# Chambers v. St. Mary's School

> Ohio Supreme Court · August 12, 1998 · 82 Ohio St. 3d 563

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6777537

## Case

- **Full name:** Chambers v. St. Mary's School
- **Court:** Ohio Supreme Court
- **Decided:** August 12, 1998
- **Citations:** 82 Ohio St. 3d 563; 697 N.E.2d 198
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Douglas
- **Judges:** Cook, Douglas, Moyer, Pfeifer, Resnick, Stratton, Sweeney
- **Cited by:** 241 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6777537

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that facts that would allow a jury to conclude that a political subdivision violated the Ohio Building Code create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to defeat immunity under R.C. 2744.02(B)(4
- holding that although a violation of an administrative rule such as the OBBC does not constitute negligence perse, such a violation may be admissible as evidence of negligence"
- reasoning that regulations are not entitled to the same respect and deference as statutory enactments for the purposes of finding a party negligent per se
- stating that “[njegligence per se is tantamount to strict liability for purposes of proving that a defendant breached a duty”
- recognizing that a statutory violation can serve “as evidence of negligence[,]” even if negligence per se does not apply

## Opinion text

Douglas, J.,
dissenting. I dissent from the judgment and opinion of the majority. Today the majority has determined that a violation of the Ohio Basic Building Code may never constitute negligence per se. What is even more shocking is that the majority further holds that the extension of the doctrine of negligence per se to violations of any administrative rules is never justified. The breadth of the majority opinion is alarming and, in addition, is simply wrong! To that end, the conclusions reached by the majority have disturbed well-settled law and have effectively overruled numerous decisions of this court.
We have held time and time again that an administrative rule issued pursuant to statutory authority has the force and effect of law unless it is unreasonable or is in clear conflict with a statute governing the same subject matter. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Lindley (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 232, 234 , 527 N.E.2d 828 , citing Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. Glander (1948), 149 Ohio St. 120, 125 , 36 O.O. 471 , 474, 77 N.E.2d 921, 924 . See, also, State ex rel. Kildow v. Indus. Comm. (1934), 128 Ohio St. 573, 580 , 1 O.O. 235 , 238, 192 N.E. 873, 876 . Indeed, this court has also implicitly agreed that a tortfeasor may be negligent per se in violating a relevant administrative regulation. See Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baker (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 316 , 15 OBR 444, 473 N.E.2d 827 . The majority, however, has turned a blind eye to these and other important cases decided by this court.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, I must dissent.
Resnick and F.E. Sweeney, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6777537. Public record. Not legal advice.