# Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel

> Supreme Court of New Jersey · March 24, 1975 · 67 N.J. 151

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7296987

## Case

- **Full name:** SOUTHERN BURLINGTON COUNTY N.A.A.C.P., CAMDEN COUNTY C.O.R.E., CAMDEN COUNTY N.A.A.C.P., GLADYS CLARK, BETTY WEAL AND ANGEL PEREZ, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS AND AND ETHEL LAWRENCE, THOMASINE LAWRENCE, CATHERINE STILL, MARY E. SMITH, SHIRLEY MORRIS AND JACQUELINE CUSTIS, PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS v. TOWNSHIP OF MOUNT LAUREL, AND
- **Court:** Supreme Court of New Jersey
- **Decided:** March 24, 1975
- **Citations:** 67 N.J. 151; 336 A.2d 713; 1975 N.J. LEXIS 181
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Mountain
- **Judges:** Hall, Mountain, Pashman
- **Cited by:** 207 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7296987

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing the need for affordable housing and providing, in response to zoning practices excluding affordable housing, that, as a matter of state constitutional law, every developing municipality has an obligation to provide, through its land use regulation, a realistic oppo…
- holding developing municipalities are under a A-0989-22 2 By way of background, plaintiff notes its affiliate companies, CT95-CT07 200 Park LLC and DT95-DT07 200 Park LLC ("CT95/DT95"
- noting that guarantees of substantive due process and equal protection, though not expressed in those terms, have nevertheless been deemed inherent in Article 1, paragraph 1 of New Jersey Constitution
- holding land-use regulations unconstitutional if municipalities fail to provide low- and moderate-income families realistic opportunities for housing

## Opinion text

Mountain, J.
(concurring). I agree with the conclusions reached in the Court’s opinion and essentially with the opinion itself. In one important respect, however, I disagree. The Court rests its decision upon a ground of State constitutional law. I reach the same result by concluding that the term, “general welfare,” appearing in N. J. S. A. 40:55-32, can and should properly be interpreted with the same amplitude attributed to that phrase in the opinion of the Court, as well as otherwise in the manner there set forth. I therefore would rest the conclusions we here announce upon an interpretation of the statute, and not upon the State constitution.
Accordingly, since I read the statute — without resort to the Constitution — to justify, if not compel, our decision, I find it unnecessary to express any view as to the merits of the constitutional argument set forth in the Court’s opinion.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7296987. Public record. Not legal advice.