# Byrnes v. LCI Communication Holdings Co.

> Ohio Supreme Court · December 11, 1996 · 77 Ohio St. 3d 125

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6774638

## Case

- **Full name:** Byrnes v. LCI Communication Holdings Company
- **Court:** Ohio Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 11, 1996
- **Citations:** 77 Ohio St. 3d 125; 672 N.E.2d 145
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Pfeifer
- **Judges:** Cook, Douglas, Moyer, Pfeifer, Resnick, Stratton, Sweeney
- **Cited by:** 130 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6774638

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that discriminatory remarks regarding age were insufficient to create an issue of fact in an age-discrimination case, where the remarks were not directed toward the plaintiffs
- finding that there “[m]ust be a link or nexus between the discriminatory statement or conduct and the prohibited act of discrimination to establish a violation of the statute.”
- finding that the employee did not meet the fourth prong of the Barker test because the employee was not replaced “by a person outside the statutorily protected class”
- noting that the Mauzy court clarified the methods for establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination under section 4112.14 of the Ohio Revised Code and that the same methods apply to section 4112.02, which is at issue here

## Opinion text

Pfeifer, J.,
dissenting. I believe that Justice Resnick’s dissenting opinion correctly articulates both what the law now is and what the requirements for proof should continue to be in age discrimination cases in Ohio. While I am sympathetic with the result achieved by the majority, I would have taken different steps to correct what appears to be an excessive jury award. This case was well and truly tried, the parties skillfully represented, and the operative law correctly stated to the jury by the trial judge. We should wring the passion out of the jury’s verdict by ordering remittitur on the general verdict and eliminating the punitive damages award. Instead, the majority has massaged and convoluted the law, rendering proof of an age discrimination case unrealistically difficult for persons who most need the law’s protection.
I am concerned that this area of the law is being further “developed” in a case where the plaintiffs are high-salaried, executive-level employees. That world, artificial to most working men and women who truly need the protection of antidiscriminatory legislation, now yields a standard of proof which does not fit the real workplace world. Because we are uncomfortable seeing a jury award $7.1 million to two highly compensated executives who gladly, and knowingly, swam with sharks, we raise the bar on proof for others. This case makes age discrimination harder to prove and thus impractical for lower level, lower paid, less educated employees, who do not have the resources to pursue an increasingly complicated and complex claim. Older employees at the bottom of the economic ladder, unlawfully demoted or discharged because of their age, and without a golden parachute to cushion their fall (or to finance their litigation), are the Ohioans the majority decision hurts most.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6774638. Public record. Not legal advice.