# Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp.

> District Court, N.D. California · May 20, 2015 · 105 F. Supp. 3d 981

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7231501

## Case

- **Full name:** Aaron SENNE v. KANSAS CITY ROYALS BASEBALL CORP.
- **Court:** District Court, N.D. California
- **Decided:** May 20, 2015
- **Citations:** 105 F. Supp. 3d 981; 25 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1009; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66170; 2015 WL 2412245
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Spero
- **Judges:** Spero
- **Cited by:** 19 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7231501

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that, in Daimler, the Supreme Court “emphasized ... that merely engaging in a ‘substantial, continuous and systematic course of business’ is [no longer] sufficient to establish general jurisdiction”
- noting that “no case law . . . suggests that 23 wage and hour claims may not be addressed under the purposeful availment approach” and 24 considering defendants’ contacts under both approaches
- stating, in the context of a hybrid FLSA collective action and state law class action, “specific jurisdiction must be demonstrated by the named Plaintiffs”
- noting in hybrid FLSA and Rule 23 action that “[i]n a purported class action, specific jurisdiction must be demonstrated by the named Plaintiffs”

## Opinion text

ORDER RE MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND MOTIONS TO TRANSFER
Re: Docket Nos. 281, 283, 285, 286
JOSEPH C. SPERO, United States Chief Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs in this putative class action are former Minor League baseball players who assert claims under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and California, Florida, Arizona, North Carolina and New York wage and hour laws against the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball doing business as Major League Baseball (“MLB”) and its thirty member franchises. Presently before the Court are two sets of motions challenging personal jurisdiction and venue.
With respect. to personal jurisdiction, two motions to dismiss have been filed in this action (the “Motions to Dismiss”). First, ten of the MLB Clubs named ; as Defendants in the Complaint — Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc., Boston Red- Sox Baseball Club L.P., -Chicago White Sox, Ltd., -Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., Inc., Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., L.P., Detroit Tigers, Inc., New York Yankees Partnership, The Phillies, Pittsburgh Associates, L.P., Tampa Bay Rays Baseball, Ltd., and Washington Nationals Baseball Club, LLC (“Proskauer PJ Defendants”) bring a Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint as Against Certain Defendants for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, Docket No. 281 (“Proskauer Motion to Dismiss”). Second, Defendant Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership and Baltimore Orioles, Inc. (collectively, “Baltimore Orioles”) join in the Proskauer Motion to Dismiss and also bring a Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violations of Federal and State Wage and Hour Laws Against the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership and Baltimore Orioles, Inc., Docket No. 285 (“Baltimore Orioles Motion to Dismiss”). -The Court refers collectively to the Defendants who seek dismissal on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction as the “Personal Jurisdiction Defendants.”
Similarly, two motions seeking transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) have been filed (“the Transfer Motions”). First, all of the Defendants except the Baltimore Orioles (“Proskauer Transfer Defendants”) bring a Motion to Transfer Action to Middle District of Florida, Docket No. 283 (“Proskauer Transfer Motion”). Second, the Baltimore Orioles join in the Pros-kauer Transfer Motion and also bring a Motion to Transfer Case to the Middle District of Florida Filed by Defendants Baltimore Orioles, Inc. and Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership (“Baltimore Orioles Transfer Motion”). In these motions, Defendants ask that the entire case be transferred to the Middle District of Florida.
*991 All of the Motions came on for hearing on Friday, February 13, 2015 at 2:00 p.m. Following the Motion hearing, the Court gave Plaintiffs leave to file a proposed amended complaint that included additional named Plaintiffs to address possible defects with respect to personal jurisdiction over the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants. The Court further instructed Plaintiffs to file a supplemental brief addressing the “arising out of’ requirement for specific jurisdiction on a team-by-team 'basis. Plaintiffs have filed a Proposed Second Consolidated Amended Complaint (“SCAC”) 1 adding name Plaintiffs, as well as the supplemental brief requested by the Court; the Baltimore Orioles and ■ the Proskauer PJ Defendants have filed a brief in response in which they assert that Plaintiffs still cannot establish the. existence of personal jurisdiction as to the teams that challenge jurisdiction.
For the reasons stated below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the Proskaur Motion to Dismiss and GRANTS the Baltimore Orioles’ Motion to Dismiss. The Court DENIES the Transfer Motions. 2
II. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of Major League Baseball
MLB is an unincorporated association whose members are the thirty MLB Clubs named as defendants in this action. SCAC, ¶ 62. Each MLB Club is affiliated with several Minor League teams, organized into “classes” roughly reflecting the skill levels of the players. Id., ¶ 169 . Although some Minor League teams are directly owned by an MLB Club, most Minor League teams are independently owned and operated pursuant to Player Development Contracts (“PDCs”), agreements by which a' Minor League club agrees to “affiliate” itself with an MLB Club .for a-certain time period. Id., ¶ 171 .
MLB teams employ a small number of players who play at the highest level, the Major Leaguers. Id.,' ¶ 146. They also employ a larger number of Minor Leag-uers, who the teams acquire through either an amateur draft or free agency. Id., ¶¶ 147,150 . The Minor Leaguers begin at the “Rookie” level and then, ideally, advance to higher levels (Class-A, Advanced Class-A, Double-A and Triple-A), potentially leading to the major leagues. Id., ¶ 169 . Many Minor Leaguers do not advance past Class-A. Id.
MLB operates a scouting service known as the Major League Baseball Scouting Bureau (“Scouting Bureau”) that evaluates amateur players on behalf of all the Defendants. Id., ¶ 163 . MLB owners created the centralized service in 1974, and it operates under the umbrella of the Office of' the Commissioner. Id. The Scouting Bureau hosts tryouts for amateur players seeking to enter the industry, and its scouts attend amateur games throughout the country and in Latin America to develop reports on amateur players. Id.
MLB' rules require that all teams use the same uniform player contract (“UPC”) when signing players. Id., ¶ 164 . Under the UPC, players receive a salary during the championship season, which lasts approximately five months. Id., ¶¶ 182-83 . They are not compensated during the remainder of the year. Id., ¶ 183 . The UPC imposes “duties and obligations” that “continue in full force throughout the calendar year,” however. Id. Thus, during the off- *992 season, players are required to participate in spring training (lasting approximately one month) and sometimes in extended spring training and instructional leagues as well. Id., ¶¶ 185-86 . Players are also required to maintain “first-class” conditioning throughout the year. Id., ¶ 187 .
B. Summary of Plaintiffs’ Claims
Plaintiffs are former and current Minor League baseball players who allege that they were paid “illegally low wages during the championship season, no overtime wages, and no wages for work performed outside the championship season.” Id., ¶¶ 19-61, 189 . Defendants are the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball and MLB’s thirty member franchises. Id., ¶¶ 62-102 . Plaintiffs assert twenty state law wage and hour claims on behalf of a number of putative classes (including a California class) 3 under Rule 28 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id., ¶¶ 103-27 . In particular, Plaintiffs assert eight claims under California la\y, two claims under Florida law, three claims under Arizona law, three claims under North Carolina law, four claims under New York law, three claims under Pennsylvania law, three claims under Maryland law and three claims under Oregon law. They also assert two claims under the FLSA on behalf of themselves and all persons similarly situated since three years before filing of the action. Id., ¶ 128 .
III. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
A. Motions
1. Proskauer PJ Defendants
The Proskauer PJ Defendants are ten MLB Clubs that contend they are not subject to personal jurisdiction in California. Proskauer Motion to Dismiss at 1. According to these defendants, they “do not have any Minor League affiliates based in California or that play games in California, and do not have any operations whatsoever in California.” Id. at 4 (citing Dkt. No. 115-1 (“Heller Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt No. 115-2 (“Steward Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt No. 115-3 (“Znidarsic Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 115-4 (“Corvino Decl.”) at ¶8; Dkt No. 115-5 (“Westhoff Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 115-6 (“Trost Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt No. 115-7 (“Strouse Decl.”) at ¶8; Dkt No. 115-8 (“Stroh Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 115-9 (“Higgins Decl.”) at ¶ 8; Dkt. No. 115-10 (“Jones Decl.”) at ¶ 8)). They assert that their primary connection with California is that “their Major League Baseball Clubs occasionally play baseball games against other California-based Major League Clubs in California.” Id. (citing Heller Decl. at ¶ 7; Steward Decl. at ¶ 7; Znidar-sic Decl. at ¶7; Corvino Decl. at ¶ 7; Westhoff Decl. at ¶ 7; Trost Decl. at ¶ 7; Strouse Deck at ¶7; Stroh Decl. at ¶7; Higgins Decl. at ¶ 7; Jones Decl. at ¶ 7). In particular, the Proskauer PJ Defendants represent that aside from “sporadic travel to California by individual employees and a small number of California-based employees,” they travel to California to play Major League baseball games only one and three times per year and those trips are relatively short, ranging in duration from two to ten days per trip. Id. (citing Declaration Of Elise M. Bloom In Support Of Motion To Dismiss The Consolidated Amended Complaint As To Certain Defendants For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction (“Bloom Jurisdiction Decl.”), Ex. *993 A-J (Moving Defendants’ Supplemental Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 2)).
The Proskauer PJ Defendants further state that they “are not licensed to do business in California; are incorporated in or organized under the laws of states other than California; maintain their principal places of business outside of California; and do not own or rent property, maintain bank accounts, or have a designated agent in the State of California.” Id. at 5 (citing Heller Decl. at ¶¶2-6; Steward Decl. at ¶¶ 2-6; Znidarsic Deck at ¶¶ 2-6; Corvino Deck at ¶¶ 2-6; Westhoff Deck at ¶¶ 2-6; Trost Deck at ¶¶2-6; Strouse Deck at ¶¶ 2-6; Stroh Deck at ¶¶ 2-6; Higgins Deck at ¶¶ 2-6; Jones Deck at ¶¶ 2-6) (emphasis in original). Nor do they “receive any income from tickets, concessions, parking or similar items for regular season games played as a visiting Club in California,” the Proskauer PJ Defendants contend. Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Deck, Ex. K (Defendant MLB’s Supplemental Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 6); id., Exs. A-J (Moving Defendants’ Supplemental Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 10)).
The Proskauer PJ Defendants assert that exercise of personal jurisdiction in California is not consistent with due process and California’s long-arm statute, Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10, because they do not have sufficient minimum contacts with California to comport with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. at 6-7 (citing Walden v. Fiore, — U.S. -, -, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1121 , 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014); Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir.2011); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). In particular, the Pros-kauer PJ Defendants argue that they are not subject to personal jurisdiction under the doctrines of either general or specific jurisdiction. Id.
The Proskauer PJ Defendants argue that the theory of general jurisdiction applies only if their “affiliations with the State are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, — U.S.-,-, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 , 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011) (quotations and citations omitted)). This is a high standard, they assert, requiring that the contacts of a defendant corporation “approximate physical presence” in the state. Id. at 7-8 (citing Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir.1986); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.2000)). They argue that merely “engaging in commerce with residents of the forum state is not in and of itself the kind of activity that approximates physical presence within the state’s borders.” Id. at 8 (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc., 223 F.3d at 1086 (internal quotations omitted)). They also point to the Supreme Court’s recent statement that “it would be the ‘exceptional case’ where ‘a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.’ ” Id. (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, — U.S. -,-, 134 S.Ct. 746, 761, n. 19 , 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014)).
In light of these stringent requirements, the Proskauer PJ Defendants argue, their limited contacts with California related to the occasional major league games that are played here are insufficient to show that they are “at home” in California or to support general jurisdiction. Id. at 8. Further, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert, the fact that MLB does not challenge personal jurisdiction in California has no *994 bearing on the analysis because the exercise of personal jurisdiction over an unincorporated association is not a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over its non-resident members. Id. at 9 (citing Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 284 F.Supp.2d 204 (D.Mass.2003)). Nor can the contacts of other (non-moving) member Clubs be imputed to the Proskauer PJ Defendants, they assert. -Id. They point to the Supreme Court’s holding in Daimler that a foreign corporation may not be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the contacts of its in-state subsidiary, which the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert amounts to a rejection of'the Ninth Circuit’s “expansive view of agency principles” in the context of personal jurisdiction. Id. (citing 134 S.Ct. at 759-60). .According to the Proskauer PJ Defendants, the reasoning of Daimler compels the conclusion that “simply because [the Pros-kauer PJ] Defendants are members of an unincorporated association some of whose members are California residents, does not mean that the foreign Clubs are ‘at home’ in California for all purposes.” Id. at 10.
The Proskauer PJ Defendants further assert that case law specifically addressing personal jurisdiction in the context of sports teams supports the same conclusion. Id. at 10-11 (citing Davis v. Billick, Case No. 301CV1964D, 2002 WL 1398560 , at *6 (N.D.Tex. June 26, 2002); Manton v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 493 F.Supp. 496, 496-98 (N.D.Ga.1980); Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 785 F.Supp. 1076, 1081 (D.R.I.1992); Evans v. Boston Red Sox, Case No. 13-00262 SOM BMK, 2013 WL. 6147675, at *4-5, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166307 , at *10-12 (D.Haw. Nov. 22, 2013); Donatelli v. Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459 (1st Cir.1990)).
Nor do communications with California residents support a finding of general jurisdiction, the Proskauer PJ Defendants contend. Id. at 11 (citing Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325 , 1331 (9th. Cir.1984); SRE-Cheaptrips, Inc. v. Media Synergy Grp., LLC, Case No. 09-cv-00622-S-EJL, 2010 WL 1913589 , at *2 (D.Id. May 12, 2010); MMCA Grp., Ltd. v. Hewlett-Packard, Co., Case No. 06-cv-7067 MMC (EMC), 2007 WL 1342586 , at *5 (N.D.Cal. May 8, 2007)).. Even to the extent such communications might be evidence that players who reside in California performed work during the offseason, they argue, this evidence would not support a finding of general jurisdiction because it is well-established that such unilateral activities, based on those players’ choice to live in California, cannot give rise to general jurisdiction. Id. at 11-12 (citing McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802 , 816-17 (9th Cir.1988); Hall v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 651 F.Supp. 335, 339 (D.Kan.1987)). Finally, the Proskauer PJ Defendants argue that intermittent travel to California by their employees is not sufficient to support general jurisdiction. Id. at 12-14 (citing A.C.K Sports, Inc. v. Doug Wilson Enters., Inc., 661 F.Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y.1987); Collyard v. Washington Capitals, 477 F.Supp. 1247, 1250, n. 3 (D.Minn.1979); Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enterprises, Inc., 368 F.Supp. 1366, 1374 (M.D.N.C.1973); Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482, 1490 (9th Cir.1993); Autogenomics, Inc. v. Oxford Gene Tech., Ltd., 566 F.3d 1012, 1018 (Fed.Cir.2009); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l., Inc., 45 F.Supp.2d 777, 781 (N.D.Cal.1998), reversed on other grounds, 223 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.2000); Vice v. Woodline USA, Inc., Case No. C 10-04103 CW, 2011 WL 207936 , at *2-3, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8014 , at *6-7 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 21, 2011); Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. 11-cv-03505 CRB, 2012 WL 1309179 , at *11 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 16, 2012)).
*995 The Proskauer PJ Defendants also argue that the Court lacks specific jurisdiction over them, Id. at 14 . According to the Proskauer PJ Defendants, to establish specific jurisdiction Plaintiffs must satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s three-part test, which requires that they demonstrate the following:
(i) the nonresident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or residents thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections. of its laws; (ii) the Named Plaintiffs’ claims must arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (iii) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable.
Id. (citing Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir.2008)). In the class action context, they assert,’ “courts may not consider a defendant’s contacts with unnamed putative class members residing in the forum state when considéring specific jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Ambriz v. Coca Cola, Case No. 13-cv-03539-JST, 2014 WL 296159 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 27, 2014)). The Proskauer PJ Defendants contend Plaintiffs fail to meet any of the three requirements for specific jurisdiction. Id.
■ With respect to the first part of the test, which requires either “purposeful availment” or “purposeful direction,” the Pros-kauer PJ Defendants argue that there is no evidence of “purposeful availment” because they have not “performed some type of affirmative conduct which allows or promotes the transaction of business within the forum-state.” Id. at 14-15 (quoting Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191, 1195 (9th Cir.1988)). The “purposeful direction” requirement, which is the one .that applies to cases like this one, involving wage-and-hour claims, also is not met, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert. Id. at 15 (citing Enriquez v. Interstate Group, LLC, Case No. 11-cv-05155 YGR, 2012 WL 3800801 , at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 31, 2012); Holliday v. Lifestyle Lift, Inc., Case No. 09-cv-4995 RS, 2010 WL 3910143 , at *3 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 5, 2010)).
Purposeful direction, according to the Proskauer PJ Defendants, requires that “Defendants must have: (1) committed an intentional act that was; (2) expressly aimed at the forum state and which; (3) caused harm that Defendants knew was likely to be suffered in the forum state.” Id. (quoting Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 803 (9th Cir.2004)). Even assuming the first and third requirements are met, the express aiming requirement is not, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert.. Id. at 15-17. In particular, any contacts the Proskauer PJ Defendants may have with Minor League players in California are “simply a function of where the players chose to live in the offseason” and are not the result of any intentional conduct on the part of the Proskauer PJ Defendants. Id. at 16-17 (citing Walden, 134 S.Ct. at 1123 ; Slepian v. Guerin, 172 F.3d 58 , 1999 WL 109676 (9th Cir.1999) (unpublished disposition); Novak v. NanoLogix, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-01971 EJD, 2014 WL 991119 , at *2 (N.D.Cal. Mar.. 11, 2014); SRE-Cheaptrips, Inc., 2010 WL 1913589 at *4; Hall, 651 F.Supp. at 339 ).
-The Proskauer PJ Defendants argue that the second part of the specific jurisdiction test is not satisfied because Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of or relate to the Proskauer PJ Defendants’ forum-related activities. Id. at 17-18. This requirement, they contend, is satisfied only if the plaintiffs’ claims “would have- arisen but for the defendants’ contacts with California.” Id. (citing Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 *996 F.3d 915, 924-25 (9th Cir.2001)). That requirement is not satisfied here, they argue, because none of the Plaintiff Minor League players “worked for the [Pros-kauer PJ Defendants] or their Minor League affiliates in California ... [and], even though the Defendants’ Major League players worked in California while playing Major League Baseball games, neither these players — nor the time they spent playing Major League games — are the subject of this action.” Id. at 17 (citing Thomas P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Producción de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir.1980)). Nor do Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the Pros-kauer PJ Defendants’ “other insubstantial contacts with California,” as they have not “ ‘directed’ their activities to California any more than any other state, and they do not — and cannot — claim that ‘but for’ the [Proskauer PJ Defendants’] contacts with California, their alleged injuries would not have occurred.” Id. at 18 (citing SRE-Cheaptrips, Inc., 2010 WL 1913589 at *7).
Finally, the third requirement for specific jurisdiction, that exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable, also is not met, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert. Id. at 18-20 . In determining whether this requirement is met, they contend, courts consider the following seven factors:
(1) the extent of the defendant’s purposeful interjection into the forum state’s affairs; (2) the burden on the defendant of defending in the forum; (3) the extent of conflict with the sov- ■ ereignty of the defendant’s state; (4) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (5) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (6) the importance of the forum to the plaintiffs’ interest in convenient and effective relief; and (7) the existence of an alternative forum.
Id. (citing CE Distrib., LLC. v. New Sensor Corp., 380 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.2004)). According to the Proskauer PJ Defendants, these'factors weigh in favor of finding that exercise of personal jurisdiction over them is not reasonable. Id.
The Proskauer PJ Defendants contend the first factor favors their position because, for the reasons discussed above, their contacts with California do not amount to “purposeful interjection” and they have not sought the protection of California’s laws. Id. at 19. They argue that the second factor, the burden of defending in California, is substantial “because it would require each Club’s representatives and employees to travel out-of-state to litigate claims that did not arise here.” Id. The Proskauer PJ Defendants concede the third factor is neutral, but assert the fourth factor favors their position because “California does not have a compelling interest in adjudicating the dispute where the conduct at issue did not take place within its borders.” Id. (citing Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. British-Am. Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir.1987)). The fifth factor, efficiency of the forum, turns primarily on where witnesses and evidence are likely to be located and weighs “heavily in favor of dismissal,” the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert, because “the evidence related to the Moving Defendants’ Minor League operations exists exclusively outside of California.” Id. (citing Core-Vent Corp., 11 F.3d at 1489 ). Further, they argue, “[ljitigating Plaintiffs’ claims against the Moving Defendants in California would be demonstrably inconvenient because out-of-state witnesses would be required to travel here to testify about events which occurred outside of California.” Id. The Proskauer PJ Defendants note that the sixth factor, which looks to the convenience and effectiveness of relief in the forum, is “not of paramount importance.” Id. at 20 (citing Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir.2002)). They suggest, however, that it *997 favors their position because “only six out of the 34 Named Plaintiffs reside in this State.” Id. The seventh factor also favors the Proskauer PJ Defendants, they assert, because the plaintiff has the burden of proving the unavailability of an alternative forum and Plaintiffs cannot do so here. Id. In particular, according to the Pros-kauer PJ Defendants, each of them is subject to general jurisdiction in the state where it has its principal placg of business and all of them are also subject to specific jurisdiction in Florida, where the claims arose. Id. Considered together, the Pros-kauer PJ Defendants assert, the seven factors discussed above demonstrate that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over them by this Court is not reasonable. Id.
2. Baltimore Orioles
The Baltimore Orioles join in and adopt the arguments and authorities set forth in the Proskauer Motion to Dismiss. In their motion, they do not offer any new arguments but rather, highlight the evidence they contend demonstrates a lack of personal jurisdiction (either general or specific) as to the Baltimore Orioles specifically. In particular, the Baltimore Orioles point to the following evidence:
The Baltimore Orioles do not have Minor League affiliates based in California, and none of their Minor League affiliates play Minor League baseball games in California. Baltimore Orioles Motion to Dismiss at 2 (citing Declaration of Daniel F. Du-quette in Support Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of Federal and State Wage and Hour Laws Against the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership and Baltimore Orioles, Inc. (“Duquette Decl.”) at ¶ 3; Declaration of Kent Qualls in Support Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of Federal and State Wage and Hour Laws Against the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership and Baltimore Orioles, Inc. (“Qualls Deck”) at ¶¶ 2-3).
The Baltimore Orioles do not hold tryouts in California and pre-draft workouts normally are held in Baltimore, Maryland. Id. at 3 (citing Declaration of M. Celeste Bruce in Support Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Complaint for Violation of Federal and State Wage and Hour Laws Against the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership and Baltimore Orioles, Inc., (“Bruce Deck”), Ex. 1 (Baltimore Orioles’ Supplemental Answers to Plaintiffs’ First Set of Interrogatories regarding Jurisdiction and Venue, Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 9)).
Players who are drafted by the Baltimore Orioles are subjected to physical examinations before being offered a contract; these physicals and execution of the contracts are “generally conducted” in either Maryland or at the Baltimore Orioles’ spring training facility in Florida. Id.
Beginning with the 2012 baseball season, Minor League players with off-season addresses in California “have signed their Addendum Cs in Florida during spring training camp.” Id. (citing Bruce Deck, Ex. 1 (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 7)). “Minor League players are provided off-season workout packages during in-person meetings held at the location of the Minor League Club, normally during the last week of the Minor League season.” Id. (citing Bruce Deck, Ex. 1 (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 8)).
• With respect to Major League games played by the Baltimore Orioles in California, “[i]n each year since 2009, the Baltimore Orioles have not made *998 more than three separate trips to California, nor played more than thirteen (13) Major League Championship Season Baseball games” in California. Id. (citing Duquette Decl. at ¶2). Further, the .schedule for these games i is set by the Commissioner of Baseball and not the Baltimore Orioles. M.
“The Baltimore Orioles only , employ a small number of California-based , scouts (in 2014, 6) and had a handful of scouts who travelled to California for short periods of time.” Id. (citing Bruce Decl., Ex. 1).
“The Baltimore Orioles do not have corporate officers or directors located in California. Nor do the Baltimore Orioles have operations, offices, a place of business or postal address in California.” Id. (citing Declaration of H. Russell Smouse in Support Motion to Dismiss Consolidated Amended Complaint. for Violation' of Federal and State Wage and Hour Laws Against the Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership and Baltimore Orioles, Inc., (“Smouse Decl.”) at ¶¶ 4-5).
“The Baltimore Orioles, Inc. is a Maryland corporation with its principal place of business in Maryland. The Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership was formed in Maryland and also has its principal place of business in Maryland.” Id. (citing Smouse Decl. at ¶¶ 2 -3; Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 14)).
“The Baltimore Orioles do not own or lease property in ■California.” Id. (citing Smouse Decl. at ¶ 4; Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 1)). ■
“The Baltimore Orioles do not receive income from tickets, concessions, parking or similar items for regular season games -that it plays in California as a- visiting Club. Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Decl., Ex. K (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No..5)). “And the Baltimore Orioles have not been sued in California (other than the instant lawsuit, consolidated with Marti v. MLB) nor initiated any lawsuits, filed cross-claims or counterclaims- [in California] since 2008.” Id. (citing Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 13)).
B. Opposition
Plaintiffs respond that the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants have “deep roots in California,” with “extensive contacts related to recruitment, hiring, and employment of California Minor Leaguers, all resulting from systematic, affirmative acts.” Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Certain Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (“Personal Jurisdiction Opposition”) at 1. In particular, Plaintiffs assert, “all [Personal Jurisdiction] Defendants consciously chose to base multiple scouts within California to evaluate and recruit the state’s amateurs ... [then] used these contacts to' consciously select California Minor Leaguers and induce them into signing contracts (which are often signed within California).” Further, Plaintiffs assert, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “then expect these Minor Leaguers to not only work during the season but also during the winter training months, and they even direct the work by providing training packets ... knowing] and expecting] that these youths will return to their home state to perform this winter work.” Id.
Plaintiffs contend Personal Jurisdiction Defendants’ “other contacts with California also result from express acts.” Id. According to Plaintiffs, “[t]hey all obtain significant sums of California revenue from *999 doing business within the state, and they all pay taxes to California. They also obtain substantial California revenue from other streams tunneled through Major League Baseball.” Id. Plaintiffs assert that “[w]ith far more MLB franchises located in California than any other state (including prominent franchises such as the Dodgers and Giants), [the Personal Jurisdiction] Defendants obtain a direct financial benefit from business occurring in the state through television revenue, internet revenue, merchandise sales, and other shared revenue.” Id. at 1-2. In light of these contacts, Plaintiffs assert, it is “quintessentially fair” to exercise personal jurisdiction over these MLB franchises. Id. at 2.
According to Plaintiffs, MLB “entrenched itself in California” in 1958, when the Dodgers and the Giants came to California, followed in 1969 by the San Diego Padres. Id. at 4 (citing Declaration Of Garrett R. Broshuis In Support Of Plaintiffs’ Opposition To Certain Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction (“Broshuis Deck”), Ex. D (Dodgers Franchise Timeline, MLB.com); Id. Ex. E (Giants Franchise Timeline, MLB.com); Id. Ex, F (Padres Franchise Timeline, MLB.com); Id., Ex. G (Team-by-Team Information, MLB.com)). There are now five franchises in California, they assert, which is. more than in any other state. Id. This high number of franchises in California means that the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “routinely travel to California to play multiple games every season — up to 16 games in a season.” Id. at 5 (citing Proskauer Motion to Dismiss at 4).
Plaintiffs assert that MLB’s contacts with California go beyond travel and that the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants each derive substantial income from California, including “$113,128.10 in revenue attributable to California from MLB Advanced Media (MLB’s internet arm) and $52,199.17 in revenue attributable to California from MLB Network (MLB’s own TV network).” Id. at .5 (citing Blopm Jurisdiction Deck, Ex. K (MLB!s Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 5)). Plaintiffs also assert that although MLB “did not .provide California revenue for television contracts or MLB Properties (its licensing arm that licenses products for all Defendants and distributes revenue) ... it goes without saying that significant revenues and sales emanate from California— the most populous state — and are eventually funneled to all Defendants.” Id.- (citing Broshuis Deck, Ex. H (search engine metrics showing that “three out of the five top keywords in search engines that lead consumers tomlb.com are California-related (‘sf giants,’ ‘dodgers,’ and ‘giants’), and, frommlblcom, a significant percentage of these consumers shop on MLB’s e-commerce site, shop.mlb.com”). Plaintiffs also point to the admissions of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants that they pay taxes in California. Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Deck, Exs. A-J (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory Nos. 11 & 12); Bruce Deck, Ex. 1 (Orioles Objection and Answer to Interrogatory NOs. 11 & 12)). In addition, according to Plaintiffs, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants have participated in workers compensation claims within California and MLB has lobbied the California legislature on behalf of its franchises “to make it more difficult to bring certain sports-related workers compensation claims in California.” IcL at 6. (citing Broshuis Deck, Ex. I (Injury claims by professional athletes, L.A. Times (Feb.' 1, 2014)); Id. Ex. J (California limits workers’ comp sports injury claims, L.A. Times (Oct. 8, 2013)). Plaintiffs also point to evidence that MLB has hosted industry-wide meetings in California in recent years. Id. (citing Broshuis Deck, Ex. K (2014 Baseball Winter Meetings returns to *1000 San Diego after three decades, MiLB. com)).
In addition to the contacts discussed above, Plaintiffs point to what they contend is “systematic recruitment” of California Minor Leaguers. Id. at 6. According to Plaintiffs, “California has long produced more major leaguers than any other state, and one recent study found that over 23 percent of American major leaguers came from California — more than twice as many as the next state.” Id. (citing Broshuis Decl., Ex. L (Kevin Nelson, THE GOLDEN GAME xiii (2004)); id. Ex. M (California is top producer of major league players, L.A. Times (July 12, 2010)); Bloom Jurisdiction Decl., Exs. A-J (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 5); Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Orioles Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 5)). Plaintiffs further contend that more Minor Leaguers come from California than any other state, citing the discovery responses of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants reflecting that “[a]ll PJ Defendants drafted dozens of Californians since 2008, and on average they each selected 7.2 Californians per year.” Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Decl., Exs. A-J (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 5); Bruce Decl., Ex. 1, (Orioles Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 5)).
According to Plaintiffs, the recruitment of Minor Leaguers from California involves a “long, intense process requiring a substantial presence in California.” Id. In particular, they contend, all of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants have multiple employees in California (an average of 6.3 employees per franchise), many of whom are scouts. Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Decl., Exs. A-J (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 2); Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Orioles Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 2)). The fact that the MLB Scouting Bureau is based in California is a reflection of the importance of scouting here, Plaintiffs contend. Id. at 7. Plaintiffs also cite to evidence that the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “systematically dispatch many other employees to California to target, evaluate, and recruit players, such as higher-level employees like cross checkers, directors of scouting, and even vice presidents and general managers.” Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Decl., Ex. AJ (Personal Jurisdiction Defendants’ Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 2); Wyckoff Decl. at ¶ 5; McAtee Decl. at ¶5). Plaintiffs assert that in 2013, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants sent an average of 9.7 such employees per franchise to California. Id. And further, when a player is selected, according to Plaintiffs, the scouts will continue to be involved in the formal discussions with the player and may also be present when the player signs the UPC. Id. (citing Wyckoff Decl. at ¶ 9; McAtee Decl. at ¶ 6; Watts Decl. at ¶ 4; Bennigson Decl. at ¶ 4; Kahaulelio Decl. at ¶ 4; Woodruff Decl. at ¶ 4; Henderson Decl. at ¶ 4; Giarraputo Decl. at ¶ 4; Lewis Decl. at ¶ 4).
Plaintiffs also present evidence relating to the work performed by Minor Leaguers in California. Plaintiffs note that the UPC requires that the Minor Leaguers “maintain ‘first class’ conditioning during the entire year, and a franchise can ‘impose a reasonable fine’ for not meeting these requirements.” Id. at 8 (citing CAC, ¶ 178 (citing UPC ¶¶ VLD and XII)). They also point to the admissions of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants that they direct this conditioning by handing out “work-out packets” to the players. Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Deck, Exs. A-J (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 7); Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Orioles Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 7); Hilligoss Decl., Ex. A; Pahuta Decl., Ex. A). Further, although only five franchises provided information about how many of their players *1001 reside in California during the offseason, as to those that did, the discovery responses showed that an average of 24.7 Minor Leaguers per franchise reside in California each winter training period, Plaintiffs contend. Id. (citing Bloom Jurisdiction Decl., Exs. C-F (Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 6); Bruce Decl., Ex. 1 (Orioles Objection and Answer to Interrogatory No. 6)). According to Plaintiffs, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants are aware that these players are living in California during the offseason because they communicate with the players and must maintain correct addresses, sending them rules and information about spring training and also a contract addendum with their salaries. Id. at 9 (citing Senne Decl., Ex. A; Khoury Decl. at ¶ 7; Bennigson Decl. at ¶ 7; Pahuta Decl. at ¶ 7; Lawson Decl. at ¶¶7-8; Watts Decl. at ¶¶ 6 — 11; Kahaulelio Decl. at ¶ 5; Smith Decl. at ¶ 4; Opitz Decl. at ¶ 5; Woodruff Decl. at ¶ 5; Henderson Decl. at ¶ 5; Giarraputo Decl. at ¶¶ 5-6; McAtee Decl. at ¶ 7; Lewis Decl. at ¶ 5 [collectively “Declarations Describing Winter Work”]).
Plaintiffs argue that there is both general and specific jurisdiction over the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants in California. Id. at 11. They assert that for general jurisdiction, the minimum contacts test of International Shoe and the “bedrock principal” of fundamental fairness are satisfied when “a defendant’s systematic and continuous contacts essentially render a corporation at home ... meaning defendant’s contacts ‘approximate physical presence’ in the state.” Id. (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, — U.S.-,-, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 , 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011), Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir.2006)). Under Tuazon , Plaintiffs assert, “some non-exhaustive factors include soliciting or engaging in business in the state, as well as the ‘[ljongevity, continuity, volume, economic impact, physical presence, and integration into the state’s regulatory or economic markets.’ ” Id. (citing Tua-zon, 433 F.3d at 1172 ). Those factors support a finding of general jurisdiction here, Plaintiffs assert, based on the “longstanding presence in California” of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants, discussed above. Id. at 12. Plaintiffs further assert that here, as in Tuazon , the “‘long and. successful operation’ in the state- were ‘not accidental.’ ” Id. (citing 433 F.3d at 1174 ). ' .
Plaintiffs also argue that “the highly ■interdependent nature of MLB” supports a finding of general jurisdiction. Id. at 13 (citing Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F.Supp. 709, 712-15 (E.D.N.Y.1972)). Thus, Plaintiffs assert, in Erving , the court found that the Squires basketball team, which was a member of the American Basketball Association (“ABA”), was subject to personal jurisdiction in New York, even though it played only -six to eight games in New York out of a season schedule of 84 games, because the games that were played in New York were “essential to the fulfillment of the business purposes -and objects of the ABA enterprise of which Squires is an integral part.” Id. (citing 349 F.Supp. at 713 ). According to Plaintiffs, the court in Erving concluded that it “did not matter that gate receipts were not purely shared — other revenue was shared and the relationships were symbiotic.” Id. (citing 349 F.Supp. at 713-14 ). Plaintiffs contend other courts analyzing sports teams and sports leagues have reached the same conclusion. Id. (citing Hollins v. U.S. Tennis Ass’n, 469 F.Supp.2d 67, 74 (E.D.N.Y.2006); Cent. Sports Army Club v. Arena Assocs., Inc., 952 F.Supp. 181, 188 (S.D.N.Y.1997); Hawkins v. Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, 288 F.Supp. 614, 618-19 (W.D.Pa.1968); Am. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 27 F.R.D. 264, 268-69 (D.Md.1961)). This *1002 conclusion is consistent with the law of agency, Plaintiffs assert,- where the acts of one joint venturer can be imputed to another joint venturer. Id. (citing Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42, 55-63 (1st Cir.2002)).
Plaintiffs argue that the facts here support a finding of general jurisdiction even more strongly than the cases cited above because this case involves “a universal scheme enacted by all Defendants to depress salaries.” Id. at 14. Further, as discussed above, Plaintiffs point to “common conduct [that] was applied in and directed at California, and [which] resulted from all Defendants’ common decisions, uniform contracts, and common implementation.” Id. Although the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “do not directly share gate receipts, the collective bargaining agreement requires all MLB franchises to share substantial revenue, with each franchise contributing 34 percent of its local revenue into a. common pool split amongst all 30 MLB franchises.” Id. at 14 (citing Broshuis Deck, .Ex. O (Article XXIV, 2012-2016 Basic Agreement) at 121). The rules also require other revenue sharing, Plaintiffs contend, and as there are more franchises in California than in any other state, “much of this shared revenue emanates from California.” Id. Further, Plaintiffs point to substantial revenue from California, including from the website and TV "network, possible licensing revenues from California, and MLB’s lobbying in California, all of which show that the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants have made California their second home, Plaintiffs assert, thus giving rise to general jurisdiction. Id. at 15.
Plaintiffs also contend that there is specific jurisdiction over their claims in California. Id. at 15. According to Plaintiffs, the theory of specific jurisdiction is based on the premise that “[d]oing business within a state is a privilege, and obligations accompany that privilege.” Id. (citing Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S: at 316, 66 S.Ct. 154 ). Thus, it is not unfair to subject a defendant to litigation in a forum where the claims are related to the defendant’s activities in the forum. Id. at 15-16. The Ninth Circuit uses a “sliding scale” for determining whether there is specific jurisdiction, Plaintiffs assert, considering both “the extent of the defendant’s contacts with the forum and the degree to which the plaintiffs suit is related to those contacts. A strong showing on one axis will permit a lesser showing on the other.” Id. at 16 (quoting Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir.2006)). The contacts that the Court should consider, according to Plaintiffs, are not limited to the plaintiffs’ contacts but also include contacts with non-plaintiffs. Id. (citing Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1207 ).
Plaintiffs agree with the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants that specific jurisdiction is evaluated under a three-part test that asks whether: (1) the defendant purposefully directed its activities towards the forum or . purposefully availed itself of the privileges of the forum;, (2) the claim arises out of , or relates to those activities; and (3) the exercise of personal jurisdiction is reasonable. Id. (citing Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1205-06 ).' Plaintiffs also agree that the proper inquiry in this case as to the first part of the test is whether the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “purposefully directed” their activities at the forum rather than the purposeful availment test. Id. at 16-17. According to Plaintiffs, purposeful direction .is satisfied when: “(1) the company commits an intentional act, (2) aimed at the forum state, that (3) causes harm that the company knows will likely be felt in the forum state.” Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1206 (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 , 104 S.Ct. 1482 , 79 L.Ed.2d 804 *1003 (1984)). Plaintiffs reject the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants’ argument that this test is not met, however. Id.
Plaintiffs argue that because the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants did not address the first and third prongs of the purposeful direction test, the Court should find that those requirements are met. Id. In any event, they contend, the evidence shows that all three requirements are, in fact, met. Id. In particular, they argue that in wage and hour cases, the intentional act requirement is met where, as here, there is a uniform employment policy that is applied within the state, even if it is also applied to employees in other states. Id. at 18 (Holliday v. Lifestyle Lift, Inc., Case No. 09-CV-4995 RS, 2010 WL 3910143 , at *3 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 5, 2010); Telles v. Li, Case No. 11-cv-1470 LHK, 2013 WL 5199811 , at *5 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 16, 2013); Enriquez v. Interstate Group., LLC, Case No. 11-cv-5155 YGR, 2012 WL 3800801 , at *4 (NJD.Cal. Aug. 31, 2012)). According to Plaintiffs, “[a] company expressly aims its conduct in such cases whén it applies the allegedly unlawful employment practices in the state” and “knows harm will likely occur in a state when it applies a policy to workers in the state.” Id. (citing Holliday, 2010 WL 3910143 , at *4; Telles, 2013 WL 5199811 , at *5; Enriquez, 2012 WL 3800801 , at *5). Further, Plaintiffs assert, specific jurisdiction, is found “[e]ven for work performed at home ... if the company knowingly hires a forum’s resident and has reason to know that work will be performed at home.” Id. (citing Wood v. Kinetic Sys., Inc., Case No. Case No. 09-cv—579 SCWD, 2010 WL 893647 , at '*5 (D.Idaho Mar. 9, 2010)). Here, Plaintiffs assert, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants 4 “acted intentionally by creating the policy decision to pay no wages at all during the winter training period and to pay no minimum wage or overtime during the season,” “expressly aimed their conduct at California by applying the policies to Californians working in California,” and “knew harm was likely to occur because they knowingly required Californians to work in California for no pay.” Id.
Plaintiffs further assert that the purposeful direction requirement is satisfied on the basis of the recruiting activities conducted by the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants in California. Id. at 19 . According to Plaintiffs, numerous courts have reached this conclusion. Id. (citing Davis v. NIH Fed. Credit Union, Case No. 12-cv-5502 JCS, 2013 WL 2147468 , at *6 (N.D.Cal. May 15, 2013); Ochoa v. J.B. Martin & Sons Farms, Inc., 287 F.3d 1182, 1186-87 (9th Cir.2002); Potts v. Cameron Offshore Boats, Inc., 401 F.Supp.2d 733, 737-38 (S.D.Tex.2005)). These cases are distinguishable from the Supreme Court’s decision in Walden , they contend; because they “involved' far more activities directed at the forum state.” Id. (citing Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1189-93 ; Davis, 2013 WL 2147468 , at *6; GT Sec., Inc. v. Klastech GmbH, Case No. 13-cv-3090 JCS, 2014 WL 2928013 , at *13-14 (N.D.Cal. June 27, 2014)). According to Plaintiffs, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants have “systematically recruited” .in California, as. is apparent from evidence showing that each one of them “drafted California amateurs every year for the last 6 years,” and that they “averaged 7.2 California draft picks per team per year.” Id. Further, they assert, “[b]oth before and after [the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants] select California Minor Leaguers, their scouts and employees communicate with them and induce them into signing the uniform contracts at issue while they reside in California.” Id.
. Plaintiffs reject the argument - of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants that there is no purposeful direction because their contacts with California “are simply a function of where players • choose to live *1004 during the off-season.” Id. at 20 (citing Proskauer Motion to Dismiss at 16). In fact, Plaintiffs assert, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “affirmatively decided to target Californians and contract with them,” knowing that “most of these Californians would return to California during the offseason, where they would then expect them to perform winter work for no pay.” Id. (citing Wood, 2010 WL 893647 , at 5-6). Further, they argue, “[sjeveral named Plaintiffs and opt-in plaintiffs suffered injuries in California while performing winter training work in California, and all [Personal Jurisdiction Defendants] employ many California Minor Leaguers in California who perform winter training work for no pay — an average of 24.7 per team based on supplied data.” Id. These activities are sufficient to show purposeful direction, Plaintiffs argue, and the Court should reject the reliance of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants on contract cases involving purposeful availment and “far fewer contacts with the forum state” in support of a contrary result. Id. (citing Slepian v. Guerin, 172 F.3d 58 (9th Cir.1999) (unpublished); Novak v. NanoLogix, Inc., Case No. C-13-01971 EJD, 2014 WL 991119 , at *2 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 11, 2014); SRE-Cheaptrips, Inc. v. Media Synergy Grp., LLC, Case No. C09-00622-S-EJL, 2010 WL 1913589 , at *3 (D.Idaho May 12, 2010); Hall v. Natl Basketball Ass’n, 651 F.Supp. 335, 339 (D.Kan.1987)).
Further, Plaintiffs contend, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants are incorrect in their assertion that in determining whether there is purposeful direction, the court should consider named plaintiffs only and not putative class members. Id. at 21. Defendants cite only a single case in support of their position, Ambriz v. Coca Cola, and that case, according to Plaintiffs, is not on point-because it involved venue rather than personal jurisdiction. Id. Moreover, Plaintiffs assert, Yahoo, International Shoe, and Walden all make clear that the purposeful direction inquiry requires an evaluation of all of the defendant’s contacts with the forum state that are connected with the litigation; thus even contacts with non-parties (such as putative class. members) are considered in cases where the contacts of the plaintiffs are intertwined with those the non-parties. Id.
The second requirement for specific jurisdiction — that the claims must “arise out of’ or be “related to” the plaintiffs activities in the forum is also met here, Plaintiffs assert. Id. at 22. Plaintiffs argue that this requirement is a “low bar” in the Ninth Circuit and merely requires “some nexus between the claims and the company’s activities — a ‘but for’ test.” Id. (citing Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir.1990), rev’d on other grounds by Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 , 111 S.Ct. 1522 , 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991)). Here, Plaintiffs assert, “there is a clear nexus between the [Personal Jurisdiction Defendants’] policies (relating to recruitment and employment of California Minor Leaguers), the harm (relating to their failure to pay minimum wage and overtime to these Minor Leag-uers), and the claims (for violations of wage and hour laws).” Id. According to Plaintiffs, “[b]ut for Defendants’ uniform policies applied in California, there would be no harm to Minor Leaguers in California — and no claims.” Id.
Finally, Plaintiffs assert, it is reasonable to exercise jurisdiction in this District rather than “litigating it in a piecemeal fashion in other forums.” Id. at 23. The burden as to this third requirement is on the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants because Plaintiffs have met the first two prongs of the specific jurisdiction test, they contend. Id. (citing Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1111 ). Plaintiffs argue that the seven factors that are considered to deter *1005 mine reasonableness (discussed above) “strongly favor exercising personal, jurisdiction over [the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants] in California.” Id.
First, for the same reasons there is purposeful direction, Plaintiffs assert, the “purposeful interjection” factor weighs in favor of reasonableness. Id. (citing Enri-quez, 2012 WL 3800801 , at *6).
Second, Plaintiffs argue, the burden on a defendant is only unreasonable where defending in the forum is “so gravely difficult and inconvenient that it violates due process.” Id. (citing Enriquez, 2012 WL 3800801 , at *6 (internal citation omitted)). Moreover, they assert, when determining whether the “burden of defending” in the forum is unreasonable, the Court must consider the burdens on both the defendants and the plaintiffs. Id. (citing Ochoa, 287 F.3d at 1192 ). The facts here favor Plaintiffs, they argue, because seven Plaintiffs (some of whom were employed by the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants) live in California and 22 of 34 Plaintiffs live west of the Mississippi. Id. In addition, the burden of travel is greater for Plaintiffs, who have limited resources, than it is on the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants, who regularly travel to California, Plaintiffs contend. Id. at 24. Moreover, Plaintiffs argue, because all but one of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants are represented by the same counsel, there will be little additional burden of litigating in California.. Id. In contrast, they assert, “filing a new case based on identical facts in multiple districts against the [Personal Jurisdiction Defendants] would be substantially more burdensome and inefficient.” Id. Thus, this factor favors the conclusion that exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable, they contend. Id.
Plaintiffs agree with the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants that the “sovereignty” factor is neutral. Id.
Plaintiffs argue that the next factor, the forum’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, strongly favors California. Id. In particular, they argue that “[w]hile residents from states throughout the country are also harmed by Defendants’ practices, more California residents are harmed than residents in any other state because many more Minor Leaguers come from California than-any other state.” Id.
Plaintiffs argue that the exercise of jurisdiction in California will also support the fifth factor, which asks the court to consider “the most efficient judicial resolution.” Id. Plaintiffs contend it would be most efficient to litigate this dispute within a single district and further, that as the “epicenter of harm,” California is the most appropriate forum. Plaintiffs also assert that dismissal of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants would result in “highly inefficient, piecemeal litigation,, which would risk disparate .rulings on identical factual and legal issues.” Id. ■
The importance of the forum to Plaintiffs also, favors a finding that jurisdiction is reasonable, Plaintiffs argue, because three named Plaintiffs live in this district, far more Plaintiffs reside in California than any other state and over half of Plaintiffs suffered alleged harm in California. Id. at 25.
Finally, the last factor — the existence of an alternative forum — favors Plaintiffs’ position, they argue, because “far more named Plaintiffs are in California than in any other state, more Defendants are headquartered in California than in any other state, and more Minor Leaguers come from California than any other state, [and therefore] no other forum would be as convenient as California.” Id.
Consequently, Plaintiffs assert, the seven factors that go to reasonableness “demonstrate that Defendants cannot demonstrate a compelling burden, and the Court *1006 should find that it has specific jurisdiction over all [Personal Jurisdiction Defendants].” Id.
C. Reply Briefs
1. Proskauer PJ Defendants
In their Reply brief, the Proskaur PJ Defendants reject Plaintiffs assertion that there is general jurisdiction' over them, asserting that Plaintiffs have relied on outdated precedent while failing to address the Supreme Court’s more recent guidance in Daimler AG v. Bauman, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 746 , 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014) and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 2846 , 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011). Reply in Support Of Motion To Dismiss The Consolidated Amended Complaint As Against Certain Defendants For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction (“Proskauer Jurisdiction Reply”) at 1. Moreover, they assert, the contention that California is their “second home” is “unsupportable.” Id. They also challenge Plaintiffs’ assertion that there is specific jurisdiction over them. Id. As they argued in the underlying motion, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert that Plaintiffs’ position is based almost' entirely on the fact that “-certain Plaintiffs and unnamed members of the putative class voluntarily choose to live in California during the off-season.” Id. The Proskauer PJ Defendants argue that this is not a sufficient basis to find specific jurisdiction given that it is “undisputed that (i) not one Minor League player played a single inning fpr a Moving Defendant in California, and (ii) not one Minor League player was required to perform any training activities for a Moving Defendant in California.” Id. The Proskauer PJ Defendants also point to Plaintiffs’ assertion in response to Defendants’ transfer motions that there is no personal jurisdiction over some- of the MLB clubs in Florida,- asserting that Plaintiffs’ argument is based on the same absence of contacts with Florida that the -Proskauer PJ Defendants assert in their Motion to Dismiss deprives this Court of personal jurisdiction over them. Id.
On the question of general jurisdiction, the Proskauer PJ Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have relied heavily on a Ninth Circuit case, Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir.2006), that predates Daimler and Goodyear and is inconsistent with those more recent Supreme Court cases. Id. at 3. In particular, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert, in Tuazon , the Ninth Circuit found that there was general jurisdiction over -a defendant that had a “serious presence” and generated “enormous revenues” in the fo(rum even though the forum was not the defendant’s “home away from home.”. Id. That conclusion is at odds with Daimler, the Proskauer PJ Defendants argue, in which the Supreme Court “warned that [the exercise of general jurisdiction in every State in which a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business ... is unacceptably grasping.’ ” Id. (citing 134 S.Ct. at 761 (internal quotations omitted)). Even if the “more lenient standard set forth in Tua-zon” applies, the Proskauer PJ Defendants argue, the contacts in that case were more extensive than the contacts here. Id. Moreover, they assert, “[c]ourts have uniformly held that contacts of the sort on which Plaintiffs rely do not support personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state sports team.” Id. at 4 (citing Davis v. Billick, Case No. CIV.A. 301CV1964D, 2002 WL 1398560 (N.D.Tex. June 26, 2002); Manton v. Cal. Sports, Inc., 493 F.Supp. 496 (N.D.Ga.1980); Sullivan v. Tagliabue, 785 F.Supp. 1076, 1081 (D.R.I.1992)). The Proskauer PJ Defendants reject Plaintiffs’ claim that these cases are distinguishable because they did not involve a “common scheme” or “contacts related to the action,” arguing that these distinctions have no bearing on whether *1007 the forum was the defendants’ “second home.” Id.
Nor does the evidence establish that the Proskauer PJ Defendants are “at home” in California, they contend. They argue that “[t]o the extent that the Moving Defendants have established a second home in any jurisdiction, it could only be Florida, where they conduct spring training, extended spring training, and instructional leagues for extended periods each year at facilities that they maintain in that state, and where one or more of their Minor League teams are based.” Id. In contrast, they argue, the Proskauer PJ Defendants “are ‘visitors’ when they travel to California to play ‘away 5 games” and “do not receive income from tickets, concessions, parking, 'or other similar items for regular season games played in California.” Id.
The.Court should also reject Plaintiffs’ attempt to impute the contacts of MLB and other non-moving clubs to the Pros-kauer PJ Defendants for the purposes of general jurisdiction, they argue. Id. at 5-6. According to the Proskauer PJ Defendants, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F.Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y.1972) in support of this approach is misplaced, both because the decision does not apply the post -Daimler analysis and because the facts in that case were distinguishable. Id. at 6-6. In particular, they argue, the court in that case found jurisdiction in New York over a Virginia team because the American Basketball Association’s principal office was located in New York City, was listed in the telephone directory there and acted as designated agent for the basketball clubs. Id. at 6. Here, in contrast; “MLB is based in New York and MiLB'is based in Florida — not California.” Id. Further, the Proskauer PJ Defendants - contend, the facts here do not support a finding of agency. Id.
Plaintiffs’ reliance on revenues that are allegedly funneled through MLB also is misplaced, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert, as Plaintiffs have evidence of revenue from only two sources, amounting to approximately $166,000 per club in 2013, and they merely offer speculation that the actual revenues are significantly greater. Id. Even if true, the Proskauer PJ Defendants argue, revenues from California are not sufficient to support general jurisdiction under Daimler, in which the Supreme Court “rejected the Ninth Circuit’s finding that the defendant was subject- to general jurisdiction because its in-state subsidiary performed services that were important to the defendant company, holding that such an agency theory would ‘subject foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would sweep beyond even the sprawling view of general jurisdiction we rejected in Goodyear.’” Id. (quoting Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 760 (internal quotations omitted)). Finally, the Proskauer PJ Defendants argue that the other cases Plaintiffs cite in support of their agency theory of jurisdiction — Day nard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42 (1st Cir.2002) and Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir.2001) — also do not support a finding of general jurisdiction. Id. at 7-8.
The Proskaur PJ Defendants also reject Plaintiffs’ assertion that there is specific jurisdiction over them in California. As in their motion, they argue that the'players’ unilateral decision to live in' California in the offseason is not sufficient to establish that the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants have intentionally directed their actions at California. Id. at 8. They argue that evidence that the players were recruited, received communications in California and signed contracts here, cited by Plaintiffs in support of specific jurisdiction, does not *1008 show purposeful direction because “the ‘minimum contacts’ analysis ‘looks to the defendant’s contacts with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with persons who reside there.’ ” Id. (quoting Walden v. Fiore, — U.S.-,-, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1122 , 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014)). The Proskauer PJ Defendants further assert that “Plaintiffs vastly overstate the purported contacts between the Moving Defendants and California-based Minor League players.” Id. at 9. In particular, the Proskauer PJ Defendants argue that of the fifteen player declarations submitted by Plaintiffs, only nine reflect that those players even played for the Proskauer PJ Defendants, with the remaining six playing for defendants who do not contest jurisdiction. Id. Further, according to the Pros-kauer PJ Defendants, of the nine who played for them during the relevant time period, “five allege no personal connections with California during the relevant time-frame while playing for the moving Clubs, but instead offer that they had ‘teammates’ — none of whom they identify by name — who reportedly returned to California for the winter.” Id. at 10.
Nor do the allegations in the remaining declarations (of players Smith, Watts, Lewis and Giarraputo) provide evidence of sufficient contacts to support jurisdiction against each of the Clubs that challenges jurisdiction, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert. Id. It is also significant, they contend, that neither Lewis nor Giarraputo are named Plaintiffs in this action, as “a defendant’s contacts with the named plaintiffs] in a class action, without reference to the defendant’s contacts with unnamed members of the proposed class, must be sufficient for the Court to exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant.” Id. (citing Ambriz, 2014 WL 296159 , at *6 (ND.Cal. Jan. 27, 2014)).
The Proskauer PJ Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs’ claims do not arise out of their forum activities. Id. at 12 . The “but for” test cannot be met, they contend, on the basis of the players’ decision to live in California because the test requires that the contacts enabled the harm to occur, not merely that the contacts are related to the claims. Id. (citing Norris v. Okla. City Univ., Case No. 93-cv-1626 VRW, 1993 WL 313122 , at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 3, 1993) (quoting Alexander v. Circus Circus Enters., Inc., 939 F.2d 847, 853 (9th Cir.1991)). Further, the Proskauer PJ Defendants assert, Plaintiffs’ other forum activities, “including their recruitment, signing contracts, or receipt of various communications ... are too attenuated from them wage-and-hour claims to establish ‘but for’ causation.” Id.
Finally, the Proskauer PJ Defendants reiterate their position that exercise of specific jurisdiction in California is unreasonable based on the factors that courts must consider to make such a determination. Id. at 14-15. Purposeful interjection, the first factor, favors the Proskauer PJ Defendants for the same reasons there is no purposeful direction, they assert. Id. at 14. As to the second factor, the burden of defending in the forum, they argue that Plaintiffs “grossly misrepresent the authority cited for their specious proposition that ‘[i]f re-filing in another jurisdiction would burden the plaintiff, then it would be unreasonable to dismiss the complaint.’ ” Id. at 14. Rather, they assert, the proper focus should be on the fact that “the number of likely witnesses who live in or reasonably close to Florida overwhelms the number who live in or reasonably close to California.” Id. With respect to the interest of the forum state in adjudicating the claims, the Proskauer PJ Defendants contend Plaintiffs “cannot dispute that this forum’s interest in enforcing California law is mitigated because the events at issue with respect to the Moving Defendants did not occur in California.” Id. (citing Fed. *1009 Deposit Ins. Corp. v. British-Am. Ins. Co., Ltd., 828 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir.1987)). The Proskauer-PJ Defendants also reject Plaintiffs’ argument that litigation in California is more efficient because it wilL avoid piecemeal litigation, arguing that Plaintiffs undercut their opposition to the transfer motions, as the entire case could have been brought in Florida.. Id. Similarly, they argue that the availability of an alternative forum factor favors the Pros-kauer PJ Defendants because the case could have been brought against all of the Clubs in Florida. Id. at 15..
2. Baltimore Orioles
In their reply brief, the Baltimore Orioles join in the arguments made by the Proskauer PJ Defendants and also highlight specific facts relating to the Baltimore Orioles that they contend support those arguments. Defendants’, The Baltimore Orioles, Inc. And The Baltimore Orioles Limited Partnership, Reply In Support Of Motion To Dismiss The Consolidated Amended Complaint For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction (“Baltimore Orioles Personal'Jurisdiction Reply”).
In support of their assertion that there is no specific jurisdiction, the Baltimore Orioles point to the contacts (or absence of contacts) with California of named Plaintiff Roberto Ortiz, who is alleged to be a “representative plaintiff for the ML Collective Class, the Arizona Class, the Florida Class and the Maryland Class.” Id. at 1-2 (quoting CAC, ¶ 43). Ortiz is alleged to reside in Bayamon, Puerto Rico and, according to the Baltimore Orioles, “[t]here is no allegation that Mr. Ortiz is a representative of the California Class, ever lived in California[,] received any documentation from the Baltimore Orioles while residing in California!,] that he played for any affiliate associated with the Baltimore • Orioles in California!,] or that he was harmed by any action of the Baltimore Orioles in California.” Id. at 2. Consequently, they assert, the claims against the Baltimore Orioles asserted by Mr. Ortiz do not arise out of the Baltimore Orioles’ contacts with California and there is no specific jurisdiction against the Baltimore Orioles. Id:
With respect to general jurisdiction, the Baltimore Orioles acknowledge that they are registered to do business in California and pay taxes here as well, but argue that these contacts are not sufficient to make California a second home for them, and therefore, these contacts do not give rise to general jurisdiction under Daimler and Goodyear. Id. at 3-4. Nor, the Baltimore Orioles contend, can Plaintiffs establish 'general jurisdiction over the Baltimore Orioles based on their other “limited contacts” with California, which include “a handful of employees in California, a small amount of income derived from California, scouting trips, travel to California for occasional meetings, recruitment and a limited number of MLB games played in any given Championship Season.” Id. at 5-6. In a footnote, the Baltimore Orioles concede that their Vice President of Baseball Operations lives in California during the off-season but they assert that this connection “has no bearing on whether Plaintiffs can establish general jurisdiction over the Baltimore Orioles.” Id. at 5 n. 7.
D. The Second Consolidated Amended Complaint
In the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs add nine new named Plaintiffs: Matt Lewis (representative for Minor League Collective, Florida Class and California Class), Nick Giarraputo (representative for Minor League Collective, Arizona Class, California Class, Florida Class.and New York Class), Leonard Davis (representative for. the Minor League Collective, Florida Class, New York Class, California Class, Arizona Class and Pennsylvania Class), David Quinowski *1010 (representative for Minor League Collective, Arizona Class, California Class, Florida Class and Oregon Class), Mark Wagner representative for Minor League Collective, California Class, Florida Class, and Arizona Class), Brandon Pinckney (representative for California Class and Florida Class)' Lauren Gagnier (representative for Minor League Collective, Florida Class, California Class and Pennsylvania Class), Omar Aguilar (representative for Minor League. Collective, Arizona Class, Florida Class and California Class) and Grant Duff (representative for Minor League Collective, Florida Class and California Class). SCAC, ¶¶ 53-61; see also id., ¶¶ 498-567 (specific allegations regarding careers of new named Plaintiffs).
E. Supplemental Briefs
1. Plaintiffs’ Supplemental Brief
In their Memorandum of Points and Authorities Regarding Personal Jurisdiction Over Certain Defendants Named in the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint (“Plaintiffs’ Supp. Brief’), Plaintiffs contend that there is personal jurisdiction as to all of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants because “[a]s alleged in the proposed [SCAC] and supported by accompanying declarations, each [Personal Jurisdiction] Defendant recruited, scouted, and ultimately hired one or more of these named Plaintiffs from California.” Plaintiffs’ Supp. Brief at 1. Plaintiffs further assert, “[t]hese named Plaintiffs then performed work in California on behalf of the [Personal Jurisdiction] Defendants. The [Personal Jurisdiction] Defendants knew these Plaintiffs would perform that work in California, and permitted and encouraged them to do so. But the [Personal Jurisdiction] Defendants did not pay them for that work.” Id. Consequently, Plaintiffs argue, this Court may .exercise personal jurisdiction over all of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants. Id.
As directed by the Court, Plaintiffs’ supplemental brief focuses on the “arising out of’ prong of the test for specific jurisdiction. Plaintiffs argue that this requirement is satisfied by meeting a “but for” test, which “simply requires ‘that there be some nexus between the cause of action and the defendants’. activities in the forum.’ ” Id. at 2 (citing Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068, 1075 (9th Cir.2001); Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 385 (9th Cir.1990), rev’d on other grounds by Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 , 111 S.Ct. 1522 , 113 L.Ed.2d 622 (1991)). Plaintiffs further assert, as they did in their Opposition brief, that in wage and hour cases, the “arising out of’ requirement is satisfied “by alleging that a company applies a wage policy in a state that leads to claims.” Id. at 3 (citing Enriquez v. Interstate GRP., LLC, 11-cv-5155 YGR, 2012 WL 3800801 , at *5 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 31, 2012); Telles v. Li, Case No. 11-cv-1470 LHK, 2013 WL 5199811 , at *5 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 16, 2013)). According to Plaintiffs, these cases “demonstrate that knowledge is not a requirement of the but-for test when a company applies a wage policy to work performed in the state.” Id. But when “the company knowingly hires a forum’s resident and has reason to know work will be performed there,” Plaintiffs assert, “specific jurisdiction is assuredly present.” Id. (citing Wood v. Kinetic Sys., Inc., Case No. CV 09-579-S-CWD, 2010-WL 893647, at *5-6 (D.Idaho, Mar. 9, 2010); Sheets v. Integrated Info. Sys., Inc., Case No. 98-cv-1328-KI, 1999 WL 417274 , at *1 (D.Or. Jun. 17, 1999); Mendelsohn, Drucher & Assocs. v. Titan Atlas Mfg., Inc., 885 F.Supp.2d 767, 779 (E.D.Pa.2012)).
Applying these standards, Plaintiffs address each of the Minor League teams that challenges personal jurisdiction, asserting that “the claims of at least one named Plaintiff can be mapped directly to pur *1011 poseful conduct undertaken by each one of the [Personal Jurisdiction] Defendants.” Id. at 6.
2. Defendants’ Supplemental Brief
In their responsive brief, Defendants contend the addition of the new named Plaintiffs in the SCAC does not cure the deficiencies in the previous consolidated complaint with respect to the existence of personal jurisdiction over them. Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities Regarding Personal Jurisdiction Over Certain Defendants Named in the Second Consolidated Amended Complaint (“Personal Jurisdiction Defendants’ Supp. Brief’) at 1. In particular, according to Defendants, Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants “purposefully directed their activities toward California and that their claims arise out of those activities.” Id. (emphasis in original).
The Personal Jurisdiction Defendants agree with Plaintiffs that the “arising out of’ requirement is satisfied if there is “but for” causation but contend Plaintiffs are incorrect in asserting this test is met by “simply [showing] ... ‘some nexus between the cause of action and the defendant’s activities in the forum.” Id. at 2 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Supp. Brief at 2-3). Instead, the Personal. Jurisdiction Defendants contend, “the key question is ‘whether the entire course of events ... was an uninterrupted whole which began with, and was uniquely made possible by, the [defendant’s] contacts in [the, forum state].’ ” Id. (quoting Norris v. Okla. City Univ., Case No. C93-1626 VRW, 1993 WL 313122 , at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 3, 1993) (emphasis added in Defendants’ brief)). Thus, they assert, “[i]f a plaintiff ‘would have the same claims5 against [the defendant]’ even in the absence of the alleged forum contacts, jurisdiction is lacking.” Id. (citing Young v. Actions Semiconductor Co., 386 Fed.Appx. 623, 627 (9th Cir.2010)). According to the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants, Plaintiffs have not met this standard.
First, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants argue that Plaintiffs mischaracterize the declarations of the new named Plaintiffs, overstating their contacts with the forum. Id. They contend, for example, the declarations do not support Plaintiffs’ assertion that ‘“each [Moving] Defendant’ recruited and scouted one or more of the named Plaintiffs from California.” Id. at 2-3 (quoting Plaintiffs’ Supp. Brief at 1) (emphasis added in Defendants’ brief). In fact, they argue, the declarations reflect that seven out of eleven of the new Plaintiffs were “scouted in California not by any of the Moving Defendants, but by unidentified ‘MLB teams.’ ”, Id. at 3 (citing Lewis Decl. at ¶ 3, Giarraputo Decl. at ¶ 3, Gor-gen Decl. at ¶ 3, Davis Decl. at ¶ 3, Pinck-ney Decl. at ¶ 3, Wagner Decl, at ¶ 3 and Quinowski Decl. at ¶ 3). Further, these contacts occurred “a decade ago, well beyond any applicable limitations period, and cannot possibly be the ‘but for’ cause of the alleged work for which Plaintiffs seek to be compensated.” Id. (citing Watts Decl. at ¶¶ 3-4, Gagnier Decl. at ¶ 3, Aguilar Decl. at ¶4 and Duff Decl. at ¶4).
The Personal Jurisdiction" Defendants also challenge Plaintiffs’ contention that they “ ‘facilitated ... California work by providing extensive winter training packets and by directing communications to Plaintiffs in California.’ ” Id. (quoting Plaintiffs’ Supp. Brief at 5). According to the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants, only five of them — the Atlanta , Braves, Washington Nationals, Pittsburgh Pirates, Chicago White Sox and Tampa Bay Rays — are alleged to have sent any communications to California, while six of the declarants (Quinowski, Wagner, Aguilar, Gagnier, Duff and Pinckney) who played for the remaining - Personal Jurisdiction Defen *1012 dants “did not state that they, in fact, received communications in California.” Id} Further, Defendants assert, none of the declarants alleges that any communication mailed to him in California related to offseason training in California; to the contrary, many of the communications received by Plaintiffs in California “refer to activities to be performed in Florida.” Id. at 3-4 (citing Broshuis Supp. Decl., Exs. A, B). Therefore, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants argue, Plaintiffs have not shown that “for each Moving Defendant, there is a Named Plaintiff who had ‘claims that arise out of or relate to the conduct of that individual Defendant in California.’” Id. at 4.
Next, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants contend the “abbreviated and attenuated contacts” that can be attributed to them — scouting and recruiting, mailings, and situs of contract signing — do not establish personal jurisdiction because they are unrelated to Plaintiffs’ wage and hour claims. Id. at 4-5. With respect to scouting and recruiting, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants assert that only Watts (Pittsburgh Pirates), Gagnier (Detroit Tigers), Aguilar (Cleveland Indians / Baltimore Orioles) and Duff (New York Yankees) claim that they were recruited or scouted by one of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants. Id. at 5. None of the remaining Personal Jurisdiction Defendants is even alleged to have recruited a named Plaintiff in California, they contend. Id. at 5-6. Further, even as to the teams who allegedly recruited named Plaintiffs in California, such recruiting activities are not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants argue. Id. at 6 (citing Selhorst v. Alward Fisheries, LLC, Case No. C-11-3266 EMC, Case No. C-11-3266 EMC, 2011 WL 4974568 , at * 6 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 19, 2011); Norris v. Okla. City Univ., Case No. C-93-1626 VRW, 1993 WL 313122 , at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 3, 1993)). Thus, they conclude, Plaintiffs have failed to establish personal jurisdiction over any of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants based on recruiting in the forum. Id.
Nor do the communications cited by Plaintiffs establish personal jurisdiction over any of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants, they argue, because none of the declarants claims that he received any communications relating to the work allegedly performed in California. Id. at 6-7 . Consequently, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants assert, Plaintiffs are unable to satisfy the “but for” test because they have not shown that their wage and hour' claims “emanated from these communications.” Id. at 6 . According to the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants, it is well-established that “limited informational communications sent into the forum” such as the ones cited here do not give rise to specific jurisdiction. Id. at 7 (citing Norris, 1993 WL 313122 , at *3-4, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11349 , at *9-10; Martin v. Clemson Univ., Case No. 07-536, 2007 WL 4531028 , at *7-9, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93703 , at *21-25 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 21, 2007); Hardnett v. Duquesne Univ., 897 F.Supp. 920, 922, 924 (D.Md.1995); Sunbelt Corp. v. Noble, Denton & Assocs., Inc., 5 F.3d 28 , 32 (3d Cir.1993)). In short, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants contend, Plaintiffs “have not proffered any facts supporting *1013 the proposition that, ‘absent Defendants’ [mailings to] California, [their] claims would not have arisen,’ ” and thus, these communications do not establish specific jurisdiction over the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants who are alleged to have sent them. Id. (quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v. Toyo Enter. Co., 665 F.Supp.2d 1084, 1094 (N.D.Cal.2009)).
With respect to the named Plaintiffs who claim that they signed their initial contracts in California — Lewis, Wagner, Giarraputo, Gorgen, Davis, Pinckney and Duff — the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants assert that these contacts also are not sufficient to establish specific jurisdiction. Id. at 8. According to the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants, signing a contract with an out-of state defendant does not “automatically establish sufficient minimum contacts to support jurisdiction;” rather, whether such a contract is evidence that the defendant “purposefully established minimum contacts with the forum” depends on the “prior negotiations and contemplated future consequences, along with the terms of the contract and the parties’ actual course of dealing.” Id. (quoting Selhorst, Case No. C-11-3266 EMC, 2011 WL 4974568 , at *4 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 19, 2011)). Those factors do not support a finding of specific jurisdiction here because the named Plaintiffs who signed their contracts in California are not alleging breach of contract and the contracts “do not require or even contemplate the performance of any work in California.” Id. (distinguishing Wood v. Kinetic Sys., Inc., Case No. CV 09-579-S-CWD, 2010 WL 893647 (D.Idaho Mar. 9, 2010) on the basis that contract specified that forum was report-to-work location). Further, according to the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants, Plaintiffs claim that “no contract negotiations took place at all,” citing allegations in the SCAC that some of the players signed the Uniform Player Contract “quickly.” Id. (citing SCAC, ¶¶ 431, 450, 498, 5 505, 513,. 529, 537 and 547).
The Personal Jurisdiction Defendants contend courts in the Ninth Circuit have “declined to exercise specific jurisdiction in circumstances where plaintiffs have alleged far more significant contract dealings occurring in California.” Id. at 8 . As a case that is “particularly instructive,” they point to Sarkis v. Lajcak, Case No. C-08-0911 RMW, 2009 WL 3367069 , 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95971 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 15, 2009), aff'd 425 Fed.Appx. 557 (9th Cir.2011). In that case, Personal Jurisdiction Defendants assert, the court found that there was no specific jurisdiction over a claim for fraudulent inducement, even though it was based on representations contained in the contract, because the plaintiffs termination did not arise out of the pre-employment discussions and negotiations. Id. at 9.
The Personal Jurisdiction Defendants also challenge the existence of specific jurisdiction over the Boston Red Sox and the Baltimore Orioles on the basis that “Plaintiffs Wagner and Quinowski do not allege that [these teams] scouted or recruited them in California, or mailed communications to them in California[,] or entered into contracts with them in California.” Id.
Finally, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ voluntary choice to perform offseason training in California does not establish contacts with California that can be imputed to them under the effects test, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Walden. Id. at 10. They reject Plaintiffs’ assertion that under *1014 Walden it is enough to establish specific jurisdiction that a defendant knowingly hires a forum’s resident and has reason to know that work will be performed there. Id. They further assert that two “home office” cases cited by Plaintiffs — Woods and Sheets v. Integrated Info. Util Sys., Inc. — are not on point because in both cases the contacts with the forum were more, extensive than they are here. Id. at 11-12. On the other hand, courts have “overwhelmingly found personal jurisdiction to be lacking in a multitude of ‘home office’ cases where, like here, the plaintiffs made unilateral decisions to perform work in a particular location,” according to the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants. Id. at 13 (citing Adams v. Riverview Healthcare Ass’n, Case No. A3-02-135, 2003 WL 1456442 , at *2-3, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4253 , at *7 (D.N.D. Mar. 17, 2013); McDowell v. Tankinetics, Inc., Case No. C-11-3306-CV-S-RED, 2012 WL 828509 , at *3, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31429 , at *11 (W.D.Mo. Mar. 8, 2012); Elliott v. Armor Holdings, Inc., Case No. 99-337-B, 2000 WL 1466112 , 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1071 (D.N.H.2000); Walburn v. Rovema Packaging Machs., LLP, 2008 WL 852443 , 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25369 (D.N.J. Mar. 28, 2008)).
Plaintiffs also fail to establish personal jurisdiction against the Tampa Bay Rays and the Philadelphia Phillies, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants contend, because Plaintiffs’ claims (based on the allegations of Gorgen and Pinckney) are time-barred. Id. at 14 . Finally, the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants assert that all the claims for unpaid offseason work asserted against them are so vaguely alleged in the SCAC that Plaintiffs do not state a claim under Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 , 127 S.Ct. 1955 , 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 669 , 129 S.Ct. 1937 , 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Id. at 14-15. Therefore, they argue, these' claims cannot give rise to personal jurisdiction. Id.
F. Legal Standard under Rule 12(b)(2)
A party may move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of personal jurisdiction. The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 F.3d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir.2006). “Where, as here, the motion is based on written materials rather than an evidentiary hearing, ‘the. plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts.’ ” Id. (quoting Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir.1990)). “Although the plaintiff cannot simply rest on the bare allegations of its complaint, ... uncontroverted allegations in the complaint-must be taken as true.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800 (9th Cir.2004) (internal quotations omitted). “Conflicts between parties over statements contained in affidavits must be resolved in the plaintiffs favor.” Id. “Where .... there is no applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction, the district court applies the law of the state in which the district court sits.” Dole Food Company, Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir.2002). The FLSA is silent with respect to personal jurisdiction and thus, the Court applies the law of California to determine whether personal jurisdiction exists. S ee Kouba v. Renzenberger, Inc., Case No. C10-159 TUC FRZ (GEE), 2010 WL 5342964 , 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135743 (DAriz. May 14, 2010). “Because California’s long-arm jurisdictional statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional analyses under state law and federal due process are the same.” Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1110 (citing Cal.Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10).
*1015 G. Whether the Court May Exercise Jurisdiction over the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants 1. Overview of Personal Jurisdiction
“For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, that defendant must have at least ‘minimum contacts’ with the relevant forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Dole Food, 303 F.3d at 1110-11 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , 66 S.Ct. 154 , 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)). “In judging minimum contacts, a court proper-' ly focuses on ‘the relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’ ” ‘ Colder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 788, 104 , S.Ct. 1482, 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977)).
Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific. See Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.2000). In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, — U.S. —-, -, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 , 180 L.Ed.2d 796 (2011), the Supreme Court explained that “[a] court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them when their affiliations with the State are so.‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.” Id. (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317 , 66 S.Ct. 154 ). On the other hand,, the Court continued, “[sjpecific jurisdiction ... depends on an ‘affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying controversy,’ principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State- and is therefore subject to the State’s regulation.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the Court stated, “[i]n contrast to general, all-purpose jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
,2. General Jurisdiction a. Legal Standard
In International Shoe , the Court observed that there are “instances in which ... continuous corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising fróín dealings entirely distinct from those' activities.” 326 U.' S. at 318, 66 S.Ct. 154 . The standard for establishing, general jurisdiction is' “fairly high.” Brand v. Menlove Dodge, 796 F.2d 1070, 1073 (9th Cir.1986). A corporate defendant may be subject to general jurisdiction when its contacts with the forum “approximate physical presence.” Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.2000). Whether this standard is met turns on the “economic reality of the de- ■ fendants’ activities rather 'than a mechanical checklist.” Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1173 (9th Cir.2006). “Factors to be taken into consideration are whether the defendant makes sales, solicits or engages in business in the state,, serves the state’s markets, designates an agent for service'of process, holds a license, or is incorporated there.” Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1086 .
“[E]ngaging in commerce with residents of the forum state is not in and of itself the kind of activity that approximates physical presence within the state’s borders.”. Id. On the other hand, where there is a “confluence of ... physical, economic, and political presence,” in the forum, there may be sufficient' minimum contacts to give rise to general jurisdiction. Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d at 1173-75. Thus, for example, in Tuazon , the Ninth Circuit held that there was gen *1016 eral jurisdiction over defendant R. J. Reynolds Tobacco (“Reynolds”) in Washington State, even though Reynolds had its headquarters in North Carolina, based on, inter alia, Reynolds’ extensive business in Washington, generating “enormous” yearly sales in the hundreds of millions of dollars, its activities targeting consumers in Washington (including focused market research and various promotions) and its involvement in organizing opposition to state and local legislation aimed at limiting or banning smoking or cigarette advertising. Id. at 1174 . The court also found significant the fact that “the essence of Tuazon’s complaint — a worldwide coverup regarding tobacco risks — cannot be characterized as ‘dealings entirely distinct’ from Reynolds’ business in Washington.” Id. (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319 , 66 S.Ct. 154 ).
In recent years, in Goodyear and Daimler, the Supreme Court has cautioned against an overly expansive view of general jurisdiction in the context of the parent-subsidiary relationship. In Goodyear, the Court held that there was no general jurisdiction over a foreign subsidiary, even though there was general jurisdiction over the United States parent corporation, because the subsidiary’s contacts with the forum were “attenuated” and it was “at no sense at home” there. 131 S.Ct. at 2857 . The Supreme Court also noted that for a corporate defendant, the “paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction” as to the corporation is “an equivalent place” to an individual’s domicile, such as the place of incorporation or principal place of business. 131 S.Ct. at 2853-54 .
In Daimler AG v. Bauman, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 746 , 187 L.Ed.2d 624 (2014), the Supreme Court held that a foreign parent could not be subject to general jurisdiction based on the contacts with the forum of the subsidiary. The Court explained that the principal place of business and the place of incorporation “have the virtue of being unique — that is, each ordinarily indicates only one place — as well as easily ascertainable.” Id. at 760-61 . The Daimler Court noted that “Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has its principal place of business,” though it “typed those places paradigm all-purpose forums.” Id. at 760-761 . Nor did it “foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case ... a corporation’s operations in a forum other than its formal place of operation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State.” Id. at 761 n. 19. It rejected, however, the plaintiffs argument that there is general jurisdiction in “every State in which a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business,” opining that such a formulation would be “unacceptably grasping.” Id. at 761 (internal citations omitted).
The Court in Daimler further advised that “the general jurisdiction inquiry does not focu[s] solely on the magnitude of the defendant’s in-state contacts.” Id. at 762 n. 20 (internal quotation and citation omitted) (alteration in original). The Court explained:
General jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. Otherwise, “at home” would be synonymous with “doing business” tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in the United States.
Id.
b. Discussion
The Personal Jurisdiction Defendants assert that although this case does not *1017 involve a parent-subsidiary relationship, the stringent requirements for general jurisdiction that are set forth in Goodyear and Daimler apply here and that under that standard, their contacts with California are insufficient to establish general jurisdiction over them in California. The Court agrees.
A number of courts have held that there is no general jurisdiction over sports teams with forum contacts that are comparable to those of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants in this case. For example, in Davis v. Billick, the court found no jurisdiction over the Baltimore Ravens in Texas under similar facts. Case No. 301CV1964D, 20Q2 WL 1398560 at *6 (N.D.Tex. June 26, 2002). There, the court held that the team’s contacts were not sufficiently continuous and systematic to give rise to general jurisdiction where: 1) employees regularly traveled to Texas for National Football League (“NFL”) owners meetings and the annual management council meeting; 2) the Ravens had contracted with a Texas resident to conduct scouting for the team; and 3) the team derived “substantial income” from NFL merchandise sales in Texas. Id. at *5-6.
Similarly, in Manton v. Cal. Sports, Inc., the court held that there was no personal jurisdiction over the Los Angeles Lakers in Georgia despite the fact that the Lak-ers: 1) “occasionally play games in Georgia”; 2) received “some revenue from Georgia by way of defendant’s broadcast of games played in Georgia back to the Los Angeles area”; 3) received $800,000 from the National Basketball Association (“NBA”) as its share of the amount paid by TV networks to broadcast NBA games, some of which were played in Georgia; and 4) received 100% of the gate receipts when Georgia NBA member the Atlanta Hawks played them in California. 493 F.Supp. 496, 496-98 (N.D.Ga.1980).
In Sullivan v. Tagliabue, the Court considered whether there was general jurisdiction in Rhode Island over the NFL and 21 of the 28 NFL member clubs. 785 F.Supp. 1076 (D.R.I.1992). The court considered the contacts of the NFL with Rhode Island and concluded that they were insufficient to establish general jurisdiction. Id. at 1079-81 . It went on to address whether the contacts of the member clubs were sufficient to establish jurisdiction. Id. at 1081 . The contacts of the member clubs with Rhode Island included: 1) “occasional trips” to Rhode Island, 2) broadcasts of NFL games into Rhode Island over network and cable stations and 3) receipt of money from ticket sales in the state and transaction of business with Rhode Island banks. Id. at 1081 . The court concluded that these contacts were insufficient to support jurisdiction, at least where the' claims (which were based on antitrust law) were not related to the contacts. Id.
In Evans v. Boston Red Sox, the court found that there was no general jurisdiction over an MLB Club, the Boston Red Sox, in Hawaii. Case No. 13-00262 SOM BMK, 2013 WL 6147675 , at *4-5, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 166307 , at *10-12 (D.Haw. Nov. 22, 2013). In reaching this conclusion, the court cited the facts (which were undisputed) that: 1) the Red Sox team “does not have any offices, employees, agents or bank accounts in Hawaii and does not own, rent or lease any property in Hawaii.” Id. at *10 . The team also., “does not have any regular season or exhibition Major League Baseball games in Hawaii.” Id. Therefpre, the court concluded, the Boston Red Sox did not have contacts with Hawaii that were “continuous, systematic and substantial.” Id.
In all of these cases, the courts evaluated general jurisdiction with reference only to the contacts of the teams themselves to *1018 the forum state; they did not aggregate the contacts of the teams with those of the sports associations of which they were members. As discussed further below, the Court concludes that that approach is correct. It is true that the contacts of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants with California are, arguably, more extensive than the contacts with the forum in the cases cited above. In Davis v. Billick, there was only a single scout in Texas and there was no indication that any employees of the Baltimore Ravens were based in Texas. Nor was there any evidence that Baltimore Ravens players traveled to Texas for games. In Mantón, although the Lakers played occasional games in Georgia, there-was no suggestion that they had any employees or were engaged in any scouting there. And in Sullivan and Evans , there appears to have been no travel to the forum state by the defendant teams for games, no employees based in the forum and no scouting activities. Nonetheless, the Court concludes that the result reached in those cases also applies here.
The Supreme Court’s recent guidance on the theory of general jurisdiction has made clear that the concept of “home” in the context of general jurisdiction should be understood narrowly, with the “paradigm forum” for an individual being his or her domicile and for a corporation being its principal place of business or place of incorporation. Goodyear, 131 S.Ct. at 2853-54 . Daimler did not foreclose the possibility that under some circumstances a forum may be “home” even if it does not fall into one of the paradigmatic categories. Id. at 760-61. The Court emphasized, however, that merely engaging in a “substantial, continuous and systematic course of business” is not sufficient to establish general jurisdiction and described as “exceptional” the case in which a defendant would be “at home” in a state other than one that falls within the paradigm. 134 S.Ct. at 761 n. 19. It also explained that in determining whether a defendant is at home, the court must appraise the defendant’s “activities in then-entirety, nationwide and worldwide,” Id. at 762 n. 20.
Applying these principals to the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants here, the Court concludes that California cannot be considered home to any of these Clubs. Even though they have all engaged in regular travel to California, conducted some business with California, engage in scouting activities in the State and even have employees who are based here, there is no indication that these ties represent such a significant portion of their activities that their presence in California would be analogous to being domiciled in California or having their principal place of business in California. Nor have Plaintiffs offered any evidence showing that the revenues the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants receive from MLB’s internet sales and TV broadcasts constitute a significant portion of their overall revenues. 6 ,
Plaintiffs’ reliance on Tuazon is unavailing. There, the contacts of the defendant tobacco company were vastly more significant than the contacts of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants in this case. In particular, the court found that Reynolds had had a “serious” presence in the forum and generated “enormous” revenues from the state. 433 F.3d at 1173. Reynolds had also hejd a license to do business in the state for decades, “advertised in purely local publications since at least the 1950s,” *1019 and engaged in local political activity to protect its market, and maintained a permanent office and workforce in the state. Id. Plaintiffs have not been able to document revenues comparable to those in Tuazon or show that for any .team challenging jurisdiction the revenues derived from activities in California constitute a significant share of their overall revenue. Further, Plaintiffs cite only a passing reference to lobbying by MLB to support their assertion that Personal Jurisdiction Defendants have a presence in California sufficient to establish general jurisdiction. See Personal Jurisdiction Opposition at 6 (citing Broshuis Deck, Exs. I-J). There is no evidence that any of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants were engaged in this lobbying.
The Court also rejects Plaintiffs’ assertion that it should reach a different result based on the “interdependent nature of MLB.” Personal Jurisdiction Opposition at 13. Plaintiffs’ position draws on cases that have highlighted the unique characteristics' of sports associations, described in one case as follows:
The highly special character of the business of operating a football team as a mémber of a league was discussed in United States v. National Football League, 116 F.Supp. 319 [ (E.D.Pa.1953) ]. The revenues of all the defendants are derived from the playing of football games, road games as well as home games. As was said in United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. [795], 817, 68 S.Ct. [855], 866 [ (1948) ]: ‘Such a continuing and far-reaching enterprise is not to be governed in this respect by rules evolved with reference to the very ‘ different businesses and activities of manufacturing and selling. Nor, what comes to the same thing, is the determination to be made for such an enterprise by atomizing it into minute parts or events, in disregard of the actual unity and continuity of the whole course of conduct, by the process* sometimes applied in borderline cases involving manufacturing ■ and selling activities.’
Am. Football League v. Nat’l Football League, 27 F.R.D. 264, 268 (D.Md.1961) (finding that venue-was proper as to two NFL team members based on activities of the NFL as a whole). Plaintiffs rely heavily on Erving v. Virginia Squires Basketball Club, 349 F.Supp. 709 (E.D.N.Y.1972), which follows a similar line of reasoning to find personal jurisdiction over a basketball team based, in part, on the contacts with the forum of the unaffiliated association (the ABA) of which it was a member. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that this case does not provide strong support for Plaintiffs’’assertion that the contacts of MLB with California should be attributed to the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants.
In Erving , a professional basketball player sought to rescind his contract with a basketball club (“Squires”).' 349 F.Supp. at 711 . Although the Squires were based in Virginia, the plaintiff brought the action in New York.- Id. The Squires argued that there was no personal jurisdiction, but the court disagreed, finding that under New York’s long-arm statute, ' N.Y. CPLR § 313 , the Squires were “doing business” in New York and therefore were subject to jurisdiction. Id. at 712 . The court reasoned that the contacts of the Squires had to be appraised with reference to their affiliation with the ABA, which it likened to a “joint venture” through which the member clubs “carry on an integrated business operation for mutual profit.” Id. at 712-13'. Thus, although the Squires played only six to eight games in New York (out of a total of 84 in a season), these games were not “casual[ ] or fortuitous[ ]” but rather, were played “on a regular and continuing basis pursuant- to a well-organized business plan.” Id. at 713 . *1020 Further, the court pointed out, although the Squires did not receive game receipts for their games in New York, the contract among the ABA members provided that they would receive all gate receipts from games in their home state of Virginia. Id. The court also pointed out that under the agreement, all of the member teams received. a portion of the revenue generated by television and radio broadcasts. Id. The court further found that Squires officials and employees regularly visited New York, where the ABA was headquartered, to conduct business. Id. at 714-15 . The court found that considered together, these contacts were.sufficient to show that the team had “continuous and substantial business operations” that satisfied NY. CPLR § 301 and therefore, that there was personal jurisdiction. Id. at 715.
Many of the contacts listed in Erving mirror the ones that the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants have.with California in this case. These, include games in the forum that are planned and scheduled by MLB as part of a “well-organized business plan,” regular travel to the forum by employees and officials of the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants, and receipt of a share of certain revenues generated by MLB. The Erving court did not, however, address the question of whether its conclusion comported with the requirements of due process as set forth in International Shoe and its progeny. Nor did the court consider whether the Squires could be considered to be “at home” in New York. In addition, to the extent that its conclusion was based on the Squires’ “continuous and substantial business, operations” in New York, the court’s reasoning may run afoul of the Supreme Court’s recent. decisions relating to general jurisdiction, which suggest that the approach in Erving may be “overly grasping.” Therefore, the Court does not find Plaintiffs’ reliance on Erving persuasive. ■ -
The Court also rejects Plaintiffs’ arguments based on the law of agency and joint ventures. Plaintiffs argue that acts of an agent may imputed to the principal for the purposes of personal jurisdiction, citing Myers v. Bennett Law Offices, 238 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir.2001). Myers held that .the acts of a defendant’s employee could be imputed to the employer for the purposes of determining whether there was specific jurisdiction where the plaintiff had made a prima facie case that the employee had apparent authority as to the conduct at issue and the employer subsequently ratified the act. 238 F.3d at 1073 . The court in that case court did not address general jurisdiction, however. Nor does the case shed any light on how agency principles might apply to members of an unaffiliated association for the purposes of assessing general jurisdiction.
Similarly, Plaintiffs’ reliance on Daynard v. Ness, Motley, Loadholt, Richardson & Poole, P.A., 290 F.3d 42 (1st Cir.2002) is misplaced. In that case, the First Circuit addressed whether there was jurisdiction in Massachusetts over claims against a Mississippi law firm on the basis of the contacts of a second law firm that had acted as an agent of the Mississippi firm. 290 F.3d at 44 . The First Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, finding that because the second firm held itself out as an agent of the first, there was a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Id. at 45 . The reasoning of that case is not applicable here, however, as the court expressly rejected the district court’s reliance on a “substantial influence” test that was articulated in a case involving an unaffiliated association, Donatelli v. Nat’l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459 (1st Cir.1990)). The court explained that:
Donatelli's substantial influence test does not control the entire universe of cases in which one part/s contacts might be attributed to another. By *1021 its terms, Donatelli applies “in the world of unincorporated associations.” Id. at 468 . Indeed, as Donatelli itself observed, the substantial influence test does not control where one seeks to attribute contacts from partner to partnership or from subsidiary to corporate parent. Id. at 465-67 . In the partnership context, “the activities of the partner are generally attributed to the partnership and jurisdiction over the partnership follows from the partner’s contacts, if sufficient, regardless of the absence of independent contacts between the partnership qua entity and the forum.” Id. at 466 . Donatel-li’s substantial influence test does not apply here, where the question is whether an actual or implied agency relationship, sufficient to attribute contacts, existed between the parties. We conclude that, similar to some cases involving actual partnerships, the relationship between the defendants here invokes certain principles of the law of agency, partnership, and joint venture and that these principles permit imputing contacts without the need to show substantial influence.
Id. at 54. If anything, the reasoning in Daynard points to the conclusion that members of unaffiliated associations are not treated like actual agents or joint ven-turers for the purposes of general jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the Court finds that there is no general jurisdiction over the Personal Jurisdiction Defendants in California.
3. Specific Jurisdiction
a. Legal Standard
“The inquiry whether a forum State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant ‘focuses on the “relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.””’ Walden v. Fiore, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 1115, 1121 , 188 L.Ed.2d 12 (2014) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 775 , 104 S.Ct. 1473 , 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 , 97 S.Ct. 2569 , 53 L.Ed.2d 683 (1977))). The exercise of specific jurisdiction “is consistent with due process” only where “the defendant’s suit-related conduct ... created] a substantial connection with the forum state.” Id.; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474 , 105 S.Ct. 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (“the constitutionál touchstone remains whether the defendant purposefully established ‘minimum contacts’ in the forum state”).
A court may exercise specific jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant where the following requirements are met:
(1) the non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;
(2) the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and
(3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e. it must be reasonable.
Dole Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir.2002).
The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs of the test for specific jurisdiction. Id. (citing Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1361 (9th Cir.1990)). “If the plaintiff succeeds in satisfying both of the first two prongs, the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present a compelling .case’ that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Id. (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476-78 , 105 S.Ct. *1022 2174 , 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985)). In a purported class action, specific jurisdiction must be demonstrated by the named Plaintiffs. See, e.g., AM Trust v. UBS AG, Case No. C-14-4125 PJH, 78 F.Supp.3d 977 , 986-87 2015 WL 395465, at *8 (N.D.Cal. Jan. 29, 2015) (“claims of unnamed class members, are irrelevant to the question of specific jurisdiction”).
b. Purposeful Availment
Although the first prong of the test for specific jurisdiction is often referred to as “purposeful availment,” the Ninth Circuit has explained that this is “shorthand” that refers to both “purposeful availment” and “purposeful direction.” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir.2004). These are “two distinct concepts.” Id. In Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme Et L’Antisemitisme, the Ninth Circuit explained that “[i]n fort cases, we typically inquire whether a defendant ‘purposefully direct[s] his activities’ at the forum.state, applying an ‘effects’ test that focuses on the forum in which the defendant’s actions were felt, whether or not the actions themselves occurred within the forum,” whereas “in contract cases, we typically inquire whether a defendant ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities’ or ‘con-summáte[s] [a] transaction’ in the forum, focusing on activities such as delivering goods or executing a contract.” 433 F.3d at 1206 (citing Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802-03 ) (citing Colder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90 , 104 S.Ct. 1482 , 79 L.Ed.2d 804 (1984)).
Wage and hour claims asserted under the'FLSA and state law are neither tort nor contract claims. Some courts in this District have “likened FLSA claims to tort claims and have applied the purposeful direction standard.” Telles v. Li, Case No. 11-cv-1470 LHK, 2013 WL 5199811 , at *4 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 16, 2013) (citing En-riquez v. Interstate Group, LLC, Case No. 11-cv-05155 YGR, 2012 WL 3800801 , at *3 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 31, 2012) (applying purposeful direction to FLSA claim); Holliday v. Lifestyle Lift, Inc., Case No. 09-cv-4995 RS, 2010 WL 3910143 , at *3 (N.D.Cal. Oct. 5, 2010) (same)). In Holli-day, for example, the court concluded that the allegations in that case — that two of the defendants “masterminded the employment policy that denied overtime compensation to non-exempt employees” — “[lent] itself to the intentional tort analysis” and therefore analyzed the first prong of the specific jurisdiction test under the purposeful direction standard. 2010 WL 3910143 , at * 3. The court acknowledged, however, that'FLSA claims are “not easily categorized as either a contract' or a tort dispute” and that because an FLSA claim “assumes the existence of an employment contract ... courts have analogized violations under the contract to common law contract breach.” Id. (citing Pavlo v. Stiefel Laboratories, Inc., Case No. 78, 1979 WL 105 , at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 1979)).
While the parties here have characterized the first prong of the. specific jurisdiction test as a question of purposeful .direction, both sides have relied upon purposeful availment decisions in support of their positions as well. See, e.g., Sheets v. Integrated Information Utility Systems, Inc., Case No. 98-cv-1328-KI, 1999 WL 417274 (D.Or. Jun. 17, 1999) (applying purposeful availment analysis in case involving both breach of contract and statutory wage and hour claims) (cited by Plaintiffs); Novak v. NanoLogix, Inc., Case No. 13-cv-01971 EJD, 2014 WL 991119 , at *2 (N.D.Cal. Mar. 11, 2014) (applying purposeful availment analysis in case involving only claims for breach of • employment agreement) (cited by Personal Jurisdiction Defendants); SRE-Cheaptrips, Inc. v. Media Synergy Group, LLC, Case No. 09-cv-00622-S- *1023 EJL, 2010 WL 1913589 (D.Idaho May 12, 2010) (applying purposeful availment analysis in case involving both breach of contract claims and tort' claims and noting that purposeful availment approach was appropriate because “[although one of [plaintiffs] claims sound[s] in .tort, all of its claims arise out of [plaintiffs] contractual relationship with the Defendants”) (cited by Personal Jurisdiction Defendants). In addition, Plaintiffs have pointed to many a

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7231501. Public record. Not legal advice.