# Pinder v. Johnson > Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · May 30, 1995 · 54 F.3d 1169 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6934800 ## Case - **Full name:** Carol L. PINDER, Individually and in her capacity as surviving Mother of her minor children, deceased and as Personal Representative of the Estates of Kim Pinder, LaToya and Troy Brummel v. Donald JOHNSON, PFC, Individually and in his official capacity, and Commissioner of Cambridge, in the City of Cambridge - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - **Decided:** May 30, 1995 - **Citations:** 54 F.3d 1169; 1995 WL 320571 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Hamilton - **Judges:** Ervin, Hall, Hamilton, Luttig, Michael, Motz, Murnaghan, Niemeyer, Russell, Widener, Wilkins, Wilkinson, Williams - **Cited by:** 179 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6934800 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding no liability under the state-created danger doctrine for the officer's conduct reassuring the plaintiff of her safety and charging the former boyfriend on lesser charges than he'd promised after having responded to a domestic disturbance call and hearing the plaintiff … - stating that state actors do not “‘commit[] an affirmative act’ or ‘create[] a danger’ every time [they] do[] anything that makes injury at the hands of a third party more likely,” and that instead, would-be plaintiffs must come forward with evidence of an act “more akin to a[… - concluding that an officer’s assurances to the victim and his decision not to charge the assailant were not affirmative acts giving rise to civil liability because, if so, “every representation by the police and every failure to incarcerate would constitute ‘affirmative action… - recognizing that the state’s affirmative duty to protect arises “when the state restrains persons from acting on their own behalf,” and noting that “[s]ome sort of confinement of the injured party— incarceration, institutionalization, or the like — is needed to trigger the aff… - holding that a police officer’s failure to uphold a promise to incarcerate a man posing a danger to- a woman and her children did not constitute affirmative misconduct by a state actor under the state- created danger doctrine ## Opinion text HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment: This appeal involves a straightforward question of qualified immunity: whether, at the time of Officer Johnson’s conduct, his actions violated “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 , 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738 , 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 , 109 S.Ct. 998 , 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) and cases which held that a state’s affirmative duty to protect could arise only in a custodial situation, see; e.g., Harpole v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 820 F.2d 923 , 927 (8th Cir.1987); Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 722 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 , 107 S.Ct. 270 , 93 L.Ed.2d 247 (1986), a reasonable officer would not have known that Johnson’s personal assurances to Pinder and subsequent actions with respect to Pittman would violate Pinder’s due process rights. For this reason, the judgment of the district court should be reversed. LUTTIG, J., joins this separate opinion concurring in the judgment. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6934800. Public record. Not legal advice.