# Schoolcraft v. City of New York

> District Court, S.D. New York · May 5, 2015 · 103 F. Supp. 3d 465

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7231289

## Case

- **Full name:** Adrian SCHOOLCRAFT v. CITY OF NEW YORK
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. New York
- **Decided:** May 5, 2015
- **Citations:** 103 F. Supp. 3d 465; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58831; 2015 WL 2070187
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Sweet
- **Judges:** Sweet
- **Cited by:** 42 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7231289

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that complaints filed with the IAB have a civilian analogue and, as the speech was not "part-and-parcel" of plaintiff's role, it was "protected" for purposes of the First Amendment
- noting that Ivilicarious liability is not a type of claim, it is a theory of liability associated with state law claime
- explaining that a “[l]ikelihood of serious harm can be evidenced by overt acts, attempts or threats of harm, or by ‘other conduct’ such as neglect or refusal to care for oneself”
- explaining that considering harm to others when admitting a patient is consistent with Mental Hygiene Law, and no state action attaches on that basis
- finding on summary judgment that JHMC, as a private hospital, does not qualify as a “person” under Section 1983

## Opinion text

Opinion
SWEET, District Judge.
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*474 [[Image here]]
Plaintiff Adrian Schoolcraft (“School-craft” or “Plaintiff’); Defendants Christopher Broschart, Timothy Caughey, Kurt Duncan, Elise Hanlon, Theodore Lauter-born, Michael Marino, Gerald Nelson, Frederick Sawyer, The City Of New York, Timothy Trainer (“City Defendants”); Defendant Deputy Inspector Steven Mauriel-lo (“DI Mauriello”); Defendant Jamaica Hospital Medical Center (“Jamaica Hospital” or “JHMC”); Defendant Dr. Lillian Aldana-Bernier (“Dr. Bernier”), and Defendant Dr. Isak Isakov (“Dr. Isakov”) (collectively “the Attending Physicians”); all move for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Based upon the facts and conclusions set forth below, the parties’ mo *475 tions are granted in part and denied in part.
I. PRIOR PROCEEDINGS
Plaintiff initiated this action - alleging Section 1983 and a number of state law causes of action, by filing a summons and complaint on August 10, 2010. Plaintiff filing an Amended Complaint on September 13, 2010¿ in response to which Jamaica Hospital filed a motion to dismiss. The Court dismissed Schoolcraft’s Section 1983 claim against Jamaica .Hospital with leave to replead, and retained supplemental jurisdiction with respect to the state law claims against Jamaica Hospital. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, No. 10 CIV. 6005 RWS, 2011 WL 1758635 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2011).
On May 9, 2012, Schoolcraft submitted a motion seeking leave to amend his complaint to, inter alia, include a First Amendment claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating to his internal reporting of improper conduct at the 81st Precinct. That request was denied in this Court’s Opinion dated June 14, 2012 on the basis that Schoolcraft’s internal reporting was made in his capacity as a public employee, and therefore not protected under the First Amendment. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, No. 10 CIV. 6005 RWS, 2012 WL 2161596 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2012). On June 20, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a letter to the Court requesting reconsideration. The motion to reconsider was also denied in the Court’s Opinion dated July 20, 2012 on the basis, that Plaintiff, in his briefing regarding the motion to amend, never raised the issue of protected speech made after his suspension on October 31, 2009 and did not raise the argument that he had no duty to report misconduct following his suspension. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, No. 10 CIV. 6005 RWS, 2012 WL 2958176 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2012). On August 1, 2012, Plaintiff wrote to the Court requesting leave to amend his complaint to add a First Amendment claim relating to the NYPD’s alleged harassment after October 31, 2009 and for unlawful seizure and detention on October 31, 2009. The Court granted him leave to plead a First Amendment claim with respect to the instances of harassment and suspension. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, No. 10 CIV. 6005 RWS, 2012 WL 3960118 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2012).
On October 1, 2012, Schoolcraft filed a Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) that included the First Amendment claim. DI Mauriello filed a motion seeking leave to amend his answer and assert counterclaims against Schoolcraft on September 24, 2013. The Court denied his request as part of an Opinion filed November 21, 2013. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 296 F.R.D. 231, 233 (S.D.N.Y.2013). DI Mauriello moved for reconsideration, and the Court granted his motion on March 14, 2014. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 298 F.R.D. 134, 136 (S.D.N.Y.2014). On March 18, 2014, DI Mauriello filed his amended Answer and Counterclaims.
The SAC remained the operative complaint through the end of 2014, including for the extensive period of fact and expert discovery. On December 4, 2014, Plaintiff moved for permission to amend the SAC. While that motion was pending, all parties moved for summary judgment.
Plaintiff received leave to file a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”) on January 16, 2015. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 81 F.Supp.3d 295, 298-99 , No. 10 CIV. 6005 RWS, 2015 WL 252413, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2015). Subsequently, all parties save Plaintiff filed amended motions for summary judgment. The motions were heard on submission and marked fully submitted on March 6, 2015.
Subsequently, Plaintiff requested that a reply affidavit from Dr. Bernier be stricken, which City Defendants opposed, and *476 DI Mauriello requested that he be allowed to reopen discovery to obtain information regarding Plaintiffs involvement in a film relating to the substance of this case.
II. FACTS
The facts are principally derived from Schoolcraft’s and Defendants’ Statements of Undisputed Facts submitted in support of their motions for summary judgment pursuant to Local Rule 56.1, read in conjunction with the parties’ responses to the 56.1 Statements. 1
Denials that the evidence cited in support of a particular statement does not support that statement, in instances where the evidence uncontrovertibly does support that statement, are treated as admissions. Denials without support or explanation are treated as admissions. Statements characterized as “additional undisputed facts” included in Dr. Bernier’s responses to Schoolcraft’s 56.1 statements but absent from Dr. Bernier’s 56.1 Statement are considered in dispute. (Compare Dr. Bernier’s Response to Plaintiffs Rule 56.1 Statement and Statement of Additional Undisputed Facts, pp. 41-53, ¶¶ 1-53 with Dr. Bernier’s Statement Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1.) Finally, the inclusion of statements in this Opinion that were challenged oh admissibility grounds, by the parties reflect a ruling that the admissibility challenge is overruled.
The following facts are not in material dispute except as noted below.
A. Schoolcraft’s Career with NYPD
1. On July 1, 2002, Schoolcraft joined the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”), and for most of his career, he was assigned as a Patrol Officer in the 81st Precinct, which is located in the Bedford Stuyvesant neighborhood of Brooklyn. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 1.)
2. The 81st Precinct is one of ten precincts that are located in the geographical area known as “Patrol Borough Brooklyn North” (“PBBN”). All Defendants save DI Mauriello admit that, as a Patrol Officer, Schoolcraft was a fine officer who ably and satisfactorily performed his duties and received satisfactory or better performance reviews for most of his career. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 2.)
3. In October of 2006, the NYPD assigned DI Mauriello to be the Executive Officer of the 81st Precinct. As the Executive Officer, DI Mauriello was the second in command at the 81st Precinct. According to DI Mauriello, he requested that transfer because it was his stated desire to earn an appointment as a Commanding *477 Officer as well as a promotion to Inspector and perhaps Assistant Chief. (Pl.’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 3.)
4. After being the Executive Officer at the 81st Precinct for one year, DI Mauriel-lo was promoted to Commanding Officer of the 81st Precinct on December 1, 2007, and he later received a promotion to the title of Deputy Inspector (“DI”). (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 8.)
B. Schoolcraft’s 2008 Performance Review
4. During the course of second, third, and fourth quarters of 2008, Schoolcraft’s performance reviews referenced his low “activity” and his failure to meet activity standards. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 10.)
6. Schoolcraft received a failing evaluation of 2.5 in his 2008 performance evaluation, which was delivered in January of 2009. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 11.)
7. DI Mauriello’s 2008 performance evaluation recommended that Schoolcraft be transferred. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 12.)
8. Schoolcraft objected to this evaluation and informed his superiors that he wanted to appeal the failing evaluation. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 13.)
9. At around this time, a poster appeared on Schoolcraft’s locker containing the words: “IF YOU DON’T LIKE YOUR JOB, THEN MAYBE YOU SHOULD GET ANOTHER JOB.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 15.)
10. Another handwritten note that later appeared on his locker stated: “shut up, you idiot.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 16.)
11. Schoolcraft believes that he was isolated from his fellow officers in the 81st Precinct. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 11).
12. The appeal process involved the transmission of paperwork to the next level of the command structure, which was the Brooklyn North Patrol Borough, headed by Defendant Assistant Chief Gerald Nelson and Defendant Deputy Chief Michael Marino. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 14.)
13. On February 25, 2009, Schoolcraft met with several supervisors at the 81st Precinct (the “February Appeal Meeting”), including DI Mauriello, and his new Executive Officer, Defendant Captain Theodore Lauterborn. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 17.)
14. At the February Appeal Meeting, Schoolcraft did not expressly discuss illegal quotas and crime misclassification. Instead, he spoke about not knowing how much activity was needed and that the numbers on his evaluation were not adding up correctly. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 1.)
15. During the February Appeal Meeting, Schoolcraft confirmed his intent to appeal the failing 2008 performance evaluation and repeatedly asked for information about what numbers were required of him. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 18.)
16. At the end of the February Appeal Meeting, another of the 81st Precinct supervisors, Sergeant Steven Weiss specifically asked Schoolcraft if he was recording the meeting. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 19.)
17. In or around early March of 2009, DI Mauriello attended a meeting at the main office for Patrol Borough Brooklyn North with Deputy Chief Marino and Sergeant Weiss from the 81st Precinct (the “March Evaluation Meeting”). DI Mau-riello discussed, inter alia, Schoolcraft’s appeal of his failing 2008 evaluation and DI Mauriello’s wish to transfer Schoolcraft out of the Precinct. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 20.)
*478 18. During the March Evaluation Meeting, DI Mauriello requested that Schoolcraft be transferred, and Deputy Chief Marino denied that request at that time for lack of paperwork. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 21.)
19. On March 11, 2009, a labor attorney representing Schoolcraft, James A. Brown, Esq., wrote DI Mauriello a letter regarding Schoolcraft’s appeal of his failing evaluation. Among other things, the letter stated:. “We are concerned that our client’s negative evaluation is based not on the factors set forth in Patrol Guide 205-48, but rather on his alleged lack of ‘activity’ related to his number of arrests and summons issued.” (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 22.)
20. After receiving the letter, DI Mau-riello told Assistant Chief Nelson about it and forwarded it to Patrol Borough Brooklyn North as part of the appeal process. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 23.)
C. March 2009 Disciplinary Incident
19. On or about March 16, 2009, while Schoolcraft was on patrol, Sergeant Weiss issued a command discipline to Schoolcraft for being “off post” and having “unnecessary conversation” with another patrol officer. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 24.)
22. Schoolcraft believed that he was being punished for the letter from his labor attorney and for appealing his evaluation. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 25.)
23. Schoolcraft made a formal request on his radio that the Duty Captain for Patrol Borough Brooklyn North respond to the scene. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 25.)
24. In response to Schoolcraft’s radio request, Captain Lauterborn, who was serving as Duty Captain at the time, had Schoolcraft brought back to the 81st Precinct. According to Schoolcraft’s recording of the meeting with Captain Lauter-born, Captain Lauterborn told Schoolcraft that after the February Appeal Meeting. Captain Lauterborn said that Schoolcraft should not be surprised by the fact that he was going to get a lot more “supervision” by the 81st Precinct supervisors and that the 81st Precinct supervisors were now paying “closer attention” to him as a result of Schoolcraft’s performance. (PL’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 26.)
25. During his conversation with Captain Lauterborn, Schoolcraft explained his feelings as follows: “I just feel my safety and the public’s safety is being compromised because of the acts of retaliation ... because of [the] appeal.” (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 6.)
26. Captain Lauterborn also told Schoolcraft that “this is gonna go on;” that he had “a long road ahead” of him; that going forward, he needed to “cross your t’s and dot your i’s;” and that the “supervision” was “coming down hard” on him not just in the past two nights but since the day he walked out of the February'Appeal Meeting. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 27.)
D. Psychological Evaluation, Restricted Duty Placement
27. Schoolcraft believes that he was the victim of a conspiracy to falsely portray him as psychologically unbalanced. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 12.)
28. On or about March 16, 2009, Sergeant Weiss began reviewing police procedures on how to have Schoolcraft psychologically evaluated. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 28.)
29. Shortly after that, Sergeant Weiss contacted the NYPD’s Early Intervention Unit and reported that he was “concerned” about the level of Office Schoolcraft’s “mental distress.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 29.)
*479 30. Sergeant Weiss also did Internet research on Schoolcraft and found a news article in a local upstate newspaper about a burglary at his father’s home and forwarded that article to the Early Intervention Unit. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 30.)
31. On April 3, 2009, Schoolcraft went to a hospital emergency room because of chest pain and received an injection of medication commonly used to treat anxiety. The hospital also gave Schoolcraft a prescription for two more doses of the same medication in pill form. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 8.)
32-. On April 6, 2009, Schoolcraft went to see his private physician, Dr. Sure, who indicated Schoolcraft should not return to work until April 14, 2009. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 9.)
33. On April 6, 2009, Dr. Sure wrote a letter to the NYPD excusing Schoolcraft from work for eight days. (City’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶ 15.)
34. As required by NYPD procedures, after being out sick on the advice of Dr. Sure, Schoolcraft then had to be seen by an NYPD doctor before returning to work. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 10.)
35. Dr. Catherine Lamstein-Reiss (“Dr. Lamstein”), an NYPD psychologist, testified that she was consulted in connection with placing Schoolcraft on restricted duty on April 13, 2009. She concluded that Schoolcraft was suffering from the physical manifestations of stress. Based on that opinion, she recommended cognitive behavioral therapy or stress management training to improve coping skills and to reduce the physical symptoms of stress. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 32.)
36. According to Dr. Lamstein, School-craft complained that he had recently re-eéived a poor performance evaluation and that his superiors had met with him in an effort to have Schoolcraft be a more active police officer. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 22.)
37. Dr. Lamstein indicated in her Consultation Report a diagnosis of “stress/anxiety” and recommended “psychotherapy”, specifically cognitive behavioral therapy “to improve coping skills [and] reduce physical symptoms of stress.” Dr. Lam-stein indicated that she was concerned that Schoolcraft’s primary care physician had recently prescribed a medication known for being anti-psychotic, but still noted his prognosis was “good, with treatment.” (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 14.)
38. Dr. Lamstein also indicated in her notes that she urged Schoolcraft-to see a psychologist. Schoolcraft disputes this, contending that she “suggested books on the topic of stress management, and therapies such as yoga.” (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶ 16.)
39. Schoolcraft was placed on restricted duty without any law enforcement or patrol duties, and his gun and shield were removed on April 13, 2009. (PL’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶ 31.)
40. As a result of being placed on restricted duty, Schoolcraft was assigned to work at the 81st Precinct as the Telephone Switchboard operator, essentially taking calls to the Precinct and handling walk-ins from members of the public. (PL’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶ 34.)
41. Schoolcraft held that position from April 2009 through the end of October 2009. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 35.)
42. All defendants save DI Mauriello admit that while on restricted duty, Schoolcraft continued his attempts to challenge his failing 2008 performance evaluation. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 36.)
43. Schoolcraft returned to see Dr. Lamstein on July 27, 2009. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 17.)
*480 44. Schoolcraft returned again to see Dr, Lamstein on October 27, 2009. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 18.)
45. Dr. Lamstein concluded that Schoolcraft should continue on restricted duty on July 27, 2009 and on October 27, 2009. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 19.)
46. Dr. Lamstein testified that she repeated her recommendation that School-craft see a psychologist on October 27, 2009. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 20.)
47. Schoolcraft testified that he did not recall seeing a psychologist subsequent to his meetings with Dr. Lamstein. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 21.)
E. Schoolcraft’s Report to Internal Affairs and NYPD’s Response
48. On August 20, 2009, Schoolcraft reported to the Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB” of “Internal Affairs”) on “corruption involving the integrity control program” at the 81st Precinct by the Integrity Control Officer, Defendant Lieutenant Timothy Caughey and Assistant Integrity Control Officer, Sergeant Weiss. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 38.)
49. On August 31, 2009, a former member of the NYPD, David Durk, reported that Schoolcraft was the victim of retaliation by his supervisors. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 39.)
50. On September 2, 2009, Schoolcraft spoke with IAB and reported that- DI Mauriello was pressuring his staff to downgrade or suppress crime reporting and that under the direction of DI Mau-riello, police officers were being directed to make arrests and issue summonses “in violation of people’s civil rights.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 40.)
51. According to the IAB report, Schoolcraft also stated that he received his failing evaluation “because he doesn’t believe in summons and arrest quotas” and that police officers “are being forced to sign the training log even though they don’t get the necessary training.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 41.)
52. On October 7, 2009, Schoolcraft met with investigators from the NYPD’s Quality Assurance Division (“QAD”). At the meeting, Schoolcraft made assertions about the nature of the alleged downgrading and suppression of major crime reporting at the 81st Precinct. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 42.) In a recorded conversation between Schoolcraft and his father discussing the QAD meeting, School-craft stated that “this is the way to fuck [DI Mauriello] over.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement Mauriello Countercl. ¶ 1.) At the actual meeting, Schoolcraft stated he was not looking to “burn anyone” or “for vengeance,” and that “this isn’t because I don’t like Inspector Mauriello, he is a jovial guy.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement Mauriello Countercl. ¶ 2.)
53. While QAD undertook to conduct an investigation into those allegations, it also referred Schoolcraft’s other misconduct allegations to IAB. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 43.)
54. During his recorded interviews with internal investigators at the NYPD, Schoolcraft told NYPD investigators that he was not reporting the alleged reporting abuses anonymously. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 93.)
55. According to an IAB report, on September 2, 2009, Schoolcraft told IAB that, “he doesn’t feel he is being retaliated against from the Members of his Command and has no problems with his supervisors and peers.” (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 27.)
56. In addition, towards the end of October, an 81st Precinct Sergeant told DI Mauriello that QAD was calling down officers and DI Mauriello called up an Inspec *481 tor from QAD, who confirmed that there was an investigation.
57. Additionally, Captain Lauterborn testified that he allegedly received complaints from other officers interviewed by QAD that Schoolcraft was asking them questions about their QAD interviews and informed DI Mauriello 2 about School-craft’s alleged conduct. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 46.)
58. Captain Lauterborn testified that he learned from DI Mauriello of a QAD investigation of the 81st Precinct. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 45.)
59. Captain Lauterborn testified that certain supervisors at the 81st Precinct, including DI Mauriello, 3 knew that School-craft’s memo book contained the name of an LAB officer prior to October 31, 2009. On October 19th Lieutenant Caughey, as Integrity Control Officer, issued a written order to all officers in the command that all inquiries from IAB must be reported to the Integrity Control Officer. (PL’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 49.)
F. October 31, 2009 — Schoolcraft’s Tour of Duty
60. Schoolcraft recorded his entire tour of duty on October 31, 2009. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 35.)
61. October 31, 2009 was the last day that Schoolcraft reported to the 81st Precinct. He worked the day tour and conducted his regular duties at the Telephone Switchboard desk before leaving work early. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 50.)
62. In conversation with colleagues, Schoolcraft stated, “look at what they did to me ... they fucked me over on my evaluation.” Schoolcraft also said that he asked supervisors to put it in writing to which they responded, “no, go fuck yourself. That’s your buddy Mauriello.” Schoolcraft then said “That’s your buddy Mauriello, that fat miserable fuck. If I could get him.... If I could get him, I would fucking sell him out faster than anything, for free. I would give him away for free.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement Mauriello Countercl. ¶ 3.)
63. During the course of the morning of October 31, 2009, Lieutenant Caughey took Schoolcraft’s memo book to “scratch it,” i.e., to make a copy of it. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 51.)
64. Schoolcraft’s recording of his entire day tour does not reveal anything said to Schoolcraft by Lieutenant Caughey other than a request to see his memo book so Caughey could “scratch” it. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 62.)
65. While in his office, Lieutenant Cau-ghey made two photocopies of the entire memo book because he saw “unusual” entries in it. Lieutenant Caughey kept one copy for himself and put the other copy in DI Mauriello’s office desk. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 52.)
66. Schoolcraft testified that, when Lieutenant Caughey returned the memo book to Schoolcraft later that day, School-craft noticed, and became alarmed, that several pages of the memo book containing his entries about corruption or misconduct were earmarked or folded down. The City and DI Mauriello dispute that several pages of the memo book -containing his entries about corruption or misconduct were earmarked or folded down, and DI Mauriello disputes characterization that pages reflected corruption or misconduct. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 57.) Schoolcraft contends, and City Defendants and DI Mauriello dispute, that Lieutenant *482 Caughey later started behaving in an unusual manner towards Schoolcraft. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ ¶ 54-56.)
67. One of the civilian workers at the Precinct, Police Administrative Aide (“PAA”) Curtis Boston (“PAA Boston”) testified that she saw Lieutenant Caughey walk by Schoolcraft that day in an unusual manner, and that twice during the course of that morning, PAA Boston and School-craft discussed Lieutenant Caughey’s unusual behavior toward Schoolcraft. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 55.)
68. PAA Boston testified that School-craft told her that he felt uncomfortable about Lieutenant Caughey’s behavior and that Schoolcraft asked her to document her reasons for why she believed Lieutenant Caughey was acting in a suspicious manner. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 56.)
69. About one hour before the end of his scheduled day, Schoolcraft told his supervisor, Sergeant Rasheena Huffman (“Sergeant Huffman”) that he was not feeling well and was going home.
70. Schoolcraft also submitted a sick report to Sergeant Huffman, which could have been a basis for Sergeant Huffman authorizing him to take “administrative sick” for the day. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 58.)
71. As Schoolcraft was leaving the precinct, Sergeant Huffman told Schoolcraft that he had the option of taking “lost time,” but did not give him written approval for either lost time or administrative sick time. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 59.)
72. Sergeant Huffman called the NYPD centralized Sick Desk to inquire whether Schoolcraft had called for permission to leave work early, and was told he had not done so. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 44.)
73. As Schoolcraft walked out of the precinct, DI Mauriello was walking in and said hello to Schoolcraft. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 41.)
G. October 31, 2009 — Events Subsequent to Schoolcraft’s Departure
74. Following Schoolcraft’s departure, Captain Lauterborn contacted the NYPD sick desk supervisor. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 26.)
75. After leaving work on October 31, 2009, at approximately 2:30 p.m., School-craft recorded conversations and events in his apartment throughout the rest of that day until the first entry was made by NYPD into his apartment at approximately 9:40 p.m. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 36.)
76. At about 3:30 p.m., Schoolcraft got home, which was located at 82-60 Eighty-Eighth Place, Queens, New York, and tele-phonically notified IAB of what Schoolcraft characterized as Lieutenant Caughey’s menacing behavior. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 60.)
77. Schoolcraft specifically informed IAB that he felt threatened, retaliated against, and in danger as a result of what Schoolcraft characterized as Lieutenant Caughey’s menacing behavior. (PL’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 61.)
78. Shortly after Schoolcraft left the precinct, the desk officer called School-craft’s cell phone, but the calls were not answered. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 45.)
79. The 104th Precinct was notified about Schoolcraft’s status, and was asked to send an officer to his home. (Mauriel-lo’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 47.)
80. About one hour later, at about 4:20 p.m., a Sergeant Krohley, from the 104th Precinct, went to Schoolcraft’s home with his driver. Sergeant Krohley rang the bell *483 for Schoolcraft’s apartment, which was on the second floor of a three-family house, and when there was no answer, he spoke to the landlady, Carol Stretmoyer (“Stret-moyer”), who told him that she believed that Schoolcraft had left about thirty minutes before. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 62.)
81. Stretmoyer also informed Sergeant Krohley that Schoolcraft had a car, which was parked on the street. Sergeant Kroh-ley determined that the car was registered in the name of Schoolcraft’s father. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 68.)
82. On October 31, 2009, Captain Lau-terborn was the Executive Officer of the 81st Precinct, i.e., the position below Commanding Officer in the chain of authority. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 50.)
88.On October 31, 2009, Captain Lau-terborn was also assigned for the day to be the PBBN Duty Captain, for the entire Brooklyn North area. (Declaration of Walter A. Kretz, Jr. dated March 6, 2015, hereinafter “SM,” Ex. AB, Brooklyn North Duty Sheet; Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 51.)
84. At all relevant times, Deputy Chief Marino (now retired) was the PBBN Assistant Chief, or second in command, with supervisory authority over all of the precincts in PBBN, including the 81st Pre7 cinct. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 53.)
85. Defendant Lieutenant Christopher Broschart from the 81st Precinct was instructed by Captain Lauterborn to go with his driver to Schoolcraft’s apartment and check to see if Schoolcraft had returned home. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 46.)
86. At about 5:00 p.m. Lieutenant Broschart arrived at the scene, and Sergeant Krohley briefed Lieutenant Brosc-hart on the facts he had determined since arriving at the scene. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 64.)
87. After Lieutenant Broschart and Captain Lauterborn arrived at School-craft’s home, they periodically knocked on the door from the early afternoon until it was dark out. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 32.)
88. Schoolcraft did not answer the door. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 33.)
89. Lieutenant Broschart updated Captain Lauterborn by telephone that School-craft was not home and that Stretmoyer had told him that Schoolcraft might have left. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶66.)
90. Captain Lauterborn told Lieutenant Broschart to stand by and wait to see if Schoolcraft returned. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 67.)
91. Later that evening, Captain Lau-terborn spoke with Dr. Lamstein. According to Dr. Lamstein’s notes of the call, Captain Lauterborn told her that School-craft left early that day and the “underlying issue” was that Schoolcraft “has made allegations against others” and the “dept’s investigation of those allegations picked up this week & it snowballed from there.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 68.)
92. Dr. Lamstein told Captain Lauter-born that she had seen Schoolcraft a few days ago and that she “had no reason to think [Schoolcraft] was a danger to himself or others.” She also stated that her “assessment of his suicide risk is only as good as the last time [she] saw him. If something happened after that and led him to be so upset that he left work without permission an hour before the end of his tour, said to have stomach pains, etc., then [she is] unable to say with any reasonable amount of certainty that he is not at risk of S/I [suicidal ideation] under present circumstances.” While Dr. Lamstein further *484 testified that she thought the NYPD “absolutely needed” to find Plaintiff and “make sure that he was ok,” Plaintiff contends that her testimony implies she did not so informed Captain Lauterborn, while City Defendants contend she explicitly communicated this impression to Captain Lauterborn. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 69; City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 30.)
93. Captain Lauterborn asked Dr. Lamstein to see if she could try to reach Schoolcraft over the telephone. (Mauriel-lo’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 70.)
94. On October 31, 2009, Dr. Lamstein attempted to contact Schoolcraft by calling him on his cell phone. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 34.)
95. At about 7:40 p.m., after speaking with Dr. Lamstein, Captain Lauterborn also called Schoolcraft’s father and told him that Schoolcraft left without permission and had to return to the 81st Precinct that night. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 70.)
96. Schoolcraft listened to Dr. Lam-stein’s message and recorded it. (Mauriel-lo’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 74.)
97. Dr. Lamstein’s message was as follows:
Hi Schoolcraft, Dr. Lamstein. I am the pager duty psychologist today and I got a call from Captain Lauterborn. I know I’m not the first call you’re receiving so I’m sure you’re aware that they’re all looking for you and very concerned because you ran off without doing proper, procedure and they’re not sure if you’re OK.
So right now they are trying to figure out if they supposed to do a whole citywide high-level mobilization to find you or if you’re OK and they’re not sure if they are supposed to be doing that. So there are other people who left you a message asking you to return to the 8-1. I asked if it would also be OK if you just returned to your home and to send a Lt. there hoping to find you.
So I don’t know what to tell them because as long as I’ve known you, I’ve had no concerns about you having thoughts about hurting yourself, I really really want to urge you to return to your home or call your Captain or you can call me. Whatever this is, if you just return to your home and just resolve whatever this is quickly and easily otherwise it’s just going to blow up to a bigger mess than you would want and I would really really hate to see that happen. I would much rather this, whatever this is, get reconciled very quickly and easily without a whole big city wide mobilization and suspensions and whatever else is being considered because this is not necessary, it can be resolved in two minutes.
[Gives phone numbers]. You can also just return home and resolve it with you there instead of at the precinct because I suggested that might be embarrassing for you.
So hope everything is OK and please give me a call. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 75.)
98. Schoolcraft did not answer Dr. Lamstein’s phone call. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 35.)
99. Captain Lauterborn also spoke with Schoolcraft’s father over the telephone. Schoolcraft’s father told him that he had spoken to Schoolcraft earlier that day, that his son told him he felt sick with a “tummy ache” and was going home and would call Schoolcraft’s father when Schoolcraft woke up. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 70.)
100. Lauterborn told Schoolcraft’s father that he needed to “physically talk to” Schoolcraft and “resolve things” and the situation was not going to “wait until the *485 morning.” Captain Lauterborn insisted that he had to talk to Schoolcraft “in person” and not “over the phone.” He also stated that the “situation [is] going to escalate as the night goes on” and that “no one is going in or out of that house he lives in because there is police all over it.” If Schoolcraft was there, Captain Lauterborn said that “we are eventually going to make our way in.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 72.)
101. Although Schoolcraft’s father assured Captain Lauterborn that his son was fíne and was probably sleeping, Captain Lauterborn insisted that it was not going to “end here” and that Schoolcraft should report to the Lieutenant on the scene outside his home. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 73.)
102. While alone in his apartment with NYPD personnel gathered outside on the street, Schoolcraft spoke several times over the telephone with his father, who was in upstate New York. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 68.)
103. Lieutenant Broschart remained outside of Schoolcraft’s apartment for approximately four hours, and never saw or heard Schoolcraft. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 37.) Deputy Chief Marino believed that Schoolcraft was still in his apartment. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 38.)
104. Despite knowing that various persons were attempting to reach him during that seven-hour period, Schoolcraft did not respond to any of the telephone calls or to the numerous knocks on his apartment door. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 71.)
105. The City Defendants and Plaintiff disagree as to the level of Assistant Chief Nelson’s involvement during this time. Plaintiff contends that DI Mauriello kept Assistant Chief Nelson informed of the NYPD’s activities throughout the evening, and understood the conduct to be in response to an “AWOL officer,” i.e., and officer absent without leave. (See City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 58.)
106. Lieutenant Broschart, Captain Lauterborn, and DI Mauriello were aware on October 31, 2009 that Schoolcraft’s gun and shield had previously been removed from him. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 39.)
107. Prior to arriving at Schoolcraft’s apartment, Captain Lauterborn was informed by Lieutenant Broschart that Stretmoyer had heard creaking sounds from Schoolcraft’s apartment, which was indication of activity in the apartment. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 59.)
108. NYPD officers also noticed that Schoolcraft’s television set was on. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 23.)
109. At approximately 8:30 p.m., Captain Lauterborn and Lieutenant Gough, Sergeant Duncan, and Sergeant Hawkins, arrived at Schoolcraft’s residence. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 58.)
110. Deputy Chief Marino directed that the NYPD Operations division be notified and that arrangements be made to have an Emergency Services Unit (“ESU”) also respond to Schoolcraft’s residence. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 55.)
111. The role of ESU is to provide specialized assistance to other units of the NYPD. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 56.)
112. An NYPD ESU crew was requested at 9:09 p.m. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 63.)
113. Deputy Chief Marino, driving his own car, and DI Mauriello, driven by Lieutenant Crawford, arrived at the scene at approximately 9:30 p.m. By the time Deputy Chief Marino arrived, ESU had already arrived at Schoolcraft’s apartment. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 64.)
*486 114. Deputy Chief Marino met with Captain Lauterborn and ESU officers, Lieutenant Gough and Sergeant Duncan, who had gathered at the 81st Precinct, in the precinct parking lot, as they prepared to go to Schoolcraft’s apartment. ■ (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 54.)
H. October 31, 2009 — NYPD’s First Entry into Schoolcraft’s Apartment
115. On October 31, 2009, Schoolcraft had a voice-activated recorder in his bedroom. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 78.)
116. The hidden recorder recorded every sound heard in Schoolcraft’s bedroom on the evening of October 31, 2009. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 79.)
117. Captain Lauterborn obtained a key to Schoolcraft’s apartment from Stret-moyer. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 40; Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 65.)
118. At 9:45 p.m. that night, after, waiting approximately four or five hours outside Schoolcraft’s home, the NYPD used Stretmoyer’s key to enter the apartment. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 74.)
119. Several supervisory NYPD officers, including Deputy Chief Marino, DI Mauriello, Captain Lauterborn, Lieutenant Broschart, and three members of the Brooklyn North Investigation Unit, Lieutenant William Gough, Sergeant Kurt Duncan, and Sergeant Raymond Hawkins, entered Schoolcraft’s home without a warrant. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 75.)
120. At the time of their- entry, several other members of the NYPD, including DI Keith Green, the commanding officer of the 104th Precinct, Lieutenant Thomas Crawford (81st Precinct); Sergeant Kevin Scanlon (104th Precinct); and several Police Officers were waiting outside of Schoolcraft’s apartment. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 77.)
121. Also responding to the scene was FDNY Lieutenant Elise Hanlon and two Jamaica Hospital Emergency Medical Technicians (“EMTs”). (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 78.) Plaintiff contends that Lieutenant Hanlon testified that she reported in connection with a “barricaded EDP,” while the 911 operator listed the purpose of the EMT dispatch as “unknown condition.”
122. According to Deputy Chief Marino and DI Mauriello, the warrantless entry into Schoolcraft’s home was justified by their concerns for his “well-being.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 79.)
123. Deputy Chief Marino testified that he had no information that Schoolcraft had threatened to hurt himself or others, though Mauriello contends that he only lacked “specific” information and points to a portion of his testimony where he states that he had been briefed about the events of day and Schoolcraft’s “psychological history.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 80.)
124. Upon entry, the ESU officers moved into Schoolcraft’s bedroom wearing bulletproof vests and helmets and carrying tactical shields. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 82.)
125. On the recording, ESU is heard knocking on the apartment door and calling out “Adrian.” As the door apparently opens, a comment is made by one of the officers in a low voice, saying “He’s on the bed.” In response, another officer asks “Is he alright?” (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 80.)
126. The Emergency Services Unit officers moved into Schoolcraft’s bedroom with their guns drawn. DI Mauriello disputes this statement. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 82.)
127. Schoolcraft was awake lying on his bed. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 83.)
*487 128. The ESU officers then addressed Schoolcraft directly, asking him to show his hands and asking him to assure them he was OK. There is no indication of any aggressive conduct or the exertion of any physical force against Schoolcraft. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 81.)
129. As reflected by the recording captured by Schoolcraft’s voice-activated digital recorder, one of the ESU officers asked Schoolcraft, “You okay?” to which School-craft replied, “Yeah, I think so.” (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 84.)
130. Once entry was made into the apartment and Schoolcraft appeared to be in reasonably good condition, Deputy Chief Marino, then DI Mauriello, and then Captain Lauterborn explained to him that he was being directed to return to the precinct. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 91.)
131. The exchange between Deputy Chief Marino and Schoolcraft was as follows:
Marino: Adrian, you didn’t hear us knocking on this door for a couple hours?
Schoolcraft: I drank some Nyquil. Unidentified male voice: Adrian, sit up. Marino: Adrian, you didn’t hear us knocking on that door ... for the last couple hours?
Schoolcraft: No, why would I be expecting anyone knocking at my door Chief?
Marino: I don’t know Adrian, but normally if you hear someone knocking you get up and answer it. They were kicking on that door loud and yelling.
Schoolcraft: I wasn’t feeling well.
Marino: You got a million people downstairs worried about your welfare, spending hours out here, worried about you. We’ve talked to your father, we’ve called your phone.
Schoolcraft: What did my father say?
Marino: I don’t know Adrian, I didn’t talk to him personally. Alright, sit down.
(Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 82.)
132. After speaking with Schoolcraft for less than a minute, Deputy Chief Mari-no said “Steve,” indicating to DI Mauriello that Deputy Chief Marino wanted him to step into the bedroom and deal with the situation. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 84.)
133. DI Mauriello ordered Schoolcraft to return to the 81st Precinct along with two officers — Sergeant Huffman and a “Rodriguez” — who had witnessed his early departure from work and were being detained at the precinct. (Mauriello’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶¶ 85, 92.)
134. The exchange between DI Mau-riello and Schoolcraft, lasting approximately forty-five seconds, was as follows:
Mauriello: Adrian, what happened today?
Adrian: I wasn’t feeling well, I left.
Mauriello: That’s it? You weren’t feeling well. Your sergeant told you to stay, right?
Schoolcraft: No, she didn’t say anything. She was talking on her cell phone.
Mauriello: You got everybody worried, we are worried about your safety.
Schoolcraft: Worried about what?
Mauriello: What do you mean, worried about what? They tried calling you, everybody(s) been calling you. Captain Lauterborn’s been calling, everyone has been calling you, your father has been calling you. You’re not answering. We were worried about anything that happens. That’s what we are worried about. God forbid. You just walk out of the precinct. I say hello to you today that was the last I saw you. You know, *488 that’s what we are worried about, your safety, your well-being.
Schoolcraft: Alright, I’m fine.
Mauriello: Well, you are going to come back to the precinct with us.
Schoolcraft: Well ... if I’m forced to. It’s against my will.
Mauriello: Against your will? OK Teddy [referring to Captain Lauterborn], you handle this.
(Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 85.)
135. DI Mauriello did not have any physical contact with Schoolcraft. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 88.)
136. Captain Lauterborn then spoke with Schoolcraft over the course of the next several minutes. Their conversation included the following exchange:
Lauterborn: Get your stuff on, we are going back to the precinct.
Schoolcraft: I’m not going back to the precinct.
Lauterborn: Adrian, we are going to go back to the precinct.
Schoolcraft: For ... ?
Lauterborn: Because we are going to do it the right way. You can’t just walk out of the command.
Schoolcraft: And do what?
Lauterborn: You can’t just walk out of the command.
Schoolcraft: What’s going to be done if I go back to the 8-1?
Lauterborn: What’s gonna be done? We are going to investigate why you left.
Schoolcraft: I’m telling you why I left, I was feeling sick.
Lauterborn: Adrian, that’s not the reason why you leave. Alright, you know that. You just don’t put a thing on a desk, you ask for permission.
Schoolcraft: I did ask permission.
Lauterborn: No you didn’t.
Schoolcraft: She denied it.
Lauterborn: Alright, so you can t leave. You weren’t given permission.
Schoolcraft: Well ... I wasn’t feeling well.
Lauterborn: She denied it, that’s it. You have to sit there and wait until your permission is granted. Alright, if it’s that bad then you’re gonna go to the hospital from the precinct. You know better than to just slap a sick report on a desk and walk out.
Schoolcraft: I didn’t do that. She embellished that I ... she was on the cell phone.
Lauterborn: Alright, so then what did you do? Set it down? She told you [that] you can’t leave and you left anyway, right?
Schoolcraft: I was going sick.
Lauterborn: And you left anyway? She told you [that] you can’t leave? Right. You can’t leave. That’s the way it rolls. You can’t go. Alright? So we have to go back. So get your clothes on, whatever you have to do. People have been calling you all day, I talked to your father. Alright?
(Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 89.)
137. As reflected by the recording, Schoolcraft refused to return to the Precinct. After the colloquy with Captain Lauterborn and Lieutenant Gough, School-craft stated he would go under protest. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 86.)
138. After agreeing to return the 81st Precinct, Schoolcraft spoke on the phone with his father, then indicated he did not feel well. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 98.)
139. Schoolcraft stated that he had to sit down' because he was not feeling well and agreed to receive medical attention. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 87.)
140. Upon hearing that Schoolcraft was not feeling well, NYPD officers offered *489 Schoolcraft medical aid. (Mauriello’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 99.)
141. Jamaica Hospital EMT Salvatore Sangeniti has been a trained EMT since 1980. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 46.)
142. While Schoolcraft was being examined by EMT Sangeniti, Deputy Chief Marino spoke with Schoolcraft about his leaving the precinct and stated that Schoolcraft disobeyed an order, and informed him that he was suspended. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 88.)
148.Immediately following Deputy Chief Marino’s statement that Schoolcraft would be suspended, EMT Sangeniti measured Schoolcraft’s blood pressure. When informed that his pressure was high, Schoolcraft responded that he had been feeling sick all day. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 89.)
144. Schoolcraft’s pulse was 120 beats per minute. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 47.)
145. Schoolcraft’s blood pressure was 160 over 120. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 48.)
146. EMT Sangeniti told Lieutenant Hanlon that Schoolcraft’s medical condition required medical attention at a hospital. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 37.)
147. Schoolcraft agreed to go to the hospital for an evaluation. Medical personnel were recorded discussing Jamaica Hospital and Forest Hills Hospital (also referred to as LaGuardia) as potential options. Schoolcraft stated that he wanted to go to Forest Hills and EMT Sangeniti explained that Jamaica Hospital would be better. Schoolcraft reiterated that he wanted to go to Forest Hills. (Pl.’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 90.)
148. A total of sixteen minutes had elapsed from the time ESU first opened the door to the apartment until the remaining officers and EMTs left the apartment with the expectation the ambulance would take Schoolcraft to the hospital for a medical exam. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement,' ¶ 104.)
149. Schoolcraft walked out of the apartment and approached the ambulance. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 103.)
150. From a distance out on the street, DI Mauriello saw Schoolcraft walk out of the house and toward the ambulance. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 108.)
151. Schoolcraft eventually refused further medical attention and went back to his apartment. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 91.)
152. Schoolcraft did not suffer any physical harm during the period DI Mau-riello was in the apartment during the first entry, and DI Mauriello is unaware of any such harm being suffered by Schoolcraft any time during the remainder of the first entry. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 106.)
153. Defendants did not use any force against Schoolcraft prior to the second entry. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 110.)
154. The EMTs remained by the ambulance, and did not enter Schoolcraft’s apartment again. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 30.)
I. October 31, 2009 — NYPD’s Second Entry into Schoolcraft’s Apartment
155. As reflected in the second part of the recording of the events in Schoolcraft’s home on October 31, 2009, Schoolcraft returned to his apartment, laid back down in his bed and refused further orders first by Captain Lauterborn and then by Deputy Chief Marino who returned to the apartment and again entered without permission. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 92.)
*490 156. When Schoolcraft returned to his apartment, DI Mauriello saw Chief Mari-no, Captain Lauterborn and Sergeant Duncan, Sergeant Hawkins, and Lieutenant Gough, follow Schoolcraft back inside. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 103.)
157. DI Mauriello did not re-enter the apartment. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 115.)
158. Deputy Chief Marino declared Schoolcraft an “emotionally disturbed person” (also known as an “EDP”) and Captain Lauterborn, Lieutenant Broschart, Lieutenant Gough and Sergeant Duncan handcuffed Schoolcraft with his hands behind his back. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 93.)
159. After Schoolcraft was declared an EDP, Deputy Chief Marino was in charge at the scene as the highest ranking NYPD officer present. Prior to that declaration, Schoolcraft disputes that Deputy Chief Marino was in charge. (Mauriello’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 83.)
160. While Schoolcraft was prone on the floor, Lieutenant Broschart held down his shoulders and Captain Lauterborn held him down by his legs. All Defendants save the City also admit that Deputy Chief Marino put his boot on Schoolcraft’s face as he tried to turn his neck around to see what was being done to his body. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 94.)
161. DI Mauriello did not arrest Schoolcraft, did not direct anyone to arrest him, and was not present when, if ever, he was placed under arrest. However, Schoolcraft contends that DI Mauriello ordered his Executive Officer, Captain Lau-terborn, to “take care of this” .when Schoolcraft refused to voluntarily return to the 81st Precinct immediately, which was, Schoolcraft contends, an order to bring Schoolcraft back to the precinct involuntarily. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 120.)
162. DI Mauriello was not present when Schoolcraft was handcuffed, and he had not directed .anyone to apply handcuffs. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 117.)
163. DI Mauriello waited outside of the house until he saw everyone exit the house with Schoolcraft being carried in a chair to the ambulance. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 124.)
164. The entire time that elapsed from the time Schoolcraft went back into his apartment until everyone left the apartment was approximately fifteen minutes. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 125.)
165. DI Mauriello was not present when Schoolcraft was suspended. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 117.)
166. DI Mauriello was not present when Schoolcraft was declared an EDP. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 119.)
167. DI Mauriello was not in School-craft’s apartment when all of the events allegedly occurred that form the basis for Schoolcraft’s claims, whether for the remainder of the first entry or during the second ■ entry. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 96.)
168. DI Mauriello did not know what had happened in the apartment during the second entry, and he did not ever again speak to or interact with Schoolcraft. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 126.)
169. Lieutenant Broschart rode in the back of the ambulance with Schoolcraft. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 96.)
170. While the NYPD officers were in Schoolcraft’s apartment, they searched his person and his apartment and found a voice-activated digital recorder belonging to Schoolcraft. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 97.)
171. DI Mauriello was not present for the removal of any of Schoolcraft’s person *491 al property, including any alleged removal of evidence Schoolcraft claims to have gathered of NYPD corruption. (Mauriel-lo’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 122.)
172. DI Mauriello did not direct anyone to remove any property and did not direct or participate in the alleged forcible removal of Schoolcraft from his apartment during the second entry. (SM Ex. S, recording of first and second entries; SM Ex. C, Mauriello Dep. pp. 376-81; Mau-riello Affidavit ¶ 123.)
173. There have been no substantiated incidents involving any allegation that any physical force whatsoever was used by Deputy Chief Marino in any incident. Schoolcraft contends that City Defendants successfully precluded inquiry on this subject in discovery and should not be permitted to assert this contention. (City’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 97.)
174. There are no substantiated allegations of unlawful search or seizure, conspiracy, or retaliation against Deputy Chief Marino, DI Mauriello, or Assistant Chief Nelson. Schoolcraft contends that City Defendants successfully precluded inquiry on this subject in discovery and should not be permitted to assert this contention. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 98.)
J. Arrival at Jamaica Hospital
175. Schoolcraft was taken to Jamaica Hospital’s Emergency Room. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 98.)
176. Jamaica Hospital is a not-for-profit hospital. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 2.)
177. In 2009, Jamaica Hospital had a mental health clinic, a psychiatric emergency department, and two psychiatric inpatient units. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 3.)
178. Schoolcraft was held at Jamaica Hospital, pretextually according to School-craft, pursuant to New York State Mental Hygiene Law Section 9.39 until November 6, 2009. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 51.)
179. Hospital medical records, or the “chart,” reflect that Schoolcraft was in custody of the NYPD at the time he was admitted. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 99.)
180. Medical records state that “EMS said the patient was behaving irrationally.” (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 37.)
181. Following Schoolcraft’s arrival at the Jamaica Hospital Medical Emergency Department, he was triaged at approximately 11:03 p.m. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 36.)
182. Schoolcraft was handcuffed by one hand to a gurney and under the custody of Lieutenant Broschart until the Lieutenant was relieved at about midnight by Defendant Sergeant Shantel James. Sergeant James remained there until the morning. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 100.)
183. On November 1, 2009, Defendant Sergeant Frederick Sawyer (“Sergeant Sawyer”), another supervisor from the 81st Precinct, was sent to Jamaica Hospital to relieve Sergeant James. When Sergeant Sawyer got to the hospital, he saw Schoolcraft on the telephone and, according to Sergeant Sawyer, he ordered him to get off the telephone. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 101.)
184. Subsequently, Sergeant Sawyer, Sergeant James, and two other officers forced Schoolcraft onto the gurney and handcuffed his other hand to the gurney, leaving him in a fully shackled position on the gurney. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 102.) All parties save the City Defendants do not deny that when Sergeant Sawyer applied the cuffs to Schoolcraft, he used both hands to squeeze the cuffs tighter and said “this is what happens to rats.” (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 103.)
*492 185. Schoolcraft was examined and laboratory tests were taken. In addition, a CT scan was ordered. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 39.)
186. No physical problems were found, other than the impression of handcuffs on both wrists. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 40.)
187. At 12:03 a.m. on November 1, Dr. Silas Nwaishieny examined Schoolcraft and requested a psychiatric consultation. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 41.)
188. In October and November 2009, non-party Dr. Khin Mar Lwin (“Dr. Lwin”) was a physician in the first year of her residency at Jamaica Hospital. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 6.)
189. Dr. Lwin performed the psychiatric consultation, which had been requested because Schoolcraft had purportedly been acting “bizarre.” (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 42.)
190. Schoolcraft, underwent the initial psychiatric examination/assessment at approximately 6:30 a.m. on November 1, 2009. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 23.)
191. According to Dr. Lwin’s notes, Schoolcraft told Dr. Lwin that he was “worried about the situation.” He told her that “this is happening” because he had been discussing the internal affairs of the police department with his superiors and the Police Commissioner, that his .supervisors were hiding information about robbery and assault cases to improve their statistics for their own advancement, that he has “documentation” about “this crime,” and that he has been reporting his supervisors’ actions for the past year. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 43.)
192. Dr. Lwin’s note indicated that as per a Sergeant James of the 81st Precinct, Schoolcraft complained about not feeling well the prior afternoon and left work early after becoming agitated and cursing a supervisor. The police followed School-craft to his home. Schoolcraft barricaded himself in his apartment and the door had to be broken down to get him. Schoolcraft initially agreed to go with them for evaluation, but once outside, he ran and had to be chased and brought to the medical emergency room. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 24.) .
193. The NYPD officers who remained with Schoolcraft at that time informed Dr. Lwin of Schoolcraft’s history and the events that occurred throughout October 31st, and said that that Schoolcraft had left work early “after getting agitated and cursing [his] supervisor.” (Jamaica’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 44.)
194. Dr. Lwin was also told that Schoolcraft had “barricaded himself’ in his apartment, which required the NYPD to break the door down, and that Schoolcraft had initially agreed to go to the Hospital for evaluation, but that once he was outside his house, he began to run, after which a chase ensued, and he was brought to the Emergency Department (“ED”) in handcuffs. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 45.)
195. Dr. Lwin was also advised that Schoolcraft had previously been evaluated by an NYPD psychologist and that as a result, Schoolcraft had not carried a gun or a badge for almost a year. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 46; Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 25.)
196. Dr. Lwin noted that while School-craft was in the ED before Dr. Lwin saw him, Schoolcraft had become agitated, uncooperative and verbally abusive due to a discussion about using the telephone, and that he had told his treating physician that “they are all against me.” (Jamaica’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 47.)
197. Dr. Lwin performed a mental status examination and determined that *493 Schoolcraft was coherent and relevant, with goal-directed speech (Exhibit U, p. 5). He was irritable with appropriate affect. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 48.)
198. Dr. Lwin noted that Schoolcraft denied suicidal and homicidal ideation, but that he was “paranoid about his supervisors.” (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 49.)
199. Dr. Lwin noted that Schoolcraft’s memory and concentration were intact, that he was alert and oriented, but that his insight and judgment were, in Dr. Lwin’s estimation, impaired. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶ 50.)
200. Dr. Lwin diagnosed Schoolcraft with a Psychotic Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified (“NOS”). ■ (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶ 51.)
201. Dr. Lwin recommended continued one-to-one observation due to Schoolcraft’s unpredictable behavior and escape risk. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 52.)
202. Dr. Lwin also recommended that Schoolcraft be transferred to the Psychiatric Emergency Room for further observation after he was medically cleared. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 53.)
208.Schoolcraft testified that he had no complaints with regard to the treatment rendered by Dr. Lwin. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 55.)
204. Dr. Patel, a psychiatrist at Jamaica Hospital, subsequently reviewed Dr. Lwin’s note and concurred with Dr. Lwin’s findings. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 26.)
205. A Psychiatric Nursing Assessment Form was completed in the Psychiatric Emergency Department on November 1, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 65.)
206. Dr. Khwaja Khusro Tariq (“Dr. Tariq”), a resident physician, performed a psychiatric evaluation in the Psychiatric Emergency Department at 12:00 p.m. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 66.)
207. In the section marked chief complaints, Dr. Tariq wrote “they just came to my place and handcuffed me” and that according to the accompanying New York City Police Department Officer (Sergeant James as per the ER consult note), School-craft had been acting bizarre. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 28.)
208. Hospital records state that Schoolcraft had been brought to the “ED” because he had been “deemed to be paranoid and a danger to himself by his police sergeant.” (Exhibit U, pp. 74-79). Contusions were noted on Schoolcraft’s arms, but he was cooperative, with clear, spontaneous, and relevant speech. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 67.)
209. Dr. Tariq’s notes indicate that Schoolcraft had been reporting irregularities at work to IAB for over a year, that his supervisors had been under-reporting crime statistics to advance their careers, that he had documentary proof thereof, and that, as a result, he was being “persecuted.” (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 69.)
210. Dr. Tariq’s notes indicated that Sergeant James stated that Schoolcraft had been acting bizarre, but Sergeant James denied making that statement. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 70.)
211. Dr. Tariq stated that Schoolcraft was cooperative, but that he was angry, with constricted affect. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶ 71.)
212. Dr. Tariq noted that Schoolcraft had paranoid and persecutory delusions because he believed that he was being persecuted for having reported his supervisors’ irregularities and corruptive behavior. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 72.)
*494 213. Dr. Tariq also determined that Schoolcraft had poor insight and judgment. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 73.)
214. Dr. Tariq diagnosed Schoolcraft as suffering from Psychosis, NOS, Rule Out Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 74.)
215. At 1:40 p.m., Dr. Tariq wrote an Order for a head CT to be performed. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 75.)
216. It was noted that Schoolcraft had spoken with his father on the telephone twice. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 76.)
217. On November 2, 2009, non-party physician Dr. Heron noted that Schoolcraft had been taken to the Hospital because the NYPD thought he was paranoid and was a danger to himself. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 77.)
218. Schoolcraft’s head CT was read as normal, per the “11/2/0910:45 a.m.” CT report. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 78.)
219. Later that morning, the two sets of handcuffs were removed and Schoolcraft was wheeled into the Jamaica Hospital Psychiatric Emergency Room for further observation following a diagnosis of Psychotic Disorder, Not Otherwise Specified (“NOS”). (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 104.)
220. After the paperwork was filled out, Schoolcraft was taken from the Psychiatric Emergency Room to a psychiatric ward in the hospital. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 107.)
221. A non-party physician, Dr. Slowik, examined Schoolcraft on November 2, 2009, at 2:15 p.m. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 29.)
222. Defendant Dr. Bernier is a physician duly licensed to practice medicine in the State of New York. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 20.)
223. Dr. Bernier was privately employed in October and November of 2009. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 22.)
224. In October and November of 2009, Dr. Bernier was also an attending physician at Jamaica Hospital. (Jamaica’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 4.)
225. In October and November of 2009, Dr. Bernier was director of JHMC’s psychiatric emergency room. (Bernier’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 21.)
226. Dr. Bernier took over School-craft’s care as the attending psychiatrist while he was in the Psychiatric Emergency Department, prior to his admission to the psychiatric unit. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 79.)
227. Prior to purportedly examining Schoolcraft, Dr. Bernier reviewed the notes created by prior treating physicians and nurses, including, but not limited to, Dr. Lwin, Dr. Patel, Dr. Tariq and Dr. Slowick. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 31.)
228. Dr. Bernier’s notes suggest that she examined Schoolcraft at Jamaica Hospital on November 2, 2009, at approximately 3:10 pm, but Schoolcraft denies she actually examined him. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 30.)
229. Dr. Bernier sought a second opinion from Dr. Dhar concerning Schoolcraft. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 33.)
230. Dr. Bernier was not directly told by anyone from the NYPD, or anyone acting on their behalf, to keep Schoolcraft at Jamaica Hospital against his will. Schoolcraft contends that she reviewed Schoolcraft’s hospital file which indicated the NYPD’s wish to keep Schoolcraft in the hospital. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 34.)
231. Dr. Bernier never spoke with the Sergeant James, or any other officer, who *495 is identified in the notes of prior treating physicians. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 35.)
232. Dr. Bernier never spoke with any police officer concerning Schoolcraft. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 36.)
233. Dr. Bernier never spoke with Dr. Lamstein concerning Schoolcraft.- (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 37.)
234. Dr. Bernier never falsified any medical records concerning Schoolcraft. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 42.)
235. As Schoolcraft’s attending, Dr. Bernier supervised the residents who evaluated Schoolcraft in the Psychiatric Emergency Room prior to admission, and she had the ultimate responsibility to care for Schoolcraft during her shift. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 80.)
236. On November 3, 2009 at 8:54 a.m., Dr. Bernier ordered Schoolcraft’s involuntary hospitalization. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 105.)
237. Dr.' Bernier determined that Schoolcraft was a danger to himself because he was psychotic and paranoid, and would benefit from in-patient stabilization. Schoolcraft contends that her determination was not bona fide as it was not based on her own examination. (Jamaica’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 81.)
238. Dr. Bernier indicated that she agreed with the previous evaluation by resident Dr. Tariq. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 82.)
239. Dr. Bernier made the decision to admit the patient to the psychiatric unit of Jamaica Hospital. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 84.)
240. On November 3, 2009 at 1:20 p.m., Dr. Bernier completed the Emergency Admission Form mandated by Mental Hygiene Law § 9.39. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 83; Isakov’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 3.)
241. The Policies and • Procedures regarding restraints are from the Policy and Procedure Manual from the Psychiatric Emergency Department of Jamaica Hospital. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 109.)
242. The written policy regarding the criteria for involuntary hospitalization is identical-to the language in the Mental Hygiene Law. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 111.)
243. Dr. Bernier provided Schoolcraft with written notice of his status and rights as an admitted patient on November 3, 2009. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 85.)
244. In October and November of 2009, Dr. Isakov was an attending physician at Jamaica Hospital. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 5.)
245. On November 4, 2009, Dr. Isakov confirmed Dr. Bernier’s decision to involuntarily hospitalize Schoolcraft. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 108.)
246. On November 4, 2009, Dr. Isakov eo-signed the Emergency Admission Form that was previously completed by Dr. Ber-nier. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 86; Isakov’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 4.)
247. Dr. Isakov also wrote the psychiatric admission note on November 4, 2009. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 87.)
248. IAB visited Schoolcraft twice while he was in Jamaica Hospital. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 136.)
249. Dr. Isakov was at a family meeting with Schoolcraft and Schoolcraft’s father (“Family Meeting”). Present at the Family Meeting was an officer from the IAB, who Schoolcraft had requested attend, and a licensed mental health social worker, Colleen McMahon. (Isakov’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 7; Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 88.)
*496 250. The Family Meeting was tape recorded. (Isakov Aff. 11.) The IAB officer did not request, pressure or influence Dr. Isakov’s independent medical judgment concerning Schoolcraft. (Isakov’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 8.)
251. Dr. Isakov requested permission from Schoolcraft to obtain a copy of his prior records from the police psychologist who had ordered taking his gun away. That request was denied by Schoolcraft. (Isakov’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 9.)
252. Dr. Isakov noted that Schoolcraft told him that he had not been happy with how the police department was being run since his career started, that he had made multiple' complaints which had not been addressed, and that, instead, he was “declared” emotionally “unstable.” (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 89.)
253. Dr. Isakov’s notes indicate that Schoolcraft told Dr. Isakov that his gun had been taken away from him after a psychiatric evaluation was performed by an NYPD psychologist, and that, since then, he has started to collect the “evidence” to “prove his point,” but then he became suspicious that “they are after him.” (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 90.)
254. Dr. Isakov’s notes indicate that Dr. Isakov found Schoolcraft to be suspicious, guarded, restless, and noted that Schoolcraft demanded to be discharged. Schoolcraft contends that this was not Dr. Isakov’s genuine belief. (Jamaica’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 91.)
255. Dr. Isakov’s notes indicate that Schoolcraft denied suicidal and homicidal ideation, but Dr. Isakov noted that School-craft expressed questionably paranoid ideas about conspiracies and cover-ups in his precinct. Schoolcraft contends that this was not Dr. Isakov’s genuine belief. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 92.)
256. Dr. Isakov noted that School-craft’s cognition and memory were intact, but that his judgment and insight were limited. Schoolcraft contends that this was not Dr. Isakov’s genuine belief. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 93.)
257. Dr. Isakov’s diagnosis was Psychosis NOS, Rule Out Adjustment Disorder with Anxiety. Schoolcraft contends that this was not Dr. Isakov’s genuine belief. (Exhibit U, p. 95; PL’s R. 56.1 Responsive Statement p. 83, ¶ 94).
258. On November 5, 2009, Dr. Isakov performed an evaluation of Schoolcraft, which Schoolcraft contends was unnecessary and not properly performed. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 95.)
259. Dr. Isakov noted that although Schoolcraft “reiterated his story” and still wanted “to take steps/action against his precinct,” he did not express any physical threats to anyone. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 96.)
260. Dr. Isakov’s notes indicate that Schoolcraft refused to give permission for anyone at Jamaica Hospital to speak with the police psychiatrist who had previously evaluated him, but agreed to see a psychotherapist after he was discharged. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 97.)
261. On November 6, 2009, Dr. Isakov performed an evaluation of Schoolcraft, which Schoolcraft contends was unnecessary and not properly performed. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 98.)
262. Dr. Isakov noted that Schoolcraft was compliant, was not in emotional distress, and was not expressing any paranoid ideation or making any threats. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 99.)
263. Dr. Isakov indicated that School-craft would be discharged after an appointment was made with an outside psychiatrist. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 100.)
*497 264. Dr. Isakov composed Schoolcraft’s Discharge Summary. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 101.)
265. Dr. Isakov’s discharge diagnosis was Adjustment Disorder with Anxious Mood. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 103.)
266. Dr. Isakov discharged Schoolcraft with a recommendation to follow up with a psychotherapist and, if he became symptomatic, to see a psychiatrist for medication. Schoolcraft contends that Dr. Isakov illegally conditioned release on Schoolcraft’s agreeing to see a psychiatrist. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 102.)
267. Dr. Isakov’s notes indicate that Schoolcraft verbalized an understanding of the recommendation that Schoolcraft consult with a psychiatrist once discharged. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 104.)
268. On November 6, 2009, Jamaica Hospital released Schoolcraft from its custody. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 112.)
269. There is no direct evidence that Deputy Chief Michael Marino spoke to any personnel from Jamaica Hospital, beyond the EMTs that arrived at Schoolcraft’s home on October 31st. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 100.)
270. There is no direct evidence that Captain Lauterborn spoke to any personnel from Jamaica Hospital, beyond the EMTs that arrived at Schoolcraft’s home on October 31st. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 113.)
271. There is no direct evidence that Lieutenant Caughey spoke to any personnel from Jamaica Hospital. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 114.)
272. There is no direct evidence that DI Mauriello spoke to any personnel from Jamaica Hospital, beyond the EMTs that arrived at Schoolcraft’s home on October 31st. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 115.)
273. There is no direct evidence that Sergeant Huffman spoke to anyone at Jamaica Hospital regarding Schoolcraft. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 116.)
274. There is no direct evidence that Lieutenant Hanlon spoke to anyone at Jamaica Hospital regarding Schoolcraft. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, 1117.)
275. There is no direct evidence that Captain Trainer spoke to anyone at Jamaica Hospital about Schoolcraft. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 118.)
276. There is no direct evidence that Lieutenant Gough spoke with anyone at Jamaica Hospital regarding Schoolcraft, beyond the EMTs that arrived at School-craft’s home on October 31st. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 119.)
277. Sergeant Weiss never went to Jamaica Hospital and never directed anyone to say anything to anyone at Jamaica Hospital. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 120.)
278. There is no direct evidence that Sergeant Duncan had any contact with anyone at Jamaica Hospital, beyond the EMTs that arrived at Schoolcraft’s home on October 31st. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 121.)
279. Lieutenant Broschart testified that until a physician evaluated School-craft, he was in police custody. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 123.)
230. Sergeant James denied having any contact with anyone at Jamaica Hospital. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 124.)
281. Dr. Roy Lubit (“Dr. Lubit”) has been retained by Schoolcraft as a psychiatric expert. Pursuant to his retention, Dr. Lubit issued an expert report. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 43.)
282. In his report, Dr. Lubit claims Dr. Bernier committed malpractice, in part, *498 due to her failure to gather information about Mr. Schoolcraft, including speaking with IAB and other key collaterals such as the police. (Bernier’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 44.)
K. Events Subsequent to Release from Jamaica Hospital
283. Schoolcraft was re-suspended for refusing to return to work after he was released from JHMC on November 6, 2009. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 71.)
284. After his discharge, Schoolcraft consulted with Dr. Steven Luell (“Dr. Luell”), a private physician. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 105.)
285. According to Dr. Luell’s report, Schoolcraft complained of stomach distress, anxiety, difficulty relaxing and insomnia, and his mood was depressed. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 106.)
286. Dr. Luell diagnosed Schoolcraft with Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Emotional Features, Rule Out Obsessive Compulsive Personality Disorder, and recommended that Schoolcraft undergo a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation and counseling. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 107.)
287. Schoolcraft did not follow those recommendations. (Jamaica’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 108.)
288. Schoolcraft met with NYPD representatives from IAB in his Queens apartment on November 6, 2009. (Mau-riello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 137.)
289. At the meeting with IAB, School-craft recounted the events of October 31, 2009. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 138.)
290. Schoolcraft provided the IAB officers with the recordings he had made of the events in his apartment on October 31, 2009. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 139.)
291. Following the IAB meeting in his Queens apartment, Schoolcraft was contacted by IAB and told IAB wanted to revisit his apartment. They met again on November 9, 2009, together with School-craft’s father. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 140.)
292. The IAB officers discussed the existence of a weapon in the apartment. IAB had learned of the weapon from the recording of the two NYPD entries on October 31, 2009, in which Schoolcraft discusses the weapon with his father and they agree he should hide it under his mattress before the NYPD makes its first entry. After denying there were any weapons on the premises, Schoolcraft ultimately acknowledged he had a weapon. (Mauriel-lo’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 141.)
293. Schoolcraft turned the shotgun over to IAB. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 142.)
294. After Schoolcraft was released from Jamaica Hospital, he moved to Johnstown, New York. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 113.)
295. In December 2009, the NYPD’s Brooklyn North Investigations Unit (“BNIU”) made its first attempt to contact Schoolcraft upstate (SAC ¶ 216), and continued to do so thereafter. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 144.)
296. ’ According to DI Mauriello, at no time did BNIU or IAB inform DI Mauriel-lo of their actions or seek to consult with him in any way about their efforts to contact Schoolcraft. (Mauriello’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 147.)
297. Schoolcraft chose not to speak with the visiting NYPD personnel. It thus became clear he had no interest in communicating further with the NYPD. (Mauriel-lo’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 146.)
298. Schoolcraft did not attend any disciplinary hearing for disclosing or attempt *499 ing to disclose NYPD corruption and police misconduct. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 101.)
299. Schoolcraft decided after his October 31, 2009 involuntary commitment to go to the media. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 72.)
300. Schoolcraft contends that' Brooklyn North Investigations Unit officers were sent to Officer Schoolcraft’s Johns-town residence on eight separate occasions, while the City Defendants contend that they visited six times. Schoolcraft further contends that Captain Timothy Trainer (“Captain Trainer”) also arranged for the local police on four occasions to “visit” Schoolcraft’s upstate home. The parties agree that Schoolcraft opened the door of his upstate home only once to accept an NYPD delivery. (City’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶¶ 63, 65.)
301. In January 2010 and in February 2010, Lieutenant Gough and Sergeant Duncan traveled with others north over 200 miles to his home to deliver papers to him. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 114.)
302. According to Schoolcraft, the Defendants’ purported visits to his upstate residence spurred him to speak to the media. (See citations in City’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶ 83.)
303. A Daily News reporter contacted Schoolcraft within a month after School-craft’s suspension. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 76.)
304. Schoolcraft corresponded with reporters and attorneys via e-mail for “a couple years” beginning in 2010. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 77.)
305. Schoolcraft spoke numerous times with The Daily News, This American Life, and The Village Voice in late 2009 and/or early 2010 through 2012. (City’s Consol. 56.1Statement, ¶ 78.)
306. Schoolcraft wrote a summary of his JHMC confinement and provided that summary to The Village Voice, The Daily News, and his various attorneys. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 79.)
307. Schoolcraft began communicating with The Village Voice reporter Graham Rayman (“Rayman”) in early 2010 and continued to communicate with him through the summer of 2012. (City’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 80.)
308. Schoolcraft gave copies of recordings of individuals within his command to Rayman and Schoolcraft’s attorneys. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 81.)
309. Schoolcraft spoke with Rayman “a couple dozen times” from early 2010 through 2012. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 83.)
310. As of October 2012, Schoolcraft had given at least six or seven interviews to the media. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 84.)
311. Schoolcraft contacted State Senator Hugh T. Farley in 2010. (City’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 85.)
312. Schoolcraft contacted New York City Councilman Albert Vann in 2010. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 86.)
313. Schoolcraft contacted New York City Councilman Peter Vallone in 2010. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 87.)
314. Schoolcraft contacted the Queens District Attorney in late 2009 or early 2010. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 88.)
315. Schoolcraft contacted the United States Department of Justice. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 89.).
316. Schoolcraft contacted plaintiff’s counsel in a stop-and-frisk case recently tried before the Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin, Floyd v. City of New York, 08 CV 1034(SAS), and provided supporting affidavits. (City’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 90.)
*500 317. DI Mauriello was a witnesses in Floyd. During his testimony, DI Mauriel-lo stated that after the quota allegations were made against him as the commanding officer of the 81st Precinct, he was transferred to become the Executive Officer of Transit Borough Brooklyn and Queens on July 3, 2010. According to DI Mauriello’s testimony, at the time of the transfer, the Chief of Patrol for the entire NYPD told DI Mauriello that he was doing a “really good job at the 81st Precinct.” However, Mauriello contends that the Chief of Patrol’s comments constituted a conciliatory gesture given Mauriello’s disappointment with the transfer, rather than a statement suggesting that the transfer was a reward. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 115.)
318. DI Mauriello considered the transfer to Executive Officer in Transit to be a position as “second commander to more officers.” (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 116.)
319. In his deposition in this case, DI Mauriello testified that soon after the news broke in a February 2010 Daily News article about the investigation into downgrading major crimes at the 81st Precinct, he attended a Patrol Borough Brooklyn North supervisors’ meeting. At the meeting his direct supervisor, Deputy Chief Marino, told DI Mauriello not to worry about the negative press because he did not believe it. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 119.)
320. In addition, according to DI Mau-riello, Deputy Chief Marino and the thirty-five other supervisors in the room told DI Mauriello that they supported him. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 120.)
321. DI Mauriello testified that he had discussions in the summer of 2011 with his now-retired supervisor, Transit Bureau Chief Diaz, and his successor, Joseph Fox, who told him that any transfers or promotions would likely have to wait until the ease is over and that until then they could not “push for him.” (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 122.)
322. All parties save DI Mauriello do not dispute that DI Mauriello has not suffered any damage to his status at the NYPD as a result of Schoolcraft’s actions. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 118.)
323. After October 31, 2009, IAB began an investigation into whether DI Mauriello knew about or suspected at the time of his entry into Schoolcraft’s home that IAB or QAD was investigating the 81st Precinct. IAB also investigated whether DI Mauriel-lo knew about the contents of Schoolcraft’s memo book at the time he entered the apartment. (PL’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 126.)
324. IAB has recommended that formal charges against DI Mauriello be filed, and those charges are still pending. (Pl.’s Consol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 128.)
325. In 2010, QAD issued a report on its investigation, stating: “In summary, although some upgrades were made during the course of 2008 and 2009, the findings illustrate severe deficiencies in the overall crime reporting process as a whole beginning with the initial interaction of complainants attempting to file reports, the supervisor’s review and finalization of the reports submitted and continuing with inordinate delay in changing, improper classifications. These conclusions, coupled with the significant amount of reports found not to have been entered into the Omni-System is disturbing.” (Pl.’s Con-sol. 56.1 Statement, ¶ 129.)
III. APPLICABLE STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A dispute is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable *501 jury could return a verdict for the nonmov-ing party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 , 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The relevant inquiry on application for summary judgment is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Id. at 251-52 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 . A court is not charged with weighing the evidence and determining its truth, but with determining whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 735 F.Supp. 1205, 1212 (S.D.N.Y.1990) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 , 106 S.Ct. 2505 ).
IY. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CLAIMS RELATING TO CITY DEFENDANTS AND DI MAURIELLO
A. Fourth Amendment Claims Survive Summary Judgment
Plaintiff and City Defendants 4 both seek judgment as a matter of law with respect to Schoolcraft’s Fourth Amendment claims relating to the NYPD’s October 31st war-rantless entry into Schoolcraft’s home, the subsequent .search and seizure of his apartment, and forcible removal of School-craft from his apartment after classifying him as an Emotionally Disturbed Person. See generally Pl.’s Mem. in Supp’t 34^14; City Defs.’ Mem. in Supp’t 1-6.
i. NYPD’s Initial Entry into School-craft’s Home
As the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed, warrantless entry, inside a home is permitted only under exigent circumstances. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 109 , 126 S.Ct. 1515 , 164 L.Ed.2d 208 (2006) (warrant-less entry per se unreasonable); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (same); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (same); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 , 39 n. 4, 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (warrantless search per se unreasonable); United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 869 (2d Cir.1981). One category of exigent circumstances, at issue in this case, relates to. instances where entry is reasonably believed necessary to “render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury.” Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 , 126 S.Ct. 1943 , 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 100 , 110 S.Ct. 1684 , 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990); Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 196 (2d Cir.1998). “[D]e-termination of exigent circumstances is an objective one based on the totality of the circumstances confronting law enforcement agents.” United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 772 (2d Cir.1990); see also Tierney, 133 F.3d at 196 . Courts consider “the facts, as they appeared at the moment of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced officer, to believe that there was an urgent need to render aid or take action.” United States v. Simmons, 661 F.3d 151, 157 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
In this case, City Defendants contend Dr. Lamstein informed Captain Lau-terborn that he “ ‘absolutely needed’ to find Plaintiff and ‘make sure that he was ok,’ ” thus satisfying the objective reasonableness of entry under the emergency aid doctrine as a matter of law. City Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n 7; City Defs.’ Mem. in Supp’t 3. However, whether Dr. Lamstein actually made this statement to Captain *502 Lauterborn is plainly in dispute. See Section II of this Opinion (hereinafter “Facts”) ¶ 92; see also Pl.’s Reply Mem. 24; Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n 2-6. Contrary to the City Defendants’ position, Dr. Lam-stein’s deposition transcript does not establish that she made those statements, and her affidavit offered as part of the City Defendants’ reply to their summary judgment motion does not render this issue indisputable. Dr. Lamstein’s recollection and her earlier deposition testimony arguably conflict. Therefore, Dr. Lam-stein’s warning cannot serve as a basis for City Defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing Schoolcraft’s Fourth Amendment claim.
In support of his motion for summary judgment on the same issue, Schoolcraft contends that, even if the conversation between Dr. Lamstein and Captain Lauter-born took place as City Defendants contend, the record establishes that Deputy Chief Marino was not actually made aware of this conversation. Facts ¶ 123; Pl.’s Reply Mem. 25-26. The City Defendants counter that under the collective or imputed knowledge doctrine, which permits an officer to conduct a warrantless search or seizure based upon a colleague’s objectively reasonable belief of exigent circumstances, Dr. Lamstein’s warning to Captain Lauterborn is imputed to Deputy Chief Marino. City Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n 7-8 (citing United, States v. Colon, 250 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir.2001)).
The collective knowledge doctrine is typically applied to warrantless searches and seizures, rather than warrantless entry, and the Second Circuit has not definitively ruled that the doctrine applies to exigent circumstances, such as under the emergency aid analysis at issue here. See Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129 , 136 n. 3 (2d Cir.2003) (“[bjecause the record before us shows that [police officers] knew the substance of the 911 call when they [entered an apartment without a warrant], this case does not raise any issues regarding the scope of the “collective knowledge” doctrine, and we need not consider whether the warrantless entry would have been justified by exigent circumstances if the information provided to the 911 operator was never transmitted either to the police dispatcher or to the officers on the scene.”). Nevertheless, other circuit and district courts have applied the doctrine under similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Russell, 436 F.3d 1086, 1095 (9th Cir.2006) (applying the doctrine to the emergency aid situation); James v. Chavez, 830 F.Supp.2d 1208, 1261 (D.N.M.2011) aff'd, 511 Fed.Appx. 742 (10th Cir.2013) (collecting cases from the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, together with Anthony from the Second, and concluding: “Although the parties have not directed the Court’s attention to, and the Court has not found, cases which discuss whether the collective-knowledge doctrine can be used to impute knowledge of exigent circumstances, the only authority, which the Court has found has suggested that the collective-knowledge doctrine can be used.”). While. not settled law in this Circuit, it is concluded that the collective knowledge doctrine may be applied to exigent circumstance analysis, just as it applied to warrantless searches and seizures.
However, City Defendants are incorrect that “it is of no moment ... that Captain Lauterborn alone” knew of his conversation with Dr. Lamstein for the purpose of the collective knowledge doctrine. City Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n 7. The doctrine applies only where officers are in communication, sharing information relevant to the determination of exigent circumstances. United States v. Cruz, 834 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir.1987) (“The determination of whether probable cause to arrest *503 exists can be based on the collective knowledge of all of the officers involved in the surveillance efforts because the various law enforcement officers in this investigation were in communication with each other.”); Toliver v. City of New York, No. 10 CIV. 3165 PAC JCF, 2012 WL 7782720 , at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2012) report and recommendation adopted, No. 10 CIV. 3165 PAC JCF, 2013 WL 1155293 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2013) (“The [collective knowledge] doctrine applies if the officers involved are in communication with each other.”); Colon v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-0173 MKB, 2014 WL 1338730 , at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2014) (same). Here, the record does not establish whether other officers were aware of Dr. Lamstein’s warning to Captain Lauterborn. See Facts ¶¶ 92, 123. Consequently, whether Dr. Lamstein made the statement to Captain Lauterborn, and whether Captain Lauterborn in turn communicated that information to his colleagues such that the collective knowledge doctrine may apply, present questions of fact barring summary judgment for the City Defendants.
Similarly, the question of whether the remaining basis for the initial entry constitute an objectively reasonable basis for warrantless entry cannot be resolved as a matter of law on this record. A jury could find that, “the facts, as they appeared at the moment of entry, would lead a reasonable, experienced officer, to’ believe that there was an urgent need to render aid or take action.” United States v. Simmons, 661 F.3d 151, 157 (2d Cir.2011). A jury must determine whether the NYPD acted reasonably given that Schoolcraft, who had been placed on restricted leave without a gun or badge, had consulted a psychiatrist, left the 81st without formal approval and did not respond to telephone calls and numerous knocks on his door. See Facts ¶¶ 35, 39, 69-72, 104. Whether the officers’ conduct was improperly motivated is a contended factual issue to be determined by a jury.
These issues of material fact apply equally to Defendants’ qualified immunity defense. “Qualified immunity will attach to an officer’s decision to enter a dwelling in response to perceived exigent circumstances so long as the conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Kerman v. City of New York, 261 F.3d 229, 236 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (internal quotations omitted)). City Defendants’ qualified immunity defense is premised on a disputed fact: whether Dr. Lamstein instructed the NYPD to find Schoolcraft. See City Defs.’ Mem. in Supp’t 4 (citing Anthony v. City of New York, 339 F.3d 129 (2d Cir.2003)); City Defs.’ Reply Mem. 5. As in Kerman , “objective reasonableness is a mixed question of law and fact when, as here, material historical facts are in dispute.” Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 111 (2d Cir.2004). The Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ motions for summary judgment regarding Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim are consequently denied.
ii. NYPD’s Decision to Remain In Schoolcraft’s Home
Similarly, judgment as a matter of law is inappropriate with respect to the NYPD’s post-entry conduct. “The officer’s post-entry conduct must be carefully limited to achieving the objective which justified the entry — the officer may do no more than is reasonably necessary to ascertain whether someone is in need of assistance and to provide that assistance.” Tierney v. Davidson, 133 F.3d 189, 197-98 (2d Cir.1998); accord United States v. Andino, 768 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir.2014). “For example, where officials enter private *504 property to fight a fire, the scope of the warrantless search is limited to that reasonably necessary to extinguish the blaze, determine the cause and origin of a fire, and ensure against rekindling.” Id. (quoting United States v. Klump, 536 F.3d 113, 118 (2d Cir.2008) (internal quotations omitted)). As was the case with respect to the initial decision to enter without a warrant, the decision to remain is evaluated on a reasonableness standard.
Material issues of fact remain with respect to the reasonableness of the NYPD’s continued presence in School-craft’s apartment. It is undisputed that when the NYPD asked Schoolcraft if he was all right within the first moments after warrantless entry, Schoolcraft responded “Yeah, I think so.” Facts ¶ 129. When asked why he did not respond to the door and phone calls, Schoolcraft informed Deputy Chief Marino that he had taken some Nyquil and had not expected anyone to knock at his door. Facts ¶ 131. He then informed DI Mauriello that he was “fine.” Facts ¶ 134. A factual issue remains as to ' whether continued presence by the NYPD was unreasonable.
The majority of justifications to which City Defendants point, i.e., Schoolcraft’s refusal of medical treatment and his “rapid retreat” into his apartment after being escorted toward the waiting ambulance (City Defs.’ Mem. in Opp’n 9) occurred after a trier of fact might conclude that the NYPD lacked a reasonably objective basis for remaining in Schoolcraft’s home. At the time he refused to return to the 81st Precinct, Schoolcraft was indisputably alert and responsive, and he had not requested medical intervention beyond saying he had taken Nyquil and had left work because he was not feeling well. Facts ¶¶ 127-29, 131, 134. Following that exchange, the officers present were not explicitly discussing Schoolcraft’s ‘wellbeing,’ rather, they were reprimanding School-craft for leaving without permission and ordering him back to the 81st Precinct in order to “investigate” why he had left. See, e.g., Facts ¶ 136.
However, summary judgment is only appropriate where the party opposing summary judgment tells a story “which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it.” See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 , 127 S.Ct. 1769 , 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). This is not the case here. Contrary to School-craft’s contention, his situation was not analogous to that of the plaintiff in United States v. Sikut, 488 F.Supp.2d 291, 312 (W.D.N.Y.2007). In Sikut , police officers unequivocally admitted that they remained in a residence following a warrantless entry after they stopped making an exigency determination. Id. It is under such circumstances that a court may, as a matter of law, hold that police officers’ presence ceases being about the exigent circumstance. See, e.g., id. In Schoolcraft’s case, City Defendants make no such admissions, and there is sufficient contradictory evidence in the record to require credibility determinations and weighing the evidence, precisely the type of analysis that cannot be undertaken on summary judgment. Fischl v. Armitage, 128 F.3d 50, 55-56 (2d Cir.1997). Consequently, the constitutionality of Defendants’ decision to remain in Schoolcraft’s apartment presents a triable issue.
iii. Designation as an EDP
Finally, the validity of the NYPD’s designation of Schoolcraft as an emotionally disturbed person (“EDP”) also cannot be determined at the summary judgment stage.
Schoolcraft was declared an EDP pursuant to New York’s Mental Hygiene Law. The statute permits an officer to place a person who “appears to be mentally ill and *505 is conducting himself ... in a manner which is likely to result in a serious harm to the person or others” into custody. N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.41 . The phrase “likely to result in serious harm” is defined as:
(a) a substantial risk of physical harm to the person as manifested by threats of or attempts at suicide or serious bodily harm or other conduct demonstrating that the person is dangerous to himself or herself, or (b) a substantial risk of physical harm to other persons as manifested by homicidal or other violent behavior by which others are placed in reasonable fear of serious physical harm.
Id. § 9.01.
A likelihood of serious harm determination is evaluated under “the same objective reasonableness standard that is imposed by the Fourth Amendment.” Kerman, 374 F.3d at 100 . Likelihood of serious harm can be evidenced by overt acts, attempts or threats of harm, or by “other conduct” such as neglect or refusal to care for oneself. Boggs v. New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., 132 A.D.2d 340 , 523 N.Y.S.2d 71, 89 (1987). However, refusal to accept medical treatment does not, by itself, establish that a person is dangerous to himself. See Green v. City of New York, 465 F.3d 65, 83 (2d Cir.2006). In Green , the Second Circuit considered a New York City Fire Department Lieutenant’s decision to involuntarily transport a patient with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis and pneumonia that explicitly, and repeatedly, declined to go to the -hospital after an episode of labored breathing. See id. at 69-73 .. Though not in the context of New York’s Mental Hygiene Law, the See-ond Circuit noted that “dangerousness to oneself justifying [involuntary transport to a hospital] does not include a refusal to accept medical treatment.” Id. at 83 .
Here, material issues of fact, specifically whether Schoolcraft’s behavior rose to the level of “other conduct demonstrating” that he was a danger to himself, remain. See, Amato v. Hartnett, 936 F.Supp.2d 416, 435 (S.D.N.Y.2013) (legality of civil confinement under Section 9.41 survives summary judgment where parties dispute whether the patient refused medical care and whether he made a statement indicating intent to commit suicide); Thomas v. City of New York, No. 09 CIV 3162 CM HBP, 2010 WL 5490900 , at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 22, 2010) (summary judgment inappropriate where parties dispute, inter alia, whether patient was yelling or cursing at officers).
The record is devoid of any homicidal or other violent behavior, or of suicidal or self-harming behavior on Schoolcraft’s part. See N.Y. Mental Hyg. Law § 9.01 . Therefore, as applied to Schoolcraft’s case, the inquiry under the applicable sections of the law is whether the NYPD had probable cause to believe that: (1) Schoolcraft appeared to be mentally ill; and (2) manifested conduct demonstrating that he was dangerous to himself. See id. §§ 9.01, 9.41.
Triable issues of fact remain as to both prongs of this inquiry. 5 As noted above, the questions of whether Dr. Lamstein ever communicated her concerns to Captain Lauterborn, or whether he then disseminated that information to colleagues at *506 the NYPD, are in dispute. See Section IV.B.Í of this Opinion. Moreover, the recordings do not contain video so that evaluation of Schoolcraft’s demeanor following the NYPD’s warrantless entry is at issue. See Cameron v. City of New York, 598 F.3d 50, 60 (2d Cir.2010) (blurry and incomplete video footage evidence cannot be used to determine legality of arrest as a matter of law, since a possibility existed that the basis for arrest existed but was not visible in the footage).
Summary judgment is also inappropriate where the evidence that is undisputed can reasonably be interpreted in opposing ways. For example, a jury may find that Schoolcraft’s calm tone for the duration of the recordings conflicts with his arguably erratic conduct. Over the course of sixteen minutes, Schoolcraft stating he did not feel well, and then that he was fine, requesting medical care, walked to the ambulance following a diagnosis of elevated blood pressure, then turned around and reentered his home, again refusing medical care. Facts ¶¶ 134, 136, 138, 147, 149, 151. On the other hand, a jury may also find that such conduct was the result of having several officers in tactical gear enter his apartment and his suspension, so that Schoolcraft’s conduct would not permit any reasonable officer to believe Schoolcraft satisfied either prongs of the substantial risk test. Facts ¶¶ 126, 142. Under such circumstances, a jury must determine whether the NYPD had probable cause to find Schoolcraft mentally ill and a danger to himself. Cf. Higgins v. City of Oneonta, 208 A.D.2d 1067 , 617 N.Y.S.2d 566, 569 (1994) (Holding as a matter of law that confinement was justified “[g]iven [the police officers’] knowledge of plaintiffs longstanding hostility toward certain members of the Police Department and City officials, coupled with [his treating psychiatrist’s] opinion that plaintiff was dangerous and the obvious threatening nature of plaintiffs phone calls”); Bayne v. Provost, No. 1:04 CV 44, 2005 WL 1871182 , at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2005) (finding probable cause as a matter of law where a medical professional “persisted in her position that Plaintiff had made the threat of suicide”).
City Defendants contend, in the alternative, that ‘arguable probable cause’ existed, rendering the NYPD’s actions protected under qualified immunity. See City Defs.’ Mem. in Supp’t 9. “Arguable probable cause exists when a reasonable police officer in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the officer in question could have reasonably believed that probable cause existed in the light of well-established law.” Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 369 (2d Cir.2007) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A judicial finding of arguable probably cause can serve as the basis for granting summary judgment as to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See generally id. at 367-72. However, “a court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law only if it can conclude that, with credibility assessments made against the moving party and all inferences drawn against the moving party, a reasonable juror would have been compelled to accept the view of the moving party.” Id. at 370-71 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Here, the record does not permit such a finding, and the issue must be submitted to a jury. The Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ motions for summary judgment on Plaintiffs Fourth Amendment claim are denied.
B. First Amendment Claim Survives Summary Judgment
City Defendants contend that School-craft’s First Amendment claim should be dismissed as a matter of law. City Defs.’ Mem. in Supp’t 10-15. Schoolcraft alleges that the City Defendants violated his First Amendment rights to report “corruption, misconduct and fraud” at the 81st Precinct by seizing his notes and other effects, hav *507 ing him involuntarily committed as an EDP, and harassing him at his upstate residence. See TAC ¶¶ 245-61. The Second Circuit has tailored the elements of a First Amendment claim to the factual context alleged. Compare Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268 F.3d 65 , 78 (2d Cir.2001) with Morrison v. Johnson, 429 F.3d 48, 51 (2d Cir.2005). In either formulation, the first requirement is protected speech. Williams v. Town of Greenburgh, 535 F.3d 71, 76 (2d Cir.2008) (“Regardless of the factual context, we have required a plaintiff alleging retaliation to establish speech protected by the First Amendment”).
i. Schoolcraft Engaged in Protected Speech
“[T]he First Amendment protects a public employee’s right, in certain circumstances, to speak as a citizen addressing matters of public concern.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 417 , 126 S.Ct. 1951 , 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006). A public employee, however, must “by necessity ... accept certain limitations on his or her freedom,” because, his speech can “contravene governmental policies or impair the proper performance of governmental functions.” Id. at 418-19 , 126 S.Ct. 1951 . The Second Circuit recently set out the applicable inquiry for determining whether a public employee’s speech is protected under the First Amendment:
Initially, a court, must determine “whether the employee spoke as a citizen on a matter of public concern. This step one inquiry in turn encompasses two separate subquestions: (1) whether the subject of the employee’s speech was a matter of public concern and (2) whether the employee spoke ‘as a citizen’ rather than solely as an employee. If the answer to either question is no, that is the end of the matter. If, however, both questions are answered in the affirmative, the court then proceeds to the second step of the inquiry, commonly referred to as the Pickering analysis: whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the public based on the government’s needs as an employer.”
Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir.2015) (hereinafter “Matthews TV”) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 , 126 S.Ct. 1951 ; Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 235 (2d Cir.2011); Lane v. Franks, — U.S. --, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 2380 , 189 L.Edüd 312 (2014); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty., 391 U.S. 563, 568 , 88 S.Ct. 1731 , 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
City Defendants first contend that Schoolcraft lacked a protected interest with respect to his post-suspension speech under the First Amendment because he was suspended rather than terminated on October 31, 2009. City Defs.’ Mem. in Supp’t 11., citing Anemone v. Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 05 CIV. 3170(LAP), 2008 WL 1956284 , at *16 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2008) aff'd, 629 F.3d 97 (2d Cir.2011). The facts in Anemone are distinguishable from those in this case. Unlike Schoolcraft, the plaintiff in Anemone continued to describe himself as a “current” public employee even after his suspension. Id. Moreover, unlike Schoolcraft, the plaintiff in Anemone held the title of “Deputy Executive Director and Director of Security for the MTA,” and the court found that he had engaged in speech pursuant to his official duties relating to security. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The City Defendants also do not attempt to square this Court’s September 10, 2012 Opinion with their current argument. See Schoolcraft v. City of New York, No. 10 CIV. 6005 RWS, 2012 WL 3960118 , at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2012) - (hereinafter “September 2012 Opin ion”). Indeed, the Court’s September *508 2012 holding remains unaltered with respect to Schoolcraft’s post-suspension speech:
Although the City Defendants contend that Plaintiff, notwithstanding his suspension was still a sworn law enforcement officer and employee of the NYPD, the fact that Plaintiff was suspended and, for the substantial majority of the time period relevant to the prior restraint claim, was hundreds of miles outside the NYPD’s jurisdiction provides a sufficient factual basis for Plaintiff to allege that he sought to exercise his First Amendment rights “as a citizen,” rather than “as a government employee.”
Plaintiff intended to speak, following his suspension from the NYPD, to the media and public at large about the NYPD’s summons policy. This intended speech addressed a matter of public concern, and, because Plaintiff intended to speak to the media and public following his suspension, Plaintiffs speech was outside the scope .of his official duties. Accordingly, the speech was protected by the First Amendment.
Schoolcraft September 2012 Opinion, 2012 WL 3960118 , at *6, *8.
In opposition to the City Defendants’ motion, Schoolcraft suggests that recent case law following the September 2012 Opinion favors extending his First Amendment claim to encompass “Schoolcraft’s speech before his suspension.” Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n 20-22 (citing Lane v. Franks, — U.S. -, 134 S.Ct. 2369, 2380 , 189 L.Ed.2d 312 (2014) (the Garcetti test is whether the speech falls within the scope of the employee’s ordinary duties); Hagan v. City of New York, 39 F.Supp.3d 481 (S.D.N.Y.2014) (a public employee reporting improper conduct of supervisors and other official outside of the chain-of-command was not part of the employee’s ordinary job responsibilities); and Griffin v. City of New York, 880 F.Supp.2d 384, 400 (E.D.N.Y.2012) (police officer’s report of a colleague’s misconduct to internal affairs not part of the chain of command and could qualify as protected speech)).
Though Schoolcraft does not detail the pre-suspension speech which he contends is now protected, he is presumably referring to Schoolcraft’s pre-suspension internal reporting to his supervisors at the 81st Precinct and to his reports to LAB and QAD. See PL’s Ltr. dated March 17, 2015 requesting a pre-motion conference (“Schoolcraft’s speech and conduct raising issues with IAB, QAD and his supervisors at the 81st Precinct, as well as his plans to report that misconduct to the Commissioner, are matters of public concern that are entitled to First Amendment protection before his October 31, 2009 suspension”). 6
In the September 2012 Opinion, this Court ruled that Schoolcraft could not base his First Amendment claims on his reporting up the chain of command or his reporting to internal affairs. See September 2012 Opinion, 2012 WL 3960118 , at *6. The September 2012 Opinion relied upon the district court opinion in Matthews v. City of New York, No. 12 Civ. 1354(BSJ), 2012 WL 8084831 , 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53213 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2012) (hereinafter “Matthews /”), for the proposition that internal reporting of a quota policy is part of an officer’s role and therefore not pro-, tected. When ultimately appealed, the Second Circuit recently vacated the District Court’s ruling in Matthews I, holding that a patrolman’s reporting on arrest and summons quota policy is not “part-and- *509 parcel” of his role as a patrolman and therefore may constitute protected speech if the way in which the officer reported has a civilian analogue and if the speech relates to an issue of public concern. See Matthews v. City of New York, 779 F.3d 167, 171-76 (2d Cir.2015) (hereinafter “Matthews TV”). 7
Considering Schoolcraft’s situation in light of the Second Circuit’s guidance in Matthews TV, the following conclusions are reached. 8 First, the record available here does not indicate that Schoolcraft played any role in setting policy, was expected to speak on policy, or had been consulted to formulate policy. Indeed, both plaintiffs had the same title of Patrolman and presumably substantially similar responsibilities which would not relate to this type of speech. See Facts ¶ 1; Matthews IV, 779 F.3d at 174 . Second, the fact that an officer’s allegations resulted in negative performance evaluations and other professional difficulties for the reporting officer “is not relevant to the narrow question of whether the officer was speaking as citizen or as a public employee.” Id. at 170 . Third, the NYPD Patrol Guide’s duty to report misconduct does not support the conclusion that reporting corruption is part of Schoolcraft’s role as a police officer, and is therefore unprotected. Matthews IV, 779 F.3d at 175 . Fourth, whether Schoolcraft engaged in speech that had a “comparable civilian analogue” is relevant to establishing whether his speech was protected. Id.
In light of Matthews IV, School-craft’s First Amendment claim extends to his pre-suspension speech. Like Officer Matthews, Schoolcraft’s reports to QAD and Internal Affairs concerned precinct-wide summons and arrest quota policies. Compare Matthews IV, 779 F.3d at 174 with Facts ¶ ¶ 52-54. Also like Matthews, Schoolcraft raised issues of the quotas with his precinct’s leadership. Compare Matthews IV, 779 F.3d at 169 (raising concerns about quotas twice with the precinct’s commanding officer and once with another precinct executive) with Facts ¶¶ 13-17, 19-20 (raising the issue with 81st Precinct leadership at the February Appeal Meeting and with leadership in Brooklyn North command at the March Evaluation Meeting).
City Defendants’ factual distinctions with respect the speech in which Matthews and Schoolcraft engaged do not alter the analysis above. Cf. City Defs.’ Reply Mem. 13-19. On the issue of a civilian analog, it is admittedly difficult to imagine a civilian one for a patrolman’s performance evaluation and appeal meetings. See Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Distr. of City of N.Y., 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir.2010) (a teacher’s choice to pursue his complaint by following the employee grievance procedure had no civilian analogue). However, Schoolcraft’s speech is not limited to those channels. He also raised these issues with IAB on August 20th and with QAD on October 7th. Facts *510 ¶¶ 48, 52. At minimum, with respect to IAB, “any citizen may report wrongdoing to the IAB. Citizens are able and directed to file reports with the IAB in the exact same manner as NYPD officers.” Griffin v. City of New York, 880 F.Supp.2d 384, 399 (E.D.N.Y.2012). Thus the IAB reporting had a civilian analogue. Moreover, with respect to the QAD reporting, whether the public at large could have engaged in similar speech is not established on this record, and this will remain a question for trial. In sum, Schoolcraft’s pre-suspension speech has civilian analogues.
The question of whether Schoolcraft’s speech is part-and-parcel of his official duties is a more difficult one. The City Defendants contend that Schoolcraft’s speech is distinguishable from Matthews’s because Schoolcraft’s pertained predominately to his own work, his own. summons and arrest ‘activity,’ and to conduct at his own precinct. See City Defs.’ Reply Mem. 16-17. They see Schoolcraft’s speech as analogous to the teacher in Weintraub , whose “formal grievance regarding the administration’s refusal to discipline a student was unprotected speech because a teacher’s need to discipline his own students is essential to his ability to effectively run a classroom as part of his day-today responsibilities.” Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of City of New York, 593 F.3d 196, 203 (2d Cir.2010) (cited in Matthews TV, 779 F.3d at 173 ). City Defendants also point to another pre-Mat-thews district court opinion, which held:
[Plaintiffs’ complaints to their superiors ... related to their concerns about their ability to properly execute their duties as police officers, as they expressed concern, inter alia, that the assignment of officers to chauffeur intoxicated officers left [their police department] shorthanded, that the hiring of uncertified officers and the retention of unqualified and/or corrupt officers affected their ability to perform their job assignments safely and that they were told not to issue summonses to certain individuals and businesses.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7231289. Public record. Not legal advice.