# Seamons v. Snow > Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit · May 8, 1996 · 84 F.3d 1226 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6939227 ## Case - **Full name:** Sherwin SEAMONS, Jane Seamons, individually, and as natural parents of Brian Seamons, a minor v. Douglas SNOW, individually and in his capacity as the Coach at Sky View High School, and agent of Sky View High School and the Cache County School District Myron Benson, individually, and as Principal of Sky View High School, and agent of Sky View High School and the Cache County School District Sky View High School the Cache County School District, Now Legal Defense and Education Fund American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project Equal Rights Advocates National Women's Law Center Women's Legal Defense Fund, Amici Curiae - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit - **Decided:** May 8, 1996 - **Citations:** 84 F.3d 1226; 1996 WL 233483 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by McKay - **Judges:** Cook, Ebel, McKay - **Cited by:** 229 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6939227 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding the student properly stated a free speech claim where the school denied him “the ability to report physical assaults in the locker room,” finding that the school’s “fear of a disturbance stemming from the disapproval associated with [the student’s] unpopular viewpoint … - finding that the defendants' conduct inextricably intertwined with the locker-room incident, and stating that the "incident was clearly sexual in nature” because the initial assault "clearly derive[s][its] power to embarrass and to intimidate from [its] sexual and sex-based na… - finding that plaintiff had a constitutionally protected interest in receiving a public education, but he did not have a protected interest in participating in specific advanced placement courses and interscholastic activities - holding that although Title IX does protect against hostile environment sexual harassment in schools, plaintiff failed to state a valid claim because he did not allege that the harassment in question was based on sex - holding that student’s reporting of sexual hazing was entitled to First Amendment protection, and school officials were not. entitled to qualified immunity when they punished him by throwing him off the football team ## Opinion text McKAY, Circuit Judge, concurring: I concur in the court’s opinion except as to the Title IX claim. As to that claim, I concur in the result. I write separately to express my disagreement with the court’s analysis of Plaintiffs Title IX claim. I cannot agree that the alleged harassment in this case was not based on sex within the meaning of Title IX. The majority writes that statements such as “boys will be boys” and “take it like a man” are not sufficiently sex related to state a claim. I believe, however, that these statements can only be understood as a response to the original hazing incident. In my view, this incident was clearly sexual in nature. Members of the football team taped Plaintiff to a towel rack while he was naked, taped his *1240 genitals, and then displayed their captive to a girl Plaintiff had dated. These actions clearly derive their power to embarrass and to intimidate from their sexual and sex-based nature. It is hard for me to believe that the display of the male genitalia to a female for other than medical or educational reasons has a non-sexual connotation. The coach’s statement that “boys will be boys” clearly relates to and flows out of the original sexual harassment. As such, it may be considered to be a continuation by the school official of the student-initiated sexual harassment, even if the statement by itself is not sexual in nature. See Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir.1987) (Title VII sexual harassment claim does not require sexual advances or other sexual conduct; rather, conduct which “would not occur but for the sex of the employee” violates Title VII). Thus, although I concur in the result for other reasons, I cannot wholeheartedly accept the court’s reasoning on this one issue. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6939227. Public record. Not legal advice.