# Student Loan Marketing Ass'n v. Riley

> Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit · January 10, 1997 · 104 F.3d 397

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6944234

## Case

- **Full name:** STUDENT LOAN MARKETING ASSOCIATION, Appellant/Cross-Appellee v. Richard W. RILEY, Secretary of the United States Department of Education, Appellee/Cross-Appellant
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
- **Decided:** January 10, 1997
- **Citations:** 104 F.3d 397; 322 U.S. App. D.C. 354; 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 351
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** On rehearing
- **Judges:** Ginsburg, Wald, Williams
- **Cited by:** 26 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6944234

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that under certain circumstances an agency letter that adopts an interpretation of law is a final agency action

## Opinion text

ORDER ON REHEARING
March 11, 1997
Sallie Mae petitions for rehearing, noting that because the district court held that the statute did not embrace securitized loans, that court should not have addressed the constitutionality of the fee as applied to such loans. See Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 , 56 S.Ct. 466, 483 , 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). We agree. Similarly, as we rejected the Secretary’s grounds for applying the fee to securitized loans, nothing in our decision should be taken as expressing any opinion on the constitutionality of the fee in that context, nor on whether there is any distinction, for constitutional purposes, between securitized loans and ones “held” by Sallie Mae in the most conventional sense of the term.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6944234. Public record. Not legal advice.