# L.A.T. v. State > District Court of Appeal of Florida · February 15, 1995 · 650 So. 2d 214 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7686257 ## Case - **Full name:** L.A.T., a juvenile v. The STATE of Florida - **Court:** District Court of Appeal of Florida - **Decided:** February 15, 1995 - **Citations:** 650 So. 2d 214; 1995 Fla. App. LEXIS 1300 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Cope - **Judges:** Cope, Hubbart, Schwartz - **Cited by:** 37 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7686257 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that defendant's shouting in a Publix supermarket "Is everybody watching this, police brutality, ... Rodney King style" and screaming and cursing at the top of his lungs was insufficient to support a conviction for disorderly conduct - holding. a " ‘fighting words' finding ... constitution *892 ally unjustified as a matter of law” where "words neither themselves urged the crowd to respond nor actually had that effect” - holding a " 'fighting words' finding ... constitutionally unjustified as a matter of law" where "words neither themselves urged the crowd to respond nor actually had that effect" - holding that words such as “You f* * *ing cops, what the h*ll do you think you’re doing? You are full of bull sh*t” were not fighting words, and compiling fighting words cases - holding. a " ‘fighting words' finding ... constitution ally unjustified as a matter of law” where "words neither themselves urged the crowd to respond nor actually had that effect” ## Opinion text COPE, Judge (specially concurring). I concur in the judgment but do not join the majority opinion. In 1974 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held the Florida disorderly conduct statute unconstitutional because, as interpreted by Florida courts in previous years, the statute was susceptible of application to speech protected by the First Amendment. Wiegand v. Seaver, 504 F.2d 303 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied and appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 924 , 95 S.Ct. 1650 , 44 L.Ed.2d 83 (1975). In so doing the Fifth Circuit noted that the Florida courts had not given the statute a definitive narrowing construction which would limit its application solely to unprotected expression. Id. at 306. In response the Florida Supreme Court adopted a narrowing construction of the statute. State v. Saunders, 339 So.2d 641 , 643 n. *219 6 (Fla.1976). The Florida Supreme Court stated: [W]e now limit the application of Section 877.0SL Florida Statutes,] so that it shall hereafter only apply either to words which “by their very utterance .. inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace,” White v. State, 330 So.2d [3, 7 (Fla.1976) ]; see Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 , 62 S.Ct. 766 , 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942); or to words, known to be false, reporting some physical hazard in circumstances where such a report creates a clear and present danger of bodily harm to others. We construe the statute so that no words except “fighting words” or words like shouts of “fire” in a crowded theatre fall within its proscription, in order to avoid the constitutional problem of overbreadth, and “the danger that a citizen will be punished as a criminal for exercising his right of free speech.” Spears v. State, 337 So.2d [977, 980 (Fla.1976)]. With these two exceptions, Section 877.03 should not be read to proscribe the use of language in any fashion whatsoever. To this extent, we modify our previous decisions construing the statute. 339 So.2d at 644 (footnote omitted). 1 In recognition of the foregoing authority, the State has argued on this appeal solely that the words used by L.A.T. were “fighting words.” I agree that on the record made in this case, the words do not qualify as “fighting words.” It would be a different matter if L.A.T. had physically interfered with the work of the officers, in which case he could be charged under an appropriate statute. See § 843.02, Fla.Stat. (1993). Similarly, in my view L.A.T. could be charged under section 843.02 if he had positioned himself in proximity to the officers and then screamed so as to interfere with the ability of the officers to communicate with each other and with witnesses. See id. 2 Clearly, L.A.T. can be required to move away from where the officers are working, failing which L.A.T. would be chargeable under the obstruction statute. The only argument offered by the State to sustain this appeal is that the words were “fighting words.” That being so, we must reverse the adjudication of delinquency. . The statute was reenacted by Chapter 86-174, Laws of Florida. See id. § 2, at 1198. . No argument has been made that L.A.T. was himself the subject of a lawful investigatory stop after the arrest of his companion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7686257. Public record. Not legal advice.