# Pinder v. Johnson > Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit · May 30, 1995 · 54 F.3d 1169 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6934799 ## Case - **Full name:** Carol L. PINDER, Individually and in her capacity as surviving Mother of her minor children, deceased and as Personal Representative of the Estates of Kim Pinder, LaToya and Troy Brummel v. Donald JOHNSON, PFC, Individually and in his official capacity, and Commissioner of Cambridge, in the City of Cambridge - **Court:** Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit - **Decided:** May 30, 1995 - **Citations:** 54 F.3d 1169; 1995 WL 320571 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Motz - **Judges:** Ervin, Hall, Hamilton, Luttig, Michael, Motz, Murnaghan, Niemeyer, Russell, Widener, Wilkins, Wilkinson, Williams - **Cited by:** 179 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6934799 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding no liability under the state-created danger doctrine for the officer's conduct reassuring the plaintiff of her safety and charging the former boyfriend on lesser charges than he'd promised after having responded to a domestic disturbance call and hearing the plaintiff … - stating that state actors do not “‘commit[] an affirmative act’ or ‘create[] a danger’ every time [they] do[] anything that makes injury at the hands of a third party more likely,” and that instead, would-be plaintiffs must come forward with evidence of an act “more akin to a[… - concluding that an officer’s assurances to the victim and his decision not to charge the assailant were not affirmative acts giving rise to civil liability because, if so, “every representation by the police and every failure to incarcerate would constitute ‘affirmative action… - recognizing that the state’s affirmative duty to protect arises “when the state restrains persons from acting on their own behalf,” and noting that “[s]ome sort of confinement of the injured party— incarceration, institutionalization, or the like — is needed to trigger the aff… - holding that a police officer’s failure to uphold a promise to incarcerate a man posing a danger to- a woman and her children did not constitute affirmative misconduct by a state actor under the state- created danger doctrine ## Opinion text MOTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring in parts I-IV of the majority opinion and in the judgment: I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion and admire its felicity of expression. I write separately to make it clear that its sole holding is that Officer Johnson was entitled to summary judgment on his qualified immunity defense. This is so because when this tragedy occurred in 1989, in view of DeShaney v. Winnebago Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 , 109 S.Ct. 998 , 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989), a reasonable police officer could not have known that Officer Johnson’s promise to Ms. Pinder created a special relationship making him liable to her. Thus, any suggestion in part V of the majority opinion that, even today, there is not and, as a matter of policy, should not be any “broad constitutional right to affirmative protection from the state” is dicta and, in my view, erroneous dicta. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6934799. Public record. Not legal advice.