# Johnson v. Turner > Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · September 8, 1997 · 125 F.3d 324 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6956674 ## Case - **Full name:** Gregory JOHNSON Albert P. Owens Robert Lynn Hill Eddie Luellen v. Kenneth Austin TURNER, Individually and in his capacity as elected Juvenile Court Judge of Memphis and Shelby County Herbert Lane Michael H. Craig A.C. Gilless, Individually and in his capacity as Sheriff of Memphis and Shelby County Shelby County Government, a Home-Ruled County Governmental Entity Operating as a Governmental Municipality Veronica Coleman, Individually and in her capacity as Shelby County Government Attorney-Employee William Moore Virginia Skinner, Individually and in her capacity as Shelby County Deputy Sheriff in charge of the criminal warrant division, Shelby County Government Harold Horne, Individually and in his capacity as Shelby County Government Attorney-Employee, State of Tennessee, Intervening - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit - **Decided:** September 8, 1997 - **Citations:** 125 F.3d 324; 1997 WL 555706 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Moore - **Judges:** Batchelder, Enslen, Moore - **Cited by:** 76 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6956674 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment that Tennessee paternity and child support statutes were unconstitutional because, at the time of the complaint, the state court contempt and paternity proceedings were final, and the plaintiffs could not s… - holding that county could not be liable for § 1983 claims premised on memorandum authored by juvenile court judge because there was no county policy; functions of juvenile court were established by state law - finding county not liable for actions of local juvenile court judge because, inter alia, ”[t]he functions of the juvenile court are established by state law” and the county could not affect actions taken by judge - finding clerk’s office employees, acting as a judge’s designee, are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity ## Opinion text MOORE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. Plaintiffs raise serious constitutional questions regarding the challenged paternity and child support procedures followed by the Juvenile Court of Memphis and Shelby County. Various procedures of the juvenile court have produced constitutional challenges for almost two decades. See Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.1980); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262 (6th Cir.1984). I agree with the majority, however, that this court cannot reach the merits of most of these challenges because of problems of the plaintiffs’ standing to raise claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and because of defendant judicial officers’ absolute judicial immunity with regard to the monetary damages claims. With respect to plaintiff Owens’s monetary claims against Shelby County, I part company from the majority. At a minimum plaintiff Owens claims that he was arrested and jailed on a warrant that simply claimed he was a parent, in other words a warrant that lacked any indicia of probable cause. This appears to be the usual practice followed in such cases, according to the evidence in the record before us. At this stage of the litigation, I cannot agree with the majority that summary judgment for the county on this claim is appropriate. Under Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 , 98 S.Ct. 2018 , 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), and Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 , 106 S.Ct. 1292 , 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), I believe, that a sufficient showing has been made that this practice of obtaining arrest warrants without any showing of probable cause that a criminal offense has been committed constitutes official municipal policy, so that Shelby County’s motion for summary judgment should have been denied. Therefore I dissent from Part II. D. of the majority opinion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6956674. Public record. Not legal advice.