# Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward

> Superior Court of New Hampshire · November 15, 1817 · 65 N.H. 473

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8506083

## Case

- **Full name:** The Trustees of Dartmouth College v. William H. Woodward
- **Court:** Superior Court of New Hampshire
- **Decided:** November 15, 1817
- **Citations:** 65 N.H. 473
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Mason
- **Judges:** Bartlett, Bell, Hon, Mason, Richardson, Smith, Sullivan, Woodbury
- **Cited by:** 1 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8506083

## Opinion text

Mr. Mason.
— By the charter of 1769 a corporation is created, by the name of “The Trustees of Dartmouth College.” The charter recites, that much expense and great labour had been bestowed, in erecting and supporting a charity school, which had become highly useful; and that individuals, as well in England as in this country, were disposed to make donations, for its enlarge *474 ment, and more liberal endowment; and that the king, “willing to encourage the laudable and charitable design,” establishéd the corporation. Twelve persons are appointed under the name of trustees, to constitute the corporation, and it is expressly provided, that it shall forever thereafter consist of twelve trustees, and no more. To them is granted the right to acquire, and hold real and personal estate, and to dispose of the same for the use of the college; and to appoint future trustees to fill vacancies in their board; and also to appoint the necessary officers of the college, and to assign them their duties and salaries; and to make laws and regulations for the proper government of the institution, together with all the usual powers of such corporations. “ To have and hol'd .all and singular the privileges, advantages, liberties and immunities, and all other the premises, herein and hereby, granted and given, or which are meant, mentioned, or intended to be given and granted unto them, the said trustees of Dartmouth College, and their sueóessors forever.”
The first act (of 27th of June 1816) makes the twelve trustees, under the charter, and nine individuals, to be appointed by the Governour and Council, a corporation, by the name of “ the trustees of Dartmouth University;” and transfers to them all '■'•the property, rights, powers, liberties and privileges” of the old corporation, with power to establish new colleges and an Institute; — subject to the controul of a board, of twenty-five overseers, to be appointed by the Governour and Council.
The second act makes provision for obviating certain difficulties, which had occurred in attempting to execute the first. And the last act authorizes the defendant, who was the Plaintiffs’ treasurer, to retain and hold for a certain time, all their property against their will; and subjects them to heavy penalties, should they impede or hinder the execution of the acts.
Under colour of these acts, the defendant claims to hold the property mentioned in the declaration.
The question is whether the acts are obligatory, and binding on the plaintiffs; they never having accepted or assented to them.
By the necessary construction of these acts, the old corporation is abolished, if they are valid; and a new one established. The first act does, in fact, create a new corporation; and transfers to it all the property and privileges of the old. The old corporation can, in no sense, be said to continue, when its property and privileges, of every kind, are thus taken away, and transferred to another corporation. The trustees and overseers of Dartmouth University constitute a corporation, if the acts are effectual for any purpose; and that corporation is, essentially, different, from the corporation of the trustees of Dartmouth College, as established by the charter.
The two corporations are different in their corporate names; in the natural persons that compose them; in the form and manner *475 of tbeir organizations; and in tbeir rights and privileges. The old corporation consists of twelve trustees; the new of twenty one trustees, and twenty five overseers. In the old corporation the trustees, by filling vacancies, as they happened, appointed then-own successors, and enjoyed and exercised all the privileges, granted by their charter, and were subject to no controul, but that of the law of the land. In the new corporation, the trustees, in their most important acts and doings, are subject to the controul of a board of overseers, dependent for their appointments on the Governour and Council. Subject to this controul, the new trustees have all the rights and powers of the old; and they have also other most important rights and powers, which the old trustees never-had, nor claimed. Of course, new duties are incurred, correspondent to the newly granted rights.
In the first act it is provided, that “ they (i. e. the new trustees) and their successors, in that capacity, as hereby constituted, shall respectively forever have, hold, use, exercise and enjoy all the powers, authorities, rights, property, liberties, privileges and immunities, which have hitherto been possessed, enjoyed and used by the trustees of Dartmouth College; — except so far as the same may be varied or limited by the provisions of this act. And they shall have power (among other things) to organize colleges in the Univex-sity; to establish an Institute, and elect fellows and members thereof; — and to arrange, invest and employ the funds of the University.” What other or more appropriate language could have been used, if the old trustees had surrendered their charter, and the legislature had intended to establish a new institution, to supply the place, and enjoy all the property and privileges of the old corporation ? In an act for that purpose, terms could not have been used more significant and appropriate, than those contained in this act. They are in substance, that the corporation, as hereby established, shall have and enjoy all the property and riglits, which have hitherto been held and enjoyed by the old corporation ; —except so far as the same may be varied or limited by this act.
It is true, the act purports to include the old trustees, in the new corporation, but they have not accepted the act, nor consented to become members of the new corporation, and consequently they are not members. For they can neither be compelled to become members of the new corporation, against their will; nor to exercise new powers, or submit to new restrictions, in the old corporation. It was neither expected, nor desired that the old trustees should unite with the new ones. The intexition doubtless was, in this indirect way to abolish the old corporation, and get rid of the trustees. The manner, in which the injury was inflicted, does not lessen the grievance.
But if it should be held, that the old corporation is not, absolutely, abolished, it could avail nothing, in support of the validity of the acts. For the legislature is no more competent to change, *476 and essentially alter the rights of the plaintiffs, than to abolish them. And it cannot be denied, that the acts do, in many particulars, essentially, affect and alter both the corporate, and individual rights and powers of the old trustees. That alterations and new limitations are imposed is admitted, by the .very terms of the first act. The new trustees are to enjoy and exercise all the property, and privileges, which had been enjoyed and exercised by the old trustees, — except so far as the same may be varied or limited by the provisions of that act.
Before the passing of the acts, the plaintiffs were sole owners of all the property, acquired under their charter, and were, alone, entitled to exercise all the privileges, granted by it. By the acts, others are admitted, • against their will, to become joint owners with them, of the property, and to a joint participation, of all the privileges. This forcible intrusion, under pretence of joint ownership, violates the plaintiffs’ rights, as essentially, as would an entire ouster.
The whole organization of the corporation is changed. — Instead of one board, consisting of twelve members, there are two boards, —one of twenty one members, — the other of twenty five. By the charter, the trustees had the right of making all suitable regulations, for the institution, subject to no appeal. By the acts, all the votes, and doings of the trustees may be negatived by the overseers; in whose appointment, the corporation has no agency.
Not only are new trustees forced in, to participate with the old ones, but new trusts, and new duties are created. — An Institute and new colleges are to be established, and the funds, acquired under the charter, may be applied to their establishment and support.
The President of the College, a member of the old corporation, held his office and salary, dependent on the twelve trustees alone. The tenure of his office is changed, and he is now dependent on others, who have already attempted to remove him.
If the legislature can, at pleasure, make such alterations and changes, in the rights and privileges of the Plaintiffs, it may take them away entirely. If a part may be destroyed or taken away by one act, the rest may, by an other. The same power, that can do one, can do the other.
I shall contend for the Plaintiffs that these acts are not obligatory : ...
... I. Because they are not within the general scope of legislative power:
II. Because they violate certain provisions of the constitution of this State, restraining the legislative power:
III. Because they violate the constitution of the United States:
On the first point, the attempt will be to show, that the legislature would not have been competent to pass these acts, and make *477 them binding on the plaintiffs, without their assent, even if there were no special restrictions on the power of the legislature, either in the constitution of this state, or of the United States.
Numerous instances have occurred, where it has been the duty of the courts of law, in this state, as well as in most other states of the union, to examine into the legality of the doings of their respective legislatures. And the cases, in which the courts have been obliged to declare legislative acts unconstitutional and void, are vastly more numerous, than judging from the theory of our governments, was to have been expected. As the constitutions-attempt to define, with exactness, the powers granted to each department of government, it might have been expected, had not experience shown the contrary, that each department would have carefully confined itself, within its prescribed limits.
The celebrated maxim that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of government, ought to be kept separate and distinct,, and be vested in different departments, was well understood, and duly appreciated, at the time of forming the constitution of this state ; and is recognized and adopted in the 37th article of the bill of rights. The due observance of this principle, according to the opinion of tbe most celebrated statesmen, and political writers, is. essential to the preservation of a free government. “ There can be no liberty, where tbe legislative and executive powers are united in tbe same person, or body of magistracy: ” or, “ if tlie power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers ” (1) . Mr. Madison, speaking of this principle, says, “ no political truth is certainly of greater intrinsick value, or is stamped with tbe authority of more enlightened patrons of liberty.” “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in tbe same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether-hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranuy” (2) .
In compliance witb this fundamental principle of all free governments, our constitution has erected tbe three departments, and given to each its proper powers.
The chief labour and difficulty has always been, to keep the legislative power, within its limits: and to protect the other departments from its encroachments. The legislature is too numerous to-be restrained by considerations of individual responsibility. Confident in its influence with the people, it acts with a boldness and intrepidity, of which the other departments are incapable. This is the united opinion of the most able judges, after a critical examination of the course and tendency of our governments. “ The legislative department is every where, extending the sphere of its activity,, and drawing all power'into its impetuous vortex.” “It is against, the enterprizing ambition of this department, that the people ought. *478 to indulge all their jealousy, and exhaust all their precautions ” (3) . Mr. Hamilton on the same subject says, “ we have seen, that the tendency of republican governments is, to an aggrandizement of the legislative, at the expense of the other departments ” (4) . “They (the legislature) have accordingly, in many instances, decided rights, which should have been left to judiciary controversy” (5) .
Legislative bodies seem to consider themselves as representing, exclusively, the sovereignty of the people, and as having the right to exercise any power, tliat they may deem expedient, unless specially prohibited. It is often gravely contended, that the legislature, thus representing the people, is superior to the other branches of the government, and that it may, of right, exert a general controuling power over them.. Such a doctrine is entirely inconsistent with that vital principle of all free governments, that the three great powers should be kept separate and independent.
This axiom requires, that each department should confine itself to the powers granted to it, and not interfere with, nor exercise those, granted to the other departments. No interference whatever ought to be permitted, except vibre there is, by the constitution, a plain delegation of power; as in the instance of the qualified negative, of the acts of the legislature, by the Governour. The different departments are co-ordinate, independent, and equally the depositaries of sovereign power. Each has what was 'delegated to it, by the people, the great source of all power, and neither has more. Each of the three powers is, in its nature, sovereign, within its proper sphere of action. Within the limits, prescribed for it, the judiciary department is as substantially sovereign, as the legislative is within its limits. And the Courts of justice have as much right, to enact and promulgate new laws, as the legislature has to decide private controversies.. For there is no more ground for a pretence, that power is ■ given, by the constitution, either directly, or by inference, to the legislature to decide on matters of private right, than that power is given to the Courts, to enact general statutes. And one department, whenever it shall attempt to act, beyond the limits of its authority, is entitled to no more obedience or respect, than an other would be, when making a similar attempt.
The Constitution of this State, and that of the United States, apparently jealous of the encroaching tendency of the legislative power, have not only defined it, with caution and exactness, but have also, in many instances, where from former experience, the greatest danger was apprehended, guarded it with special prohibitions. But these “ parchment barriers ” will have little effect, unless carefully guarded, and firmly defended by the judicia^. The powers are divided, and granted to separáte and independent *479 departments, to tbe end, that each may, in its turn, be checked and restrained, in any attempt, to exercise powers not granted to it. To restrain the legislative department, from overleaping its boundary, the chief reliance is placed on the Judiciary.
That the Courts of law, not only have the right, but are bound to entertain questions, and decide, on the constitutionality of acts of the legislature, though formerly doubted, seems to be now, almost universally, admitted. But an erroneous opinion still prevails, to a considerable extent, that the courts, in the discharge of this great and important duty, ought to act, not only with more than ordinary deliberation, but even with a degree of cautions timidity. The idea is, that these are dangerous subjects for Courts, and that they ought not to declare acts of the legislature unconstitutional, unless they come to their conclusion, with absolute certainty, like that of mathematical demonstration ; and where the reasons are so manifest, that none can doubt. A Court of law, when examining the doings of a co-ordinate branch of the government, will always treat it, with great decorum. This is proper in itself, and necessary to preserve an harmonious understanding, between independent departments. So also, it ought to be, after the most careful deliberation only, that a proceeding of such co-ordinate branch should be pronounced void. Because the result is always important. But the examination is to be pursued with firmness, and the final decision, as in other cases, must be according to the unbiased dictate of the understanding.
An act of the legislature must, necessarily, have the sanction of the opinion of a majority, of a numerous body of men. It cannot therefore be supposed, that the reasons, against the validity of such an act, will ordinarily be so plain and obvious, as to leave no manner of doubt. To require then, that Courts shall abstain, from declaring acts of the legislature invalid, while a scruple of doubt remains, is nothing less, than to demand a surrender of their jurisdiction in this particular; in the due exercise of which consists the chief, if not only efficient security, for the great and fundamental principle of our free governments. Experience shows, that legislatures are in the constant habit, 'of exerting their power to its utmost extent. They intentionally act up to the very verge of their authority: and are seldom restrained by doubts or timidity. If the Courts, fearing a conflict, adopt a course directly opposite, by abandoning their jurisdiction, and retiring, whenever a plausible ground of doubt can be suggested, the time cannot be distaiit, when the legislative department “will draw all power into its impetuous vortex.”
The constitution of this State gives to the Legislature all legislative power, and no other, that has any relation to the matter, under consideration. If therefore the passing of the acts, in question, be not within the general scope of the legislative power, they cannot be valid.
*480 The acts are predicated on no previous proceedings against the plaintiffs, showing any misconduct; but the attempt is, by a mere declaration of the sovereign will of the legislature, to take from the plaintiffs the whole, or a part, (and it makes no difference which) of their property and privileges; and to transfer them to others. That cannot be done by the exercise of the legislative power. That power is confined to the enacting of laws, and providing the proper ways and means for their execution, and finds there a sufficiently broad field of operation. Whenever a legislature rightfully performs other functions, it must be by virtue of special power, delegated for the purpose. A legislature can never, by virtue of its general legislative power, interfere in questions of private right. A legislature within its proper sphere of action, is governed by its discretion alone; it can have no other guide. But private rights are not held by the uncertain tenure of arbitrary discretion. — “An elective despotism was not the government we fought for ” (6) .
The security of private rights is the only valuable and important advantage, which a free government has over a despotick one. If the rights of individuals must be liable to be violated by despotick power, it, matters not, whether that power rests in the hands of one, or many. Numbers impose no restraint, and afford no security. Experience has shown, where all the powers of government have been united, that their being exercised by a numerous assembly, has afforded to private rights, no security against the grossest acts of violence and injustice.
The Legislature can make laws, by which private rights may become forfeited. But the Courts of justice are alone competent to adjudge and declare the forfeiture. While the legislative and judicial powers are kept separate, it can never be competent for the legislature, under any pretence whatever, to take property from one, and give it to another, or in any way infringe private rights. Were that permitted, all questions of private right might be speedily determined by legislative.orders and decrees; and there would be no occasion for Courts of law.
The deciding on matters of private right appertains, plainly and manifestly, to the judiciary department. It constitutes the chief labour of Courts of justice. As then one department cannot exercise the powers belonging to another, it follows, that the legislature cannot, rightfully, assume any part of this jurisdiction, thus, belonging to the judiciary department. The province of the legislature is to provide laws, and that of the Courts to decide rights, according to the laws. Were the Courts to assume the power of' making the laws, by which they are to decide, their judgments, would be arbitrary. Because, in making the laws, they could have no other rule than their own discretion. So when the legislature,. *481 whose right it is to make the law, assumes the power of adjudicating, the separate powers of government become united, and a despotism is created. And accordingly, it will be generally found, that where legislatures have attempted to interfere with private rights, they have decided with little or no regard to existing laws, but according to their own arbitrary discretion; or in other words, by the exercise of despotick power.
The general principle may be safely asserted, that no vested right whatever can bo devested, and taken away from one, and transferred to another, by force of a legislative act, and without the agency of a Court of justice. This principle is clearly established, in the case of Vanhorne vs. Dorsance. 2 Dal. 304 . A vested right is a right, acquired and possessed according to existing laws. Mr. Justice Ashurst calls it “ a legal right, properly vested in a third person, or an interest legally vested” (7) . All rights, legally acquired, are alike protected. The right to possess any peculiar privilege, or incorporeal hereditament, is entitled to the same protection, as the right of visible property. And it makes no difference, whether the property or privilege was obtained, by a grant from the State, or a private individual. The legislature cannot revoke its own grants. Thus land granted by a legislature becomes private property, and the grantee has immediately all the rights of ownership. And the agency of the legislature, in making the grant, gives it no authority to interfere with any rights, which the grantee derives from his grant (8) . So the grant, by the legislature to an individual, of a particular privilege, gives a vested right to the enjoyment of that privilege. It has been decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, that a grant, from a State, of a privilege or immunity, that certain land should be free from taxation, confers a right on the owner, which the legislature cannot infringe (9) . Of the same nature are grants of the privileges of keeping publick ferries, or erecting bridges and receiving certain tolls therefor, and also patents for new and useful inventions, all which create legal or vested rights, which cannot be taken away or infringed by the legislature.
If then legal rights, vested in individuals, cannot be taken away, or infringed by legislative acts, the next enquiry is whether the Plaintiffs have any such rights, which can be affected by the acts; in question.
The Plaintiffs claim to have legal rights, both in their corporate, and individual capacities. In their corporate capacity, they claim the franchise of being, and continuing to be, a corporation, and the right to possess and enjoy all the privileges, granted and assured to them, by their charter; and among others, the right to the property, acquired under it. In their individual capacities, *482 they claim the right to be members of the corporation, and to enjoy all the privileges, accruing to them from being members.
That many corporations have legal rights, and which of course cannot be abolished or infringed by the Legislature, cannot be doubted. It will not, as is believed be contended, that the Legislature can abolish incorporated Banks and insurance companies, and dispose, of their property, at pleasure. Such corporations clearly have vested rights, with which the legislature cannot interfere.
There are corporations of different kinds, and with different incidents, which are all very exactly defined by law. To ascertain what are the rights of the corporation, under consideration, it must be seen, to what species or class of corporations, it belongs, and what are the incidents, and rights of that species or class.
The only division of corporations, material to the present enquiry, is that of civil and eleemosynary.
Civil corporations are constituted for the purpose of government; or for the encouragement, of trade, and commerce, or such like purposes (10) . Some of them may be, with propriety, and often are called publick corporations. The division of a state, into counties and towns, for the purpose of civil government, creates publick corporations. These sections or districts are organized, for the purpose of exercising certain functions of civil government. And over these, the legislature may without doubt exercise a controuling power, to a certain extent. Other civil corporations, established for the promotion of commerce, or the more convenient management of pecuniary concerns, are private, and with them the legislature has no power to interfere.
The general division of a state into counties and towns, as is done in this,'and the other states of New-England, creates corporations of a peculiar kind, having a few only of the ordinary incidents of corporations. In this State, the corporate privileges of towns, with few exceptions, are conferred and limited by general laws, extending equally to all. A town, like a county, may be established without the consent of the inhabitants, who may be compelled, against their wills, to become members of the corporation. In this, there is nothing unjust or arbitrary, as a like provision extends to all the inhabitants of the state, who must be members of some town, and County Corporation. Although the privileges of such corporations may, in a certain degree be subject to legislative controul, it by no means follows, that the legislature can, rightfully, take from any such corporation its property, and transfer it to another.
Somewhat similar to these, are incorporated cities, where all within certain limits, are included, and made members of the corporation. But where there is a special grant of peculiar privileges, the legislative power to new-model, or controul them, if admitted at all, must be with great limitation. The legislature *483 cannot abolish such corporations, or do anything equivalent to it. As far as the privileges are peculiar, and such as cannot be affected by a general law, applicable to all, it is not easy to see on what principles they can be essentially changed or altered, by a special act of the legislature. But however that may be, if the legislature have a controuling power, over such corporations, it must be, because they are created, for the purpose of civil government, and are publick corporations. And consequently if it were admitted, that such power could be exercised over these corporations, it would not follow, that it might be so exercised over ■ corporations of a different kind, and established for different purposes.
An eleemosynary corporation is always for charitable purposes. Its design is, to secure the applications of donations to charitable uses, according to the directions of the donors. It has no concern with the civil government of the State, either general, or local; nor in the promotion of commerce, or any other branch of business, which are the objects of civil corporations. It originates in private bounty, and its privileges are granted, for the purpose of perpetuating, and securing the application of the bounty, to the objects intended. And it is always a private, in contradistinction to publick corporations. All hospitals are eleemosynary and private corporations; and with them incorporated Colleges and Schools are always classed (11) .
Hospitals and colleges or schools are always classed together, and alone constitute eleemosynary corporations. Professor Wooddeson says, “all eleemosynary corporations may I believe bo included, under the name of hospitals, colleges or schools; in respect of visitation there seems no discrimination between Colleges and Hospitals ” (12) . Colleges established, for securing the means of instruction, and for the promotion of learning, are eleemosynary, and private corporations, in the same sense, that Hospitals are, which are established, for securing the means of subsistence for the sick and poor. The object of eleemosynary corporations is to execute the wills of donors. He, who gives to a charity, may surely direct the uses, to which his bounty shall be applied.
A striking mark of distinction, between civil and eleemosynary corporations, is, that the former is not, and the latter is subject to visitation. There can be no private visitors of civil corporations. Their disputes are determined, and the performance of their duties enforced, in courts of law. But all eleemosynary corporations have visitors, whoso right and duty it is, to enforce the due observance of the regulations of the institution. To all colleges and schools for the purpose of instruction, visitation is a necessary incident, as it is also to Hospitals. This is laid down as an acknowledged principle, by all elementary writers, and appears to *484 be universally admitted in the cases, where the rights of such cor- ' porations were in question ” (13) .
“When governours are appointed, to superintend a charity, they are in all cases visitors of the objects of the charity ; when the application of the revenues is not immediately entrusted to them, they are also visitors, as to the application of the revenues; and the Court of chancery has no jurisdiction over them; but when the management of, and application of the revenues is immediately entrusted to them, then as to these they are subject to the controul of that Court” (14) . This is the manner, in which the plaintiffs are incorporated. They are therefore themselves visitors of the corporation, as to the objects of the charity, and may be compelled faithfully to apply the revenues to those objects.
According to well established principles then, there can be no doubt, to which class of corporations, the one in question belongs. It is clearly an eleemosynary corporation, and of consequence, a private corporation. It may be safely asserted, that not even the semblance of an authority can be produced to support a contrary opinion. It differs from civil and publick corporations, in all those particulars, which are supposed to* give the legislature a right, to interfere in their concerns.
This being a private corporation, the plaintiffs have legal rights, and interests, which cannot be taken away or infringed, at the discretion of the legislature. The" rights of private corporations are entitled to the same protection as the rights of individuals. A corporation is created for the purpose of securing and perpetuating rights. It is admitted that corporate rights must originate, in a grant from the state; they are nevertheless legal rights. It is not pretended, that the legislature can resume its grants, to an individual, of either property or privileges. What better right has it, to resume its grants, to a private corporation, established to administer private charity? It is-true, the expectation of pub-lick benefit was the inducement, to create the corporation. And in the present case that expectation has not been disappointed. The funds have been duly applied to the objects designed, or if not, that duty can be enforced, by the Courts of Justice. The expectation of publick benefit is always the inducement, for erecting corporations of every kind. Of course, if they answer the ends, for which they are established, the state derives advantages from them. But it does not follow, that all their property and privileges are held in trust for the publick, and that the legislature may dispose of them, among the other publick property, at pleasure. The state is entitled, to all the benefits and advantages, stipulated for, in the grant of incorporation, and to nothing more. The state has an interest, that the property and privileges of an individual should be used, in such a manner as to be beneficial to the *485 publick. Is the individual therefore a trustee for the publick, and may the legislature, on that ground, take his privileges, into their own hands? They have no better right to interfere, with private corporations, under pretence of their being publick trusts.
An eleemosynary corporation is the means, devised by the policy of the law, to secure the fulfilment of the will of a charitable donor. The corporation is nothing more, than the means used to obtain an object; and can the law be justly charged, with the absurdity of converting the means, it has thus devised into an engine to defeat the object? Who would found an eleemosynary corporation, or give it property, for the purpose of securing it, for a special charitable use, knowing, that he thereby, subjected his property to any use, that a legislature, under the influence of momentary passion, or prejudice, might prefer? Very different is the protection, which the law affords to property, given to charitable uses, which it guards, at all points, with the most vigilant caution. It will- carry into effect devises and conveyances, for charitable uses, under circumstances, which would render them void, if for any other purpose.
The circumstance, that this state has made donations to the corporation, does not alter its nature, nor lessen or destroy the plaintiffs’ rights. The state, like other donors, gave on such conditions, as it pleased; and like other donors, it can enforce the fulfilment of the conditions. The state of Vermont also made donations, and would thereby seem to have as much power, on that ground, to interfere with the concerns of the corporation, as this state has. In the case of Terrett & al. vs. Taylor, & al. where the attempt was, by a legislative act, to take away the property of the episcopal churches, in Virginia, and apply it to other uses, Judge Story, in delivering the opinion of the Court, says, “Had the property thus acquired, been originally granted by the State, or the King, there might have been some colour, and it ivould have been but a colour, for such an extraordinary pretension" (15) .
It is impossible, without disregarding all established principles and authorities, on this subject, to consider a private eleemosynary corporation, a publick trust, and its members, publick officers of the state, and therefore incapable of having any rights, of the character of private lights.
In most eleemosynary corporations, the objects of the charity, that is those who are individually to receive the benefit of it, are •admitted and constituted members of the corporation. In a hospital, incorporated on that plan, the poor and sick to enjoy the benefit of the charity, must be admitted members of the corporation. Can they be said, to hold the property and privileges of the corporation, in trust for the publick, and to be all publick officers of the state ? It has never been supposed, that the rights of a corporation so con *486 stituted were, in relation to the publick, different from those of a corporation, constituted as ours is.
It is admitted, the plaintiffs are trustees of the revenues of the corporation, and bound to apply them to the objects intended to be provided for, and that this, trust may be enforced against them. But this is a private, not a publick trust. So also the corporate privileges are held in trust, partly for individual members of the corporation, but chiefly for those, who, though not members, are to receive the ultimate benefit of the charity. But although the plaintiffs hold the property and privileges in trust, they are still the legal owners, and have all the legal rights thereto appertaining. When a trustee asserts, in a Court of law, his right to property, conveyed to him in trust, it is surely no sufficient answer, to tell him the property is designed for the use and benefit of others, and that he individually suffers no injury, and therefore is entitled to no remedy. The chief design, of conveying property in trust, is to constitute the trustee a legal protector of it; because the cestui que trust is generally incompetent. A benefit to the trustee personally is hot designed.
The true principle is, that a trustee, having the legal right, is entitled to all its remedies; and Courts of justice, instead of restraining him, often compel him to exert them. Were the law otherwise, all trust property would lie at the mercy of every invader. The cestui que trust cannot protect it, because not the legal owner; and if the trustee máy not, it is without protection. In no case is the propriety and necessity, of allowing legal protection to property, in the hands of trustees, more apparent, than in that of corporations, like the present, for charitable purposes. For it is most manifest, the charity can, in no other way, be protected. To hold that trustees, on the ground of a supposed want of interest, are’ incompetent to protect the subject matter of the trust, would destroy, not only all charitable corporations, where trustees are introduced, but all trusts whatever.
In corporations, for the promotion of commerce, or the management of mere money concerns, it is not necessary, nor "always the case, that those, who contribute the funds, and participate in the profits, should bé members of the corporation. Persons, having-no interest in the funds, may be members of the' corporation, and hold them in trust'for those who are entitled to the profits. The trustees, in such a corporation, would unquestionably be competent in law, to protect all its rights.
There is then no ground, for raising such an interest in the state, or such a trust for those, to be benefited by the institution, as shall defeat the plaintiffs’ rights. This is a private corporation, and of that kind the most favoured in law. And it has legal rights, if any corporation can have such rights. Any principle, which can be assumed, to deprive this corporation of legal rights, will be equally applicable to every other corporation, of whatso *487 ever kind. The most private corporation, that can be established for the purpose of trade, or the management of money concerns, can make out no better claim to legal rights. A corporation, for the most charitable and benevolent purposes, surely has, both by legal principles, and according to the common opinion of mankind, rights, as inviolable, as those of a corporation, for the purpose of commerce and traffick. If these acts of the legislature can be supported, they can pass similar acts, in relation to any and every corporation. It is then for the defendant boldly to maintain, that no corporation has legal rights ; but that all their property, and pretended privileg’es are held, at the mercy of the legislature.
Corporations must claim all their rights, by virtue of grants from the state; but they are not, for that reason, less secure or inviolable, than similar rights of individuals, derived from the same source. Peculiar privileges, granted by the state to individuals, although intended to promote the publiclc interest, become vested rights, and cannot be resumed. On what ground rests the distinction between these, and similar privileges, granted to private corporations ? There is no secret or implied condition, to a grant, or charter of incorporation, that it may be revoked or annulled by the legislature, whenever it pleases.
The British Parliament can, as it is held, abolish corporations. So it can pass acts of attainder, and of pains and penalties. But neither can be done, by virtue of the ordinary and legitimate legislative power, which belongs to our legislature. According to the theory of the British government, the Parliament is omnipotent. “A corporation may be dissolved by act of Parliament which is boundless, in its operations ” (16) . In modem times however, the exercise of these extraordinary powers, which are entirely incompatible with the existence of private rights of any kind, has been seldom resorted to.
The attempt was made, by the Bill introduced into Parliament, in the year 1783, by Mr. Fox, for new modelling the charter of the East India Company. The attempt was resisted and defeated. The city of London, in their petition against the bill assert “ that it was not only a high and dangerous violation of the charters of the Company, but a total subversion of all the principles of the law and constitution of that country.” Lord Thurlow termed it “ a most atrocious violation of private property, which cut every Englishman to the bone.” Mr. Pitt opposed it, as being “ a daring violation of the chartered rights of the Company” (17) . The bill did not pass. But the attempt was so strongly denounced, by publick opinion, that it ruined the party, which made it. In times of the greatest excess of arbitrary power in England, resort was seldom had to this unlimited power of Parliament. The great attempt to destroy, or controul the corporations, in the reign of *488 Charles II..was made by the oppressive use of judicial proceeding, through the servility of dependent judges. The charters of the city of London, and of the colonies of Massachusetts and Connecticut, were declared forfeited on information of quo warranto.
But whatever be the extent of this undefined and arbitrary power, of the British Parliament, I trust it will not be contended, that it has descended to our legislature. The taking away of the colonial charters, under colour of that power, is justly classed among the grievous oppressions, which led to our independence. “ Chartered rights ” were then deemed, of too sacred a nature, to be voted away, as the. passions or caprice of a legislature might incline. Will it now be asserted, that the British Parliament or King, or both united, were competent to abolish, or new model the colonial Charters ? If it could be done, by legislative power alone, they might; for they possessed the whole legislative power over that subject matter. 1
In the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Terrett & al. vs. Taylor & al. before mentioned, it is said, “ The title was indefeasibly vested in the churches, or rather in their legal agents. It was not in the power of the crown to seize or assume it, nor of the Parliament, unless by the exercise of a' power the most arbitrary, oppressive, and unjust, and endured, only because it could not be resisted.” “ The dissolution of the form of government did not involve in it a dissolution of civil rights, or an abolition of the common law, under which the inheritances of every man in the state were held. The State itself succeeded only to the rights of the crown ” (18) . If the plaintiffs forfeited .none of these rights, by the revolution in government, the legislature had no more power over their rights, than previously existed, in the hands of some depository of power. The Parliament of Great Britain had no rightful power whatever over this corporation. The legislature of this state succeeded to all the power, which the King, who granted the charter had, and to no more.
In England the creating of corporations appertains to the King, and he has all the legitimate power, that exists for dissolving them; except what is vested in the judicial Courts (19) . He can institute proceedings in the Courts, and for just cause obtain a forfeiture of all corporate rights and privileges; and then regrant them, as he pleases. He may also grant charters, to old corporations, with new modifications, which, if accepted, are binding. All this may the legislature of this state do.
But the King cannot abolish a corporation, or give it a new organization, or alter any of its powers or privileges, without its consent. This is the well established, and acknowledged doctrine of the common law (20) . -On the ground that the King cannot *489 resume tbe grant of a corporate privilege, it is held that the grant of a franchise, already granted, is void (21) . The King’s grants, of corporate rights, bind him, as much as his grants of land. When therefore he has granted such rights, he cannot resume and regrant them, till it has been determined by due trial, in a Court of law, that they have become forfeited.
The remedy for the King, in such case, was a writ of quo warranto: in place of which, in latter times, the information of quo warranto has been used, as being more convenient. “A writ of quo warranto (says Judge Blackstone) is in the nature of a writ of right, for the King against him, who claims or usurps any office, franchise, or liberty; to enquire by what authority he supports his claim, in order to determine the right. It lies also, in the case of the non-user, or long neglect of a franchise, or misuser or abuse of it.” “ The judgment, on a writ of quo warranto being in the nature of a writ of right, is final and conclusive even against the crown ” (22) . So far then from resuming his grants of corporate rights, at pleasure, the King was obliged to try his claim, for a forfeiture, like any other person, and if the determination was against him, the corporation was secured in the quiet enjoyment of them.
Corporations forfeit their rights, by non user or misuser, and are to be vacated by trial and judgment (23) . Their powers cannot be newly modified, or altered, without their consent. In case of the offer of a new charter, to an old corporation, it may be accepted or rejected, as the corporation pleases; or part may be accepted, arid part rejected (24) . “ During the violent proceedings, that took place in the latter end of the reign of Charles the II. it was among other things, thought expedient to new model most of the corporation towns, in the kingdom; for which purpose, many of those bodies were persuaded to surrender their charters, and informations in the nature of quo warranto were brought against others, upon a supposed or frequently a real forfeiture of their franchises, by neglect or abuse of them ” (25) . Would the King, in those violent times have taken the trouble, of resorting to the Courts of law, if it had been supposed, that he might have resumed his grants, at pleasure. There was no pretence, that he could of his own authority, and without the agency of the Courts, lawfully interfere with, or controul any of the rights of corporations.
As successors to the King, then, the legislature have no power, to pass the acts in question. And it may be safely asserted, that before the change in the form of government, the plaintiffs could not have been rightfully deprived of their property or privileges, without a trial in due course of law. Do they now hold their *490 rights by a tenure less secure, and more subject to arbitrary controul, than they did before the revolution ? It the legislature may annul or repeal grants of corporate privileges, what shall restrain them from doing the same with grants of land? What are to be the limits of this newly discovered authority ? Should the royal grants of land, made before the revolution, be examined, more instances of heedless extravagance will be found, than in any grants of corporate privileges. If one may be resumed, so may the other, for they both rest on the same principles for security.
We know from experience, that the legislative power is of an encroaching nature. Permit the legislature, in this instance, to abolish a charter of corporate privileges, and there will be no ground left, on which they can be restrained, from abolishing patents or grants of land. . The great principle of security, for' private property, will be destroyed. And let it be remembered that the attempt to vacate legal rights and titles, vested in individuals, has, in fact, been made by the legislatures of more than one of the states, in the Union. The only means of security is to abide by settled principles, and firmly resist the first attempt 'at encroachment. The law affords the same security and protection, for the enjoyment of franchises or privileges, as it does for other rights. An action for a disturbance of a franchise or privilege, is well known in law, and may be as easily maintained, either by an individual, or a corporation, as for any other injury.
As then a grant of privileges, to an individual creates legal rights, which cannot be infringed by legislative acts; and as there is no distinction, known in law, as to the effect of such a grant, when made to an individual, and when made to a private corporation, it follows, that the grant to the plaintiffs created legal rights, that were duly vested, and which of course cannot be infringed by the legislative acts in question. It is of no consequence, as it respects the right, whether the privileges, granted to the plaintiffs by their charter, are valuable, in a pecuniary point of view, or otherwise. They are essentially of the nature of private property, and consequently entitled to protection, like other private property.
The plaintiffs, in their aggregate capacity, are entitled to the franchise of being a corporation, and of enjoying all the privileges contained in their charter, according to its provisions. The President of the College is entitled to the quiet enjoyment of his office, with all the privileges and perquisites incident to it. And so also, the other members of the corporation are, individually, entitled to enjoy their respective privileges. In Miller vs. Spateman, (26) it is held, “ That the law takes notice, that the natural members of the corporation, of whom the corporation consists, are not strangers to the corporation, but are the parties interested in all the revenues and privileges of the corporation, of which they are mem *491 bers.” A corporation may take a grant for the benefit of their particular members.” In the celebrated case of Ashby vs. White, where an individual member of the corporation sued for an infringement of his right of suffrage, to which he was entitled, as a corporator, among the reasons assigned by the House of Lords for their judgment, it is said; “ The inheritance of this privilege is in the corporation aggregate ; but the benefit, possession, and exercise is in the persons of those who, by the constitutions of those charters are appointed to elect. And in all cases, where a corporation hath such a privilege, the members thereof, in their private capacity, have the benefit and enjoyment thereof. It appears by other instances, that it is usual and proper for corporations to have interests granted them, which inure to the advantage of the members, in their private capacities ”' (27) . Many cases are there stated of actions being maintained for the violation of such rights (28) .. . . .
. . . Besides the right of the President to his office and emoluments, each individual trustee has the privilege of being a member, and of acting according to the provision of the charter, in all matters, relating to the government of the corporation, and in the management of its property, and in the conducting of all its concerns. These privileges, that the members of the corporation hold, in their private capacities, constitute vested rights, which are subject to no controul, but that of the law of the land.
It is not a new doctrine, that in a free government, the legislative power, without any direct and express restriction, is incompetent to abolish, or take away vested lights. It results from the very nature and design of a free government. This is plainly and forcibly asserted by Judge Chase, in delivering his opinion, in the case of Calder vs. Bull. “ The purposes for which men enter into society, will determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the proper objects of it. The nature and ends of legislative power will limit the exercise of it. An act of the legislature, (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered as a rightful exercise of legislative authority. The obligation of a law, in governments, established on express compact, and on republican principles, must be determined by the nature of the power, on which it is founded.” “ A law that destroys or impairs the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that makes a man judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B. it is against all reason and justice for a people to entrust a legislature with such powers ; and therefore it cannot be presumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit of our state governments amount to a prohibition of such acts of legis *492 lation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid them. The legislature- cannot change innocence into guilt, or punish innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private contract; or the right of private property. To maintain that our federal, or state legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been expressly restrained would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, altogether inadmissible, in our free republican governments” (29) .
If then a correct view has been taken of the powei-s of the legislature and of the rights of the plaintiffs, it would not have been ■competent for the legislature to pass these acts, if there had been no special restrictions on the legislative power; because they are not within the general scope of that power, and consequently void.
II. There are special restrictions, on the power of the legislature, in the constitution of this state, which these acts violate.
They violate that part of the 15th article of the bill of rights, which provides, “that no subject shall be arrested, imprisoned, ■despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put ■out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate; but by judgment of his peers, or the law of the land.” If these acts are'valid, the plaintiffs are deprived of their property, and of the “ immunities and privileges,” granted to them by their charter, by other means, than the judgment of their peers, or the law of the land. The acts of the legislature take away their rights and privilege's, without any trial whatever.
This provision of the Bill of rights was unquestionably designed to restrain the legislature, as well as the other branches of government, from all arbitrary interference with private rights. It was adopted from magna charta, and was justly considered by our forefathers, long before the formation of otir constitution, as constituting the most efficient security of their rights and liberties.
Lord Coke, in his commentary on magna charta, explains the phrase “ by the law of the land ” to mean “ by due course and process of law.” That is, no subject shall be deprived of his property,, immunities, or privileges, but by judgment of his peers, or by due course and process of law. This then surely cannot be done by special act of the legislature, without judgment of peers, and without any process of law. To make his meaning still more plain, if possible,'that Parliament was bound by this provision of magna charta, Lord Coke says, “ against this ancient and fundamental law, and in the face thereof,, I find an act of Parliament made, &c. (30) directing certain summary and arbitrary proceedings, by colour of which act, shaking this fundamental law, it is not credible what horrible oppressions and exactions, to the undoing of infinite numbers of people, were committed by Sir Richard Empson and Edmund Dudley.” “ and the ill success thereof, and the fearful ends *493 of these two oppressors, should deter others from committing the like; and should admonish Parliaments, that instead of this ordinary and precious trial per legem terrae, they bring not in absolute and partial trials, by discretion” (31) .
It is sufficiently apparent, that Lord Coke understood this provision to extend to, and bind Parliament. Hence his complaint that Parliament had in that instance violated it, by dispensing-with trials according to the law of, the land ; and authorizing, in certain cases, the exaction of forfeitures, on trials by the arbitrary discretion of magistrates. For even that act of Parliament, so justly denounced for its “ horrible oppressions,” did not, like the present acts of our legislature, attempt -to devest, and take away private rights, without any trial at all. The construction of the provision has always been according to Lord Coke’s opinion. It has never been doubted, that Parliament was morally bound by it. But the difficulty in England has been that Parliament, being omnipotent, in all matters of civil institution, is too powerful for the constitution, and cannot be restrained.
The same construction has been uniformly given to this provision, in the Courts of the different states of the Union. The Superior Court of South Carolina, in the case of Bowman vs. Middleton, decided that an act of the colonial legislature of 1712, taking property from one, and vesting it in another, without trial by jury, was void; because it infringed this provision of magna charta, which bound the legislature. They say, “ that the plaintiffs can, claim no title, under the act in question, as it was against common right, as well as against magna charta, to take away the freehold of one man, and vest it in another: and that too to the prejudice of third persons, without any compensation, or even a trial, by the jury of the country, to determine the right in question. That the-act was therefore, ipso facto, void. That no length of time could give it validity, being originally founded on erroneous principles ” (32) . In a subsequent case, in the same Court, Waties, J. said he-had gone into a long investigation of the technical import of the words lex terrae, “ that they meant the common law, and ancient statutes, down to the time of Edward II. which were considered, as part of the common law. That this was the true construction, given to them, by all the commentators on magna charta, from whence they were adopted by the constitution of South Carolina. If the lex terrae meant any law, which the legislature might pass, the legislature would be authorized by the constitution, to destroy the right, which the constitution had expressly declared should forever be inviolably preserved. This is too absurd a construction to be the true one. He understood therefore the constitution to mean,, that no freeman shall be deprived of his property, but by such means, as are authorized by the ancient common law of the land.. *494 According to this construction the right of property is held under the constitution, and not at the will of the legislature ” (33) . Of the same import is the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts. “ If this (an act of the legislature) is to be construed a disposal, by the legislature, of lands owned by that proprietary, (under which the plaintiff claimed) or by any individual, claiming by their grant or allotment, it militates directly, with a well known- provision of magna charta, revived and enforced in the bill of rights, prefixed to the constitution of government, for this Commonwealth; that no subject shall be deprived of his property, but by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land; not any private and special statute, for the purgóse, but that law, which affects alike, under the same circumstances, the whole territory and community ” (34) .
This provision of magna charta is introduced into the 5th article ■of the amendments of the constitution of the United States. The terms, in which it is there expressed, show conclusively that it was understood in the same sense, that we contend it always has been understood. They are, that “ no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” This is manifestly designed to secure a trial, according to the established laws of the land; and it certainly restrains the legislature, from depriving an individual of his life, liberty, and property, without such trial. The two phrases “ law of the land ” and “ due process of law,” as used in the two constitutions, doubtless have the same meaning. If otherwise, however, the result will be the same. For the legislature of this state is as much bound by this provision, in the constitution of the United States, as they would be, were it contained in our own constitution. If the plaintiffs are deprived of their property by the acts in question, it certainly has not been done by due process of law. The law provides no such summary process, by which individuals may, without trial be deprived of their rights.
Thus has this provision been always understood, as imposing a restraint on the legislative power, from the time it was first introduced into magna charta, down to the present time. It has been incorporated into the constitution of most of the states of the Union, and it is believed, that not a single judge, or commentator, either before, or since it was introduced into our constitution, has attempted to give it a different meaning. The terms used are general, embracing the legislature, equally with the other departments of government; and any reason, which can be assigned, for excepting the legislature from this restraint, may, with equal force, be applied, for excepting either, or both the other departments. Indeed if this provision were not applicable to the legislature, it would be idle and useless. The previous part of this article of the bill of rights, together with others, regulating the manner of trials, are *495 more especially designed, to restrain the judiciary. This seems to be the only provision, to be found in the constitution of this state, against the legislature’s passing special acts, for the regulation of individual cases. It restrains the legislature, from passing acts, which spend their force on one, or more individuals, and are not to apply to others, under similar circumstances. The law of the land is applicable to the community at large.
The greatest if not only effectual, security, against legislative oppression, is, that the law must be general, embracing all under like circumstances, and including the legislators among the rest. An oppressive law, applicable to the whole community, will soon be repealed. But if the legislature, under the influence of prejudice, or passion, to which all bodies of men, however constituted or selected, are occasionally subject, can pass acts, having- the force of laws, to apply to a solitary individual only, he may be destroyed, before publick sympathy can be excited, for his relief. A law, according to any just definition, that ever has, or can be given of it, must be general in its operation. It is a rule of conduct, for all, within the principle it establishes. An act of the legislature, prescribing a particular rule, for the government of one or more individuals, therein named, would not ha.ve the force of law, but would be void (35) . This principle is not inconsistent with the power of the legislature to pass private statutes. Such statutes, instead of taking away, confer privileges; and whatever regulations are imposed, in consideration of the privileges granted, become binding, by the assent of the parties, at whose application, the statutes are passed.
If this construction, which has always hitherto been put on the article of the bill of rights, under consideration, is to be still abided by, it is conclusive in favour of the plaintiffs. Their charter grants them certain “immunities and privileges.” This article provides, in effect, that they shall not be deprived of these “ immunities and privileges,” but by due trial, and according to the well known general laws of the land, which are binding on the whole community. The acts of the legislature, which are made for the purpose of depriving them of their immunities and privileges, without any trial whatever, must therefore be declared to be void.
These acts violate also the 23d article of the bill of rights, which provides that, “retrospective laws are highly injurious, oppressive and unjust. No such laws therefore should be made, either for the decision of civil causes, or the punishment of offences.”
There can be no ground for dispute, as to what constitutes a retrospective law. In the case Calder vs. Bull, Judge Chase says, “ every law, that takes away, or impairs rights, vested agreeably to existing laws, is retrospective” (36) . The correctness of this *496 definition of retrospective laws has never been disputed, as is known. It was adopted, and made the ground of decision, in the case of the Society vs. Wheeler, in the Circuit Court of the United States, in this District. In the very able opinion there delivered,, it is said, “upon principle, every statute, which takes away, or impairs vested rights, acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective; and this doctrine seems fully supported by authorities ” (37) . It is not only .against natural justice, but. utterly inconsistent with every correct idea of a law, that it should be made to operate retrospectively on past actions, and vested rights (38) .-
This article prohibits the passing of retrospective laws of any kind, as well such as affect the rights of property, and individual privileges, as those, made for the punishing crimes. The latter, which are generally called ex post facto laws, and which are no more unjust than the former, have been denounced, by a most respectable authority, as being a more unreasonable, and cruel method of ensnaring people to their ruin, than that adopted, by the worst of the Roman emperors, who wrote his laws in a small character and hung them up on high pillars, to prevent their being read (39) .
It is hoped, that it has been already sufficiently shown, that the plaintiffs have vested rights, acquired under existing laws. If so, these acts, which infringe their rights, are retrospective, and void. The plaintiff’s rights were perfect and complete. They were in the full enjoyment of their property and privileges, and by no existing-law, could they have been ousted or molested. If this article does, not protect such rights, it is not easy to perceive what rights are-protected by it.
The 37th article provides, that the three essential powers of government “ ought to be kept, as separate from, and independent-of each other, as the nature of a free government will admit, or as. is consistent with that chain of connection; which binds the wholefabrick of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity.” This article has already been noticed, as bearing on the general powers of the legislature. It may also, with propriety, be considered as imposing a special restraint against the legislature’s, exercising judicial power. The limitation, with which this great elementary principle is adopted, does not, in any degree, lessen its-force, in relation to the question under consideration. The bill of rights establishes general principles, by which the constitution of government was formed, and according to which, it is to be construed. The three departments of government are connected together, and in certain particulars, dependent on each other. The- *497 constitution declares the extent of this connection and dependence. Powers are, in certain cases and for special purposes, given to one department, which partake of the nature of the general powers of another department. This qualification was necessary to preserve consistency in the different parts of the constitution. For the conducting of impeachments, for instance, the legislature is vested with judicial power. It would therefore have been absurd, after this express grant of judicial power, in that case, to have declared, without qualification, that the legislature should exercise no judicial power.
By the proper construction of this article, each department is restrained, from exercising any of the general powers of another department, except in cases, where it is especially authorized by the constitution. A construction that should leave each department at liberty, to exercise the powers of another, whenever it might deem it expedient, would render the provision of the article useless. Indeed the language admits of no other construction than that before stated. The substance is, that the three powers of government shall be kept, as separate and independent, as is consistent, with the nature of a free government, and the provisions of the constitution. The free government, here meant, is doubtless one, where the rulers have no powers, other than what are delegated to them, by the people. Is it inconsistent with the nature of such a government, or with tke provisions of our constitution, that the legislature should abstain from the exercise of judicial power, in cases where that power is not granted to them, but is granted to another department ? We have already seen, that no free government can exist, without such a restraint on the legislative power.
Under the first point, it was shown, that the general legislative power did not extend, to the devesting of private rights, and that the passing of these acts which take from the plaintiffs their rights, and give them to others, was substantially an exercise of judicial power. That the legislature did not examine witnesses, and hear the parties, before they decided on their rights, shows only the extent of the oppression, and the total incompetency of the legislature to exercise judicial power, in such cases. As then no special authority is given to the legislature, to exercise judicial power, in this or similar cases, the acts violate also this article of the constitution.
III. It is contended that the acts violate the 3 Oth section of the 1st article of the constitution of the United States, which provides that “no state shall pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts.”
This comprehensive provision was intended as well to supply the omissions and deficiencies, in the constitutions of the several states, as to afford an additional and uniform security, for private rights throughout the United States (40) .
*498 The charter of 1769 is a contract, within the true meaning of that term, as used in the constitution of the United States. Every grant, whether from a private individual, or from a state, is a contract. A grant from a state being necessarily made, with great deliberation and formality, constitutes a contract of the most solemn nature. It is of familiar knowledge, that a grant from one individual to another, either of lands, or of incorporeal rights, amounts in legal estimation to a contract. In like manner, a similar grant, from a state to an individual, constitutes a contract. A state incurs the same obligation from its grant, as a private individual does; and it has no more power to abolish its grants, or discharge itself from their obligation, than a private individual has. No just government can desire to possess such power.
That a grant of land, by a state to an individual, is a contract, within this provision of the constitution, and consequently cannot be annulled, or infringed, by any act of the legislature of the state, has been expressly decided, by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Fletcher vs. Peck (41) . And that a grant of privileges and immunities, by a state to an individual, constitutes a contract, has been as expressly decided, by the same Court, in the case of New-Jersey vs. Wilson (42) . In the latter case, the state of'New-Jersey had before the revolution made a grant of certain lands, with the special immunity or privilege, that they should forever remain free from taxation. The state had lately taxed the lands. The decision was, that the grant, as it respected this immunity, or privilege, constituted a contract, within the protection of the constitution, and that the state of New-Jersey could not, in violation of their contract, tax the lands. That Court having the right to determine, in the last resort, the construction of the constitution of the United States, its decisions must be conclusive, and- binding on all other Courts.
So patents for new inventions, grants of tolls, and of all such like rights, conferring immunities and privileges, constitute contracts, within’ the meaning of the constitution of the United States. If there be any question remaining, on this point, it is whether a grant of the privilege of being a corporation differs so essentially from grants of other privileges, as to form an exception, in this respect. No foundation for any such distinction is perceived.
In the case of Terrett vs. Taylor, (42) it is held, that the legislature of a state cannot repeal statutes creating private corporations. This must be on the principle, that such statutes constitute contracts; for otherwise they might be repealed. The abolishing of the original grant of incorporation, and the abolishing of the grants of property, or new privileges, subsequently made to the *499 corporation, are in that case, supposed to be alike out of the power of the legislature, and for the same reasons. Because all such grants are contracts. It makes no difference, whether they are in the form of statutes, or charters.
That a grant of land, to a private corporation, is as much a contract, as a similar grant to an individual, will hardly be doubted. A corporation is a person in law, capable of contracting; and if such grant, when made to a natural person, constitutes a contract, no reason can be assigned, why it should not, when made, to a corporation.
The legislature of this state has granted certain lands to the corporation, under consideration, which they cannot take away; because the grant constitutes a contract, and is therefore protected, by the constitution of the United States. Would it not be then grossly absurd to hold, that the grant of the franchise, or privilege of being a corporation does not constitute a contract, and consequently, that the legislature may, at pleasure, abolish the corporation ; and then take to themselves not only the lands, they have granted to it, but also all the other property, and privileges of the corporation.
The charter, constituting the plaintiffs a corporation, and granting them certain immunities and privileges, is as complete a contract, as a grant of land to them would have been. It contains all the common, and necessary ingredients, and qualities of a contract executed. It is an agreement of competent parties, on a sufficient consideration.
There can be no doubt that there were competent parties to the contract: the King of one side, and the Trustees named in the charter of the other.
There was also an agreement of parties. The granting of the charter by one party, and the acceptance of it by the other, affords ample evidence of an agreement of the parties. The trustees, by accepting it, agreed to the provisions and stipulations of the charter, as effectually as the King did, by granting it. Unless accepted by the grantees, it could have had no effect or operation. A grant or charter of incorporation, till accepted is a nullity. That acceptance is necessary to give it effect is too well established, to admit of any manner of doubt. “As the intention of the grant of incorporation is to confer some benefit on the grantees, which however may be counterbalanced, by some conditions, with which, it is accompanied, it has become an established rule, that the grant must be accepted, by the voluntary consent of a majority of those, whom it is intended to incorporate, othenvise the grant will be void ” (43) . The same doctrine may be found in the reports of cases, where this point has been incidentally discussed. For it seems never to have been seriously contended, that a private cor *500 poration could be established, without the voluntary consent of the corporators (44) .
The acceptance is always averred in pleading, when a right is derived under a charter; and issue may be taken on the fact of acceptance, as is done in the case of the King vs. Pasmore (45) . So the. non acceptance may be averred, to defeat the operation of a charter (46) . This shows conclusively that the grant is a contract, and not a law, to be repealed at the pleasure of the legislature. Judge Blackstone in pointing out the difference, between a contract and a law, says “In compacts, we ourselves, determine, and promise what shall be done, before we are obliged -to do it; in laws we are obliged to act, without ourselves determining, or promising any thing at all ” (47) .
That the contract was made on a sufficient consideration, or motive, is apparent, from the recital in the charter of the benefits and advantages expected. The trustees, by accepting the charter, completed the contract, and incurred an obligation, which, they say, they have faithfully performed. If they have not, the law affords an ample remedy.
It is impossible to have any just or con’ect idea of a corporation, without considering the creation of it, as resting in a contract. In the case of the King vs. Pasmore, Judge Buller says “ The question referred by the jury, for the opinion of the Court, is whether the letters patent were or were not duly accepted by the persons, to whom they were granted ” “And I do not know how to reason on this point better, than in the manner urged by one of the relators’ council; who considered the grant of incorporation to be a compact between the crown and a certain number of individuals ’’ (48) . A grant, by one party, and an acceptance of it by the other, necessarily involves the idea of a contract; and without considering it as a contract, there can be no reasoning about it. There can be no question, whether a charter of incorporation, be of the nature of a contract, that cannot be repealed, or of a law, that, may be repealed. If a law, whence the necessity or propriety of acceptance by the grantees? Must a law, after it is duly enacted, be accepted or assented to by an individual, in order to make it binding on him ?
So a charter of incorporation may be surrendered, and by the surrender, the grantees are released from all obligations arising under'it. Can individuals, in that manner refease themselves, from the obligations imposed on them by a law ?
If then the charter, creating this corporation, must according to *501 established principles, be held, to be a contract, within the meaning of the constitution of the United States, the plaintiffs are still entitled to enjoy all the privileges and immunities, thereby assured to them. And consequently the acts of the legislature, which so manifestly impair the obligation of that contract, by violating those privileges and immunities, is unconstitutional and void.
It is not easy to foresee all the consequences, of adopting new and untried principles. It might be worth while to consider, for a moment what is to become of the property of a private corporation, abolished by a legislative act. — The doctrine of the law is, that the lands of a corporation, in case of a dissolution, by whatever means, revert to the grantors. If the old corporation is abolished, w'hat shall prevent the grantors or their heirs from asserting their claims to the lands, -which have been granted it? Their right would, in that event, seem to be unquestionable. Is then another strain to be made, on the principles of the constitution, by taking away from the grantors their right, to the reversion of the lands, for the sake of vesting them, in the new corporation, according to the design of the acts in question ? But it must be remembered, that a part of the landed property of the old corporation, and that not the least valuable, is situated under a jurisdiction, over which the legislature of this state, has no controul. Is it to be expected, that the state of Vermont will, without an effort to assert its rights, permit lands, lying within its own jurisdiction, which it gave to Dartmouth College, for certain uses, to be transferred to another institution, and converted to other uses?
If these acts are held to be valid not only this College, but every other literary and charitable institution must become subject to the varying, and often capricious will, of the legislatures. Their revenues will be blended with the publiek revenues, and liable to be applied to any use, which the emergency of occasions may, in the opinion of the legislatures, require. The liberal and benevolent, when disposed to aid such institutions, can have no security, that their donations will be applied, to the objects intended. A striking instance of this has already occurred. The individual, at whose solicitation, these acts were passed, in a devise of property, for the support of certain professorships, in the newly established University, fearing that some future legislature would apply his donation, to other purposes, has expressly provided, in case these acts shall be-li rendered nugatory, be altered or repealed, unless by the consent, of the new trustees, as now constituted,,” that his devise shall thereby become void; and the property be transferred to other uses. This idle attempt, to restrain the power of a future legislature, so as to prevent its following the example, now set, shows not only the fears, that donations will be misapplied; but also the impossibility of securing them to any certain use, while subject to the arbitrary controul of a legislature.
The attempted innovation would affect the character of our *502 literary institutions, not less than their revenues. To be useful and respectable, they must be stable and independent. So obvious is this, that in most countries, under arbitrary governments, the universities and literary establishments, of the higher order, have been permitted to enjoy great privileges, with as much independence. as could consist with the nature of such governments. If our seminaries of learning are to be reduced, to a state of servile dependence on the legislatures, and are to be new modelled, to answer the occasional purposes of prevailing political parties, all hopes of their future usefulness must be abandoned.
In the early settlement of New-England, the establishment of Colleges was among the chief cares of the wisest and best men of that period. They have remained to the present time, substantially on the same ancient model; and with scanty means have been eminently useful. The present bold experiment, if carried into effect, will probably terminate in their final destruction.
Me. Sullivan.
— The case, presented to the consideration of the Court, is not that of a private corporation, complaining that the legislature had oppressively and without a trial seized on property held to its own use; it is not the case of a private corporation complaining that the legislature had wantonly deprived it of any means of acquiring property, which had, at any time, been granted to it; but it is the case 'of a publick corporation, created expressly —created exclusively for the publick interest, complaining that the legislature, the guardians of that interest, have undertaken, without consent, to alter and amend its charter.
Are the acts to amend the charter, and to enlarge and improve the corporation of Dartmouth College, constitutional ? This is the question to be decided by the Court.
The right of the Court to declare those acts of the legislature, which are repugnant to the constitution, to be unconstitutional and void, is not denied. If, for example, the legislature should pass an ex post facto law, making that act a crime, which was innocent at the time of its being done, it would be not only right, but the duty of the Court to pronounce it void. When the constitution prohibits the passing of particular laws, and the legislature does pass them, the safety of the people requires, that the Court should interpose and prevent their operation. While it is agreed, that the Court has power to declare every act of, the legislature,, which violates the constitution, to be unconstitutional and void; it must also be agreed, that it is a power, which ought never to be exercised, but with the greatest caution. It is important'to the peace and happiness of the community, that the most perfect harmony should exist between the different departments of government. The judicial department should never pronounce an act, deliberately passed by the legislature, to be unconstitutional in a case of a doubtful nature; its repugnancy to the constitution *503 should be plain, palpable, indisputable, in order to justify such a decision. Courts will presume, that every act, which is passed, comes within the constitutional powers of the legislature.
I shall attempt, in the first place, to show, that the Corporation of Dartmouth College was a publick corporation. Tf it was, no doubt can be entertained, as to the right of the General Court to alter and amend its charter; in such a manner as, in their judgment, would best promote the publick welfare.
Whether this corporation was publick or private, is not to be determined by considering, whether it was founded or endowed by the bounty of the government or by that of an individual. — It is said by Lord Hardwicke, that “it is the extensiveness of the objects to be benefited, that constitutes a charity a publick or a private one” (1) . With equal propriety it may be asserted, that it is the extensiveness of the objects or persons, for whose benefit a corporation is created, that shows it to be of the one description or the other. A corporation, erected for the benefit of its own members, holding property and exercising its powers and franchises, for their use and advantage only, is private; so also, is a corporation, holding property in trust for a number of individuals, and exercising its powers and franchises for the advantage of those individuals alone: but a corporation, created for the benefit of the inhabitants of a whole State or Province; holding property for their use, and exercising all its powers and franchises for their advantage is a publick corporation. For whose benefit was this corporation erected ? For the benefit of the persons composing it, or, for that of the publick ? Let the charter answer the questions. The language of the charter is, “ That we considering the premises, and being willing to encourage the laudable and charitable design of spreading Christian knowledge among the savages of our American wilderness, and also, that the best means of education be established in our Province of New-Hampshire for the benefit of said Province, do of our special grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, by and with the advice of our Council for said Province, by these presents will, ordain, grant, and constitute, that there be a College, erected in our said Province of New-Hampshire, by the name of Dartmouth College, for the education and instruction of youth of the Indian tribes in this land in reading, writing, and all parts of learning, which shall appear necessary and expedient for civilizing and christianizing children of pagans, as well as in all liberal arts and sciences; and also of English youth and any others. And the Trustees of said College may and shall be one body corporate and politick in deed, action, and name, and shall be called, named, and distinguished by the name of the Trustees of Dartmouth College.” This corporation, then, as its charter shows, was established, not for the advantage of the corporators ; not for the advantage of a small number of individuals ; *504 but for tbe benefit of the whole people of the Province of New-Hampshire.
As the» end, for which private corporations are established, is the benefit of individuals; and as all the rights, privileges, and franchises, conferred on them, are granted with this view; individuals have always a direct, a beneficial interest in the property held by such .corporations; an interest which they may transfer to others — which may be taken for their debts — and which, in the event of ,their death, descends to their representatives. But as the end, for which this corporation- was erected, was to promote the welfare of the whole community; as all its rights, privileges, and franchises were granted for this purpose, neither the corpora-tors themselves, nor any other individuals had any beneficial interest in the property held by the corporation ; they had no interest that could be transferred to others ; none that could be taken for-their debts; none that could descend to their representatives in case of their death. The corporation was a mere instrument to effect the important publick purposes, for which it was instituted.
A. publick corporation, by force of the term, whether it has the government or an individual for its founder, must mean a corporation erected for the publielc benefit.
It appears from the charter, that the corporation of Dartmouth College was established for the express, the avowed purpose of promoting the welfare of a whole Province. It was an instrument, formed to attain objects, in which no individual had a particular interest, but in which the community had a deep one. It was vested with power to hold property in trust for the publick, but it could hold none for the use of the corporators. It was clothed with various powers, capacities, and franchises, all of which were to be exercised for the benefit of the publick, but not one of them for the advantage of its own members, or of any individuals whatever. In short, it was created — it existed only for publick purposes. If a corporation of this description be not a publick one, then, in my opinion, no publick corporation ever did, or ever can exist.
If this corporation was a publick one, the right of the General Court to alter and amend its charter must be clear. All English writers who treat of corporations, agree, that they may be dissolved by an act of the government (2) . If the legislature have power to dissolve corporations, they may, without doubt, alter and amend their charters. Judge Swift in his system of the iaws of Connecticut observes, “It is manifest that the legislature have power to dissolve or alter all corporations of a publick nature ” (3) . In this and in other states of the Union, publick corporations have been altered, modified, enlarged, and restrained in almost numberless instances, and the right of the legislatures to do' this cannot *505 justly be questioned. In tlie case of town corporations, whose limits are fixed by charter, the General Court has repeatedly altered them. Towns have been divided; their limits have been contracted or enlarged, at the pleasure of the legislature, against the will and the remonstrances of tlie towns interested. The limits of the towns of Stratham and Newmarket were extended, from the banks to the channel of Exeter river, in order to subject them to a heavy burthen, while the towns were opposing the extension with their utmost might. The town of Pembroke affords another example of the exercise of this power. It will be proper to mention the circumstances of this case, because the right of the legislature to extend the limits of towns was considered by the Court. — Pembroke was indicted for not repairing a bridge over a certain river. Their defence was, that the bridge was not within their limits, as fixed by their act of incorporation, and, of course, that they were not bound to repair it. The bridge, as it appeared from the evidence, was over a river between the towns of Pembroke and Allenstown, but no part of it was within the limits of either. The jury gave a verdict for the town. Application was then made to the General Court, to extend the limits of Pembroke so far as to incLude the bridge. This was done. The town was again indicted for not repairing the bridge. It was contended on their part, that the act of the General Court, extending their limits, was unconstitutional, as it was passed not only without their consent, but against it; and in order to subject them to the burthen of repairing the bridge. But the Court decided the act to be constitutional.
The limits of parishes have been frequently altered. Particular individuals with their estates in one parish have been disaunexed and annexed to another, thereby constituting a poll parish. This, as the Supreme Court in Massachusetts say, in the case of Colburn against JSllis al. (4) “Is in fact a permanent alteration of the limits of the parish, so far as to include the lands, owned by the persons disannexed;” and the Court recognize the authority of the legislature to make such alterations. — Rights and privileges, which had long been exercised and enjoyed by towns and parishes, have, by acts of the General Court, been taken from them; new duties and new burthens have been imposed; while no one suspected, that the legislature transcended their constitutional powers. It is apparent, that by the division of a town, or by extending its limits, very serious evils may be suffered. By a division, it becomes less able to perform many of its corporate duties; by extending its limits, it may often become liable to heavy burthens, not contemplated at the time of its incorporation. When the limits of parishes are altered, they must always be subjected to inconveniences. But no injury whatever can possibly arise to the mem *506 bers of the corporation of Dartmouth College by an alteration of its charter.
If this corporation was a private one, I shall contend that the legislature had a right to alter its charter, so far as the publick good required.
In this country the supreme object, for which government was instituted, was to secure the happiness of the people. To effect an end so important, the interest of individuals and of corporations must yield to that of the publick. On this principle, the legislatature often take the property of individuals, when the publick good requires it; they often deprive individuals of some of then-natural rights, when the exercise of them would prove detrimental. Why may they not, with equal right, take the property of corporations, when the publick welfare demands it? Why may they not, with equal 'propriety, deprive corporations of some of their rights and privileges, when the exercise of them would produce mischief to the Commonwealth ? Does the law guard the property of corporations, with more vigilance, than that of individuals ? Are the rights of the former more sacred than those of the latter? Shall we see, with approbation, the property and rights of individuals taken, when the good of society requires it, and shall we regard it as sacrilege, to take, under any circumstances, the property or the rights of corporations? The law does not protect the property or the rights and privileges of corporations, with more solicitude, than those of individuals. Neither law nor justice regards the rights and privileges of the latter, as less sacred than those of the former. Suppose .the lands of a private corporation are wanted for a fortification or an arsenal, may they not be taken? Suppose they are wanted for a highway or for any important publick purpose, may they not be taken? Without a power in the government to take the property and the rights of private corporations, as well as those of individuals, its operations would often be obstructed, and the safety of society might be endangered.— When the property of private corporations is required by the good of the community ; when the exercise of their rights proves injurious to society; to deny to the legislature the power of taking their property and of limiting or depriving them of their rights, is to depart from that principle, which has been mentioned, and which is the foundation of every free government: it is to sacrifice “the good of the many to that of the few ” — the interest of the publick to that of every little corporation.
The legislatures of many of the states, perhaps of all of them, have taken from private corporations some of their rights and privileges, when the welfare of the community has required it. In this state it has often been done. — The New-Hampshire Bank made some of its bills payable in Philadelphia. The Genex-al Court passed an act, declaring that after a certaiix day “ It should be unlawful for any Banking company in this state, by themselves, *507 their directors, or agents to issue any bank bill or bank note payable at any other place, than at the Bank from which it is issued ” (5) . Every Banking company, that acted in violation of this law, was subjected to a penalty of one hundred dollars for each offence. The New-Hampshire Bank had a right, by its charter, to make its bills payable in Philadelphia, or New York, or at any place whatever. The act prohibiting this, was an alteration of its charter, as much as if it had been entitled, an act to alter and amend the charter of the New-Hampshire Bank. Yet it has never been suggested, that the legislature had not power, by the constitution, to pass the law. In many other instances, the General Court has deprived Banks of rights conferred on them, and in effect, altered their charters. By an act passed in June 1807, (6) Banks were forbidden to issue bills, which were not payable on demand and to bearer; or which were subject to any condition. Every Bank, existing in the state at the time when this law was passed, had a right by its charter to make its bills payable at a future day — to order — and subject to conditions. The law, depriving Banks of these rights, has never been considered as repugnant to the constitution. Tt has not unfrequently happened, that the legislatures of those states, in which Banks have been established, have prohibited their passing bills under certain denominations. Thus, the General Court of Massachusetts in June 1799, made a law, that no Bank, incorporated by the legislature of that Commonwealth, except the Nantucket Bank, should issue any notes for a less sum than five dollars (7) . By their charters they had a right to issue bills of any denomination. This law deprived them of that right.
The General Court have not only imposed new duties on Banks, but have added heavy penalties, to enforce the performance of them. By an act, passed in June 1814, the Directors of the several Banks in this state are obliged to make returns of the situation of their respective Banks, annually, to the Governour and Council; and in case of neglect or refusal, the Banks are subjected to a penalty of one thousand dollars.
The General Court of Massachusetts passed a law, by which all the Banks within the Commonwealth were subjected to a penalty of two per cent, a month, on the amount of those of their bills, which should not be paid, when presented for payment. An action was commenced against the Penobscot Bank to recover the amount of certain bills, presented for payment, but which were not paid; and also to recover two per cent, a month on that amount. It was contended on the part of the Bank, that the law was unconstitutional. But the Court recognized the authority of the legislature to make it. It was, say the Court, “ A duty incumbent *508 on the legislature to pass the law, and this the rather, as these corporations derive all their powers from legislative grants ” (8) . In this case the Court recognize the authority of the legislature, to superintend corporations of a private nature, and to impose penalties upon them for not performing those duties, the neglect of which produces mischief to society. — -They hold, that as these corporations derive all their powers from legislative grants, it is not only the right, but the duty of the legislature to see that the Commonwealth receives no detriment.
It would be easy to multiply instances, in which the legislature of this state, and those of other states, have limited the powers and taken the rights of private corporations, when required by the welfare of the community.
While I contend that the General Court has power, to take the property, the rights, and privileges of private corporations, I agree that it is a power, which ought never to be exercised, but for the strongest and most important reasons. It will, however, be at once perceived, that the reasons, which require such extreme caution on the part of the legislature, with respect to private corporations, do not exist in this case. The interest of the legislature is not the same with that of private corporations; their interests are always separate and distinct, and may sometimes be opposite. The legislature may pass a law, which, by depriving such corporations of their rights and privileges, does them an essential injury; while it does no injury whatever to the legislature. But no law can be made, to alter the charter of Dartmouth College, that will not produce as much mischief to the legislature that make it, if the law prove injurious at all, as to the members of the corporation. In this case, therefore, there can be no danger that the legislature will ever abuse their power.
It is alleged that these acts violate the constitution of the United States. When a charter of incorporation is granted, there is always, it is said, an implied contract on the part of the government, that the charter shall not be altered without the consent of the corporation; that the constitution of the United States provides, that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts; that to alter the charter of a corporation without consent would impair the obligation of a contract, into which the government had entered, and would, consequently, be a violation of the constitution.
The idea, that when a charter of incorporation is granted, there is an implied contract on the part of government, that the charter shall never be altered without consent, is wholly unfounded — it is visionary. In what cases does the law imply a contract? In those cases and in those only, in which reason and justice are so strongly in favour of it, that the law. presumes the contract has been made. Does reason or does justice say, that the interests of a *509 whole community shall suffer, for the benfit of a small number of individuals, whose charter of incorporation proves injurious ? Suppose a number of individuals should say to the legislature, we wish you to grant us an act of incorporation, and to enter into a contract, that however prejudicial the charter may be to the welfare of the publick, it shall never be altered without our consent, would the legislature incorporate them on such terms ? It is impossible to believe it. Nothing can be more unreasonable than to assert, that the law implies such a contract, when every man must perceive that the legislature, if expressly requested, would never make such an one. It is far more reasonable to say, that where a number of individuals are incorporated, there is an implied agreement on their part, that their charter may be altered whenever the publick good requires it; than that the government makes a contract, that it never shall be altered, whatever injuries it may produce to society.
If there be such a contract, as is alleged, that the legislature shall never alter the charter of this corporation without its consent, with whom was that contract made? With the King of Great Britain. It will not be pretended, that the King had more power to restrain the .legislature by his contract from making such an alteration, than one legislature has to restrain by its contract all succeeding legislatures. If it were possible for the General Court to be so forgetful of their duty, so regardless of the welfare of their constituents, as to make an express contract of such a nature as the one said to exist in this case, it would be unconstitutional and void; because it-would contravene a principle, which is the very basis of our government. No legislature has power to agree, that the interests of a corporation shall be preferred to those of the publick. One legislature has no authority to agree with a corporation, that no succeeding legislature shall take its property, its rights, or its privileges, although the taking of them may be loudly demanded by the good of the community. The legislature have no more power to make a contract with a corporation, that it shall be forever exempt from all legislative controul, than they have to make such an one with an individual.
If a charter of incorporation be a contract, it certainly is not such a contract, as comes within the spirit and meaning of that article in the constitution, that has been mentioned. In order to determine this, it will only be necessary to enquire, what was the design of this article ? What were the evils that it was intended to prevent ? Before the formation of the general government, the legislatures of several of the states passed tender acts, instalment laws, &c. Where individuals had made contracts to pay debts in specie, laws were enacted, enabling them to pay in depreciated paper; a, tender of such paper discharged the debts. In some of the states, laws were passed providing, that if debtors should tender to their creditors any articles of personal property, and the *510 creditors should refuse to accept them, such tender should operate as an extinguishment of the debt to the amount of the property tendered.. Such proceedings were unjust; they were violations of the principles of moral obligation and of social justice. These evils, as well as those arising from instalment laws, were full in the view of the framers of the constitution. Apprehensive that the state legislatures might, at some future period, be actuated by the same illiberal and unjust spirit, that led to the passing of these laws, they determined to impose such checks and restrictions, as should effectually prevent the recurrence of these evils. For this purpose, they made the provision, that no state should pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts. The Supreme Court in Massachusetts have said, that this was the design of the provision. “ The article respecting the obligation of contracts (say the Court) as we all know, was provided against paper money, instalment laws, &c. (9) .
I am aware, that the Supreme Court of the United States has decided, that contracts, made by a state as well as those made by individuals, are within the meaning of this article. But the cases, in which they have so decided, bear no analogy to the present. The case of Fletcher against Peck (10) was not -.the case of an implied, but of an express contract. The legislature of the state of Georgia, in consideration of a large sum of money, sold lands to certain individuals; the court decided, that a succeeding legislature had no right to repeal the law by which these lands were conveyed. — The case of the state of New-Jersey against Wilson (11) is unlike this.. The legislature of New-Jersey were desirous of extinguishing the claims of the Indians, to certain lands lying within the state. For this purpose, they agreed to purchase other lands and to convey them to the Indians; they passed an act, declaring that the lands so purchased, should never be subject to any tax. In consideration of this the Indians released their claims. The act, exempting the lands from the payment of taxes, was repealed, and the lands were taxed. The court decided, that the repealing act violated this article in the constitution. These cases only show, that if a state makes a grant of lands for a valuable consideration, the legislature of such state cannot pass an act to rejoeal the law by which the lands themselves or any ¡Drivileges annexed to them are granted. Neither of them has the remotest tendency to show, that a charter of incorporation is a contract within- the meaning of the constitution. ' No court has ever so decided.
If, when a charter of incorporation is granted, any alteration of it, without the consent of the corporation, impairs the obligation of a contract within the meaning of the constitution of the United *511 States, then the state legislatures have no power to alter the limits of a county — or a town — or a parish. Not a single new burthen— not a single new duty, can they impose upon either. All the laws of this state’and of other states of the Union, limiting the powers and taking the rights of Banks; imposing new duties upon them, and subjecting them to penalties for not performing those duties, are void. Little did the makers of these laws imagine, that if they deprived corporations of a single right or privilege — if they limited any one of their powers, to prevent the publick from suffering serious and distressing evils, that they violated the constitution of the United States. — The most sharp sighted adversary of the constitution did not perceive, that this article would ever prevent the state legislatures, from passing such laws as they thought proper, in relation to the civil institutions existing within the 'states. If this be the true construction of the article, and it had been so understood, when the constitution was proposed to the consideration of the people, it would have given a death blow to the instrument.
“A constitution is the form of government delineated by the mighty hand of the people.” It is the solemn expression of their will. Their intention should always guide in its construction. If Courts should extend its operation beyond that intention, they would substitute their own will, in the place of the will of the people. They might in this way, convert a wise and salutary provision in the constitution, into an instrument of injustice and oppression.
In order to ascertain the true meaning of this article then, we should always keep in view the intention of the people — the particular evils contemplated by them, and against which they designed to guard. This is the polar-star, that should direct us in its construction. Without this rule to guide us, such an extended interpretation may be given to this provision, as to despoil the state legislatures of most of their powers. They may be left, indeed, with the empty name of sovereign, but with scarcely an attribute of sovereignty. If this rule be disregarded, the time may come, and that time may not be distant, when it will be denied that the state legislatures have power to pass any law for the limitation of actions founded on contracts. It might be contended, that they have no authority to pass such a limitation act, with far more plausibility, than that they have no authority to alter the charter of a corporation. It might be said, that a limitation act violates the constitution of the United States, because it not only impairs, but destroys the obligation of contracts. It is suggested, that there is a distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given by the legislature to enforce that obligation; that the remedy may be modified, as the legislature may think proper, without impairing the obligation of the contract. Precarious indeed is the right of the state legislatures to *512 pass such laws, if that right has no better foundation, than the suggestion that has been mentioned. This suggestion, that a limitation act is only the modification of a remedy and does not impair the obligation of contracts, is entirely unfounded.* It is manifest, that the obligation of one party to perform his contract can exist only in consequence of the remedy of the other party to enforce its performance. Take from one party his remedy to compel the performance of a contract, and the other party is not obliged to perform it — his obligation is destroyed. A limitation act takes away all remedy.
It is further said, that a limitation act does not take away the remedy of the creditor, but only establishes, that certain circumstances shall be evidence that the contract has been performed. This suggestion is as unfounded as the other. Courts of law say expressly, that the debt exists notwithstanding the statute of limitations, but that the creditor is deprived bjr it of his remedy (12) . But what circumstances does the law establish, as evidence of the performance of the contract? There can be no circumstance from which performance can be inferred, but the acquiesence of the creditor beyond the period of limitation. If this be evidence of performance, then, if a man bring an action upon a note of more than six years standing, the defendant plead the general issue, and a verdict pass against him ; he may move in arrest of judgment and prevail in his motion ; because the acquiesence of the plaintiff, which is proof of payment, appears on the record. But all the authorities agree, that a motion in arrest of judgment in such a case could not prevail.
In order that the estates of deceased persons may be settled, in a reasonable time, the legislatures of the different states have enacted laws, that creditors, who do not exhibit their claims against such estates, within limited periods, shall be barred from recovering them. These laws impair the obligation of contracts. They furnish no evidence, that the contracts have been performed, but merely take away the remedy of those creditors, who neglect to exhibit their claims.
The legislatures of the different states are constantly making laws on the subject of contracts. The welfare of the people requires them to exercise this power. The laws, thus passed by them, frequently affect existing contracts, and impair their obligation. But these laws must all be regarded, as repugnant to this provision in the constitution, unless its construction be limited by considering the intention of the people; the particular evils they had in view, and which it was their design to prevent.
This charter, it is said, is a grant; but it is only a grant of powers for publick purposes. The trustees were publick agents. If the legislature should, by an act or resolve, appoint a number *513 of individuals as agents, for the purpose of effecting some important object of a publick nature, every one would say, that they might take from these agents any powers or authorities, that had been granted, or might confer any new ones at their pleasure. Suppose the legislature should think proper, to make them a corporation, for the sole purpose of better promoting the object in view, they would be agents of the publick still, and as much under legislative controul after their incorporation as before. To believe the contrary is to suppose, that there is some magick in the charter, that instantly makes the deputy superior to his principal; that raises the servant above his master. If the trustees were publick agents, and the General Court could not limit, or take any powers that had been conferred on them without violating the constitution of the United States, then they have no right to limit or take any powers, granted to any of the publick servants, without a violation of that instrument.
It is remarked by Judge Johnson in the case of Fletcher vs. Peck, that the state legislatures pass laws, impairing the obligation of contracts; yet, that these laws appear to be within the most correct limits of legislative powers, and certainly could not have been intended to be affected by this constitutional provision. If there be any contracts, the obligation of which may be impaired by laws made by a state, without violating this provision, the present is unquestionably of the number. — It may be safely affirmed, that this article in the constitution was never intended to restrain the state legislatures from passing laws, impairing the obligation of any contracts, except those where the interests of the contracting parties were entirely separate and distinct; so that a law might be passed by the legislature of a state, which would operate in favour of one of the parties to the contract, while it operated injuriously and oppressively toward the other. But no such evil can possibly exist in this ease. Here, the government and the trustees have no separate, no distinct interests to guard — their interests are precisely the same. The purposes of this incorporation were the spreading of Christianity and the diffusion of knowledge among the people. The legislature have as much concern in these important purposes, and in the prosperity of the corporation itself, as the mean of obtaining them, as the trustees themselves. No ill-judged law, altering the charter of this corporation — and doing it an injury, can do more mischief to the trustees, than to the legislature that make it. How, in such a case, could restrictions, on the legislatures of the states be contemplated? The people had all the security, that could be required or afforded. Constitutiops written on parchment or on paper may be disregarded; oaths may be forgotten; responsibility to constituents may prove insufficient to restrain legislators from abusing their power; but, when the interests of legislators are united with those of the objects of their laws ; when bad laws will produce as much injury *514 to those, who make them, as to those, on whom they are intended to operate, there is the most perfect security that such laws never will be made. To have required restrictions on the legislatures of the states, in such a- case, would have betrayed a species of delirious jealousy, never entertained by the reflecting and enlightened people of this country.
It is objected, that these acts are repugnant to that article in our bill of rights, which declares, “that no subject shall be.arrested, imprisoned, despoiled, or deprived of his property, immunities, or privileges, put out of the protection of the law, exiled, or deprived of his life, liberty, or estate, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the law of the land.” The trustees complain that they have been deprived of their property. But what property was this article intended to protect ? It was unquestionably that property, in which a man has a direct, a beneficial interest; property which he holds to his own use; and for which he is entitled to a compensation, when taken from him. If the property, held by the trustees, has been taken from them, which is denied, they had no beneficial interest in it; they did not hold it to their own use: they were entitled to no compensation for its loss. Have these acts made the trustees poorer than they were ? This cannot be pretended, without accusing them of a breach of .trust — of appropriating to their own use property belonging to the publick. I entertain too high a respect for the character of the trustees to suggest or to believe this. Will the trustees avow, that they believe themselves to be entitled to a compensation for this property ? I am confident they will not. So far then, as respects the taking of property, they complain where no injury has been sustained. — But how far does this article protect property, in which a man has a beneficial interest ? So far, that it cannot be taken from him, but by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. Surely, if the property of a corporation or of an individual be taken by an act of the legislature, it is taken by a law of the land. Every government has power to take private property, when required by the

[Text truncated at 120,000 characters. The full text is on the page linked above.]

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8506083. Public record. Not legal advice.
