# Myers v. Loudoun County Public Schools > Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · August 10, 2005 · 418 F.3d 395 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8409657 ## Case - **Full name:** Edward R. MYERS, individually and as guardian of minor children v. LOUDOUN COUNTY PUBLIC SCHOOLS Commonwealth of Virginia, and United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee, and Edgar B. Hatrick, Superintendent, State of Alabama State of Alaska State of Arkansas State of Colorado State of Delaware State of Florida State of Georgia State of Hawaii State of Idaho State of Illinois State of Indiana State of Kansas State of Kentucky State of Maryland State of Mississippi State of Montana State of Nevada State of North Carolina State of North Dakota State of Ohio State of Oklahoma State of Oregon State of Pennsylvania State of South Carolina State of South Dakota State of Tennessee State of Texas State of Utah State of Washington State of Wyoming, Amici Supporting - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - **Decided:** August 10, 2005 - **Citations:** 418 F.3d 395; 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 16722; 2005 WL 1879911 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Duncan - **Judges:** Duncan, Motz, Williams - **Cited by:** 268 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8409657 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding it “noteworthy that, given the vast number of Establishment Clause cases to come before the Court, not one Justice has ever suggested that the Pledge is unconstitutional. In an area of law sometime marked by befuddlement and lack of agreement, such unanimity is striking” - recognizing that the legal competence of a “layman . . . is clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others,” and holding that “non-attorney parents generally may not litigate the claims of their minor children in federal court” - explaining that remand usually is required when a pro se parent has represented a child below but reaching the merits where children were represented by counsel on appeal and the appeal turned solely on a question of law - finding in a "borderline case” that the "history of our nation, coupled with repeated dicta from the Court respecting the constitutionality of the Pledge guides our exercise of that legal judgment in this case” ## Opinion text DUNCAN, Circuit Judge, concurring: I write to join in all but Part III-A-1 of Judge Williams’ fine opinion. I agree, of course, with her conclusion in that section that the Pledge does not violate the Establishment Clause. I am concerned, however, that the analysis — flowing as it does from the premise that history tells us that some government invocations of religion are insulated from the strictures of the Establishment Clause — comes closer to crossing the line drawn by the Supreme Court majority in McCreary County v. *409 Am. Civil Liberties Union, — U.S. -, 125 S.Ct. 2722 , 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005), than is necessary to sustain the state law at issue here. One of the most significant points of contention between the majority and the dissent in McCreary focuses on whether official acknowledgments of God (cata-logued at length by Justice Scalia in dissent and cited here in part III-A-1) prove that government may “espouse submission to the divine will” without offending the principle of governmental neutrality that undergirds the Establishment Clause. McCreary, 125 S.Ct. at 2743 . Whereas the dissent relied upon historical evidence tending to show that the Founders believed that some official acknowledgments of religion were compatible with the Establishment Clause, the majority cited other evidence suggesting “that the Framers intended the Establishment Clause to require governmental neutrality in matters of religion, including neutrality in statements acknowledging religion.” Id. at 2744 . Accordingly, a majority of Justices agreed that, beyond the broad principle of governmental neutrality, “[t]he fair inference is that there was no common understanding about the limits of the establishment prohibition” at the founding. Id. As Justice O’Connor observed, “[r]ea-sonable minds can disagree about how to apply the Religion Clauses in a given case. But the goal of the Clauses is clear: to carry out the Founders’ plan of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible in a pluralistic society.” Id. at 2746 (O’Connor, J., concurring). McCreary thus reaffirmed the principle that “the ‘First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion.’ ” Id. at 2733 (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 , 89 S.Ct. 266 , 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968)). * Mindful of McCreary’s lessons, I believe that this case is best resolved by reliance upon (1) the Supreme Court’s repeated assurances, albeit in dicta, that the Pledge does not violate the Establishment Clause, and (2) authority suggesting that recitation of the Pledge is not a religious activity, but rather a “patriotic exercise designed to foster national unity and pride” in the ideals that the flag symbolizes. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 , 124 S.Ct. 2301, 2305 , 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004). I do not believe that we need to go any further to resolve the issue before us. I intend no suggestions about the "vibrancy” of this principle beyond what is suggested by the quoted language itself. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8409657. Public record. Not legal advice.