# Harris v. Garner

> Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit · June 27, 2000 · 216 F.3d 970

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6985864

## Case

- **Full name:** Frederick Lamar HARRIS, Danny Chadwick v. Wayne GARNER, Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections, A.G. Thomas, Director of Facilities Division of the Georgia Department of Corrections, United States of America, Intervenor-Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
- **Decided:** June 27, 2000
- **Citations:** 216 F.3d 970; 2000 WL 827324
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Anderson
- **Judges:** Anderson, Barkett, Birch, Black, Carnes, Cox, Dubina, Edmondson, Hull, Marcus, Tjoflat, Wilson
- **Cited by:** 365 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6985864

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating, in reference to the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s exhaustion requirement, “[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 15(d) does authorize a court to permit a party to supplement a pleading even though the original pleading is defective in its statement of a claim for relief …
- finding that the text “[n]o federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined” in § 1997e(e) means that the statute’s bar on monetary relief absent a showing of phys- ical injury applies only to actions that were commenced at the time that the plaintiff was confined i…
- holding that because the plaintiffs were incarcerated when they commenced the action, notwithstanding the fact that they were released from confinement during the pendency of the action, 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) applied “with full force and effect to them.”
- holding that the PLRA does not prevent a former prisoner from filing suit after his release, and therefore dismissal of an action under the PLRA must be "without prejudice to re-filing the claim if and when the plaintiff is released.”
- holding that Section 1997e(e) applied to claims brought 24 by prisoners even if they were subsequently released from custody prior to judgment and amended or 25 ||Supplemented their complaints after release

## Opinion text

ANDERSON, Chief Judge,
concurring specially:
I concur in the result, and in much of the reasoning of the majority. I agree with the majority that the statutory language evinces a congressional purpose to discourage, indeed to bar, a prisoner from bringing a suit for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury. I do not believe that it is contrary to the statutory language to routinely dismiss such suits, even if the prisoner has been released *986 after the filing of the suit. Indeed, I believe dismissal would be the appropriate action in most such circumstances; and that dismissal would best serve the congressional language and purpose.
However, I agree with the dissent that Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(d) would provide some discretion in a district judge to entertain a supplemental pleading setting forth the fact of a prisoner’s release, and to avoid dismissing a case under some of the more unusual circumstances described by the dissent. In my judgment, a district court should exercise such discretion only rarely (for example, when a prisoner had a color-able claim of physical injury which has been tried to a jury and when a dismissal would involve a manifest waste of judicial resources).
Because it is clear to me that the instant case is not one in which the district judge would exercise discretion to avoid dismissal, a remand would be futile. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment affirming the district court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6985864. Public record. Not legal advice.