# In re C.J.B.

> Court of Appeals of North Carolina · June 21, 2005 · 171 N.C. App. 132

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7394718

## Case

- **Full name:** In the Matter of C.J.B. and M.G.B., Minor Children.
- **Court:** Court of Appeals of North Carolina
- **Decided:** June 21, 2005
- **Citations:** 171 N.C. App. 132; 614 S.E.2d 368; 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 1168
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Wynn
- **Judges:** Elmore, Wynn
- **Cited by:** 39 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7394718

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that prejudice shown where there was a five month delay in entry of the written order terminating respondent's parental rights
- finding respondent adequately articulated the prejudice arising from the delay in the entry of the order where records and transcripts were missing and irretrievable and the respondent's appellate counsel was unable to reconstruct the trial court proceedings

## Opinion text

WYNN, Judge concurring.
I concur in the majority's resolution of this matter and write separately to underscore that non-compliance with the thirty-day requirement for the trial court's entering a termination order is not per se prejudicial and that prejudice must be shown for delayed entry to constitute reversible error.
In the recent In re B.P., S.P., and R.T., ___ N.C.App. ___, 612 S.E.2d 328 (2005), the majority indicated that a violation of a thirty-day requirement for filing adjudication and dispositional orders required that the orders be vacated. I dissented from the majority to make clear that this Court had previously held that a thirty-day rule violation does not per se warrant the delayed *371 order to be vacated. Indeed, in In re J.L.K., 165 N.C.App. 311 , 598 S.E.2d 387 (2004), this Court stated that "[w]hile the trial court's [89-day] delay clearly violated the 30-day provision of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B-1109(e), we find no authority compelling that the TPR order be vacated as a result." Id. at 315, 598 S.E.2d at 390 .
As I underscored in my dissent, a party "must show that she was prejudiced by the delay in order to grant a new hearing." In re B.P., S.P., and R.T., ___ N.C.App. at ___, 612 S.E.2d at 334 (Wynn, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citation omitted). In In re B.P., S.P., and R.T., the Clerk of Court lost the original order, and a new order was thus re-filed outside the thirty-day period. The respondent did not dispute the circumstances or object to the timeliness of the new order, the new order did not require anything different of respondent, and the filing of the new order did not impede respondent's ability to appeal. I therefore saw no prejudice. Id. at ___, 612 S.E.2d at 333 .
Here, in contrast, as the majority notes, prejudice by the five-month delay in entering the order has been shown: Records and transcripts are missing and unretrievable, and Respondent's appellate counsel is unable to reconstruct the trial court proceedings. The delayed order therefore must be vacated.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7394718. Public record. Not legal advice.