# Calder v. Wife

> Supreme Court of the United States · August 15, 1798 · 3 U.S. 386

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8373627

## Case

- **Full name:** Calder et Wife, versus Bull et Wife
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** August 15, 1798
- **Citations:** 3 U.S. 386
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Iredelljuflice
- **Judges:** Iredell, Juflice, Paterson
- **Cited by:** 8 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8373627

## Opinion text

Iredell, Juflice.
Though I concur in the general refu/t of the opinions, which have been delivered, I cannot entirely adopt the reafons that are aligned upon the occafion. '
From the belt information to be collected, relative to the Conftitution of ConneSticut, it appears, that the Legiflature of that State has been in the uniform, uninterrupted, habit of exercifing a general fuperintending power over its courts of law, by granting new trials. It may, indeed, appear ftrange to fome of us, that in any form,, there íhould'exift a power to grant, with refpeeb tofuits depending or adjudged, new rights of trial, new privileges of proceeding, not previoufly recognized and regulated by pofitive inftitutions; but fuch is the 'eftabliihed ufage of Connecticut^ and it is obvioufly confiftent with the general fuperintending authority of her Legiflature Nor is it altogether without fome fanftion for a Legiflature to aft as a court of juftice.In England, we know, that one branch of the Parliament, the' houfe of Lords, not only exercifes a judicial power in cafes of impeachment, and for the trial of its own members, but as the court of dernier refort, takes cognizance of many fuits at law, and in equity: And that in conftruftion of law, the jurifdiftion there exercifed is by the King in full Parliament;, which ihews that, in its origin, the caufes were probably heard beforethe whole Parliament. When Connecticut Was fettled, the right of empowering her Legifla-tureto fuperintend the Courts of Juftice, was, I prefume, early affirmed ;and its expediency, as applied to the local circumftan-ces and municipal policy of the State, is fanftioned by along and uniform praftice. The power, however, is judicial in its nature; and whenever it is exercifed, as in the prefent inftance,. it is an exercife of judicial, not of legiflative, authority.
Bur, let us, for a moment, fuppofe, that the refolution, granting a new trial, was a legiflative aft, it will by no means follow, that it is an aft affefted byjthe conftitutional prohibition, that “ no State ihall pafs any ex p off facto law.” I will endeavour to ftate the general principles, which influence me, on this point, fuccinftly and clearly, though I have not had an opportunity to reduce my opinion to writing..
If, then, a government, compofed of Legiflative, Executive and Judicial departments, were eftabliihed, by a Confti-tution, which impofed no limits on the leg’ílátive power, the confequence would inevitably be, that whatever .the legiflative ■power choie toenaft, would be lawfully enafted, and the judicial power could never interpofe to pronounce it void. • It is true, that fome fpeculative jurifts have held,, that a legiflative' aft againft natural juftice muft, in itfelfj be voidbut I can-pr»t think that, under fuch a government, any Court of Juftice would poflefs a power to declare it fo. Sir William Blackflone, having put the ftropg cafe of an aft- of Parliament, which *399 authcfrife a man to try his own cáufe, explicitly adds, that even in that cafe, “ there is no court that has power to defeat the intent of the Legiflature, wh' n couched in fuch evident and exprefs words, as leave no doubt whether it was the intent of' the Legiflature, or no.” 1 Bl. Com. 91.
In order, therefore, to guard againft fo great an evil, it has been the policy of all the American ftates, which have, individually, framed their ftateconftitutions finee the revolution,and of the people of the United.States^ when they framed the Federal Conftitution, to define with précifion the objects of'the legifla-tive power, and to reftrain its exercife within marked and fettled boundaries. If any af any country- by bad-means) yet; in the prefent inilance the objection doesnot arife : Becaufe, iff. if the a£t of the Uegilla-ture of Connecticut wasajüdicial acl, it is r.ot within the words of che-C-oniritu.rion ; and 2d. even if it w'as a legislative' ail, it is not within the meaning of the prohibition.
Cushing, JuJlice. The cafe appears to me tobe clear of all difficulty, taken either way. If the a£t is a judicial a£t, it is not touched by the Federal Coaílituticn: and, if it is a legif- *401 legiflative a£lj it is maintained and juftified by Ae ancient and Uniform pra&ice of the ft ate. of GohneEiicut.
Judgment affirmed.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/8373627. Public record. Not legal advice.
