# Liston v. County of Riverside

> Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · July 21, 1997 · 120 F.3d 965

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6952946

## Case

- **Full name:** Jimmy LISTON Venice Liston Danny Liston Andrew Liston Elishia Liston, minors, by and through their Guardian ad Litem, Jim Liston, Plaintiffs-Appellants-Cross-Appellees v. COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE, a political subdivision of the State of California David Pike D. Podkowa, and Paul Amicone, Police Officer Bart Belknap, Deputy Gail Marianes, Deputy John Powell, Deputy Robert Pruitt Danny Scaturro, Detective Raymond Rucker, Lieutenant Tom Mitchell, Police Officer Darrell Reed, Police Officer, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellants
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
- **Decided:** July 21, 1997
- **Citations:** 120 F.3d 965; 97 Daily Journal DAR 9229; 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5742; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 18962; 1997 WL 403988
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Reinhardt
- **Judges:** Except, Hall, Leavy, Reinhardt
- **Cited by:** 214 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6952946

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that officers who were inside plaintiffs premises during the execution of the search warrant “were participants in the detention of the [plaintiffs]” and there *1170 fore were not entitled to summary judgment on plaintiffs’ claim under the Fourth Amendment
- finding “ ‘triable issues’ regarding the reasonableness of the detention, particularly as to whether it continued after the officers knew or a reasonable officer would have known that a serious mistake had been made”
- reversing, in part, grant of qualified immunity on Fourth Amendment claim of unnecessary destructiveness, because record was unclear whether some property damage occurred after officers learned they were in wrong house; noting that if officers had engaged in complained-of cond…
- finding that excessive force is “ordinarily a question of fact for the jury”

## Opinion text

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting from Section B.3:
I think that Section B.3. is both unnecessary and undesirable. It makes little sense *982 to segment, and attempt to analyze with such particularity, each aspect of the search, when the search in general will in any event be carefully examined in its entirety in subsequent proceedings in the district court. I also do not believe that we are in a position at this point to make the factual determination that is necessary to support a conclusion that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to any “ransacking” that occurred prior to the time they observed that they were in the wrong house; this is particularly true because the district court made no such factual determination itself, but relied instead only on its inability to determine which of the officers was responsible for the “ransacking.” I would, therefore, let the fact-finder determine the officers’ liability with respect to the entire search.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6952946. Public record. Not legal advice.