# Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections

> District Court, E.D. Virginia · October 22, 2015 · 141 F. Supp. 3d 505

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7234425

## Case

- **Full name:** Golden BETHUNE-HILL v. VIRGINIA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS
- **Court:** District Court, E.D. Virginia
- **Decided:** October 22, 2015
- **Citations:** 141 F. Supp. 3d 505; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144511
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Payne
- **Judges:** Keenan, Payne
- **Cited by:** 12 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Vacated in part, on other grounds by Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 137 S. Ct. 788 (2017).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7234425

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- rejecting the test of the dissent that “views the 55% [black voting age population] floor as a ‘filter through which all line-drawing decisions had to pass’ ” (citation omitted)
- discussing the challenges of utilizing compactness scores when “no one can agree what [compactness] is or, as a result, how to measure it”
- describing the "[t]estimony on this question" as "a muddle"

## Opinion text

MEMORANDUM OPINION
ROBERT E. PAYNE, Senior District Judge:
This case challenges the constitutionality of twelve Virginia House of Delegates districts (the “Challenged Districts”) as racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The case is ripe for decision following a four-day bench trial at which the parties presented oral testimony and offered numerous exhibits. Our findings of fact are based on our assessment of the record and are grounded in our determinations respecting the credibility of the witnesses.
Our conclusions of law address the several legal issues presented by the parties. In particular, we have determined that it is the burden of the Plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that race was the predominate factor motivating the decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district in that, as to each of those districts, Virginia’s General Assembly subordinated race-neutral districting principles to racial considerations when forming the district.- Based on this legal standard and the record, we have concluded that, except as to House District 75, the Plaintiffs have not carried that burden and that race was not shown to have been the pre *511 dominant factor in the creation of eleven of the twelve Challenged Districts.
We are satisfied that race was the predominant factor in the creation of House District 75. However, we have also concluded that, in using race, the General Assembly was pursuing a compelling state interest, namely, actual compliance with federal antidiscrimination law, and that, in the process, the General Assembly used race in a manner narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.
In the Memorandum Opinion that follows, the Court will review the procedural background of the case in Section I; provide a brief overview of the law relating to racial gerrymandering claims in Section II; and set out its findings on the factual background of the case in Section III. In Section IV, the Court will articulate its understanding of the relevant legal framework for evaluating racial gerrymandering (or “racial sorting”) claims, set out additional factual findings of general applicability, and conduct a district-by-district analysis with district-specific factual findings and district-specific application of the relevant legal framework.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the wake of the 2010 census, the Virginia General Assembly sought to redraw the legislative districts for the Virginia House of Delegates (“House”) and the Senate of Virginia (“Senate”). The task of redistricting is one that carries great political and legal consequence. In a representative democracy, such legislation shapes more than the abstract boundaries of electoral districts; it shapes the character, conduct, and culture of the representatives themselves. On its face, the legislation recites a singularly tedious list of precincts and counties. But in application, few pieces of legislation have a more profound impact on the function of government and whether it acts as “the faithful echo of the voices of the people.” Justice James Wilson, The Works of the Honourable James Wilson, L.L.D. 433 (Bird Wilson, ed., The Lorenzo Press 1804).
The political significance of redistricting is matched only by its legal complexity. Those shepherding redistricting legislation must traverse a precarious path between constitutional and statutory demands that are often in tension with one another and provide opaque interpretive standards rather than clear rules.
As to the 2011 redistricting, Delegate Chris Jones led this effort in the House. Delegate Jones played an instrumental role in the 2001 redistricting process and drew upon that experience to lead the 2011 redistricting efforts. Pis.’ Ex. 35 at 46:18-48:21; Trial Tr. 272:24-274:7 (Jones). Because Virginia was a covered jurisdiction under Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) at the time the redistricting legislation was prepared, and was therefore subject to the requirements of Section 5 of the VRA, 1 (Docket No. 83), it was necessary to ensure that the plan did not result in a “retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 , 96 S.Ct. 1357 , 47 L.Ed.2d 629 (1976). In an attempt to comply with this statutory command, Delegate Jones crafted a plan containing twelve majority-minority House Districts (“HDs” or “Districts”). 2 These are the Challenged Districts: HDs 63, 69, 70, 71, 74, 75, 77, 80, 89, 90, 92, and 95.
*512 On December 22, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a Complaint against the Virginia State Board of Elections, the Virginia Department of Elections, and various members thereof in- their official capacities (“Defendants”), alleging that the Challenged Districts were racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting Defendants from implementing or conducting further elections based on the Challenged Districts. (Docket No. l.) 3 The Plaintiffs are twelve citizens of the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia who are lawfully registered voters in the Commonwealth and each of whom resides in one of the twelve Challenged Districts. (Docket No. 83.) The Plaintiffs requested that the case be heard by a three-judge district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (a) on the grounds that the action “challeng[es] the constitutionality of the apportionment of ... [a] statewide legislative body.” (Docket No. 1.) That request was granted by the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. (Docket No 11.)
The Virginia House of Delegates and the Virginia House of Delegates Speaker William Howell (“Intervenors”) moved to intervene in the case. (Docket No. 12.) That motion was granted. (Docket No. 26.)
A four-day bench trial began on July 7, 2015. (Docket Nos. 99-102.) Because the Defendants are “administrative agencies that implement elections” but “do not draw the districts,” Trial Tr. 12:14-25 (Defendants), the Defendants allowed the Inter-venors to carry the burden of litigation but joined the Intervenors’ arguments at the close of the ease, id. at 830:2-3 . For ease of reference, the Defendants and Interve-nors will be referred to as the Intervenors.
II. BASIC OVERVIEW OF RACIAL GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS
Before proceeding to the facts of the case and the substance of this litigation, a brief overview of the constitutional and statutory requirements pertinent to racial gerrymandering claims is appropriate. As noted above, these commands often cut counter to each other and require legislators to balance competing considerations. Tracing their evolution is therefore useful as a predicate for the decision that follows.
The Supreme Court has long observed that the right to vote is “fundamental” because it is “preservative of all rights.” Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 , 6 S.Ct. 1064 , 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886). In Reynolds v. Sims, the Court recognized that “the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise” and held that the malapportionment of state legislative bodies in derogation of the “one person, one vote” principle violates the Equal Protection Clause. 377 U.S. 533, 555 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). Because legislation affecting the right to vote “strike[s] at the heart of representative government,” id., the “Constitution leaves no room for classification of people in a way that Unnecessarily abridges this right,” id. at 560 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 , and grants every citizen “an inálienable right to full and effective participation in the political processes of his State’s legislative bodies,” id. at. 564,' 84 S.Ct. 1362 .
The decision in Reynolds only required state legislatures to comply with the equal population standard, but its language would come to stand for something more. The next year, in Fortson v. Dorsey, the *513 Court suggested that a “constituency apportionment scheme” may not “comport with the dictates of the Equal Protection Clause” if it “would operate to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the voting population.” 379 U.S. 433, 438-39 , 85 S.Ct. 498 , 13 L.Ed.2d 401 (1965). With Fortson, the Supreme Court first recognized that redistricting legislation may offend Equal Protection Clause principles when it distinguishes between-voters on a racial basis.-
Over time, the Supreme Court has come to recognize two types of racial gerrymandering claims under the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) claims of racial vote dilution, where the redistricting legislation- is “conceived or operated as [a] purposeful devio[e] to further racial discrimination by minimizing, canceling out or diluting the voting strength of racial elements in the voting population,” Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 , 102 S.Ct. 3272 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982) (internal quotation marks omitted); and (2) claims of racial sorting, where the redistricting legislation, “though race neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other' than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification,” Shaw v. Reno (Shaw I), 509 U.S. 630, 649 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 , 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993).
A. Racial Vote Dilution and the Fourteenth Amendment
The Supreme Court first struck down a districting scheme for unconstitutional racial vote dilution in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 , 93 S.Ct. 2332 , 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973). There, the Court stated:
The plaintiffs’ burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in question — that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to eléct legislators of their choice.
412 U.S. at 765-66 , 93 S.Ct. 2332 . At the time, it was unclear whether such a claim required a showing of discriminatory intent or could-be maintained based solely on discriminatory effect.
Several years later, in City of Mobile v. Bolden, the Court suggested in a plurality opinion that both discriminatory intent -and discriminatory effect were required to establish a claim of unconstitutional racial vote dilution. ' 446 U.S. 55, 66 , 100 S.Ct. 1490 , 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980). That holding was reaffirmed by a majority of the Court in Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 , 102 S.Ct. 3272 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1982). Writing for the majority, Justice White confirmed that “a showing of discriminatory intent has long been required in all types of equal protection cases charging racial discrimination.”. Rogers , 458 U.S. at 6Í7, 102 S.Ct. 3272 .
Therefore, in a constitutional racial vote dilution ease, the plaintiff must show that the State has placed a burden upon the right to vote by intentionally establishing or maintaining devices or procedures that cause minority citizens to have less opportunity than other citizens to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. This dilutes the minority voter’s ability to exercise the “full and effective” right to vote.
B. Racial Sorting and the Fourteenth Amendment
The other strand of “racial gerrymandering” — a racial sorting claim such as the one presented in this case1 — is “analytically distinct” from a vote dilution claim. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 , 132 L.Ed.2d 762 (1995). “Whereas a vote dilution claim alleges that the State has enacted a .".. *514 purposeful device ‘to minimize or cancel out the voting potential of racial or ethnic minorities,’ ... the essence of [a racial sorting claim] is that the State has used race as a basis for separating voters into districts.” Id. (internal citations omitted).
In Shaw I, the Supreme Court faced two patently bizarre legislative districts. 509 U.S. at 635 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 . One resembled a “Rorshach ink-blot test” or a “bug splattered on a windshield,” while the other was “even more unusually shaped”:
[The district] is approximately 160 miles long and, for much of its length, no wider than the 1-85 corridor. It winds in snakelike fashion through tobacco country, financial centers, and manufacturing areas until it gobbles in enough enclaves of black neighborhoods. Northbound and southbound drivers on 1-85 sometimes find themselves in separate districts in one county, only to “trade” districts when they enter the next county. Of the 10 counties through which District 12 passes, 5 are cut into 3 different districts; even towns are divided. At one point the district remains contiguous only because it intersects at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them. One state legislator has remarked that “if you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you’d kill most of the people in the district.”
Id. at 635-36 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted). Although the text of the legislation was facially neutral, the Court found that “it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional dis-tricting principles.” Id. at 642 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 .
For that reason, rather than requiring the plaintiffs to present evidence of discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect, the Supreme Court treated the legislation as tantamount to a suspect facial classification and employed strict scrutiny. Id. at 642-43 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 (“Express racial classifications are immediately suspect because, absent searching judicial inquiry, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are ‘benign’ or ‘remedial’ and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics____ Accordingly, we have held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their race to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. These principles apply not only to legislation that contains explicit racial distinctions, but also to those ‘rare’ statutes that, although race neutral, are, on their face, ‘unexplainable on grounds other than race.’ ”) (quoting Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 , 97 S.Ct. 555 , 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977)).
In order to prove a racial sorting claim, a plaintiff must show that the legislature “subordinated” traditional race-neutral districting principles in crafting the district’s boundaries:
The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district. To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral district-ing principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.
*515 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 (emphasis added). This threshold, standard is “a demanding one.” Indeed, the Plaintiffs must overcome a presumption that the legislature acted correctly and in good faith. Id. Thus, the plaintiff “must show that the State has relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting practices.” Id. at 928 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
If the plaintiff makes -the requisite showing, the State must demonstrate that the redistricting legislation is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest. In redistricting cases where the State claims a compelling interest in compliance with the VRA, the legislature must show that it had a “strong basis in evidence” to support its use of race-based districting. Alabama Legislative Black Camus v. Alabama, — U.S.-, 135 S.Ct. 1257, 1274 , 191 L.Ed.2d 314 (2015). In other words, the legislature must have “good reasons to believe” that its use of racial classifications was “required” by the VRA, “even if a court does not find that the actions were necessary for statutory compliance” after the fact. Id. at 1274 . .
C. The Voting Rights Act
In addition to these constitutional imperatives, redistricting legislation must also comply with the VRA. “The Voting Rights Act was designed by Congress to banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting[.]” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 , 86 S.Ct. 803 , 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966) abrogated by Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 2612 , 186 L.Ed.2d 651 (2013). Enacted pursuant to Congress’ enforcement powers under the Fifteenth Amendment, see Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. at 2619-21 , the VRA prohibits states from adopting plans that would result in vote.dilution under Section 2 or — in covered jurisdictions — retrogression under Section 5. 4
Section 2 of the VRA prohibits'the imposition of any electoral practice or procedure that “results in á denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen ... to vote on account of race or color.,” 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (a). A § 2 violation occurs when, based on the totality of circumstances, the political process results in minority “members hav[ing] less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (b). By adopting the “discriminatory effect” language from Reges-ter and omitting any requirement to prove discriminatory intent as required by Lodge , Congre'ss created a statutory “results test” that could be brought by plaintiffs who might be otherwise unable to bring a claim of racial vote dilution under the Equal Protection Clause. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 641 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 (“In 1982, [Congress] amended § 2 of the Voting Rights Act to prohibit legislation that results in the dilution of a minority group’s voting strength, regardless of the legislature’s intent.”).
In order to prove a § 2 violation, a plaintiff must satisfy three prerequisites: compactness, political cohesiveness, and bloc voting. “First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a sin *516 gle-member district.” Thornburg v. dingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 , 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). “Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.” Id. at 51 , 106 S.Ct. 2752 . “Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it—in the absence of special circumstances, such as the minority candidate running unopposed—usually to defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.” Id. These final two factors are often referred, to collectively as “racial polarization.” Once these prerequisites have been satisfied, the court evaluates the plaintiff’s evidence based on the totality of the circumstances. The totality of circumstances must be considered with a focus on whether the minority group in question was denied “equal political opportunity.” Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1014 , 114 S.Ct. 2647 , 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994).
With respect to redistricting legislation, § 2 establishes a. “natural floor” based' on the State’s demographics for the number of districts wherein members of a minority group must maintain an “equal political opportunity” to “elect representatives of their choice.” Where a minority group, is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a numerical majority in a hypothetical district, § 2 requires the creation of a district wherein members of that group maintain the equal ability to elect representatives of their choice'. See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1,13 , 129 S.Ct. 1231 , 173 L.Ed.2d 173 (2009). Proving this hypothetical requires the plaintiffs to present an alternative redistricting plan. See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd„ 520 U.S. 471, 480 , 117 S.Ct. 1491 , 137 L.Ed.2d 730 (1997) (“Because the very concept of vote dilution implies—and, indéed, necessitates—the existence of an ‘undiluted’ practice against which the fact of dilution may be measured, a § 2 plaintiff must also postulate a reasonable alternative voting practice to serve as the benchmark ‘undiluted’ voting practice.”).
Section 5 of the VRA, on the other hand, forbids voting changes with “any discriminatory purpose” as well as voting changes that diminish the ability of citizens, on account of race, color, or language minority status, “to elect their preferred candidates of choice.” Shelby County, 133 S.Ct. at 2621 . Sections 2 and 5 “differ in structure, purpose, and application. Section 5 applies only in certain jurisdictions specified by Congress and ‘only to proposed changes- in voting procedures.’” Holder v. Hall,- 512 U.S. 874, 883 , 114 S.Ct. 2581 , 129 .L;Ed.2d 687 (1994) (quoting Beer, 425 U.S. at 138 , 96 S.Ct. 1357 ) (emphasis added). ■
Section 5 was enacted as “a response to a common practice in some jurisdictions of staying one step ahead of the federal courts by passing new discriminatory voting laws as soon as the old ones had been struck down.” , Beer, 425 U.S. at 140 , 96 S.Ct. 1357 . By requiring that proposed changes be approved in advance, Congress' sought “ ‘to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil to its victim,’ by ‘freezing election procedures in the covered areas unless the changes can be shown to be nondiscriminatory.’” Id. (quoting ELR.Rep. No. 94-196, pp. 57-58 (1970)). The purpose of this approach was to ensure that “no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise.” Holder, 512 U.S. at 883 , 114 S.Ct. 2581 .
“Retrogression, by definition, requires a comparison of a jurisdiction’s new voting plan with its existing plan. It also necessarily implies that the jurisdiction’s existing plan is the benchmark against which ■ the ‘effect’ of voting changes is measured.” Reno, 520 U.S. at 478 , 117 S.Ct. 1491 . Unlike the “natural floor” of *517 § 2 ensuring equal ability to elect, the retrogression standard of § 5 creates a “relative floor” based upon the existing benchmark plan. Under. § 5, the State must -ensure that the new plan does not “lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise” by diminishing the'ability of minority voters to elect their preferred candidates of choice as compared to the Stated existing plan. .
Therein lies the rub. 5 ' To comply with federal statutory command (the VRA), the State must consider arid account for race in‘drawing legislative districts in order to craft a compliant plan: However, to avoid violating the federal constitution, the State must not subordinate traditional, neutral principles to racial considerations in drawing district boundaries.
And, at the same time, the State must also comply with the “one person, one vote” constitutional requirement as specified in -Reynolds v. Sims. That, of course, is not a traditional- redistricting principle to be weighed as part of the predominance inquiry, as Alabama makes clear. But it is a federal constitutional requirement that, of necessity, is central to the redistricting process and that is highly instrumental in the drawing of district boundaries. '
It is within the context of this legal framework that the Virginia General Assembly sought to design and enact a compliant redistricting plan. And these principles are central to the resolution of this case.
Before proceeding to the facts of the case, the Court feels it necessary to pause and recognize that Delegate Jones, members of the redistricting committee, and other legislators involved in the crafting and amendment of HB 5005 did not have the benefit of either the Supreme Court’s guidance in the recent Alabama decision or the guidance provided in the opinion entered here today. Based on the evidence and'testimony provided in the record, the Court believes that, all of the legislators involved proceeded in a good faith attempt to comply with all relevant constitutional and statutory demands, as they understood them at the time..
III. Factual Background
A. The 2011 Redistricting Process
' The first steps in the redistricting process began well before the United States Census Bureau released its population and demographic ' data. Trial Tr. 273:11 (Jones). On August 23, 2010, Delegate Mark Cole announced that the redistricting subcommittee of the House of Delegates Committee on Privileges and Elections had scheduled a series of six public hearings throughout the Commonwealth to solicit input into the House redistricting process.' (Docket No. 85.) These public hearings were held between September 8, 2010 and December 17, 2010. Id,.; Trial Tr. 273:14-19 (Jones). Following these hearings, Governor McDonnell signed Executive Order 31 on January 10, 2011, creating the “Independent Bipartisan Advisory Redistricting Commission” (“Governor’s Commission”) to develop plan proposals, review public input, and analyze recommendations from other stakeholders in the voting public. (Docket No. 85.)
Redistricting began in earnest in February 20Í1 when the 2010 census data was released via Public Law 94-171. 6 Trial Tr. *518 276:4-21 (Jones). On March 25, 2011, the House Committee on Privileges and Elections adopted a resolution setting out the criteria that the committee would follow in reviewing redistricting plans. Pis.’ Ex. 48 at 6. The House Committee established six criteria, which were as follows:
I. Population Equality: The population of legislative districts shall be determined solely according to the enumeration established by the 2010 federal census. The population of each district shall be as nearly equal to the population of every other district as practicable. Population deviations in House of Delegates districts should be within plus-or-minus one percent.
II. Voting Rights Act: Districts shall be drawn in accordance with the laws of the United States and the Commonwealth of Virginia including compliance with protections against the unwarranted retrogression or dilution of racial or ethnic minority voting strength. Nothing in these guidelines shall be construed to require or permit any districting policy or action that is contrary to the United States Constitution or the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
III. Contiguity and Compactness: Districts shall be comprised of contiguous territory including adjoining insular territory. Contiguity by water is sufficient. Districts shall be contiguous and compact in accordance with the Constitution of Virginia as interpreted by the Virginia Supreme Court in the cases of Jamerson v. Womack, 244 Va. 506 [ 423 S.E.2d 180 ] (1992) and Wilkins v. West, 264 Va. 447 [ 571 S.E.2d 100 ] (2002).
IV. Single-Member Districts: All districts shall be single-member districts.
V. Communities of Interest: Districts shall be based on legislative consideration of the varied factors that can create or contribute to communities of interest. These factors may include, among others, economic factors, social factors, cultural factors, geographic factors, governmental jurisdictions and service delivery areas, political beliefs, voting trends, and incumbency considerations .... Local government jurisdiction and precinct lines may reflect communities of interest to be balanced, but they are entitled to no greater weight as a matter of state policy than other identifiable communities of interest.
VI. Priority: All of the foregoing criteria shall be considered in the dis-tricting process, but population , equality among districts and compliance with federal and state constitutional requirements and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 shall be given priority in the event of conflict among the criteria. Where the application of any of the foregoing criteria may cause a violation of applicable federal or state law, there may be such deviation from the criteria as is necessary, but no more than is necessary, to avoid such violation.
Pis.’ Ex. 16. These criteria were substantially similar to the criteria adopted by the committee in the 2001 redistricting cycle, with two exceptions. Ints.’ Ex. 27. First, the 2001 criteria had permitted a population deviation of “plus-or-minus two percent,” rather than one percent, which Delegate Jones stated was altered to better “approximate the one-person-one-vote [standard] in the Virginia constitution.” *519 Trial Tr. 275:10-19 (Jones). Second, the 2001 criteria were updated to include a citation to the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia in Wilkins v. West as part of the “Contiguity and Compactness” criterion. Id. at 275:13-15.
B. The 55% Black Voting Age Population Floor
At the time the redistricting process began, the twelve Challenged Districts had black voting-age populations (“BVAP”) ranging from 46.3% to 62.7%. Three of the districts had BVAPs below 55%. All others were above 55%. Several legislators believed that the twelve “ability-to-elect” districts found in the 2001 redistricting plan (or “Benchmark Plan”) needed to contain a BVAP of at least 55% in the 2011 redistricting plan to avoid “unwarranted retrogression” under Section 5 of the VRA and to comply with Criterion II of their own redistricting rules.
The existence of a fixed racial threshold can have profound consequences for the Court’s predominance and narrow tailoring inquiries in a racial sorting claim, so a substantial amount of time at trial was devoted to questions related to this factual topic. However, the most important question — whether such a figure was used in drawing the Challenged Districts — was not disputed. Rather, the parties disputed whether the 55% BVAP was an aspiration or a target or a rule. In the end, it is not relevant. whether the 55% BVAP was a rule or a target because all the parties agree — and the Court finds — that the 55% BVAP figure was used in structuring the districts -and in assessing whether the redistricting plan satisfied constitutional standards and the VRA, and whether the plan would be precleared by the Department of Justice (“DOJ”). 7
At trial, two additional questions regarding the 55% figure dominated the discussion. First, whether the BVAP figure included or excluded those who identified themselves in the census process as ethnically Hispanic and racially black. And second, what'the source of the 55% BVAP figure was. •
The parties hotly debated whether the appropriate measure of BVAP used in the redistricting process did or did not include individuals who identified as racially black and ethnically Hispanic in the census data. The supposed importance of this dispute was that, if black Hispanics were excluded from the black population count, three of the Enacted Plan’s majority-minority districts would actually contain a BVAP percentage just shy of 55%. Trial Tr. 280:24- *520 281:10 (Jones); 862:4-7 - (Intervenors). That, according to Intervenors, would support a finding that there was not a 55% BVAP floor in deciding on the twelve Challenged Districts.
The ‘record shows that delegates attempting to comply with the 55% BVAP floor submitted their proposed changes using data that included black Hispanics in the BVAP count. See Pis.’ Ex. 33 at 46; Trial Tr. 40:10-25 (McClellan); Trial Tr. 68:23-69:2 (Dance); Ints.’ Pre-Trial Brief at 8. Although Delegate Jones claimed to personally believe that the DOJ would use a BVAP figure excluding black Hispanics, Trial Tr. 286:8-16 (Jones), this was not a distinction that he discussed with any other delegates, id. at 427:1-428:16 & 490:2-4, and he repeatedly asserted on the House floor that all majority-minority districts in the proposed legislation had a BVAP of 55% or higher, Pis.’ Ex. 35 at 42, 66, 108. Moreover, Delegate Jones “assumed” that Virginia, in its preclearance submissions to the DOJ; would represent that all 12 majority-minority districts contained at least 55% BVAP. Trial Tr. 447:6-8 (Jones). This turned out to be the case. Pis.’ Ex. 48 at 11 (“All 12 black majority districts were maintained with greater than 55% black YAP — a range of'-55.2% to 60.7%.”).
At trial, Intervenors relied on a spreadsheet prepared by the Division of Legislative Services (“DLS”) in an attempt to show that including Hispanics in the BVAP count would be erroneous. The spreadsheet contains rows of data by district and, in each column, contains metrics such as total population, population by race, racial population by percentage, population by ethnicity, and ethnic population by percentage. Pis.’ Ex. 60 at 13. After adding the racial and ethnic population totals column by column, the Intervenors dramatically revealed that the number exceeded that of the district’s total population. Trial Tr. 282:10-286:7 (Jones). But this exercise reflects an error on the part of the Intervenors, not DLS. Because ethnicity measures a different variable than race, the racial and ethnic data are not meant to be added in the first place. If one removes the ethnicity column from the count (on the assumption that Hispanic individuals of any race are already counted in their respective racial columns), then the total population figure is corrected. That does not, however, imply that Hispanics who are racially black should be excluded from the black population count because' to do so would undercownt the number of black individuals in the BVAP percentage.
The record shows that the ethnic data provided by the census only has redistricting implications in states that may heed to craft majority-Hispanic districts or majority-“black-plus-Hispanic” (or “coalition”) districts. In' states such as Virginia, on the other hand, black Hispanics would count towards the total black population of a district for retrogression purposes. Id. at 747:14-749:12 & 752:17-754:17 (Ansola-behere). That appears to be consistent with the DOJ’s (admittedly confusing) guidance on this question: “If there are significant'numbers of-responses which report Latino and one or more minority races (for example, Latinos who list their race as Black/African American), those responses will be allocated alternatively to the Latino category and the minority race category.” Pis.’ Ex. 9 at 4-5 (76 Fed.Reg. Vol. 27 (Feb. 9, 2011) at 7472-7473). This “alternating” approach presumably applies to situations where the district would be majority-“black-pIus-Hispanic,” in which case counting black Hispanic individuals as either black or Hispanic in alternating fashion would avoid counting those individuals twice in the same district. 8 Trial Tr. *521 757:1-12 (Ansolabehere). Thus, the Court finds that the proper count includes black Hispanics within the BVAP percentage of each majority-minority district. This method of counting results in a BVAP above 55% for all twelve majority-minority districts, ranging from 55.2% to 60.7%.
Regardless, this debate — like the first— generated more heat than light. The actual differences in BVAP percentages were minute, and both parties eventually agreed that the distinction was not one of great legal significance. See id. at 816:5-9 (Plaintiffs) (“The distinction between how [these are] calculate^] ... is simply irrelevant, and it doesn’t matter what we call it. ' They used a racial target, and whether that was 53 or 54 or 55 or 56, whether, you measure it this way or that way, it just doesn’t matter.”) and id. at 862:8-11 (In-tervenors) (“Do I believe the difference between these two numbers is in reality meaningful in actual reality? No, it isn’t a significant difference one way or the other, let’s be candid.”).
Unlike the first two questions, the answer to the third question — i.e., the source of the 55% rule — can carry great legal significance. Testimony on this question is a muddle. Delegate Dance testified that her understanding came from Delegate Jones and that the 55% figure was necessary in order to achieve DOJ approval, id. at 70:18-23 (Dance), but her speech from the House floor appears to represent it as her own understanding, see Pis.’ Ex. 33 at 45 (“[W]e need 55 percent at least voting African-Americans[.]”). Delegate McClellan understood the committee’s adopted criteria to require “each of the majority-minority districts .... to have a black voting-age population of at least 55 percent',” Trial Tr. 33:1 — 4 (McClellan), and testified that she came to this understanding “[t]hrough conversations with' Delegate Jones and with Legislative Services,” id. at 33:6-8. Delegate Tyler testified that her understanding came from Delegate Spruill, (Docket No. 90-2, Ex. B at" 57:5-8), and Delegate Armstrong testified that, “as far as' [he] could tell, the number was almost pulled out of thin air,” Trial Tr. 98:1-2 (Armstrong).
Delegate Jones initially testified that the figure was drawn from the public hearings held with the community..- See id. at 424:1-4 (Jones) (55%. BVAP “is what the community had indicated to us that they felt would allow them to elect the candidate of their choice,”); id. at .429:8-9 (“That was the testimony that we heard during the public hearings.”). Although this testimony is consistent with his prior statements from the House floor, see Pis.’ Ex. 35 at 72, the trial record does not support it. At trial, Delegate Jones admitted that he had not read the transcripts from every hearing and could not recall a single instance of a member of the public requesting a 55% BVAP level. Trial Tr. 442:18-443:9 (Jones). Moreover, most of these hearings were transcribed and submitted as evidence. A review of the public hearing transcripts from the Fall of 2010 fails to’ reveal any mention of the 55% figure. See Pis.’ Exs. 3-6, Ints.’ Ex. I. 9
Delegate Jones also claimed that .the 55% .figure came from “Delegate Dance, and Delegate Tyler, Delegate Spruill, and one or two othe[r] .... African-American members of the House.” Trial Tr. 431:4-7 *522 (Jones). This was then narrowed to Delegates Dance, Tyler, and Spruill. Id. at 490:5-13. After further questioning, the 55% figure appears to have come from feedback that Delegate Spruill received from various groups in Virginia and from concerns that Delegate Tyler would be unable to hold her seat in [¶] 75 with a lower BVAP percentage. Id. at 494: 6-495:1. In discussing Delegate McClellan’s seat, by contrast, Delegate Jones indicated that, while “no one” was comfortable leaving the BVAP percentage in [¶] 71 at 46%, “they felt that we needed to have a performing majority-minority district, and from the members that I spoke to, they felt that it needed to be north of 50 percent minimum.” Id. at 293:6-16 (emphasis added).
Based on the foregoing testimony, and the evidence set forth below, the Court finds — based on the record presented— that the 55% BVAP floor was based largely on concerns pertaining to the re-election of Delegate Tyler in [¶] 75 and on feedback received from Delegate Spruill and, to a lesser extent, Delegates Dance and Tyler. That figure was then applied across the board to all twelve of the Challenged Districts.
C. The Passage and Enactment of HB 5005
During the redistricting process, the General Assembly initially considered three plans: HB 5001, HB 5002, and HB 5003. HB 5001 was the plan designed and proposed by Delegate Jones. HB 5002 and HB 5003, on the other hand, were designed by university students and proposed by other members of the House of Delegates. Id. at 376:24-378:9. According to Delegate Jones, HB 5002 paired somewhere between 40 and 48 incumbents, contained six majority-minority districts, and had over a 9% population deviation. Id. at 378:10-379:4. HB 5003, on the other hand, paired somewhere between 32-34 incumbents, contained nine or ten majority-minority districts, and also did not meet the population deviation criteria. Id. at 379:8-17. The Governor’s Commission also designed two plans that contained 13 and 14 majority-minority districts, respectively; however, those plans were never formally introduced or proposed. Id. at 379:18-380:11.
Once the House had coalesced around HB 5001 and the plan was married with the Senate’s redistricting plan, the bill was ready for passage and enactment. On April 12, 2011, the Virginia General Assembly passed HB 5001. (Docket No. 83.) Based largely upon objections to the Senate plan, then-Virginia Governor Robert McDonnell vetoed HB 5001 three days later. Ints.’ Ex. 10. After relatively minor revisions to the House plan and more substantial revisions to the Senate plan, Pis.’ Ex. 48 at 10, the legislature passed HB 5005, which was signed by the Governor and enacted into law on April 29, 2011, (Docket No. 83).
To comply with its obligations under the VRA, the Commonwealth then submitted the Enacted Plan (or “the Plan”) to the DOJ for preclearance. Id. The DOJ pre-cleared the Plan on June 17, 2011, (Docket No. 83), and the first election under the new districts was held on November 8, 2011, (Docket No. 85).
IV. ANALYSIS
The questions raised in a racial sorting claim are deceptive in their simplicity but profound in their implications. Resting at the crossroads of race, politics, and the constitutional limits of federal power, the claim raises vital questions about how we identify as citizens and how we project that identity in the halls of the legislature. The Supreme Court has crafted an interpretive standard for navigating this field: the legislature must not allow *523 racial considerations to predominate over (i.e., to subordinate) traditional redistriet-ing criteria. If this results from attempted compliance with the VRA, the State must show a “strong basis in evidence” that its use of race was necessary to comply with a constitutional reading of the statute.
What this standard provides in conceptual grace, however, it lacks in practical guidance. For legislators, it does little to signal when it may be constitutionally permissible to cut through a precinct or move a boundary line to alter the demographic composition of a district for purposes of complying with similarly mandatory federal law. For litigators, it provides an enticingly vague standard and invites litigation that can drive up the cost of conducting and defending the State’s redistricting endeavor. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 118 , 117 S.Ct. 1925 , 138 L.Ed.2d 285 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Any redistricting plan will generate potentially injured plaintiffs, ... [a]nd judges (unable to refer, say, to intent, dilution, shape, or some other limiting principle) will find it difficult to dismiss those claims[.']”).' And for courts, it provides an uncomfortable amount of discretion in a field that the Supreme Court has repeatedly admonished “represents a serious intrusion on the most vital of local functions.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 915 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 . By asking courts attempting to identify predominance to engage in a searching factual inquhy and comprehensive balancing before applying strict scrutiny — and to justify strict scrutiny — the test gives the judicial branch the relatively broad power to strike down or uphold legislative districts without much guidance in how to do so, notwithstanding exhortations to exercise “extraordinary caution” to the contrary.
Therefore, to sharpen the judicial inquiry, to ensure that the requisite burden is satisfied, and to assess whether redistricting legislation has successfully navigated the narrow passage between constitutional and unconstitutional redistricting, it is appropriate to articulate how the Court understands the predominance and strict scrutiny inquiries are to proceed as a matter of law. The statewide and district-by-district evidence then ■ will be assessed within that framework.
A. The Racial Sorting Framework
The essence of the racial sorting analysis is quite easy to articulate and comprehend. First, • courts examine whether racial considerations predominated over — or “subordinated” — traditional redistricting criteria. If a court so finds, . then the court applies strict scrutiny. Second, the court examines whether the legislature had a strong basis in evidence for believing federal law required its use of race, assuming this is the basis upon which the State seeks to justify its decision.
But, as this case demonstrates, the devil is in the details. The parties actually have proposed conflicting rules regarding the “subordination” test. And each believes that the Supreme Court’s recent Alabama decision reinforces its position. But both cannot be right, and we think that neither is. ...
The Plaintiffs’ case and our colleague’s dissent revolve chiefly around the evidence that legislators employed a 55% BVAP floor when crafting the Challenged Districts. According to Plaintiffs’ theory, “race predominates if it is the most important criterion.” Pis.’, Post-Trial Brief at 4 (Docket No. 105). In other words, subordination “does not require open conflict with ‘traditional’ districting criteria.” Id. at 5.
Thus, the Plaintiffs, like the dissent, propose a per se rule: the drafters’ use of the 55% BVAP floor in districting is verboten and automatically satisfies Miller’s predo *524 minance standard. This, the Plaintiffs argue, is the central thrust of the Alabama case:
This case boils -down'to a very simple proposition: May Virginia’s General Assembly utilize a fixed numerical racial threshold in establishing district lines____ The answer to this question has been addressed and definitively settled by the United States Supreme Court in its recent Alabama decision which unambiguously condemned- the use of racial thresholds in. redistricting[.]
Trial Tr. 811:1-10 (Plaintiffs).
Despite its tempting simplicity and visceral appeal, the Court must reject this proposal. Although the Alabama decision condemned the use of unwritten racial thresholds, it did not establish a per se predominance rule. In Alabama , the Court accepted the lower' court’s finding that legislators had employed BVAP percentage floors in the challenged districts. See Alabama, 135 S.Ct. at 1271 (“The legislators in charge of creating the redistricting plan believed, and told their technical adviser, that a primary redistricting goal was to maintain existing racial percentages in each majority-minority district, insofar as feasible.”). If the use of those thresholds constituted predominance per se, then there would have been little reason for the Supreme Court to have remanded the case to the district court to determine whether race predominated. Id. at 1272 ,
Rather, the: Court' pointed out that “[tjhere [was] considerable evidence that this goal had a direct and significant impact on the drawing of at least some of [the' district’s] boundaries.” Id. at 1271 (emphasis added). “That [the State] expressly adopted and applied a policy of prioritizing mechanical racial targets above all other districting criteria (save one-person, one-vote) provides evidence that race motivated the drawing of particular lines in multiple districts in the State.” Id. at 1267 (emphasis added). ■
The Alabama case could not be clearer that use of racial BVAP floors constitutes evidence — albeit significant evidence — of predominance. But, we do not read Alabama to hold that use of a BVAP floor satisfies the Plaintiffs’ predominance burden merely because the floor Was prioritized “above all other districting criteria” in “importance.” Rather, the' significance of the racial floor is its impact on the creation of the district; This demands “actual conflict between traditional redistricting criteria and race that leads to the subordination of the former, rather than a merely hypothetical conflict that per force results in the conclusion that-the traditional criteria have been subordinated to race.” Page v. Virginia State Bd.' of Elections, No. 3Í80V678, 2015 WL 3604029 , at *27 (E.D.Va.2015) (Payne, J., dissenting).
To understand why this is so, one must remember the origin of — and the rationale for — the Shaw claim. The district boundaries in Shaw were so, outlandish that— despite any express textual-classification by race in the statute — “it rationally [could] be viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional districting principles.” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 642 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 . In response, the Court treated the legislation as though it had employed a facial classification and subjected the legislation to. strict scrutiny rather than requiring the plaintiffs to prove both discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect.
In Shaw , the Court compared the districts to racial “balkanization” and “political apartheid” and cautioned that such districts threaten expressive harm — i.e., the stigmatization of individuals “by reason of their membership in a racial group” and the incitement of “racial hostility” — as well as representative harm — ie.,' the threat *525 that elected officials would begin to “believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather .than their constituency as whole.” Id. at 657, 643, 648 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 .
Unlike in its racial and political' vote dilution cases, however, thé Supreme Court did not charge plaintiffs with producing evidence that such discriminatory effects had, in fact, come to pass. See-e.g., Rogers, 458 U.S. at 625-27 , 102 S.Ct. 3272 (observing, in racial vote dilution case that “[e]xtensive evidence was cited by the District Court to support its finding that elected officials of Burke. County have been unresponsive and insensitive to the needs of the black community, which- increases the likelihood that the political process was not equally open to blacks”); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 131-32 , 106 S.Ct. 2797 , 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986) (observing in political vote dilution case that “[a]n individual or a group of individuals who votes for a losing candidate is usually deemed to bp adequately represented,by the winning candidate and to have as much opportunity to influence that candidate, as other voters in the district” and that the Court “cannot presume in such a situation, without actual proof to the contrary, that the candidate elected will entirely ignore the interests of those voters”) (emphasis added). Such evidence is not necessary in a racial sorting claim because “[ejxpress-racial classifications are immediately suspect” and are subjected to strict' scrutiny. Shaiv I, 509 U.S. at 642 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 . This is similarly true for the functional equivalents of express racial classifications: statutes “unexplainable on grounds other than race” or statutes that are an “obvious pretext for racial discrimination.*’ See id. at 643-44 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 .
• No sooner had the ink dried on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Shaw , than it was faced with a slightly different question. What if the district’s boundaries are not “bizarre” or “irrational,” but still reflect a clear manifestation of racial classification? In Miller , the Court recognized that Shaw represented an “analytically distinct”- claim, 515 U.S. at 911 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 , but decided that the litigation before it “require[d] [the Court] further to consider the requirements of the proof necessary to sustain this equal protection challenge,” id. at 915 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 . Rather than abandoning the claim’s' animating principles, the Court altered the threshold showing and clarified that parties bringing a racial sorting claim are “neither confined in their proof to evidence regarding the district’s geometry'and makeup nor required to make a threshold showing óf bizarreness.” - Id.
The district challenged in Miller was not as bizarre as those found in Shaw , but, “when'its shape [was] considered in conjunction with its racial and population densities,” ■ it became “exceedingly obvious” that the district employed “narrow land bridges” in “a deliberate attempt to bring black populations into the district.” Id. at 917, 115 S.Ct. 2475 , There, the district’s various spindly appendages contained nearly 80% of the district’s total black population. Id. These facially evident deviations from neutral districting conventions could only be explained on the- basis of race. Id. at 918-19 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 . 10 *526 Thus, districts such as the one found in Miller still raise the specter of expressive or representative harms and still manifest, on the face of the law, the lawmakers’ clear intent to “us[e] race as a basis for separating voters into districts.” Id, at 911, 115 S.Ct. 2475 . Moreover, these districts necessarily reflect the kind of “very stereotypical assumptions the Equal Protection Clause forbids;” namely, the “demeaning notion that members of the defined racial groups ascribe to certain ‘minority views’ that must be different from those of other citizens.” Id. at 914 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 .
However, when racial considerations do not entail the compromise of neutral dis-tricting norms, the basis for a racial sorting claim evaporates. Traditional, neutral districting principles reflect certain judgments about voters, but these are the same judgments that animate all geographic — as opposed to proportional — representation systems: that those who live near each other in the same communities, counties, and cities have something in common, something that warrants their representation as a reasonably defined geographical — rather than racial or political — unit.
More importantly, holding that otherwise reasonably neutral districts are subject to strict scrutiny because of a merely theoretical or latent conflict between race and traditional districting criteria would unlash the Shaw claim from the mooring of facial classification jurisprudence. If this legal equivalence is forfeited, it is unclear why the “analytically distinct” nature of the claim should not unravel entirely, forcing plaintiffs to prove the expressive or representative harms postulated in Shaw .
■Admittedly, the issue presented in this case is a difficult one. The Supreme Court reserved from the very outset the question of whether the intentional use of a 50% BVÁP threshold was sufficient to sustain a racial sorting claim:
It is unnecessary for us to decide whether or how a reapportionment plan that, on its face, can be explained in nonracial terms successfully could be challenged. Thus, we express no view as to whether “the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more,” always gives rise to an equal protection claim.
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 649 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 . Although the principal opinion in Bush v. Vera attempted to put this question to rest, 517 U.S. 952, 958 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 , 135 L.Ed.2d 248 (1996) (“Strict scrutiny does not apply ... to all intentional creation of majority-minority districts.”) (principal opinion), Justice Kennedy expressed some doubts in his concurring opinion:
I join the plurality opinion, but the statements in ,. the opinion that strict scrutiny would not apply to all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority districts require comment. I do not consider these dicta to commit me to any position on the question whether race is predominant whenever a State, in redistricting, foreordains that one race be the majority in a certain number of districts or in á certain part of the State.
Id. at 996 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
Based on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Alabama , the Court now appears to be divided, or at least equivocal, on whether BVAP thresholds alone are sufficient to constitute predominance. Compare Alabama, 135 S.Ct. at 1267 (noting that , the prioritization of “mechanical racial targets above all other districting criteria” only provides evidence that race predominated) with League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 517 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 , 165 L.Ed.2d 609 (2006) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito) (arguing *527 that the intentional use of a 50% BVAP threshold necessarily means race predominated).
Although the unwritten use of a racial floor by legislators may seem repugnant at first blush, the interpretation of predominance proposed by the Plaintiffs and the dissent has quite serious repercussions. 11 If the use of a BVAP threshold — any BVAP threshold — is sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny in the absence of a' facial manifestation in the lines themselvés through the subordination of traditional redistrieting principles, then the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act — as applied to redistrieting — would be drawn into question. More fundamentally, the compatibility of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause might be drawn into question. 12 The Court does not believe that the Constitution — or that Supreme Court precedent — either requires or permits the Plaintiffs’ view of predominance and, therefore, does not believe that the racial sorting claim extends any further than its original purpose: to strike down those districts that,- on their face, reflect racial classifications.
Moreover, the Plaintiffs do not take umbrage at the use of racial targets, so long as those targets serve the ends of preserving minority voters’ ability to elect. Quoting from the Alabama decision during their closing statement, the Plaintiffs observed that, in order to be narrowly tailored, the legislature must ask “to what extent must we preserve existing minority percentages in order to maintain the minorities’ present ability to elect the candidate of its choice.” Trial Tr. 819:23-820:1 (Plaintiffs) (quoting Alabama, 135 S.Ct. at 1274 ). But, the inquiry into whether the targets are- adequately justified only occurs after finding race predominant. If targets themselves constitute subordination, then it is hard to see how the Plaintiffs have not smuggled one inquiry into the next. This would again threaten the foundations of the VRA by making all its redistrieting applications subject to strict scrutiny 13 and set up a potential conflict *528 between the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause.
After this journey, we thus arrive back where we started: Miller’s predominance test. In Miller , the Court, described the Plaintiffs’ burden as follows:
The plaintiffs burden is to show, either through circumstantial evidence of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to legislative purpose, that race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature’s decision to place a significant number of voters within or without a particular district To make this showing, a plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests, to racial considerations.
515 U.S. at 916 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs would prefer we stop reading Miller at this exact punctuation mark.- And, under that formulation, they could plausibly argue that they have proved racial predominance merely upon proof that legislators used' a 55% BVAP floor. But the very next sentence in Miller leads where this Court must, follow: “Where these or other race-neutral considerations are the basis for redistricting legislation, and are not subordinated to race, a State can ‘defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines.’ ” Id. (quoting Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 ) (emphasis added). The Court’s quotation of Shaw in this instance rather clearly reflects its intention:
[Traditional districting principles such as compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions ... are important ... because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines .... Put differently, we believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter.
Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 (emphasis.added),. Therefore, we rely on the principal opinion in Bush , which stated that the “neglect of traditional districting criteria” is “necessary, [but] not sufficient” for strict scrutiny to apply. Bush, 517 U.S. at 962 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 (principal opinion) (emphasis added); accord Miller, 515 U.S; at 928, 115 S.Ct. 2475 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“To invoke strict scrutiny, a plaintiff must show that the State has relied on race in substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting practices.”).
Our dissenting colleague advocates a different reading of predominance. The dissent views the 55% BVAP floor as a “filter through which all line-drawing decisions had to pass” and argues that this “racial filter necessarily .... rendered all traditional criteria that otherwise would have been ‘race-neutral,’ tainted by and subordinated to race.” Post at 575. According to the dissent, “a legislative district necessarily is crafted ‘because of race ’ ” when such a filter is employed.- Post at 575-76 (emphasis added). The dissent takes the view that the “application of strict scrutiny in this suit wag never a close question” because when the legislators “intentionally created [55% BVAP] districts,” this “was sufficient to show that race was a predominant factor in its redistricting.” Bush, 517 U.S. at 999-1000 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). We respectfully decline to adopt this reading of predominance.
First, the dissent’s interpretation echoes the view that was rejected by the principal opinion in Bush v. Vera. See id. at 962, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (principal.opinion). In his sepa *529 rate Bush concurrence, Justice Thomas wrote:
In my view, [the intentional creation of a 50% BVAP district] means that the legislature affirmatively undertakes to create a majority-minority district that would not have existed but for the express use of racial classifications — in other words, that a majority-minority district is created “because of,” and not merely “in spite of,” racial demograph-ies. When that occurs, traditional race-neutral districting principles are necessarily subordinated (and race necessarily predominates), and the legislature has classified persons on the basis of race. The resulting redistricting must ’ be viewed as a racial gerrymander.
Id. at 1001 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). Although Justice Thomas recognized that this question was “expressly reserved” in Shaw I , he believed that the Court had “effectively resolved it in subsequent cases.” Id. at 999, 116 S.Ct. 1941 .
' Justice Thomas first pointed to the Supreme Court’s decision in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 , 115 S.Ct. 2097 , 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995), as evidence that “all governmehtal racial classifications must be strictly scrutinized.” Id. at 999-1000, 116 S.Ct. 1941 . But this presumes what must in fact be proven: that the Virginia legislature’s facially neutral redistricting legislation was the legal equivalent, of a facially racial classification. Predominance is itself the arbiter of this legal equivalency.
In Adarand, the question was whether a contracting clause providing “financial iri-centive[s] to hire subcontractors controlled by ‘socially and economically disadvantaged individuals’ ... violates the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” 515 U.S. at 204, 115 S.Ct. 2097 . In that case, federal law required the use of the clause in most federal agency contracts, and expressly “require[d] the clause 'to state that ‘[t]he contractor shall presume that socially and economically disadvantaged individuals include Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, Asian Pacific Americans, and other minorities[.]’ ” Id. at 205 , 115 S.Ct. 2097 : •
The dissent retreads this path by citing to City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 , 109 S.Ct. 706 , 102 KEd.2d 854 (1989). As in Adarand, the Croson Court was faced with a city ordinance expressly requiring contractors to subcontract at least 30% of their work on city contracts to “Minority Business Enterprises” owned and controlled by “[cjitizens of the United States who are Blacks, Spanish-speaking, ’Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or'Aleuts.” Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78 , 109 S.Ct. 706 .
We have no «doubt that strict scrutiny is applied to all express racial classifications, but .neither Adarand nor Croson help light our path to interpreting predominanqe. Adarand itself . explicitly ■ disclaimed any application to facially neutral legislation, stating that “this case concerns only classifications-based explicitly; on race, and presents none of the additional difficulties posed by laws that, although facially race neutral, result in racially disproportionate impact and are motivated by a racially discriminatory purpose.” , Adarand, 515 U.S. at 213 , 115 S.Ct. 2097 (emphasis added).
Justice Thomas next pointed to Miller and argued that the State’s “concession that it intentionally created [50% BVAP] districts was sufficient to show that race was a predominant,-motivating factor in its redistricting.” Bush, 517 U.S. at 1000 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 (Thomas,-J.,-concurring in the judgment). The dissent also relies upon Miller to argue that strict scrutiny is war *530 ranted when a legislature is “motivated by,” rather. than merely “conscious of,” race in its districting. See post at 571. But this demands the impossible. We cannot ask legislators to accidentally wander into compliance with the VRA, and Miller cannot be read to invoke strict scrutiny whenever legislators intentionally create a district with a predetermined BVAP floor.
In Miller , there was considerable evidence showing “that the General Assembly was motivated by a predominant, overriding desire to assign black populations to the Eleventh District and thereby permit the creation of a third majority-black district.” 515 U.S. at 917, 115 S.Ct. 2475 . It was the State’s overriding assignment of voters on the basis of race, rather than other districting criteria, that made the third majority-minority district constitutionally offensive. If Miller stood for. the proposition that the intentional ereation of a 50% BVAP district dime constituted “predominance,” then all three majority-minority districts would have constituted racial gerrymanders. Instead, the opinion focused on the Eleventh District, which was a geographic “monstrosity” and required the State to add lengthy appendages, split' precincts, and abandon “all reasonable standards of compactness and contiguity.” Id. at 909, 917-19 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 .
The Miller decision does, of course, recognize that “statutes are subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause not just when they contain express racial classifications, but also when, though race neutral on their face, they are motivated by a racial purpose or object.” 515 U.S. at 913, 115 S.Ct. '2475. But it is Miller’s subordination test itself that mans the floodgates to ensure that the predominance exception to traditional facial classification jurisprudence does not swamp the standing rule that Equal Protection Clause claims against facially neutral statutes usually require plaintiffs to prove discriminatory purpose and discriminatory effect.
Subordination in the enacted plan (rather than subordination of hypothetical plans) is required because a map that reflects neutral conventions on its face eliminates the assumption of expressive and representative harm found in Shaw I without necessarily imposing any other constitutionally cognizable harms in its stead. The Supreme Court recognized as much in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 , 98 S.Ct. 2733 , 57 L.Ed.2d 750 (1978). '
In Bakke , the Supreme Court struck down a higher education admissions program that reserved a specific number of seats for minority applicants. See 438 U.S. at 275 , 98 S.Ct. 2733 . The problem with this scheme was that it “prefer[red] the designated minority groups at the expense of other individuals who [were] totally foreclosed from competition for the 16 special admissions seats[.]” Id. at 305 , 98 S.Ct. 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.) (emphasis added). As Justice Powell wrote, “[w]hen a classification denies an individual opportunities or benefits enjoyed by others solely because of his race or ethnic background, it must be regarded as suspect.” Id..
Justice Powell contrasted this holding with the Supreme Court’s holding the previous year in United Jewish Organizations v. Carey (UJO), 430 U.S. 144 , 97 S.Ct. 996 , 51 L.Ed.2d 229 (1977). In UJO, the State of New York had redrawn its voting districts “to enhance the electoral power of certain ‘nonwhite’, voters” and “meet [the] objections of the [DOJ] under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act [.]” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 304-05 , 98 S.Ct. 2733 (opinion of Powell, J.). The Supreme Court affirmed the plan. According to Justice Powell, UJO was distinguishable “as a case in which the *531 remedy for an administrative finding of discrimination encompassed measures to improve the previously disadvantaged group’s ability to participate, mthout excluding individuals belonging to any other group from enjoyment of the relevant opportunity — meaningful participation in the electoral process.” Id. at 305, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (emphasis added). When a legislature crafts a plan that reflects traditional, neutral, districting conventions and does not intentionally dilute any group’s meaningful participation in the electoral process, there is no constitutionally cognizable offense to be found. The use of a quota does not change this. See UJO, 430 U.S. at 162 , 97 S.Ct. 996 (principal opinion) (“[A] reapportionment cannot violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment merely because a State uses specific numerical quotas in establishing a certain number of black majority districts. Our cases under [Section] 5 stand for at least this much.”). 14
From this vantage, the second problem with the dissent’s reading comes into view: an interpretation of predominance that ignores “discriminatory effect” and deploys strict scrutiny when a neutral statute is adopted “because of’ race-based-motives would allow claims to proceed on “racial purpose” alone. Such an interpretation raises vexatious justiciability and balance of powers questions.
A redistrieting plan struck down “solely because of the motivations of the men who voted for it” regardless “of its facial content or effect ... would presumably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing body repassed it for different reasons.” See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 , 91 S.Ct. 1940 , 29 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). That is because the offense is not in the legislative content of the enactment but only in the mental content of the legislators. Although divining the amalgamated motivations of an entire legislature may be tolerable when a showing of discriminatory effect further girds the inquiry, a “purpose only” equal protection claim would require courts to rest judgment upon the thoughts of a coequal branch alone.
We decline to take that path. As Chief Justice Burger once wrote,
The seductive plausibility of single steps in a chain of evolutionary development of a legal rule is often not perceived until a third, fourth, or fifth ‘logical’ extension occurs. Each step, when taken, appeared a reasonable step in relation to that which preceded it, although the aggregate or end result is one that would never have been seriously considered in the first instance. This kind of gestative propensity calls for the ‘line drawing’ familiar in the judicial, as in the legislative process: ‘thus far but not beyond.’
United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123,127 , 93 S.Ct. 2665 , 37 L.Ed.2d 500 (1973). The dissent’s interpretation might be a logical step in the evolution of the equal protection “predominance” test. But we think it would be one step too far. Predominance requires that racial considerations manifest in the enacted plan itself through the actual subordination of other districting criteria. That determination cannot be made without examining the respective roles of both race and the other redistricting factors in the actual plan before the Court.
*532 For the foregoing reasons, we reject the invitation' to- read the unwritten Use of a 55% BVAP floor as a per se satisfaction of the predominance inquiry in a racial sorting claim. Of course, evidence of such thresholds is still significant when examining those districts that exhibit deviations from traditional, neutral districting principles. See Easley v. Cromartie (Cromartie II), 532 U.S. 234 , 254, 121 S.Ct. 1452 , 149 L.Ed.2d 430 (2001) (noting that the use of a 50% racial threshold was “significant” evidence in Bush and Miller); Page, 2015 WL 3604029 at *35 (Payne, J., dissenting) (noting the significance in Shaw v. Hunt (Shaw II), 517 U.S. 899 , 116 S.Ct. 1894 , 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996), of a concession by the State to create two districts with 50% BVAP thresholds). Shaw II, for example, recognized that racial deviations from neutral principles cannot be saved by later resort to non-racial explanations. See 517 U.S. at 907, 116 S.Ct. 1894 .
According to the dissent, Shaw II compels a finding of predominance whenever non-racial factors are only considered “consistent with the racial objective.” Post at 572. But the district at issue in Shaw II was “highly irregular and geographically non-compact by any objective standard that can be conceived.” Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 905-06, 116 S.Ct. 1894 . Simply put,- the Shaw II Court was faced with a situation wherein some “race-neutral” goals — such as partisan balance — could still be partially advanced despite the qualitative predominance of race, but it was not faced with a situation wherein racial districting goals posed no conflict with neutral districting criteria whatsoever.
Moreover, the author of Shaw II , Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined the principal opinion issued the same day in Bush v. Vera, suggesting that these two opinions can — and should — be read in harmony. The Bush opinion joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist explicitly rejected the interpretation that the dissent now attributes to his opinion in Shaw II .
We adopt a reading consistent with Shaw II , as evidenced by our finding of racial predominance in [¶] 75. A State cannot district predominantly on the basis of race and then insulate such racial line drawing by pointing to other non-racial goals advanced by the racial sort.
Alabama) like its predecessors in the Shaw-Miller line, holds that racial thresholds constitute evidence, not dispositive proof, of racial predominance. If the thresholds employed by the legislators crafting the bill do not manifest in the formation of the enacted district, then there is no facial classification equivalent upon which to rest Shaw’s “analytically distinct” framework.
If one strict predominance rule were not enough, Intervenors advance a counter-theory that they claim is derived from Alabama . As the Intervenors stated during their closing argument:
“[T]he question you must answer to get to strict scrutiny ... is whether the use of . race resulted in any district which violated Virginia law or traditional redistricting criteria of the state, or, as the state, did here, their specifically adopted criteria.”
Trial Tr. 16:8-13 (Intervenors). Interve-nors drew the Court’s attention to a passage in the Alabama decision where the Court “talk[ed] about [the State] transgressing its own state guidelines, its own state criteria.” Id. at 853:15-854:9. And so it did:
There is considerable evidence that [the racial thresholds] had a direct and significant impact on the drawing of at least some of District 26’s boundaries ..... Transgressing their own redistric-tinq guidelines, the drafters split seven precincts between the majority-black *533 District 26 and the majority-white District 25, with the population' in those precincts clearly divided on racial lines.
Alabama, 135 S.Ct. at 1272 (emphasis added). But, as is clear from the cited passage, the drafters’ transgression of their own redistricting guidelines — like their informal usé of a racial threshold — is "evidence of predominancé, not dispositive proof. That is because “subordination” is not the same as a “violation” or “transgression.” Subordination requires á balancing of degree to determine whether non-raeial criteria or racial criteria predominated.
For example, it is difficult to understand what a “transgression” of “compactness” would even entail. Compactness, like temperature, falls along a range, and there is- no professional consensus about what degree of departure (from any of more than twenty measures) is enough to say a district is “not compact.” Trial Tr. 716:15-18 (Hofeller). 15
More importantly, the “traditional” criteria discussed in the Shaw-Miller cases are informed by, but not defined by, state law. Rendering the predominance inquiry subject to state law would make the existence of a federal constitutional claim dependent upon an individual state’s resolutions, statutes, or constitution.
The determinative question is not whether a State’s individualized districting requirements are “violated,” but whether traditional, neutral districting criteria and other districting criteria have been generally “subordinated” to racial considerations on the whole. See Page, 2015 WL 3604029 at *11 (“To show that race predominated, Plaintiffs need not establish that the legislature disregarded every traditional dis-tricting principle.”). A State’s violation of, or departure from, its own stated criteria can constitute evidence in the predominance analysis, but Alabama does not require that the State do. so in order to make out a racial: sorting claim.. Intervenors’ proposed interpretation is, accordingly, rejected.
1. Predominance Analysis
As common courtesy holds, one should not shoot down a suggestion without offering ah approach to replace it. Although “predominance,”' “subordination,” “dilution,” and “retrogression” are all standards not amenable to hard rules or safe harbors, the Court does have an obligation to thé parties to explain its reasoning as clearly and definitively as possible. Therefore, the Court will walk through each of the steps of the analytical- framework that it has applied to arrive at its conclusions with respect to the Challenged Districts.
A racial sorting claim is. “one area in which appearances do matter.” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 . Because a district must exhibit “substantial disregard of customary and traditional districting practices” in order to animate the racial sorting doctrine’s central concern with facial’ classification, Miller, 515 U.S. at 928 , 115 S.Ct.- 2475 -(O’Connor, J., concurring), the Court will evaluate each Challenged District for “subordination” in' three steps.
First, the Court will review the district on the basis of its compliance with traditional, neutral districting criteria, including, but. not limited to, compactness, contiguity, nesting, and adherence to *534 boundaries provided by political subdivisions and natural geographic features.
Second, the Court will examine those aspects of the Challenged District that appear to constitute “deviations” from neutral criteria. These may be particular, isolated areas along the district’s boundary, or — on occasion — the district itself may seem facially questionable. Based on the evidence submitted and testimony provided, the Court will examine the record to ascertain the underlying rationale for those deviations. In determining the reasons for deviations from the traditional neutral criteria, it will be necessary to determine whether a deviation was caused in part or entirely by the need to comply with the one-person, one-vote precepts 16 or by political circumstances such as protection of incumbents.
Third, the Court will weigh the totality of the evidence and determine whether racial considerations qualitatively subordinated all other non-racial districting criteria.
a. Neutrality
A racial sorting claim requires the Court find that the State subordinated traditional, neutral criteria, and other nonracial districting criteria to racial considerations. Traditional districting principles include, inter alia, compactness, contiguity, respect for political subdivisions, and communities “defined by actual shared interests.” See Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 ; Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 . These conventions neutrally advance the values inherent in a geographic — rather than proportional — system of representation, such as responsiveness, accountability, familiarity, ease of access, ease of administration, and political engagement.
The specific traditional criteria outlined in Miller and Shaw are not constitutionally required. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 ; Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 , 752 n. 18, 93 S.Ct. 2321 , 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973) (“[C]ompactness or attractiveness has never been held to constitute an independent federal constitutional requirement for state legislative districts.”). Rather, these criteria are important because they reflect the neutrality that is central to a redistricting statute that complies with the Equal Protection Clause. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 558 , 84 S.Ct. 1362 . 17 Traditional, neutral conventions are important to evaluate in a racial gerrymandering claim “because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines.” Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 647 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 (emphasis added).
Of course, states may continue to develop new neutral districting principles, and a State’s consistent adherence thereto would also be considered an objective factor to help defeat a claim of gerrymandering. Existing traditional districting conventions “evolved over the years through the political process” itself. Bush, 517 U.S. at 1073 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 (Souter, J., dissenting). What renders these guiding principles important for redistricting purposes is that *535 they observe'and advance neutral democratic values.
The fact that a district deviates from neutral- criteria on its face does not, however, mean that those deviations were racially motivated. Other, non-racial dis-tricting criteria may also be used to defeat a claim of racial gerrymandering by demonstrating that the district’s deviations from neutral criteria are attributable to race-neutral motives. Chief among these are political and incumbency considerations. See Alabama, 135 S.Ct. at 1270 .
During the first stage of the predominance inquiry, the Court examines whether the redistricting legislation — on its face — raises questions .about the use of discriminatory, individualized criteria (such as race, politics, or incumbency) or whether it appears to be predominantly explainable on the basis of traditional, neutral, geographic criteria (such as compactness, contiguity, or respect for political subdivisions).
In reviewing the Challenged Districts, the Court will consider neutral criteria in the following manner:
i. Compactness
As Justice Stevens stated in Karcher v. Daggett, “geographical compactness serves independent values; it facilitates political organization, electoral campaigning, and constituent representation.” 462 U.S. 725, 756 , 103 S.Ct. 2653 , 77 L.Ed.2d 133 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). Although' “non-coinpact” districts may sometimes be necessary 'to serve these values — such as when a “major transport corridor might ... minimum[ize] travel time for a representative to travel around the district”— “drastic departures from compactness are a signal that something may be amiss.” Id. at 758, n. 20 , 103 S.Ct. 2653 .
Yet, compactness is surprisingly ethereal given its seemingly universal acceptance as a guiding principle for districting. All of the expert testimony provided reveals one deep conceptual dilemma: no one can agree what it is or, as a result, how to measure it. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 535:19-536:8 (Katz). There are “at least 20” measures, not one of which can claim any greater legitimacy than its peers. Id. at 555:16-17. The Reock test measures geographical dispersion and therefore is sensitive to — and its scoring punishes— elongated districts. Id. at 136:13-23 (An-solabehere). The- P.olsby-Popper test measures perimeter dispersion and therefore is sensitive to — and its scoring punishes — oddly shaped district boundaries with- large numbers of indentations. Id. Meanwhile, the Schwartzberg test looks at “a normalized standard deviation of the distance from every point to the center of the district,” id. at 558:4-7 (Katz), and the Boyce-Clark test measures the “center of inertia” or “how far is the farthest voter from the center of the district,” id. at 537:12-538:6, One notable political scientist has quipped that all of these measures are just variants of “the intraocular test”: “people look at distric[t] maps, they figure out which districts they think look ugly, and then they choose the compactness measure which comports with their eyeball-view of the mapping.” Id. at 542:14-24 (Katz). See also id. at 697:20-698:9 (Hofeller) (noting that “the main measurement of compactness ... while you are drawing a map is to look at the shapes of districts, so-called eyeball test”).
But compactness is not important for its own sake. Rather, compactness is important because it serves certain values of geographic representation. Therefore, the “major transportation corridor” district discussed by Justice Stevens would fare poorly on the Reock metric, but would serve its purposes in a manner that might be reflected by another measure (such as driving time). Meanwhile, a district that adheres to highly irregular county lines, id. at 559:18-21 (Katz); 687:1-4 (Hofeller), *536 or easily identifiable geographic features, id. at 538:14-19 (Katz); 687:1-4 (Hofelier), might score poorly on the Polsby-Popper test, but would enhance the values served by those neutral criteria, as discussed below. If the price of advancing these other neutral criteria is compactness, then the cost is not a judicial concern.
Nor does a district’s “absolute” compactness score matter so much as its “relative” score. The Court’s examination of a district’s compactness • measure may be informed by the average in the State (which is important to take account of a State’s inalterable features), see Ints.’- Ex. 14 at 12 (discussing Virginia’s irregular shape, county lines, and geographic features), may be informed by the average in the nation (which is important to take account where a State’s own averages may be far above or far below the national average), see Page, 2015 WL 3604029 at *33 (“A highly compact district in a state that adheres closely to compactness principles may be both the least compact in the state and among the most compact in the nation.”) (Payne, J., dissenting), and may be informed by historical averages (which is important to account for trends in compactness over several districting cycles),' see Trial Tr. 560:2-10 (Katz) (noting it is “perfectly reasonable” to use compactness measures “in comparing two maps for the same state”). These are all factors that courts must consider when evaluating this criterion.
In short, the Court would be remiss to look at compactness scores in a vacuum, but that does not render them useless as evaluative tools in the predominance inquiry. The key is not “absolute” compactness, “relative” compactness, or even a State’s adherence to its own constitutional or statutory compactness definitions (although these may be illuminating); rather, the key is whether compactness deviations are attributable to something meaningful, such as other neutral criteria or a legitimate use of non-neutral criteria. 18 As Dr. Hofelier stated at trial, echoing Justice Stevens’ sage advice, compactness is “more like a flag than a conclusion.” Trial Tr. 684:17-18 (Hofelier).
ii. Contiguity
Contiguity, like compactness, serves important democratic purposes, binding geographic communities together and helping to enable effective representation. In upholding a district under the Virginia constitution’s contiguity provision despite its division by water, the Supreme Court of Virginia reflected upon this raison d’étre:
Although the record shows that travel between [some] precincts and the remainder of the district requires travel through another district, there is nothing in this record showing that such access is unreasonable, unduly burdensome, or adversely impacts the ability of residents to secure meaningful representation of their interests or effective communication with their elected represen-tativei
Wilkins v. West, 264 Va. 447, 465-66 , 571 S.E.2d 100 (Va.2002). As the Page court reminded, “contiguity and other traditional districting principles are ‘important not because they are constitutionally required,’ but rather ‘because they are objective factors’ courts may consider in assessing racial gerrymandering claims.” 2015 WL 3604029 at *11.
A district split by water has not “violated” contiguity for the purposes of a racial sorting claim any more than a district *537 connected by a single point on land has “respected” contiguity. See Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 636 , 113 S.Ct. 2816 (noting that one of the districts in that case “remain[ed] contiguous only because it intersected] at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them”). As with compactness, contiguity admits of degrees. Districts that are not divided by water are more contiguous than those that are, and districts that are at least connected by a water crossing — such as a bridge — are more contiguous than districts that are not. Land contiguity is important not because it is determinative, but because it reflects the common understanding that bodies of water may mark the natural divide between communities of interest or constitute barriers to the effective function of democratic activities. 19
Of course, deviations from land contiguity may also reflect adherence to other neutral districting criteria. Many Cities lie across rivers or around harbors and, indeed, are built outward from the central focal point of the community: the waterfront. In such cases, a body of water that “divides” a community may actually be the primary factor that unites it. In other words, a “deviation” from “contiguity” standards may be an attempt to respect a distinct community of interest or political subdivision. The subordination of contiguity conventions is, like compactness, simply a factor that the Court must consider in conducting its predominance analysis,
iii. Political Subdivisions
A common and significant neutral dis-tricting criterion is respect for political subdivisions, such as counties or cities. “Subdivision boundaries tend to remain stable over time. Residents of political units such as townships, cities, and counties often develop a community of interest, particularly when the subdivision plays an important role in the provision of governmental services.” Karcher; 462 U.S. at 758 , 103 S.Ct. 2653 (Stevens, • J., concurring). Moreover, adherence to subdivision boundaries can facilitate civic engagement, enhance democratic accountability, and increase administrative convenience. See id. (“[Legislative districts that do not cross subdivision boundaries are administratively convenient and less likely to confuse the voters,”); id. at 787 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 2653 (Powell, J., dissenting). As Justice Powell once wrote:
Most voters know what city and county they live in, but fewer are likely to know what [legislative] district they live in if the districts split counties and cities. If a voter knows his [legislative] district, he is more likely to know who his representative is. This presumably would lead to more informed voting. It also is likely to lead to a representative who knows the heeds of his district and is more responsive to them.
Id. at 787 n. 3, 103 S.Ct. 2653 (Powell, J., dissenting) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
When a legislative district is “nothing more than an artificiál unit divorced from, and indeed often in conflict' with, the various communities established in the State,” legislators cannot represent their constituents properly and voters cannot exercise the ballot intelligently.. Id. at 787 , 103 S.Ct. 2653 (Powell, J., dissenting). A report produced by the Governor’s Commission distilled the overarching themes that were repeatedly voiced during its public forums from around the Commonwealth. As the Commission noted, “the splitting of municipal and county jurisdictions drew the ire of citizens, who ... pointed out the *538 difficulties that citizens have in knowing who to contact, who to hold accountable, and who among several legislators should coordinate or lead the representation of local city and county interests in the General Assembly.” Pis.’ Ex. 23 at 8.
In evaluating whether neutral criteria were subordinated, a legislature’s adherence to city and county boundaries provides an important reference point for courts undertaking the predominance analysis. Of course, the legislature may, and often will, need to deviate from political subdivision borders to comply with federal- or .state-mandated population constraints. In such situations, the Court will look to whether another neutral criterion — such as compactness, geographic boundaries, predict boundaries, or communities of interest — helps to explain the method of departure. In this manner, neutral criteria can often form a “backstop” for one another when one criterion cannot be fully satisfied, thus ensuring that neutral criteria are still predominating in the balance,
vi. Natural Geography
Geographic features, such as mountains ranges or rivers, may also be used to provide a neutral boundary during the dis-tricting process. Oftentimes, these geographic indicators mark the boundaries of distinct communities of interest or can provide a point of reference for voters, candidates, and representatives. In many cases, these natural boundaries may' already constitute the basis for governmental subdivision lines. See, e.g., Ints.’ Ex. 14 at 12 (noting that, in Virginia, “[mjany county lines follow riverbeds, and the State’s western boundary runs along 400 miles of mountain ridges and rivers”).
Over time, artificial geography may also come to play a similar role. Major transportation thoroughfares may slowly generate distinct communities of interest on either side of the divide, or the marker may be used as a useful reference point for voters, candidates, and representatives seeking to understand their own district’s boundaries. These are important factors to consider, especially when adherence to traditional subdivision lines is not possible,
v. Nesting
Nesting refers to the practice of putting two or more districts of the lower chamber of the state legislature wholly within each district of the upper chamber. “By permitting voters readily to identify their voting districts and corresponding representatives, a nested plan can be expected to foster voter participation.” Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 179 n. 18, 106 S.Ct. 2797 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Nesting may result in a House district boundary that appears inexplicable by neutral criteria until the corresponding Senate district is laid atop.
vi. Precincts
Precincts and Voting Tabulation Districts (“VTDs”) are often the smallest objectively identifiable geographic groupings that legislators use to organize legislative districts. They may occasionally correspond to towns, neighborhoods, or other identifiable communities of interest, but they are not “governmental jurisdictions” in their own right. Trial Tr. 234:11-16 (Ansolabehere); 605:4 (Hood). In Virginia, VTDs generally correspond to voting precincts. Id. at 253:14-17 (Ansolabeh-ere).
Given their small size, compliance with precinct or VTD boundaries alone will rarely be sufficient to show adherence to neutral criteria. This is because VTDs can easily be strung together into grotesque formations having little regard for compactness, contiguity, political subdivisions, or other important neutral criteria advancing democratic values. In short, a district could avoid splitting any VTDs but remain highly suspicious on its face.
For these same reasons, however, VTD splits will often provide a flag for further *539 inquiry. The unexplained splitting of several VTDs in a single district can call into question the criteria guiding that district’s construction.
vii. Communities of Interest
Among traditional, neutral districting principles, the concept of respecting “communities of interest” is the most enigmatic. On the one hand, respect for such communities is often considered the guiding light of the other neutral principles. On the other hand, defining some “communities of interest” may involve straddling the fence between neutral and discriminatory criteria. For example, communities of interest may be defined by relatively objective factors, such as service delivery areas, media markets, or major transit lines. Similarly, communities may be somewhat objectively characterized as rural, suburban, or urban. These can be valid neutral criteria, assuming that legislators actually have access to this information and rely upon it. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 953 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 (principal opinion) (discounting argument that legislature relied upon “urban character,” “shared media sources,” and “major transportation lines” because the “supporting data were largely unavailable to the legislature before the district was created” and the factors did not possess “the same degree of correlation to district lines that racial data exhibit”).
The “communities of interest” criterion becomes less neutral, however, when one considers “cultural,” “social,” or “religious” communities of interest. This tendency to morph into a more individualized metric explains the Miller Court’s qualification that traditional districting principles include “respect for ... communities defined by actual shared interests.” 515 U.S. at 916, 115 S.Ct. 2475 . To give effect to this elusive delineation, it is important to have demonstrable evidence of shared interest when the boundaries cannot be explained on an objective or neutral basis.
viii. State Criteria
For the reasons discussed above, a plaintiff does not need to prove that a State “violated” its own districting criteria in order to prove predominance. A State’s deviation from its own constitutional, statutory, or adopted criteria does, however, constitute evidence that is probative of subordination.
b. Deviations
If the Challenged Districts, or significant parts of the Challenged Districts, appear inexplicable by reference to the consistent application of traditional, neutral principles, then the Court will examine the basis for those departures. Deviations from neutral criteria signal the presence of potential subordination and lay the foundation for the sorting claim; namely, that the districts reflect racial classifications of individual voters and do not constitute neutral, geographic representative units.
The Supreme Court has cited several sources of direct and circumstantial evidence that courts can rely upon in identifying racial deviations, including:
[Statements by legislators indicating that race was a predominant factor in redistricting; evidence that race or percentage of race within a district was the single redistricting criterion that could not be compromised; ... use of land bridges in a deliberate attempt to bring African-American population into a district; and creation of districts that exhibit disregard for city limits, local election precincts, and voting tabulation districts.
Page, 2015 WL 3604029 , at *7 (internal citations omitted).
Because traditional, neutral principles advance fundamental democratic values and neutral state interests, districts that substantially disregard these principles can “causfe] a severe disruption of traditional forms of political activity.” Bush, 517 U.S. at 974 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 (principal *540 opinion). In Bush v. Vera, Justice O’Con-nor described the impact that such districts can have:
Campaigners seeking to visit their constituents “had to carry a map to identify ■the district lines, because so'often the borders would move from block to block”; voters “did not know the candidates running for office” because they did not know which district they lived in. In light of [the State’s] requirement .that voting be arranged by precinct, with each precinct representing a community that shares local, state, and federal representatives, it also created administrative headaches for local election officials[.]
Id. at 974 , 116 S.Ct.»1941. Such complaints. have , been -echoed by local election officials in Virginia who “end up taking the brunt of complaints from voters who can’t understand why they can’t vote in their old precinct, why they can’t find any of their current office holders on the ballot, and why they are in the same district as a relative who lives nowhere near them[.]” Pis.’ Ex. 26 at 17:6-18.
. Of course, the presence of identifiable deviations alone does not satisfy the predominance inquiry because “subordination” requires “substantial disregard” for traditional, neutral districting criteria. . The substantiality of any identified deviations — and whether it is sufficient to support a finding of predominance — is examined when the Court weighs the evidence as a whole in the final stage.
In reviewing the Challenged Districts, the Court will consider evidence bearing on legislators’ bases for- the deviations; Deviations may be attributed to any number of considerations, but .legislators typically rely upon the following: population equality, race, political affiliation or preference, and incumbency. The Court will evaluate these bases for deviation in the following manner:
i. Population
“[A]n equal population goal ... is part of the redistricting background, taken as a given, when determining whether race, or other factors, predominate in a legislator’s determination as to how equal population objectives will be met.” Alabama, 135 S.Ct. at 1270 . Thus, achievement of the population goal is not a traditional redistricting factor that is considered in the balancing that determines predominance. However, the requirement to comply with federally imposed population goals is relevant to assessing why a district may appear to -deviate from neutral criteria. This is particularly- true where the census data shows significant losses or gains of population in certain geographic areas of a State.
The Court’s' analysis does not change just because the State has' decided to adopt a lower percentage deviation threshold than constitutionally required. In Alabama , the legislature adopted “a more rigorous deviation standard than our precedents have found necessary under the Constitution.” Id. at 1263 . There, as here, it seems that '“[cjompliance with these two goals” — BVAP targets and a ± 1% population deviation rule — “posed particular difficulties with respect to ... the State’s ... majority-minority districts[.]” Id. But “legislative efforts to create districts of approximately equal population” more stringent than the 5% deviation held generally permissible in Broum v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 , 103 S.Ct. 2690 , 77 L.Ed.2d 214 (1983), cannot explain away‘deviations from neutral principles. 20 Id. at 1270. The predominance inquiry examines the basis upon which voters were sorted into appropriately ap *541 portioned districts. Id. at-1271. Where apportionment by ■ political subdivision must be sacrificed to equal population goals, for example, other neutral principles such as compactness and precinct boundaries can often pick up the slack. A substantial deviation from neutral principles, therefore, only admits of answer by other, non-neutral criteria, such as race or political affiliation.
ii. Racial Deviations
One explanation for a district’s deviations from neutral districting criteria may be voters’ race. The mere awareness or consideration of race by legislators in their districting decisions does not, on its own, provide sufficient evidence to support a claim of racial sorting under the Equal Protection Clause. Shaw 'I, 509 U.S. at-646,-113 S.Ct. -2816 (“[T]he legislature always is aware of race when - it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors. That sort of race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination.”). It takes more than consideration of race to prove that race predominated over traditional factors. • Of course,' if legislators’ use of racé entailed the subordination of other districting criteria, it must be adequately justified under the strict scrutiny regime.
iii. Political Deviations
Another explanation for a district’s deviations from- neutral districting criteria may be voters’ political opinions, affiliations, and beliefs. As with race, the mere awareness or consideration of voters’ political affiliation by legislators is both unavoidable and constitutionally permissible. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 753-54 , 93 S.Ct. 2321 (“It would be idle, we think, to contend that any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate it.... The very essence of districting is to produce a different — a more ‘politically fair’ — result. ... Politics and political considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment.”). Accordingly, districting on the basis of political affiliation may be a legitimate criterion for the legislature to consider. Alabama, 135 S.Ct. at 1270 (citing Bush for the proposition that legislators may rely on “political affiliation” in districting); Bush, 517 U.S. at 954-65 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 (principal opinion) (citing Gaff-ney ). 21
*542 The Intervenors have raised the argument that some of the Challenged Districts have political, rather than racial, justifications. 22
iv. Incumbency Deviations
Yet another explanation for a district’s deviations from neutral districting criteria may be incumbency considerations. In Gaffney v. Cummings, the Supreme Court observed that: “It would be idle, we think, to contend that any political consideration taken into account in fashioning a reapportionment plan is sufficient to invalidate it.... Redistricting may pit incumbents against one another or make very difficult the election of the most experienced legislator.” 412 U.S. at 753-54, 93 S.Ct. 2321 . Accordingly, a district’s impact on an incumbent may be a legitimate criterion for the legislature to consider; Alabama, 135 S.Ct. at 1270 (citing Bush for the proposition that legislators may consider “incumbency protection” in districting).
However, as with political deviations, deviations from neutral districting principles for incumbency purposes are not always permissible. In Bush , the Court recognized “incumbency protection, at least in the limited form of ‘avoiding contests between incumbentfs],’ as a legitimate state goal.” 517 U.S. at 964-65, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (principal opinion) (emphasis added). This state interest “aim[s] at maintaining existing relationships between incumbent congressmen and their constituents and pre-serv[es] the seniority the members of the State’s delegation have achieved in the United States House of Representatives,” White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 792 , 93 S.Ct. 2348 , 37 L.Ed.2d 335 (1973), but does not necessarily invade the province of the voters. As the LULAC Court advised: “[Ijncumbency protection can be a legitimate factor in districting, but experience teaches that incumbency protection can take various forms, not all of them in the interests of the constituents.” 548 U.S. at 440-41 , 126 S.Ct. 2594 .
Here, the Intervenors allege that many of the Challenged Districts’ deviations have “incumbency protection” justifications. See, e.g., Trial Tr. 825:5-7 (Interve-nors) (“This was an incumbent-protection plan. That’s the predominate motive of this plan[.]”). Some of these deviations reflect an interest in drawing district lines between incumbents’ residences to avoiding pairing incumbents. See, e.g., id. at 304:6-21 (Jones). Other deviations, however, reveal an effort to fence in the incumbent’s preferred voters or fence out the incumbent’s detractors or challengers. See, e.g., id. at 325:19-326:23 (Jones). Whether this latter definition of “incumbency protection” states a legitimate government interest need not be decided here because no one has presented that issue. See Weiser, 412 U.S. at 792 , 93 S.Ct. 2348 .
That said, we share the dissent’s concern over Intervenors’ “implicit suggestion that approval by incumbent legislators” can somehow “rescue” a plan from a finding of racial predominance. Post at 576. We fully agree that “[t]he [VRA] and the Equal Protection Clause are intended to protect the rights of the individual voter, not to promote the self-interest of incumbents in majority-minority districts.” Post at 576. And; to be clear, the framework we adopt today condones no such thing.
*543 For example, if legislators attempt to “ ‘pac[k]’ minority voters into a particular majority-minority district for the purpose of protecting the incumbent,” post at 576. (emphasis added), this would still constitute racial sorting regardless of the “goal” of incumbency protection, see post at 543-44. This is precisely what we find occurred in [¶] 75, and we hold that race predominated accordingly. See post at 556-58.
On the other hand, if legislators attempt to pack supporters -into their districts or attempt to remove detractors or challengers, then it could hardly be said that race drove the districting deviation. This does not imply that such actions are immune from constitutional challenge. Althbugh the Supreme Court has only sanctioned a state interest in “incumbency pairing prevention,” the Plaintiffs simply did not raise any challenge to the Commonwealth’s alleged interest in a wider definition of “incumbency protection,” Thus, we are in no. position to decide that constitutional question.
Simply put, if incumbency interests constitute the predominate- criterion driving the construction of the district, then a claim of racial gerrymandering must fail. That, however, does not imply that a claim of political gerrymandering would face a similar fate.
c. Weighing
The final step in the predominance inquiry of a racial sorting claim involves the weighing of the evidence in toto to determine whether the deviations attributable to race “predominate” over all other districting criteria employed by the legislature, including both neutral criteria and deviations attributable to non-racial motives. To demonstrate predominance, the Plaintiffs must show that the legislature “subordinated” or exhibited “substantial disregard” for these other criteria.
In making its predominance determination, the Court “must be sensitive to the complex interplay of forces that enter a legislature’s redistricting calculus” and “exercise extraordinary caution.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 915-16 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 . “Federal-court review of districting legislation represents a serious intrusion on the most vital of local functions,” id. at 915 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 , and the Plaintiffs’ burden is understandably “a demanding one,” id. at 928 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 (CfConnor, J., concurring). Therefore, the redistricting enactments of a legislature are entitled to a presumption of correctness and good faith, and the burden is upon the plaintiff to dislodge that presumption. Id. at 915 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 (majority opinion).
It should be noted, however, that the predominance' balancing inquiry is qualitative Father than quantitative. In Miller, for' example, the challenged district employed gangly arms at various points to capture black population centers, but the district’s overall shápe was not far from routine. See id. at 917 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 ; id. at Appendix B. Looking at the complete picture, however, the district court found that “[r]ace was.... the predominant, overriding factor explaining the General Assembly’s decision to attach to the [district] various appendages containing dense majority-black populations.” Id. at 920 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 .
In conducting the predominance balancing, two. particular issues warrant the Court’s careful attention.
i. Racial & Political Correlation
Occasionally, a deviation may appear equally explainable by racial or political motivations. Because the State is presumed to have acted lawfully and in good faith, the plaintiff must provide evidence that race — rather than politics — represented the primary basis for the classification. Evidence may include the sources of data *544 relied upon in drawing the district, the use of fixed (or “aspirational”) political or racial targets or floors, and statements from legislators regarding the relative priority of their racial and political goals.
A political objective, however,' does not immunize the use of race as a basis for classification because race cannot be used as a proxy for political characteristics-, Bush 517 U.S. at 968 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 (principal opinion), even if there is a -proven correlation between race and political preference, in the state. This is because “to the extent that race is used as a proxy for political characteristics, a racial stereotype requiring strict scrutiny is in operation.” Id.
This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Hunt v. ■ Cromartie (Cromartie I). The lesson of Cromartie .1 was that a political classification would not be considered racial simply because the Democratic voters happened to be black. 526 U.S. 541, 542 , . 119 S.Ct. 1545 , 143 L.Ed.2d 731 (1999) (“[A] jurisdiction may engage in constitutional political gerrymandering, even if it so happens that the most loyal Democrats happen to be black Democrats and even if those responsible for drawing the district are conscious of that fact.”). The lesson was not that a racial classification would be considered political simply because black voters happened to be Democrats.
In the latter scenario, the State still makes decisions about individuals based on the color of their skin. It is the act of using race as a proxy that constitutes an offensive stereotype. The fact that a stereotype might have some basis in fact — or is relied upon to achieve “non-racial” pur-, poses — does not render it any. less offensive.
Evidence of a racial floor will also lend support to the argument that race, rather than politics, can be attributed for particular deviations from neutral principles. -Although such a floor will not result in per se predominance where a district is formed predominantly on the basis of neutral criteria, its use can buttress a plaintiffs argument that race was the primary reason for a deviation where race and politics would otherwise seem equally plausible. :
Lastly, statements about the relative priority of districting goals may constitute evidence to support a finding of racial predominance. Taken alone, the parroting of federal requirements or the acknowledgment that certain compliance obligations are “mandatory” or “nonnegotiable” does not lend any weight in the predominance balance. If it did, the State would start the predominance balancing at an immediate disadvantage. However, if evidence is provided that demonstrates legislators held a false belief that certain artificial criteria — such as fixed BVAP floor — were necessary to comply with federal law, then statements by those particular legislators regarding compliance are relevant evidence in the predominance inquiry,
ii. Core Retention
Core retention — or “respecting existing district boundaries” — appears to be facially neutral and serves neutral political values,' such as increased- administrative ease, electoral accountability, and enhanced voter awareness and engagement. Unlike the other neutral criteria identified above, however, core retention holds a special place in the predominance balance. That is because “core preservation ... is not directly relevant, to the origin of the new district inhabitants.” Alabama, 135 S.Ct. at 1271 . Moreover, core retention may be used to insulate the original basis for the district boundaries.
- Thus, where district lines track a path similar to their predecessor districts or where “core retention” seems to predominate, courts should also examine the underlying justification for the original lines *545 or original district. Legislators’ use of the core retention principle should certainly receive some degree of deference. But, the inquiry in a racial, sorting claim examines the basis upon which voters were placed “within or without a particular district.” Miller, 515 U.S. at 916 , 115 S.Ct. 2475 . “That’s the way we’ve always done it” may be a neutral response, but it is not a meaningful answer.
The Court applied the foregoing principles when weighing all of the evidence in the record and in ascertaining whether voters were sorted into a district predominantly on the basis of their race.
2. Strict Scrutiny Analysis
Having applied these precepts to the evidence, we found that the Plaintiffs met their burden to prove that race was predominant in the formation of [¶] 75, making it necessary to apply strict scrutiny as to that district. To survive strict scrutiny, the redistricting statute must be narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. In the redistricting context, this familiar test takes on a somewhat different appearance, which the Court will now examine,
a. Compelling Interest
In prior cases, the Supreme Court has assumed, without deciding, that compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws can constitute a compelling state interest. See Shaw II, 517 U.S. at 915, 116 S.Ct. ' 1894 (“We assume, arguendo, for the purpose of resolving this suit, that compliance with § 2 [of the VRA] could be a compelling interesé.]”); Bush, 517 U.S. at 977 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 (principal opinion) (“[W]e assume without deciding that compliance with the results test [of the VRA] ... can be a compelling state -interest.”). Various members of the Court have also expressed their separate views on the matter. See Bush, 517 U.S. at 990 , 116 S.Ct. 1941 (O’Connor, J.; concurring) (“In my view ... the States have a compelling interest in complying with the results test [of the VRA] as this Court has interpreted'it.”); LULAC, 548 U.S. at 517 , 126- S.Ct. 2594 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting-in part, joined'by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito) (“I would hold that compliance with § 5 of the Voting Rights Act cambe [a compelling state] interest.”).
This already complex posture was rendered even less certain'by the recent decision in Shelby County, There, the Supreme Court struck down the coverage formula under Section 4 of the VRA, but “issue[d] no holding on § 5 itself[.]” 133 S.Ct. at 2631 . The Supreme Court did not

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7234425. Public record. Not legal advice.