# People v. Stewart

> Michigan Supreme Court · June 28, 2005 · 472 Mich. 624

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/848639

## Case

- **Full name:** People v. Stewart
- **Court:** Michigan Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 28, 2005
- **Citations:** 472 Mich. 624; 698 N.W.2d 340
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Markman, Kelly, Taylor, Cavanagh, Corrigan, Young, Weaver
- **Cited by:** 11 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

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- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/848639

## Opinion text

Michigan Supreme Court
Lansing, Michigan
Chief Justice: Justices:

Opinion Clifford W. Taylor Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver
Marilyn Kelly
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.
Stephen J. Markman

FILED JUNE 28, 2005

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 124055

LEONARD LAMONT STEWART,

Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________

BEFORE THE ENTIRE BENCH

WEAVER, J.

This case is one of statutory interpretation. Under

MCL 791.234(10), a prisoner may apply for a judicial

certificate of cooperation. If the prisoner is found to

have cooperated with law enforcement, then the prisoner is

eligible for parole 2.5 years sooner than otherwise. The

questions presented are: (1) when the prisoner’s

cooperation must occur, and when a court may make a

determination that cooperation has occurred; (2) what

constitutes “cooperation” under MCL 791.234(10), and

whether defendant’s actions met that standard; and (3)

whether this case should be remanded to the circuit court
for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether defendant

has cooperated within the meaning of the statute.

We hold that a prisoner’s cooperation may occur at any

time before the prisoner is released on parole. But the

cooperation must occur before the filing of a motion for

judicial determination of cooperation. Similarly, the

statute imposes no limits on when a court may make a

determination that cooperation occurred.

Cooperation means that a prisoner engages in conduct

where the prisoner is working with law enforcement for a

common purpose, provides useful or relevant information to

law enforcement, or establishes that although the prisoner

provided law enforcement any information he or she had, and

it turned out not to be relevant or useful, the prisoner

never had any relevant or useful information to provide. A

prisoner who had relevant or useful information to provide

and chose not to provide this information, however, cannot

be considered to have cooperated with law enforcement.

Under these standards, defendant did not meet his

burden of initially showing, by affidavit or otherwise,

that he had cooperated with law enforcement. Accordingly,

defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

To the extent that People v Matelic, 249 Mich App 1;

641 NW2d 252 (2001), and People v Cardenas, 263 Mich App

2

511; 688 NW2d 544 (2004), conflict with this opinion, they

are overruled.

We affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s

motion for judicial certification of cooperation.

I. FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The police intercepted a package of cocaine at the

Saginaw office of United Parcel Service. The police set up

surveillance at the house to which the package was

addressed and had a police officer deliver the package.

David Harrell, a codefendant, signed for the package. A

short time later, police officers raided the house.

Harrell told the police that defendant asked him if

defendant could have packages delivered to Harrell’s house,

and that three or four packages had been delivered in 1994.

Harrell stated that defendant had come to the house earlier

with Bryant Fields, and that defendant had said that Fields

would be picking the package up. During the raid, Fields

came to the house to pick up the package. When the police

arrested Fields, they found two rocks of cocaine wrapped in

$50 and a green pager. Fields stated that the pager

belonged to the man for whom he was picking up the package;

Harrell said that the pager looked like the one that

defendant carried. During the raid, the pager went off

three times, displaying defendant’s home phone number. The

3

package originated in Pomona, California, and there were

several calls made from defendant’s home phone to Pomona.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of

possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of

cocaine, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), and conspiracy to commit

possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of

cocaine, MCL 750.157a(a). At the time that defendant was

convicted and sentenced in 1995, MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i)

provided that an individual found guilty of possessing with

the intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine would

receive a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.

Further, there was no possibility of parole for an

individual sentenced to a mandatory life sentence “for a

major controlled substance offense . . . .” MCL

791.234(4).1 Consequently, defendant was sentenced to two

consecutive life sentences without the possibility of

parole.

In 1998, three years after defendant was sentenced,

the Legislature revised the statutes. The revisions

removed the mandatory life imprisonment for those convicted

of possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams of

cocaine and replaced that punishment with “life or any term

1
The substance of MCL 791.234(4) is now contained in
MCL 791.234(6).

4

of years but not less than 20 years.” MCL

333.7401(2)(a)(i). The revisions further provided that

such an offender would be eligible for parole after either

twenty years (if the offender “has another conviction for a

serious crime”) or after 17.5 years’ imprisonment (if the

offender “does not have another conviction for a serious

crime . . . .”). MCL 791.234(6). These same amendments

also created MCL 791.234(10), which permits an offender

convicted of possession with intent to distribute over 650

grams of cocaine to be eligible for parole 2.5 years

earlier if the offender is found to have “cooperated with

law enforcement . . . .”

Under MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), defendant was found to be

eligible for parole after 17.5 years’ imprisonment.

Defendant subsequently petitioned to be certified as having

cooperated with law enforcement under MCL 791.234(10). The

trial court denied defendant’s request, stating:

The Defendant states that he had no relevant
or useful information to provide to law
enforcement officers previously. Additionally,
he states that he is “ready and willing to
proffer any relevant or useful information that
he may have, without undue haste.[”] He,
however, fails to allege how he will have any
relevant or useful information for law
enforcement officials approximately eight years
after his arrest. The Court finds that due to a
lack of facts, it cannot enter an order of
cooperation.

5

Defendant sought leave to appeal, and the Court of

Appeals denied defendant’s delayed application for leave to

appeal. Unpublished order, entered May 21, 2003 (Docket

No. 243562).

This Court then granted defendant leave to appeal,

asking the parties to address the following:

(1) What constitutes “cooperation” for the
purpose of MCL 791.234(10), and did defendant’s
actions satisfy that requirement? (2) Does MCL
791.234(10) contain a temporal limitation on when
cooperation must occur? (3) Does MCL 791.234(10)
contain a temporal limitation on when a court may
make a determination that cooperation occurred?
(4) Was People v Matelic, 294 Mich App 1 (2001),
properly decided?[2] (5) Should this case be
remanded to the Saginaw Circuit Court for an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether
defendant has cooperated within the meaning of
MCL 791.234(10)? [People v Stewart, 470 Mich 879
(2004).]

II. Standard of Review

This case involves the interpretation of MCL

791.234(10). We review questions of statutory

interpretation de novo. People v Jones, 467 Mich 301, 304;

651 NW2d 906 (2002). The primary goal in construing a

statute is “to give effect to the intent of the

Legislature.” In re MCI Telecom Complaint, 460 Mich 396,

2
This issue is now irrelevant because People v Matelic
was largely overruled by a conflict panel in People v
Cardenas, 263 Mich App 511; 688 NW2d 544 (2004), convened
pursuant to MCR 7.215(J) after the order granting leave to
appeal was entered.

6

411; 596 NW2d 164 (1999). We begin by examining the plain

language of the statute. People v Morey, 461 Mich 325,

330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999).

III. Analysis

The statute at issue, MCL 791.234(10), provides:

If the sentencing judge, or his or her
successor in office, determines on the record
that a prisoner described in subsection (6)
sentenced to imprisonment for life for violating
or conspiring to violate section 7401(2)(a)(i) of
the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL
333.7401, has cooperated with law enforcement,
the prisoner is subject to the jurisdiction of
the parole board and may be released on parole as
provided in subsection (6), 2-1/2 years earlier
than the time otherwise indicated in subsection
(6). The prisoner is considered to have
cooperated with law enforcement if the court
determines on the record that the prisoner had no
relevant or useful information to provide. The
court shall not make a determination that the
prisoner failed or refused to cooperate with law
enforcement on grounds that the defendant
exercised his or her constitutional right to
trial by jury. If the court determines at
sentencing that the defendant cooperated with law
enforcement, the court shall include its
determination in the judgment of sentence.

A

The first issue we must address is what temporal

limits MCL 791.234(10) imposes on when cooperation must

occur and when a court may make a determination that

cooperation occurred.

We agree with the conflict panel in People v Cardenas

that the only temporal limitation the statute places on a

prisoner’s cooperation is that the cooperation must occur
7

before the filing of a motion for judicial determination of

cooperation. Other than that limitation, the cooperation

may occur at any time before the prisoner is released on

parole. Specifically, we agree with the following

reasoning set out by Judge Wilder in his partial dissent in

Matelic and adopted by the Cardenas conflict panel:

“Giving the phrases ‘has cooperated’ and
‘have cooperated’ their plain meaning, then, it
is clear that the Legislature intended that the
prisoner’s cooperation must have occurred at some
time before the prisoner’s application for parole
release under MCL 791.234(10). Similarly, the
phrase ‘had no relevant or useful information to
provide’, when given its plain meaning and
considered in relation to the present perfect
tense clause ‘have cooperated,’ expresses the
Legislature’s intent that the prisoner must have
lacked information before the prisoner’s
application for treatment under MCL 791.234(10),
in order to be found as a matter of law to have
cooperated.” [Cardenas, supra at 518, quoting
Matelic, supra at 31-32.]

We conclude also that the statute imposes no limits on

when a court may make a determination that cooperation

occurred. The statute refers to the sentencing judge or

that judge’s successor in office making the determination

of cooperation:

If the sentencing judge, or his or her
successor in office, determines on the record
that a prisoner . . . has cooperated with law
enforcement . . . . [MCL 791.234(10).]

The statutory language that a successor judge may make

a finding of cooperation indicates that there may be cases

where such a finding can and would be made after
8

sentencing. Under the language of the statute, a judge may

make the determination that a prisoner has cooperated at

any time before an order of parole is entered.

B

The next question to consider is what constitutes

“cooperation” for the purpose of MCL 791.234(10).

i

The statute specifically provides: “The prisoner is

considered to have cooperated with law enforcement if the

court determines on the record that the prisoner had no

relevant or useful information to provide.” MCL 791.234(10)

(emphasis added). This use of the past tense, “had,”

indicates that defendant must at no time have had any

relevant or useful information, not merely that any

information he once had is no longer relevant or useful.

We hold that a prisoner who has provided to law enforcement

information that was found to be neither useful nor

relevant can be considered to have cooperated with law

enforcement if that prisoner never had any relevant or

useful information to provide. But a prisoner who never

provided any information or who had relevant or useful

information to provide and chose not to provide this

information when it was still relevant or useful cannot be

considered to have cooperated with law enforcement.

9

Defendant alleges that he should be found to have

cooperated because he never had any useful or relevant

information to provide. Before sentencing, in 1995,

defendant stated that he had nothing to say about the

offense, that he was being framed, and that he knew the

police “let the perpetrators get away scott free.” When

petitioning for the certification of cooperation, eight

years after his conviction, defendant advised the trial

court that at the time he was sentenced he “had no useful

or relevant information to provide.” In his brief on

appeal to this Court, defendant also asserted that he

“answered the questions the police asked of him, but was

not able to tell the police anything about drugs and drug

sales for he knew nothing about those things.” Because

defendant never provided any information to law

enforcement, he cannot be considered to have cooperated.

Further, despite defendant’s protestations of

innocence, defendant was convicted of possession with

intent to deliver over 650 grams of cocaine and conspiracy

to commit possession with intent to deliver over 650 grams

of cocaine. We note that MCL 791.234(10) applies only to

prisoners who have been convicted of violating or

conspiring to violate MCL 333.7401(2)(a)(i), which

prohibits manufacturing, creating, delivering, or

possessing with intent to manufacture, create, or deliver a
10

schedule 1 or 2 controlled substance that is in an amount

of 650 grams or more. It may be presumed that a prisoner

convicted of one of these crimes would have the following

relevant or useful information for law enforcement: where

the prisoner got the drug, how he or she processed it, how

he or she intended to deliver it, and to whom he or she

intended to deliver it. On the basis of defendant’s

convictions, and the facts surrounding them, we conclude

that defendant did have relevant or useful information that

he could have given to law enforcement at the time of his

arrest or conviction.

Defendant could have disclosed to the police the name

of the person who shipped the cocaine to him, the names of

the other people involved in the drug ring, and how he was

planning to distribute the drugs. At the time of

defendant’s arrest or conviction, this information would

have been relevant or useful. Because defendant had

relevant or useful information to provide and chose not to

provide this information, defendant cannot be considered to

have cooperated with law enforcement.

ii

Cooperation can also include providing useful or

relevant information to law enforcement. MCL 791.234(10)

states that “[t]he prisoner is considered to have

cooperated with law enforcement if the court determines on
11

the record that the prisoner had no relevant or useful

information to provide.” The clear implication is that a

prisoner is also considered to have cooperated with law

enforcement if the prisoner has provided relevant or useful

information. The prisoner bears the burden of proving that

he or she has provided all the information he or she

possesses about a crime; the prisoner cannot pick and

choose what information he or she is prepared to disclose.

We note that the statute does not limit the relevant

or useful information to information about the crime for

which the prisoner was convicted. If a prisoner who was

convicted of possession with intent to deliver over 650

grams of cocaine had relevant or useful information on a

murder, providing that information to law enforcement could

be cooperation.

Defendant alleges that he should be found to have

cooperated because he is willing to provide relevant and

useful information to law enforcement in the future.

Defendant’s statement in his petition for certification of

cooperation that he was “ready and willing to proffer any

relevant or useful information that he may have, without

undue haste,” is an offer of future cooperation. But, as

we stated in part III(A) of this opinion, a prisoner’s

cooperation must have occurred before the petition for

certification of cooperation is filed. It is not
12

sufficient for defendant to allege that he would be willing

to cooperate in the future.

iii

Finally, defendant alleges that on the basis of his

conduct before and following his arrest, he should be found

to have cooperated with law enforcement. “Cooperate” is

defined as “to work together; 1) to act or work together

with one another or others for a common purpose.” Webster’s

New World Dictionary, Second College Edition. Considered

in light of the statute, cooperation would include conduct

such as participating in a controlled drug buy or a sting

operation, or engaging in some other conduct to work with

law enforcement toward a common goal.3 The trial judge

would determine, on the basis of the evidence in each

individual case, whether the prisoner had cooperated within

the meaning of MCL 791.234(10).

Defendant asserts that he should be found to have

cooperated with law enforcement on the basis of the

following conduct:

3
The discussion of whether conduct, rather
than providing information, can constitute
cooperation under MCL 791.234(10)is not dicta,
because the defendant in this case alleged that
on the basis of certain conduct on his part he
should be found to have cooperated with law
enforcement.

13

[D]efendant did not endeavor to hide or
destroy evidence after his co-defendants[’]
arrest; and he did not tamper with or intimidate
witnesses. Defendant did not flee to avoid
prosecution prior to his arrest nor during the
interval between his release on bond and
subsequent conviction. At all times Defendant
was polite and courteous to investigating
officers and officers of the court. [Defendant’s
August 6, 2002, brief in support of motion for
certification of cooperation, p 6.]

But defendant’s alleged conduct does not constitute

cooperation under the statute. Defendant’s actions in not

hiding or destroying evidence, not intimidating witnesses,

not fleeing to avoid prosecution, and being courteous to

the investigating officers did not amount to working with

law enforcement for a common purpose. Defendant refrained

from impeding law enforcement personnel in their purpose,

but did nothing to work toward that purpose with the law

enforcement personnel.

C

The final question concerns when a prisoner is

entitled to an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the

prisoner has cooperated within the meaning of MCL

791.234(10).

We agree with the Cardenas conflict panel that the

prisoner has the burden of initially showing, by affidavit

or otherwise, that he or she has already cooperated with

law enforcement or that he or she provided any information

he or she had to law enforcement, but at no time before
14

filing the motion did he or she have any relevant or useful

information to provide. The sentencing court would then

have the discretion to conduct such a hearing after

reviewing the evidence, in the event it concludes that a

genuine and material factual issue exists regarding whether

the prisoner cooperated.

Here, we have already found that defendant’s alleged

conduct did not constitute cooperation; defendant has not

alleged that he has provided any useful or relevant

information; and we have concluded that defendant cannot be

considered to have cooperated because he previously had

useful or relevant information that he did not provide to

the police. Defendant has not met his burden of initially

showing that he has cooperated with law enforcement and,

therefore, is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

IV. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s order denying defendant’s

motion for judicial certification of cooperation.

Elizabeth A. Weaver
Clifford W. Taylor
Michael F. Cavanagh
Maura D. Corrigan
Robert P. Young, Jr.

15

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 124055

LEONARD LAMONT STEWART,

Defendant-Appellant.

_______________________________

MARKMAN, J. (concurring).

I agree with the majority that defendant has not met

his burden of establishing that he has cooperated with law

enforcement, and, thus, I agree with its affirmance of the

trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for

certification of cooperation. I write separately to set

forth two areas of concern.

First, I disagree with the majority that “a prisoner

who never provided any information . . . cannot be

considered to have cooperated with law enforcement.” Ante

at 9. While this may be reasonable as a matter of policy,

it is simply inconsistent with the direction of the

Legislature. MCL 791.234(10) states that a “prisoner is

considered to have cooperated with law enforcement if the

court determines on the record that the prisoner had no
relevant or useful information to provide.” The majority

appends to the Legislature's definition the further

requirement that a prisoner must have provided some

information to law enforcement. It thus adds language to

the statute that is not there. While I can conceive of few

instances in which a silent prisoner will ever be able to

satisfy his burdens under the statute, I nonetheless

disagree with the majority's substitution of its own

definition of “cooperation” for that of the Legislature.

Second, I would not address, in dictum, as the

majority does, whether “cooperation” under MCL 791.234(10)

“include[s] conduct such as participating in a controlled

drug buy or a sting operation,” and whether “cooperation”

pertains to providing information about crimes unrelated to

the crime for which the prisoner has been convicted. Ante

at 12-13.1 Perhaps precisely because it is dictum, and

1
I am puzzled by the majority’s assertion that its
discussion of these matters does not constitute dictum.
Ante at 13 n 3. The prosecutor has not argued that
defendant did not “cooperate” by failing to participate in
a controlled drug buy, and defendant has not argued to the
contrary. And the prosecutor has not argued that defendant
did not “cooperate” by failing to provide information about
an unrelated crime, and defendant has not argued to the
contrary. That defendant has asserted one form of conduct
as “cooperation”-- namely, his failure to resist the
police, an absurd argument correctly rejected by the
majority-- does not properly allow the majority to decide
whether every other conceivable form of “conduct”
constitutes “cooperation.”

2

because these matters have not been briefed by the parties,

I find the majority’s discussion to be cursory and

insufficiently respectful of the fact that there may be

alternative, plausible understandings of MCL 791.234(10).

Again, the majority sets forth a reasonable policy, but it

fails to adequately explain why such policy is compelled by

the statute. I would avoid this dictum, and await a case

in which these issues can be explored more thoroughly, and

in a more relevant setting.

Stephen J. Markman

3

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

SUPREME COURT

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v No. 124055

LEONARD LAMONT STEWART,

Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________

KELLY, J. (concurring in result only).

I concur that defendant did not qualify for a

certificate of cooperation. However, I disagree with

several crucial aspects of the majority’s interpretation of

MCL 791.234(10).

The majority opinion creates the requirement that, to

be eligible for credit for cooperation under MCL

791.234(10), a prisoner must provide law enforcement with

all the information he has about a crime. The statute does

not contain this requirement. Moreover, I believe that the

Legislature did not intend that the statute should be

interpreted to include it.

One might reflect that a prisoner providing less than

all the information he possesses about a crime could

nonetheless be very helpful to law enforcement. That may

explain why the Legislature chose to confer the benefit of
early parole eligibility using such general terms. It

permitted the benefits to be conferred if the prisoner is

shown to have "cooperated with law enforcement," and it

refrained from indicating what constitutes cooperation and

how much cooperation is enough.

Moreover, the Legislature chose not to limit the

statute's benefit to prisoners who provide information that

is relevant and useful. Rather, it specified that the

prisoner may be found to have cooperated with law

enforcement even if the court determines that he had no

relevant or useful information to provide. MCL

791.234(10). The Legislature pointedly left it to the

discretion of the judge to determine how much cooperation

is sufficient to earn the benefit of early parole

eligibility.

For these reasons, I concur only in the result of

Justice Weaver's majority opinion.

Marilyn Kelly

2

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/848639. Public record. Not legal advice.