# United States v. Marlo Brown

> Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · June 8, 2012 · 474 F. App'x 136

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/801943

## Case

- **Full name:** UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff — Appellee, v. Mario BROWN, Defendant — Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
- **Decided:** June 8, 2012
- **Citations:** 474 F. App'x 136
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** King, Shedd, Keenan
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-4879

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

MARLO BROWN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:07-cr-00426-RDB-1)

Submitted: April 30, 2012 Decided: June 8, 2012

Before KING, SHEDD, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marlo Brown, Appellant Pro SE. Benjamin M. Block, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:

Marlo Brown pleaded guilty to distribution of cocaine

base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2006). The district

court sentenced Brown to 151 months of imprisonment, and we

granted the Government’s motion to dismiss his appeal as

untimely. The district court subsequently granted in part

Brown’s 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2011) motion, entering an

amended judgment from which Brown now appeals. Finding no

error, we affirm.

Brown first argues on appeal that the district court

lacked jurisdiction over his prosecution. However, Brown

pleaded guilty to a federal offense, and we have previously held

that 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) is a constitutional exercise of

Congressional authority. See United States v. Leshuk, 65 F.3d

1105, 1111-12 (4th Cir. 1995).

Brown next argues that the district court erred in

finding that he was a career offender, contending that his two

prior assault convictions do not qualify as crimes of violence.

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying an abuse of

discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51

(2007); see also United States v. Layton, 564 F.3d 330, 335 (4th

Cir. 2009). In so doing, we examine the sentence for

“significant procedural error,” including “failing to calculate

(or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the

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Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.]

§ 3553(a) [(2006)] factors, selecting a sentence based on

clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the

chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.

Pursuant to the Guidelines, a defendant is classified

as a career offender if he was eighteen years old when he

committed the offense of conviction, the offense of conviction

is a felony crime of violence or controlled substance offense,

and he has sustained at least two prior convictions for crimes

of violence or controlled substance offenses. U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 4B1.1(a) (2011). A crime of

violence is defined in part as an offense punishable by a term

exceeding one year of imprisonment that has as an element the

use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against

another. USSG § 4B1.2(a). A controlled substance offense is an

offense punishable by a term exceeding one year of imprisonment

that prohibits the distribution of a controlled substance. USSG

§ 4B1.2(b). Here, even if Brown’s prior assault convictions did

not qualify as crimes of violence, he had sustained two prior

qualifying convictions for distribution of a controlled

substance and robbery. Therefore, the district court did not

err in determining that Brown was a career offender.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district

court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

3
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials

before the court and argument would not aid in the decisional

process.

AFFIRMED

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/801943. Public record. Not legal advice.