# State ex rel. Cuyahoga County Democratic Party Executive Committee v. Taft

> Ohio Supreme Court · June 11, 1993 · 67 Ohio St. 3d 1

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6768457

## Case

- **Full name:** The State ex rel. Cuyahoga County Democratic Party Executive Committee v. Taft, Secretary of State
- **Court:** Ohio Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 11, 1993
- **Citations:** 67 Ohio St. 3d 1; 615 N.E.2d 615; 1993 Ohio LEXIS 1567
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Moyer
- **Judges:** Douglas, Moyer, Pfeifer, Resnick, Sweeney, Wright
- **Cited by:** 6 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6768457

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that suspected violations of campaign-finance laws are not sufficient evidence of incompetence
- reaffirming that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies in these circumstances

## Opinion text

Moyer, C.J.,
dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because it fails to follow well-established law of this state and because it sends the wrong message with respect to the qualifications required of persons serving as members of a county board of elections.
In an opinion that sweeps aside precedent of this court establishing the broad discretion of the Secretary of State under R.C. 3501.07 to reject the recommenda *3 tion of a county political party, the majority claims to adhere to the principle of law established in State ex rel. Democratic Executive Commt. v. Brown (1974), 39 Ohio St.2d 157 , 68 O.O.2d 100 , 314 N.E.2d 376 . The majority concludes that the Secretary of State does not have the discretion to reject a recommended appointee because he has failed to comply with campaign finance laws. I fail to comprehend why the Secretary of State has discretion to reject an appointee on the basis of a potential personality conflict or conflict of interest, as we have previously held, but does not have the discretion to reject an appointment on the basis that the appointee has violated campaign finance laws. There can hardly be a clearer case of this court’s substitution of its judgment for that of the Secretary of State.
The second reason the writ of mandamus should be denied is that the majority of this court has now held that the Secretary of State has a clear legal duty to seat a person on a board of elections who has violated the very campaign finance laws the appointee is required to administer.
The writ should be denied.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6768457. Public record. Not legal advice.