# Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher

> Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit · November 16, 1995 · 70 F.3d 1474

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6936960

## Case

- **Full name:** DAYTON AREA VISUALLY IMPAIRED PERSONS, INC., an Ohio Non-Profit Corporation Wayne County Foster Parents Network, an Unincorporated Ohio Non-Profit Association Ohio Telemarketing Association, Inc., an Ohio Non-Profit Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees v. Lee FISHER, Attorney General, State of Ohio, Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant, J. Anthony Sawyer, City Attorney of the City of Dayton, Ohio Lee J. Falke, Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County, Ohio
- **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
- **Decided:** November 16, 1995
- **Citations:** 70 F.3d 1474; 1995 WL 678204
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Norris
- **Judges:** Daughtrey, Engel, Norris
- **Cited by:** 62 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6936960

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “a challenge to the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction under the abuse of discretion standard” will succeed when “the district court relied upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applied the governing law, or used an erroneous legal standard” …
- stating “the public as a whole has a significant interest in ensuring equal protection of the laws and protection of First Amendment liberties”

## Opinion text

ALAN E. NORRIS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I concur with the conclusions reached by my colleagues in virtually every respect, I write separately because I believe that Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 1716.08(D), which requires professional solicitors to obtain written commitments for donated tickets, passes constitutional muster.
Assuming that the provision imposes a content-based restriction on speech, it is neither unduly burdensome nor overly broad in view of the state’s compelling interest in ensuring that charitable solicitations are free from fraudulent representations.
The provision itself is certainly narrow inasmuch as it only affects those solicitors who use donated tickets as a means of increasing contributions. Further, the provision does not impose a limit on the number of tickets that can be given away; it merely requires that solicitors engage in a modicum of forethought by contacting the recipient organization before, rather than after, the fundraising campaign. Seen in this light, the burden, if any, imposed on solicitors is minimal when balanced against the state’s interest in ensuring that the tickets are used as represented.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6936960. Public record. Not legal advice.