# Jones v. Williams > Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · July 24, 2002 · 297 F.3d 930 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7012310 ## Case - **Full name:** Betty JONES v. Willie WILLIAMS City of Los Angeles Michael Akana Grady Dublin Richard Ludwig Chester McMillion Edward Ortiz Wilson Wong Alfonso Reyes Richard A. Brown Richard Ginelli Gary Clarke Robert Holcomb David Nila Richard Selleh Mark Kroecker Michael Hillman Michael Downing, individually and in their official capacities, and Daryl Gates Arthur Daedelow Martina Villalobos - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - **Decided:** July 24, 2002 - **Citations:** 297 F.3d 930; 2002 WL 1629432 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Silverman - **Judges:** Reed, Scannlain, Silverman - **Cited by:** 1,229 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7012310 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding a proper jury 19 instructions for a § 1983 integral participation claim must explain “either integral participation or 20 personal involvement was required before a jury could find officers liable” and liability could not 21 attach “for merely being present at the scen… - holding that “mere presence 8 at a search or membership in a group, without personal involvement in and a causal connection 9 to the unlawful act, [does not] create liability under section 1983” - explaining that a plaintiff must allege that each defendant personally participated 14 in the conduct alleged to have violated his constitutional rights - explaining that a plaintiff must allege that each defendant personally participated 23 in the conduct alleged to have violated his constitutional rights - emphasizing that liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires the defendant’s 3 || personal participation in the alleged constitutional violation ## Opinion text SILVERMAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: I respectfully concur in the result. I write separately because, in my view, the Rutherford instruction submitted by the plaintiff was a correct statement of the law. It was properly refused only because it was not justified by the evidence. Specifically, the evidence at trial was not susceptible of the interpretation that the damage occurred while no one but the officers was present. To the contrary, the residents testified to what they say they witnessed the police officers doing. The police officers gave their opposing version of the story, and it was for the jury to decide which to believe. As a general rule, a res ipsa-type instruction can be given in a case such as this if: first, the defendants are uniquely positioned, to the exclusion of others, to know the circumstances that caused the plaintiffs injury; and second, the injury would not normally occur without wrongdoing on the defendants’ part. See Reber v. United States, 951 F.2d 961 , 964 n. 1 (9th Cir.1991). Res ipsa belongs to the world of negligence. This case, like Rutherford, involves an intentional constitutional tort. However, the principle of proof is the same. If government actors/defendants, due to circumstances of their own creation, prevent the plaintiff from identifying precisely which of them caused the plaintiffs injury, the jury can infer causation against those in exclusive control of the event. This is just what the proposed Rutherford instruction would have permitted. As I see it, the instruction was correctly refused because it was not supported by the evidence, not because it misstated the law. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/7012310. Public record. Not legal advice.