# Texas v. United States

> District Court, S.D. Texas · February 16, 2015 · 86 F. Supp. 3d 591

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7229880

## Case

- **Full name:** State of TEXAS v. UNITED STATES of America
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. Texas
- **Decided:** February 16, 2015
- **Citations:** 86 F. Supp. 3d 591; 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18551; 2015 WL 648579
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Hanen
- **Judges:** Hanen
- **Cited by:** 38 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7229880

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “[i]n response to a Senate inquiry, the USCIS told the Senate that the top four reasons for denials were: (1) the applicant used the wrong form; (2) the applicant failed to provide a valid signature; (3) the applicant failed to file or complete Form I–765 or failed…
- finding a “Directive” met the first prong where it required the “immediate implementation of certain measures”

## Opinion text

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
ANDREW S. HANEN, District Judge.
This is a case in which twenty-six states or their representatives are seeking in-junctive relief against the United States and several officials of the Department of Homeland Security to prevent them from implementing a program entitled “Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents.” 1 This program is designed to provide legal presence to over four million individuals who are currently in the country illegally, and would enable these individuals to obtain a variety of both state and federal benefits.
The genesis of the problems presented by illegal immigration in this matter was described by the United States Supreme Court decades ago:
Sheer incapability or lax enforcement of the laws barring entry into this country, coupled with the failure to establish an effective bar to the employment of undocumented aliens, has resulted in the creation of a substantial “shadow population” of illegal migrants — numbering in the millions — within our borders.
The Attorney General recently estimated the number of illegal aliens within the United States at between 3 and 6 million. In presenting to both the Senate and House of Representatives several Presidential proposals for reform of the immigration laws— including one to “legalize” many of the illegal entrants currently residing in the United States by creating for them a special statute under the immigration laws — the Attorney General noted that this subclass is largely composed of persons with a permanent attachment to the Nation, and that they are unlikely to be displaced from our territory.
“We have neither the resources, the capability, nor the motivation to uproot and deport millions of illegal aliens, many of whom have become, in effect, members of the community. By granting limited legal status to the productive and law-abiding members of this shadow population, we will recognize reality and devote our enforcement resources to deterring future illegal arrivals.” Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Immigration and *605 Refugee Policy of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 9 (1981) (testimony of William French Smith, Attorney General).
This situation raises the specter of a permanent caste of undocumented resident aliens, encouraged by some to remain here as a source of cheap labor, but nevertheless denied the benefits that our society makes available to citizens and lawful residents. The existence of such an underclass presents most difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality under law.
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 , 218-19 & n. 17, 102 S.Ct. 2382 , 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). Thus, even in 1982, the Supreme Court noted in Plyler that the United States’ problems with illegal immigration had existed for decades. Obviously, these issues are still far from a final resolution.
Since 1982, the population of illegal aliens in this country has more than tripled, but today’s situation is clearly exacerbated by the specter of terrorism and the increased need for security. 2 Nevertheless, the Executive Branch’s position is the same as it was then. It is still voicing concerns regarding its inability to enforce all immigration laws due to a lack of resources. While Congress has not been idle, having passed a number of ever-increasing appropriation bills and various acts that affect immigration over the last four decades (especially in the wake of the terrorist attacks in 2001), it has not passed nor funded a long term, comprehensive system that resolves this country’s issues regarding border security and immigration. To be sure, Congress’ and the Executive Branch’s focus on matters directly affecting national security is understandable. This overriding focus, however, does not necessarily comport with the interests of the states. While the States are obviously concerned about national security, they are also concerned about their own resources being drained by the constant influx of illegal immigrants into their respective territories, and that this continual flow of illegal immigration has led and will lead to serious domestic security issues directly affecting their citizenry. This influx, for example, is causing the States to experience severe law enforcement problems. 3 Regardless of the reasons behind the actions or inaction of the Executive and Legislative Branches of the federal government, the result is that many states ultimately bear the brunt of illegal immigration.
This case examines complex issues relating to immigration which necessarily in *606 volve questions of federalism, separation of powers, and the ability and advisability, if any, of the Judiciary to hear and resolve such a dispute.
Chief Justice Roberts wrote in National Federation of Independent Business v. Se-belius:
We [the judiciary] do not consider whether the [Patient Protection and Affordable Care] Act embodies sound policies. That judgment is entrusted to the Nation’s elected leaders. We ask only whether Congress has the power under the Constitution to enact the challenged provisions.
Nearly two centuries ago, Chief Justice Marshall observed that “the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted” to the Federal Government “is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.” In this case, we must again determine whether the Constitution grants Congress powers it now asserts, but which many States and individuals believe it does not possess.
— U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2577 , 183 L.Ed.2d 450 (2012) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404 , 4 Wheat. 316 , 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819)).
I. THE ISSUES BEFORE AND NOT BEFORE THE COURT
Although this Court is not faced with either a Congressional Act or an Executive Order, the sentiment expressed by these Chief Justices is nonetheless applicable. The ultimate question before the Court is: Do the laws of the United States, including the Constitution, give the Secretary of Homeland Security the power to take the action at issue in this case? Nevertheless, before the Court begins to address the issues raised in this injunctive action, it finds that the issues can best be framed by emphasizing what is not involved in this case.
First, this case does not involve the wisdom, or the lack thereof, underlying the decision by Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) Secretary Jeh Johnson to award legal presence status to over four million illegal aliens through the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA,” also referred to interchangeably as the “DHS Directive” and the “DAPA Memorandum”) program. Although the Court will necessarily be forced to address many factors surrounding this decision and review the relationship between the Legislative and Executive Branches as it pertains to the DHS Secretary’s discretion to act in this area, the actual merits of this program are not at issue.
Second, with three minor exceptions, this case does not involve the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program. In 2012, DACA was implemented by then DHS Secretary Janet Napolita-no. The program permits teenagers and young adults, who were born outside the United States, but raised in this country, to apply for deferred action status and employment authorizations. The Complaint in this matter does not include the actions taken by Secretary Napolitano, which have to date formalized the status of approximately 700,000 teenagers and young adults. Therefore, those actions are not before the Court and will not be addressed by this opinion. Having said that, DACA will necessarily be discussed in this opinion as it is relevant. to many legal issues in the present case. For example, the States maintain that the DAPA applications will undergo a process identical to that used for DACA applications and, therefore, DACA’s policies and procedures will be instructive for the Court as to DAPA’s implementation.
*607 Third, several of the briefs have expressed a general public perception that the President has issued an executive order implementing a blanket amnesty program, and that it is this amnesty program that is before the Court in this suit. Although what constitutes an amnesty program is obviously a matter of opinion, these opinions do not impact the Court’s decision. Amnesty or not, the issues before the Court do not require the Court to consider the public popularity, public acceptance, public acquiescence, or public disdain for the DAPA program. As Chief Justice Roberts alluded to above, public opinions and perceptions about the country’s policies have no place in the resolution of a judicial matter.
Finally, both sides agree that the President in his official capacity has not directly instituted any program at issue in this case. Regardless of the fact that the Executive Branch has made public statements to the contrary, there are no executive orders or other presidential proclamations or communique that exist regarding DAPA. The DAPA Memorandum issued by Secretary Johnson is the focus in this suit.
That being said, the Court is presented with the following principle issues: (1) whether the States have standing to bring this case; (2) whether the DHS has the necessary discretion to institute the DAPA program; and (3) whether the DAPA program is constitutional, comports with existing laws, and was legally adopted. A negative answer to the first question will negate the need for the Court to address the latter two. The factual statements made hereinafter (except where the Court is discussing a factual dispute) should be considered as findings of fact regardless of any heading or lack thereof. Similarly, the legal conclusions, except where the Court discusses the various competing legal theories and positions, should be taken as conclusions of law regardless of any label or lack thereof. Furthermore, due to the overlap between the standing issues and the merits, there is by necessity the need for a certain amount of repetition.
II. HISTORY OF THIS LITIGATION
On November 20, 2014, Jeh Johnson, in his position as Secretary of the DHS, issued multiple memoranda to Leon Rodriguez, Director of the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Director of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and R. Gil Kerlikowske, Commissioner of the United States Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”). One of these mem-oranda contained an order establishing a new program utilizing deferred action to stay deportation proceedings and award certain benefits to approximately four to five million individuals residing illegally in the United States. The present case, filed in an attempt to enjoin the rollout and implementation of this program, was initiated by the State of Texas and twenty-five other states or their representatives. Specifically, the States allege that the Secretary’s actions violate the Take Care Clause of the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See U.S. Const, art. II, § 3; 5 U.S.C. §§ 500 et seq, 4 The States filed this suit against DHS Secretary Johnson and the *608 individuals mentioned above, as well as Ronald D. Vitiello, the Deputy Chief of the United States Border Patrol, and the United States of America. 5 In response to Plaintiffs’ suit, the Defendants have asserted two main arguments: (1) the States lack standing to bring this suit; and (2) the States’ claims are not meritorious.
Multiple amici curiae have made appearances arguing for one side of this controversy or the other. Several separate attempts have been made by individuals— at least one attempt seemingly in support of Plaintiffs, and one in support of Defendants — to intervene in this lawsuit. Both the States and the Government opposed these interventions. Because the Court had already implemented a schedule in this time-sensitive matter that was agreed to by all existing parties, it denied these attempts to intervene without prejudice. Permitting the intervention of new parties would have been imprudent, as it would have unduly complicated and delayed the orderly progression of this case. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), (b)(3). Further, this Court notes that the interests of all putative intervenors are more than adequately represented by the Parties in this lawsuit. 6 As suggested by Fifth Circuit authority, the Court has reviewed their pleadings as if they were amici curiae. See Bush v. Viterna, 740 F.2d 350, 359 (5th Cir.1984) (per curiam).
III. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
For some years now, the powers that be in Washington — namely, the Executive Branch and Congress — have debated if and how to change the laws governing both legal and illegal immigration into this country. This debate has necessarily included a wide-ranging number of issues including, but not limited to, border security, law enforcement, budgetary concerns, employment, social welfare, education, positive and negative societal aspects of immigration, and humanitarian concerns. The national debate has also considered potential solutions to the myriad of concerns stemming from the millions of individuals currently living in the country illegally. To date, however, neither the President nor any member of Congress has proposed legislation capable of resolving these issues in a manner that could garner the necessary support to be passed into law. 7
On June 15, 2012, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano issued a memorandum creating the DACA program, which stands for “Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals.” Specifically, Secretary Napolitano’s memorandum instructed her Department heads to give deferred action status to all illegal immigrants who:
1. Came to the United States before age sixteen;
2. Continuously resided in the United States for at least five years prior to *609 June 15, 2012 and were in the United States on June 15, 2012;
3. Were then attending school, or had graduated from high school, obtained a GED, or were honorably discharged from the military;
4. Had not been convicted of a felony, significant misdemeanor, multiple misdemeanors, or otherwise pose a threat to national security; and
5. Were not above the age of thirty.
Doc. No. 38, Def. Ex. 19 (June 15, 2012 DACA Memorandum issued by Secretary Napolitano). This Directive applies to all individuals over the age of fifteen that met the criteria, including those currently in removal proceedings as well as those who are newly-encountered by the DHS. In addition, DHS employees were instructed to accept work authorization applications from those individuals awarded deferred action status under DACA. While exact numbers regarding the presence of illegal aliens in this country are not available, both sides seem to accept that at least 1.2 million illegal immigrants could qualify for DACA by the end of 2014. Doc. No. 38, Def. Ex. 21; Doc. No. 64, PI. Ex. 6. Of these individuals, approximately 636,000 have applied for and received legal presence status through DACA. Doc. No. 38, Def. Ex. 28. Both of these figures are expected to rise as children “age in” and meet the program’s education requirements. Doc. No. 38, Def. Ex. 6; Doc. No. 64, PI. Ex. 6. Estimates suggest that by the time all individuals eligible for DACA “age in” to the program, approximately 1.7 million individuals will be eligible to receive deferred action. Doc. No. 38, Def. Ex. 21; Doc. No. 64, PI. Ex. 6.
A review of the DACA program, however, would not be complete without examining the number of individuals who have applied for relief through the program but were denied legal status: of the approximately 723,000 DACA applications accepted through the end of 2014, only 38,000— or about 5% — have been denied. Doc. No. 38, Def. Ex. 28. In response to a Senate inquiry, the USCIS told the Senate that the top four reasons for denials were: (1) the applicant used the wrong form; (2) the applicant failed to provide a valid signature; (3) the applicant failed to file or complete Form 1-765 or failed to enclose the fee; and (4) the applicant was below the age of fifteen and thus ineligible to participate in the program. Doc. No. 64, PI. Ex. 29 at App. P. 0978. Despite a request by the Court, the Government’s counsel did not provide the number, if any, of requests that were denied even though the applicant met the DACA criteria as set out in Secretary Napolitano’s DACA memorandum. The Government’s exhibit, Doc. No. 130, Def. Ex. 44, provides more information but not the level of detail that the Court requested.
The States contend and have supplied evidence that the DHS employees who process DACA applications are required to issue deferred action status to any applicant who meets the criteria outlined in Secretary Napolitano’s memorandum, and are not allowed to use any real “discretion” when it comes to awarding deferred action status. 8 Similarly, the President of the National Citizenship and Immigration Services Council — the union that represents the individuals processing the DACA applications — declared that the DHS manage *610 ment has taken multiple steps to ensure that DACA applications are simply rubber-stamped if the applicants meet the necessary criteria. See Doc. No. 64, PI. Ex. 23 at 3 (Dec. of Kenneth Palinkas, President of Nat’l Citizenship and Immigration Services Council) (hereinafter “Palinkas Dec.”). The States also allege that the DHS has taken steps to ensure that applications for DAPA will likewise receive only a pro forma review. 9
Gn November 20, 2014, following in his predecessor’s footsteps, Secretary Johnson issued a memorandum to DHS officials instructing them to implement the DAPA program and expand the DACA program in three areas. That memorandum, in pertinent part, states the following:
B. Expanding DACA
DACA provides that those who were under the age of 31 on June 15, 2012, who entered the United States before June 15, 2007 (5 years prior) as children under the age of 16, and who meet specific educational and public safety criteria, are eligible for deferred action on a case-by-case basis. The initial DACA announcement of June 15, 2012 provided deferred action for a period of two years. On June 5, 2014, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) announced that DACA recipients could request to renew their deferred action for an additional two years.
In order to further effectuate this program, I hereby direct USCIS to expand DACA as follows:
Remove the age cap. DACA will apply to all otherwise eligible immigrants who enter the United States by the requisite adjusted entry date before the age of sixteen (16), regardless of how old they were in June 2012 or are today. The current age restriction excludes those who were older than 31 on the date of the announcement (ie., those who were born before June 15, 1981). That restriction will no longer apply.
Extend DACA renewal and work authorization to three-years. The period for which DACA and the accompanying employment authorization is granted will be extended to three-year increments, rather than the current two-year increments. This change shall apply to all first-time applications as well as all applications for renewal effective November 24, 2014. Beginning on that date, USCIS should issue all work authorization documents valid for three years, including to those individuals who have applied and are awaiting two-year work *611 authorization documents based on the renewal of their DACA grants. USCIS should also consider means to extend those two-year renewals already issued to three years.
Adjust the date-of-entry requirement. In order to align the DACA program more closely with the other deferred action authorization outlined below, the eligibility cut-off date by which a DACA applicant must have been in the United States should be adjusted from June 15,’ 2007 to January 1, 2010.
USCIS should begin accepting applications under the new criteria from applicants no later than ninety (90) days from the date of this announcement. 10
C. Expanding Deferred Action
I hereby direct USCIS to establish a process, similar to DACA, for exercising prosecutorial discretion through the use of deferred action, on a case-by-case bar sis, to those individuals who:
• have, on the date of this memorandum, a son or daughter who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident;
• have continuously resided in the United States since before January 1, 2010;
• are physically present in the United States on the date of this memorandum, and at the time of making a request for consideration of deferred action with USCIS;
• have no lawful status on the date of this memorandum;
• are not an enforcement priority as reflected in the November 20, 2014 Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants Memorandum; and
• present no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion, makes the grant of deferred action inappropriate.
Applicants must file the requisite applications for deferred action pursuant to the new criteria described above. Applicants .must also submit biometrics for USCIS to conduct background checks similar to the background check that is required for DACA applicants. Each person who applies for deferred action pursuant to the criteria above shall also be eligible to apply for work authorization for the period of deferred action, pursuant to my authority to grant such authorization reflected in section 274A(h)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Deferred action granted pursuant to the program shall be for a period of three years. Applicants will pay the work authorization and biometrics fees, which currently amount to $465. There will be no fee waivers and, like DACA, very limited fee exemptions.
USCIS should begin accepting applications from eligible applicants no later than one hundred and eighty (180) days after the date of this announcement. As with DACA, the above criteria are to be considered for all individuals encountered by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), or USCIS, whether or not the individual is already in removal proceedings or subject to a final order of removal. Specifically:
• ICE and CBP are instructed to immediately begin identifying persons in their custody, as well as newly *612 encountered individuals, who meet the above criteria and may thus be eligible for deferred action to prevent the further expenditure of enforcement resources with regard to these individuals.,
• ICE is further instructed to review pending removal cases, and seek administrative closure or termination of the cases of individuals identified who meet the above criteria, and to refer such individuals to USCIS for case-by-case determinations. ICE should also establish a process to allow individuals in removal proceedings to identify themselves as candidates for deferred action.
• USCIS is instructed to implement this memorandum consistent with its existing guidance regarding the issuance of notices to appear. The USCIS process shall also be available to individuals subject to final orders of removal who otherwise meet the above criteria.
Under any of the proposals outlined above, immigration officers will be provided with specific eligibility criteria for deferred action, but the ultimate judgment as to whether an immigrant is granted deferred action will be determined on a case-by-case basis.
This memorandum confers no substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship. Only an Act of Congress can confer these rights. It remains within the authority of the Executive Branch, however, to set forth policy for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion and deferred action within the framework of existing law. This memorandum is an exercise of that authority.
Doc. No. 1, PI. Ex. A (November 20, 2014 DAPA Memorandum issued by Secretary Johnson), (emphasis in original). The Government relies on estimates suggesting that there are currently 11.3 million illegal aliens residing in the United States and that this new program will apply to over four million individuals. 11
Deferred action is not a status created or authorized by law or by Congress, nor has its properties been described in any relevant legislative act. Secretary Johnson’s DAPA Memorandum states that deferred action has existed since at least the 1960s, a statement with which no one has taken issue. Throughout the years, deferred action has been both utilized and rescinded by the Executive Branch. 12 The practice has also been referenced by Congress in other immigration contexts. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1154 (a)(l)(D)(i)(II), 227(d)(2). It was described by the United States Supreme Court in Reno v. Ameri-carir-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee as follows:
To ameliorate a harsh and unjust outcome, the INS may decline to institute *613 proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation. This commendable exercise in administrative discretion, developed without express statutory authorization, originally was known as nonpriority and is now designated as deferred action. A case may be selected for deferred action treatment at any stage of the administrative process. Approval of deferred action status means that, for the humanitarian reasons described below, no action will thereafter be taken to proceed against an apparently deportable alien, even on grounds normally regarded as aggravated.
525 U.S. 471, 484 , 119 S.Ct. 936 , 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (quoting 6 C. Gordon, S. Mailman & S. Yale-Loehr, Immigration Law and Procedure § 72.03[2][h] (1998)). It is similarly defined in 8 C.F.R. § 274a.l2(c)(14).
D. Factual Contentions
Secretary Johnson supported the implementation of DAPA with two main justifications. First, he wrote that the DHS has limited resources and it cannot perform all of the duties assigned to it, including locating and removing all illegal aliens in the country. Secretary Johnson claimed that the adoption of DAPA will enable the DHS to prioritize its enforcement of the immigration laws and focus its limited resources in areas where they are needed most. Second, the Secretary reasoned that humanitarian concerns also justify the program’s implementation.
Plaintiffs maintain that the Secretary’s justifications are conditions caused by the DHS, are pretexts, or are simply inaccurate. Regarding resources, Plaintiffs argue that the DHS has continued to be funded at record levels and is currently spending millions to create the enormous bureaucracy necessary to implement this program. 13 The States additionally maintain that the DAPA program was: politically motivated and implemented illegally. The first proposition is not the concern of the Court; the second is. To support the latter proposition, the States quote President Obama at length. First, they quote the President’s statements made prior to the implementation of DAPA stating that he, as President, did not have the power under the Constitution or the laws of this country to change the immigration laws. On these occasions, he asserted that only Congress could implement these changes in this area of the law. From these statements, the States reason that if the President does not have the necessary power to make these changes, then the DHS Secretary certainly does not.
The States claim that following the announcement of the DAPA program, the President’s rhetoric dramatically shifted. They cite statements made after the announcement of DAPA in which the President is quoted as saying that because Congress did not change the law, he changed it unilaterally. The States argue that the *614 DAPA program constitutes a significant change in immigration law that was not implemented by Congress. Agreeing with the President’s earlier declarations, the States argue that only Congress can create or change laws, and that the creation of the DAPA program violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution and infringes upon any notion of separation of powers. Further, they assert that the President has effectuated a change in the law solely because he wanted the law changed and because Congress would not acquiesce in his demands.
Obviously, the Government denies these assertions.
E. Legal Contentions
This case presents three discrete legal issues for the Court’s consideration. First, the Government maintains that none of the Plaintiffs have standing to bring this injunctive action. The States disagree, claiming that the Government cannot implement a substantive program and then insulate itself from legal challenges by those who suffer from its negative effects. Further, the States maintain that Secretary Johnson’s DAPA Directive violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution; as well as the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) and the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA”). In opposition to the States’ claims, the Government asserts that it has complete prosecutorial discretion over illegal aliens and can give deferred action status to anyone it chooses. Second, the Government argues that discretionary decisions, like the DAPA program, are not subject to the APA. Finally, the Government claims that the DAPA program is merely general guidance issued to DHS employees, and that the delineated elements of eligibility are not requirements that DHS officials are bound to honor. The Government argues that this flexibility, among other factors, exempts DAPA from the requirements of the APA.
IV. STANDING
A. Legal Standard
1. Article III Standing
Article III of the United States Constitution requires that parties seeking to resolve disputes before a federal court present actual “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, cl. 1. This requirement limits “the business of federal courts to questions presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of resolution through the judicial process.” Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 , 88 S.Ct. 1942 , 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968). Plaintiffs, as the parties invoking the Court’s jurisdiction, bear the burden of satisfying the Article III requirement by demonstrating that they have standing to adjudicate their claims in federal court. Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir.2001). The “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 , 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that they have “suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or imminent.” Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 517 , 127 S.Ct. 1438 , 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007). Second, a plaintiff must show that there is a causal connection between the alleged injury and the complained-of conduct — essentially, that “the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant.” Id. Finally, standing requires that it “be ‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be ‘redressed by a favorable decision.’ ” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 , 96 S.Ct. 1917 , 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)).
*615 2. Prudential Standing
In addition to these three constitutional requirements, “the federal judiciary has also adhered to a set of ‘prudential’ principles that bear on the question of standing.” Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 , 102 S.Ct. 752 , 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Many opinions refer to these principles as being under the banner of “prudential” standing. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 164 , 117 S.Ct. 1154 , 137 L.Ed.2d 281 (1997). First, the Supreme Court has held that when the “asserted harm is a ‘generalized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure, by all or a large class of citizens, that harm alone does not warrant exercise of jurisdiction.” Id. Rather, these “abstract questions of wide public significance” are more appropriately left to the representative branches of the federal government. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 , 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Second, the plaintiffs must come within the “zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.” Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475 , 102 S.Ct. 752 (quoting Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 , 90 S.Ct. 827 , 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970)). Finally, a plaintiff “must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Id. at 474, 102 S.Ct. 752 (quoting Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 , 95 S.Ct. 2197 ).
3.- Standing Under the Administrative Procedure Act
The APA provides that a “person suffering a legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702 . This right of judicial review extends to agency actions “for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704 . To demonstrate standing under the APA, the plaintiff must show that it has suffered or will suffer a sufficient injury in fact. Nat’l Credit Union Admin, v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S. 479, 488 , 118 S.Ct. 927 , 140 L.Ed.2d 1 (1998). The plaintiff must also demonstrate prudential standing under the APA, which requires showing that “the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [is] arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question.” Id. (quoting Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 152 , 90 S.Ct. 827 ). For this prudential standing inquiry, it is not necessary for a court to ask “whether there has been a congressional intent to benefit the would-be plaintiff.” Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 522 U.S. at 488-89 , 118 S.Ct. 927 . Rather, if the plaintiffs interests are “arguably within the ‘zone of interests’ to be protected by a statute,” the prudential showing requirement is satisfied. Id. at 492 , 118 S.Ct. 927 . This requisite showing is not made, however, if the plaintiffs interests are “so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 , 107 S.Ct. 750 , 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987).
When seeking review of agency action under the APA’s procedural provisions, Plaintiffs are also operating under a favorable presumption. They are presumed to satisfy the necessary requirements for standing. See Mendoza v. Perez, 754 F.3d 1002, 1012 (D.C.Cir.2014). Specifically, as stated by the D.C. Circuit, “[plaintiffs asserting a procedural rights challenge need not show the agency action would have been different had it been con *616 summated in a procedurally valid manner — the courts will assume this portion of the causal link.” Id.
B. Resolution of Standing Questions
Questions regarding constitutional and prudential standing implicate the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction; thus challenges to standing are evaluated as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). When evaluating subject-matter jurisdiction, the court may consider: “(1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161 . The court’s analysis also depends on whether the challenging party has made a “facial” or “factual” attack on jurisdiction. See Paterson v. Weinberger, 644 F.2d 521, 523 (5th Cir.1981). A facial challenge consists of only a Rule (12)(b)(l) motion without any accompanying evidence; for this challenge, the court “is required merely to look to the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint because they are presumed to be true.” Id.
Conversely, when making a factual attack on the court’s jurisdiction, the challenging party submits affidavits, testimony, or other evidentiary materials to support its claims. Id. A factual attack requires the responding plaintiff “to submit facts through some evidentiary method” and prove “by a preponderance of the evidence that the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. Here, Defendants submitted a number of exhibits in support of their attack on Plaintiffs’ standing to bring this suit in federal court. Therefore, for the purposes of ruling on Defendants’ challenge, the Plaintiffs bear the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they possess the requisite standing required by Article III. It is not necessary, however, for all Plaintiffs to demonstrate standing; rather, “one party with standing is sufficient to satisfy Article Ill’s case-or-controversy requirement.” Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 , 52 n. 2, 126 S.Ct. 1297 , 164 L.Ed.2d 156 (2006). Thus Plaintiffs’ suit may proceed as long as one Plaintiff can show by a preponderance of the evidence that it fulfills the necessary requirements to show standing.
C. Analysis
1. Article III Standing
a. Injury
The States allege that the DHS Directive will directly cause significant economic injury to their fiscal interests. Specifically, Texas argues that the DHS Directive will create a new class of individuals eligible to apply for driver’s licenses, 14 the processing of which will impose substantial costs on its budget. Plaintiffs rely on Texas’ driver’s license program to demonstrate how the costs associated with processing a wave of additional driver’s licenses will impact a state’s budget. Texas’ undocumented population is approximately 1.6 million, and Plaintiffs’ evidence suggests that at least 500,000 of these individuals will be eligible for deferred ac *617 tion through DAPA. Doc. No. 64, PI. Ex. 14 ¶ 33; PI. Ex. 24 ¶ 6. Under current Texas law, applicants pay $24.00 to obtain a driver’s license, leaving any remaining costs to be absorbed by the state. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.421 . If the majority of DAPA beneficiaries currently residing in Texas apply for a driver’s license, it will cost the state $198.73 to process and issue each license, for a net loss of $174.73 per license. Doc. No. 64, PI. Ex. 24 ¶ 8. Even if only 25,000 of these individuals apply for a driver’s license— approximately 5% of the population estimated to benefit from the DHS Directive in Texas — Texas will still bear a net loss of $130.89 per license, with total losses in excess of several million dollars. Id. These costs, Plaintiffs argue, are not unique to Texas; rather, they will be similarly incurred in all Plaintiff States where DAPA beneficiaries will be eligible to apply for driver’s licenses.
In addition to these increased costs associated with processing a wave of additional driver’s licenses, a portion of the States’ alleged injury is directly traceable to fees mandated by federal law. See REAL ID Act of 2005, PL 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005). Following the passage of the REAL ID Act in 2005, states are now required to determine the immigration status of applicants prior to issuing a driver’s license or an identification card. Id. To verify immigration status, states must submit queries to the federal Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements (SAVE) program and pay $0.50-$1.50 for each applicant processed. SAVE Access Methods & Transaction Charges, USCIS. In Texas, estimates suggest that the state pays the federal government on average $0.75 per driver’s license applicant for SAVE verification purposes. Doc. No. 64, PI. Ex. 24 ¶ 5. Thus by creating a new group of individuals that are eligible to apply for driver’s licenses, the DHS Directive will increase the costs incurred by states to verify applicants’ immigration statuses as required by federal law. 15
As Defendants concede, “a direct and genuine injury to a State’s own proprietary interests may give rise to standing.” Doc. No. 38 at 23; see also, e.g., Clinton v. City of N.Y., 524 U.S. 417, 430-31 , 118 S.Ct. 2091 , 141 L.Ed.2d 393 (1998) (negative effects on the “borrowing power, financial strength, and fiscal planning” of a government entity are sufficient injuries to establish standing); Sch. Dist. of City of Pontiac v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 584 F.3d 253, 261 (6th Cir.2009) (school districts had standing “based on their allegation that they must spend state and local funds” to comply with federal law). Defendants in this case argue, however, that the projected costs to Plaintiffs’ driver’s license programs are “self-inflicted” because the DHS Directive does not directly require states to provide any state benefits to deferred action recipients, and because states can adjust their benefit programs to avoid incurring these costs. Doc. No. 38 at 21-22. This assertion, however, evaluates the DHS Directive in a vacuum. Further, this claim is, at best, disingenuous. Although the terms of DAPA do not compel states to provide any benefits to deferred action recipients, it is clear that the DHS Directive will nonetheless affect state programs. Specifically, in the wake of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, it is apparent that the federal government will compel compli- *618 anee by all states regarding the issuance of driver’s licenses to recipients of deferred action. 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.2014).
In Arizona Dream Act Coalition v. Brewer, the plaintiffs, DACA beneficiaries, sought an injunction to prevent the defem dants from enforcing an Arizona policy that denied driver’s licenses to recipients of deferred action. Id. at 1060 . Necessary for the imposition of an injunction, the Ninth Circuit examined whether the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their -case, and focused on the fact that Arizona’s driver’s license program permitted other non-citizens to use employment authorization documents to obtain driver’s licenses — the same documentation that would be conferred upon DAPA recipients. Id. at 1064 . Finding that this policy likely discriminated against similarly-situated parties in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, the court enjoined the defendants from denying driver’s licenses to deferred action beneficiaries. Id. at 1069 .
More importantly, the Ninth Circuit in Arizona also considered whether the denial of driver’s licenses to deferred action recipients was preempted by the Executive Branch’s determination that deferred action recipients were also authorized to work in the United States. Id. at 1063 . Stating that “the ability to drive may be a virtual necessity for people who want to work in Arizona,” the court noted that more than 87% of Arizona’s workforce depended on personal vehicles to commute to work. Id. at 1062 . Although not the basis for its finding, the court addressed preemption at length. It reasoned that the defendants’ policy of denying driver’s licenses to deferred action recipients “interferes with Congress’s intention that the Executive determine when noncitizens may work in the United States” and would be preempted by federal law. Id. at 1063 . Reinforcing this position, the concurring opinion argued that the majority should have not merely discussed it, but should have included this reasoning as part of its holding since there was no question that federal law required the issuance of driver’s licenses to deferred action recipients. Id. at 1069-75 . The Government filed briefs in that case arguing that all of Arizona’s attempts to avoid these expenses were preempted. Doc. No. 54, PI. Ex. 3.
Although the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Arizona is not necessarily binding on the majority of Plaintiffs in this case, it nonetheless suggests that Plaintiffs’ options to avpid the injuries associated with the DHS Directive are virtually non-existent and, if attempted, will be met with significant challenges from the federal government. 16 The federal government made it clear in Arizona (and would not retreat from that stance in this, case) that any move by a plaintiff state to limit the issuance of driver’s licenses would be viewed as illegal. As held by the Ninth Circuit in Arizona, denying driver’s licenses to certain recipients of deferred action violated the Equal Protection clause, and would likely be preempted by DAPA, as well. See id. at 1067 . This conclusion would be particularly persuasive in Texas since its driver’s license program — like Arizona’s — permits applicants to rely on federal employment authorization documentation to show legal status in the United States. If Texas denied driver’s licenses to beneficiaries of the DHS Directive, as suggested by the Government here, it would immediately be sued for impermissibly discriminating against similarly-situated parties that rely *619 on employment authorization documentation to apply for driver’s licenses. See id. at 1064 . Even if Texas could structure its driver’s license program to avoid these impermissible classifications, the court in Arizona strongly suggested that the denial of driver’s licenses to deferred action recipients would be preempted by the Executive Branch’s intent that deferred action recipients work while they remain in the United States. Therefore, if Texas or any of the other non-Ninth Circuit States sought to avoid an Equal Protection challenge and instead denied driver’s licenses to all individuals that rely on employment authorization documentation, they would be subjecting themselves to a different but significant challenge oh federal preemption grounds. As stated above, Arizona, Idaho, and Montana — the Plaintiff States that fall within the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction — do not even have the option of trying to protect themselves. 17
Setting aside these legal questions, this all-or-nothing choice — that Texas either allow the DAPA beneficiaries to apply for driver’s licenses and suffer financial losses or deny licenses to all individuals that rely on employment authorization documentation — is an injury in and of itself. An injury cannot be deemed “self-inflicted” when a party faces only two options: full compliance with a challenged action or a drastic restructure of a state program. See Texas, v. United States, 497 F.3d 491, 496-98 (5th Cir.2007) (finding that Texas had standing on the basis of a “forced choice”: after federal regulations, Texas either had to comply with an administrative procedure it thought was unlawful or forfeit the opportunity to comment on proposed gaming regulations). Further, the necessary restructuring to ensure constitutional compliance would require Texas to deny driver’s licenses to individuals it had previously decided should be eligible for them — a significant intrusion into an area traditionally reserved for a state’s judgment. This illusion of choice — instead of protecting the state from anticipated injuries — merely places the states between a rock and hard place.
Defendants also argue that the projected injuries to Plaintiffs’ driver’s license programs are merely generalized grievances that are shared by all the states’ citizens, and as such are insufficient to support standing in this case. The cases *620 that Defendants cite for this contention, though, are easily distinguishable. In these cases, the plaintiffs broadly alleged general harm to state revenue or state spending. See Commonwealth of Pa. v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 672 (D.C.Cir.1976) (Pennsylvania’s “diminution of tax receipts [was] largely an incidental result of the challenged action” and was not sufficient to support standing); People ex rel. Harti-gan v. Cheney, 726 F.Supp. 219, 226 (C.D.Ill.1989) (Illinois’ alleged injury of “decreased state tax revenues and increased spending on social welfare programs” not sufficient to support standing). When, however, an action directly injures a state’s identifiable proprietary interests, it is more likely that the state possesses the requisite standing to challenge the action in federal court. See Wyo. v. Okla., 502 U.S. 437, 448 , 112 S.Ct. 789 , 117 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (Wyoming had standing to challenge a state statute for direct and undisputed injuries to specific tax revenues); Sch. Dist of City of Pontiac, 584 F.3d at 261-62 (school district had sufficient injury to demonstrate standing when compliance with No Child Left Behind forced plaintiffs to spend state and local funds). Here, Plaintiffs have shown that their projected injuries are more than “generalized grievances”; rather, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that DAPA will directly injure the proprietary interests of their driver’s license programs and cost the States badly needed funds. In Texas alone, the state is projected to absorb significant costs. If the majority of the DHS Directive beneficiaries residing in the state apply for driver’s licenses, Texas will bear directly a $174.73 per applicant expense, costing the state millions of dollars.
On a final note, it is important to reiterate the federal government’s position in front of the Ninth Circuit in Arizona — a position that it has not retreated from in the present ease: a state may not impose its own rules considering the issuance of driver’s licenses due to claims of equal protection and preemption. Although the federal government conceded that states enjoy substantial leeway in setting policies for licensing drivers within their jurisdiction, it simultaneously argued that the states could not tailor these laws to create “new alien classifications not supported by federal law.” Doc. No. 64, PI. Ex. 3 at 11. In other words, the states cannot protect themselves from the costs inflicted by the Government when 4.3 million individuals are granted legal presence with the resulting ability to compel state action. The irony of this position cannot fully be appreciated unless it is contrasted with the DAPA Directive. The DAPA Directive unilaterally allows individuals removable by law to legally remain in the United States based upon a classification that is not established by any federal law. It is this very lack of law about which the States complain. The Government claims that it can act without a supporting law, but the States cannot.
The contradictions in the Government’s position extend even further. First, driver’s license programs are functions traditionally reserved to state governments. Even the DHS recognizes this reservation. The DHS teaches naturalization applicants preparing for their civics examination that driver’s license programs are clearly a state interest. See Study Materials for the Civics Test, USCIS. 18 Of the sample civics questions, the DHS provides the following question and lists five acceptable answers:
*621 42. Under our Constitution, some powers belong to the states. What is one power of the states?
• provide schooling and education
• provide protection (police)
• provide safety (fire departments)
• give a driver’s license
• approve zoning and land use.
Id. (emphasis added). 19
Nonetheless, the DHS through its DACA Directive directly caused a significant increase in driver’s license applications and the costs incurred by states to process them; DAPA, a much larger program, will only exacerbate these damages. These injuries stand in stark contrast to the Government’s public assertion that driver’s license programs fall in the realm of “powers [that] belong to the states.” Id.
The Government’s position is further undermined by the fact that a portion of Plaintiffs’ alleged damages associated with the issuance of driver’s licenses are fees mandated by federal law and are paid to the Government. As discussed above, the REAL ID Act requires states to pay a fee to verify the immigration status of each driver’s license applicant through the federal SAVE program. See REAL ID Act of 2005, PL 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005); SAVE Access Methods & Transaction Charges, USCIS. 20 The fees associated with this program, combined with the federal government’s creation of the possibility of four to five million new driver’s license applicants, give rise to a situation where states must process an increased amount of driver’s license applications and remit a significant portion of their funds to the federal government as required by the REAL ID Act. Further, the states have no choice but to pay these fees. If they do not, their citizens will lose their rights to access federal facilities and to fly on com *622 mercial airlines. 21
Another ironic aspect of the Government’s argument exists again at the intersection of the DAPA Directive and the REAL ID Act. Those supporting the passage of the REAL ID Act asserted that the Act would prevent illegal immigration by making it more difficult for individuals with no legal status to get state driver’s licenses. See REAL ID and Biometric Technology, at 492. 22 While the REAL ID Act recognized that individuals with deferred action status would be eligible to obtain driver’s licenses, it seems almost without argument that the drafters of the Act did not foresee four to five million individuals obtaining deferred action by virtue of one DHS Directive, especially when the yearly average of deferred action grants prior to DACA was less than 1,000. Therefore, DAPA arguably undercuts one of the very purposes of the REAL "ID Act, and will certainly undermine any deterrent effect or security benefit that may have motivated passage of the Act.
b. Causation
Establishing causation can be difficult where the plaintiffs alleged injury is caused by “the government’s allegedly unlawful regulation (or lack of regulation) of someone else.... ” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 (emphasis in original). In the cases cited by the Government, causation depends on the decisions made by independent actors and “it becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as to produce causation....” Id. Essentially, establishing causation requires the plaintiff to show that the alleged injury is not merely “remote and indirect” but is instead fairly traceable to the actions of the defendant. Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18 , 47 S.Ct. 265 , 71 L.Ed. 511 (1927).
The Supreme Court has declined to find that a plaintiff had standing sufficient to bring suit in federal court when it merely speculates as to whether the defendant’s action would cause the alleged harm. See id. at 17-18 , 47 S.Ct. 265 . In Florida v. Mellon, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the federal government from collecting an inheritance tax in Florida, arguing that it would cause Florida residents to remove property from the state, thereby “diminishing the subjects upon which the state power of taxation may operate.” Id. The Supreme Court held that whether the defendants’ actions would cause individuals to act in such a way that would produce injury to the state was “purely speculative, and, at most, only remote and indirect.” Id. at 18 , 47 S.Ct. 265 .
*623 Here, unlike Florida’s injury in Mellon , the alleged harm to Plaintiffs’ driver’s license programs would be directly caused by the DHS Directive. Further, there is no speculation as to the probability of its occurrence; rather, it is like watching the same play performed on a new stage. The DACA Directive, implemented in 2012, permitted its recipients to receive the status or documentation necessary to subsequently apply for driver’s licenses. See Access to Driver’s Licenses for Immigrant Youth Granted DACA, NILC (Dec. 2014) (“DACA recipients who obtain an employment authorization document and a Social Security number have been able to obtain a license in almost every state”). 23 Similarly, the DAPA Directive also provides its recipients with the status and the documentation necessary to apply for a driver’s license in most states. See Ark.Code Ann. § 27-16-1105 (proof of deferred status sufficient to apply for driver’s license); Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 521.142 (employment authorization documentation sufficient for driver’s license application). Aside from furnishing the status or documents necessary to apply for a driver’s license, the DAPA Directive will also provide an incentive for its applicants. The Directive permits and encourages its beneficiaries to apply for work authorization for the period that they will be granted deferred status in the United States. For individuals in the United States who commute to work, driving is the most common made of transportation. In 2013, it was estimated that 86.3% of the United States’ workforce commuted to work in private vehicles. 24 See Commuting in America 2013: The National Report on Commuting Patterns and Trends, American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials (Oct.2013). 25 This is especially true' in the states that are Plaintiffs in this case, as none of them have extensive mass transit systems. In sum, the federal government’s actions in Arizona, and its refusal to disclaim future such actions in this case, establish that it will seek to force Texas (and other similarly-situated states) into these changes. Further, some portion of Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries are fees mandated by federal law that are required to be paid by states directly to the federal .government — damages that are a virtual certainty. Plaintiffs — or at least Texas — have clearly met their burden of showing that their alleged injuries have been and will be directly “traceable” to the actions of the Defendants. Far from a generalized injury or “pie in the sky” guesswork, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a direct, finite injury to the States that is caused by the Government’s actions. Given that Plaintiffs have shown that they stand to suffer concrete and particularized consequences from Defendants’ actions, they have pled an injury sufficient to demonstrate standing in this Court.
c. Redressability
The redressability prong of the standing analysis examines whether the remedy a plaintiff seeks will redress or prevent the alleged injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 . Of this three-prong standing analysis, the question of *624 redressability is easiest for this Court to resolve. The remedy Plaintiffs seek will undoubtedly prevent the harm they allege will stem from Defendants’ DHS Directive. DAPA provides its beneficiaries with the necessary legal presence and documentation to allow them to apply for driver’s licenses in most states; 'without this status or documentation, these beneficiaries would be foreclosed from seeking a driver’s license. Therefore enjoining the implementation of the DHS Directive would unquestionably redress Plaintiffs’ alleged harm.
Plaintiffs (or at least one Plaintiff) has clearly satisfied the. requirements for Article III standing.
2. Prudential Standing
In addition to fulfilling the Article III standing requirements, Plaintiffs have also satisfied the requirements of prudential standing. As discussed above, the States have not merely pled a “generalized grievance” that is inappropriate for the Court’s resolution. Rather, the States have shown that the DAPA program will directly injure their proprietary interests by creating a new class of individuals that is eligible to apply for state driver’s licenses. When this class applies for driver’s licenses, the States will incur significant costs to process the applications and issue the licenses — costs that the States cannot recoup or avoid. Instead of a “generalized grievance,” the States have pled a direct injury to their fiscal interests.
Second, Plaintiffs’ claims come within the “zone of interests” to be protected by the immigration statutes at issue in this litigation. The Supreme Court has stated time and again that it is the duty of the federal government to protect the border and enforce the immigration laws. 26 The Government has sought and obtained rulings that preempt all but token participation by the states in this area of the law. The basis for this preemption was that the states’ participation was not wanted or required because the federal government was to provide a uniform system of protection to the states. The fact that DAPA undermines the INA statutes enacted to protect the states puts the Plaintiffs squarely within the zone of interest of the immigration statutes at issue.
Further, Congress has entrusted the DHS with the duty to enforce these immigration laws., 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (a)(1). The DHS’ duties include guarding the border and removing illegal aliens present in the country. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103 (a)(5), 1227. DAPA, however, is certainly at odds with these commands. These duties were enacted to protect the states because, under *625 our federal system, they are forbidden from protecting themselves.
Finally, Plaintiffs are not resting their claim for relief solely on the rights and interests of third-parties. Rather, the States are seeking to protect their own proprietary interests, which they allege will be directly harmed by the implementation of DAPA. Thus Plaintiffs have similarly satisfied their burden to show prudential standing.
3. Standing under the APA
Relying on the APA, Plaintiffs assert not only a basis for standing but also an argument on the merits. Because these concepts are closely intertwined, the Court will address both in its discussion of the merits. Nevertheless, for the reasons stated above and the reasons articulated below, the States have APA standing as well.
D. Other Grounds for Standing
The States have asserted three additional bases for standing: (1) parens patriae standing; (2) Massachusetts v. E.P.A. standing; and (3) abdication standing. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. E.P.A, these theories seem at least indirectly related to the par-ens patriae claim discussed below. There is, however, ample evidence to support standing based upon the States’ demonstration of direct injury flowing from the Government’s implementation of the DAPA program. Since the States have, or at least Texas has, shown a direct injury, as well as for the reasons discussed below, this Court either rejects or refuses to rely solely on either of the parens patriae or Massachusetts v. E.P.A. theories as the basis for Plaintiffs’ standing. Both the Parties and amici curiae, however, have briefed these theories in depth; thus the Court is compelled to address them.
1. Parens Patriae
Plaintiffs also rely on the doctrine of parens patriae to establish an independent basis for standing in their suit against Defendants. Parens patriae permits a state to bring suit to protect the interests of its citizens, even if it cannot demonstrate a direct injury to its separate interests as a sovereign entity. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 , 102 S.Ct. 3260 , 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982). Meaning literally “parent of the country,” parens patriae recognizes the interests “that the State has in the well-being of its populace” and allows it to bring suit when those interests are threatened. Id. at 602 , 102 S.Ct. 3260 ; Black’s Law Dictionary 1287 (10th ed.2014). Here, the States allege that the DHS Directive will injure the economic interests of their residents, necessitating a parens patriae suit to ensure that those interests are protected from the consequences of the Government’s actions.
Defendants, relying primarily on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Massachusetts v. Mellon, contend that the States’ invocation of parens patriae is misplaced. They claim states cannot maintain a parens pat-riae suit against the federal government since the federal government is the ultimate protector of the citizens’ interests. See 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 , 43 S.Ct. 597 , 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923). In Massachusetts v. Mellon, Massachusetts brought a parens patriae suit to challenge the constitutionality of the Maternity Act, arguing that the burden of funding the Act fell disproportionately on industrial states like Massachusetts. Id. at 479 , 43 S.Ct. 597 . Holding that the federal government is the supreme parens patriae, the Court stated that “it is no part of [a state’s] duty or power to enforce [its citizens’] rights in respect of their relations with the federal government.” Id. Thus, Defendants argue *626 that the States’ suit should be similarly-barred since the federal government’s right to protect citizens’ interests trumps that of the states.
Defendants’ succinct argument, however, ignores an established line of eases that have held that states may rely on the doctrine of parens patriae to maintain suits against the federal government. See, e.g., Wash. Utilities and Transp. Comm’n v. F.C.C., 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.1975) (state regulatory agency relied on parens patriae to bring suit against F.C.C. and U.S.); Kansas ex rel. Hayden v. United States, 748 F.Supp. 797 (D.Kan.1990) (state brought suit against U.S. under par-ens patriae theory); Abrams v. Heckler, 582 F.Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y.1984) (state used parens patriae to maintain suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services). These cases rely on an important distinction. The plaintiff states in these cases are not bringing suit to protect their citizens from the operation of a federal statute — actions that are barred by the holding of Massachusetts v. Mellon. See, e.g., Wash. Utilities and Transp. Comm’n, 513 F.2d at 1153 ; Kansas ex rel. Hayden, 748 F.Supp. at 802 ; Abrams, 582 F.Supp. at 1159 . Rather, these states are bringing suit to enforce the rights guaranteed by a federal statute. Id. For example, in Kansas ex rel. Hayden v. United States, the governor of Kansas brought a parens patriae suit to enforce the provisions of the Disaster Relief Act, which provided for the disbursement of federal funds to aid areas deemed a “major disaster.” Kansas ex rel. Hayden, 748 F.Supp. at 798 . Specifically, the governor brought suit to enforce the statute after he alleged that the area in question was wrongfully denied status as a “major disaster area” when the procedural mechanisms for making that decision were ignored. Id. at 799 . Similarly, in Abrams v. Heckler, New York’s attorney general brought a parens patriae suit to enforce the provisions of a Medicare statute after a final rule issued to implement the statute deprived New York Medicare recipients of a significant amount of funds. Abrams, 582 F.Supp. at 1157 . Arguing that the final rule misinterpreted the provisions of the statute and thus exceeded statutory authority, the attorney general sought to have the Medicare funds distributed in compliance with the statute. Id.
Consequently, Defendants’ rebuttal to the States’ parens patriae argument is not as simple as they would suggest. States are not barred outright from suing the federal government based on a parens patriae theory; rather, provided that the states are seeking to enforce— rather than prevent the enforcement of — a federal statute, a parens patriae suit between these parties may be maintained. In the instant case, the States are suing to compel the Government to enforce the federal immigration statutes passed by Congress and to prevent the implementation of a policy that undermines those laws. Though seeking adherence to a federal statute is a necessary component for a state’s parens patriae suit against the federal government, it alone is not enough; in addition, states must identify a quasi-sovereign interest that is harmed by the alleged under-enforcement. See Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 601 , 102 S.Ct. 3260 (“to have such [parens patriae ] standing the State must assert an injury to what has been characterized as a ‘quasi-sovereign interest’ ”). The defining characteristics of a quasi-sovereign interest are not explicitly laid out in case law; rather, the meaning of the term has undergone a significant expansion over time. See Com. of Pa. v. Kleppe, 533 F.2d 668, 673 (D.C.Cir.1976). Although the earliest recognized quasi-sovereign interests primarily concerned public nuisances, the doctrine ex *627 panded rapidly to encompass two broad categories: (1) a state’s quasi-sovereign interest “in the health and well-being— both physical and economic — of its residents”; and (2) a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in “not being discriminatorily denied its rightful status within the federal system.” Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 607 , 102 S.Ct. 3260 . In particular, courts have consistently recognized a state’s quasi-sovereign interest in protecting the economic well-being of its citizens from a broad range of injuries. See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609 , 102 S.Ct. 3260 (discrimination against Puerto Rican laborers injured economic well-being of Puerto Rico); Wash. Utilities and Transp. Comm’n, 513 F.2d at 1152 (increased rates for intrastate phone service would injure the economic well-being of the state); Abrams, 582 F.Supp. at 1160 (changes to Medicare that would decrease payments to New York recipients is sufficient injury to economic well-being); Alabama ex rel. Baxley v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 467 F.Supp. 791, 794 (N.D.Ala.1979) (relocation of executive and administrative offices would damage the economic well-being of Alabama by decreasing available jobs and injuring state economy).
Here, the States similarly seek to protect their residents’ economic well-being. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that the DHS Directive will create a discriminatory employment environment that will encourage employers to hire DAPA beneficiaries instead of those with lawful permanent status in the United States. 27 To support this assertion, Plaintiffs focus on the interplay between the DHS Directive and the Affordable Care Act passed in 2010. Beginning in 2015, the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) requires employers with fifty or more employees to offer adequate, affordable healthcare coverage to their full-time employees. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 26 U.S.C. § 4980H. If an employer with fifty or more employees chooses not to offer health insurance to its full-time employees, it instead incurs a monetary penalty. Id. Currently, ACA requires that employers provide health insurance only to those individuals that are “legally present” in the United States. Id. at § 5000A(d)(3). The definition of “legally present,” however, specifically excludes beneficiaries of the 2012 DACA Directive. If an employer hires a DACA beneficiary, it does not have to offer that individual healthcare nor does it incur a monetary penalty fpr the failure to do so. See 45 C.F.R. § 152.2 (8). The States argue that the Obama Administration is expected to promulgate similar regulations that will also bar beneficiaries of the DAPA Directive from participating in the ACA’s employer insurance mandate. This exclusion, the States argue, will exacerbate unemployment for its citizens because it will create an employment environment that will encourage employers to discriminate against lawfully present citizens. Since the ACA’s exclusion of DAPA beneficiaries makes them more affordable to employ, employers will be inclined to prefer them over those employees that are covered by the terms of the ACA. Id.
The States’ alleged injury to their citizens’ economic well-being is within the quasi-sovereign interests traditionally protected by parens patriae actions. See, e.g., *628 Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 609 , 102 S.Ct. 3260 ; Wash. Utilities & Transp. Comm’n, 513 F.2d at 1152 ; Kansas ex rel. Hayden, 748 F.Supp. at 802 ; Abrams, 582 F.Supp. at 1160 ; Alabama ex rel. Baxley, 467 F.Supp. at 794 . The States’ challenge, however, is premature. Although some expect that the Obama Administration will promulgate regulations barring DAPA beneficiaries from participating in the ACA’s employer insurance mandate, it has yet to do so. See A Guide to the Immigration Accountability Executive Action, Immigration Policy Center (Dec. 22, 2014) 28 (“[T]he Obama Administration will promulgate regulations to exclude DAPA recipients from any benefits under the Affordable Care Act, much as it did in the aftermath of the DACA announcement.”) (emphasis added); DACA and DAPA Access to Federal Health and Economic Support Programs, NILC (Dec. 10, 2014) 29 (the Obama Administration “issued regulations that deny access to health coverage under the ACA for DACA recipients and is expected to do the same for DAPA recipients”) (emphasis added); Michael D. Shear & Robert Pear, Obama’s Immigration Plan Could Shield Five Million, N.Y. Times (Nov. 19, 2014) 30 (quoting Stephen W. Yale-Loehr, professor of immigration law at Cornell, for assertion that it “appears ” that these individuals will be barred from health benefits under ACA) (emphasis added). Discouraging the resolution of controversies that are not ripe, the Supreme Court has held that courts should avoid “entangling themselves in abstract disagreements ... until an administrative decision has been formalized and its effects felt in a concrete way....” Natl Park Hospitality Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 807-08 , 123 S.Ct. 2026 , 155 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2003). Here, the administrative decision from which the States’ alleged economic injury will flow has not been formalized. Thus, the States’ parens patriae suit is not ripe for adjudication.
2. Massachusetts v. E.P.A. Claims
Clearly, in addition to the traditional Article III standing, Plaintiffs can also pursue their direct damage claims under the ambiguous standards set forth in Massachusetts v. E.P.A. In Massachusetts , the Supreme Court held that Massachusetts had standing to seek redress for the damages directly caused to its interests as a landowner. Similarly, the States have standing because the Defendants’ actions will allegedly cause direct damage to their proprietary interests. Consequently, no matter how one reads Massachusetts v. E.P.A., it strengthens the conclusion that the States do have standing to sue for direct damages.
Nevertheless, separate and apart from their direct damage claim (for which at least Texas has standing) and somewhat related to the parens patriae basis for standing, the States also assert standing based upon the continual non-enforcement of the nation’s immigration laws, which allegedly costs each Plaintiff State millions of dollars annually. The evidence in this case supplies various examples of large, uncompensated losses stemming from the *629 fact that federal law mandates that states bear the burdens and costs of providing products and services to those illegally in the country. These expenses are most clearly demonstrated in the areas of education and medical care, but the record also contains examples of significant law enforcement costs.
a. Argument of the States and Amid
The States and some amid briefs argue that the Supreme Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. E.P.A. supports the States’ assertion of standing based on their injuries caused by the Government’s prolonged failure to secure the country’s borders. Whether negligently or even with its best efforts, or sometimes, even purposefully, the Government has allowed a situation to exist where illegal aliens move freely across the border, thus allowing — at a minimum — 500,000 illegal aliens to enter and stay in the United States each year. 31 The federal government is unable or unwilling to police the border more thoroughly or apprehend those illegal aliens residing within the United States; thus it is unsurprising that, according to prevailing estimates, there are somewhere between 11,000,000 and 12,000,000 illegal aliens currently living in the country, many of whom burden the limited resources in each state to one extent or another. Indeed, in many instances, the Government intentionally allows known illegal aliens to enter and remain in the country. When apprehending illegal aliens, the Government often processes and releases them with only the promise that they will return for a hearing if and when the Government decides to hold one. 32 In the meantime, the states — with little or no help from the Government— are required by law to provide various services to this population. 33 Not surprisingly, this problem is particularly acute in many border communities. According to the States’ argument, this situation is exacerbated every time the Government or one of its leading officials makes a pro-amnesty statement or, as in the instant case, every time the DHS institutes a program that grants status to individuals who have illegally entered the country.
b. Analysis
The States’ argument is certainly a simplification of a more complex problem. Regardless of how simple or layered the analysis is, there can be no doubt that the failure of the federal government to secure the borders is costing the states— even those not immediately on the border — millions of dollars in damages each year. While the Supreme Court has recognized that states “have an interest in mitigating the potentially harsh economic *630 effects of sudden shifts in population,” 34 the federal government has effectively denied the states any means to protect themselves from these effects. Further, states suffer these negative effects regardless of whether the illegal aliens have any ties or family within the state, or whether they choose to assimilate into the population of the United States. 35 The record in this case provides many' examples of these costs. Evidence shows that Texas pays $9,473 annually to educate each illegal alien child enrolled in public school. 36 In Texas, 7,409 unaccompanied illegal immigrant children were released to sponsors between October of 2013 and September of 2014. Thus, in that period alone, Texas absorbed additional education costs of at least $58,531,100 stemming from illegal immigration. Further, this figure addresses only the newly-admitted, unaccompanied children; it by no means includes all costs expended during this period to educate all illegal immigrant children residing in the state. Evidence in the record also shows that in 2008, Texas incurred $716,800,000 in uncompensated medical care provided to illegal aliens.
These costs are not unique to Texas, and other states are also affected. Wisconsin, for example, paid $570,748 in unemployment benefits just to recipients of deferred action. Arizona’s Maricopa County has similarly estimated the costs to its law enforcement stemming from those individuals that received deferred action status through DACA. That estimate, which covered a ten-month period and included only the law enforcement costs from the prior year, exceeded $9,000,000.
To decrease these negative effects, the States assert that the federal government should do two things: (1) secure the border; and (2) cease making statements or taking actions that either explicitly or impliedly solicit immigrants to enter the United States illegally. In other words, the Plaintiffs allege that the Government has created this problem, but is not taking any steps to remedy it. Meanwhile, the States are burdened with ever-increasing costs caused by the Government’s ineffectiveness. The frustration expressed by many States and/or amici curiae in their briefing is palpable. It is the States’ position that each new wave of illegal immigration increases the financial burdens placed upon already-stretched State budgets.
It is indisputable that the States are harmed to some extent by the Government’s action and inaction in the area of immigration. Nevertheless, the presence of an injury alone is insufficient to demonstrate standing as required to bring suit in *631 federal court. A plaintiff must still be able to satisfy all of the elements of standing— including causation and redressability — to pursue a remedy against the one who allegedly caused the harm.
Not surprisingly, the States rely, with much justification, on the Supreme Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. E.P.A. to support standing based on these damages. 549 U.S. 497 , 127 S.Ct. 1438 , 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007). In Massachusetts , the Supreme Court held that states have special standing to bring suit for the protection of their sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests. Id. at 520 , 127 S.Ct. 1438 . Justice Stephens quoted a prior decision from Justice Kennedy, stating to the effect that states “are not relegated to the role of mere provinces or political corporations but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty.” Id. at 519 , 127 S.Ct. 1438 (quoting Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715, 119 S.Ct. 2240 , 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999)) The majority concluded that Massachusetts, in its role as a landowner, suffered (or would suffer) direct damages from the EPA’s refusal to act under the Clean Air Act. Id. at 519, 526, 127 S.Ct. 1438 . Massachusetts’ status as a landowner, however, was only the icing on the cake. See id. at 519 , 127 S.Ct. 1438 . This status reinforced the Supreme Court’s conclusion that “[Massachusetts’] stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” Id. Without explicitly delineating formal elements, the majority seemed to recognize a special form of “sovereignty standing” if the litigant state could show: (1) a procedural right to challenge the act or omission in question and (2) an area of special state interest. See id. at 518-26 , 127 S.Ct. 1438 . With regard to the latter, Justice Stephens concluded that states have standing to file suit to protect the health and welfare of their citizens since our structure of government mandates that they surrender to the federal government: (1) the power to raise a military force; (2) the power to negotiate treatises; and (3) the supremacy of their state laws in areas of federal legislation. Id. at 519 , 127 S.Ct. 1438 .
The States conclude that Justice Stephens’ holding is equally applicable to their situation. First, the States have no right to negotiate with Mexico or any other country from which large numbers of illegal aliens immigrate; thus the States cannot rely on this avenue to resolve or lessen the problem. Second, the States cannot unilaterally raise an army to combat invaders or protect their own borders. Third, the federal government ardently defends against any attempt by a state to intrude into immigration enforcement— even when the state seeks to enforce the very laws passed by Congress. Therefore, the States reach the same conclusion as the Supreme Court did in Massachusetts v. E.P.A. They have the power to sue the federal government in federal court to protect their quasi-sovereign interests in the health, welfare, and natural resources of their citizens.
The States lose badly needed tax dollars each year due to the presence of illegal aliens — a clear drain upon their already-taxed resources. These damages, the States argue, are far greater and more direct than the damages stemming from air pollution in Massachusetts . Thus, they conclude that they should similarly have standing. This Court agrees to the actual existence of the costs being asserted by Plaintiffs. Even the Government makes no serious attempt to counter this argument, considering that the Government’s lack of border security combined with its vigilant attempts to prevent any state from protecting itself have directly led to these damages. Causation here is more direct than the attenuated causation chain *632 patched together and accepted by the Supreme Court in Massachusetts .
Nevertheless, standing in Massachusetts was not dependent solely on damages flowing from the lax enforcement of a federal law; the Supreme Court also emphasized the procedural avenue available to the state to pursue its claims. See id. at 520 , 127 S.Ct. 1438 . Specifically covering the section under which Massachusetts’ claim was brought, the Clean Air Act provided that “[a] petition for review of action of the Administrator in promulgating any ... standard under section 7521 of this title ... may be filed only in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.” Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (b)(1). The States claim that the APA gives them a similar procedural avenue. The APA states:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States or that the United States is an indispensable party. The United States may be named as a defendant in any such action, and a judgment or decree may be entered against the United States: Provided, That any mandatory or injunctive decree shall specify the Federal officer or officers (by name or by title), and their successors in office, personally responsible for compliance. Nothing herein (1) affects other limitations on judicial review or the power or duty of the court to dismiss any action or deny relief on any other appropriate legal or equitable ground; or (2) confers authority to grant relief if any other statute that grants consent to suit expressly or impliedly forbids the relief which is sought. -
5 U.S.C. § 702 (emphasis in original). Section 703 of the APA specifically authorizes a suit like this case where the States seek a mandatory injunction. 5 U.S.C. § 703 . Finally, Section 704 provides a cause of action for a “final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court....” 5 U.S.C. § 704 . It is appropriate to note that the Government has asserted that there is absolutely no remedy, under any theory, for the Plaintiffs’ suit — seemingly placing the States’ suit squarely within the purview of Section 704.
The Government counters' this contention, however, by arguing that the DAPA program is an exercise of discretion and merely informational guidance being provided to DHS employees. Since it argues that discretion is inherent in the DAPA program, the Government concludes that it not only prevails on the merits of any APA claim, but that this discretion also closes the standing doorway that the States are attempting to enter. 37 The Court will ad *633 dress these assertions in a separate part of the opinion because they are not the key to the resolution of the indirect damages contemplated in this section regarding standing under Massachusetts v. E.P.A.
It has been recognized that the resources of states are drained by the presence of illegal aliens — these damages unquestionably continue to grow. In 1982, the Attorney General estimated that the country’s entire illegal immigrant population was as low as three million individuals.. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. at 218-19 , 102 S.Ct. 2382 . Today, California alone is reported to have at least that many illegal immigrants residing with its borders. Among the Plaintiff States, the only difference with regard to the population of illegal immigrants residing within each is that the population is not evenly distributed. 38 The Government does not dispute the existence of these damages, but instead argues that widespread and generalized damages — such as those suffered by all taxpayers collectively — do not provide a basis for one to sue the Government. The States concede that the cases cited by the Government certainly stand for that proposition; but they argue that the new rules announced in Massachusetts v. E.P.A. give them, in their role as states, “special solicitude” to bring ah action to protect the resources of their citizens. Turning to the dissent, the States similarly find support for this new form of standing from Chief Justice Roberts’ statement that the majority opinion “adopts a new theory of Article III standing for States....” Id. at 539-40, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
The Court recognizes that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Massachusetts appears to establish new grounds for standing — a conclusion the dissenting opinions goes to lengths to point out. Nevertheless, the Court finds that Massachusetts did not abandon the traditional standing requirements of causation and redressability — elements critical to the damages discussed in this section. The Court finds that the Government’s failure to secure the border has exacerbated illegal immigration into this country. Further, the record supports the finding that this lack of enforcement, combined with this *634 country’s high rate of illegal immigration, significantly drains the States’ resources. 39
Regardless, the Court finds that these more indirect damages. described in this section are not caused by DAPA; thus the injunctive relief requested by Plaintiffs would not redress these damages. DAPA applies only to individuals who have resided in the United States since 2010. If the DHS enforces DAPA as promulgated, this group has already been in the country for approximately five years. Therefore, the costs and damages associated with these individuals’ presence have already been accruing for at least a five-year period. ■ The relief Plaintiffs seek from their suit is an injunction maintaining the status quo— however, the status quo already includes costs associated with the presence of these putative DAPA recipients. If the Court were to grant the requested relief, it would not change the presence of these individuals in this country, nor would it relieve the States of their obligations to pay for any associated costs. Thus, an injunction against DAPA would not redress the damages described above.
The States also suggest that the special sovereign standing delineated in Massachusetts encompasses three other types of damages that will be caused by DAPA. First, the continued presence of putative DAPA recipients will increase the costs to which the States are subjected. 40 Specifically, the States allege that, because DAPA recipients will be granted legal status for a three-year period, those who have not already pursued state-provided benefits will now be more likely to seek them. Stated another way, DAPA recipients will be more likely to “come out of the shadows” and to seek state services and benefits because they will no longer fear deportation. Thus, the States’ resources will be taxed even more than they were before the promulgation of DAPA.
Regardless of whether the States’ prediction is true, the Constitution and federal law mandate that these individuals are entitled to state benefits merely because of their presence in the United States, whether they reside in the sunshine or the shadows. Further, aside from the speculative nature of these damages, it seems somewhat inappropriate to enjoin the implementation of a directive solely because it may encourage or enable individuals to apply for benefits for which they were already eligible.
The States’ reply, though supported by facts, is not legally persuasive. The States rightfully point out that DAPA will increase their damages with respect to the category of services discussed above because it will increase the number of individuals that demand them. Specifically, the Plaintiffs focus on two groups. First, there are many individuals each year that self-deport from the United States and return to their homeland. 41 The States *635 suggest, with some merit, that DAPA will ineentivize these individuals to remain in the United States.
.Second, the States focus on the individuals that would have been deported without the legal status granted by DAPA, alleging that their continued presence in this county will increase state ’ costs.' The States argue that the DHS has decided it will not enforce the removal statutes with regards to at least 4,300,000 people plus hypothetically millions of others that apply but are not given legal presence. They conclude in the absence of the DAPA program, the DHS in its normal course of removal proceedings would have removed at least some of these individuals. Thus DAPA will allow some individuals who would have otherwise been deported to remain in the United States. The Government has made no cogent response to this argument. Were it to argue against this assertion, the Government would likely have to admit that these individuals would not have been deported even without DAPA — an assertion that would damage the DHS far more than it would strengthen its position.
The States are correct that there are a number of individuals that fall into each category. Immigration experts estimate that 178,000 illegal aliens self-deport each year. 42 Though the DHS could likely calculate the number of individuals deported and estimate the number that self-deported over the past five years (and used those figures to estimate those who would in the near future) that would have otherwise qualified for DAPA relief, that evidence is not in the record. It is reasonable to conclude, however, that some of these individuals would have self-deported or been removed from the country. The absence of these individuals would likely reduce the states’ costs associated with illegal immigration.
The Government has not directly addressed the suppositions inherent in this argument, but it and at least two sets of amici curiae have suggested a response. Specifically, they suggest that any potential reduction in state costs that could have been anticipated in the absence of DAPA will be offset by the productivity of the DAPA recipients and the economic benefits that the States will reap by virtue of these individuals working, paying taxes, and contributing to the community.
This Court, with the record before it, has no empirical way to evaluate the accuracy of these economic projections, and the record does not give the Court comfort with either position. Yet, these projections do demonstrate one of the reasons why the .Court does not accept the States’ argument for standing on this point. A theory without supporting evidence does not support a finding of redressability. Based upon the record, the presence of damages or offsetting benefits is too speculative to be relied upon by this or any other court as a basis for redressability.
The last category of damages pled by Plaintiffs that falls within Massachusetts ’ “special solicitude” standing is predicated upon the argument that reports made by the Government and third-parties concerning the Government’s actions have had the effect of encouraging illegal immigration. The Government does not deny that some of its actions have had this effect, but maintains that its actions were legal and appropriate. In other words, these actions may have had the unintended effect of encouraging illegal immigration, but that does not create a damage model *636 that would satisfy either the causation or redressability requirements of standing.
Nevertheless, a myriad of reasons support a court’s abstention from intervention when damages are premised upon the actions of third-parties motivated by reports (and misreports) of governmental action. 43 The Court will address only two.
The First Amendment protects political debate in this country. Enjoining that debate, or finding damages predicated upon that debate, would be counter-productive at best and, at worst, a violation of the Constitution. The crux of the States’ claim is that the Defendants violated the Constitution by enacting their own law without going through the proper legislative or administrative channels. One cannot, however, consistently argue that the Constitution should control one aspect of the case, yet trample on the First Amendment in response to another. Speech usually elicits widely-differing responses, and its ramifications are often unpredictable. Clearly, reports of governmental activity, even if they are biased, misleading, or incorrect, are protected speech — despite the fact that they may have the unintended effect of inspiring illegal immigration.
Second, a lawful injunction that would cure this problem cannot be drafted. Unquestionably, some immigrants are encouraged to come to the United States illegally based upon the information they receive about DACA and DAPA. Reports of lax border security, minimal detention periods following apprehension, and the ease of missing immigration hearings may also encourage many to immigrate to this country illegally. Individuals may also be encouraged to immigrate illegally because they have been told that the stock market is doing well, or that the United States’ economy is doing better than that of their homeland, or because the United States has better schools or more advanced medical care. The decision to immigrate illegally is motivated by innumerable factors, and a court would be jousting at windmills to craft an injunction to enjoin all of these activities.
Statements and reports about the implementation of DACA and DAPA may very well encourage individuals to try to reach the United States by any means, legal or otherwise. Further, it is undisputed that illegal immigration strains the resources of most states. This side-effect, however, is too attenuated to enjoin DAPA’s implementation. The States have not shown that an injunction against DAPA would redress these particular damages.
E. Standing Created by Abdication
1. The Factual Basis
The most provocative and intellectually intriguing standing claim presented by this case is that based upon federal abdication. 44 This theory describes a situation when the federal government asserts sole authority over a certain area of American life and excludes any authority or regulation by a state; yet subsequently refuses to act in that area. Due to this refusal to act in a realm where other governmental entities are barred from interfering, a state has standing to bring suit to protect itself and the interests of its citizens.
The States concede, here, that the regulation of border security and immigration are solely within the jurisdiction of the United States — an assertion the United *637 States agrees with and has repeatedly insisted upon in other cases. However, rather than enforcing laws pertaining to border security and immigration, the Government, through DAPA, has instead announced that it will not seek to deport certain removable aliens because it has decided that its resources may be better used elsewhere. In sum, the States argue that the Government has successfully established its role as the sole authority in the area of immigration, effectively precluding the States from taking any action in this domain and that the DHS Secretary in his memorandum establishing DAPA has announced that except for extraordinary circumstances, the DHS has no intention of enforcing the laws promulgated to address millions of illegal aliens residing in the United States.
The facts underlying the abdication claim cannot be disputed. In Arizona v. United States, the federal government sued Arizona when the state tried to enforce locally enacted immigration restrictions. Arizona v. United States, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2492 , 183 L.Ed.2d 351 (2012). The Supreme Court upheld the Government’s position, holding that federal law preempted the state’s actions. Id. at 2495 . Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, in doing so, still recognized the states’ plight due to federal preemption in the area of immigration:
The pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to the States. Arizona bears many of the consequences of unlawful immigration. Hundreds of thousands of deportable aliens are apprehended in Arizona each year. Unauthorized aliens who remain in the State comprise, by one estimate, almost six percent of the population. And in the State’s most populous county, these aliens are reported to be responsible for a disproportionate share of serious crime.
Statistics alone do not capture the full extent of Arizona’s concerns. Accounts in the record suggest there is an “epidemic of crime, safety risks, serious property damage, and environmental problems” associated with the influx of illegal migration across private land near the Mexican border. Phoenix is a major city of the United States, yet signs along an interstate highway 30 miles to the south warn the public to stay away. One reads, “DANGER— PUBLIC WARNING — TRAVEL NOT RECOMMENDED/Active Drug and Human Smuggling Area/Visitors May Encounter Armed Criminals and Smuggling Vehicles Traveling at High Rates of Speed.” The problems posed to the State by illegal immigration must not be underestimated.
These concerns are the background for the formal legal analysis that follows. The issue is whether, under preemption principles, federal law permits Arizona to implement the state-law provisions in dispute.
Id. at 2500 . Despite this expression of empathy, the Supreme Court held, with minor exceptions, that states are virtually powerless to protect themselves from the effects of illegal immigration. 45 Id. Hold *638 ing that States cannot even exercise their civil power to remove an illegal alien, the majority opinion stated that “Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security, is responsible for identifying, apprehending, and removing illegal aliens.” Id. at 2495 . The Government continues to take the position that “even State laws relating to matters otherwise within the core of the police power will generally be preempted ... Arizona (or any other State) may not substitute its judgment for the federal government’s when it comes to classification of aliens.” Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14-16, Arizona v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir.2014). As made clear in this DACA-related brief, the Government claims total preemption in this area of the law. Thus, the first element of an abdication claim is established.
To establish the second element necessary for abdication standing, the States assert that the Government has abandoned its duty to enforce the law. This assertion cannot be disputed. When establishing DAPA, Secretary Johnson announced that the DHS will not enforce the immigration laws as to over four million illegal aliens eligible for DAPA, despite the fact that they are otherwise deportable. DHS agents were also instructed to terminate removal proceedings if the individual being deported qualifies for relief under the DAPA criteria. Further, the DHS has *639 also announced that, absent extraordinary circumstances, it will not even deport illegal aliens who apply for DAPA and are rejected. The record does not contain an estimate for the size of this group, but hypothetically the number of aliens who would, otherwise be deported if the INA were enforced is in the millions. Secretary Johnson has written that these exemptions are necessary because the DHS’ limited funding necessitates enforcement priorities. Regardless of the stated motives, it is evident that the Government has determined that it will not enforce the law as it applies to over 40% of the illegal alien population that qualify for DAPA, plus all those who apply but are not awarded legal presence. It is not' necessary to search for or imply the abandonment of a duty; rather, the Government has announced its abdication.
The Government claims, however, that its deferred action program is merely an exercise of its prosecutorial discretion. Any justifications regarding abdication, though, are not a necessary consideration for standing. This inquiry may be necessary to a discussion on the merits, but standing under a theory of abdication requires only that the Government declines to enforce the law. Here, it has. 46
The Government claims sole authority to govern in the area of immigration, and has exercised that authority by promulgating a complex statutory scheme and prohibiting any meaningful involvement by the states. As demonstrated by DACA and DAPA, however, the Government has decided that it will not enforce these immigration laws as they apply to well over five million people, plus those who had their applications denied. If one had to formulate from scratch a fact pattern that exemplified the existence of standing due to federal abdication, one could not have crafted a better scenario.
2. The Legal Basis
The Government has not seriously contested the Plaintiffs’ factual basis for this claim — nor could it. Turning from the *640 facts of this claim to the applicable law, the concept of state standing by virtue of federal abdication is not well-established. It has, however, been implied by a number of opinions, including several from the Supreme Court. The abdication theory of standing is discussed most often in connection with a parens patriae claim. It has also been discussed as providing APA standing, and in some contexts is relied upon as the exclusive basis for standing. Traditionally, parens patriae actions were instituted by states seeking to protect the interests of their citizens, as well as for protection of their own quasi-sovereign interests. One of this principle’s few limitations stems from the notion that the federal government, rather than a state, has the superior status in the role as a parent. In other words, the federal government was the supreme parens patriae. Thus a state can rely on parens patriae to protect its interests against any entity or actor — except the federal government. As explicitly noted by the dissent in Massachusetts v. E.P.A:
A claim of parens patriae standing is distinct from an allegation of direct injury. See Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 448-449, 451 , 112 S.Ct. 789 , 117 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). Far from being a substitute for Article III injury, parens patriae actions raise an additional hurdle for a state litigant: the articulation of a “quasi-sovereign interest” “apart from the interests of particular private parties.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 , 102 S.Ct. 3260 , 73 L.Ed.2d 995 (1982) (emphasis added) (cited ante, at 1454). Just as an association suing on behalf of its members must show not only that it represents the members but that at least one satisfies Article III requirements, so too a State asserting quasi-sovereign interests as parens pat-riae must still show that its citizens satisfy Article III. Focusing on Massachusetts’s interests as quasi-sovereign makes the required showing here harder, not easier. The Court, in effect, takes what has always been regarded as a necessary condition for parens patriae standing' — a quasi-sovereign interest— and converts it into a sufficient showing for purposes of Article III.
What is more, the Court’s reasoning falters on its own terms. The Court asserts that Massachusetts is entitled to “special solicitude” due to its “quasi-sovereign interests,” ante, at 1455, but then applies our Article III standing test to the asserted injury of the Commonwealth’s loss of coastal property. See ante, at 1456 (concluding that Massachusetts “has alleged a particularized injury in its capacity as a landowner ” (emphasis added)). In the context of parens patriae ■ standing, however, we have characterized state ownership of land as a “nonsovereign interes[t]” because a State “is likely to have the same interests as other similarly situated proprietors.” Alfred L. Snapp & Son, supra, at 601, 102 S.Ct. 3260 .
On top of everything else, the Court overlooks the fact that our eases cast significant doubt on a State’s standing to assert a quasi-sovereign interest — as opposed to a direct injury — against the Federal Government. As a general rule, we have held that while a State might assert a quasi-sovereign right as parens patriae “for the protection of its citizens, it is no part of its duty or power to enforce their rights in respect of their relations with the Federal Government. In that field it is the United States, and not the State, which represents them.” Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-486 , 43 S.Ct. 597 , 67 L.Ed. 1078 (1923) (citation omitted); see also Alfred *641 L. Snapp & Son, supra, at 610, n. 16, 102 S.Ct. 3260 .
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 539 , 127 S.Ct. 1438 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Following this assertion, Chief Justice Roberts described the majority opinion as bestowing upon the states “a new theory of Article III standing....” Id. at 1466. Expounding further on this point, Chief Justice Roberts quoted a footnote from Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex rel. Barez stating that:
[T]he fact that a State may assert rights under a federal statute as, parens patri-ae in no way refutes our clear ruling that “[a] State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the Federal Government.”
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 540 n. 1, 127 S.Ct. 1438 (quoting Alfred L. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 610 n. 16, 102 S.Ct. 3260 ) (citations omitted).
As demonstrated by Massachusetts ’ conflicting opinions regarding the limitations of parens patriae standing, it is difficult to determine how long the law has permitted a state to rely upon this doctrine to show standing in a suit against the federal government. This interpretation may be well established, as asserted by Justice Stephens in the majority opinion, or it may be unprecedented, as described by the four dissenters. Regardless of its longevity, it is a rule delineated by the Supreme Court of the United States and which this Court is bound to follow. See, e.g., Bradford Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights than Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA’s New Standing Test for States, 49 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 1701 (2008).
The concept of abdication standing, however, has not been confined to parens pat-riae cases. Specifically, the States rely on the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heckler v. Chaney, which involved a decision by the FDA not to take certain enforcement actions regarding the drugs used in lethal injections administered by the states. 470 U.S. 821 , 105 S.Ct. 1649 , 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). Upholding the agency’s decision not to act, the Supreme Court noted that they were not presented with “a situation where it could justifiably be found that the agency has ‘consciously and expressly adopted a general policy’ that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” Id. at 833 n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 1649 (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C.Cir.1973)).
The States claim that, unlike the FDA’s action at issue in Heckler , the DAPA program is a total abdication and surrender of the Government’s statutory responsibilities. They contend that the DAPA Directive basically concedes this point, and this Court agrees. The DAPA Memorandum states that the DHS cannot perform all the duties assigned to it by Congress because of its limited resources, and therefore it must prioritize its enforcement of the laws. This prioritization necessitated identifying a class of individuals who are guilty of a violation of the country’s immigration laws, and then announcing that the law would not be enforced against them. The DAPA Memorandum concludes that, for the DHS to better perform its tasks in one area, it is necessary to abandon enforcement in another.
In response, the Government maintains its overall position: it is immaterial how large the putative class of DAPA beneficiaries is because DAPA is a legitimate exercise of its prosecutorial discretion. Earlier in this opinion, this Court held that Plaintiffs have standing based upon the direct damages they will suffer following the implementation of DAPA. Nevertheless, based upon the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heckler , and the cases discussed below, this Court also finds that Plaintiffs have *642 standing because of the DHS’ abdication of its statutory duties to enforce the immigration laws.
The Heckler Court is not alone in addressing abdication standing. Again not involving the parens patriae doctrine, the Fifth Circuit has addressed the concept of abdication in a similar suit involving the same parties. See Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir.1997). In Texas v. United States, the Fifth Circuit held that abdication did not exist for several reasons. Id. at 667 . First, it noted that Texas did not argue that the Government was “mandating” that it take any action with respect to undocumented aliens. Id. This fact situation is dissimilar to the one presently before the Court. Here, the States put forth evidence that demonstrates that the Government has required and will require states to take certain actions regarding DAPA recipients. Further, the Government has not conceded that it will refrain from taking similar action against the remaining Plaintiffs in this case. Second, the Fifth Circuit in Texas held that the Government’s failure to effectively perform its duty to secure the border did not equate to an abdication of its duty. Id.
Plaintiffs contend that these distinctions made by the Fifth Circuit in Texas are noticeably absent in the present case. The DHS unilaterally established the parameters for DAPA and determined that it would not enforce the immigration laws as they apply to millions of individuals — those that qualify for DAPA and surprisingly even those that do not. Thus, the controlling but missing element in Texas that prevented a finding of abdication is not only present in this case, but is factually undisputed. 47 Further, if one accepts the Governmenfs position, then a lack of resources would be an acceptable reason to cease enforcing environmental laws, or the Voting Rights Act, or even the various laws that protect civil rights and equal opportunity. Its argument is that it has the discretion to cease enforcing an act as long as it does so under the umbrella of prosecutorial discretion. While the Court does not rule on the merits of these arguments, they certainly support the States’ standing on the basis of abdication.
In regards to abdication standing, this case bears strong similarities to Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159 (D.C.Cir.1973). In Adams , the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare adopted a policy that, in effect, was a refusal to enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 1161 . Specifically, the Secretary refused to effectuate an end to segregation in federally-funded public education institutions. Id. In Adams , as in the case before this Court, the Government argued that the “means” of enforcement is a matter of absolute agency discretion, and in the exercise of that discretion it chose to seek voluntary compliance. See id. at 1162 . Rejecting this argument and holding that the Secretary had abdicated his statutory duty, the D.C. Circuit noted that:
[t]his suit is not brought to challenge HEW’s decisions with regard to a few school districts in the course of a generally effective enforcement program. To the contrary, appellants allege that HEW has consciously and expressly adopted a general policy which is in effect an abdication of its statutory duty. We are asked to interpret the statute and determine whether HEW has correctly construed its enforcement obligations.
*643 A final important factor distinguishing this case from the prosecutorial discretion cases cited by HEW is the nature of the relationship between the agency and the institutions in question. HEW is actively supplying segregated institutions with federal funds, contrary to the expressed purposes of Congress. It is one thing to say the Justice Department lacks the resources necessary to locate and prosecute every civil rights violator; it is quite another to say HEW may affirmatively continue to channel federal funds to defaulting schools. The anomaly of this latter assertion fully supports the conclusion that Congress’s clear statement of an affirmative enforcement duty should not be discounted.
Id. (emphasis added).
In the present case, Congress has clearly stated that illegal aliens should be removed. Like that at issue in Adams , the DHS program clearly circumvents immigration laws and allows individuals that would otherwise be subject to removal to remain in the United States. The policy in Adams purported to seek voluntary compliance with Title VI. In contrast, the DHS does not seek compliance with federal law in any form, but instead establishes a pathway for non-compliance and completely abandons entire sections of this country’s immigration law. Assuming that the concept of abdication standing will be recognized in this Circuit, this Court finds that this is a textbook example.
F. Conclusion
Having found that at least one Plaintiff, Texas, stands to suffer direct damage from the implementation of DAPA, this Court finds that there is the requisite standing necessary for the pursuit of this case in federal court. Fulfilling the constitutional requirements of standing, Texas has shown that it will suffer an injury, that this injury is proximately caused by the actions of the Government, and that a favorable remedy issued by the Court would prevent the occurrence of this injury. 48 This Court also finds that Texas’ claim has satisfied the requirements of prudential standing: Plaintiffs’ suit is not merely a generalized grievance, the Plaintiffs’ fall within the “zone of interest” pertaining to the immigration statutes at issue, and Plaintiffs’ suit is not based merely on the interests of third-parties.
Finally, for the various reasons discussed above and below, it is clear that Plaintiffs satisfy the standing requirements as prescribed by the APA. Thus even “unreviewable” administrative actions may be subject to judicial review under exceptional circumstances, such as when there has been a clear departure from the agency’s statutory authority. See Manges v. Camp, 474 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir.1973). With regard to APA standing, this Court emphasizes that there is a difference between the standing required to bring a lawsuit and that necessary for APA re-viewability. Although traditional standing refers to the ability of a plaintiff to bring an action, APA “reviewability” concerns the ability of the Court to actually review and grant relief regarding the act or omission in question on either procedural or substantive grounds. This Court will ad *644 dress these redressability issues as part of its discussions on the merits.
Having reached the conclusion that standing exists for at least one Plaintiff, the Court turns to the merits.
V. THE MERITS OF THE STATES’ CLAIMS
As previously noted, this opinion seeks to address three issues: standing, legality, and constitutionality. Having concluded that at least one Plaintiff, the State of Texas, has standing, the Court now addresses the merits of the States’ claims regarding the DAPA program.
A. Prosecutorial Discretion and Agency Prioritization
A basic issue intrinsically interwoven in most of the arguments presented in this case warrants attention before proceeding. It does not resolve any of the ultimate remaining questions, but the Court nevertheless finds it important. Just as the Government has been reluctant to make certain concessions, prosecutorial discretion is an area where the States, possibly in fear of making a bigger concession than intended, are reluctant to concede. As discussed above, one of the DHS Secretary’s stated reasons for implementing DAPA is that it allegedly allows the Secretary to expend the resources at his disposal in areas he views as deserving the most attention. He has set forth these priorities as follows:
1.Priority 1: threats to national security, border security, and public safety;
2. Priority 2: misdemeanants and new immigration violators;
3. Priority 3: other immigration violations.
See Doc. No. 38, Def. Ex. 5 (Nov. 20, 2014 Memorandum, “Policies for the Apprehension, Detentio

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7229880. Public record. Not legal advice.