# Stillwagon v. City of Delaware

> District Court, S.D. Ohio · August 15, 2017 · 274 F. Supp. 3d 714

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7245191

## Case

- **Full name:** James R. STILLWAGON v. The CITY OF DELAWARE, Defendants James R. Stillwagon v. Officer James Ailes
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Ohio
- **Decided:** August 15, 2017
- **Citations:** 274 F. Supp. 3d 714
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Sargus
- **Judges:** Sargus
- **Cited by:** 9 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

OPINION AND ORDER
EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR., CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. Defendants The City of Delaware (the “City”), Detective Benjamin Segaard, Former Detective Patrick' Gerke, Officer Adam Willauer, Detective Sergeant Jonathan Radabaugh, Officer James Ailes, and Officer Jason Flynn (collectively, the “Municipal Defendants”) 1 have moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff James R. Stillwagon’s (“Stillwagon”) claims against them. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 1[ECF No. 203].) 2 Stillwagon, in turn, seeks summary judgment against several of the Municipal Defendants on his § 1983 false arrest, malicious prosecution, and excessive force claims,' his Ohio law malicious prosecution claim, and his' municipal liability claim relating to excessive force. (Pl.’s Mots, for Summ. J. [ECF Nos. 205, 206, 207].) ' ■' b-
Also before the Court are two additional motions: the Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Strike [ECF No. 231] and the Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Certain Expert Testimony [ECF No. 232],
For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS ÍN PART and DENIES IN PART, the Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [ECF No. 203; ’1606 ECF No. 189] and Motion to Strike [ECF No. 231; ’1606 ECF No. 217], DENIES Stillwagon’s motions for summary judgment [ECF Nos. 205, 206, 207; ’1606 ECF Nos. 191, 192, 193], and GRANTS the Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Exclude [ECF No. 232;. ’1606 ECF No. 218], '
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
This case stems from a series of widely publicized events that occurred in Delaware, Ohio, and the surrounding highways on September 30, 2012. The Court provides the following description of that *726 day’s events based primarily on Stillwag-on’s deposition testimony. Several witnesses observed portions of these events. And Defendant Mattingly has provided his own account of some of the events. The Court reviews the witness statements and Mattingly’s account later.
. 1. Events on Route 42
On September 30, Stillwagon was riding his. motorcycle northeast on Route 42 toward Delaware, Ohio. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 60-62 [ECF No. 200-1].) Stillwagr on had a handgun in the tank bag of the motorcycle. (Id. at 95.) He carried the weapon legally, as he had obtained a concealed carry permit several years earlier. (See id. at 35.)
Defendant Richard 0. Mattingly was also driving on Route 42 on September 30. (See Mattingly Interview Tr. 1 at 5 [ECF No. 155-5].) Mattingly had consumed some beer at home. (Mattingly Interview Tr. 2 at 48 [ECF No. 184-4].) He then continued drinking as he drove his pickup truck. (See id. at 49.)
Stillwagon and Mattingly first came into contact at a Marathon station located at the intersection of Routes 42 and 33. (See Marathon Video at 15:07:52.) Stillwagon had stopped to buy 'gas; Mattingly had stopped for beer and cigarettes. (See id. at 15:07:38 to 15:13:17.) Both Stillwagon and Mattingly were parked at gas pumps. (Id. at 15:07:53 to 15:13:09.) Mattingly was parked behind Stillwagon. (Id.), Stillwagon pulled out of the station, and Mattingly left immediately behind him. (Id. at 15:13:02 to 15:13:20.)
Just northeast of the Marathon station, Route 42 narrows from four lanes to two lanes. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 68-69.) As Stillwagon approached this merger, Stillwagon has testified that Mattingly sped past him on the left, cutting Stillwag-on off and nearly hitting him. (See id. at 68 70.) The truck came within several inches of Stillwagon’s motorcycle. (See id. at 69.) As he made the pass, Mattingly was looking at Stillwagon and laughing. (See id, at 68—69.) Mattingly then sped off out of Still-wagon’s sight, “skip[ing] his tires” along the way (i.e., tapping his brakes to “lay rubber down”). (Id. at 70, 72.)
Less than two miles up the road, Still-wagon testified that Mattingly stopped his truck half on the road and half on the berm. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 70-72.) Mattingly was waving a blue metal baseball bat out of the driver’s side window, and signaling for Stillwagon to go around him. (See id.) Stillwagon did not drive around the truck; instead, he stopped and waited around 50 yards behind the truck. (See id. at 73.) Eventually Mattingly started moving again. (Id.) He sped off out of Stillwagon’s sight, “skipping] his tires a few times.” (Id. at 73.)
Farther up the road, Stillwagon testified that Mattingly again stopped half on the road and halt on the berm. (Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 74.) He waved for Stillwagon to-pass him using the baseball bat. (Id.) When Stillwagon did not pass him, Mat-tingly took off. peeling put and skipping his tires-in thé process. (See id. at 74-75.) Mattingly soon fell in behind a slower moving car though. (See id. at 75.) Stillwagon testified that he then passed Mattingly and the slower moving car. (Id.)
By riding north in the southbound .lane, and forcing at least one car off the road in the process, according to Stillwagon, Mat-tingly caught up with him. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 75-76; Oct. 1, 2012 Reninger Email at PagelD 5110 [ECF No. 162-6].) Mattingly purportedly made three cut-in moves from Stillwagon’s left, almost knocking Stillwagon off his bike. (Stillwag-on Dep. Vol. I at 76-77.) On the third cut-in, Stillwagon braked. (Id. at 76.) Mattingly responded by making a sharp right turn *727 immediately in front of Stillwagon and •braking hard. (See id. at 76-78.) Stillwagon testified that he was able to stop just soon enough to avoid colliding with the back of Mattingly’s truck. (See id)
Mattingly and Stillwagon' were approaching- the traffic light at Watkins/Moore Road by this point. (See Still-wagon Dep. Vol. I at 78.) The light was red. (id) Stillwagon testified that Mattingly drove through the red light and continued at a high rate of speed toward Delaware. (See id.) Stillwagon stopped, at-the light and then, after the light turned green, pulled into a gravel parking area. (See id at 78-79.) Stillwagon wanted to distance himself from Mattingly. (Id. at 79.) While Stillwagon waited in the parking area, two motorists who had witnessed Mattingly’s maneuvers (a woman named Lois Reninger and a man) stopped to ask if Stillwagon was alright. (See id. at 79-80.) The male motorist called the police at Still-wagon’s request. (See id. at 80.) The police indicated that Stillwagon could wait by the side of the road for an officer to come and take a report. (See id.) Because the police had not given any indication of when an officer might come, Stillwagon decided that he would not make a report. (See id.) Stillwagon waited on .the side of the road for several minutes. (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 37, 41, 43 [ECF No. 160-11].) Stillwagon thought that Mattingly would be far up the road ■ by that point. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 83.) As a precaution, though, in case Mattingly tried “to come back down the road [to] try to run [him] over,” Stillwagon removed his firearm from the tank bag and secured it in his jacket before leaving the parking area. (See id. at 96.)
Stillwagon drove several miles northeast on Route 42; as he passed Section Line Road, Mattingly pulled back onto the road behind him. (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 17 [ECF No. 160-10]; Stillwagon interview Tr. 2 -at 43-44; Oct. 2, 2012 Reninger Email at PagelD 5111 [ECF No. 162-6].) There were five or six ears between them-.' (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 89-90.) Mattingly entered the southbound lane and passed them all. (See id.) Several cars in that lane had to pull off the road to avoid a head-on collision with Mattingly’s truck, (See id. at 90.) Mattingly then pulled back into the right lane and accelerated. (See id.) Stillwagon testified that the truck came within inches of his motorcycle. (See id.) To avoid being rammed by the truck, Stillwagon sped up to almost 85 miles per hour. (See id. at 90-91.)
Mattingly slowed down and backed away from the bike. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 91.) However, according to StiHwago'n’s account, Mattingly soon accelerated into the southbound lane and started his cut-in moves again. (See id at 91-92.) Stillwagon braked. (See id. at 92.) Mattingly then cut in front of Stillwagon and braked hard, causing Stillwagon to nearly crash into the back of Mattingly’s truck for- the second time. (See id. at 92-94.) Stillwagon narrowly avoided a collision by swerving and slamming on his brakes. (See id) Both vehicles came to a stop. (See id. at 94.) Mattingly then drove up the road , and out of Stillwagon’s sight. (See id. at 94, 101-02.)
2. Events on the Exit Ramp and in the AutoZone Parking Lot
Route 42 merges with Route 23 and turns into a four-lane divided highway as it approaches Delaware. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 103-13 [ECF No. 200-1].) As Stillwagon. approached Delaware, he saw Mattingly stopped at the traffic light at the merger; the light was green. (See id at 103.) Stillwagon stayed back 200 to 300 meters and watched Mattingly. (See id. at 103-04.) When the light turned red, .Still-wagon testified that Mattingly drove *728 through the intersection, narrowly avoiding a collision with a tanker truck, and onto the divided highway. (See id. at 1060 Stillwagon waited at two different traffic lights before entering the divided highway. (See id. at 106-07.)
An exit ramp on the right (east) side of the highway leads to William Street. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 112-13.) The ramp forms its own lane. (See id.) As Stillwagon came to this portion of Route 42, he .kept to the right to take the William Street exit. (Id.) Mattingly was ahead of Stillwagon at this point and driving north in the far left lane. (See id. .at 113.) By Stillwagon’s account, Mattingly was traveling slowly, around 10 miles per hour, and had roughly 20 cars backed up behind him. (Id.) Mattingly had almost passed the William Street exit, but instead of continuing on the highway, he made a sudden right turn, crossing two lanes of traffic and barely missing a concrete divider, to merge onto the ramp. (See id. at 114.) Stillwagon continued down the ramp a considerable distance behind Mattingly. (See id. at 115-16.)
Stillwagon approached the end of the ramp and saw Mattingly sitting under a green light at the William Street intersection. (Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 117.) The ramp is narrow and enclosed to the left by a concrete wall and to the right by a heavily wooded hill and a guardrail. (See id. at 123; William St. Ramp Photo at 1 [EOF No. 199-5].) Rather than drive past Mattingly, Stillwagon decided to wait on the right side of the exit ramp, 40 to 50 yards back , from the truck. (Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 121.)
A few seconds after Stillwagon stopped, Stillwagon testified that the back-up lights on the truck lit up and the truck started backing up directly toward him. (See Still-wagon Dep. Vol. I at 126, Í31-32.) Knowing that he had no room to maneuver on the ramp, Stillwagon retrieved his pistol and fired at the.latch on the truck’s tailgate. (See id. at 126-27.) Stillwagon fired three -rounds. (Id. at 128.) He hit the center of tailgate, slightly above the latch, with two rounds. (Id.; Tailgate Photo at PagelD 7901 [EOF No. 200-3].) The third round likely went into the ground; Still-wagon had pulled his pistol down when he saw Mattingly exiting the ramp. (See Still-wagon Dep. Vol. I at 128, 137-39) According to Stillwagon, Mattingly then quickly shifted out of reverse and turned right onto William Street through the red light. (See id. at 128,133,150.)
Stillwagon drove to the end of the ramp, and after waiting at the light, Stillwagon turned right onto William Street. (Still-wagon Dep. Vol. I at 151.) Until he turned, Stillwagon could not see to the right, down William Street. (Id. at 152.) After turning, however, Stillwagon testified that he saw Mattingly stopped on the Olentangy River bridge, straddling both eastbound lanes. (See id. at 153-54.)
To avoid Mattingly, Stillwagon testified that “made a radical left turn into the oncoming lane.” (Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 154.) He claimed that he was attempting to reach the concrete base of a light pole stand (the “concrete pillar”) that he could see in a parking lot just east of the bridge. (See id. at 154-55.) Immediately after Still-wagon started his left turn into the oncoming lane, Stillwagon testified that Mattingly accelerated, turned sharply to the left across William Street, cut in front of the motorcycle, and drove into the parking lot. (See id. at 155.) Mattingly turned to the left after entering the parking lot. (Eagles Video at 15:31:00 to 15:31:04.) He looped around the concrete pillar and stopped facing the road. (Id.) Stillwagon entered the parking lot seconds later; he drove directly to the concrete pillar to the left of the parking lot entrance. (Id. at 15:31:04 to 15:31:12.)
*729 After reaching the concrete pillar, Still-wagon testified that he looked up and saw the truck several feet in front of him. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 168-69.) The driver’s side of the truck was facing Still-wagon. (Eagles Video at 15:31:13.) According to Stillwagon, Mattingly looked at him, revved the truck’s engine, and started to leave the parking lot. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 172-74, 177.) Speculating that Mattingly might try to bring, the truck around the pillar, to the side where Still-wagon was unshielded, Stillwagon fired two rounds at the truck’s rear driver-side tire. (See id. at 174.) One. of the rounds hit the tire; the other round hit the back quarter panel behind the rear tire. (Wilgus Aff. ¶¶ 33, 35 [EOF No. 232-1].)
Mattingly exited the parking lot,' turned left, and started heading east on William Street. (Eagles Video at 15:31:17 to 15:31:21.) But rather than driving away, Mattingly re-entered the parking lot farther to the east, maneuvered around a large planter, and drove directly toward Stillwagon. (Id. at 15:31:23 to 15:31:29.) Stillwagon had put down the kickstand and jumped off his motorcycle by this point. (Id.) There was nothing between him and the truck, as Mattingly had maneuvered the truck to the other side of the concrete pillar. (Id.) As the truck drove toward him, Stillwagon aimed for the truck’s bumper and fired one shot. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 187.) The bullet struck the wind deflector, below and to the left of the truck’s front license plate. (Wilgus Aff. ¶ 37.) The truck then swerved to the left and came to a stop, facing William Street, about ten feet in front of Stillwagon. (Eagles Video at 15:31:28 to 15:31:31.)
The truck stopped and Stillwagon then walked to the truck’s passenger-side door. (Eagles Video at 15:31:31.) He tried to open the door, hut it was locked; he thought that he might be able to grab Mattingly and pull him out of the truck. (See Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 189.) Mat-tingly, appearing agitated to Stillwagon, then purportedly kicked open the driver-side door and jumped out of the truck. (Id. at 194.) In an effort to close the proximity between him and Mattingly, Stillwagon quickly walked around the back of. the truck, “using [it] as a barrier if [Mattingly] had a gun,” (Id. at 189.)
As Stillwagon came around the back of the truck and approached Mattingly, Mat-tingly was facing east, with his back to the truck. (Stillwagon Dep. Vol. I at 195.) Still-wagon testified that Mattingly was yelling at him. (Id. at 199.) Stillwagon yelled back, indicating that he would shoot Mattingly if he had a gun in his right hand—the hand that was concealed from Stillwagon’s view. (See id. at 200-01.) Stillwagon testified that Mattingly then quickly turned toward him; Stillwagon, in turn, grabbed Mattingly by the shoulder, kicked him in the knee, and hit him in the back of the head with his pistol, at which point the pistol discharged into the air. (See id. at 200-02.) Stillwagon then pushed Mattingly to the ground. (See id. at 210.) Mattingly attempted to stand up again, but Stillwagon ordered him to stay on the ground. (See id. at 248.) Stillwagon asked a bystander to call the police, and he set his pistol down on a nearby planter. (Id. at 251.)
3. Stillwagon’s Detention and Arrest
Rashad Pitts, a Delaware County Sheriff’s Deputy arrived first. Stillwagon waved Pitts over and acknowledged that he had fired the weapon. Stillwagon. stated: “I shot the fucker. I don’t think he’s shot.” (Pitts Cruiser Video at 15:36:48.) Stillwag-on then indicated that Mattingly had just tried to kill him six times. (Id. at 15:36:51.) He informed Pitts that his pistol was sitting on the planter by the entrance to the parking lot, and he complied with Pitts’s instructions to lie on the ground and to roll *730 onto his stomach. (Id. at 15:37:00 to 15:38:17.) Stillwagon did not resist as Pitts doublé cuffed him behind the back. (Id. at 15:38:17 to 15:38:43.)
When Pitts walked toward William Street to secure the pistol sitting-on the planter, Defendant Mes took charge -of Stillwagon. (See Cruiser 62 Video at 15:39:56; Pitts Cruiser Video at 15:39:13.) Mes decided that he would move Stillwag-on and place him in the back of a police cruiser. (See Cruiser 62 Video at 15:39:56.) Mes assisted Stillwagon to his feet, guided Stillwagon to a police cruiser, and then placed Stillwagon (by verbally directing him and physically pushing him) into the back seat of the cruiser while Stillwagon’s hands were double cuffed behind his back. (See Cruiser 62 Video at 15:39:56 to 15:41:31; Pitts Cruiser Video at 15:39:56 to 15:40:21.) 3
Mter placing Stillwagon in the back of the cruiser, Mes asked Stillwagon to explain what happened. (Cruiser 62 Video at 15:41:42.) Stillwagon responded by describing the incident, from beginning to end, roughly as recounted above. (See id. at 15:41:61 to 15:49:00.) Several minutes later, and while Stillwagon was still in the back of the cruiser, Stillwagon explained to a different officer some of the events that took place in the parking lot. (See Cruiser 63 Video at 15:55:08 to 15:56:10.)
About four minutes later, Stillwagon was transported to the Delaware police station. (See Cruiser 63 Video at 16:00:00.) At the station, Defendant Flynn placed plastic evidence bags over Stillwagon’s hands. (Flynn Dep. at 170 [ECF No. 53-1].) Flynn secured the bags with tape. (Id.; see Stillwagon Dep. Vol. II at 444 [ECF No. 200-2].) The bags were to preserve any gunshot residue on Stillwagon’s hands. (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 2 [ECF No. 160-10]-.)
Defendants Segaard and Gerke interviewed Stillwagon at the station. Stillwag-on described the incident from his first encounter with Mattingly on Route 42 to the final confrontation in the AutoZone parking lot.’ (See, e.g., Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 9-2Í.) Stillwagon’s description was, again, roughly as recounted above, and it was consistent with the statement he had given Mes in the parking lot. (See, e.g., Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 9-21; see also Cruiser 62 Video at 15:41:51 to 15:49:00.) The officers 4 found Stillwagon’s description to be credible. (See Segaard Dep. Vol. I at 130 [ECF No. 16Ó-1]; Still-wagon Interview Tr.. 2 at 37 [ECF No. 160-11].) 5
Gerke and Segaard also learned during the interview, through text messages from officers at the scene, the location of four .of the five bullet holes in the truck. (Stillwag-on Interview Tr. 2 at 44-45.) The locations corresponded with where Stillwagon said he shot the truck. (See id. at 35, 44-45; Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 21.)
Aside from the information they. obtained during the interview, Defendants Segaard, Gerke, Willauer, and Radabaugh were potentially aware of several other pieces of evidence: the final location of the truck and the motorcycle in the parking lot; the location of the Shell casings in the AutoZone parking lot (i.e., next to the concrete pillar) and on the exit ramp (i.e., on the east side of the ramp and south of the painted turn arrow farthest from Wil- *731 liara Street); that there' was an empty shell casing in the chamber of Stillwagon’s pistol; that no blood spatter consistent with a gunshot wound was found at the scene; that Mattingly had a blue metal baseball bat in his truck; that Mattingly had beer cans (at least one opened) in his truck; and that Mattingly smelled strongly of, alcohol in the parking lot. (See, e.g., Radabaugh Dep. Vol. I at 76-78 [ECF No. 193-1]; Radabaugh Dep, Vol. II at 205-Q9, 227, 240-41, 292-93 [ECF No. 196-1]; Se-gaard Dep. Vol. I at 33-34, 266; Wilgus Aff. ¶¶ 13-17 [ECF No. 232-1]; Willauer Dep. Vol. I at 91-94, 99-100, 103-04 [ECF No. 52-1].) 6
Regarding the source of Mattingly’s injury, the officers had acquired differing information. Segaard and Willauer heard, either from paramedics or other personnel on the scene, that Mattingly had been grazed in the head. (See Segaard Dep. Vol. I at 236-37; Willauer Dep. Vol. I at 98-99; Willauer Dep. Vol. II at 129-31 [ECF No. 157-1].) Stillwagon, by contrast, told Se-gaard and Gerke that he had kicked Mat-tingly in the leg and then hit Mattingly on the head with his hand and pistol. (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 51.) Mattingly was reportedly alert and talking at the scene. (Segaard Dep. Vol. I at 75-76; Wil-lauer Dep. Vol. II at 129.)
A surveillance camera at the Eagles Lodge recorded the events in the Auto-Zone parking lot. Segaard and Radabaugh may have watched the surveillance video before Stillwagon’s arrest. (See Radabaugh Dep. Vol. I at 91-93.) The video shows, among other things, Mattingly leave and then re-enter the parking lot, maneuver around a large planter, and drive directly toward Stillwagon. (Eagles Video at 15:31:23 to 15:31:29.) The video also shows Stillwagon walk to the passenger-side door of the truck, pause, and then, without stopping or taking a shooting stance, walk around the back of the .truck and toward the driver-side door, where Stillwagon makes what appears to be a downward motion with his arm. (Id. at 15:31:31 to 15:31:49.)
Near the time of Stillwagon’s interview, Segaard has testified that he conversed with several people—including, potentially, Radabaugh, Gerke, and Delaware Police Chief Bruce Pijanowski—outside the interview room. (See Segaard Dep. Vol.I at 29-30,149-50; Segaard Dep. Vol. II at 526-27 [ECF No. 162-1].) 7 Following this, group conversation, and after, concluding Still-wagon’s interview, Segaard instructed Wil-lauer to prepare and file a felonious assault charge against Stillwagon. (See Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4578 [ECF No. 160-4].) Stillwagon, who had been in police custody since his detention in the parking lot, was formally arrested that evening at 8:48 p.m. (See Release Report at 1 [ECF' No. 205-1].) Stillwagon considers this to be the point at which he was falsely arrested. (PL’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 2 [ECF No. 205].) 8
Segaard and Gerke attempted to speak with Mattingly that evening. (Segaard In *732 vestigation Report at PagelD 4578.) However, they learned while in route to the hospital that Mattingly had left without being discharged. (Id.) The officers continued to the hospital anyway; they hoped to learn more about Mattingly’s condition. (Id.) They were unable, though, to obtain Mattingly’s medical records. (Id.)
Segaard later spoke with Mattingly on the phone. (Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4578.) Mattingly did not seem particularly intérested in participating in the investigation. (Id.)
4. Stillwagon’s Prosecution
At 8:04 a.m. the next day, October 1, 2012, Willauer filed a criminal complaint against Stillwagon alleging that he committed felonious assault when he “knowingly attempted] to cause serious physical harm to [Mattingly] by discharging a firearm at him at least six times, ultimately striking [him] in the head.” (Crim. Compl. at 1 [ECF No. 205s-2].)
In the days following Stillwagon’s arrest and the filing of the criminal complaint, Segaard, Gerke, Willauer, and Radabaugh obtained additional information about the incident.
a. Witness Statements
The officers received statements from several witnesses to the events on Route 42 and the confrontation in the AutoZone parking lot.
Lois Reninger—one of the two people who stopped to talk with Stillwagon near Watkins/Moore Road—corresponded with Segaard by phone and email. (See Oct. 2, 2012 Reninger Email at PagelD 5111 [ECF No. 162-6].) She watched Mattingly pass and then brake check Stillwagon. (Oct. 1, 2012 Reninger Email at PagelD 5110 [ECF No. 162-6].) She then stopped, along with another motorist, to check on Stillwagon; they were by the side of the road for three to five minutes. (Id.) Still-wagon appeared to be shaken and “was almost in his own world.” (Id.) She confirmed that the other motorist called the police and that Stillwagon did not want to wait to file a report. (Id.) She heard Still-wagon quietly say to himself that he would “[g]et the son of a bitch.” (Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).) And when Still-wagon re-entered the road. Reninger observed that he made “a normal entry.” (Id.) Reninger re-entered the road after Stillwagon. Farther up Route 42, near Section Line Road, she observed a silver pickup truck (like Mattingly’s) pull onto Route 42 and head north. (Oct. 2, 2012 Reninger Email at PagelD 5111.)
Tina Bickham and Kevin Cogan also communicated with Segaard. They witnessed Mattingly driving north in Route 42’s southbound lane. (See Bickham Call at 3-5 [ECF No. 162-3]; Cogan Call at 4-8 [ECF No. 162-10].) And they were each forced to drive off the road to avoid a collision with Mattingly’s truck. (See Bick-ham Call at 3-5; Cogan Call at 4-8.)
Ruth Sayre contacted Segaard too. She witnessed Mattingly chase and cut in on Stillwagon on Route 42. (See Sayre Call at 4-5 [ECF No. 205-5].) Based on this observation, she suggested that Mattingly’s story (disseminated on the news) of his truck suffering mechanical problems was likely untrue. (See id. at 5,11.)
Daniel Powell, Chris Linkous, 9 William Brown, and Susan Orcena each observed the events in the AutoZone parking lot and provided statements to the police. Powell’s account was consistent with the events recorded on the Eagles Lodge video. (See Eagles Video at 15:31:31 to 15:31:49.) The *733 other witnesses’ statements, by contrast, are each contradicted in critical ways by the Eagles Lodge video. (See id.)
Powell described Mattingly leaving and re-entering the parking lot. (Cruiser 66 Video at 15:40:53 to 15:41:04.) And he described Stillwagon approaching and then hitting Mattingly on the head with a gun, at which point the gun fired. (Id. 15:41:04 to 15:41:12.)
Observing the events through the rear-view mirror of his car, which was parked in front of AutoZone, Linkous claimed to see Mattingly rim from the driver side to the passenger side of the truck. (Linkous Call at 3 [ECF No. 162-8].) And according to-Linkous, Stillwagon then shot at Mat-tingly, Mattingly went down, and Stillwag-on shot again. (Id.) The Eagles Lodge video, however, does not show Mattingly run to and fall to the ground by the passenger side of the truck (See Eagles Video at 15:31:31 to 15:31:49.)
Brown was at AutoZone’s front window. (Brown- Call at 2 [ECF No. 159-13].) He claimed to see Stillwagon ride his motorcycle to the passenger side of the truck, fire a shot at the truck, park the motorcycle, take aim (through the passenger side of the truck), and fire at Mattingly, take a couple of steps forward, take aim, and again shoot through the passenger side of the truck, walk a bit closer and again fire at the passenger side of the truck, walk around the back of the truck and halfway up the driver side of the truck, and then fire two more shots-at Mattingly. (Id. at 3-4.) In contrast to this account, the Eagles Lodge video simply shows Stillwagon walk to the truck’s passenger-side door, pause, and then walk around the rear of the truck to the driver-side door. (See Eagles Video at 15:31:31 to 15:31:49.)
Orcena was riding in a car with her husband, traveling east on William Street. (Orcena Second Statement at PagelD 4598 [ECF No. 160-5].) As their vehicle approached the off ramp from Route 23, they heard gunfire-. (Id.) Her husband stopped the car. (Id.) Orcena claimed to see Mat-tingly exit and “walk[ ] around to the side of the truck.” (Id.) In an initial statement, Orcena claimed that she:then heard a shot and saw Mattingly fall to the ■ ground. (Orcena First Statement at PagelD 5205 [ECF No. 162-12].) In a later statement, however, Orcena claimed to see Stillwagon approach Mattingly, take direct aim from eight to ten feet away, and shoot him. (Orcena Second Statement at PagelD 4598.) Orcena stated that her' husband then pulled into a parking lot on the south side of William Street and dialed 911. (Id.) The Eagles Lodge video does not depict Mattingly walk around the side of the truck, nor does it depict Stillwagon taking direct aim at Mattingly from eight to ten feet away, (Eagles Video at 15:31:31 to 15:31:49.) The Eagles Lodge video- also does not show a car stopped in the eastbound lane across from the AutoZone parking lot. (Id. at 15:30:55 to 15:32:00.) An eastbound car does, however, eventually turn into a parking lot on the south side of William Street. (Id. at 15:31:51 to 15:31:57.)
b. Mattingly
In the days after the incident, the officers also spoke with Mattingly. He was interviewed twice: first by Segaard and then by Segaard and Gerke. Mattingly began the first interview by providing a brief, generalized description of the incident. He stated that he was traveling to visit his dad when Stillwagon passed him and started braking. (Mattingly Interview Tr. 1 at 4, 6 [ECF No. 155-5].) Stillwagon was annoyed, Mattingly surmised, about how slow Mattingly was driving. Mattingly averred that his truck was experiencing various mechanical problems' (“drawing power, shorting and pulling”), which caused him to drive slowly and, later, erratically. (See id. at 6.) Mattingly stated *734 that he tried to communicate his mechanical problems to Stillwagon using hand gestures. (Id. at 8-9.) The effort was unsuccessful though, as farther up the road, at the exit ramp to William Street, Stillwagon shot at his truck. (See id. at 7-9.) Mattingly attempted to take refuge in the Auto-Zone parking lot. (Id. at 7.) But Stillwagon allegedly pulled in beside him and started shooting into the passenger side of the truck. (Id.) Mattingly got out of the truck, and Stillwagon purportedly came around the back of the vehicle firing his weapon and saying “you’re dead, you’re dead, you’re dead.”;(/A) Mattingly could not remember any more of the encounter. (Id. at 7t8.)
Later in the interview, and in response to Segaard’s various follow-up questions, Mattingly again discussed the events in the AutoZone parking lot; (Mattingly Interview Tr. 1 at 38.) Segaard asked Mat-tingly why, after seemingly fleeing, he reentered the parking lot. (Id. at 39.) Mat-tingly stated that he did not remember reentering the parking lot; he suggested though that he was probably just scared. (Id. at 39-40.) Regarding the injuries he sustained, Mattingly again stated that he exited the truck and heard Stillwagon yelling; he could not remember anything else though. (See id. at 41-43.) Mattingly speculated that he must have ducked and cringed for a, bullet to have hit him in th¿ back of the head. (See id. at 42.)
Segaard and Gerke began the second interview by insisting that Mattingly stop feigning memory loss and tell the truth; throughout the process, they repeatedly referenced the purported, fact that Mat-tingly had been shot in the head. (See, e.g., Mattingly Interview Tr. 2 at 10,13-14,16-17, 19, 32, 41-43, 77 [ECF Nos. 184-3, 184-4].) Following this discussion, Mat-tingly offered additional details.
Mattingly reiterated that Stillwagon came around the back of the truck and shot.at him from eight to ten feet away. (See Mattingly Interview Tr. 2 at 73-75, 77.) Mattingly remembered “the shots,” the “sound of it,” the “look of the barrel,” the “look of [Stillwagon’s] face,” the “whole image.” (Id. at 77-78.) Mattingly stated that he then went unconscious. (Id. at 75, 77.) Mattingly opined.that the only physical contact between him and Stillwagon would have been when he was already on the ground. (Id. at 76.)
Segaard and Gerke tried to obtain a further explanation from Mattingly about his departure and re-entry to the Auto-Zone parking lot. (See Mattingly Interview Tr. 2 at 5-7, 79-80.) Mattingly initially implied that he still did not remember the event and that he must have, been acting out of fear. (See id. at 5-7.) After the officers’ admonition that he should stop feigning memory loss and tell the truth, Mattingly indicated that he was confused at the time about where Stillwagon was. (See id. at 79-80.)
Mattingly admitted during the second interview to drinking beer before and during the events on Route 42. (See Mattingly Interview Tr. 2 at 19-20, 48-49.) He acknowledged that his truck’s back-up lights might have come on when he was stopped at the end of the .William Street exit ramp, but he insisted that his truck did not move backwards. (Id. at 68-69.) And he told the officers that he and Stillwagon both engaged in aggressive behavior on Route 42. (See, e.g., id. at 14,20, 50-58.)
Mattingly continued to insist that his truck was experiencing mechanical problems. (Mattingly Interview Tr. at 17, 35, 51.) He also continued to insist that he could not remember certain events, or their sequence. (See, e.g., id. at 52, 61, 63-65, 67—68, 73, 78.) And in various instances, when Segaard or Gerke, asked Mattingly about a specific event, Mattingly simply speculated about his actions. (See, e.g., id. at 53, 61, 64-65, 67-68.)
*735 .The officers did, not find Mattingly’s account to be especially trustworthy—particularly the part addressing the events on Route 42. (See Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4579 [ECF No. 160-4]; see also Segaard Dep. Vol. II at 471-72 [ECF No. 162-1].)
The officers also obtained additional information about Mattingly’s injuries. During his first interview, Mattingly stated that his knee hurt and was swollen; (Mat-tingly Interview Tr. 1 at 4.) Although he did not remember injuring his knee, Mat-tingly speculated that he must have fallen oh it after losing consciousness. (See id.) Segaard viewed Mattingly’s head injury: it was at the base of Mattingly’s skull, and “there did not appear to be any swelling or scorching that would have indicated ... that he was either hit on the head or that his head had been exposed to a discharging firearm at point blank range.” (Se-gaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4579-80.) And a police evidence technician also viewed Mattingly’s head wound: there was “no stippling, scorch marks or anything else [indicative of] a point blank bullet wound,” nor was there swelling consistent with a blunt for impact. (Id. at Pa-gelD 4580.)
c. Investigation Reports, Indictment, and Trial
By October 5, 2012, Segaard, Gerke, Willauer, Flynn, and Ailes had filed their investigation reports. about the incident. (See Investigation Reports at PagelD 4566-91 [ECF No. 160-4].) And Segaard, in addition to .drafting his report,,compiled a Grand Jury Packet and developed a Grand Jury Synopsis PowerPoint. (See Grand Jury Packet at PagelD 4559 [ECF No. 160-4]; Grand Jury Synopsis at 1 [ECF No. 165-1].)
Nearly four months after the incident, on January 29, 2013, Segaard testified before the Delaware County grand jury. (Se-gaard Dep. Vol. IV at 911 [ECF No. 199-1].) Stillwagon was indicted on four counts of felonious- assault. (Indictment at 1-4 [ECF No, .203-2].) A. Bill of Particulars later clarified that three of the indicted counts alleged that Stillwagon had attempted to shoot Mattingly; the fourth count alleged that Stillwagon had used his pistol to cause serious physical harm to Mattingly. (Bill of Particulars at 1-2 [ECF No. 205-8].)
Stillwagon’s criminal case went to trial on October 1, 2013. (See J. Entry at 1 [ECF No. 205-9].) Finding no evidence in •the record that could support a conviction, the trial court dismissed each of the counts brought against Stillwagon and entered a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Ohio Criminal Rule 29. (See id.)
B. Procedural Background
Stillwagon filed his complaint in the ’807 case on July 10, 2014, and he filed his complaint in the ’1606 case on September 18, 2014. Following the Court’s March 31, 2016 Opinion and Order on the Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Stillwagon filed, on May 16, 2016, an amended complaint in the ’807 case. The Court has since consolidated the ’807 and ’1606 cases for all purposes, including trial.
As relevant here, Stillwagon asserts nine claims: claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for (1) false arrest (against- Segaard, Willauer, Gerke, and Radabaugh); (2). malicious prosecution (against Segaard, Willauer. Gerke, and Radabaugh); (3) civil conspiracy (against Segaard, Willauer, Gerke, and Radabaugh); 10 (4) supervisory liability *736 (against Radabaugh); 11 (5) excessive force (against Mes and Flynn); and (6) municipal liability (against the City); as well as claims under Ohio law (against Segaard, Willauer, Gerke, and Radabaugh) for (7) malicious prosecution; (8) civil conspiracy; and (9) spoliation of evidence. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 169-192 [ECF No. 78].) 12 Stillwagon is suing Segaard, Willauer, Gerke, Rada-baugh, Ailes, and Flynn in their individual capacities. (Id. ¶ 18; ’1606 Compl. ¶ 5 [’1606 ECF No. 1].)
Following extensive discovery, the parties filed the cross-motions for summary judgment that are currently before the Court. The Municipal Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all the claims asserted against them. Stillwagon, in turn, has filed three motions for summary judgment. In his first motion, Still-wagon requests summary judgment against Segaard and Willauer on his false arrest claim and malicious prosecution claims (under § 1983 and Ohio law). (PL’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 1 [ECF No. 205].) In his second motion, Stillwagon requests summary judgment against Mes and Flynn on his excessive force claim. (PL’s Second Mot. for Summ. J. at 1 [ECF No. 206].) Md in his third motion, Still-wagon requests summary judgment against the City on his municipal liability claim relating to excessive force. (PL’s Third Mot. for Summ. J. at 1 [ECF No. 207].)
Two additional motions relating to the parties’ summary judgment filings are also before the Court. The Municipal Defendants have moved to strike a catalog of evidence submitted as an exhibit by Still-wagon. (Defs.’ Mot. to Strike at 1 [ECF No. 231].) Md the Municipal Defendants have moved to exclude two paragraphs from an affidavit submitted by one of Still-wagon’s experts. (Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude at 1 [ECF No. 232].)
The Court first considers the Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Strike.
II. MOTION TO STRIKE
The Municipal Defendants request that the Court strike, and decline to consider for purposes of the pending motions for summary judgment, a catalog of evidence submitted by Stillwagon as an exhibit to his Memorandum in Opposition [ECF No. 220] to the Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. (Mot. to Strike at 1 [ECF No. 231].) The catalog is a list of the alleged “false statements, falsified or fabricated evidence and misleading omissions by Defendant police officers.” (Catalog at 1 [ECF No. 220-2].) The Municipal Defendants contend that the catalog fails to comply with Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, which provides, in relevant part, that a “proponent may use a summary, chart, or calculation to prove the content of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court.” Fed. R. Evid. 1006.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(2) “governs the procedure by which courts must review objections to the admissibility of evidence presented in connection with a motion for summary judgment.” Smith v. Interim Healthcare of Cincinnati, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-582, 2011 WL 6012971 , at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2011). Under that rule, a party may object if it believes that materials cited in support of a motion for summary judgment “cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. *737 56(c)(2). A party’s objection- under Rule 56(c)(2) “functions much as an objection at trial, adjusted for the pretrial setting. The burden is on the proponent to show that the material is admissible as presented or to explain the admissible form that is anticipated.” Id. (2010 Advisory Committee notes). A party need not file a separate motion to strike when challenging evidence submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment. Id. If a party does file a separate motion to strike, the motion should be construed as an objection under Rule 56(c)(2). Smith, 2011 WL 6012971 , at *4
The Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Strike, which the Court construes as an objection under Rule 56(c)(2), consists of two request: (1) that the Court decline to consider the catalog as it decides the parties’ motions for summary judgment and (2) that the Court strike the catalog from the docket. The Municipal Defendants’ first request has merit. Stillwagon acknowledges in his response to the Motion to Strike that the catalog “is not evidence under [Federal Rule of Evidence] 1006” and “was never intended to be considered as such.” (Opp’n to Mot. to Strike at 3 [ECF No. 243].) Based on this acknowledgment, the Court grants the Municipal Defendants’ Motion in part and will not consider the catalog as it decides the parties’ motions for summary judgment. 13
The Municipal Defendants’ second request is less successful. Defendants point to no legal authority authorizing the Court to strike an exhibit from the docket under Rule 56. Indeed, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee’s notes, coupled with case law interpreting the Rule, appear to contradict the argument that the Court can strike an exhibit under Rule 56. The Advisory Committee explicitly stated that “[t]here is no need to make a separate motion to strike” when objecting to materials cited in support of a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (2010 Advisory Committee notes). And courts have clarified that a motion to strike such materials should be construed as an objection ■ under Rule 56(c)(2). The Municipal Defendants’ Motion to Strike is therefore denied to the extent that it asks the Court to strike Stillwagon’s catalog from the docket.
III. MOTION TO EXCLUDE
The Municipal Defendants have moved to exclude' paragraphs 39 and 40 of an affidavit submitted by Gary Wilgus, a crime scene investigator and expert witness for Stillwagon. (Mot. to Exclude at 1 [ECF No. 232].) In the challenged paragraphs, Wilgus states:
39. Based upon the information listed above concerning the bullet holes, their locations, patterns and directionality, the physical evidence all supports that Mr, Stillwagon made no attempt to shoot at the driver of the truck. As to every shot fired, Mr. Stillwagon was intentionally aiming at the truck, not the driver. Assuming that the shots in the tailgate came first, the shots to the rear driver’s side second, and the shot to the front of the truck was last, each time Mr. Stillwagon fired the weapon, the bullets struck lower on the truck and thus further from the driver. Assuming that Mr. Stillwagon is competent with the firearm, the physical evidence renders the theory that he was attempting to shoot the driver entirely implausible'.
.40. If the Delaware Police Depart; ment had requested-my conclusions at the' time of the investigation, regarding the analysis of the shooting-related evi *738 dence, I would have told them that it was my opinion that Mr. Stillwagon was aiming at the truck, not the driver. It was clear to me from day one there was no attempt to actually shoot at the driver himself. However, I was not asked to provide[ ] my analysis or conclusions on this issue.
(Wilgus Aft. ¶¶ 39, 40 [EOF No. 232-1].) The Municipal Defendants challenge these paragraphs, arguing that (i) Wilgus is not qualified to offer opinions regarding Still-wagon’s state of mind at the time he fired the shots, (ii) any methodology employed by Wilgus in forming these opinions is unreliable, and (iii) Wilgus’s opinions will not assist the factfinder. (Mot. to. Exclude at 1.)
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the use of expert testimony. Under the Rule, “[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if:”
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence' or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702. “The trial judge is the ‘gatekeeper’ of expert evidence and determines its admissibility under Rule 702.” Palatka v, Savage Arms, Inc., 535 Fed.Appx. 448, 453 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S, 136, 142, 118 S.Ct. 512 , 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997)). And as the gatekeeper, a trial judge has discretion to determine the admissibility of a proposed expert’s testimony “ ‘based on whether the testimony is both relevant and reliable.’ ” Id. (quoting Rose v. Truck Ctrs., Inc., 388 Fed.Appx. 528, 533 (6th Cir. 2010)). When considering the admissibility of particular- expert testimony, the trial judge “must assess ‘whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and ... whether that reasoning or methodology can be applied to the facts in issue.’” Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93 , 113 S.Ct. 2786 , 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). The proponent of expert testimony must establish its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 251 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Court agrees with the Municipal Defendants that paragraphs 39 and 40 of Wilgus’s affidavit should be excluded. The testimony Wilgus provides in those paragraphs on Stillwagon’s intentions in firing his pistol represents an exercise in drawing inferences from the facts of the case. And as this Court has explained previously, “‘[t]he jury is sufficiently capable of drawing its own inferences regarding intent, motive or state of mind from the evidence, and permitting expert testimony on this subject would be merely substituting the expert’s judgment for the jury’s and would not be helpful for the.jury.’” Waite, Schneider, Bayless & Chesley, L.P.A. v. Davis, 253 F.Supp.3d 997 , 2015 WL 3505793, at *14 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (quoting Siring v. Or. State Bd. of Higher Educ., 927 F.Supp.2d 1069, 1077 (D. Or. 2013)); see also CMI-Trading v. Quantum Air, 98 F.3d 887, 890 (6th Cir. 1996) (“The intent of the parties is an issue within the competence of the jury and expert opinion testimony will not assist the jury, within the meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, in determining the factual issue of intent.”).
Stillwagon suggests that Wilgus was not opining about intent. (See Opp’n to Mot., to Exclude at 6 ,[ECF No. 242].) According to Stillwagon, Wilgus’s “opin *739 ions are that the physical evidence strongly contradicts the theory that [Stillwagon] was attempting to shoot [Mattingly].” (Id.)
Stillwagon’s argument offers an incomplete picture of Wilgus’s testimony. Wilgus opines that “the physical evidence renders the theory that [Stillwagon] was attempting to shoot the driver entirely implausible.” (Wilgus Aff. ¶39.) But. Wilgus also avers that “as to every shot fired, Mr. Stillwagon was intentionally aiming at the truck, not the driver.” (Id.) With this second statement, Wilgus clearly offers an opinion about intent.
Ultimately though, Stillwagon points to a distinction without a difference. Regardless of how Wilgus’s testimony is cast, Wilgus is still drawing inferences from the facts of the case-inferences that the jury needs no assistance in drawing. Accordingly, the Court grants the Municipal Defendants’ Motion and will exclude paragraphs 39 and 40 of Wilgus’s affidavit from its consideration in ruling on the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment. 14
IV. CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant has the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact, which may be accomplished by demonstrating that the nonmoving party lacks evidence to support an essential element of its case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Barnhart v. Pickrel, Schaeffer & Ebeling Co., 12 F.3d 1382, 1388-89 (6th Cir. 1993). When the moving party has carried this burden, the nonmoving party must then set forth specific facts'showing that there is a.genuine issue for trial, Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 374 (6th Cir. 2009).
“After the parties have presented their evidence, ‘the judge’s function is not himself tó weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.’ ” Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 374 (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S, 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must draw all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 , 90 S.Ct. 1598 , 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); see Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 , 120 S.Ct. 2097 , 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000). However, .the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the nonthoving party’s position will not be sufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury reasonably could find for the non-moving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 ; see Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 479 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 , 106 S.Ct. 1348 , 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) (finding reliance upon mere allegations, conjecture, or implausible inferences to be insufficient to survive summary judgment).
Here, the parties have filed cross-motions for summary ' judgment. Each party, as a movant for summary judgment, bears the burden of establishing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. The fact that one party fails to satisfy that burden on its own Rule 56 motion does not automatically indicate *740 that the opposing party has satisfied the burden and should be granted summary judgment on the other motion. In reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, courts should “evaluate each motion on its own merits and view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Wiley v. United States, 20 F.3d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1994). The standard of review for cross-motions for summary judgment does not differ from the standard applied when a motion is filed by one party to the litigation. Taft Broad. Co. v. United States, 929 F.2d 240, 248 (6th Cir. 1991).
Stillwagon asserts several claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , which provides a remedy for “the deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” with respect to actions taken by persons acting “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . To prevail on a claim brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of law. Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2015).
A. Request to Strike Stillwagon’s Memorandum in Opposition
The Municipal Defendants have, as a preliminary matter, requested that the Court strike Stillwagon’s Memorandum in Opposition [ECF No. 220] to their Motion for Summary Judgment. (Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 1 [ECF No. 233].) The Memorandum was due on Friday, May 5, 2017, but was not filed until Saturday, May 6. (Id.) When, as here, a request to strike falls outside the scope of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), which provides for striking matters from “a pleading,” the Court relies on its inherent power to control the docket when deciding whether to strike the document. Hill v. Ohio State Univ. T & L, No. 2:12-cv-984, 2013 WL 2354069 , at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 29, 2013); see Anthony v. BTR Auto. Sealing Sys., Inc., 339 F.3d 506, 516-17 (6th Cir. 2003).
The Court denies the request to strike. Stillwagon filed his Memorandum just one day late. The Municipal Defendants do not claim to have suffered any prejudice from the late filing. (See Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at 1.) And, in fact, the Municipal Defendants have not identified any reason, aside from the mere fact that the filing was late, why the Court should strike the Memorandum. (See id.) Striking Stillwagon’s Memorandum under these circumstances would constitute a disproportionately harsh sanction. And striking the Memorandum would neither benefit the Court’s docket management nor help to resolve the case more expeditiously.
The Court moves now to the substance of the motions for summary judgment.
B. False Arrest
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary on Stillwagon’s § 1983 false arrest claim. A false arrest claim implicates “the Fourth Amendment right to be arrested only upon probable cause.” Crockett v. Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 579-80 (6th Cir. 2003). Prevailing on the claim thus “ ‘requires a plaintiff to prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.’” Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 305 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, Ohio, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005)).
Probable cause exists when the police have “‘reasonably trustworthy information ... sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] *741 had committed or was committing an offense.’ ” Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 315 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 , 85 S.Ct. 223 , 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)). “No overly burdensome duty to investigate applies to officers faced with the prospect of a warrantless arrest.” Logsdon v. Hains, 492 F.3d 334, 341 (6th Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, “ ‘[pjroba-ble cause determinations involve an examination of all [the] facts and circumstances within an officer’s knowledge at the time of an arrest.’ ” Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 315 (quoting Estate of Dietrich v. Burrows, 167 F.3d 1007, 1012 (6th Cir. 1999)). That is, “the initial probable cause determination must be founded on. ’both the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence’ known to the arresting officer.” Logsdon, 492 F.3d at 341 (quoting Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 318 ). An officer “cannot simply turn a blind eye toward potentially exculpatory evidence.” Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 372 (6th Cir. 1999). With respect to [affirmative defenses, “where a reasonable police officer would conclusively know that [a suspect’s] behavior is protected by a legally cognizable affirmative-defense, that officer lacks a legal foundation to arrest that person for that behavior.” Painter v. Robertson, 185 F.3d 557 , 571 & n.21 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A] peace officer, in assessing probable cause to effect an arrest, may not ignore information known to him which proves that the suspect is protected by an affirmative legal justification for his suspected criminal actions.”). “[T]he existence of probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible.” Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995).
1. The Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
The Municipal Defendants contend that Segaard, Willauer, Gerke, and Radabaugh are entitled to qualified immunity and, thus, summary judgment. (See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 11-18 [ECF No. 203].) Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, “ ‘government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability from civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly , established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 601 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)). Determining whether qualified immunity shields a defendant from liability is a question of law involving a two-step inquiry. “First, the court must determine whether, based upon the applicable law, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs show that a constitutional violation has occurred.” Id. If a violation could be established, the next step is to determine whether the statutory or constitutional right was clearly established. Id. When a defendant raises qualified immunity as an affirmative defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the officer is not entitled, to the defense. Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 375 .
a. Constitutional Violation
The officers are entitled to qualified immunity, the Municipal Defendants argue, because the Sixth Circuit routinely grants qualified immunity in cases where, despite the suspect’s assertion of an affirmative defense, the facts known to the arresting officer track the elements of an offense. (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 17.) The Municipal Defendants’ statement of the law is accurate. But it is not controlling in this case. The cases decided by the Sixth Circuit, 'and cited by the Municipal Defendants, involved situations where the evidence did not present a genuine issue of material fact on whether a reasonable police officer would have conclusively known that the affirmative defense applied. See Harvey v. Carr, 616 Fed.Appx. 826, 829 *742 (6th Cir. 2015). This case, by contrast (and as discussed below), involves evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact on whether a reasonable officer would have conclusively known that Stillwagon acted in self-defense and, more • broadly, on whether probable cause existed to arrest Stillwagon;
To determine whether the officers had probable cause to arrest Stillwagon, the Court considers whether the totality of the facts and circumstances known to the officers at the moment, of arrest was sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that Stillwagon had committed an offense. See Sykes, 625 F.3d at 306 ; see also United States v. Duval, 742 F.3d 246, 253 (6th Cir. 2014) (“ ‘[T]he collective knowledge of agents working as a team is to be considered together in determining probable cause.’ ” (quoting United States v. Woods, 544 F.2d 242, 269-60 (6th Cir. 1976))). 15
i. Information Known at the Time of Arrest
When Stillwagon was arrested on the evening of September 30, 2012, Segaard, Gerke, Willauer, and Radabaugh were operating on a limited amount of information. The officers knew: the final location of the truck and the motorcycle in the parking lot; the location of the shell casings in the AutoZone' parking lot (i.e., next to the concrete pillar) and on the exit ramp (i.e., on the east side of the ramp and south of the painted turn arrow farthest from William Street); the location of at least four of the five bullet holes in Mattingly’s truck (i.e., two in the tailgate, one in the rear driver-side tire, and one in the quarter panel behind that tire); that there was an empty shell casing in the chamber of Still-wagon’s pistol (potentially suggesting that the pistol was in contact with something when it was last fired); that no blood spatter consistent with a gunshot wound was found at the scene; that Mattingly had a blue metal baseball bat in his truck; that Mattingly had beer cans (at least one opened) in his truck, and that Mattingly was alert, talking, and smelled strongly of alcohol at the parking lot. (See, e.g., Rada-baugh Dep. Vol. I at 76-78 [ECF No. 193-1]; Radabaugh Dep. Vol, II at 206-09, 227, 240-41, 292-93 [ECF No. 196-1]; Segaard Dep. Vol. I at 33-34, 75-76, 266 [ECF No. 160-1]; Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 44-45 [ECF No. 160-11]; Wilgus Aff. ¶¶ 13-17 [ECF No. 232-1]; Willauer-Dep. Vol. I at 91-94, 99-100, 103-04 [EOF No. 52-1]; Willauer Dep. Vol.-II at 129 [ECF No. 157-1],) 16 When viewed in the most favorable light, the evidence also shows that Segaard and Radabaugh viewed the Eagles Lodge surveillance video before Still-wagon’s arrest. (See Radabaugh Dep. Vol. I at 91-93, 98-100; Segaard Dep. Vol. I at 125.) 17 And, finally, Segaard and Gerke *743 knew—and largely believed—what Still-wagon told them during his interview at the police station. (See Segaard Dep. Vol. I at 130; Stillwagon Interview Tr. -2 at 37.)
The events started, Stillwagon explained in his interview, after he left the Marathon station at the intersection of Routes 42 and 33: “I filled up, got on the road, and I was just—I was going 50 miles an hour. I remember right when I got over this, what 33 and this car—this truck misses me' by five inches. I was going about 50, he was going about 70. Holy shit. Then all of a sudden he stops up in here and waits for me to come up. So I stayed back and ... so that happened all the way up .... ” (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 10-11 [160-10].) Stillwagon described in detail Mat-tingly’s aggressive passing, brake checking, swerve-ins, bat-waiving, and other maneuvers. (See, e.g., id. at 9-21.) Stillwagon emphasized that Mattingly had repeatedly tried to kill him. (See, e.g., id. at 12, 21.)
Stillwagon indicated that he had made numerous efforts to separate himself from Mattingly while on the highway. (See, e.g., Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 9-21.) Most notably, Stillwagon stated that he pulled over and waited several minutes “to let the guy go on up the road.” (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 37; see Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 9, 12.) On why he pulled over, Stillwagon further related:
And I couldn’t understand. I kept staying behind him. All I wanted to do was go 42, over 23, over to go to Mt. Vernon. So I figure this guy’s got—going to get off one of these roads. So when—he showed me his baseball bat. He’s going like that. He’s going to hit me with his baseball bat. I go—.
So when I went around him he just smiled, he had a baseball bat. I said no big deal. So I just kept going. So he sort of disappeared. And I see these lights and he’s passing like five or six cars at a time. And he comes up right behind me. I mean, fucking this close. And I said this guy is going to fucking kill me. He’s a fucking idiot.
So I go on—I' speed up. And then he just sort of slows down, And then a car passes. I think a car passed him. And I went, you know,' I went in tb—let’s see what I did. When he did that he got 'right behind me and then I sped up and then he just sort of backed off, you know. I said that really bothered me. Then I said I have this gun. I said I’m not going to go down in front of a Dodge pickup truck, you know. So that’s why I pulled over. That’s when 1 pulled over.
(Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 15-16.) Two other motorists pulled over too. (Id. at 9, 12.) They asked Stillwagon.if he was alright, and the'' woman motorist asked whether someone should call the police. (Id. at 9, 16.) As he informed the officers, Stillwagon responded in the affirmative: “I said yeah, call the police. Will you call the police for me? Can you do that for me?” (Id. at 16; see also Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 43.) The woman then asked Stillwagon what he was going to do. (Still-wagon Interview Tr. 1 at 16.) Stillwagon explained: “I said, I’m going to go up the road. After I figure he’ll go up the road. And I might see the little bastard, I’ll see what his problem is. So that’s when I went on.up the road.” (Id. at 16-17.) Stillwagon further stated that, while stopped at the side of the road. “I jacked one [bullet] in when I pulled over at that gravel thing. When those people, said, what are you going to do about it, I’m going to go up *744 that road and see what’s wrong with that bastard. I figured he was a farm kid, he had a big day and I was just going to go to Mt. Vernon, you know, to the cemetery.” (Id. at 23.)
Stillwagon indicated that after pulling away from the motorists, he “thought [Mattingly] was long gone.” (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 41.) But, then, “[a]ll of a sudden here comes this fucking pickup truck going about 80 miles an hour passing seven cars. He’s right behind me again. And I don’t know if he stayed at that Marathon station and hid because I didn’t see him anymore, you know.” (Id. at 17.) Stillwagon related how Mattingly then slowed down and started “jerking his brakes.” (Id. at 18.) Stillwagon kept his distance, and Mattingly then drove through a red light, Stillwagon explained. (See id.)
Stillwagon stated that his next encounter with Mattingly was near the William Street exit ramp: “I looked on 23, he had like 10 or 20 cars backed up. He was going 10 miles an hour down the road.” (Still-wagon Interview Tr. 1 at 18.) Mattingly was in the passing lane and then “[a]ll of a sudden he just went like this, over, and he went down there [the exit ramp], I was still back, way back here because I waited at that light. It was all the traffic. Then I get off that exit thinking this guy’s clear. And there he is.” (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 54; see also Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 19 (“[A]ll of a sudden he just rips off and goes down that exit. So I go down that exit, you know, I said, that son of a bitch. I just want to know what his problem was.”).) Stillwagon later clarified that the William Street exit is the one he uses when he drives from his office to his parents’ grave, as he was doing that day. (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 23-24, 26.)
As Stillwagon drove down the exit ramp, he saw that Mattingly was stopped ahead. (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 39, 54 (“I’m behind him, you know, may three or four, five minutes. So I go down that ramp and next thing is he’s down at the end of the thing because the light got him, you know.”).) Then, as Stillwagon related, “[w]hen I got down that ramp and I saw his lights go on I said, this son of a bitch is going to back up on me and now I’m going to eat this truck. I went bang, bang. You can see the pattern. I put a tight pattern right there. If I wanted to kill the fucker I would have shot him right in the fucking head.” (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 21; see also id. at 19-20 (“[W]hen I shot—I shot like two times at him I think it was. And I just shot right down the middle. I wasn’t trying to shoot the fucker. I was just going to say, you know, you have your fucking truck, you know, with you but we can talk.”).) Stillwagon later reiterated: “When I saw his lights. I saw his lights go on. I said this son of a bitch is backing upon me and I’m going to make sure he understands that we’re not going to do that today.” (Id. at 24; see also Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 33 (“I saw the lights and ... I shot two shots into his car to say don’t fuck with me. Okay. Just go your way.”).)
After Stillwagon fired at the truck, Mat-tingly “ripped around the corner” and off the exit ramp. (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 39.) Stillwagon waited at the red light at the end of the ramp. (Id.) He explained to the officers that he did not expect to see Mattingly again: “He went and I figured the guy is done. We’re done. He’s not going to fuck around with me anymore.” (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 31; see also Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 39 (“I waited for the light and I said, you know, that fucker is- gone.”).) When the light changed, however, Stillwagon explained that he was surprised to see Mattingly “dead stopped waiting for me” in the middle of the road. (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 34.) As Still-wagon drove up the road, Mattingly *745 turned into the AutoZone parking lot in a maneuver that Stillwagon interpreted as the beginning of a u-turn: “I come around the thing and I go, holy fuck, this guy’s in the—he’s waiting for me again. After that he just goes around. I don’t know if he went over a curb or there’s a road there.... And I said this guy is coming back. He’s going to come back on me and run me over.” (Id.) To avoid what he thought would be another vehicular attack by Mattingly, Stillwagon explained that he “jumped into where you saw me where I ended up. I was just trying to gel behind that concrete pier to try to get some type of defense and I jumped up and I shot at his—shot at his car.” (Id. at 34-35; see also Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 21-22, 28, 30 (“Then I don’t know, something came in his head to stop and then he did a big u-ey and he was going to come back on me. He figures he was probably1 going to try to run me over or something.”) (“Then he just goes—he sees me and then he ■... makes a big boomerang and I just did a short—I could see that concrete pier and I’m going to get behind it to protect myself.”) (“And he stopped dead in the road and sees me and then he makes his'big rush to get another. It’s like ah ambush. That’s what it looked like to me. Like he’s going to ram me with his truck now.”).)
Stillwagon made it the pillar, he explained, by turning his bike “as fast as [he] could.” (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 49.) Stillwagon then pulled out his gun and fired at the truck’s tire. (See id. at 49, 51.) He explained: “I was flicking going crazy, too, because hurry up and coming for me. So I jumped off the bike and I turned around and I went bang, and then he—he came and I remember shooting his tire.... I said I’m going to stop this son of a bitch from going down the road anymore.” (Id. at 51.) Mattingly then swung around the concrete pillar and aimed the truck at Stillwagon. (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 19.) “I was fearing for my life,” he told the officers. (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 40.) Stillwagon again fired at the truck; as he explained,
[Mattingly] goes fast and he goes like this, jams his brakes on and he floors- it and he goes up around those cars. And I figure he’s coming back to ram me .... He was coming right for me. I shot—I think I shot- again right into his engine. I said, I’ll fucking kill you. And he went like this. Let’s see, he went in—I shot him—I shot at him right here he was coming right for me because my bike is—you guys know where the bike is. He was coming right for me in that fucking truck.
(Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 19-20.) Still-wagon later reiterated:' “Then I turned into that thing quick because I didn’t want to be set up and that’s as far as I got and I could hear that engine. I immediately got the kickstand, jumped off and I went like that, bam, shot into his truck a couple of times, maybe once. I don’t know.” (Id. at 22.)
After Stillwagon shot at the engine, the truck “swung off’ and stopped. (See Still-wagon Interview Tr. 2 at 36.) Stillwagon told the officers that he then ran around the car:
I said what the fuck—and he came out real sheepish. And he’s like this., I said he has a, gun, it’s going to be bad. I’m going to get shot or he’s going to get shot. And he goes mother fuck, you— something. I couldn’t even understand what the hell he was saying. And then I just said you’re fucking crazy and I'just kicked him right in the leg then just went—hit him in the head like that. And that was it.
(Id. at 51; see also Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 20-22 (“[H]e came out of the ear like this, he had his hand down like that and I had the gun. I said dude, I’m going to fucking let you have it. He had some *746 thing hanging down. I don’t know if he had' some rope. So I went over and I kicked him like—I kicked him like what the fuck’s' wrong with you. Then I hit him right in the head with the gun.”) (“And then he stopped and then that made him veer, off and stop at the 42. He couldn’t get out because of the traffic. Then I went over and he got out like a sheep dog, you know. Like a punk. And I’ve been in enough—I go, what the fuck’s wrong with you man? You want to get killed today or what? You try killing me. I’m not going to let you do that to me.”).)
Stillwagon and Defendant Gerke discussed the last round that discharged from Stillwagon’s pistol:
STILLWAGON: I kicked him and he went—then I hit him. And the mistake was I must have had my hand on—I was so pissed that it must have popped my— popped the gun off. I don’t know if I shot him in the head or not.
GERKE: Yeah, you did.
STILLWAGON: Did I?
GERKE: Uh-huh.
(Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 32.) Later, Stillwagon and Gérke again addressed the last gunshot:
GERKE: That’s when the round went?
STILLWAGON: Yeah. Must have. I must have had my finger on the trigger.
GERKE: All right. So you didn’t walk up to him and shoot him in the head?
STILLWAGON: No. I would have shot him in the head at the—when he was stopped at the light.
GERKE: I just want to make that clear.
STILLWAGON: Yeah. Yeah. No. No. he’s just punking.
(Id. at 51-52; see also Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 21 (“[W]hen I hit him in the head my finger must have been on the trigger. But I don’t think—I don’t know what I did. I hit him with the handgun. I hit him over the head. I said, what the fuck, you trying to kill me?”),)
ii. Probable Cause
The Municipal Defendants contend that the officers had probable cause to arrest Stillwagon for felonious assault, which, in Ohio, is a crime committed when a person knowingly causes or attempts to cause physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance. O.R.C. § 2903.11(A). “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature.” Id. § 2901.22(B). The defendant officers purportedly had probable cause to arrest Still-wagon for this crime when,(i) Stillwagon shot at. Mattingly’s truck and (ii) Stillwag-on hit Mattingly on the head with his hand and pistol. (See Defs.’ Mot, for Smhm. J. at 2-7 [ECF No. 203].)
(1) Shots Striking Mattingly’s Truck
. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Stillwagon, a jury, could reasonably conclude that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Stillwagon for felonious assault based on the shots that struck Mattingly’s truck. Specifically, the jury could find that the officers had insufficient information suggesting that Stillwag-on knowingly attempted to cause Mattingly physical harm by means of a deadly weapon. 18
In concluding .that they .had probable cause to arrest Stillwagon for felonious assault, the officers relied 'heavily on Still-wagon’s interview statements. (See Se-gaard Dep. Vol. I at 141, 151 [ECF No.. 160-1].) But in his interview with Segaard and Gerke, Stillwagon repeatedly stated *747 that he was shooting at the truck, not Mattingly. (See, e.g., Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 19-21 [ECF No. 160-10]; . Still-wagon Interview Tr. 2 at 34-85 [ECF No. 160-11].) And various pieces of information supported this exculpatory assertion. Still-wagon described, for example, numerous instances when he easily could have shot Mattingly. (See, e.g., Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 21; Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 51-52.) Stillwagon, however, did not avail himself of any of those opportunities. Still-wagon described the efforts he took to distance himself from Mattingly and he described his attempt to shelter by the concrete pillar in the AutoZone parldng lot; these efforts evidenced Stillwagon’s reluctance to engage and, thus, that he did not knowingly attempt to harm Mattingly. (See, e.g., Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 9-21, 31; Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2.at 39.) And the bullet holes found in Mattingly’s truck (whose locations corresponded with Stillwagon’s interview statements on where he shot the truck) were situated in places far from where Mattingly was seated. (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 44-45.)
In support of their argument that the officers had probable cause to arrest Still-wagon, the Municipal Defendants point to State v. Weaver, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26591, 2016-Ohio-7984, ¶¶3-5 , 2016 WL 7077001 , a case in which an Ohio appellate court affirmed a defendant’s criminal conviction for felonious assault. In Weaver, police officers stopped the defendant after observing him shooting out of his car window at another vehicle. Id. ¶¶3-4. The defendant claimed to be acting in self-defense, and he insisted that he was only attempting to shoot the other vehicle’s tires. Id. ¶ 5. Although Weaver and the present- case share some similarities, the facts of the cases are distinct. The officers in Weaver observed the defendant firing his gun and presumably concluded that the defendant was not acting in self-defense or attempting to only shoot the other vehicle’s tires. See id. ¶ 3. There is also no discussion in Weaver of any evidence, aside from the defendant’s statement, that may have supported the assertion that the defendant was shooting at the other vehicle’s tires. See id, ¶¶ 3-12. Here, by contrast, no officers observed Stillwagon fire his pistol; instead, the officers relied on Stillwagon’s statement, which Segaard and Gerke found to.be credible. (See Segaard Dep. Vol. I at 130 [ECF No. 160-1]; Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 37.) And, unlike Weaver, Stillwagon’s assertion that he was not attempting to shoot Mattingly was bolstered by independent evidence—the location of the bullet holes, (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 44-45.) Weaver, in short, does not control here.
(2) Hand and Pistol Strike to Mattingly’s Head
A jury could also reasonably conclude that a reasonable police officer would have conclusively known that Stillwagon was acting in self-defense and that' probable cause to arrest him for felonious assault was, therefore, lacking regarding the blow Stillwagon delivered to Mattingly’s head using his hand and pistol. See Painter, 185 F.3d at 571 & n.21. 19
*748 To establish a claim of self-defense under Ohio law, the accused must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) he was not at fault in creating the violent situation, (2) he had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape was the use of force, and (3) that he did not violate any duty to retreat or avoid the danger. State v. Thomas, 77 Ohio St.3d 323 , 673 N.E.2d 1339 , 1342 (1997); State v. Williford, 49 Ohio St.3d 247 , 551 N.E.2d 1279, 1281 (1990). Self-defense also involves a proportionality requirement: the accused “is privileged to use that force which is reasonably necessary to repel the attack.” Williford, 551 N.E.2d at 1281 . Clarifying the second element of a self-defense claim, the Ohio Supreme Court has explained that courts analyzing an accused’s fear of imminent harm must apply a combined subjective and objective test. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d at 1345. “The person’s belief must be objectively reasonable under the circumstances, and he must subjectively believe he needed to resort to force to defend himself.” In re C.L., 197 Ohio App.3d 514 , 2011-Ohio-6892, ¶ 23 , 968 N.E.2d 34 (4th Dist.).
Based on Stillwagon’s detailed explanation of the incident and the Eagle’s Lodge security camera footage, a reasonable officer could have conclusively known that Stillwagon was not at fault in creating the confrontation with Mattingly. Stillwagon insisted that he took the actions he did because Mattingly had repeatedly tried to kill him. (See, e.g., Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 12, 21 [ECF No. 160-10].) Stillwagon informed the officers of Mattingly’s numerous unprovoked attacks. (See, e.g., id. at 9-21.) He described several instances in which he attempted to distance himself from Mattingly. (See, e.g., id.) And he described his attempt to take shelter near a concrete pillar in the parking lot—a maneuver recorded on the Eagles Lodge video. (Eagles Video at 15:31:02 to 15:31:13; Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 34-35 [ECF No. 160-11].) The bullet holes in Mattingly’s truck could, moreover, reinforce the conclusion that Stillwagon was not at fault in creating the confrontation. Their locations could suggest that Stillwagon was firing defensively—that is, attempting to disable the truck or send a message, not injure the truck’s driver.
A reasonable officer could have also conclusively known that Stillwagon had a bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that his only means of escape was the use of force. Stillwagon informed the officers that he was afraid for his life and that Mattingly had nearly killed him multiple times. (See, e.g., Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 9-21; Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 40 [ECF No. 160-11].) The Eagles Lodge video supported those statements, as it revealed Mattingly leaving the parking lot and then re-entering the lot and driving directly at Stillwagon. (Eagles Video at 15:31:17 to 15:31:31.) The presence of a baseball bat in Mattingly’s truck also bolsters the conclusion that Stillwagon’s fear for his life was objectively reasonable. Wielding a baseball bat, Mattingly could have seriously injured or killed Stillwagon even after the truck was disabled.
Based on much of the same information, a reasonable officer could have conclusively known that Stillwagon, in striking Mat-tingly on the head with his pistol, used only the amount of force reasonably necessary to repel Mattingly’s attacks. Stillwag-on told the officers that Mattingly had just tided to kill him and that he feared for his life. (See, e.g., Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 9 21; Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 40.) And the threat posed by Mattingly was evidenced by the baseball bat found in Mattingly’s truck (and brandished by Mat-tingly earlier in the encounter) and by the *749 Eagles Lodge video, which, as noted above, recorded Mattingly re-enter the parking lot and drive directly at Stillwag-on. (Eagles Video at 15:31:23 to 15:31:31.)
As to the final element, the parties dispute whether Stillwagon had a duty to retreat. The duty hinges on whether Still-wagon used “deadly force” in striking Mat-tingly on the head with his hand and pistol. See Williford, 551 N.E.2d at 1282 ; State v. Kucharski, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 20815, 2005-Ohio-6541, ¶ 19 , 2005 WL 3358860 . Under Ohio law, deadly force “means any force that carries a substantial risk that it will proximately result in the death of any person.” O.R.C. § 2901.01(A)(2). A substantial risk “means a strong possibility, as contrasted with a remote or significant possibility, that a certain result may occur.” Id. § 2901.01(A)(8).
A reasonable officer could have conclusively known that Stillwagon’s act of striking Mattingly on the head with his hand and pistol was not a utilization of deadly force. Stillwagon struck Mattingly on the head once. (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 51.) And the wound Mattingly suffered was minor. (-See Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4574 [ECF No. 160-4] (regarding Mattingly’s condition. Segaard “was advised that he had been talking and it was believed that he would recover”); Wil-lauer Dep. Vol. I at 98-99 [ECF No. 52-1] (acknowledging that Mattingly was reported to have only suffered a graze on his head); Willauer Dep. Vol. II at 129 [157-1] (stating that Mattingly was reported to be alert at the scene).)
However, even if Stillwagon used deadly force, a reasonable officer could have conclusively known that Stillwagon did not violate a duty to retreat. First, a reasonable officer could conclude that Stillwagon did not violate a duty to retreat when he entered the AutoZone parking lot and stopped by the concrete pillar. Stillwagon informed Segaard and Gerke of his efforts to distance himself from Mattingly on Route 42 and the William Street exit ramp. (See, e.g., Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 9-21; Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 39.) And, most pertinently, Stillwagon informed the officers that he drove to the pillar to use it as a shield against Mattingly’s .truck. (See, e.g., Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 20-22, 25-26, 28; Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 34, 49, 51.) Stillwagon’s fear that Mattingly might use the truck to attack him- again is vindicated by the Eagles Lodge video, which shows Mattingly enter the parking lot seconds before Stillwagon and promptly begin looping the truck around the pillar in way that could suggest Mattingly intended to continue pursuing Stillwagon. (See Eagles Video at 15:30:58 to 15:31:04.) And the video also vindicates Stillwagon’s fear when it shows Mattingly re-enter the parking lot and drive directly at Stillwag-on. (Id. 15:31:23 to 15:31:31.)
And second, a reasonable officer could also conclude that Stillwagon did not violate a duty to retreat, when he approached Mattingly. Stillwagon told the officers that the truck stopped in front of him when Mattingly veered off from his charge. (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 36.) Mattingly exited the truck with a hand down. (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 20.) Stillwagon’s fear that Mattingly might have a gun, (see Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 51), could justify his swift approach toward Mattingly, Ohio law only requires a person to retreat “if he has available a reasonable means of retreat from the confrontation.” Williford, 551 N.E.2d at 1282 (emphasis added). And retreating from, a person who had engaged in the conduct Mattingly had, and who might also have a gun, might not be reasonable.
When the evidence is viewed most favorably to Stillwagon, a jury could, in sum, reasonably conclude that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Stillwagon *750 for felonious assault. And consequently, the evidence produced by Stillwagon, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, shows that he was falsely arrested. The Court now moves to the second portion of the qualified immunity inquiry—whether the alleged unconstitutional actions violated a clearly established right.
b. Clearly Established Right
A right is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes if “the contours of the right at issue have been made sufficiently clear to give a reasonable official fair warning that the conduct at issue was unconstitutional.” Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600, 613 (6th Cir. 2015). “[WJhile a right may not be ‘clearly established’ at a ‘high level of generality’ or by broad historical assertions, neither must the specific conduct, at issue have been found unconstitutional for a reasonable officer to be on notice that the conduct is unconstitutional.” Id. at 615-16 . That is, fair warning does not require “ ‘a [prior] case directly on point’” or'even a prior case that is “ ‘fundamentally’ ” or “ ‘materially’ ” similar to the present case, as such a rule “would be too rigid an application of the clearly established inquiry.” Id. at 613 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 , 131 S.Ct. 2074 , 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 , 122 S.Ct. 2508 , 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002)).
Here, the contóurs of the right allegedly violated by the officers—freedom from arrest in the absence of probable cause—were sufficiently clear on the date in question to give a reasonable official fair warning that Stillwagon’s arrest was unconstitutional if made without probable cause. Sec Parsons v. City of Pontiac, 533 F.3d 492, 504 (6th Cir. 2008); see also Courtright v. City of Battle Creek, 839 F.3d 513, 520 (6th Cir, 2016) (“The constitutional right to ‘freedom from arrest in the absence of probable cause’ is clearly established within our circuit.” (quoting Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 428 (6th Cir. 2015))). Accordingly, a jury could reasonably conclude that the officers’ actions violated a clearly established right.
c. Objective Unreasonableness
In a final argument, the Municipal Defendants contend that even if the Court finds that the officers “should have conclusively determined that [Stillwagon] had acted in self-defense, [the officers’] error in any such determination would he in a gray area, not a clear transgression,” (Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 18.) The Municipal Defendants appear to argue, in other words, that the officers’ actions were not objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established right to be free of false arrest. See Parsons, 533 F.3d at 500 (explaining that the Sixth Circuit, in its qualified immunity analysis, occasionally considers “‘whether the plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to indicate that what the official allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly established constitutional rights’ ” (quoting Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 408 F.3d 305 , 311 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005))). This argument fails. For the same reasons that a jury could find that a reasonable officer would have conclusively' known that Still-wagon acted in self-defense, ¾ jury could also find that the officers’ decision to arrest Stillwagon was objectively unreasonable. See id. at 504.
Qualified immunity does not entitle Se-gaard, Willauer, Gerke, and Radabaugh to summary judgment on Stillwagon’s false arrest claim.
2. Stillwagon’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Although Stillwagon alleges that he was falsely arrested by Segaard, Willauer, Gerke, and .Radabaugh, Stillwagon only moves for summary judgment against Se- *751 gaard and Willauer. (PI.’ s First Mot. for Summ.- J. at 1 [ECF No. 205].) Stillwagon contends that the evidence supporting his false arrest claim is so one-sided that no jury could reasonably find in favor of the Municipal Defendants. (See id. at 75-76.) The Court disagrees.. . .
A jury could reasonably conclude that the officers had probable cause to believe that Stillwagon knowingly attempted to cause physical harm to another by means of a deadly weapon (i.e., committed felonious assault) when he fired the rounds that struck Mattingly’s truck. During his interview at the police station, Stillwagon told the officers several times that he was not trying to shoot Mattingly. At several points in the interview, however, Stillwag-on made ambiguous statements, which, when viewed in the light most favorable to the, Municipal Defendants, could suggest that Stillwagon was attempting to shoot Mattingly, not the truck. Stillwagon stated, for example: “He was coming right for me, I shot—I think I shot again right into his engine. I said, I’ll fucking kill you. And he went like this. Let’s see, he went in—I shot him—I shot at him right here he was coming right for me because my bike is— you guys know where the bike is. He was coming right for me in that fucking truck.” (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 20 [ECF No. 160-10].) As Stillwagon also informed the officers: “I jacked one [bullet] in when I pulled over at that gravel thing. When those people said, what are you going to do about it. I’m going to go up that road and see what’s wrong with that bastard. I, figured he was a farm kid, he had a big day and I was just going to go to Mt. Verijón, you know, to the cemetery.” (Id. at 23.)
A jury could also reasonably determine that the officers had probable cause to arrest Stillwagon for the blow he delivered to Mattingly’s head because a reasonable police officer might not have conclusively known that Stillwagon hit Mattingly on the head in self-defense.
Stillwagon informed the officers during Ms interview, for example, that he approached Mattingly after the. truck came to a stop in the AutoZone parking lot. (See Stillwagon Interview Tr, 1 at 20-22 [ECF No. 160-10].) A jury could find that this admission undercuts the first element in Stillwagon’s self-defense claim—that Still-wagon was not at fault, in creating the violent situation.
Stillwagon informed the officers that Mattingly had waved a bat during the events on the highway and that Mattingly might have had something in his hand when he exited the truck. (See Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 20, 29.) Given, however, that Stillwagon had not seen Mattingly with a gun (or some other projectile weapon), a jury could find that Stillwagon had not satisfied the second element in his self-defense claim—that he have an objectively reasonable belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.
' Viewed in the light'most favorable to the Municipal Defendants, the evidence could also show that a reasonable officer would have made the self-defense determination based on the assumption that Stillwagon shot Mattingly (rather than, or in addition to, striking Mattingly with his hand and pistol). A jury could arrive at this conclusion based on (i) paramedic statements overheard by some of the officers indicating that Mattingly had been grazed and (ii) Stillwagon’s acknowledgment in his interview that he did not know if he shot Mat-tingly in the head. (See Segaard Dep. Vol. I at 236-37 [ECF No. 160-1]; • Stillwagon Interview Tr. 2 at 32 [ECF No. 160-11]; Willauer Dep. Vol. II at 129-31 [ECF No. 157-1].)
Assuming Stillwagon shot Mattingly, Stillwagon would have had a duty to retreat, See O.R.C. § 2903.11(A); State v. *752 Dale, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 2012 CA 20, 2013-Ohio-2229, ¶ 15 , 2013 WL 2406261 . And based on Stillwagon’s admission that he approached Mattingly in the parking lot after the truck came to a stop, a jury could find that a reasonable police officer would not have conclusively known that Stillwag-on fulfilled his duty to retreat.
For these reasons, the Court denies Stillwagon’s request for summary judgment against Segaard and Willauer on the false arrest claim.
C. Malicious Prosecution under § 1983
Stillwagon and the Municipal Defendants have filed cross-motions for summary judgment on Stillwagon’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim. To prevail on that claim, a plaintiff must prove that “(1) the defendant made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiff; (2) there was no probable cause for the criminal prosecution; (3) as a consequence of the legal proceedings, the plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial arrest; and (4) the criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiffs favor.” Webb, 789 F.3d at 659 (citing Sykes, 625 F.3d at 308-09 ).
1. The Municipal Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
The Municipal Defendants request summary judgment on Stillwagon’s § 1983 malicious prosecution claim because (i) Defendants Segaard and Gerke are entitled to absolute immunity and (ii) each of the defendant officers is entitled to qualified immunity. (See Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. at 11-13,18-19 [EOF No. 203].)
a. Absolute Immunity
Defendants Segaard and Gerke have raised the affirmative defense of absolute immunity in relation to their grand jury testimony against Stillwagon. They insist that their absolute immunity entitles them to summary judgment on Stillwagon’s malicious prosecution claim.
i. Legal Background
As a general rule, when a plaintiff is arrested pursuant to a grand jury indictment, “ ‘the finding of an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.’” Webb, 789 F.3d at 660 (quoting Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 716 (6th Cir. 2006)); see Radvansky v. City of Olmsted Falls, 395 F.3d 291 , 307 n. 13 (6th Cir. 2005). Under Sixth Circuit precedent, a plaintiff could overcome this conclusive determination if he could establish that the “defendants knowingly or recklessly presented] false testimony to the grand jury to obtain the indictment.” Webb, 789 F.3d at 660 (citing Martin v. Maurer, 581 Fed.Appx. 509, 511 (6th Cir. 2014)).
This exception largely disappeared in 2012 when the United States Supreme Court held that a grand jury witness has absolute immunity from any § 1983 claim based on the witness’s testimony. Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 369 , 132 S.Ct. 1497 , 182 L.Ed.2d 593 (2012). 20 The immunity, the Court explained, could “not be circumvented by claiming that a grand jury witness conspired to present false testimony or by using evidence of the witnesses] testimony to support any other § 1983 claim concerning the initiation or maintenance of a prosecution. Were it oth *753 erwise, ‘a criminal defendant turned civil plaintiff could-simply reframe a claim to attack the preparation instead of the absolutely immune actions themselves.’” Id. (quoting Dykes v. Hosemann, 776 F.2d 942, 946 (11th Cir. 1985)). The Court clarified though that absolute immunity does not extend to all activity that a witness conducts outside of the grand jury room. Id. at 370 n. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1497 . A law enforcement official might be entitled to only qualified immunity if, for example, she “falsifies affidavits ... [or] fabricated] evidence concerning an unsolved crime.” Id.
The Sixth Circuit recently discussed Rehberg and the scope of absolute testimonial immunity in Sanders v. Jones, 845 F.3d 721, 727-35 (6th Cir. 2017), and King v. Harwood, 852 F.3d 568, 584-91 (6th Cir. 2017). The plaintiff in each case brought a malicious prosecution claim. And in each case, the defendant raised an absolute immunity defense. The cases are instructive because they illustrate “the thin but conspicuous line” between, on the one hand, a law enforcement officer who merely provides grand jury testimony, engages in related “ ‘preparatory activity, such as a preliminary discussion in which [he] relates the substance of his intended testimony,’ ” or conspires with prosecutors or other officers to testify falsely and, on the other hand, a law enforcement officer who either (1) “‘set[s] the wheels of government in motion by instigating a legal action’” or (2) “‘falsifies] affidavits’” or “ ‘fabricated] evidence concerning an unsolved crime.’” King, 852 F.3d at 584 (quoting Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 370 -71 & n. 1, 132 S.Ct. 1497 ). Sanders and King fell on different sides of the line.
In its analysis of Rehberg , the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed that the Supreme Court left the door open for at least some § 1983 claims against grand jury witnesses. Sanders, 845 F.3d at 734 . The door is not open wide though. Only in a limited set of circumstances may a plaintiff bring a § 1983 claim against a grand jury witness who has asserted absolute immunity. See King, 852 F.3d at 587-88 . “[T]he presumption that the grand-jury indictment is evidence of probable cause is rebuttable and not-eonclusive” where
(1) a law-enforcement officer, in the course of setting a prosecution in motion, either knowingly or recklessly makes false statements (such as in affidavits or investigative reports) or falsifies or fabricates evidence; (2) the false statements and evidence, together with any concomitant misleading omissions, are material to the ultimate prosecution of the plaintiff; and (3) the false statements, evidence, and omissions do not consist solely of grand-jury testimony or preparation for that testimony (where preparation has a meaning broad enough to encompass conspiring to commit perjury before the grand jury).
Id.
Segaard testified before the grand jury and is .therefore entitled to absolute immunity. (Segaard Dep. Vol. IV at 911 [ECF No. 199-1].) Gerke, on the other hand, has admitted that he did not testify before the grand jury. (Gerke Dep. Vol. II at 383 [ECF No. 184-1] (“I never testified,at trial or at Grand Jury, no.”).) Given this admission, Gerke is only protected by absolute immunity to the extent that he might have conspired with Segaard regarding Se-gaard’s testimony. See Rehberg, 566 U.S. at 369 , 132 S.Ct. 1497 . To determine whether Segaard and Gerke are entitled to summary judgment based on this absolute immunity, the Court must consider whether Stillwagon has produced evidence that would allow him to rebut the presumption of probable cause created by the grand jury indictment; See King, 852 F.3d at 587-88 .
*754 ii. Alleged Omissions, False Statements, and Fabricated Evidence
Stillwagon opposes summary judgment by arguing that his § 1983 claims are not based on grand jury testimony. (See Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 1-2, 15-16 [ECF No. 220].) According to Stillwagon, Segaard and Gerke knowingly or recklessly made false statements and falsified or fabricated evidence in the course of setting his prosecution in motion. (See Pl.’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 38-75 [ECF No. 205].) And he argues that this evidence was material.to the prosecution and does not consist solely of grand jury testimony or preparation for that testimony. (See id. Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. at 15-16.)
Stillwagon begins by identifying witnesses that Segaard allegedly concealed or attempted to influence with his own purportedly false comments.
• Tina Biekham witnessed Mattingly driving north in Route 42’s southbound lane; she was driving one of the vehicles forced off the road to avoid a collision with Mattingly’s truck. (See Biekham Call 'at 3-5 [ECF No. 162-3].) She spoke with Segaard the day after the incident and explained what she saw. (See id. at 2.) Segaard did not mention Bick-ham’s call in his October 5, 2012 Investigation Report or in the' Grand Jury Packet prepared that same day. (Segaard Dep. Vol. II at • 422-23 [ECF No. 162-1].) Nor did Segaard otherwise inform the prosecutors about Bickham’s call. (See id. at 422-25.)
• Kevin Cogan was also forced off the road when Mattingly used Route 42’s southbound lane to pass a-line of vehicles. (See Cogan Call at 4-8 [ECF No. 162-10].) Cogan spoke to Segaard about what he observed, (See id.) Stillwagon suggests that Se-gaard, in his phone conversation with Cogan, attempted to influence Cogan with false information, namely, that “there was definitely some kind of long road rage thing that had gone all the way from 33 all the way to Delaware from 42” and . that “they did this for ten miles.” (Id. at 9.)
• Ruth Sayre . witnessed ■ Mattingly chase and cut-in on Stillwagon on Route 42. (See Sayre Call at 4-5 [ECF No. 205-5].) She called Se-gaard to inform him that Mattingly’s story of having mechanical problems with his truck was likely untrue. (See id. at 5,11.) Stillwagon contends that Segaard hid Sayre’s observations, as she was not mentioned in his Investigation Report or . the Grand Jury Packet, and her name was not listed in the prosecution’s. discovery response to Stillwagon. (See Gov’t Disc. Resp. at 1-2 [ECF No. 199-9]; Segaard Investigation Report at Pa-geID 4573-91 [ECF No. 160-4], See generally Grand Jury Packet [ECF No. 160-4].) Stillwagon also suggests that Segaard may have attempted to influence Sayre -with false informa- • tion when he told her: “[I]t’s getting more and more clear that the victim wasn’t blameless as far as just the way this altercation'began. But we do have to—ultimately the other guy did end up shooting him so he ... he did take it too far.” (Sayre Call at 6.)
• And then there is Daniel Powell, who observed the events in the AutoZone parking lot and gave a statement to the police at the scene. (See Cruiser 66 Video at 15:40:53 to 15:41:12; Powell Dep. at 10, 22-23 [ECF No. 181-1].) In his statement at the scene, Powell described Mattingly leaving and re-entering the parking lot, and he described Stillwagon approaching and then hitting Mattingly *755 on the head with a gun, at which point the gun fired. (Cruiser 66 Video at 15:40:63 to 15:41:12.) Powell has since testified in a deposition taken for this case that he thought Mattingly “was going to try and run over Mr. Stillwagon.” (Powell Dep. at 31.) He has also testified that it “[l]ooked like [Stillwagon] was just trying to disable the vehicle.” (Id. at 29.) And as to the final shot fired. Powell has testified that Stillwagon “pistol whipped” Mattingly: “[Still-wagon] brought [the pistol] up kind of at an angle, and the barrel and everything was facing straight up, because I could see the muzzle flash go up.” (Id. at 22.) Segaard did not mention Powell, or Powell’s statement, in his Investigation Report. (See Segaard Investigation Report' at PagelD 4573-91.)
Stillwagon next identifies a 911 call that Segaard purportedly hid. When Stillwagon pulled off Route 42 near the intersection of Watkins/Moore Road, two motorists pulled off as well. ‘ (Stillwagon Interview Tr. 1 at 9, 12 [EOF No. 160-10].) Stillwagon had informed Segaard during his interview at the police station that he had asked the motorists to call 911. (Id. at 16.) Segaard told the prosecutors that he checked the Delaware communications center for -the call but did not find anything. (Jan. 30, 2017 Dumolt Email at 1 [EOF No. 199-7].) Stillwagon notes, however, that he found the purportedly nonexistent call, (see Incident Run Sheet at 1 [EOF No, 160-12]), during his review of the communication center’s records. (Pl.’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 44-45.)
Stillwagon identifies alleged false statements in an email Segaard sent to the Delaware County prosecutors two days after the incident. In the email, Segaard outlined the evidence in the case, some of which supported the government’s theory that Stillwagon acted as the aggressor and shot Mattingly, and some of which contradicted the theory. (See Oct. 2, 2012 Se-gaard Email at 1-2 [ECF No. 199-10].) Regarding the Eagles Lodge video, Se-gaard stated:
Really good thing—the shooting of Mat-tingly himself is actually caught on video. The downside is that the camera is very far away. But you can still see it. I am pretty sure that BCI can probably make it a lot better. I put a magnifying glass on my screen and I could see Stillwagon take a shooting stance at least three times. Twice he fired into the passenger window of the truck. Once from the rear bumper after Mattingly had exited the truck.
(Id. at 2.) But as Stillwagon explains, the Eagles Lodge video does not show Still-wagon taking a, scooting stance near the truck’s rear bumper. (See Pl.’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 57-60; Eagles Video at 15:31:31 to 15:31:43.) And Segaard, despite viewing thé .video multiple times and at various magnifications during his deposition, admitted that he is unable to identify the moment in the video where Stillwagon allegedly stops and takes a shooting stance near the rear bumper. (See Segaard Dep. Vol. IV at 884-91 [EOF No. 199-1].)
Stillwagon identifies numerous purported falsehoods and alleged misleading omissions in Segaard’s Investigation Report.
• Segaard, as noted above, omitted any reference to Bickham or Sayre in the Investigation report. (See Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4573-91.)
• Segaard offered a purportedly false description of the Eagles Lodge video: he describes the video as showing Still-wagon “take[ ] a shooting stance, partially behind the taillight,” (Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4588), even though Segaard was unable to identify during his deposition the point in the *756 video where Stillwagon allegedly-stopped and took the shooting stance. (See Segaard Dep. Vol. IV at 884-91.)
• Segaard asserted that Stillwagon “fired and struck Mattingly in the head” while Stillwagon was “partially behind the taillight,” (Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4588), despite various pieces of evidence showing that Mattingly was not shot, including the nature of the wound, the absence of any shell casings near the truck, Stillwagon’s insistence that he physically hit Mattingly, the presence of an empty shell casing in Stillwagon’s pistol, and the presence of a reddish residue on the pistol’s rear sight. (See Pl.’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 57-61.)
• Segaard omitted Mattingly’s admission that his backup lights might have come on after he stopped his truck on the exit ramp. (See Segaard Dep. Vol. II at 515 [ECF No. 162-1]; Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4573-91.)
• And Segaard wrote: “I was also informed that Stillwagon had already confessed to shooting Mattingly, to Officer Ailes.” (Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4574.) Ailes, however, has subsequently acknowledged that Stillwagon was not suggesting in his parking lot statements that he had shot Mattingly. (See Ailes Dep. Vol. II at 270 [ECF No. 156-1]; see also Ailes Cruiser Audio Tr. at 4 [ECF No. 156-3].)
Segaard also allegedly mischaracterized in the Investigation Report various statements Stillwagon made during his interview at the police station.
• Segaard wrote that Stillwagon “described a series of times where he and Mattingly had passed each other, in an aggressive way,” (Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4578), although Se-gaard now acknowledges that “[n]one of the witnesses that came forward described anything other than the aggressive truck.” (Segaard Dep. Vol. Ill at 691 [ECF No. 164-1].)
• Segaard allegedly failed to mention Mattingly’s re-entry to the roadway at Section Line Road (the “ambush,” as Stillwagon refers to it). (See Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4576.) Instead, Segaard wrote, “[Stillwagon] continued his story and picked it up at a point where the truck had been behind him again. His description became somewhat jumbled and then he recounted locating Mattingly at the red light where US 42 merges with US 23.” (Id.)
• Segaard suggested that Stillwagon “[caught] up with Mattingly on the exit ramp, intentionally.” (Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4589.) Segaard purportedly ignores, however, that Mat-tingly made a sharp turn from the passing lane onto the exit ramp after Still-wagon had already entered the exit lane. (PL’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 50-51; see Segaard Investigation Report at Pa-gelD 4589.)
• Segaard averred that Stillwagon had fired the shots on the exit ramp from 20 to 30 feet behind Mattingly’s truck, (see Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4589), despite the fact that the shell casings had been found 140 to 160 feet from the end of the ramp. (See Exit Ramp Diagram at 1 [ECF No. 160-13]; Exit Ramp Photo at 1 [ECF No. 199-5].)
• And Segaard wrote that Stillwagon admitted to “followpng]” Mattingly into the AutoZone parking lot. (Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4576.) Se-gaard purportedly fails to mention though that Stillwagon had waited at the light at the end of the exit ramp, that Mattingly had stopped on William Street, and that Stillwagon drove directly to the concrete pillar rather than follow the path taken by Mattingly in the *757 parking lot. (Pl.’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 54-55; ■ see Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4576.)
Stillwagon notes that a reddish residue on the rear sights of his pistol was present in a photograph taken of the pistol at the crime scene but was never mentioned in Segaard’s paperwork in the criminal case. (Pl.’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 61-62.)
Stillwagon identifies a purported false statement on the cover page of the Grand Jury Packet—that the case ■ involved “a more than 10 mile, mutual ‘road rage’ incident” in which “James Stillwagon discharged a firearm at Richard Mattingly’s vehicle, before ultimately shooting him in the head.” (Grand Jury Packet at PagelD 4559 [ECF No. 160-4] (emphasis added).) Segaard later admitted in his deposition that he should not have used the word “mutual.” (Segaard Dep. Vol. Ill at 673.)
Stillwagon identifies two alleged misrepresentations in the Grand Jury Synopsis PowerPoint. First, in slides purporting to illustrate the exit ramp incident, Segaard placed Stillwagon’s motorcycle north of the second turn arrow painted on the ramp. (Grand Jury Synopsis at 23-26 [ECF No. 165-1].) As Segaard later admitted, Still-wagon’s true location was south of the second turn arrow and, thus, farther from the truck than Segaard had indicated. (See Segaard Dep. Vol. IV at 873.) Second, a slide describing Stillwagon’s purported statements to Officer Ailes states: “Truck was ‘dead stopped’ on US 23 off-ramp.” (Grand Jury Synopsis at 57.) The cruiser camera video, however, records Stillwagon saying “I was a dead stop.” (Ailes Cruiser Audio Tr. at 4 (emphasis added).)
Stillwagon points to Segaard and Gerke’s purported effort to manipulate Mattingly into fabricating his story of the incident. (See Pl.’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 66-69.) After listening to Mattingly’s initial, unconvincing, description of the incident, the officers allegedly pressured Mattingly to fabricate (i) his being shot in the head from a distance and (ii) an explanation for why he re-entered the AutoZone parking lot that would fit with the narrative of him being the frightened victim. (See id.; see also, e.g., Mattingly Interview Tr. 1 at 39, 64 [ECF No. .155-5] (Segaard: “Yeah. Blows my mind. I don’t know why you [re-entered the parking lot] and I’m trying to—I was hoping you could help me understand.”) (Segaard: “[I]f you’re talking to the news, what you should focus on is how sore you are. how much it hurt getting shot.”); Mattingly Interview Tr. 2 at 13, 16-17, 41, 43, 79 [ECF Nos. 184-3, 184-4] (Gerke: “Let’s not forget the fact that your truck is shot to hell and you were shot in the head. Do you understand that?”) (Gerke: “Start at the gas station and carry us. to AutoZone when you got shot in the fucking head.”) (Gerke: “Dude, you got shot in the head. Your truck is shot to shit. I mean, let’s not overlook that. You re the victim here,”) (Segaard,: “[T]he defense team is going to' say, my client says that he hit you with the gun, he didn’t shoot you. He was just mad and he punched you. Minor assault. You’re going to say, no, he shot me,”) (Gerke: “Could the behavior of your driving ... be you pulled into the parking lot, you didn’t see him, and you did another loop and said maybe I shouldn’t be going back just in case he’s still there?”),) ,
Lastly, Stillwagon argues that Segaard presented the prosecutors' with witness statements that Segaard knew to be false. (See Pl.’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 69-75.) Chris Linkous, William Brown, and Susan Orcena all gave statements on what they purportedly saw in the AutoZone parking lot. (See id.) The statements, however, were each contradicted in critical ways by the Eagles Lodge video, which Segaard had viewed. (See id.) And, in his Investigation Report, Segaard purportedly misrepresented the content of those wit *758 ness statements to make them seem consistent with one another and the other evidence in the case. (Pl.’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 69-75; see Segaard Investigation Report at PagelD 4683-91.)-
iii. Analysis
The Municipal Defendants contend" that even if Segaard and Gerke omitted information, made false statements, or fabricated evidence, their conduct falls within the scope of Segaard’s absolute immunity, (See Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s First Mot. for Summ. J. at 18 n.4 [ECF No. 216]; Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of Mot.-for Summ. J. at 7-10, 16 [ECF No. 233].) In support of this argument, the Municipal Defendants point to the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Sanders v, Jones. ' - -
In Sanders , several pieces of evidence known to the defendant, Lamar Jones, süggested that Amy Sanders was not' the drug dealer identified by a confidential informant. See Sanders, 845 F.3d at 723-25 . Nonetheless, Jones prepared, and forwarded to the prosecutor’s office, a police report that, according to Sanders, falsely identified her as a drug dealer. See id. at 723-25, 730 . Jones did not discuss the report with anyone from" the prosecutor’s office until the morning of the grand jury. Id. at 724-26 . Reading directly from the police report for most of his grand jury testimony, Jones testified that Sanders was the drug dealer. See id. at 725 . Sanders was indicted. Id. The charges against her were eventually dismissed- though due to misidentification. Id.
The Sixth Circuit held that Jones was entitled to summary judgment on Sanders’s malicious prosecution claim. Sanders, 845 F.3d at 735 . As the court explained, although Rehberg did not provide Jones absolute immunity for his police report, the police report standing alone could not rebut the grand jury’s finding of probable cause. Id. at 733. That is because “false.,statements in a police report or made to a prosecutor cannot, on their own, be "material to the grand jury’s finding of probable cause.” Id. at 732. Rehberg , in other, words, “effectively defeated] Sanders’s malicious prosecution claim based on the alleged false police report because she [could not] -overcome the presumption of probable cause without using Jones’s absolutely immune grand jury testimony.” Id. at733.
• The circumstances- in 'Sanders bear some similarities to those present here. Most notably, both Sanders and Stillwagon have argued that an officer’s investigation report contained false information. Still-wagon’s malicious prosecution claim against Segaard and Gerke is, however, not controlled by the outcome ih Sanders .
Less than three months after issuing Sanders , the Sixth Circuit explained in King v. Harwood that the presumption of probable cause created by a grand jury indictment is rebuttable, and not conclusive, in a limited set of circumstances (listed earlier). See King, 852 F.3d at 587-88 . The evidence produced by Stillwagon fits within this 'limited set of circumstances.
Stillwagon has created a genuine issue of material fact on whether Segaard and Gerke, -in the course of setting Still-wagon’s prosecution in motion, either knowingly or recklessly made false statements or. falsified or fabricated evidence. See King, 852 F.3d at 591 . When viewed in the light most favorable to Stillwagon, the evidence, shows that Segaard and Gerke initiated Stillwagon’s -prosecution, Segaard directed Willauer to prepare and file felonious assault charges, and Gerke may have participated in the decision to charge Still-wagon. The evidence, viewed most favorably, also shows that'Segaard knowingly or recklessly made false statements in his Investigation- Report, in an email communication with prosecutors, in the Grand Jury Packet, and -in the Grand Jury Syn *759 opsis PowerPoint. And the evidence, viewed most-favorably, shows that Segaard and Gerke knowingly or recklessly falsified or fabricated evidence when they purportedly attempted to manipulate Mattingly’s testimony and when Segaard conversed with witnesses on the phone.
The evidence produced by Stillwagon also creates a question for the jury on whether this alleged false and fabricated evidence, together with the purported misleading omissions in Segaard’s Investigation Report and other investigative materials, were material to Stillwagon’s prosecution. See King, 852 F.3d at 591 . The Municipal Defendants contend that the purported omissions and alleged false and fabricated evidence were not material to. the prosecution because Stillwagon’s own admissions created probable cause for his arrest and prosecution. As the Court explained in its discussion of the false arrest claim though, a jury could reasonably conclude that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest Stillwag-on. And as the Court explains below, a jury could also reasonably conclude that there was no probable cause for Stillwag-on’s prosecution. When viewed in the light most favorable to Stillwagon, the purported omissions and alleged false and fabricated evidence were material to the prosecution, as they (i) manufactured support for the theory that Stillwagon shot Mattingly in the head from a distance; (ii) inaccurately suggested that Stillwagon was attempting to shoot Mattingly rather than the truck; and (iii) undercut Still-wagon’s assertion of self-defense.
And a question for the jury exists on whether the purported omissions and alleged false and fabricated evidence consist solely of grand jury testimony or preparation for that testimony. See King, 852 F.3d at 591 . Most of the alleged false statements come from Segaard’s Investigation Report; several statements come from the Grand Jury Packet and the Grand Jury Synopsis PowerPoint;. and one- statement comes from an email Segaard sent to the Delaware County prosecutors. The Municipal Defendants contend that each of these documents was made in preparation for Segaard’s grand jury t

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7245191. Public record. Not legal advice.