# Byrnes v. LCI Communication Holdings Co.

> Ohio Supreme Court · December 11, 1996 · 77 Ohio St. 3d 125

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6774636

## Case

- **Full name:** Byrnes v. LCI Communication Holdings Company
- **Court:** Ohio Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 11, 1996
- **Citations:** 77 Ohio St. 3d 125; 672 N.E.2d 145
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Douglas
- **Judges:** Cook, Douglas, Moyer, Pfeifer, Resnick, Stratton, Sweeney
- **Cited by:** 130 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6774636

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that discriminatory remarks regarding age were insufficient to create an issue of fact in an age-discrimination case, where the remarks were not directed toward the plaintiffs
- finding that there “[m]ust be a link or nexus between the discriminatory statement or conduct and the prohibited act of discrimination to establish a violation of the statute.”
- finding that the employee did not meet the fourth prong of the Barker test because the employee was not replaced “by a person outside the statutorily protected class”
- noting that the Mauzy court clarified the methods for establishing a prima facie case of age discrimination under section 4112.14 of the Ohio Revised Code and that the same methods apply to section 4112.02, which is at issue here

## Opinion text

Douglas, J.,
concurring. I concur in the judgment. In doing so, I continue to subscribe to our holding in Mauzy v. Kelly Services, Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578 , 664 N.E.2d 1272 .
My concurrence herein is based specifically on the fact that the fourth prong of the test established in Barker v. Scovill, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 146 , 6 OBR 202, 451 N.E.2d 807 , is absent in this case, to wit, that plaintiffs-appellees were not replaced by a person or persons not belonging to the protected class. Plaintiffsappellees were, in fact, not replaced at all.
In concurring, I am not unmindful of the “direct evidence” standard as so well set forth in the dissent of Justice Resnick. I believe the standard, where it can be shown to exist, still lives.
F.E. Sweeney, J., concurs in the foregoing concurring opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6774636. Public record. Not legal advice.