# Abila v. Funk

> District Court, D. New Mexico · November 23, 2016 · 220 F. Supp. 3d 1121

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7240844

## Case

- **Full name:** George ABILA v. Shawn FUNK Lezlie Duckett Kay Youngman and Todd Bannister
- **Court:** District Court, D. New Mexico
- **Decided:** November 23, 2016
- **Citations:** 220 F. Supp. 3d 1121; 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162474; 2016 WL 7242731
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Jamesbrowning
- **Judges:** Browning, James
- **Cited by:** 4 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7240844

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “a pretrial detainee can prevail by showing that jailor’s actions were not rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive governmental purpose, or that the actions appear excessive in relation to that purpose”

## Opinion text

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
James 0. Browning, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on: (i) the Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment for Inhumane Conditions of Confinement, filed September 6, 2016 (Doc. 156)(“MSJ”); and (ii) the County Defendants’ Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. 1 — Dismissal of Plaintiffs Substantive Due Process Claims, filed September 9, 2016 (Doc. 162)(“Defendants’ MSJ”). The Court held a hearing on October 25, 2016. The primary issue is whether, as a matter of law, Defendant Shawn Funk, the warden at Eddy County Detention Center, and Defendant Todd Bannister, the health and services administrator in charge of medical , and mental health care at Eddy County Detention Center, violated Plaintiff George Abila’s rights to substantive due process protected by the Constitution of the United States of America, when — for more than six months — Funk and Bannister housed Abila in a small padded cell with no furnishings, no clothing, constant lighting, cold blowing air, and only a grated hole in the floor to use as a toilet. The Court concludes that, from January ' 3, 2012, until June 21, 2012, the time period following Abila’s return from the hospital after having attempted suicide, and during which Abila did not make any overt suicide attempts, the squalid conditions of Abila’s padded cell, combined with Abila’s lack of exercise and reception of only some, undocumented recreation, amounts to shockingly inhumane living conditions. These conditions were not rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive purpose, and the imposition of these conditions amounted to punishment and violated Abila’s clearly established substantive due-process right to be confined in an environment that does *1132 not result in degeneration, or otherwise threaten his mental and physical well-being. Accordingly, the Court grants Abila’s MSJ, which seeks judgment only as to that timeframe. The Court thus denies the Defendants’ MSJ as it relates to that same time frame. In addition, because the Court determines that there are genuine issues of material fact pertaining to Abila’s confinement before January 3, 2012, precluding it from entering summary judgment in relation to that time frame, the Court will deny the Defendants’ MSJ in its entirety.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Abila, and Funk and Bannister, have filed Motions for Summary Judgment. See MSJ; Defendants’ MSJ. Funk and Bannister specifically incorporate the undisputed material facts that they proffer in the Defendants’ MSJ as part of their response to Abila’s MSJ. See County Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment for Conditions of Confinement ¶¶ 1-2, at 2, filed September 26, 2016 (Doc. 172)(“Re-sponse”). Abila, in his Reply to Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs Motion and Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment for Inhumane Conditions of Confinement ¶ 3, at 3, filed October 12, 2016 (Doc. 182)(“Reply”), does not specifically dispute the proffer of undisputed material facts that Funk and Bannister make in Defendants’ MSJ and incorporate into their Response. In this scenario, however, the Court deems it appropriate to credit the arguments Abila makes in the Plaintiffs Response to Defendants’ Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. 1 — Dismissal of Plaintiffs Substantive Due Process Claims, filed October 7, 2016 (Doc. 174)(“Response to Defendants’ MSJ”). Further, because the Response to Defendants’ MSJ proffers its own additional facts, to which Funk and Bannister respond in the County Defendants’ Reply in Support of Amended Motion for Partial Summary Judgment No. 1 — Dismissal of Plaintiffs Substantive Due Process Claims, filed October 21, 2016 (Doc. 186)(“Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ”), the Court also deems it appropriate to credit the arguments that Funk and Bannister make in the Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ. 1 As a result, the Court cannot completely consider Abila’s MSJ in the abstract of Defendants’ MSJ, and thus presents the following undisputed material facts drawn from the arguments made pursuant to both motions.
Abila was booked at Eddy County Detention Center in Carlsbad, New Mexico, on August 8, 2011, and housed in general population. See MSJ ¶¶ 1-2, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶¶ 1-2, at 2 (not disputing this fact); Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 1, at 2 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 1, at 4 (not disputing this fact). About a month later, on September 6, 2011, Abila swallowed a razor blade. See MSJ ¶ 3, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶ 3, at 2 (not disputing this fact); Defendants’ MSJ ¶2, at 2 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶2, at 4 (not disputing this fact). He remained in general population until October *1133 24, 2011. See Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 1, at 2 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 1, at 4 (not disputing this fact). 2 On October 24, 2011, Abila cut his arms with a razor blade in a suicide attempt and needed stitches at the hospital. See MSJ ¶ 4, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶¶4, at 2 (not disputing this fact); Defendants’ MSJ ¶4, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶4, at 4 (not disputing this fact). Abila was hostile with medical staff at the hospital and continued to threaten suicide. See Defendants’ MSJ ¶4, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶4, at 4 (not disputing this fact). Although housed in “segregation” after the incident — and placed on a watch for his own safety, see Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 4, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 4, at 4 (not disputing this fact) — on November 12, 2011, Abila again cut his arms, and needed medical attention and stitches at the Carlsbad Medical Center in Carlsbad, New Mexico. 3 “Abila claimed he had managed to find and cut himself with a sharp piece of metal, despite the restrictions on what he could have in the segregation cell.” Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 8, at 3 (setting forth this fact). See Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶8, at 5 (not disputing this fact). After he had cut his arms, “Abila resisted staffs attempts to save him, guarding his arms and refusing to allow them to staunch the bleeding.” Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 9, at 3 (setting forth this fact). See Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 9, at 5 (not disputing this fact).
*1134 Upon return to Eddy County Detention from the hospital, Captain Mike Ingram ordered Abila to be housed in a padded cell. See MSJ ¶ 7, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶7, at 2 (not disputing this fact). Padded cell 166, where Abila was housed, “had no furnishings, no sink, no mattress, and only a grated hole in the floor in which he was to defecate and urinate.” MSJ ¶ 8, at 3 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶ 8, at 2 (not disputing this fact). During his transport into padded cell 166, Abila fought with staff and, in the process, blood was sprayed onto an officer’s face. 4 Abila had pulled out his stitches, and thus he was again taken to the hospital. See MSJ ¶ 9,. at 3 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶ 9, at 2 (not disputing this fact); Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 12, at 4 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 12, at 5 (not disputing this fact).
Upon Abila’s return to Eddy County Detention, Bannister ordered that Abila be placed in a restraint chair. See MSJ ¶ 10, at 4 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶ 10, at 2 (not disputing this fact); Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 13, at 4 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 13, at 5 (not disputing this fact). Abila pulled off his bandages before he was placed into the restraint chair. See Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 13, at 4 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 13, at 5 (not disputing this fact), 5 Abila’s wounds began to bleed again as staff struggled to reband-age him and restrain him- in the chair. See Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 14, at 4 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 14, at 5 (not disputing this fact). During the struggle Abila threatened to hurt the staff when he got out of his restraints. See Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 15, at 4 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 15, at 5 (not disputing this fact). At 2:45 p.m. on November 18, 2011 — he had been released from the hospital on November 13, 2011 — Ingram and codefendant Kay *1135 Youngman, mental health nurse, agreed to downgrade Abila to a fifteen-minute “emotionally upset” watch. 6 At 5:45 p.m. that day, Abila bit a chunk of flesh out of his own arm and required bandaging. See Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 19, at 5 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 19, at 6 (not disputing this fact). In addition, later that day, Abila attempted to choke himself using his dinner and, after staff attended to him and stopped the choking, Bannister ordered that Abila be sedated. 7
Abila “was put into a restraint chair in padded cell 166,’ then remained in some kind of restraint continuously in the padded cell for ninetéen days.” MSJ ¶ 11, at 4 (setting forth this fact). 8 Abila’s wrists de *1136 veloped sores from the restraints, causing Eddy County Detention Sergeant Carrie Patterson to email Funk a plea for help requesting that the restraints be loosened. See MSJ ¶¶ 12-13, at 4 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶¶ 12-13, at 3 (not disputing this fact). Funk denied Patterson’s request; “almost everything [Patterson] asked for [Abila] was a no.” MSJ ¶ 14, at 4 (setting forth this fact)(first alteration in original)(second alteration added). See Response ¶14, at 3 (not disputing this fact). “On November 18, twice on November 21 and twice on November 22, 2011, mental health staff from CHC (now CCS), ECDC’s contract mental health service provider, checked on Abila.” Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 21, at 5 (setting forth this fact). 9 On November 22, 2011, Abila struck himself in his head with his suicide restraint belt. See Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 22, at 5 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶22, at 7 (not disputing this fact). 10 The following day, Abila began slamming his head into the wall until he bled. See Defendants’ MSJ 1123, at 5 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 23, at 7 (not disputing this fact). At this point, “Sgt. Sarah Santana alerted a nurse, [and] then entered Abila’s cell with a protective helmet.” Defendants MSJ ¶ 24, at 5 (setting forth this fact). See Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 24, at 7 (not disputing this fact). While Santana was putting the pro *1137 tective helmet onto Abila, Abila charged at “Sgt. Voldahl,” who “didn’t like Plaintiff and would often do things to upset him on purpose.” 11
Abila was removed from Padded Cell 166 into “segregation” on December 6, 2011. Defendants’ MSJ ¶26, at 6 (setting forth this fact). See Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 26, at 8 (not disputing this fact). On December 24, 2011, Abila, while in his cell, swallowed screws and plastic. See MSJ ¶ 15; at 4 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶ 15, at 3 (not disputing this fact); Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 27, at 6 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶27, at 8 (not disputing this fact). Abila was put on a fifteen-minute watch— instead of being immediately taken to the hospital — per orders that Bannister made over the telephone, until Abila started coughing up blood and was transported to the hospital. See MSJ ¶¶ 16, 17, at 4 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶¶ 16-17, at 3 (not disputing this fact); Defendants’ MSJ ¶28, at 6 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ 1127, at 8 (not disputing this fact). Abila’s extensive confinement in segregation could have contributed to his desire to harm himself. See MSJ ¶ 18, at 4(setting forth this fact); Reply ¶ 18, at 4 (restating this fact). 12
Abila remained at the hospital until January 3, 2012, and, upon his return to Eddy County Detention, he was placed in padded cell 169. See MSJ ¶ 19, at 5 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶ 19, at 4 (not disputing this fact). 13 Padded cell 169 *1138 measured “5 feet, five inches by 7 feet, 7 inches,” and did not have furnishings, a sink, a mattress, or a toilet, and contained only a grated hole in the floor for Abila’s urination and defecation. MSJ ¶¶ 20-21, at 5 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶¶ 20-21, at 4 (not disputing this fact). Funk ordered that “Inmate Abila is to have the following items only!!! ... 1. Green suicide suit 2. Green suicide blanket 3. Regular meals served in a rubber security tray, rubber cup, and rubber spork to be picked up 30 minutes after he is initially served his meals.” MSJ ¶ 22 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶ 22 (not disputing this fact); Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 31, at 6 (referencing . this fact). 14 Accordingly, Abila had only those items and was often left completely nude in his cell. See MSJ ¶ 23, at 5 (setting forth this fact). 15 Funk also *1139 mandated that Abila “would use the toilet in the cell he was currently in.” MSJ ¶ 24, at 5 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶24, at 5 (not disputing this fact). That “toilet” was a grated hole in the floor that needed to be flushed from the outside and, given the grate, was “difficult to get feces ... through the hole in[to] the ground.” MSJ ¶¶ 25-26, at 6 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶¶ 25-26, at 6 (not disputing this fact). Sometimes the “bowel movements would stay on top of the grate.” Response ¶27, at 5 (setting forth this fact). 16 The “toilet would have to be flushed several times to completely clear the contents.” Response ¶28, at 5 (setting forth this fact). See MSJ ¶ 28, at 6 (not disputing this fact). 17 Abila was forced to eat in close proximity to the grated hole. See MSJ ¶29, at 6 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶ 29, at 5 (not disputing this fact). Furthermore, because there was no sink in his cell, Abila would eat without sanitizing his hands. See MSJ ¶ 30, at 6 (setting forth this fact). 18 Funk even wrote in an email to staff that “[i]f [Abila] receives anything other than what has been authorized by this memo the cameras will be reviewed and the person or persons giving him the unauthorized items will receive disciplinary action up to and including termination.” MSJ ¶ 31, at 6-7 (setting forth this fact). *1140 See Response ¶ 31, at 6 (not disputing this fact).
Abila was then ordered to stay in padded cell 169 for the duration of his detention at Eddy County Detention. See MSJ ¶32, at 7 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶ 32, at 6 (not disputing this fact). Funk and Bannister were involved in a collaborative decision to keep Abila in padded cell 169 for the remainder of his time at Eddy County Detention. See MSJ at 12 (setting forth this fact). 19 Funk “knew it was against ECDC policy to house an inmate in a padded cell without a written order from a physician.” MSJ ¶ 34, at 7 (setting forth this fact). 20 A physician, Kim Lark, had contracted with Eddy County Detention and could write that requisite order. See MSJ ¶35, at 7 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶ 35, at 7 (not disputing this fact). Lark was not contacted “regarding any order to place Plaintiff in the padded cell.” MSJ ¶ 36, at 7 (setting forth this fact). 21 “Defendant Funk understood it was in violation of ECDC policy to create a standing, or PRN 22 order for an inmate to be housed in therapeutic seclusion.” MSJ *1141 ¶ 37, at 7 (setting forth this fact). 23 “[Ljeaving an inmate in a padded cell for the length of time Plaintiff was subjected was inhumane,” and the decision to house Abila in the “padded cell for such an extended period of time was tragic .... ” MSJ ¶¶ 38-39, at 8 (setting forth this fact). 24
From January 3, 2012, until June 21, 2012, Youngman “saw Abila over eighty times and stated in every record she created that Abila remained a suicide risk.” Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 34, at 7 (setting forth this fact). 25 Abila “received medication from the mental health staff in hopes of rehabilitating him, but in April, 2012, he began to hoard the medication and CHC had to discontinue it.” Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 35, at 7 (setting forth this fact). 26 Young-man “never wrote a note recommending that security staff move Abila from the padded cell.” Defendants’ MSJ ¶36, at 7 (setting forth this fact). 27 If Youngman had engaged in a conversation about moving Abila from the padded cell, she would have made a record of it. See Defendants’ MSJ ¶37, at 7 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 37, at 10 (not disputing this fact). 28 The contract health *1142 care service provider, “CHC,” and its employees “were required by their contract with the jail to ‘identify to the Warden those members of the jail population with medical or mental health conditions which may be worsened as a result of being incarcerated at the jail.” Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 38, at 7 (setting forth this fact). See Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 38 (not disputing this fact). Youngman “never identified Abila as a member of the jail population who needed to be .moved from his conditions for his mental health.” Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 39, at 7 (setting forth this fact). 29
“[I]n the nine years [Eddy County Detention guard Christine Gallegos] had been at the jail, she had never seen any other inmate stay in the padded cell for a longer time than Plaintiff.” MSJ ¶ 40, at 8 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶ 40, at 40 (not disputing this fact). Additionally,
[n]ow that Eddy County Detention guard Jeannie Santana actually knew how long [Abila] was in there, that’s terrible.... Because a padded cell is not a very comfortable place to be. And for that length of time, without communication with other inmates and somewhere to stretch out and walk around and watch TV, all that, that’s terrible.
MSJ ¶ 41, at 8 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶41, at 8 (not disputing this fact). Patterson indicated that the “Plaintiffs treatment in the padded cell ‘[made her] feel bad for him. He went through a lot in there.” MSJ ¶ 42, at 8 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶42, at 8 (not disputing this fact).
Abila stayed in padded cell 169 from January 3, 2012, until June 21, 2012. See MSJ ¶43, at 8 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶43, at 8 (not disputing this fact); Defendants’ MSJ ¶40, at 7-8 (setting forth this fact); Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 40, at 11-12 (not disputing this fact. 30 Padded cell 169 “was uncom *1143 fortably cold and smelled horrible, as the smell of feces would come up from the hole in the floor and permeated the walls of the padded cell.” MSJ ¶ 44, at 9 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶44, at 8 (not disputing this fact). The “Plaintiff had been complaining that the air conditioner was constantly blowing cold air on him.” MSJ ¶ 45, at 9 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶45, at 8 (not disputing this fact). For that period of time from January 3, 2012, until June 21, 2012, when he was in the padded cell, Eddy County Detention staff kept a watch log about- Abila. See MSJ ¶46, at 9 (setting forth this fact); Response' ¶ 46, at 8 (not disputing this fact).
With respect to the watch log, if Abila was “removed from his cell for recreation, that movement would be noted on the watch logs ....” MSJ ¶47, at 9 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶47, at 8 (not disputing this fact). 31 According to *1144 those watch logs, Abila received no exercise for 159 days — although, he did receive some amount of undocumented recreation in the form of television, reading on a bench, and card games. See MSJ ¶¶ 48-49, at 9 (setting forth this fact). 32
Further, Patterson “would often ask Defendant Funk and Chief of Security Michael Ingram if she could allow Plaintiff recreation, but the response was ‘always [ ] no, no, no, tomorrow, next week, next week.’ ” MSJ ¶ 50, at 9 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶ 50, at 9 (not disputing this fact). Patterson let Abila out of his cell once during his detention and was disciplined. See MSJ ¶ 51, at 10 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶ 51, at 9 (not disputing this fact). It was Funk’s responsibility to ensure that inmates were allowed out for recreation. See MSJ ¶ 52, at 10 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶ 52, at 9 (not disputing this fact). On one occasion, Ingram told Patterson, in response to her request to take Abila out for recreation, that “he ain’t going to get shit and don’t be kissing the inmate[’]s ass.” MSJ ¶ 53, at 10 (setting forth this fact). 33
Abila “contested his confinement in the padded cell and asked Defendant Funk why he could not be moved to another cell.” MSJ ¶ 54, at 10 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶ 54, at 10 (not disputing this fact). In response, Funk told Abila that he would “remain in the padded cell ‘until [he could] comply with any and all lawful orders and directions and when [he could] treat staff with the same respect [he was] given.” MSJ ¶ 53, at 10 (setting forth this fact). 34 Funk understood that Eddy *1145 County Detention’s policy on padded cell use prevented staff from using the padded cell “to try to change the way they’re acting if they’re not being a physical threat of harm to themselves or others.” MSJ ¶ 56, at 10 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶56, at 10 (not disputing this fact).
Abila’s “healthcare in ECDC was conspicuously inadequate, and inhumane.” Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 1, at 2 (setting forth this fact). See Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ ¶1, at 1-2 (not disputing this fact). 35 Bannister was not bothered that Abila had been in his cell for six months with the lights on for twenty-four hours a day. MSJ ¶¶ 57-58, at 11 (setting forth this fact). See Response ¶¶ 57-58, at 10 (not disputing this fact). Bannister was also not bothered, under the circumstances, by the fact that Abila had not stepped outside for six months. See Response ¶ 59, at 10 (setting forth this fact). 36 Further, in hindsight, Bannister would not do anything differently, and he would “make the same decision again about Plaintiffs housing.” MSJ ¶¶ 60-61 (setting this fact forward). See Response ¶¶ 60-61 (not disputing this fact). Abila suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder. See Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 8, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 8, at 4 (not disputing this fact). Bannister is an author of the Eddy County Detention’s policies that were based on the National Commission on Correctional Healthcare standards regarding the use of restraints and seclusion. See MSJ ¶ 62, at 12 (setting forth this fact); Response ¶62, at 10 (not disputing this fact). 37
*1146 In sum, Abila was housed in a small, “41 square foot padded cell, with no furnishings, no sink, and only a grated hole in the floor for urination and defecation.” MSJ at 12 (setting forth this fact as a core undisputed fact). 38 See Response at 11 (not disputing this fact). Abila was housed in padded cell 169, in particular, from January 3, 2012, through June 21, 2012. See MSJ at 12 (setting forth this fact as a core undisputed fact); Response at 11 (not disputing this fact). Funk and Bannister were involved in a collaborative decision to keep Abila in padded cell 169 for the remainder of his time at Eddy County Detention. See MSJ at 12 (setting forth this fact as a core undisputed fact). 39 During his time in the padded cell, Abila received no exercise and only some, undocumented, amount of recreation. See MSJ ¶¶ 48-49, at 9. 40 For a period of time during Abila’s housing in the padded cell, he was not actively suicidal. See Response to Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 10, at 3 (setting forth this fact); Reply in *1147 Support of Defendants’ MSJ ¶ 10, at 4 (not disputing this fact). 41
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Abila brings this suit against Funk and Bannister for their alleged failure to provide him medical care during his detention at Eddy County Detention. See Third Amended Complaint for the Recovery of Damages Caused by the Deprivation of Civil Rights and Tortious Conduct, filed March 17, 2016 (Doc. 102)(“Third Amended Complaint”). The Complaint first alleges, as Counts I and II, a violation of substantive due process, under the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitution of the State of New Mexico, because of the inhumane conditions of Abila’s confinement and because of inadequate medical care. See Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 114-138, at 11-14. Count III then alleges a violation of procedural due process by Funk, and Count IV alleges that Funk, in his official capacity, maintained a custom and policy of violating constitutional rights. See Third Amended Complaint ¶¶ 139-160, at 14-16. Abila now moves for summary judgment, by his MSJ, requesting that the Court grant judgment in his favor with respect to Counts I and II, for inhumane conditions of confinement during the time period from January 3, 2012, until June 21, 2012. See MSJ at 1. In the alternative, Funk and Bannister move for summary judgment on Counts I and II, arguing that Abila’s substantive due process claims must be dismissed in accordance with Funk and Bannister’s qualified immunity.
1. The Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment.
Abila’s MSJ argues that Funk and Bannister ordered Abila “housed in [ ] abusive conditions indefinitely. They were inhumane, punishing, and in violation of Mr. Abila’s Fourteenth Amendment, substantive due process rights.” MSJ at 2. Accordingly, Abila moves for summary judgment against Funk and Bannister on Counts I and II — for inhumane conditions of’ confinement — because (i) “ECDC’s denial of recreation to [Abila] was a clear violation of the constitution;” (ii) Abila’s “confinement in an incredibly small padded cell, without a bed, toilet, sink, or adequate heating for eight months is a clear violation of his rights;” and (in) although “[b]oth the denial of exercise and exposure to the deplorable conditions of the padded cells [Abila] was subjected to at ECDC are so sub-human that each, on its own, are [sic] violative of [Abila]’s constitutional rights ... the combination of these two conditions is undoubtedly unconstitutional.” MSJ at 14, 16, 20. Abila thus argues that he has met the burden under rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is entitled to summary judgment.
Abila first argues that Eddy County Detention’s “denial of recreation and exercise is unconstitutional as a matter of law.” MSJ at 14. Essentially, Abila argues that
there can be no doubt that total denial of exercise for an extended period of time would constitute cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.... In fact, even when inmates are denied recreation of more than five hours per week, over a very *1148 short period of time, this denial raises serious constitutional questions.
MSJ at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). Abila maintains that the standard in this context requires the Court to determine whether adequate exercise was enjoyed. See MSJ at 14. Abila explains that, in Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d 521 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
[t]he Court reasoned that a “pretrial detainee is presumed innocent ... [and] a state cannot escape its caretaking responsibilities ... [or] use security classifications as a license to harm pretrial detainees.It therefore held the jail was required to provide an “opportunity for some form of recreation ... to protect the mental and physical health of all pretrial detainees.”
Campbell v. McGruder, 580 F.2d at 546 .
Abila maintains that the watch logs provide evidence that he received constitutionally inadequate recreation. See MSJ at 16. In addition, the MSJ argues that “Sgt. Carrie Patterson testified that she had taken him out for recreation once and ‘had gotten in trouble for it.’ ” MSJ at 16. Accordingly, the MSJ argues that Abila’s “inadequate exercise over the course of six consecutive months is a clear violation of his substantive due process rights.” MSJ at 16.
The MSJ then turns to Abila’s argument that the “conditions [he] was subjected to in the padded cell are unconstitutional as a matter of law.” MSJ at 16. Abila essentially argues that “[t]he Tenth Circuit [has] found conditions similar to those imposed on Plaintiff to have amounted to punishment and violated the Fourteenth Amendment.” MSJ at 17 (citing Littlefield v. Deland, 641 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1981)). The MSJ also cites a case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which provides that “causing a man to live, eat and perhaps sleep in close confines with his own human waste is too debasing and degrading to be permitted.” MSJ at 17 (citing LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 977-78 (2d Cir. 1972)). With respect to the fact that Abila was being housed in the padded cell because of suicidal concerns, the MSJ contends: “If conditions of confinement are bad enough, they can be described as punishment regardless of the motivations of jail staff.” MSJ at 18. Moreover, pointing to Littlefield v. Deland once more, the MSJ asserts that “holding an inmate under conditions of detention this extreme for such an excessive period as fifty-six days is punishment and ... cannot be imposed in accordance with the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.” MSJ at 18.
The MSJ then reiterates the poor living conditions to which Abila was subjected, amounting to eight months of being housed in “an unfurnished cell,” and being “forced to sleep on the cold floor, fully naked, or wearing only a suicide smock.” MSJ at 18. In addition, according to Abila, the “cell measured only 41 square feet,” the “air conditioner was constantly blowing,” and Abila was “forced to live, eat, and sleep in close confines with a grated hole in the floor in which he was supposed to defecate and urinate.” MSJ at 18-19. The MSJ also references the nineteen days for which Abila “was held in constant restraints.” MSJ at 20. Accordingly, the MSJ concludes that “the conditions Plaintiff was subjected to were so extreme they cannot be described as anything other than punishing .... Funk and Bannister have violated Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment rights.” MSJ at 20.
The third argument which the MSJ makes is that “the cumulative effects of the lack of recreation and conditions Plaintiff was subjected to in padded cell 169 are unconstitutional as a matter of law.” MSJ at 20. In support, the MSJ provides that *1149 “the denial of exercise and exposure to the deplorable conditions of the padded cells Plaintiff was subjected to at ECDC are so sub-human that each, on its own, are [sic] violative of Plaintiffs constitutional rights.” MSJ at 20. Abila refers to the Supreme Court of the United States of America’s guidance that “the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution is intended to protect and safeguard a prison inmate from the environment where degeneration is probable and self-improvement unlikely because of the conditions existing which inflict endless suffering, whether physical or mental.” MSJ at 20-21 (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 , 97 S.Ct. 285 , 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976)).
Last, the MSJ contends that the conduct of Funk and Bannister amounted to deliberate indifference, which means that one has acted where he (i) “knew the inmate faced a substantial risk of harm” and (ii) “failed to take reasonable actions to abate that harm.” MSJ at 22 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). The MSJ asserts that “deliberate indifference is a hard thing to prove, but the facts associated with this case are extreme and the indifference is stark.” MSJ at 24.
2. The Response to Abila’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Response begins by reminding Abi-la that Funk and Bannister have also “asserted the defense of qualified immunity,” and, thus, the “Plaintiff must first show that a specific constitutional right was violated .... and that there was clearly established law that would have put Defendants on notice that they were violating his rights when they placed him under suicide precautions following his multiple attempts to end his life.” MSJ at 12. The Response contends that “it is established that due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished prior to a lawful conviction”; that to decide “whether a particular restriction imposed on a pretrial detainee comports with due process, a court must determine whether the restriction is punitive or reasonably related to a legitimate and nonpunitive governmental purpose;” and that “[t]he Due Process Clause protects against deliberately wrongful government decisions rather than merely negligent government conduct.” Response at 12-13.
The Response then argues that the “Plaintiffs access to recreation and exercise was not constitutionally inadequate,” because “numerous witnesses testified that Plaintiff received recreation while housed in the padded cell, including playing card games with detention staff, writing letters, reading books, and watching television while outside of his cell.” Response at 15. In addition, the Response provides that “the Court must not only consider whether Plaintiffs recreation and exercise were limited, but also the justification for limiting them.” Response at 15. The Response argues that, because Abila was suicidal and “violent with staff on a number of occasions,” the MSJ has not “shown that his rights were clearly established.” Response at 16.
The Response next contends that, “here, Defendants were responding to serious and repeated attempts by Plaintiff to end his life,” and that “to ignore the inmate’s suicidality would have made the jail derelict in its duties.” Response at 17-19. Accordingly, the Response argues that the “Plaintiff cannot show that the measures were punitive in nature as opposed to a necessary response to Plaintiffs suicidal actions.” Response at 19. Thus, according to Defendants, “neither the conditions of the cell nor the amount of recreation provided to Plaintiff was constitutionally deficient.” Response at 19. In addition, accord- *1150 mg to Defendants, “their combination is not unconstitutional,” so the Response argues that the “Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation ... that Plaintiffs rights to different conditions of confinement were clearly established” and that “the restrictions were motivated by punitive, rather than protective considerations.” Response at 23. The Response concludes that “Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.” Response at 23.
3. The Reply to the Response to the Motion for Summary Judgment.
In his Reply, Abila provides that his MSJ
[rjelies on the depositional testimony of ECDC guards, former guards, or the defendants themselves to establish Plaintiff was subjected to extreme conditions of confinement and restraint for a prolonged period of time. Plaintiffs Motion demonstrates he was denied recreation and exercise for over six months in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. It also asserts the conditions inside the padded cell were so extreme they amounted to the illegal punishment of a pretrial detainee. In one notable peiiod, Plaintiff was in some form of mechanical restraint continuously for 19 days. Finally, the Motion argues that the combination of the conditions and lack of exercise rose to the level of a due process violation.
Reply at 1. The Reply then generally repeats the undisputed facts, and explains that, “in attempting to dispute Plaintiffs facts, Defendants introduced the concept that Plaintiff was held for mental health reasons and security reasons.” Reply at 10 (citing Response ¶34, at 6). The Reply indicates that there is nothing in the record which may “provide a description of what those security concerns were and why they did not result in the normal disciplinary process found in jails.” Reply at 10. Accordingly, the Reply argues that the Defendants
do not adequately dispute the conditions Plaintiff was subjected to, which Plaintiff argues are so bad Defendants could cite no legitimate interest for him being housed in them. Further, Defendants dispute Plaintiff did not receive recreation because he was infrequently allowed out of his cell to be cuffed to a bench.
Reply at 14. The Reply then reiterates the import of Littlefield v. Deland, where a pretrial detainee spent “long periods of defecating into a hole in the floor, [had] no exercise, no substantive human interaction, cold meals, and no clothing,” the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit concluded that the conditions the pretrial detainee endured “were punishing, regardless of the motivation behind them.” Response at 9-10. Accordingly, the Reply argues, “it has been clearly established that an inmate is entitled to be confined in an environment which does not result in his degeneration or which threatens his mental and physical well being.” Reply at 11.
The Reply then presents a new argument that Abila does not need to show that Funk and Bannister acted with deliberate indifference in order to succeed on his substantive due-process claim. Reply at 12. In support of such a lesser standard, Abila underscores the impact of the Supreme Court’s holding in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 2466 , 192 L.Ed.2d 416 (2015), which described the state of mind required to demonstrate an officer’s use of excessive force on a pretrial detainee as being “an objective standard.” Reply at 12. Accordingly, Kingsley v. Hendrickson, provides that a pretrial detainee can prevail by showing that a jailor’s actions were not rationally related to a legiti *1151 mate nonpunitive governmental purpose, or that the actions appear excessive in relation to that purpose. See Reply at 12. The Reply then argues that the Supreme Court had, on other occasions, maintained such an objective standard with respect to its review of prison conditions, in addition to excessive force claims. See Reply at 12. The Tenth Circuit, in Littlefield v. Deland, also applied an objective standard in finding that the “inmate’s conditions were so atrocious that they could not be rationally related to a legitimate interest, and were objectively punishing.” Reply at 13. The Reply thus argues that “the deliberate indifference standard associated with post convicted prisoners found in the Eighth Amendment context is, therefore not appropriately used here.” Reply at 14. The Reply concludes that the “Defendants did not dispute the crux of Plaintiffs motion— he was denied the ability to exercise for 159 days. The deplorable conditions of the padded cell and complete denial of recreation are, as a matter of law, unconstitutional and in violation of Plaintiffs substantive due process rights.” Reply at 14.
4. Defendants’ MSJ.
Funk and Bannister initially provide that Abila’s Complaint “alleges that his placement and housing in segregation represented a violation [of] his substantive and procedural due process rights.” Defendants’ MSJ at 2. Essentially, Funk and Bannister argue, “[t]he thrust of Abila’s complaint is that ECDC staff should have known that being placed in a padded safety cell, or what Abila calls ‘solitary confinement,’ was damaging to his mental health and that the conditions in the suicide cell amount to a constitutional violation.” Defendants’ MSJ at 2. In response to these allegations, Funk and Bannister move for summary judgment with respect to Abila’s substantive due-process claims, arguing that “[t]he defense of qualified immunity applies.... It was not clearly established that placing a suicidal inmate in a cell for his own protection, on the advice of a mental health professional, was a violation of Abila’s substantive due process rights.” Defendants’ MSJ at 2. Funk and Bannister characterize Abila’s claim as being that he was “over-supervised.” Defendants’ MSJ at 12.
Funk and Bannister begin their argument by explaining that “Abila’s housing was derived from his suicidal behavior and was a result of the jail’s duty to protect the inmates in its charge. During his months in the safety cell, Abila was constantly supervised and regularly saw the jail’s mental health providers.” Defendants’ MSJ at 8. Accordingly, the Defendants’ MSJ argues that “[a] due process claim turns on deliberate indifference, and as a matter of law, Defendants were not deliberately indifferent to Abila’s needs given the attention they paid him and the mental healthcare he received. Further ... Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on that elaim.” Defendants’ MSJ at 8. Abi-la must thus demonstrate, the Defendants’ MSJ argues, “that a specific constitutional right was violated” and that the “Government official’s conduct violate[d] clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Defendants’ MSJ at 9 (citing Chavez v. Cnty. of Bernalillo, 3 F.Supp.3d 936, 974-75 (D.N.M. 2014)(Browning, J.)). The Defendants’ MSJ argues that, because “Abila’s conditions of confinement were a reasonable response to his repeated and varied attempts to end his own life, and do not meet the punishing standard required to create a constitutional violation,” Abila’s claim must fail. Defendants’ MSJ at 10.
*1152 Further, the Defendants’ MSJ provides that “the Due Process Clause protects against deliberately wrongful government decisions.” Defendants’ MSJ at 11 (internal quotations omitted). Thus, the standard is that “a prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of harm implicates the Eighth Amendment.” Defendants’ MSJ at 11. Here, then, the Defendants’ MSJ argues that “corrections facilities are required to take suicide threats and attempts seriously, and ECDC’s compliance with the law cannot be equated with deliberate indifference.” Defendants’ MSJ at 12. This balancing act, the Defendants’ MSJ explains, cuts in Funk and Bannister’s favor as to whether they were deliberately indifferent to Abila’s substantive due-process rights. See Defendants’ MSJ at 12-18.
Turning away from Funk and Bannister’s response to Abila’s suicide attempts, the Defendants’ MSJ next addresses “whether the conditions of confinement are unconstitutional for a pretrial detainee, the inquiry [being] whether the conditions amounted to punishment.” Defendants’ MSJ at 18 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 , 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)). Accordingly, the Defendants’ MSJ addresses Littlefield v. Deland, arguing that the standard against which the Tenth Circuit analyzes a pretrial detainee’s conditions of confinement involves:
[Determining whether the disabilities imposed on plaintiff during his detention constituted punitive measures implicating due process or, conversely, were permissible regulatory restraints, the trier of fact must first consider whether detention facility officials expressed an intent to punish the pretrial detainee. If they did not, the determination generally will turn on whether an alternative purpose to which (the restriction) may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned (to it).
Defendants’ MSJ at 19. Again, the Defendants’ MSJ provides Abila’s suicide attempts as the justification for his housing in the padded cell, which Funk and Bannister argue makes the conditions lawful. See Defendants’ MSJ at 19. Further, the Defendants’ MSJ distinguishes the facts of Littlefield v. Deland, where, for fifty-six days, prison officials placed
a non-violent, severely mentally ill inmate who had demonstrated nothing more than ‘bizarre behavior’ in a strip cell for punishment ... [which] had no windows, no lights, and no floor covering. He was not allowed any clothing at all, and no bedding, forcing him to lie entirely naked on a bare concrete floor, was never allowed out of his cell, and engaged in throwing urine and feces back and forth with other inmates without any opportunity for personal hygiene.
Defendants’ MSJ at 20 (alteration added). Essentially, then, the Defendants’ MSJ argues that “the undisputed facts of the case show that Abila was indeed subject to serious restrictions. However, the conditions of confinement do not rise to the level that has been generally accepted as unconstitutional by the Tenth Circuit.” Defendants’ MSJ at 19. Thus, Funk and Bannister argue, “Abila cannot show that he suffered a clearly established violation of his rights when ECDC staff placed him in a safety cell for six months at the express direction of mental health staff, even assuming he was required to use a floor toilet and have limited recreation for his safety.” Defendants’ MSJ at 24.
The Defendants’ MSJ also argues that “Abila did not receive inadequate access to medical care and defendants were entitled to rely on the judgment o[f] mental health *1153 professionals.” Defendants’ MSJ at 25. With respect to this argument, Funk and Bannister assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity, because they took Abi-la’s suicide attempts seriously and “relied on mental health’s staffs determination that he should remain in that cell.” Defendants’ MSJ at 27. The Defendants’ MSJ then concludes by requesting judgment as a matter of law with respect to Abila’s substantive due-process claims. See Defendants’ MSJ at 28.
5. Response to Defendants’ MSJ.
The Response to Defendants’ MSJ restates the arguments Abila made in his own MSJ: “The conditions endured were so bad Plaintiff has filed his own Motion for Summary Judgment.... Plaintiff has alleged looking at the facts most favorably to the Defendants, their conduct was so indifferent, and the conditions so bad that no valid penological purpose can be assigned to them.” Response to Defendants’ MSJ at 2. Accordingly, Abila argues that the Defendants’ MSJ
claims the conditions imposed were a valid way of trying to save Plaintiffs life. The central core of their motion, that the living conditions were acceptable for this purpose, ignores testimony from several expert witnesses that describe them as inhumane and in violation of both national standards and ECDC’s own policies.
Response to Defendants’ MSJ at 2.
The Response to Defendants’ MSJ then proceeds to argue that, essentially, Funk and Bannister’s conduct violated Abila’s clearly established rights to humane confinement as a pretrial detainee pursuant to the Due Process Clause. See Response to Defendants’ MSJ 14-15. A constitutional violation occurred, the Response to Defendants’ MSJ argues, because “the Tenth Circuit has held a prisoner is entitled to be confined in an environment which does not result in his degeneration or which threatens his mental and physical well being,” and “the use of a cell devoid of furnishings with a grate in the floor as the only toilet, for 56 days was said to violate the due process clause in the context of a pre trial detainee.” Response, to Defendants’ MSJ at 15. Funk and Bannister argue: “Any objectively reasonable officer or jail guard would know of their duties under the Fourteenth Amendment to make sure the people they detain are provided humane conditions and medical care if they are obviously suffering from a serious medical condition regardless of whether they knew exactly what that condition was.” Response to Defendants’ MSJ at 15.
The Response to Defendants’ MSJ then turns to the objective standard for making an inhumane conditions claim that Abila outlined in his Reply to his own MSJ. See Response to Defendants’ MSJ at 15. The objective standard’s application, in this context, as Kingsley v. Hendrickson explained, means that, where “the conditions are objectively bad enough, as Plaintiff has claimed they are, the court would not need to examine whether officials were deliberately indifferent to those conditions. It would be enough to hold the conditions were objectively punishing.” Response to Defendants’ MSJ at 16. Abila concedes, however, that the objective standard applies only “to the parts of [his] claims that do not reference medical care, such as the allegations he was housed in a tiny cell without access to recreation and with an open drain as a toilet.” Response to Defendants’ MSJ at 16. Because Abila relies, in part, on “the failure to provide medical care” as “one of the mutually enforcing conditions plaintiff was subjected to,” the Response to Defendants’ MSJ thus turns to the deliberate indifference standard that he must meet to show a failure to provide *1154 medical care. Response to Defendants’ MSJ at 16-17.
To make a showing of deliberate indifference with respect to the failure to provide medical care, the Response to Defendants’MSJ provides that the
Defendants will have violated this standard if their conduct disregards a known or obvious risk that is very likely to result in the violation of a prisoner’s constitutional rights ... or the prisoner must show that the defendants knew he faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.
Response to Defendants’ MSJ at 17. Abila thus argues that he has met the standard, where there is clearly established law indicating that the conduct at issue violated Abila’s constitutional rights to humane confinement as a pre-trial detainee. See Response to Defendants’ MSJ at 18. In sum, the Response to Defendants’ MSJ concludes by arguing that “it is clear most of the horrifying conditions of confinement Plaintiff was subjected to are undisputed. The tiny cell, the open drain, the cold temperature, the cold food, the lack of clothing, (with the exception of a suicide smock), and the enormous amount of time spent in these conditions.” Response to Defendants’ MSJ at 23. Accordingly, the Response to Defendants’ MSJ requests that the Court deny Defendants’ MSJ.
6. The Reply In Support of the Defendants’ MSJ.
The Reply in Support of the Defendants’ MSJ begins with its argument regarding the undisputed facts. See Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ at 1-8. The Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ then returns to Funk and Bannister’s claim of qualified immunity. See Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ at 9. Funk and Bannister reiterate their argument that Littlefield v. Deland is inapplicable to these facts, and that Abila thus “bears the burden of showing- a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit case on point to show the law is clearly established.” Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ at 9. Funk and Bannister then “reiterate that any time a condition is reviewed, the Court must look to the justification for the condition,” and that here, Abila has not overcome the fact that the “Defendants took” many lengths “to ensure that Plaintiff could not hurt himself, including medication, frequent review by mental health professionals, and housing conditions designed to eliminate access to potentially dangerous items in response to increasingly creative attempts to hurt himself.” Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ at 10.
Funk and Bannister then contend that, even if the Court applies the objective reasonableness test that Kingsley v. Hendrickson used, Abila has failed to overcome their claim to qualified immunity. See Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ at 10. Accordingly, Funk and Bannister first argue that the Court should apply the deliberate indifference standard, because the Tenth Circuit has not as of yet applied an objective reasonableness standard like that of Kingsley v. Hendrickson. See Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ at 10. In addition, Funk and Bannister argue that Kingsley v. Hendrickson was limited to its facts — that being an excessive force scenario. See Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ at 10. The Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ also contends that the case law Abila cites in favor of an objective inquiry also entails a subjective analysis. See Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ at 11. Last, Funk and Bannister argue that Abi-la’s reliance on the Defendants’ violations of their own Eddy County Detention policies .would require the Court to conclude that, even under the objective reasonableness standard, the allegations are “insufficient to create a constitutional violation.” *1155 Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ at 11. Thus, Funk and Bannister conclude that Abila’s substantive due-process claim must fail because: (i)- the conditions were suicide prevention measures; (ii) Abila was not denied medical care; (iii) even when viewed objectively, in the abstract of the state officials’ intent, Abila fails to demonstrate a violation of his rights; and (iv) Abila cannot show that it was clearly established under existing case law that taking “extreme precaution with a suicidal inmate was a violation of his substantive due-process rights, and Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.” Reply in Support of Defendants’ MSJ at 11.
7. The October 25, 2016, Hearing.
The Court held a hearing on October 25, 2016. See Transcript of Hearing, taken October 25, 2016 (“Tr.”). 42 The Court began the hearing with argument related to the MSJ. See Tr. At 3:22-23 (Court). Abila began by recapping the “simple uncontroversial facts” underlying his MSJ, as well as explaining that the MSJ relates to a very specific time period and does not seek to cover Abila’s full stay at Eddy County Detention. Tr. at 4:4-5:18 (Coyte). Regarding the possible time periods, Abila explained that there were a few specific time periods which the Court needed to consider: (i) when Abila was initially arrested and booked into Eddy County Detention, during which he was actively suicidal, spanning from July, 2011, until December, 2011; and (ii) when Abila returned from the hospital in January, 2012, and was housed in the padded cell. See Tr. at 4:15-5:10 (Coyte). Abila argued that “the conditions on his return from the hospital were extreme in a manner that would be considered torturous or excessive,” and that “those extreme conditions are undisputed.” Tr. at 5:12-16 (Coyte). The MSJ, Abila argues, relates only to that time period where Abila was not actively suicidal, from January, 2012, until June, 2012. See Tr. at 10:15-23 (Coyte).
Abila then conceded that, for the purposes of his MSJ:
I’m going to accept that he’s suicidal for a period of time. I’m going to accept that he has security issues they claim. But they don’t actually give those out in any specificity.... What I’m telling you is— that’s not disputed — is he is in a cell with the lights on 24 hours a day; a hole in the floor to defecate into; no clothes; it was cold; the air blew on him constantly. He didn’t get outside of his cell except on occasions that are noted in a log, and those occasions indicate that he didn’t get out for exercise at all. And this is where one disputed fact ... comes ... the dispute they say is that he got some form of recreation. And they claim he played cards and watched TV. We dispute that, because we, the testimony they use to say that is that in the middle of the night a guard would take pity on him and handcuff him to a bench in the booking area. Or in the middle of the night, a guard would, on a weekend shift, give him a candy bar. But he didn’t get cards in that period of time.... The cards, came in the other cell ... the normal cell that you talk about in October.
Tr. at 14:13-15:13 (Coyte). In sum, then, Abila’s argument is that, in the MSJ, “we talk about [how] the exercise .,. alone may get you” a constitutional violation, “the toilet on its own and the conditions in the cell,” like “the size of it, the toilet that is an open drain, the lack of bedding and *1156 all the rest, that might get you there,” and also, taking the lack of exercise and the conditions of the cell together, that “might get you there.” Tr. 8:1-6 (Coyte). Then, turning to the MSJ’s substance, Abila explained that “it is substantive due process.” Tr. at 26:8 (Coyte). Accordingly, Abila recapped the arguments that he makes in the MSJ with respect to a pretrial detainee’s substantive due-process rights. See Tr. at 26:1-31:16 (Coyte).
Funk and Bannister then took up argument on the MSJ, and conceded that they did not “see any factual dispute here that keeps the Court from getting to the legal issue.” Tr. at 32:5-9 (Court, Drennan). Funk and Bannister next argued that “the jail very carefully selected these restrictions based on Mr. Abila’s apparent] sui-cidality.” Tr. at 33:18-20 (Drennan). To that point, though, the Court posited that “you probably got conditions that wouldn’t survive the constitutional analysis for a violent prisoner, but they’re being imposed upon somebody because of their mental condition.” Tr. at 33:21-25 (Court). Bannister and Funk responded that, in this area of the law, the Court’s analysis in a given case “has to be ... based on its specific facts.” Tr. at 34:1-5 (Drennan). Regarding the standard that must be met to demonstrate a substantive due process claim, Funk and Bannister argued that it is “kind of a deliberate indifferent standard, and that, in the absence of an expressed intent to punish, a pretrial detainee must show that actions are not rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose to succeed on that kind of substantive due process claim.” Tr. at 36:6-19 (Dren-nan).
Abila then said that he was going to use both of those prongs, “but I must recognize that deliberate indifference is hard to prove at summary judgment.” Tr. at 37:2-25 (Coyte). Abila then briefly provided that “you don’t get qualified immunity to torturing someone because it’s so shocking.” Tr. at 39:4-6 (Coyte). The Court indicated that “I’m troubled by the conditions here,” Tr. at 39:11-12 (Court), and that it was inclined to grant Abila’s motion as it related to the period of time beginning in January, 2012, see Tr. at 50:3-8 (Court).
Then turning to Defendants’ MSJ, the Court clarified that the difference between the MSJ and Defendants’ MSJ was that the Defendants’ MSJ covers the entire period of time, whereas the MSJ was confined to one period. See Tr. at 42:9-14 (Court). Funk and Bannister did not spend much time rehashing the argument that had already been made, except to address the issue of Abila’s medical care. See Tr. at 44:11-12 (Drennan). Regarding that issue, Funk and Bannister maintained that that the mental health care was satisfactory, and that Abila was seen by professionals who indicated that he presented an ongoing suicide risk. See Tr. at 45:1-16 (Dren-nan). Abila then took up argument, and stated that, regarding the issue of medical care, “the facts are clearly disputed,” “in the first period before January,” and that thus Defendants’ MSJ should be denied to the extent it relies on the provision of mental health care. Tr. at 46:8-19 (Coyte). The Court then indicated that it would take Defendants’ MSJ under advisement. See Tr. at 42:9-14 (Court).
LAW REGARDING MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: “The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The movant bears the initial burden of ‘showing] that there is an absence of evidence to support the *1157 nonmoving party’s case.’ ” Herrera v. Santa Fe Pub. Sch., 956 F.Supp.2d 1191, 1221 (D.N.M. 2013)(Browning, J.)(quoting Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 891 (10th Cir. 1991)). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 , 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Before the court can rule on a party’s motion for summary judgment, the moving party must satisfy its burden of production in one of.two ways: by putting evidence into the record that affirmatively disproves an element of the non-moving party’s case, or by directing the court’s attention to the fact that the non-moving party lacks evidence on an element of its claim, “since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-25 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 . On those issues for which it bears the burden of proof at trial, the nonmovant “must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to his case in order to survive summary judgment.” Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1197 (10th Cir. 2007).
Plustwik v. Voss of Norway ASA, 2013 WL 1945082 , at *1 (D. Utah May 9, 2013)(Sam, J.) (emphasis added). “If the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, that party must support its motion with credible evidence — using any of the materials specified in Rule 56(c) — that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 331 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 (Brennan, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original). 43 Once the movant meets this burden, rule 56 requires the nonmoving party to designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. at 324 , 106 S.Ct. 2548 ; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The party opposing a motion for summary judgment must “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.” Applied Genetics Int’l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec., Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). See Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1539 (10th Cir. 1993) (“However, the nonmoving party may not rest on its pleadings but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof.”)(internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 56(c)(1) provides: “A party asserting that a fact ... is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by ... citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations' (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). It is not enough for the party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment to “rest on mere allegations or denials of his pleadings.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505 . See Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, *1158 896 F.2d 1228, 1231 (10th Cir. 1990); Otteson v. United States, 622 F.2d 516, 519 (10th Cir. 1980)(“[O]nce a properly supported summary judgment motion is made, the opposing party may not rest on the allegations contained in his complaint, but must respond with specific facts showing the existence of a genuine factual issue to be tried.” (citation omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted)).
Nor can a party “avoid summary judgment by repeating conclusory opinions, allegations unsupported by specific facts, or speculation.” Colony Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Omer, No. CIV 07-2123 JAR, 2008 WL 2309005 , at *1 (D. Kan. June 2, 2008)(Robinson, J.)(citing Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “In responding to a motion for summary judgment, ‘a party cannot rest on ignorance of facts, on speculation, or on suspicion and may not escape summary judgment in the mere hope that something will turn up at trial.’ ” Colony Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Omer, 2008 WL 2309005 , at *1 (quoting Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 794 (10th Cir. 1988)).
To deny a motion for summary judgment, genuine factual issues must exist that “can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505 . A mere “scintilla” of evidence will not avoid summary judgment. Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d at 1539 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). Rather, there must be sufficient evidence on which the fact finder could reasonably find for the nonmoving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 251, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (quoting Schuylkill & Dauphin Improvement Co. v. Munson, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 442, 448 , 20 L.Ed. 867 (1871)); Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d at 1539 . “[Tjhere is no evidence for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable ... or is not significantly probative, ... summary judgment may be granted.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (citations omitted). Where a rational trier of fact, considering the record as a whole, could not find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 , 106 S.Ct. 1348 , 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court should keep in mind certain principles. First, the court’s role is not to weigh the evidence, but to assess the threshold issue whether a genuine issue exists as to material facts requiring a trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 . Second, the ultimate standard of proof is relevant for purposes of ruling on a summary judgment, such that, when ruling on a summary judgment motion, the court must “bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. 2505 . Third, the court must resolve all reasonable inferences and doubts in the nonmoving party’s favor, and construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 550-55 , 119 S.Ct. 1545 , 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (“The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”). Fourth, the court cannot decide any issues of credibility. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505 .
*1159 There are, however, limited circumstances in which the court may disregard a party’s version of the facts. This doctrine developed most robustly in the qualified immunity arena. In Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 , 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007), the Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate where video evidence “quite clearly contradicted” the plaintiffs version of the facts. 550 U.S. at 378-81 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 . The Supreme Court explained:
At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a “genuine” dispute as to those facts. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c). As we have emphasized, “[w]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts .... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. [at] 586-587, 106 S.Ct. 1348 ... (footnote omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. [at] 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 .... When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.
That was the case here with regard to the factual issue whether respondent was driving in such fashion as to endanger human life. Respondent’s version of events is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him. The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction; it should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.
Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. at 380-81 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 (emphasis in original).
The Tenth Circuit applied this doctrine in Thomson v. Salt Lake County and explained:
[B]ecause at summary judgment we are beyond the pleading phase of the litigation, a plaintiffs version of the facts must find support in the record: more specifically, “[a]s with any motion for summary judgment, when opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts.” York v. City of Las Cruces, 523 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 ); see also Estate of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr, 511 F.3d 1255, 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).
Thomson v. Salt Lake Cty., 584 F.3d at 1312 (brackets omitted). “The Tenth Circuit, in Rhoads v. Miller, [ 352 Fed.Appx. 289 (10th Cir. 2009)(Tymkovich, J.)(unpublished), 44 ] explained that the blatant *1160 contradictions of the record must be supported by more than other ■witnesses’ testimony[.]” Lymon v. Aramark Corp., 728 F.Supp.2d 1222, 1249 (D.N.M. 2010)(Browning, J.)(citation omitted), aff'd, 499 Fed.Appx. 771 (10th Cir. 2012).
In evaluating a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, we take the facts “in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 , 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). “[T]his usually means adopting ... the plaintiffs version of the facts,” id. at 378 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 , unless that version “is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed him,” id, at 380, 127 S.Ct. 1769 . In Scott, the plaintiffs testimony was discredited by a videotape that completely contradicted his version of the events. 550 U.S. at 379 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 . Here, there is no videotape or similar evidence in the record to blatantly contradict Mr. Rhoads’ testimony. There is only other witnesses’ testimony to oppose his version of the facts, and our judicial system leaves credibility determinations to the jury. And given the undisputed fact of injury, Mr. Rhoads’ alcoholism and memory problems go to the weight of his testimony, not its admissibility .... Mr. Rhoads alleges that his injuries resulted from a beating rendered without resistance or provocation. If believed by the jury, the events he describes are sufficient to support a claim of violation of clearly established law under Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395-96 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989), and this court’s precedent.
Rhoads v. Miller, 352 Fed.Appx. at 291-92 (internal quotation marks omitted). See Lymon v. Aramark Corp., 728 F.Supp.2d at 1249 -50 (quoting Rhoads v. Miller, 352 Fed.Appx. at 291-92 ). In a concurring opinion in Thomson v. Salt Lake County, the Honorable Jerome A. Holmes, United States Circuit Judge for the Tenth Circuit, stated that courts must focus first on the legal question of qualified immunity and “determine whether plaintiffs factual allegations are sufficiently grounded in the record such that they may permissibly comprise the universe of facts that will serve as the foundation for answering the legal question before the court,” before inquiring into whether there are genuine issues of material fact for resolution by the jury. 584 F.3d at 1326-27 (Holmes, J., concurring)(citing Goddard v. Urrea, 847 F.2d 765, 770 (11th Cir. 1988)(Johnson, J., dissenting))(observing that, even if factual disputes exist, “these disputes are irrelevant to the qualified immunity analysis because that analysis assumes the validity of the plaintiffs’ facts”).
LAW REGARDING LIABILITY FOR CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS UNDER 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the *1161 jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 . “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 , 108 S.Ct. 2250 , 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). Individual, non-supervisory defendants may be liable if they knew or reasonably should have known that their conduct would lead to the deprivation of a plaintiff’s constitutional rights by others, and an unforeseeable intervening act has not terminated their liability. See Martinez v. Carson, 697 F.3d 1252, 1255 (10th Cir. 2012)(“The requisite causal connection is satisfied if [the defendants] set in motion a series of events that [the defendants] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive [the plaintiffs] of [their] constitutional rights.” (quoting Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir. 2006))). The .Supreme Court has made clear that there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens 45 and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 , 117 S.Ct. 1382 , 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997). “An entity cannot be held liable solely on the basis of the existence of an employer-employee relationship with an alleged tortfeasor.” Garcia v. Casuas, No. CIV 11-0011 JB/RHS, 2011 WL 7444745 , at *25 (D.N.M. Dec. 8, 2011)(Browning, J.)(citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. at 689, 98 S.Ct. 2018 ). Supervisors can be held liable only for their own unconstitutional or illegal policies, and not for the employees’ tor-tious acts. See Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (10th Cir. 1998).
1. Color of State Law.
“Under Section 1983, liability attaches only to conduct occurring ‘under color of law.’” Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442,1447 (10th Cir. 1995). The under-color-of-state-law requirement is a “jurisdictional requisite for a § 1983 action, which ...- furthers the fundamental goals of preserving an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law ... and avoiding imposing on the state, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.” Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 492 (10th Cir. 1995). “The- traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made *1162 possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’ ” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. at 49 ; 108 S.Ct. 2250 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 , 61 S.Ct. 1031 , 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941)). “The authority with which the defendant is allegedly ‘clothed’ may be either actual or apparent.” Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d at 493 . Accordingly, at a base level, to conclude that an action was taken under color of state law, the court must determine that “ ‘the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right’ must be ‘fairly attributable to the State.”’ Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d at 1447 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 , 102 S.Ct. 2744 , 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982)).
The Tenth Circuit has directed that, while “ ‘state employment is generally sufficient to render the defendant a state actor .., [,] at the same time, it is Veil settled that an otherwise private tort is not committed under color of law simply because the tortfeasor is an employee of the state.’” Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d at 493 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. at 935 -36 n.18, 102 S.Ct. 2744 ; Mark v. Borough of Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137, 1150 (3d Cir. 1995)). Thus, “before conduct may be fairly attributed to the state because it constitutes action ‘under color of state law,’ there must be ‘a real nexus’ between the employee’s use or misuse of them authority as a public employee, and the violation allegedly committed by the defendant.” Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d at 493 . What constitutes the required real nexus, however, is not completely clear. As the Tenth Circuit has stated, whether there is a real nexus in a particular case depends on the circumstances:
The under color of law determination rarely depends on a single, easily identifiable fact, such as the officer’s attire, the location of the act, or whether or not the officer acts in accordance with his or her duty. Instead one must examine “the nature and circumstances of the officer’s conduct and the relationship of that conduct to the performance of his official duties.”
David v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 101 F.3d 1344, 1353 (10th Cir. 1996)(citations omitted) (quoting Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 986 (1st Cir. 1995)).
2. Individual Liability.
Government actors may be liable for the constitutional violations that another committed, if the actors “set in motion a series of events that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to deprive the plaintiff of her constitutional rights,” thus establishing the “requisite causal connection” between the government actor’s conduct and a plaintiffs constitutional deprivations. Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d 1036, 1046 (10th Cir. 2006). The Tenth Circuit has explained that § 1983 liability should be “ ‘read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.’ ” Martinez v. Carson, 697 F.3d at 1255 (quoting Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 , 81 S.Ct. 473 , 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. at 663 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 ). “Thus, Defendants are liable for the harm proximately caused by their conduct.” Martinez v. Carson, 697 F.3d at 1255 (citing Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d at 1046 ). As the Court has previously concluded, “a plaintiff who establishes liability for deprivations of constitutional rights actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is entitled to recover compensatory damages for all injuries suffered as a consequence of those deprivations. The recovery should be guided by common-law tort principles — including principles of causation .... ” Train v. *1163 City of Albuquerque, 629 F.Supp.2d 1243, 1251 (D.N.M. 2009) (Browning, J.). 46
The Tenth Circuit has found liability for those defendants who proximately caused an injury alleged under § 1983 and stated that the fact that the “conduct of other people may have concurrently caused the harm does not change the outcome as to [the defendant],” so long as there was not a superseding-intervening cause of a plaintiffs harm. Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1220 (10th Cir. 2006).
Even if a factfinder concludes that the residential search was unlawful, the officers only “would be liable for the harm ‘proximately’ or ‘legally* caused by then-tortious conduct.” Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 1995). “They would not, however, necessarily be liable for all of the harm caused in the ‘philosophic’ or but-for sense by the illegal entry.” 72 F.3d at 400 . In civil rights cases, a superseding cause, as we traditionally understand it in tort law, relieves a defendant of liability. See, e.g., Warner v. Orange Cnty. Dep’t of Prob., 115 F.3d 1068, 1071 (2d Cir. 1996); Springer v. Seaman, 821 F.2d 871, 877 (1st Cir. 1987), abrogated on other grounds by Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701 , 109 S.Ct. 2702 , 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989).
Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d at 1046 . Thus, in the context of a claim under the Fourth Amendment, the Tenth Circuit has held that government actors “may be held hable if the further unlawful detention and arrest would not have occurred but for then-conduct and if there were no unforeseeable intervening acts superseding their liability.” Martinez v. Carson, 697 F.3d at 1255 . The Tenth Circuit gave an example of a superseding-intervening cause, quoting the Honorable Samuel J. Alito, then-United States Circuit Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit:
Suppose that three police officers go to a suspect’s house to execute an arrest warrant and that they improperly enter without knocking and announcing then-presence. Once inside, they encounter the suspect, identify themselves, show him the warrant, and tell him that they are placing him under arrest. The suspect, however, breaks away, shoots and kills two of the officers, and is preparing to shoot the third officer when that officer disarms the suspect and in the process injures him. Is the third officer necessarily liable for the harm caused to the suspect on the theory that the illegal entry without knocking and announcing rendered any subsequent use of force unlawful? The obvious answer is “no.” The suspect’s conduct would constitute a “superseding” cause, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 442 (1965), that would limit the officer’s liability. See id. § 440.
Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d at 1046 (quoting Bodine v. Warwick, 72 F.3d at 400 ). Additionally, “[f]oreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk, and ... will not supersede the defendant’s responsibility.” Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d at 1047 (quoting William Lloyd Prosser et al„ Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 44, at 303-04 (5th ed.1984)). If
*1164 the reasonable foreseeability of an intervening act’s occurrence is a factor in determining whether the intervening act relieves the actor from liability for his antecedent wrongful act, and under the undisputed facts there is room for reasonable difference of opinion as to whether such act was wrongful or foreseeable, the question should be left for the jury.
Trask v. Franco, 446 F.3d at 1047 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 453 cmt.b (1965)).
3. Supervisory Liability.
The Tenth Circuit has held that supervisors are not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is “ ‘an affirmative link ... between the constitutional deprivation and either the supervisor’s personal participation, ... exercise of control or direction, or ... failure to supervise.’ ” Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009)(quoting Green v. Branson, 108 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1997))(alterations omitted). Because supervisors can be held liable only for their own constitutional or illegal policies, and not for the torts that their employees commit, supervisory liability requires a showing that such policies were a “deliberate or conscious choice.” Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d at 1307-08 (citations omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted). Cf. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404 , 117 S.Ct. 1382 (“[I]t is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the ‘moving force’ behind the injury alleged.” (emphasis in original)).
The Tenth Circuit has recognized that Ashcroft v. Iqbal limited, but did not eliminate, supervisory liability for government officials based on an employee’s or subordinate’s constitutional violations. See Garcia v. Casuas, 2011 WL 7444745 , at *25-26 (citing Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2010)). The language that may have altered the landscape for supervisory liability in Ashcroft v. Iqbal is as follows: “Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 . The Tenth Circuit in Dodds v. Richardson held:
Whatever else can be said about Iqbal, and certainly much can be said, we conclude the following basis of § 1983 liability survived it and ultimately resolves this case: § 1983 allows a plaintiff to impose liability upon a defendant-supervisor who creates, promulgates, implements, or in some other way possesses responsibility for the continued operation of a policy the enforcement (by the defendant-supervisor or her subordinates) of which “subjects, or causes to be subjected” that plaintiff “to the deprivation of any rights ... secured by the Constitution .... ”
Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d at 1199 . The Tenth Circuit noted that Ashcroft v. Iqbal “does not purport to overrule existing Supreme Court precedent,” but stated that “Iqbal may very well have abrogated § 1983 supervisory liability as we previously understood it in this circuit in ways we do not need to address to resolve this case.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d at 1200 . It concluded that Ashcroft v. Iqbal did not alter “the Supreme Court’s previously enunciated § 1983 causation and personal involvement analysis.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d at 1200 . The Tenth Circuit, based on this conclusion, set forth a test for supervisory liability under § 1983 after Ashcroft v. Iqbal:
*1165 A plaintiff may ... succeed in a § 1983 suit against a defendant-supervisor by demonstrating: (1) the defendant promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that- (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm, and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation.
Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d at 1199 -1200 (citing Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1000 (10th Cir. 2002)). The Tenth Circuit noted, however: “We do not mean to imply that these are distinct analytical prongs, never to be intertwined.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d at 1200 n.8. Relying on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Board of County Commissioners v. Brown, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that two of the prongs often, if not always, are sufficient proof that the third prong has been met also:
Where a plaintiff claims that a particular municipal action itself violates federal law, or directs an employee to do so, resolving these issues of fault and causation is straightforward. Section 1983 itself contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying federal right. In any § 1983 suit, however, the plaintiff must establish the state of mind required to prove the underlying violation. Accordingly, proof that a municipality’s legislative body or authorized decisionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right necessarily establishes that the municipality acted culpably.’ Similarly, the conclusion that the action taken or directed by the municipality or its authorized de-cisionmaker itself violates federal law will also determine that the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff complains.
Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d at 1200 n.8 (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. at 404-05 , 117 S.Ct. 1382 )(internal quotation marks omitted). The Tenth Circuit noted that “[w]e think the same logic applies when the plaintiff sues a defendant-supervisor who promulgated, created, implemented or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that itself violates federal law.” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d at 1200 n.8. Thus, the Tenth Circuit reduced the test to what can be seen as a two-part test for supervisor liability, requiring the plaintiff to prove “an 'affirmative’ link ... between the unconstitutional acts by their subordinates and their ‘adoption of any plan or policy ... — express or otherwise — showing their authorization or approval of such misconduct.’ ” Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d at 1200 -01 (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371 , 96 S.Ct. 598 , 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976)).
4. Municipal Liability.
A municipality will not be held hable under § 1983 solely because its officers inflicted injury. See Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3d 1215, 1218 (10th Cir. 2006). Rather, to establish municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (i) that an officer committed an underlying constitutional violation; (ii) that a municipal policy or custom exists; and (iii) that there is a direct causal link between the policy or custom, and the injury alleged. See Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3d at 1218 . When a claim is brought against a municipality for failing to train its officers adequately, the plaintiff must show that the municipality’s inaction was the result of deliberate indifference to the rights of its inhabitants. See Graves v. Thomas, 450 F.3d at 1218 .
LAW REGARDING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Qualified immunity recognizes the “need to protect officials who are re *1166 quired to exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the vigorous exercise of official authority.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 807 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). “Qualified immunity protects federal and state officials from liability for discretionary functions, and from ‘the unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn-out lawsuit.’ ” Roybal v. City of Albuquerque, No. CIV 08-0181 JB/LFG, 2009 WL 1329834 , at *10 (D.N.M. April 28, 2009)(Browning, J.)(quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 , 111 S.Ct. 1789 , 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991)). The Supreme Court deems it “untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly under the Constitution against federal officials.” Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 , 98 S.Ct. 2894 , 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978). “The qualified immunity analysis is the same whether the claims are brought under Bivens or pursuant to the post-Civil War Civil Rights Acts.” Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1291 (10th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905 (10th Cir. 2001).
Under § 1983 (invoked in this case) and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 , 91 S.Ct. 1999 , 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), a plaintiff may seek money damages from government officials who have violated her constitutional or statutory rights. But to ensure that fear of liability will not “unduly inhibit officials in the discharge of their duties,” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987), the officials may claim qualified immunity; so long as they have not violated a “clearly established” right, they are shielded from personal liability, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). That means a court can often avoid ruling on the plaintiffs claim that a particular right exists. If prior case law has not clearly settled the right, and so given officials fair notice of it, the court can simply dismiss the claim for money damages. The court need never decide whether the plaintiffs claim, even though novel or otherwise unsettled, in fact has merit.
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 , 131 S.Ct. 2020, 2030-31 , 179 L.Ed.2d 1118 (2011).
Issues of qualified immunity are best resolved at the “earliest possible stage in litigation.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 , 129 S.Ct. 808 , 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)(quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 , 112 S.Ct. 534 , 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991)(per curiam)). “If qualified immunity is to mean anything, it must mean that public employees who are just doing their- jobs are generally immune from suit.” Lewis v. Tripp, 604 F.3d 1221, 1230 (10th Cir. 2010).
Qualified immunity shields government officials from liability where “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 231 , 129 S.Ct. 808 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 ). Qualified immunity also shields officers who have “reasonable, but mistaken beliefs,” and operates to protect officers from the sometimes “hazy borderfs]” of the law, Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 , 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151 , 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, the plaintiff must demonstrate: (i) that the defendant’s actions violated his or her constitutional or statutory rights; and (ii) that the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. See Rig *1167 gins v. Goodman, 572 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009).
1. Procedural Approach to Qualified Immunity.
The Supreme Court recently revisited the proper procedure for lower courts to evaluate a qualified immunity defense. In Pearson v. Callahan, the Supreme Court held that lower courts “should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances of the particular case at hand.” 555 U.S. at 236 , 129 S.Ct. 808 . The Supreme Court also, noted that, while no longer mandatory, the protocol that Saucier v. Katz outlined — by which a court first decides if the defendant’s actions violated the Constitution, and then the court determines if the right violated was clearly established — will often be beneficial. See Pearson v. Callahan 555 U.S. at 241 , 129 S.Ct. 808 . In rejecting the prior mandatory approach, the Supreme Court recognized that “[t]here are cases in which it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from' obvious whether in fact there is such a right,” and that such an approach burdens district court and courts of appeals with “what may seem to be an essentially academic exercise.” 555 U.S. at 237 , 129 S.Ct. 808 . The Supreme Court also recognized that the prior mandatory approach “departs from the general rule of constitutional avoidance and runs counter to the older, wiser judicial counsel not to pass on questions of constitutionality unless such adjudication is unavoidable.” 555 U.S. at 241 , 129 S.Ct. 808 (alterations -omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted). See Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658 , 132 S.Ct. 2088, 2093 , 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012)(affirming Pearson v. Callahan’s procedure and noting that deciding qualified immunity issues on the basis of a right being not “clearly established” by prior case law “comports with our usual reluctance to decide constitutional questions unnecessarily”). Once the plaintiff establishes an inference that the defendant’s conduct violated a clearly established constitutional right, a qualified immunity defense generally fails. See Cannon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 998 F.2d 867 , 870-71 (10th Cir. 1993).
The Supreme Court recognizes seven circumstances where district courts should proceed directly to and “should address only” the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity analysis: when (i) the first, constitutional violation question “is so factbound that the decision provides little guidance for future cases”; (ii) “it appears that the question will soon be decided by a higher court”; (iii) deciding the constitutional question requires “an uncertain interpretation of state law”; (iv) “qualified immunity is asserted at the pleading stage,” and “the precise factual basis for the ... claim ... may be hard to identify”; (v) tackling the first element “may create a risk of bad decisionmaking,” because of inadequate briefing; (vi) discussing both elements risks “bad decision-making,” because the court is firmly convinced the law is not clearly established and is thus inclined to give little thought to the existence of the constitutional right; or (vii) the doctrine of “constitutional avoidance” suggests the wisdom of passing on the first constitutional question when “it is plain that a constitutional right is not clearly established but far from obvious whether in fact there is such a right.” Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d 1173, 1180-81 (10th Cir. 2011)(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. at 236-42 , 129 S.Ct. 808 ). Regarding the last of these seven circumstances, the. Supreme Court has clarified that courts may “avoid avoidance” and address the first prong before the second prong in cases involving a recurring fact pattern, where guidance on the constitu *1168 tionality of the challenged conduct is necessary, and the conduct is likely only to face challenges in the qualified immunity context. Camreta v. Greene, 131 S.Ct. at 2031-32 . See Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d at 1181 . 47 “Courts should think carefully before expending ‘scarce judicial resources’ to resolve difficult and novel questions of *1169 constitutional or statutory interpretation that will ‘have no effect on the outcome of the case.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 , 131 S.Ct. 2074 , 2080, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011)(quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236-37 , 129 S.Ct. 808 , 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009)). See Camreta v. Greene, 131 S.Ct. at 2032 (“In general, courts should think hard, and then think hard again, before turning small cases into large ones.”). 48 The Tenth Circuit will remand a case to the district court for further consideration when the district court has given cursory treatment to the clearly *1170 established prong of the qualified immunity analysis. See Kerns v. Bader, 663 F.3d at 1182 .
2. Clearly Established Rights in the Qualified Immunity Analysis.
To determine whether a right was clearly established, a court must consider whether the right was sufficiently clear that a reasonable government employee in the defendant’s shoes would understand that what he or she did violated that right. See Casey v. W. Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1327 (10th Cir. 2007). “A clearly established right is generally defined as a right so *1171 thoroughly developed and consistently recognized under the law of the jurisdiction as to be ‘indisputable’ and ‘unquestioned.’” Lobozzo v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 429 Fed.Appx. 707, 710 (10th Cir. 2011)(unpublished)(quoting Zweibon v. Mitchell, 720 F.2d 162,172-73 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
“Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the- plaintiff maintains.” Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th Cir. 2001). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has observed that it is generally not necessary to find a controlling decision declaring the “very action in question ... unlawful.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 , 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). “In determining whether the right was ‘clearly established,’ the court assesses the objective legal reasonableness of the action at the time of the alleged violation and asks whether ‘the contours of the right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’ ” Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d at 1186 (alteration in originalXquoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 ). A court should inquire “whether the law put officials on fair notice that the described conduct was unconstitutional” rather than engage in “a scavenger hunt for cases with precisely the same facts.” Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004).
The Supreme Court has clarified that the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity test is a very high burden for the plaintiff: “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2083 . “In other words, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.’ ” Reichle v. Howards, 132 S.Ct. at 2093 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2083 ). “The operation of this standard, however, depends substantially upon the level of generality at which the relevant ‘legal' rule’ is to be identified.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 639 , 107 S.Ct. 3034 . “The general proposition, for example, that an unreasonable search or seizure violates the Fourth Amendment is of little help in determining whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2084 . The level of generality at which the legal rule is defined is important, because qualified immunity shields officers who have “reasonable, but mistaken beliefs” as to the application of law to facts and operates to protect officers from the sometimes “hazy border[s]” of the law. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 205, 121 S.Ct. 2151 .
The Tenth Circuit held in Kerns v. Bader that, although “a case on point isn’t required if the impropriety of the defendant’s conduct is clear from existing case law,” the law is not clearly established where “a distinction might make a constitutional difference.” 663 F.3d at 1188 (emphasis in original). In Kerns v. Bader, dealing with the search of a home, the Tenth Circuit explained that the relevant question “wasn’t whether we all have some general privacy interest in our home,” but “whether it was beyond debate in 2005 that the officers’ entry and search lacked legal justification.” 663 F.3d at 1183 (emphasis added). Earlier Tenth Circuit cases, clarifying the level of generality at which a legal rule must be defined, applied a sliding scale to determine when the law is *1172 clearly established. See Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2007)(“The more obviously egregious the conduct in light of prevailing constitutional principles, the less specificity is required from prior case law to clearly establish the violation.”). “[W]hen an officer’s violation ... is particularly clear ..., [the Tenth Circuit] does not require a second decision with greater specificity to clearly establish the law.” Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d at 1284 . Furthermore, “general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning .... ” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 , 122 S.Ct. 2508 , 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002).
LAW REGARDING SUBSTANTIVE DUE-PROCESS CLAIMS
The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that “no State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1. In general, state actors may be held liable under § 1983 only for their own affirmative acts that violate a plaintiffs due-process rights and not for third parties’ acts. See Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d at 1251 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 197 , 109 S.Ct. 998 , 103 L.Ed.2d 249 ). “[Nothing in the language of the Due Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. at 195 , 109 S.Ct. 998 . The Due Process Clause is not a guarantee of a minimal level of safety and security. See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. at 195 , 109 S.Ct. 998 .
1. Exceptions to the General Rule.
There are, however, two exceptions to this general rule. The first exception — the special-relationship doctrine— arises when the state has a custodial relationship with the victim, which triggers an affirmative duty to provide protection to that individual. See Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d 1270, 1280 (10th Cir. 2003); Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-89, 22 F.3d 991 , 994-95 (10th Cir. 1994). The second exception — the danger-creation theory — provides that a state may also be liable for an individual’s safety “only when ‘a state actor affirmatively acts to create, or increases a plaintiffs vulnerability to, or danger from private violence.’ ” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d at 1251 (quoting Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th Cir. 2001)). “If either the special-relationship or danger-creation exception applies, the conduct of the state actor must go beyond negligence to the point of ‘shocking the conscience.’ ” Glover v. Gartman, 899 F.Supp.2d 1115, 1135 (D.N.M. 2012)(Browning, J.)(citing Johnson ex rel. Estate of Cano v. Holmes, 455 F.3d 1133, 1142 (10th Cir. 2006)(“The shocks the conscience standard applies to both types of suits.”)).
2. Special-Relationship Exception.
The first exception to the general principle that a state’s negligent failure to protect an individual cannot trigger liability under the due-process clause is the special-relationship doctrine. A plaintiff must show that they were involuntarily committed to state custody to establish a duty to protect under the special-relationship doctrine. See Liebson v. N.M. Corr. Dep’t, 73 F.3d 274 , 276 (10th Cir. 1996). “A special relationship exists when the state assumes control over an individual sufficient to trigger an affirmative duty to provide protection to that individual (e.g. when the individual is a prisoner or involuntarily committed mental patient).” Uhl- *1173 rig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir. 1995).
3. Danger-Creation Exception.
The Due Process Clause protects against “deliberately wrongful government decisions rather than merely negligent government conduct.” Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d at 573 . The danger-creation exception to this rule applies only when “a state actor affirmatively acts to create, or increases a plaintiffs vulnerability to, or danger from private violence.” Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 923 (10th Cir. 2001). See Estate of B.I.C. v. Gillen, 702 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012)(“[S]tate officials can be hable for the acts of private parties where those officials created the very danger that caused the harm.”). Under a danger-creation theory, there is no § 1983 liability absent “an intent to harm” or “an intent to place a person unreasonably at risk of harm.” Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d at 573 . A plaintiff must show “sufficient[ ] ‘affirmative conduct on the part of the state in placing the plaintiff in danger.’” Estate of B.I.C. v. Gillen, 702 F.3d at 1187 (quoting Gray v. Univ. Colo. Hosp. Auth., 672 F.3d 909, 916 (10th Cir. 2012)). To state a prima-facie case, the plaintiff must show that his or her danger-creation claim for due-process violations meets a six-part test: (i) the state and individual actors must have created the danger or increased plaintiffs vulnerability to the danger in some way; (ii) the plaintiff must be a member of a limited and specifically definable group; (iii) the defendant’s conduct must put the plaintiff at substantial risk of serious, immediate, and proximate harm; (iv) the risk must be obvious and known; (v) and the defendant must have acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk. See Pena v. Greffet, 922 F.Supp.2d 1187, 1227 (D.N.M. 2013)(Browning, J.)(citing Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1126 (10th Cir. 2008)).
In determining whether the danger-creation exception applies, the Tenth Circuit has focused on the deliberateness of the conduct in relation to the caused harm. See Christiansen v. City of Tulsa, 332 F.3d at 1281 . The defendant must recognize the unreasonableness of the risk of the conduct and act “with an intent to place a person unreasonably at risk.” Medina v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 960 F.2d at 1496. The intent to place a person unreasonably at risk is present where the defendant “is aware of a known or obvious risk” creating a high probability that serious harm will follow, and the defendant nonetheless proceeds with a “conscious and unreasonable disregard of the consequences.” Medina v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 960 F.2d at 1496 (citations omitted).
4. What Shocks the Conscience.
A government actor’s official conduct intended to injure in a way that cannot reasonably be justified by any government interest most likely shocks the conscience. See Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 , 118 S.Ct. 1708 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)(“[C]onduet intended to injure, in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is the sort of official action most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.”). “[A] plaintiff must do more than show that the government actor intentionally or recklessly caused injury to the plaintiff by abusing or misusing government power.” Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d 1214, 1222 (10th Cir. 2006)(quoting Moore v. Guthrie, 438 F.3d 1036, 1040 (10th Cir. 2006)(inter-nal quotation marks omitted)). “The plaintiff must demonstrate a degree of outra-geousness and a magnitude of potential or actual harm that is truly conscience shocking.” Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 448 *1174 F.3d at 1222 -23 (quoting Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 574 (10th Cir. 1995))(internal quotation marks omitted).
Establishing these limits advances “three basic principles highlighted by the Supreme Court in evaluating substantive due process claims: (1) the need for restraint in defining their scope; (2) the concern that § 1983 not replace state tort law; and (3) the need for deference to local policymaking bodies in making decisions impacting upon public safety.”
Camuglia v. City of Albuquerque, 448 F.3d at 1223 (quoting Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d at 574 ).
“Whether the conduct shocks the conscience is an objective test, based on the circumstances, rather than a subjective test based on the government actor’s knowledge.” Pena v. Greffet, 922 F.Supp.2d at 1227 (citing James v. Chavez, 830 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1276 (D.N.M. 2011)(Browning, J.)(concluding that the use of deadly force did not shock the conscience even if the suspect did not have an intent to harm the officer, because the officer “had sufficient facts before him to conclude that there was a threat of serious physical harm” and the “courts must evaluate a [government actor’s] conduct objectively”), aff'd, 511 Fed.Appx. 742 (10th Cir. 2013)).
In Martinez v. Uphoff, 265 F.3d 1130 (10th Cir. 2001), the widow of a corrections officer sued the director, deputy director, warden, and deputy wardens of the department of corrections, alleging that the defendants deliberately failed to ensure proper training and supervision of penitentiary personnel, failed to provide safe and adequate staffing, and failed to take corrective action to protect her husband, all of which resulted in him being killed during the escape of three inmates. See 265 F.3d at 1132 . The district court found that the plaintiff failed to state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Due Process Clause under a danger-creation theory, because the defendants’ actions were “not of such a magnitude that the Court is able to conclude they shock the conscience.” 265 F.3d at 1134 . The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion, stating: “[U]n-der the circumstances of this case, inaction in the face of known dangers or risks is not enough to satisfy the danger-creation theory’s conscience shocking standard.” 265 F.3d at 1135 .
In Schaefer v. Las Cruces Public School District, 716 F.Supp.2d 1052 (D.N.M. Apr. 30, 2010)(Browning, J.), the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants — the school district, superintendent, principal, and vice principal of a middle school — violated the plaintiffs’ substantive due-process rights when they did not take sufficient action to prevent a student at the school from “racking” 49 the plaintiffs’ son. 716 F.Supp.2d at 1072-73 . The Court concluded that the defendants’ conduct did not shock the conscience. See 716 F.Supp.2d at 1074-75 . The Court explained: •
Assuming the absolute worst from the Schaefers’ alleged facts, the Defendants were aware of three instances of an unknown eighth-grade student racking various sixth-grade students within the span of a month, and failed to implement policies to improve hallway monitoring and stop this conduct from occurring in time to prevent [the plaintiffs’ son] from falling victim to the same fate. Further, the Defendants indicated to the sixth graders that it had policies in place to punish indi *1175 viduals that assaulted other students but did not, in fact, have such policies.
While such behavior may be worthy of remedy under tort law, and perhaps worthy of punishment in the form of punitive damages, the Court’s conscience is not shocked ....
Any number of actions by the Defendants might have remedied the problem, but the Court’s conscience is not shocked by the Defendants’ failure to consider or-implement such a policy. Even if the Defendants knew that students frequently — more than three times per month — attacked other students in the halls and declined to implement safety measures to minimize that conduct, the Court is not convinced that it would rise to the level of shocking the conscience. . .
716 F.Supp.2d at 1074-75 .
LAW REGARDING PRETRIAL DETENTION CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
The Supreme Court of the United States laid a foundation for the law on conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees in Bell v. Wolfish. In that case, a group of pretrial detainees challenged their conditions of confinement within the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York City, a federal short-term custodial facility. See 441 U.S. at 523 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 . The Supreme Court rejected the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s standard, which required that pretrial detainees “be subjected to only those ‘restrictions and privations’ which ‘inhere in their confinement itself or which are justified by compelling necessities' of jail administration.’ ” 441 U.S. at 531 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 . It selected a wholly different 'test, explaining that, “[i]n evaluating the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention that implicate only the protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of -law, we think that the proper inquiry is whether those conditions amount to punishment of the detainee.” 441 U.S. at 535 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court spent much of its opinion distinguishing permissible “disabilities] imposed during pretrial detention” from the “punishment” that the Constitution prohibits. 441 U.S. at 535 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 . It explained:
Once the Government has exercised its conceded authority to detain a person pending trial, it obviously is entitled to employ devices that are calculated to effectuate this detention. Traditionally, this has meant confinement in a facility which, no matter how modern or how antiquated, results in restricting the movement of a detainee in a manner in which he would not be restricted if he simply were free to walk the streets pending trial. Whether it be called a jail, a prison, or a custodial center, the purpose of the facility is to detain. Loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement in such a facility. And the fact that such detention interferes with the detainee’s understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into “punishment.”.
441 U.S. at 537 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 .
The Supreme Court stated that a disability could constitute punishment if: (i) detention facility officials had an expressed intent to punish; or '(ii) the disability bears no reasonable relationship to any legitimate government objective. See 441 U.S. at 538 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 ; Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 7 , 112 S.Ct. 995 , 117 L.Ed.2d 156 (1992); Blackmon v. Sutton, 734 F.3d 1237, 1241 (10th Cir. 2013). It continues:
*1176 Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably-related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to “punishment.” Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal — if it is arbitrary or purposeless — a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 539 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 . See id. at 540 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 (“Restraints that are reasonably related to the institution’s interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting and are restrictions that the detainee would not have experienced had he been released while awaiting trial.”).
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments that the Constitution prevents their jailers from: (i) placing two inmates in each cell; (ii) prohibiting the receipt of hardcover books, unless mailed directly from publishers, book clubs, or book stores; (iii) forbidding the receipt of packages of personal property and food; (iv) requiring inmates to leave their cells during cell searches; and (v) performing visual body cavity searches after contact visits with outside visitors. See 441 U.S. at 540-560 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 . It concluded that these practices were “reasonable responses by MCC officials to legitimate security concerns.” 441 U.S, at 561, 99 S.Ct. 1861 .
In reaching these conclusions, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of prison officials’ judgment: “Prison administrators ... should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” 441 U.S. at 547 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 .
The Supreme Court also recognized that “pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted prisoners.” 441 U.S. at 545 , 99 S.Ct. 1861 .
In Blackmon v. Sutton, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit confronted a pretrial detainees claim that juvenile detention center officials violated his clearly established constitutional rights by placing him in a restraint chair for punishment. See 734 F.3d at 1239 . The Tenth Circuit, evaluating the defendants’ qualified immunity argument, noted:
The jurisprudential terrain between arrest and conviction remains today only partially charted. Over the last several decades, the Supreme Court has elaborated in considerable detail the standards of care prison administrators must satisfy to avoid inflicting “cruel and unusual” punishment on convicted prisoners in violation of the Eighth Amendment. E.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 , 97 S.Ct. 285 , 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 , 114 S.Ct. 1970 , 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). The Court has, as well, expounded on what force officers may and may not use to effect an arrest consistent with the Fourth Amendment and its prohibition of “unreasonable searches and seizures.” E.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 , 109 S.Ct. 1865 , 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). But at least so far the Court has done comparatively little to clarify the standards of care due to those who find themselves between these

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7240844. Public record. Not legal advice.