 61-page November 2004 Report demonstrated that Defendant had satisfied his twofold burden under the Consent Decree’s termination clause. 8 For all of the reasons previously espoused by the court in R.C.I, that Report was woefully inadequate to sustain Defendant’s burden. 9 In short, the court declined to hold a hearing merely for the sake of having a hearing because an undefined request for one was made by Defendant.
Defendant has not specifically requested a hearing in connection with his present motion. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, essentially advocate that the court can deny the motion on the written record, but cannot grant the motion without holding a hearing, (see Doc. No. 767 at 1, 3.) The court, however, finds again that a hearing only would prove to be superfluous and would not aid the court in its decisional process. The court has been immersed in this case for more than a decade and has an in-depth knowledge of the case. 10 *1129 Throughout the duration of this litigation, the court has received frequent status reports from the court monitor and has reviewed the extensive filings by the parties.
Moreover, the court finds that there is a developed record in this case. In this regard, the parties have had the opportunity to conduct discovery in connection with Defendant’s “second” motion (see Sept. 2, 2005 Order (Doc. No. 768)), to amass evidence in support of their positions for and. against termination of the Consent Decree, and to file that evidence with the court. The record is replete with evidence and arguments from the parties, and the facts and data are extensive.
The court further finds that the material evidence is undisputed. In this regard, the court finds that, as in the past, the issues turn on an interpretation of the Consent Decree and whether the material evidence is sufficient under the Consent Decree to warrant its termination. 11 The authority cited by Plaintiffs (see Doc. No. 767 at 17 n. 5) does not support their argument that, under the circumstances presented in this case and described above, a hearing is either mandated or warranted. Cf. Cody v. Hillard, 139 F.3d 1197 , 1200 (8th Cir.1998) (observing the absence of authority that “a hearing is a necessary prerequisite to terminating supervision over a [consent] decree (as opposed to modifying a decree)” and stating that “the necessity of a hearing depends on whether there are disputed factual issues”).
C. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
While the court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted, this finding does not in any way abdicate the court’s responsibility to provide the parties with a sufficient explanation of the facts and reasons underlying its ruling. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 246 , 111 S.Ct. 630 (observing that, “[i]f ... a [consent] decree is to be terminated or dissolved, respondents ... are entitled to a [precise] statement from the court”). As stated by the Sixth Circuit, a district court, which is considering whether to terminate a consent decree, “should make sufficiently detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., to advise the parties of the factual basis for its decision and permit informed appellate review.” Bradley v. Milliken, 772 F.2d 266, 272 (6th Cir.1985); see also Joseph A. by Wolfe, 69 F.3d at 1089 (vacating and remanding judgment for failure of lower court “to make the specific and clear findings required” by Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). This opinion constitutes the court’s findings of fact and conclusions .of law in accordance with the foregoing dictates.
IY. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The extensive background of this case is very familiar to the parties and the court and is recited in the court’s prior opinion in which the court denied Defendant’s first motion to terminate the Consent Decree. See R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1034-41 . A detailed updating of that background is not necessary here, and the court refers the reader to its prior opinion.
A. Brief Summary of R.C.I
In R.C.I, the court found that Defendant had not met his twofold burden for termination of the Consent Decree because the evidence did not demonstrate that Defendant was and would remain in substantial *1130 compliance with the requirements of the Consent Decree and of the Implementation Plan, as required for termination of the injunction in this case. The court set out in detail its conclusion that, in light of the governing law, there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that those requirements, which the court distilled into five core purposes (as set out in the previous section of this opinion), had been achieved. Consequently, the court rejected the ultimate recommendation of the court monitor in his November 2004 Report that “the court find that DHR is in substantial compliance with the Consent Decree” and “that the independent monitoring of the Consent Decree” cease. 12 R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1059 . As detailed in its prior opinion, the court was “unable to reconcile the court monitor’s recommendation of ‘substantial compliance’ with the data and other information in the court monitor’s November 2004 Report.” Id. at 1048 . The court also deemed telling the fact that the court monitor did not expressly state that he believed DHR “will remain in substantial compliance,” which is the second prong of Defendant’s burden for termination of the Consent Decree, but instead advocated continued supervision by the court for a period of a year to monitor the “areas of performance” discussed in his report. See Id. at 1058-59 (citing Ct. Monitor Nov. 2004 Report at 60-61).
Although in R.C.I the court declined to release the court monitor or to terminate the Consent Decree, the court concurred with the recommendation of the court monitor that Defendant file a performance report with the court which “contained] facts addressing the same areas of performance as the monitor’s report” and which “include[d] the county ratings ordered by the court.” Id. at 1058-59 ; (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2004 Report at 61.) In R.C.I, the court set a deadline of August 4, 2005, for the filing of the performance report and stated that, at that time, “Defendant may renew his motion to terminate the Consent Decree and Implementation Plan,” if the evidence supports such a motion. See 390 F.Supp.2d at 1059 .
B. Orders and Pleadings Filed after R.C.I
The court now picks up where its prior opinion left off. On August 3, 2005, Defendant complied with the court’s directives issued in R.C.I and, consequently, filed the instant “second motion for order terminating the Consent Decree,” which is accompanied by a plethora of evidence. (Doc. No. 761.) On August 29, 2005, Plaintiffs submitted an opposition to Defendant’s motion, attaching their own evidence and requesting discovery should the court not be inclined to deny the motion outright. (Doc. No. 767 at 1, 7, 17-18.)
After reviewing the parties’ submissions, the court entered an order, directing the court monitor to file by November 18, 2005, a report responding to all assertions in Defendant’s second motion to terminate the Consent Decree and in Plaintiffs’ response. (Sept. 2, 2005 Order at 1 (Doc. No. 768).) The court’s order further provided, “The court monitor shall provide specific and detailed discussion of whether he believes that Defendant has met both prongs of the twofold burden for termination of the consent decree and shall include particularized references to an analysis of the evidence which justifies his conclusions.” (Id.) In the same order, the court also authorized Plaintiffs and Defendant to engage in limited discovery for a period of two months, (id. at 2), and per *1131 mitted the parties to file any additional evidence and/or further arguments in support of their respective positions pertaining to the second motion to terminate the Consent Decree. 13 (See id.)
In compliance with the court’s order of September 2, 2005, Plaintiffs and Defendant filed briefs and evidence in support of their respective positions regarding termination of the Consent Decree, and the court monitor filed a 64-page report. 14 (Doc. Nos.779, 781, 783.) To briefly summarize, in his November 2005 report, the court monitor found that the then “current data,” primarily arising from QSR “sustainability reviews” (see supra footnote 7), was insufficient to demonstrate that DHR was complying with the five core purposes of the Consent Decree. Although the court monitor praised DHR’s accomplishments, the court monitor concluded that the data was “not consistent with the achievement of Core Purpose One,” that the QSR reviews showed “significant weaknesses in performance” of individualized service plans (“ISPs”) (core purpose two), that essentially there was no “quantitative data” to support Core Purpose Three, and that “[t]he [then] current evidence for achievement of Core Purpose Five [was] mixed.” Core Purpose Four received a positive review from the court monitor. (Id. at 56-59.) In his conclusion, the court monitor stated that “[t]here are particular weaknesses in the achievement of Core Purposes Two and Three [which] are an underpinning for achieving the other core purposes.” (Id. at 59-60.)
The court monitor explained that all sixty-seven of Alabama’s counties at one point in time had successfully “converted” their child welfare practices in conformity with the core purposes of the Consent Decree and that the counties had established the infrastructure or “building blocks” necessary to support compliance with the second prong of the Consent Decree’s termination clause. The court monitor, however, concluded that the then existing data showed a “lack of consistency [by the counties] in meeting the core purposes.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 9, 60-61 (Doc. No. 783).) The court monitor observed that a more accurate analysis of the second prong of the Consent Decree
would require on-site work in a sample of counties to verify current caseloads, [to] conduct additional QSR reviews of a significant sample of children, and to compare the findings to the quantitative data, qualitative data, and stakeholder input provided at the time of the determination of conversion to the current performance levels.
(Id. at 64.) In his November 2005 report, the court monitor emphasized the importance of on-site reviews during the “conversion” process. 15 After careful study of *1132 Defendant’s and Plaintiffs’ submissions and the court monitor’s report, the court entered an order on December 15, 2005 (Doe. No. 787), in which it concurred with the court monitor’s recommendation and directed the court monitor
to perform on-site work in a random and representative sample of counties in order to verify current caseloads, to conduct additional QSR reviews of a random and representative sample of children, and to compare the findings to the quantitative data, qualitative data, and stakeholder input provided at the time of the determination of conversion to present. The court monitor shall determine the method for generating a random and representative sample of counties and children to accomplish his purposes of evaluating Defendant’s level of compliance with the terms of the consent decree, and, if desired, he may seek input from counsel for Plaintiffs and Defendant.
(Doc. No. 787 at 2.)
The court set a deadline of February 28, 2006, for the court monitor to complete his reviews and submit a report of his findings. (Id.) In the same order, the court stated that it would “hold in abeyance” Defendant’s second motion to terminate the Consent Decree until the completion of these reviews. (Id. at 3.) Subsequently, over objection by Defendant (Doc. Nos. 788, 791, 792), but based upon the court monitor’s representation that, logistically, it was not possible to complete the reviews by the February 28 deadline, the court, after holding a telephone conference on the matter (Doc. Nos.793-94), extended the court monitor’s deadline to March 31, 2006, to conduct the court-ordered on-site reviews and to April 21, 2006, to submit his report to the court. (Doc. No. 803 at 1-2); (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 1 (Doc. No. 812).)
C. The Court Monitor’s 2006 On-Site Sustainability Reviews
The court monitor sought input from both Defendant and Plaintiffs regarding the process for completing the court-ordered reviews. 16 (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 2 (Doc. No. 812).) Ultimately, the court monitor selected the following ten counties to be reviewed: Chambers, Randolph, Conecuh, Jackson, Lauderdale, Lee, Montgomery, Macon, Marshall and Jefferson. These counties comprise three small counties, four mid-sized counties and three large counties. The total number of children included in the reviews was 152, and, for each county, the court monitor “evenly split as much as possible” the number of children in foster care and the number under protective supervision. (See id. at 3.) No serious argument has been advanced by either Defendant or Plaintiffs that these ten counties and the children in those counties whose cases were scrutinized are not “random” and “representative” of the state as a whole. (Doc. No. 787 at 2.)
The court monitor completed his reviews by the March 31, 2006 deadline, and timely filed his report on April 21, 2006. (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report (Doc. No. 812).) In his April 2006 Report, the court monitor explains that he employed the “review methodology followed during previous compliance reviews,” (id. at 2), and that the “[sjample sizes of children within the respective counties are comparable to the number used by the monitor during his previous on-site reviews.” (Id. at 3.) These sample sizes also are larger than the number of children included in the QSR reviews, which received some criti *1133 cism from the court in R.C.I. 17 See 390 F.Supp.2d at 1048-49 . “The methodology included completing QSRs on a randomly selected sample of children in each county, reviewfing] ... quantitative county data, and conducting a series of focus groups with county staff and local children’s community stakeholders.” 18 (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 2 (Doc. No. 812).)
These 2006 on-site sustainability reviews required the retention and work of many reviewers. To decrease expenses and at the urging of Defendant, the court monitor agreed to use 50 percent of reviewers provided by DHR. (See id. at 3.) The court monitor chose the other 50 percent of reviewers, whom at the time of his selection he deemed more trained and experienced than the DHR reviewers. (Id.) Ultimately, though, the court monitor concluded that the reviews performed by the “independent reviewers and the DHR reviewers were conducted with diligence!,] and the findings were closely comparable and accurate.” (I d.) The 2006 on-site sustainability reviews also included between fifty and one hundred interviews in each county (with more interviews conducted in Jefferson County) with key stakeholders in the child welfare system. (Id. at 4.) The format for stakeholder interviews paralleled the typical format used by the court monitor during the original on-site compliance reviews. Key stakeholders included DHR employees (both management and front-line workers), “local providers of services, family court judges, foster parents, educators, guardian ad litems, DHR attorney[s,] juvenile probation officers,” and law enforcement officials. (Id.)
In his April 2006 report (see Doc. No. 812), discussed in more detail later in this opinion, the court monitor outlines his conclusions that seven of the ten counties are sustaining performance consistent with the principles of the Consent Decree. These counties are Chambers, Randolph, Cone-cuh, Jackson, Lauderdale, Lee and Montgomery. In the court monitor’s opinion, however, three counties are not sustaining, one small-, one medium- and one large-sized county, i.e., Macon, Marshall and Jefferson counties, respectively. (See Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 89 (Doc. No. 812).) He stops short of rendering an express finding of substantial compliance as a whole, but states that “[t]he findings of the ten county reviews are consistent with the findings and issues reported in the monitor’s September 2005 report to the court,” (i.e., Doc. No. 783), a report in which he concluded that Defendant had not demonstrated the second prong of the Consent Decree’s termination clause. (Id. at 94.)
*1134 V. DISCUSSION
The court independently has reviewed the evidence, as it always has done, and for the reasons articulated below, determines that there is evidentiary and legal support for a finding that Defendant has satisfied both prongs of the Consent Decree’s termination clause. The court emphasizes that it has considered all of the evidence in reaching its findings. The omission of any reference or discussion to any discrete fact, exhibit or other evidence, therefore, should not be interpreted to mean that the court ignored or did not weigh that evidence. The court has weighed both the negative and the positive evidence, and the court is cognizant of Plaintiffs’ criticisms. The court, however, has discerned that these criticisms are not serious enough to foreclose a finding of substantial compliance or to call into doubt Defendant’s ability to remain in substantial compliance in the future.
A. Analysis of Substantial Compliance under the First Prong of the Termination Clause of the Consent Decree
The first prong of the termination clause of the Consent Decree mandates that Defendant demonstrate that “DHR is in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Decree and of the Implementation Plan[.]” (Consent Decree ¶ 93, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235), as amended by ¶ 10 of the 1999 Consent Order (Doc. No. 511).) For the reasons to follow, the court finds that Defendant has demonstrated substantial compliance under the first prong.
Pursuant to the Implementation Plan, the parties agreed that the principles of the Consent Decree would be phased in by geographic areas, namely counties, and that “each fiscal year an identified group of counties [would] be ‘converted.’ ” (Order Regarding Implementation and Implementation Plan at 3 (Doc. No. 266).) Although DHR was unable to attain conversion in all counties by the original agreed-upon deadline of October 1, 1999, (see Consent Decree ¶ 66), that goal finally was reached on March 11, 2005. See R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1035-36, 1046 (describing the extensions of deadlines and the final attainment of conversion in all sixty-seven counties). Through the court monitor’s thorough and systematic evaluation of each county in Alabama, each county has reformed its child welfare practices and has demonstrated that it can provide care for its children in a manner which conforms to the requirements of the Consent Decree. The court monitor has stated that the findings that each county, at the time of “conversion,” was “substantially in compliance” with the Consent Decree constitute the “primary support for finding compliance with prong one of the Consent Decree.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 7 (Doc. No. 783).) The court also recognized this great achievement, stating in R.C.I that “the fact that the court monitor has declared each and every county ‘converted’ is monumental, as paragraph 31 of the Consent Decree anticipated a county-by-county conversion, pursuant to staggered deadlines set out in the Implementation Plan.” 390 F.Supp.2d at 1046-47 .
The court monitor also has cited, in general terms, Defendant’s abidance with the mandated obligations in the Implementation Plan and with the court’s orders entered throughout this litigation and, in specific terms, has stated that DHR has implemented the “infrastructure” required by the Implementation Plan, which is necessary to support practice in accordance with the Consent Decree. 19 (See Ct. Moni *1135 tor Nov. 2005 Report at 9, 25, 60 (Doc. No. 783)); (see, e.g., Order Regarding Implementation and Implementation Plan at 7-9 (Doc. No. 266)); (Implementation Plan, Infrastructure, at 1); (see also Doc. No. 761 at 9.)
Plaintiffs have not presented any detailed challenge to the court monitor’s conclusion that prong one of the Consent Decree’s termination clause has been satisfied. Rather, Plaintiffs, as well as Defendant, devote the majority of their discussions in their briefs to the second prong of the Consent Decree’s termination clause, focusing on “sustainable substantial compliance,” to borrow Plaintiffs’ phraseology. (Doc. No. 781 at 3.) Indeed, in recent years, it appears that an understanding has evolved, if not express then implied, that Defendant would satisfy the first prong of the Consent Decree’s termination clause when the last of Alabama’s sixty-seven counties attained “conversion” status, which as stated occurred on March 11, 2005. 20
Based on the foregoing discussion and the court’s independent evaluation of the record, the court concurs with the court monitor’s recommendation that Defendant has satisfied the requirements of prong one of the Consent Decree’s termination clause. The court bases its decision upon the evidence in the record, as highlighted above, and the remarkable fact that the child welfare practices in every county in Alabama have been scrutinized and have been declared “converted.” The court also bases its finding on its concurrence with the court monitor that DHR effectively has overhauled its pre-R.C. practices and has implemented an infrastructure which is sufficient to support a system of care which incorporates all of the core purposes of the Consent Decree. Other of DHR’s accomplishments, which the court finds further amplify Defendant’s demonstration of substantial compliance under prong one, are set out in the court monitor’s November 2004 Report. (See Ct. Monitor Nov. 2004 Report at 2, 58-59); (see also Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 9, 60 (Doc. No. 783).)
The court also finds that it is fitting at this point to spotlight the fact that a common theme emanates and predominates in the extensive record and that theme is that the parties and the court monitor have effectuated remarkable and demonstrable improvements in DHR’s child welfare system. DHR’s child welfare system is, no doubt, far different and far better today than it was at the time that this litigation commenced. The quality of care which children under DHR’s supervision receive has improved substantially, (see, e.g., Doc. No. 781 at 2 (although arguing against termination of the Consent Decree, plaintiffs state that “all would agree” that there has been “notable improvement since the entry of the Consent Decree in 1991”).) With that said, the court recognizes that Plaintiffs take strong issue with DHR’s compliance with prong two of the Consent Decree’s termination clause, as they aptly state that the material question is not whether “the system now treats children *1136 better than it did in 1988.” (Doc. No. 820 at 3.) It is appropriate now for the court to turn to a discussion of the second prong. As should be evident from the court’s discussion below, the court has given very serious consideration to whether the evidence demonstrates that DHR has satisfied prong two of the Consent Decree’s termination clause.
B. Analysis of Substantial Compliance under the Second Prong of the Termination Clause of the Consent Decree
The second prong of the termination clause of the Consent Decree requires that Defendant demonstrate “that DHR will remain in substantial compliance after termination of the injunction in this case.” 21 (Consent Decree ¶ 93, entered June 11, 1991 (Doc. No. 235), as amended by ¶ 10 of the 1999 Consent Order (Doc. No. 511).) In R.C.I, the court stated that, “in [its] opinion, the best evidence to support a finding that DHR ‘will remain in substantial compliance’ ... is evidence that, after conversion, counties have continued to operate in a manner that substantially complies with the Consent Decree.” R.C. I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1058 . In R.C.I, however, the court found that the “evidence [was] lacking” in that regard. Id. Plaintiffs complain that DHR has not had ample time in the interim between the court’s May 2005 memorandum opinion and order, denying Defendant’s first motion to terminate the Consent Decree, and Defendant’s present filing to bring DHR’s child welfare system in compliance with the requirements of prong two of the termination clause of the Consent Decree. (Doc. No. 767 at 3.)
Plaintiffs’ argument is slightly off-key. In its May 2005 memorandum opinion and order, the court’s primary reason for denying Defendant’s motion to terminate the Consent Decree rested on the conclusion that the court monitor’s report submitted in November 2004, upon which Defendant heavily relied, contained insufficient data to support the court monitor’s recommendation of substantial compliance. In other words, it was unclear whether evidence of substantial compliance existed or not because there were large gaps in the eviden-tiary proof.
Notwithstanding Plaintiffs’ further objection, for the reasons to follow, the court finds that the missing evidence has been supplied and that Defendant has demonstrated that DHR “will remain” in substantial compliance with the Consent Decree and the Implementation Plan after termination of the injunction in this case. 22 *1137 As discussed herein, that evidence is supplied, in part, by the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews which were ordered by the court and conducted by the court monitor.
1. Preliminary Findings Concerning the 2006 On-Site ,Sustainability Reviews and the Parties’ Positions as to what the Reviews Mean in Terms of Substantial Compliance
Initially, regarding the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews, the results of which'are elaborated upon in the court monitor’s April 2006 Report (Doc. No. 812), the court makes the following findings and observations which hopefully will help clarify what issues are not before the court for exhaustive analysis.
First, the court finds that the results of the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews constitute valuable evidence in evaluating the merits of the present motion for the following reason. During the “conversion” process of each county, the court monitor’s on-site compliance review was the yardstick by which the court monitor determined if a county had implemented the required system of care into its child welfare practices and had achieved a level of practice which conformed to the requirements of the Consent Decree. The 2006 on-site sustainability reviews conducted by the court monitor replicate these original on-site compliance reviews. The court monitor has explained that he employed the same “review methodology” that he used when he initially evaluated each of Alabama’s sixty-seven counties and that the “[sjample sizes of children within the respective counties [were] comparable to the number used by the monitor during his previous on-site reviews.” (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 2-3 (Doc. No. 812).) As recited earlier herein, in R.C.I, the court set out the methodology underlying the review process employed by the court monitor in conducting his initial on-site compliance reviews, see 390 F.Supp.2d at 1036 , and the court finds that the methodology is sound.
Second, the court accepts all of the data articulated by the court monitor in his April 2006 Report. Neither party has lodged an objection as to the accuracy of this data. Instead, Plaintiffs and Defendant essentially argue that the data supports a finding in their favor on the issue of substantial compliance and that the other party’s interpretation of the data is wrong.
Third, the court accepts the conclusions reached by the court monitor as to whether or not each of the ten counties reviewed presently is demonstrating substantial compliance. To reiterate, the court monitor says that, overall, seven counties are sustaining substantial compliance and that three are not. Although the court concurs with the court monitor that three counties are not substantially complying with the Consent Decree, the court parts ways with the court monitor to the extent that the court monitor 'is recommending that the court find that DHR has not met its burden under the second prong of the Consent Decree’s termination clause.
Fourth, the court finds that, when viewed collectively, the ten counties selected for reviews are “representative” of the status of the state as a whole.
Notwithstanding the foregoing findings, the court’s task has not been a simple one. Perhaps, if the court monitor had found that all ten counties had failed or that all had passed the “substantial compliance” inquiry, the court’s job would have been simplified. As it stands, seven counties passed the court monitor’s substantial compliance scrutiny, two of those seven with marginal but, importantly, passing grades, and three did not pass. Given the varied complex facets of the core purposes, many of which are subjective in nature, and the pliancy of the substantial compli- *1138 anee standard, particularly in institutional reform cases such as this one, the court’s task has been more complicated. It would be superficial as well to predicate a finding on a pure percentage basis, i.e., to say that a compliance ratio of seven out of ten counties or 70 percent either does or does not equate substantial compliance, and the court does not understand either party to advance such a position. (see Doc. No. 820 at 5, 8.)
Defendant argues that “the overall results” of the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews “[are] impressive and provide solid evidence that (1)[ ] Defendant has sustained compliance with the Consent Decree for an extended period of time and (2) practice under the RC principles is improving across the state.” (Doc. No. 811 at 3.) Just as emphatically, Plaintiffs contend otherwise. After very careful consideration, the court finds that the evidence in the court monitor’s April 2006 Report (Doc. No. 812), when considered against the legal principles governing substantial compliance and other evidence in the record, legalistically tilts in favor of a finding that Defendant has met its burden under prong two of the Consent Decree’s termination clause. The court now turns to a discussion of the evidence, which the court finds appropriately begins with a discussion of DHR’s ratings from the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews in the categories of “overall child status” and “overall performance.” The court, thereafter, will provide a more specific analysis of the evidence as to each of the five core purposes of the Consent Decree; the account of this evidence, however, is not in numerical sequence.
2. Ratings: Overall Child Status and Overall Performance
Defendant maintains that the rating in the category of “overall child status” is the “single most important measure of the effectiveness of the System of Care, because it is the ranking that measures the outcomes for the children under care.” (Doc. No. 811 at 4.) Plaintiffs do not disagree, (see Doc. No. 767 at 11 (stating that the overall child status and overall performance measures “form[ed] the foundation of the Monitor’s determination of compliance” during on-site reviews).) The “overall child status” rating assesses “how well” as a whole a “child [is] presently doing” based on the thirteen child and family status domains which reviewers probe when evaluating a county’s compliance with the requirements of the Consent Decree. 23 (See Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report, Appendix A (Doc. No. 783).) The “overall child status” is measured based upon a “special scoring procedure” which uses a “6-point rating scale.” (Id.)
In line with the parties’ assessment, the court finds that the composite rating attributed to the counties, which were part of the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews, in the category of “overall child status” is a good indicator that, systemwide, children within DHR’s care are safe and are doing well and that DHR is sustaining substantial compliance with the Consent Decree. Impressively, the aggregate “overall child status” rating for all ten counties subject to the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews was 96 percent. (Ct. Monitor’s April 2006 Report at 90, 92 (Doc. No. 812).) Even the three counties which the court monitor found not to be sustaining substantial com *1139 pliance — Macon, Marshall and Jefferson counties — achieved an aggregate “overall child status” rating of 93 percent. (Id. at 92.) The impressiveness of these ratings is amplified when one considers that, throughout the implementation of the Consent Decree, the court monitor generally has declared a county converted “ ‘when 85% of child status and system performance ratings [were] acceptable during an on-site compliance [review].’ ” R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1035 ; (see also Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 4 (Doc. No. 812).)
Moreover, Defendant asserts that the rating in the category of “overall performance” constitutes “the next most important measurement.” (Doc. No. 811 at 4 & n. 4.) This assertion has not been contradicted. The composite rating from the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews in the category of “overall performance” shows marked improvement from the evidence which was before the court when it entered R.C.I. 24 In R.C.I, the limited evidence revealed that fifteen counties had been subjected to QSR reviews and that only three of those counties demonstrated an “overall performance” rating of 85 percent or better and that, “[disturbingly, five of the fifteen counties received ratings of only 25 percent.” 390 F.Supp.2d at 1050 (citing Ct. Monitor Nov. 2004 Report at 35). In the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews; half of the counties scored 90 percent or better, two scored in the eightieth percentile range, and no county scored as low as 25 percent. 25
S. Core Purpose One
Core purpose one is the prevention of out-of-home placements and the advancement of family unification, but only when at-home placement provides an environment where the child is safe from imminent and serious harm. In R.C. I, the court found that the evidence in the record at that time revealed that the percentage of children in out-of-home care steadily had been increasing since 1995. The court found, though, that there was insufficient explanation in the record as to the cause of the increase. The evidence was mixed and limited as to whether the increase in out-of-home placements was due to regression in DHR’s standard of care or due to a rise in methamphetamine abuse in homes, an external factor outside of DHR’s control. See R.C. I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1051-52 . This limited evidence did not assist this court in determining the cause of the increase. 26
*1140 The court finds that there now is unre-futed evidence indicating that the challenge for counties in the areas of family unification, the prevention of out-of-home placements (and the related goal of achieving permanence in a child’s living situation, a component of core purpose five) has been sparked largely by an external factor, that is, the rapid increase in the use and production of crystal methamphetamine affecting families in Alabama. Some counties have suffered more than others, but all appear to have suffered. For example, in discussing the current methamphetamine epidemic which plagues Jackson County, the court monitor states as follows in his April 2006 Report:
The major issue affecting practice [in Jackson County] is the rapid increase in the presence and use of crystal methamphetamine. Use and production have increased and are seen in homes with multi-generational use. Half of the intakes in Jackson County are attributed to crystal methamphetamine. Increase in the number of labs is posing more health risks for children and for workers.
(Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 29 (Doc. No. 812).) Notably, of the ten children who were reviewed in Jackson County, 70 percent of the cases were opened due to substance abuse. (Id. at 3.) In fact, with Conecuh County presenting the only exception, substance abuse by a parent was the leading reason in all counties that a case was opened.
Defendant also has submitted evidence which reveals that the adverse consequences of the methamphetamine boom have been felt systemwide, and the court monitor has “concurred] with DHR’s assessment of the role of methamphetamine[].” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 52 (Doc. No. 783).) The director of Covington County, for example, attests: “Work with families in home environment seems to have evolved from neglect due to the poverty of being in a rural community to explosive methamphetamine labs.” (Aff., Attach. B to Doc. No. 779-3.) Defendant also submitted the affidavit of Freída Baker (“Baker”), who signed her statement as DHR’s Deputy Director of the Family Services Division. (Baker Aff. — '“Children in Care” at 2 (electronically filed as Ex. 36 to Doc. No. 761).) As noted by Baker, the percentage of children coming into care as a result of substance abuse increased more than 500 percent during the three years preceding the signing of her affidavit, and “[t]he complexity of substance-abusing families presents a national challenge, particularly in the area of crystal-methamphetamine.” (Id. at 7.)
The methamphetamine epidemic obviously increases dramatically the influx of new children entering DHR’s child welfare system and strains available resources for achieving the goals of keeping children in their homes, maintaining bonds between a children and their families, and attaining permanence in children’s living situations. Children who live in a home which is pervaded by methamphetamine use and/or its manufacture are not safe, and their removal from the destructive environment is imperative for their safety. See R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1046 n. 18 (reiterating “its strong position that no child is to be placed in a home from which he or she has been removed whereupon return he or she stands any chance of a repetition of the abusive behavior. If DHR is to err, let it be on the side of the safety of the child, not on the side of home unification merely for the sake of bolstering the statistics.”); (see also Implementation Plan, system processes and services, page 5 (“DHR may remove a class member from his home only if it is not possible, through the provision of services (including intensive home-based services), to protect the class member from imminent, serious harm while living at home”).)
*1141 The court finds that the persistent and repeated observations by the court monitor and the evidence submitted by Defendant concerning the rise in methamphetamine use in Alabama and its devastating effect on families and children explain, in large measure, the rise in out-of-home placements. In other words, the court finds that the increase in the number of children in out-of-home care is not attributable to any systemic defect, but rather to an external cause outside of DHR’s control. The record further indicates that the methamphetamine epidemic is an epidemic which, during the initial conversion process, was not affecting counties in the same manner as of present, (see, e.g., Baker Aff., titled “Children in Care” at 7 (electronically filed as Ex. 36 to Doc. No. 761), in which Baker observes that, in 2001, 3.9 percent of Alabama admissions to foster care were due to substance abuse, but that, in 2004, almost 20 percent of admissions into care were the result of family substance abuse.)
Defendant obviously must be prepared to mold practices and policies to address this relatively new challenge, as well as any other now-unforeseen future challenges, and there is evidence that it is prepared to do so without court supervision. To highlight an example, there is evidence that, in Lee County, the director and the staff have developed a methamphetamine protocol in partnership with law enforcement agencies and the local hospital in the community. (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 53 (Doc. No. 812).)
Relatedly, the evidence reveals that DHR is working hard to maintain family connections. Baker’s affidavit provides a synopsis of the services which DHR has implemented as a result of the Consent Decree in an effort to prevent removal of children from their homes where possible (called “front-end” services), including the Family Options Program. (Baker Aff., titled “Children in Care” at 2 (electronically filed as Ex. 36 to Doc. No. 761).) The Family Options Program provides immediate, intensive in-home assessment and support for families. (Id.) In 2004, this program served 3,038 children from 1,247 families. (Id. at 5); (see also Def. Aff. ¶ 16A (electronically filed as exhibit 5 to Doc. No. 761).) Similarly, Baker attests that, while out-of-home placements have increased in Alabama, so have the number of children who are served in their homes. (Baker Aff., titled “Children in Care” at 6.) Indeed, the court monitor complimented Defendant in this area, stating that “the capacity to deliver home-based family preservation services was developed and implemented over the duration of the Consent Decree.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 15 (Doc. No. 783).)
The court also finds that the results from the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews reveal notable improvements in the area of family connections. Prior to these reviews, the available evidence, which was cited in the court monitor’s November 2005 Report, revealed that, although counties “worked diligently” to increase the number of visits between families and children in care so as to maintain family connections, the QSR reviews revealed that only 63 percent of the children included in these aggregate reviews had acceptable ratings in the domain of “maintaining family connections.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 14-15 (Doc. No. 783).)
Turning to the present record, namely, to the results from the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews, the combined performance for the seven sustaining counties in this category (i.e., maintaining family connections) was 89 percent, and the nonsustaining counties received a combined score of 72 percent. (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 90, 92 (Doc. No. 812).) The court monitor finds, to use the words of *1142 the court monitor, that DHR is “trend[ing] in the expected direction.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 24 (Doc. No. 783).) Notably, as to the seven sustaining counties, there were no significant problems noted by the court monitor regarding the counties’ performance in the areas comprising core purpose one.
In sum, the court does not find that the increase in the number of children in out-of-home care is an impediment to a finding of substantial compliance as to core purpose one, and the court finds that DHR has effectively incorporated core purpose one into its child welfare practices. Stated differently, the court finds that Defendant has demonstrated that it will remain in substantial compliance with core purpose one after termination of the Consent Decree.
4. Core Purpose Four
Child safety is not only a component of core purpose one, but is the essential focus of core purpose four. Providing a safe haven for children, who are catapulted into DHR’s child welfare system, always has been one of the paramount purposes of the Consent Decree and a top priority of the court. In this regard, the court finds that, although there are varied components of the Consent Decree, an estimable barometer for measuring how DHR’s child welfare system is functioning as a whole is to look at whether the children who are served by DHR are safe. The foregoing was implied by the court monitor in his inverse statement that children will be safe from harm only “when each child and family served is consistently provided with supports and services that are consistently executed with due diligence.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 2 (Doc. No. 783).) As explained herein, the court finds that the evidence indicates that DHR is doing a good job of protecting children from harm and is doing so in a manner which substantially complies with the Consent Decree.
Overall, the court finds that the evidence regarding child safety is very positive. All of the counties which were part of the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews scored 90 percent or better in the category of “safety of the child.” 27 Previously, the court monitor has observed that “the strongest data” that children are safer now than they were before the commencement of this lawsuit is revealed through this child safety rating on the QSR reviews. (See Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 11 (Doc. No. 783).)
Turning to the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews, in five counties — Chambers, Randolph, Jackson, Lauderdale and Montgomery — 100 percent of the children received an acceptable rating in the category of child safety. (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 10, 17, 33, 41, 58 (Doc. No. 812).) In Chambers County, “[t]here were no reported concerns with the safety of youth, and safety plans were present where appropriate.” (Id 12.) The report was equally favorable for Randolph County, where the court monitor observed that children’s safety plans are “monitored closely” and that home visits by workers occur at least monthly, but often more frequently. (Id. at 20.) Similarly, in Co-necuh and Lauderdale counties, there were no concerns espoused regarding child safety, and, additionally, in Conecuh County, stakeholders expressed their belief “that *1143 workers ... are keeping children safe.” (Id. at 44, 51.)
Moreover, the remaining five counties— Conecuh, Lee, Macon, Marshall and Jefferson — scored in the ninetieth percentile range for acceptable cases in the category of child safety. (See id. at 25, 50, 66, 75, 85.) Even in Macon, Marshall and Jefferson counties, which the court monitor found are not sustaining an overall level of practice which substantially complies with the Consent Decree, the court finds that these counties satisfy the substantial compliance standard in the area of child safety. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ suggestion made in a similar, but slightly different, context (see Doc. No. 820 at 7-8), the court finds that “minimally acceptable,” the phrase used by the court monitor to describe Macon, Marshall and Jefferson counties’ compliance in the area of child safety, means what it says, i.e., that performance levels in the area of child safety satisfy the threshold of substantial compliance, even if only minimally so. (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 93 (Doc. No. 812).)
The ability of counties to timely investigate allegations of child abuse and neglect is another measurement of safety. As aptly noted by the court monitor, “[t]he fact that the substantial backlogs of CAN investigations that existed in some counties, and particularly Jefferson county and Mobile county, at the outset of the system reform essentially have been eliminated is strong evidence that children are more likely to be kept safe.” 28 (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 11 (Doc. No. 783).) In R.C.I, the court found that there existed “[p]ositive data as to core purpose four pertaining to the prevention and timely interventions and investigations of class members believed to be victims of sexual abuse and/or neglect,” 390 F.Supp.2d at 1054 , and the court’s finding remains the same. In R.C.I, the court explained:
[Sjome “quantitative indicators” as to whether or not DHR is ensuring child safety are revealed through data compiled by DHR regarding the number of child abuse and neglect (“CAN”) reports received, the timeliness of contact to these reports, and the timeliness of the resolution of the CAN report. (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2004 Report at 39.) According to the court monitor, the data demonstrates a steady and notable increase in the percentage of cases having initial CAN contacts within the required five days. (Id.) To Defendant’s credit, there is data that, in 91.4 percent of cases, DHR caseworkers are making contact with children who are the subject of CAN reports within five days, and percentages of initial CAN contacts have averaged approximately 90 percent during the previous three years. (Id. at 41.) The court monitor observes that these figures represent a “considerable increase since 1997” when only 49 percent of children were contacted by a social worker within five days. (Id.)
390 F.Supp.2d at 1054 .
Furthermore, the statements provided by community stakeholders reveal that county staff members have developed strong, positive working relationships with law enforcement. (See, e.g., Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 12, 20, 36, 44, 53, 78 (Doc. No. 812).) In Marshall County, for example, “[l]aw enforcement spoke very highly of DHR and reported that [it was] responsive and cooperative.” (Id. at 78.) Also, in Jackson County, which as discussed earlier in this opinion has been hard hit by the ill effects of methamphetamine abuse, stakeholders described strong collaboration between DHR staff and law enforcement, judges and guardian ad litems. (See id. at 36.) The court monitor observed that, in Jackson County, law enforcement and DHR staff “work *1144 well together when methamphetamine[][is] involved” and that “[l]aw enforcement has been diligent with training DHR staff regarding home visit safety.” 29 (Id.) The court again commends Defendant for DHR’s continued “ability and willingness to respond immediately to any complaint concerning child safety, as well as to cooperate with municipal, county and state law enforcement [and federal law enforcement, where indicated] in all matters pertaining to child endangerment and the prevention of the same.” R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1033 (brackets added).
In finding that DHR has demonstrated substantial compliance with core purpose four, the court is not insensitive to the recently-reported death in Jefferson County of a child, who had been returned to his mother’s care, but who nonetheless was under DHR’s watch, and another case where it was alleged that DHR failed to investigate a report of child abuse. (See Doc. No. 767 at 12); (Doc. No. 820 at 21.) The court also is cognizant of DHR’s representation to the court of the measures employed to address the reported incident of abuse, which DHR states included an investigation and the imposition of disciplinary actions against employees and the county director. (See Doc. No. 779 at 12.) After careful consideration, the court finds that the record does not support the conclusion that these tragedies exemplify sys-temwide failures, as opposed to “isolated” occurrences. Wyatt v. Rogers, 985 F.Supp. 1356, 1388 (M.D.Ala.1997). Although Plaintiffs take a contrary position than that of the court, Plaintiffs have admitted that a failure in an individual case, even a tragic one, does not, “in and of itself, demonstrate[ ] noncompliance.” (Doc. No. 767 at 12.) Although the court, and certainly DHR, desires every child in every county to achieve optimal success under DHR’s system of care, the court realizes that such a goal is neither realistic nor possible, and this is the reason the Consent Decree embodies a standard of substantial, rather than complete, compliance. 30
As a final observation, the court commends DHR for its success in the outcome of child safety on a national study. In a United States government study conducted by the Children’s Bureau and the Administration for Children and Families, located within the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”), the State of Alabama achieved substantial conformity within the safety outcome titled “Children are, first and foremost, protected from abuse and neglect.” R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1054 n. 31 (citing Ct. Monitor Nov. 2004 Report at 53); (see also Betty Ziri Aff. (Ex. 34 to Doc. No. 761) (discussing generally the review process); (Exs. 35 & 36 to Doc. No. 761).) Although the court recognizes that the DHHS standards do not supplant the terms of the Consent Decree, as Plaintiffs readily have pointed out (see Doc. No. 835 at 1; Doc. No. 767 at 9), the court observes that the DHHS reviews incorporate a methodology similar to that employed by the court monitor; the DHHS reviews integrate data analysis and *1145 individual case reviews, with ratings assessed based upon “the federal review instrument and interviews of key stakeholders of [DHR’s] system.” (Paul Butler Aff. (Doc. No. 836 & Attachment 3 to Doc. No. 811)); (see also Dean Aff. ¶¶ 4, 7 (Ex. 17 to Doc. No. 761).)
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that overall DHR is keeping children safe. The court finds Defendant has demonstrated that DHR will remain in substantial compliance with core purpose four of the Consent Decree after court supervision ends.
5. Core Purpose Two: Service Delivery and Competent Staff
Core purpose two embodies a multitude of important aims of the Consent Decree. Core purpose two provides: The delivery of comprehensive services, in a coordinated and therapeutic manner, by competent staff -with appropriate caseloads, to class members and families in home-based and community-based settings, devised pursuant to ISPs, for the purposes of facilitating home placement, satisfying the unique physical, emotional, social, educational and other needs of class members, and promoting smooth transitions for class members when they “age out” of the system. The court turns now to an examination of core purpose two.
a. Service Delivery
One of the important principles of the Consent Decree, i.e., a component of a well-functioning system of care, is that “children and families should have access to an array of services that ... address individual, physical, emotional, social, and education needs.” (See Ct. Monitor Nov. 2004 Report at 3.) The court monitor found, and the court concurs, that “DHR has developed an array of services necessary to implement the system of care.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 9 (Doc. No. 783).) These services are extensive. Some are discussed in Baker’s and Defendant’s affidavits. (See Baker Aff., titled “Children in Care” at 2-6 (electronically filed as Ex. 36 to Doc. No. 761)); (Def. Aff. ¶¶ 12, 15 (electronically filed as Ex. 5 to Doc. No. 761).) 31 Therapeutic foster family care is one such “service” for which DHR deserves praise. Therapeutic family foster care did not exist as a resource at the inception of this lawsuit, and the court concurs with the court monitor that “its creation has been a strength of the system.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 13 (Doc. No. 783)); (see also Implementation Plan “Conversion” section at 4 (describing as one of the fifteen indicators of conversion that “the provision of ... therapeutic family foster care is increased”).)
DHR’s success in the area of services can be attributed, in part, to its financial commitment to obtaining and spending the funds necessary for the creation and implementation of these services. (See Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 10 (Doc. No. 783).) The evidence reveals that annually DHR is spending $100 million more for child welfare services than required by the Consent Order (i.e., the Order which extended the time for compliance with the Consent Decree). (Id.); (see Feb. 11, 1999 Consent Order (Doc. No. 511)); (Def. Aff. ¶ 16B (electronically filed as Ex. 5 to Doc. No. 761).) Also, every county uses flexible funds to provide appropriate services for children and their families. (Lapsley Aff. ¶ 8 (electronically filed as exhibit 6 to Doc. No. 761)); (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 10 (Doc. No. 783) (“The monitor concurs that flexible funding has been utilized.”).) The use of flexible funds is essential to a county’s ability to practice consistently *1146 with the Consent Decree. (See Implementation Plan, cited recently in Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 2-3 (Doc. No. 783)); (see also Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 4-5 (observing that “[sizable increases in funding through revenue maximization efforts were accomplished and had a direct impact on the availability of flexible funds that could be accessed by ISP [individualized service plan] teams to craft individualized services for children and families”).)
b. Competent Staff
Paragraph 53 of the Consent Decree states: “Services shall be provided by competent staff who are adequately trained and supervised and who have appropriate caseloads. The competence of staff, staffs training and supervision, and staffs caseloads shall be deemed adequate when the ‘system of care’ is able to comply with the standards set forth in this decree.” (Consent Decree ¶ 53.) In the area of competency of staff, the court discusses below DHR’s compliance with the court’s order on licensing standards for social workers, the perception of stakeholders concerning their interactions with staff in various counties (as revealed in the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews), and staff training programs developed as a result of the Consent Decree.
i. DHR’s Demonstrated Compliance with the Court’s Order on Developing a Licensed Child Welfare Social Worker Workforce
The Consent Decree’s goal of having competent staff is advanced, in part, through the court’s Order on licensing standards (“Licensing Order”), and the evidence reveals that DHR is complying with these court-mandated requirements. By way of brief background, in December 1999, DHR finalized a policy on licensing requirements, which has been approved by the court and embodied in the court’s Licensing Order entered on January 18, 2000. (Licensing Order (Doc. No. 538).) The policy, in sum and substance, created a new entry-level classification for social workers and provided that DHR would only hire applicants for this classification who had earned a bachelor’s degree in social work. (Id.) The policy also implemented incentives for existing staff to obtain professional social work degrees, such as providing staff with paid educational leave. (Id.)
Regarding the Licensing Order, the court monitor has observed that, “[t]hrough direct intervention of the court, the workforce has become more professionally credentialed through the preferential hiring of workers having [bachelor’s and master’s degrees] who subsequently obtain licensure when working for DHR.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 5 (Doc. No. 783).) Indeed, the court ordered Defendant to implement licensing requirements for social workers as a measure to help ensure that DHR recruits the caliber of workers needed to implement the Consent Decree. (Licensing Order (Doc. No. 538).)
Defendant has submitted evidence, through the deposition testimony of Reba Cantrell (“Cantrell”), of DHR’s sustained progress in adhering to and, in some instances, exceeding the requirements set out in the court’s Licensing Order. 32 (Cantrell Dep. at 38-50 (Attach. K to Doc. No. 779)); (Doc. No. 779 at 20.) Cantrell attests that DHR hires only social workers who meet the court-mandated licensing requirements. 33 (Cantrell Dep. at 39.) Can *1147 trell attests that, consistent with the court’s Licensing Order, DHR continues to reimburse licensing fees for those employees who have attained bachelor’s degrees and master’s degrees in social work and provides supervision and continuing education for social workers, thereby enabling them to maintain their licensing requirements. (Id.) DHR’s other accomplishments in the areas of recruitment and retention are set out further in Cantrell’s deposition testimony. (See id. at 40-50.)
Moreover, DHR employs full-time employees whose jobs are devoted to recruiting and retaining social workers. (See id. at 39.) Namely, in 2001, DHR established a Staff Development Office for the specific purpose of ensuring DHR’s compliance with the court’s Licensing Order and furthering the recruitment and retention of licensed and qualified social workers. See 390 F.Supp.2d at 1039 .
The court monitor has commended DHR for the creation and work of the Staff Development Office. (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2004 Report at 55). Notably, discussing the accomplishments of the Staff Development Office, the court monitor has stated, “As a result of targeting recruiting efforts and supporting workers obtaining licen-sure, the percentage of license-eligible social work frontline staff has increased from 19.3% of staff in 2000 to 40% of staff as of October 2004.” (Id.) As set out by the court monitor in his November 2004 Report, DHR also has made a long-term commitment to adhere to the court’s Licensing Order after termination of the Consent Decree. (Id.) In sum, the court finds that the evidence establishes that DHR is committed to sustaining the improvements it has made in recruiting and retaining licensed child welfare social workers and that it is complying with the court’s Licensing Order.
ii. Stakeholders’ Reports
In the area of worker competence, another consideration deemed important by the court monitor, and one which weighs in Defendant’s favor on the substantial compliance inquiry, is the perception of relevant stakeholders, (see, e.g., Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 4 (requiring for a county’s conversion that “stakeholder input and collaborative working relationships were predominantly reported as positive”)); (see also Larry Dean Aff. ¶ 8 (Ex. 17 to Doc. No. 761) (stating that “stakeholder interviews comprise a key component of the onsite review process”).) Overall, with the exception of Jefferson County, the court monitor recited positive comments from stakeholders regarding the competence of staff. Comments from stakeholders are set out in more detail below, but the court briefly recites a few of those comments here. In Chambers County, “all stakeholders and staff cited strong leadership as the primary strength in the county,” and, in particular, “[t]he director was described as having a high standard for practice and as being supportive of her staff.” (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 12 (Doc. No. 812).) In Conecuh County, the court monitor noted that the staff was “stable” and that “[tjhere was a high regard for the staff from all stakeholder groups and an overall belief that workers are doing a good job and are keeping children safe.” (Id. at 28.) In Jackson County, stakeholders, in particular, noted “the strength of the supervisory staff as an asset to [DHR] and key to positive practice outcomes.” (Id. at 29.) In Randolph County, “[stakeholder input was uniformly positive.” (Id. at 20.) Finally, a “strength” of Montgomery County, as noted by stakeholders, was the “stable” leadership. (Id. at 61.)
*1148
Hi Training
A multitude of training programs have been implemented as a result of the Consent Decree in this case, as elaborated upon in the Child Welfare Strategic Plan which sets out various training programs which DHR offers for its social workers, many through national resource centers. See R.C.I, 390 F.Supp.2d at 1039 , (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2004 Report at 55-57); (Ex. to Doc. No. 714.) Alabama Certification Training is one example of the training that now is provided to staff. (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 8-9 (recognizing that “Alabama Certification Training and other training ha[ve] been provided on an ongoing basis to staff’)); (see also id. at 4 (noting that the development of Alabama Certification Training resulted from this litigation).) The court monitor found, and the court concurs, that “training curricula ... have been established.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 10 (Doc. No. 783).)
Turning to the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews, training specifically was noted as a strength in two counties, i.e., Chambers and Jackson. As to the remaining compliant counties, the court monitor made no observations, positive or negative, on the issue of training; there, however, is no indication that his positive position espoused in his November 2005 report, supra, has changed.
With that said, the court recognizes that in those counties which the court monitor deemed were not in substantial compliance, workers reported that training needed to be improved. (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 6, 29, 44, 69, 79 (Doc. No. 812).) Commendably, in one of those counties, namely, Jefferson County, at the time the court monitor conducted his 2006 on-site sustainability review, there was specific evidence that this county already was in the process of improving its training curricula. (See Tanveer Aff. ¶ 11 (Ex. to Doc. No. 811).) “Staff trainers were added to the Jefferson County DHR training unit in 2005 to address both new and ongoing training needs,” and an expanded three-month training program for newly-hired workers was slated to commence in August 2005. (Id.)
In short, the evidence is favorable as to the establishment of exemplar training programs in DHR’s counties. The evidence, though, is somewhat mixed as to whether some counties are implementing the training curricula in a satisfactory manner. In reaching its findings of sys-temwide substantial compliance, the court has weighed both the positive and negative evidence in the area of training.
6. Core Purpose Two: Appropriate Caseloads
As discussed above, compliance with the court’s Licensing Order is one important step DHR took to implement core purpose two into its child welfare practices. A more difficult task for DHR has been discerning how to retain an adequate number of competent staff to serve the children in its care. One way to retain staff is to minimize burnout which can be attributable to high caseloads. High caseloads also reduce the quality of care each child receives from his or her social worker. To this end, the Consent Decree recognizes that child welfare professionals must have appropriate caseloads in order to carry out the principles of the Consent Decree. (See Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 36 (citing ¶ 53 of the Consent Decree) (Doc. No. 783)); (see also Agreement Regarding Implementation, § IV, ¶ 12, which provides: “The Implementation Plan shall identify maximum caseloads for various types of staff, including DHR caseworkers, and specify the steps that will be taken to bring caseloads down to at least those levels.”).
Consequently, the Implementation Plan set a June 1994 deadline for DHR to de *1149 velop and to adopt provisional caseload standards, mutually acceptable to the parties, for conversion of counties. (Doc. Nos. 452, 538.) The 1994 deadline proved unattainable, however, and, ultimately, the court stepped in. As a result, the parties reached an agreement which is embodied in the court’s order setting caseload and staffing levels. 34 The court’s 1998 Order expressly recognizes that “[t]he Consent Decree contemplates staffing to be one of the core responsibilities of [DHR].” (Ct. 1998 Order at 2); (Consent Decree ¶ 53.) This section of the court’s opinion focuses on DHR’s compliance with the court’s 1998 Order.
In R.C.I, the court explained that the overall objective of the court’s 1998 Order is to restrict the number of cases assigned to social workers so that caseloads remain manageable. 35 As recognized by the court monitor, the court’s 1998 Order also “anticipated that there will be some variability in the day-to-day management of caseload levels at the local county level and that some allowance is necessary for periodic, but not sustained, county caseload levels going above the court-specified standards.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 38 (Doc. No. 783).) Therefore, the “Implementation” sections of the court’s 1998 Order, embodied in Appendix B, ¶ 1, set out the steps a county must take to correct caseload overages and, at the outer fringe, mandate that DHR implement corrective action to cure caseload problems within seven months. 36 (See id); (see also Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 40 (Doc. No. 783)); (Salter Aff. ¶ 4 (electronically filed as Ex. 12 to Doc. No. 761).)
Defendant argues that DHR is complying with the court’s 1998 Order. 37 The primary evidentiary support for his argument comes via two affidavits from Mike *1150 Salter (“Salter”), a 32-year veteran of DHR who at the time he signed his affidavits worked as the director of DHR’s office of management and fiscal analysis. (Salter Affs. (electronically filed as Ex. 12 to Doc. No. 761 & Ex. 5 to Doc. No. 779-5).) 38 Briefly, among the points Salter makes in his affidavits are as follows. He says that systemwide staffing allocations actually are greater than that required by the court’s 1998 Order. (Salter Aff. ¶ 11 (electronically filed as Ex. 12 to Doc. No. 761).) He offers explanations for why variations and overages in caseloads occur. 39 Salter also addresses some of the court’s concerns, which the court outlined in R.C.I, including a concern that staffing allocations in certain converted counties were reduced after the counties were “declared” in substantial compliance with the Consent Decree. (Id. ¶ 16.) Below, the court will include discussion of Salter’s affidavits where appropriate.
In contrast to DHR’s position, the theme echoed by the court monitor is that DHR exhibits weaknesses in its ability to comply with the court’s 1998 Order. (See, e.g., Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 89, 93-94 (Doc. No. 812).) Plaintiffs concur with the court monitor’s opinion and argue that the statistics, collected from the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews and as a whole, demonstrate that DHR is not substantially complying with any component of core purpose two. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 820-18 at 9-12.)
a. Staffing Allocations and the Child Welfare Staffing Committee
A discussion of staffing allocations is incomplete without first recognizing DHR’s Child Welfare Staffing Committee, which is the product of the Consent Decree. (See Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 40 (Doc. No. 783).) The Staffing Committee is responsible for allocating for each county the number of staff the county needs in order to comply with the court’s 1998 Order. As observed in R.C.I, the Staffing Committee “meets ‘regularly’ for the primary purpose of monitoring staff-to-caseload ratios. The Staffing Committee reviews county directors’ requests for additional personnel and incorporates county consultant updates regarding county staffing needs.” 390 F.Supp.2d at 1039 (internal citations omitted). These meetings occur on a monthly basis. (See Salter Aff. ¶ 15 (electronically filed as Ex. 12 to Doc. No. 761) (observing that DHR’s “staffing committee meets every month to review the caseloads and take corrective action as quickly as necessary”).) In his affidavits, Salter describes in more detail the procedures used by the Staffing Committee, including the analyses generated by the county caseload management re *1151 ports and the biweekly staffing reports, to review county staffing levels and to monitor a county’s compliance with the court’s 1998 Order. (Salter Aff. ¶¶ 5-8 (electronically filed as Ex. 12 to Doc. No. 761)); (Salter Aff. at 2-3 (electronically filed as Ex. 5 to Doc. No. 779-5).) The Staffing Committee is an asset of DHR.
The court monitor recently observed a specific example of the effective workings of the DHR Staffing Committee. Namely, in Lauderdale County, the court monitor stated that “[s]taff turnover and caseload issues have been stabilized in the past two years” as a result of the collaborative efforts of the county and the DHR Staffing Committee which resulted in the committee’s allocation of additional personnel for Lauderdale County. (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 37 (Doc. No. 813).)
Salter also cites Jackson County as one example of the positive contributions made by the Staffing Committee. He says that, due to the Staffing Committee’s vigilance in monitoring the increase of child welfare cases in Jackson County, the Staffing Committee has increased staffing allocations five times between November 2003 and September 2004, from fourteen to eighteen workers. (Salter Aff. ¶ 15 (electronically filed as Ex. 12 to Doc. No. 761)); (see also Wayne Sellers’ Aff. (Attach. 6 to Doc. No. 811) (stating in his capacity as the director of the Marshall County DHR office that the “DHR Staffing Committee has quickly responded to our ever-increasing caseloads and increased our allocation many times over the past two years”).) Other examples of the work of the Staffing Committee are noted in the next section.
The court finds that, through the efforts of the Staffing Committee, DHR actually is allocating the number of positions needed in counties to comply with the caseload standards established by the court’s 1998 Order. The Child Welfare Staff Data charts support the court’s findings. A discussion of that data follows.
The court looks first to the Child Welfare Staff Data chart, which is submitted as attachment 4 to Salter’s Affidavit. 40 (see Doc. No. 779-5). The Child Welfare Staff Data chart contains five categories of information for each county pertaining to staffing and workload data. As explained by Salter, the first row, titled in abbreviated form “co. mthly caseload report,” reflects the number of staff needed in the county to comply with the court’s 1998 Order, as calculated by the caseload management system and reported in the county management reports. The second row, titled “system data,” shows the number of staff needed to comply with the court’s 1998 Order based on DHR’s automated system “count of cases.” 41 (Salter Aff. at *1152 2, 6 (Doc. No. 779-5).) The third row, labeled “allocation,” sets forth the staffing allocation determined for the county by the Staffing Committee. (Id.) The fourth row, labeled “CFP last pay period of mth.,” represents the number of workers actually employed during the month in question, and the fifth and final row denotes the average R.C. workload percentage in the county for the month. (See id.)
The Child Welfare Staff Data chart compiles monthly data of seventeen counties from November 2004 to September 2005. Of the 187 total months measured, there are 171 months where staffing allocations in counties either met or exceeded one or both of the figures in the first and second rows (i.e., the figures quantified through the caseload management system and DHR’s automated system). Translated into percentages, this data reflects that DHR met the staffing allocation requirements in 91 percent of the months examined. The court finds that this data is favorable.
The sixteen remaining months (out of 187 months) denote staff allocation shortages in five counties, namely, Elmore, Jackson, Marshall, Pike and Shelby. Jackson County’s staff allocation was short by one for five months, and Marshall County’s staff allocation suffered by one for seven consecutive months. Elmore County also was short one allocation during one month, as was Pike County. Shelby County was deficient by one worker for two months.
Similarly, the court finds that favorable results are revealed in a separate Child Welfare Staff Data chart, submitted as Appendix D to the court monitor’s April 2006 Report. This chart examines staffing data on twenty-seven counties for a period of thirteen months beginning in December 2004 and continuing through December 2005. 42 As reflected in this chart, for 321 months (out of a total of 351 months), staffing allocations either met or exceeded one or both of the figures quantified by the caseload management system and DHR’s automated system (which are used to determine compliance with the court’s 1998 Order).
The data and percentages discussed herein are even more positive when one considers that the staffing allocations, which are generated by the caseload management system (designated as “co. report” on the Total Child Welfare Staff Need report) and DHR’s automated system (designated as “system” on the Total Child Welfare Staff Need report), are based upon the caseload ratios which DHR has implemented which, for some types of cases are lower than that required by the court’s 1998 Order. (See Attach. 3 to Salter Aff. (electronically filed as Ex. 5 to Doc. No. 779-5)); (see also Salter Aff. at 4 (electronically filed as Ex. 5 to Doc. No. 779-5)); (Salter Aff. ¶ 8 (electronically filed as Ex. 12 to Doc. No. 761).) For instance, Salter attests, that as of September 2005, systemwide, there were thirty-one additional CAN (child abuse and neglect) social workers allocated to various county offices due to DHR’s implementation of a ratio lower than the court’s stan *1153 dard. (Salter Aff. at 5 (electronically filed as Ex. 5 to Doc. No. 779-5).)
Salter further attests that DHR “has consistently provided more staff for county offices than required by the staffing order,” and he has discussed the statistics which the court finds supports his assertion. (See, e.g., Salter Aff. ¶ 12 (electronically filed as Ex. 12 to Doc. No. 761).) For example, he says that, in May 2005, “[t]he combined total of the workers on board and the ones being hired was 1,609, which [was] the staffing allocation for May 2005.” (Id. ¶ 10.)
Based on the foregoing evidence, the court issues the following findings. First, overall, having considered in its totality the evidence assimilated in the Child Welfare Staff Data charts, the court finds that the data equates to evidence of substantially compliant staffing allocations. Similarly, the court concurs with Salter that these charts “show[ ] that DHR is working hard to keep staff levels high enough to enable [] counties to meet the caseload standards.” (Salter Aff. at 6 (electronically filed as Ex. 5 to Doc. No. 779-5).) Furthermore, the court finds that the shortfalls are minimal and are inconsequential to a finding of substantial compliance. Second, the court finds that the Staffing Committee ensures, through monitoring and analysis, that counties are allocated a sufficient number of workers to comply with and, in some instances, to exceed the requirements in the court’s 1998 Order. (See id.)
Additionally, Salter adequately has addressed the court’s concern, as also voiced by the court monitor, that DHR reduced staffing allocations in counties after the counties were found to be in substantial compliance with the Consent Decree. See R.C.I, 890 F.Supp.2d at 1051; (see Salter Aff. ¶ 16 (electronically filed as Ex. 12 to Doc. No. 761).) Salter attests, ‘While it is true that some counties were reduced in staff after conversion, they were never reduced below the number required by the caseload standards.” (see Salter Aff. ¶ 16.) He explains that, during the conversion process, many counties were provided extra staff “above that needed by the court[-]ordered standards, so that workers would have time to learn the R.C. principles.” (Id.) He cites Calhoun County as an example. He says that in December 2003, when Calhoun County had its assertion presentation, Calhoun County employed eleven more workers than required by the court’s 1998 Order (i.e., the court’s 1998 Order required fifty-six workers and Calhoun County employed sixty-seven workers). (Id.) By April 2005, due to a decrease in the number of cases, the court’s 1998 Order required Calhoun County to employ fifty-four workers. (Id.) The court, thus, finds that Calhoun County’s reduction of staff between December 2003 and April 2005 from sixty-seven to sixty did not violate the court’s 1998 Order. (Id.) Salter also states that “[s]ome” counties have increased their staff since the time of assertion presentations and cites Etowah County as one example. (Id. ¶ 17.)
At this juncture, the court observes that, although Salter suggests to the contrary, the court does not view the court monitor to dispute the foregoing evidence. Indeed, the court monitor has noted a positive trend in recent staffing patterns. The court monitor has stated that, subsequent to his November 2004 Report, statewide, “both the actual number of child welfare professionals and the number of allocated positions have increased.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 at 39 (Doc. No. 783).) Namely, the court monitor stated that, in August 2004, there were 1,558 allocated positions and, in October 2005, that number increased to 1,622. (Id.) Corresponding to the increased allocations, in August 2004, there were 1,546 actual workers, and in *1154 October 2005, there were 1,564 actual workers. (Id.) Allocating a sufficient number of- staffing slots to each county to comply with the court’s 1998 Order and actual filling all of those available slots are two different issues. The court monitor primarily criticizes the latter, as discussed below; Salter focuses on the former,
b. DHR’s Compliance with the Monitoring and Reporting Sections of the Court’s 1998 Order
The court finds that the evidence demonstrates that DHR is monitoring caseloads standards, in accordance with the dictates set out in Section II of the court’s 1998 Order. (See Ct.1998 Order, Appendix B, § II.) Based on the foregoing evidence, the court finds that DHR has in place a well-functioning framework for allocating staff and tracking and reporting caseloads, by number and by type, on the county level, as required by Section II. (See id.) (“Each county shall determine monthly the average caseload for each standard component (i.e., foster cases, family services, etc.) and document the average caseload during the months for each worker[].”). The court monitor concurs that “information is collected that can be used to manage and evaluate the system of care.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 10 (Doc. No. 783).) The effectiveness of DHR’s framework is demonstrated by the Staffing Committee’s proven ability to allocate staff for each county, adjusting the numbers up or down when necessary, so that each county has the number of staff required to comply with the court’s 1998 Order. In other words, the court finds that DHR is “increasing the county staff allocation, if it is determined that the caseloads in excess of the standard are a result of increasing incidence and demand.” (Ct.1998 Order, Appendix B, § II E.)
Furthermore, the evidence establishes that, as dictated by the court’s 1998 Order, counties are “reporting] three months of caseload data by worker and a quarterly average on the quality assurance reports.” (See id. § II B.) Finally, the court’s 1998 Order requires that a county having more than 10 percent of workers exceeding the standard caseloads must file an exception report, explaining therein the reasons for the overages and the corrective action which it is implementing to correct the deficiencies. As recognized by the court monitor, “DHR has consistently filed these exception reports as addendums to the monthly caseload management report.” 43 (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 43 (Doc. No. 783).)
c. The Court Monitor’s Measurements for Ascertaining Substantial Compliance with the Court’s 1998 Order and Examination of the Evidence from the 2006 On-Site Sustainability Reviews
The court monitor traditionally has taken into account three factors when analyzing caseload data to assess compliance with the court’s 1998 Order. (See Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 47 (Doc. No. 783).) These three “important” factors, explained in more detail below, are as follows: (1) the county’s “average R.C. workload”; (2) the number of counties which are “over standards” for periods of time exceeding the seven-month outer goal of corrective action set out in the court’s 1998 Order, see supra footnote 36; and (3) the percentage of workers “over standards” *1155 within a county. 44 (See id. at 47-48.) As to the third factor, the court monitor has stated: “Having 20% or less of [the] staff over court-specified standards falls within the range of caseload variability typically accepted by the monitor.” (Ct. Monitor Dec. 2003 Report at 29.) Concerning the first factor, at times, the court monitor also has given some leeway (10 percent) to counties concerning overages in R.C. workloads. (See, e.g., Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 at 48 (Doc. No. 783)); (cf. Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 37 (Doc. No. 812) (observing that a case worker whose monthly caseload average was 109 percent was over standards “by a small percentage”).)
The court further finds that other factors also are relevant to the analysis of compliant caseloads. Some of these factors were discussed in the preceding subsections and include whether DHR is allocating positions to allow counties to hire the requisite number of workers needed to comply with the court’s 1998 Order and whether DHR is complying with other of the technical requirements of the court’s 1998 Order, such as the implementation of measures to monitor and to track caseload data (i.e., Section II of Appendix B). As discussed above, the court finds that DHR is compliant in the foregoing matters. Any evidence of good faith on the part of DHR also should not be ignored and has been considered by the court.
Below, the court examines the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews to assess how the ten representative counties are performing in the three areas traditionally examined by the court monitor (as set out above). As explained herein, the court finds that the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews yield results which support a finding of systemwide substantial compliance concerning core purpose two. The court further finds that the evidence reveals a demonstration of good faith by DHR and establishes that federal oversight is not necessary in order to ensure future compliance with the court’s 1998 Order.
i. Counties’ Average R.C. Workloads
In his December 2003 Report, the court monitor stated that a county’s average R.C. workload level is an “indicator that describes the ability of the staffing capacity of each individual county to meet the court’s current caseload demands.” (Ct. Monitor Dec. 2003 Report at 11.) He explains that a county’s average R.C. workload level “is determined by a formula that examines the total number of children and families receiving services (CAN investigations, Foster Care and/or Protective Services, Adoptions, Resource Development and Supervisors) and compartes] these figures to allocated staff for each of the above-listed service-type categories.” (Id.) According to the caseload management reports, attached as Appendix C to the court monitor’s April 2006 Report, eight of the ten counties did not exceed an average R.C. workload of 100 percent for the month reviewed. (See Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report, Appendix C.) Those counties and their average R.C. workloads, in percentages, are as follows: (1) Chambers (74 percent); (2) Randolph (67 percent); (3) Conecuh, (89 percent); (4) Jackson, (98 percent); (5) Lauderdale (84 percent); (6) Lee (82 percent); (7) Montgomery (97 percent); and (8) Jefferson (93 percent). (See id.). Another county, Marshall County, had an average R.C. workload of 107 percent, meaning that only one county, Macon County, scored above 110 percent, with an average R.C. workload of 114 percent. *1156 (See id.) The court finds that the foregoing data is very favorable.
The foregoing evidence collected as part of the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews also reveals other positive facts on caseload standards. The court finds that the data set out in the Child Welfare Staff Data chart, attached as Appendix D to the court monitor’s April 2006 Report, and the data in Appendix C reflect the ability of counties to correct caseload overages. For example, between December 2004 and December 2005, Jackson County experienced average R.C. workloads ranging between 101 percent and 126 percent; however, Jackson County attained an improved 98 percent average R.C. workload in February 2006 during the court monitor’s on-site sustainability review. (See Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 30 & Appendixes C & D.) Conecuh County also demonstrated improvements, reducing average R.C. workloads for four consecutive months, from 139 percent in September 2005, to 119 percent in October 2005, to 92 percent in November 2005 and, finally, to 89 percent in December 2005. (Id., Appendixes C & D.) Additionally, for five consecutive months, from September 2005 to January 2006, Montgomery County maintained its average R.C. workloads in the ninetieth percentile range. (Id.)
Appendix D also reflects that the average R.C. workloads in Lee and Randolph counties remained below 100 percent for thirteen consecutive months; thus, these two counties exhibited perfect compliance for the time period in question. Jefferson and Lauderdale counties maintained average R.C. workloads at or below 105 percent during the same thirteen months. (See id., Appendix D.)
ii. Counties’ Seven-Month Track Record
In his November 2005 Report to the court, the court monitor stated:
Managing active caseloads on a day-today basis is a dynamic process as caseload levels for individual workers will fluctuate as cases close, and new cases for children and families are opened. It is not uncommon in the management of active cases for workers to occasionally go above caseload standards. This occasional allowance was contemplated in the timeframes for corrective action discussed in the 1998 Order[.]
(Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 47 (Doc. No. 783).) The court’s 1998 Order recognizes the inevitable ebb and flow in caseloads for individual workers and, thus, permits DHR a period of time to correct noncompliant caseloads, with seven months constituting the maximum time period for correction, see supra footnote 36. (See also Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 48 (Doc. No. 783).) For the reasons to follow, the court finds that the ten representative counties, which were subjected to the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews, demonstrate that DHR is tracking caseloads, identifying caseload problems, and implementing corrective action to correct caseload overages within the court-ordered maximum time frames.
In his April 2006 Report, the court monitor did not elaborate upon certain data which the court finds demonstrates that counties effectively are ensuring that average R.C. workloads do not exceed the 100 percent ceiling for seven continuous months. Appendix D to the court monitor’s April 2006 Report charts the monthly average workload levels of the ten representative counties and others from December 2004 through December 2005 and is worthy of the court’s discussion. (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report, Appendix D (Doc. No. 812).) As outlined in Appendix D, eight of the ten counties subjected to the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews (which includes two non-sustaining counties) were not over standards for any uninterrupted seven-month period. (See id.) Of these ten counties, therefore, only Jackson and Marshall counties suffered aver *1157 age R.C. workload levels greater than 100 percent for seven consecutive months. 45 Regarding Jackson County, however, the data is not all bad. The data reveals that Jackson County gradually made improvements; namely, between October 2005 and December 2005, Jackson County reduced its average R.C. workload from 122 percent to 101 percent. Moreover, neither Jackson County nor Marshall County had average R.C. workload levels greater than 110 percent for any continuous seven-month period, 110 percent being a margin of tolerance recognized recently by the court monitor. (See Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 at 48 (Doc. No. 783)); (cf. Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 37 (observing that a case worker whose monthly caseload average was 109 percent was over standards “by a small percentage”).)
Prior to the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews, the court monitor stated “that counties having [average] R.C. workloads over standards, with some counties having workloads over standards for durations as long as seven months, remains a persistent problem for DHR.” (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 47 (Doc. No. 783).) The court finds that the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews of the ten representative counties reveal that DHR has halted and, indeed, has corrected this “persistent problem.” The court finds that this data reveals marked improvements and that the data easily extends into the parameters of substantial compliance.
Hi. Data Pertaining to Percentages of Staff “Over Standards”
The court turns to an examination of the data from the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews to ascertain how many workers were “over standards” within a county, the third factor which the court monitor deemed important when analyzing caseload data to assess a county’s compliance with the court’s 1998 Order. (Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 47 (Doc. No. 783).) This factor denotes “the percentage of staff for each county [who] have current caseloads that are in excess of court-specified limits, commonly referred to as being ‘over standards.’ ” (Ct. Monitor Dec. 2003 Report at 10.) Again, a worker with an average R.C. workload of 100 percent or less is deemed in compliance with the court’s 1998 Order. Below is the data, discussed county by county, concerning workers who, for the month in question, carried caseloads in violation of the standards set out in the court’s 1998 Order, as reported in the monthly management reports generated by DHR’s caseload management system. This data is found in Appendix C to the court monitor’s April 2006 Report. (See Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report, Appendix C (Doc. No. 812).)
The court observes also that the court monitor’s discussions, presently and in the past, reveal that other considerations, in addition to the raw data, also factored into the court monitor’s evaluation of whether a county is performing satisfactorily in this third area of examination. (See, e.g., Ct. Monitor Nov. 2005 Report at 53-54 (Doc. No. 783).) The court, thus, includes discussion of these other relevant considerations, which include among other things the perceptions of stakeholders. Below, the court first sets out the evidence garnered from each county as a result of the 2006 on-site sustainability reviews, followed by the court’s findings regarding said evidence.
In Chambers County, one of the six workers, or 17 percent, was over standards. 46 This worker’s workload for the *1158 month was 108.6 percent. The intake worker was over standards (155.6 percent), and one of the three supervisors, or 33 percent, was over standards (111 percent). 47 As the court monitor explained, in Chambers County, there was significant turnover in front-line practice, but he found that the turnover was “warranted” and did not “reflect[ ] adversely in current practice.” (Ct. Monitor April 2006 Report at 6-7 (Doc. No. 812).) The court monitor says also that the caseloads of the intake and caseworker will even out as new workers assume caseloads. (Id.)
In Randolph County, no worker was “over standards,” meaning that eight case workers, the intake worker and three supervisors had workload averages for the month in question at or below 100 percent. Accordingly, the court monitor reports that the staff in Randolph County has been very stable with no turnover in the twelve months preceding his report. (Id. at 14.)
In Conecuh County, “25% of workers [were] over standard[s].” (Id. at 21.) The court monitor, however, indicates that this percentage, although seemingly high, “should be interpreted with some caution.” (Id.) He observes that “[t]here [was] one CAN investigator ... who also ha[d] 11 ongoing cases and one foster care child.” (Id.) This worker was “over standards” by a small percentage (102.4 percent). See id. The court monitor also states that there were “two foster care workers!,] with [one] worker at 114% of workload standard, [who was] shown as having 15 foster care cases, three ongoing, and one CAN.” (Id.) The court observes also that the sole supervisor was in compliance with the workload figures. (See id., Appendix C.)
Conecuh County, however, experienced no staff turnover in the twelve months preceding the court monitor’s April 2006 Report. (See id. at 21.) The court monitor recites that stakeholders felt that “workers are dedicated and are providing equal or better service than at the time of assertion.” (Id. at 28.) The 2006 on-site sustainability review similarly revealed that “[t]here was a high regard for the staff from all stakeholder groups and an overall belief that workers are doing a good job and are keeping children safe.” (Id.)
In Jackson County, the monthly management report reveals that 43 percent of the workers had caseloads which exceeded the maximum caseload requirements, with caseloads ranging from 111.1 percent to 153.3 percent. (Id., Appendix C.) One of the three supervisors also exceeded standards, carrying a workload which was 5.6 percent “over standards.” (Id.) Pertaining to Jackson County, the court monitor observes that, at the time of his report, the Jackson County director had been in the position for only nine months. (Id. at 29.) He also says that, “[although the new staff is young and inexperienced in the child welfare field,” these new professionals have “strong social work skills” and “strong training and support from supervisory staff.” (Id.) The three supervisors “have longevity,” and stakeholders, in particular, “repeatedly noted the strength of the supervisory staff as an asset to the department.” (Id.) Noting the statistics from the monthly management report un *1159 der review, however, the court monitor states that “[

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8688051. Public record. Not legal advice.