# Hammond v. Hammond

> High Court of Chancery of Maryland · August 27, 1828 · 2 Md. Ch. 306

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6683240

## Case

- **Full name:** HAMMOND v. HAMMOND
- **Court:** High Court of Chancery of Maryland
- **Decided:** August 27, 1828
- **Citations:** 2 Md. Ch. 306
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Bland
- **Judges:** Bland
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6683240

## Opinion text

Bland, Chancellor.
This case standing ready for hearing and being submitted, the proceedings were read and considered. Whereupon it is Decreed, that the auditor take an account of the real and personal estate of the late Philip Hammond which came to the hands of the said Elizabeth Hammond, Rezin Hammond, Thomas Hammond, and Charles Hammond, as executors or otherwise of the late Philip Hammond; and of the manner in which the same may have been administered or distributed. And also an account of the debts due and owing from the said late Philip Hammond at the time of his death which are yet remaining unpaid. And that the auditor state said accounts from the pleadings and proofs now in the case, and from such other evidence as the parties may have taken before him, or have taken before any justice of the peace, on giving three days notice as usual, and lay before him.
*310 After which the case was brought before the court to have the creditors of the testator called in, for the purpose of having the assets properly administered, and of making a final settlement, and distribution of the estate.
11th September, 1828.
Bland, Chancellor.—
Ordered, that the creditors of Philip Hammond, late of Anne Arundel county, deceased, file the vouchers of their claims in the chancery office on or before the 17th day of January next., And that' a copy of this order be inserted in some newspaper or newspapers once in each of three successive weeks before the 17th day of' October next.
The object of this suit being to adjust the rights and liabilities-of the respective parties, as claimants under the will of Philip Hammond, deceased, it was obviously liable to abate by the death of any one of them, whose interest did not survive or fall into the common stock for the benefit of any one or all of the others; although as regarded the creditors. of' the deceased, it was to .be treated as a mere creditor’s suit. Therefore, on the death of the plaintiff Philip Hammond, the surviving plaintiffs filed a supplemental bill of revivor against his widow Juliana Hammond, and his infant children Philip Hammond, Marianna Hammond, Harriet Hammond, Edward Hammond, and Cecelia Hammond; who all answered and admitted the facts as stated in the bill.
The auditor reported, that, in consequence of the imperfect state of the accounts and vouchers of the defendant Rezin, who was one of the executors, he had taken unusual pains to prepare his account ; that he, the auditor, had made a statement, to make a report' of which to the court, the affidavit of Rezin-was necessary; that several days had been appointed for him to appear and verify the statement; but he had failed to do so; from which, and his conduct the auditor alleged, that he was convinced he should be unable to report any account unless Rezin should be compelled to attend.
8th Jiugust, 1829.
Bland, Chancellor.
It having been made the duty of the auditor to state such accounts as the Chancellor may direct; and as he has, for that purpose, been clothed with authority to administer an oath to all witnesses' and persons proper to be examined upon such accounts; (a) it necessarily follows, that, here as in England on a reference to a master, where an exe *311 üütor, as in this instance, or other party has been decreed or ordered to account, he may be called before the auditor and examined on oath upon interrogatories in relation to such account. The answers of a party to interrogatories being, in such case, considered in the nature of an answer to the bill, may, in the same way, be excepted to for insufficiency. And such party may be compelled by attachment, if necessary, to attend before the auditor, and to answer as required. (b)
Ordered, that the said Bezin Hammond forthwith attend before the auditor, and give such information and testimony, or make such affidavit as may be deemed pertinent and necessary to enable the auditor to state such an account as he has been directed to state, or the nature of the case may require; provided, that a copy of this order be served on the said Bezin Hammond.
The auditor on the 25th of August, 1829, filed his report of the accounts which' he had stated in obedience to the decree of the 27th of August, 1828, in which he set forth, that the overpayments of Charles, Thomas, and Elizabeth, amounted together to $2,047 29; and that there was due from the defendant Rezin $555 19; that the outstanding claims against the testators, as then shewn, amounted to $3,086 29; that Charles and Harriet claimed to have their legacies charged against the general fund, which, if allowed, would leave the sum of $5,908 39 to be provided for; that, assuming this as the amount to be raised from the estate, he had stated the amount of contribution with which the respective devisees were chargeable; that there was a debt due to the estate amounting to $605 with interest and costs, which had not then been collected; and of the parcel of land devised to be sold for the payment of debts, there remained one hundred and fifteen acres yet to be disposed of; neither of which items had been included in his estimate of the estate.
To this report of the auditor the defendant Rezin excepted; because Charles and Harriet had been allowed their legacies out of the general fund to the prejudice of the other devisees.
The parties Thomas, Charles, Rezin, and Elizabeth, as executors of the late Philip Hammond, by their petition stated, that a judgment had been recovered against them, and their sureties, on their bond, as executors, for the use of JYicholas G. Ridgely for *312 the sum of $471 36, with interest and costs, it being a debt due from their testator; and that Ridgely had sued out a fieri facias against them. Whereupon they prayed that he might be restrained from proceeding at law, &c.
On the 29th of September, 1829, an-injunction was granted as. prayed, \ . •
The plaintiffs, with the leave .of the court, on the 28th of. October, 1829, so amended their bill as to make Jinn Hammond, the wife, and Matthias. Hammond, t Denton Hammond, Susan Hammond, and Jinn Hammond, the infant children of the defendant Rezin; and Harriet Hammond, the wife, with Henry Hammond, Thomas Hammond, and Margaret Hammond, the' infant children' of the plaintiff J.ohn, parties to this suit, on the ground of their having an interest in the .estate of the testator under his will. The adult defendants put in their answers, and the infant defendants answering by their guardian ad litem to this amended bill, admit- . ted all the facts as set forth by the plaintiffs.
On the 7th of November, 1829, the parties filed the following agreement: ‘Whereas there is a cause now depending in the Court of Chancery, for the settlement of the estate of Philip Hammond, deceased; and it is ascertained, that the estate specially devised by said Hammond, for payment of debts, is insufficient, for that purpose; and whereas there'.is some doubt whether the contribution provided for by the will, should be made by the devisees of said Hammond, equally, or in proportion to the value of the property severally devised to them. It is, therefore,, agreed, in order to save expense, that' said, doubt shall be submitted to the Chancellor. And in case the Chancellor should determine that the said contribution shall be borne by the said property in pr'opor-' tion to its value, then the property devised to Thomas Hammond, shall be estimated to be worth $10,000; the property devised to Charles Hammond, shall be estimated to be worth $10,000; the property devised to Henry Hammond, shall be estimated to be worth $10,000; the real property devised to John Hammond, shall be estimated to be worth $2,000; the property devised to, George: W. Hammond, shall be estimated to be worth $10,000; the property devised to Rezin Hammond, shall be estimated to be worth $10,000; the property devised to Matilda Hammond, shall be estimated to be worth $10,000; the property devised to Harriet Ham-mond, shall be estimated to be worth.$10,000; the^property devised to Philip Hammond, Jr. shall be estimated to be worth *313 $10,000; and the property devised to Philip H. Mewburn, shall be estimated to be worth $10,000. It is also agreed, that no advantage shall be taken of any alleged defect in the bill, in not charging, that Charles and Harriet Hammond, are entitled to have their pecuniary legacies raised by contribution.’
22d December, 1829.
Bland, Chancellor.
This case standing ready for hearing, and the solicitors of the parties having been fully heard, the proceedings were read and considered.
It has been urged, that the sums of money given to Charles and Harriet are merely pecuniary legacies, payable only out of the surplus after debts and specific legacies. It is alleged in the bill and admitted, that the personal estate of the testator is inadequate to pay his debts; hence it follows, that those sums of money given to Charles and Harriet, cannot be paid, unless, like the devises and bequests of the original will, they are to be considered as specific legacies, only chargeable with a proportional contribution for the payment of the debts, which the funds appropriated for that purpose by the testator, was insufficient to pay.
In questions of this kind, it is declared by all the authorities, that the intention of the testator is always to prevail, unless it contravenes some established rule of law. It is evident, from the general character of the testamentary instrument under consideration, that the late Philip Hammond, by his will, had designed to dispose of his whole estate, of every description, in a very especial manner. His wife, each one of his children, and his grandson, are named and provided for, by a donation of what he manifestly had estimated as a due proportion of his properly. And each share is given, in a manner, so carefully guarded, as clearly to shew, that the whole subject had been pondered over and well considered. Whether each one of the dividends, so made, was, in fact, of equal value is of no importance, as regards the present question. After the testator had thus established the proportions, in which the first and chosen objects of his bounty should take, he then gives to five of his slaves their freedom, with small pieces of property for their support during their lives; and then, in conclusion, he provides for his creditors: but, in doing so, he cautiously guards against disturbing the equilibrium he had established among his devisees, by expressly declaring, that in case the fund, so set apart for his creditors, should not be sufficient, £that the property devised to my sons and daughters, and to my grandson, shall contribute in equal proportion, to the discharge of my debts.’
*314 From this clause, and the general tenor of the win, there can be no doubt, that every devise, and every bequest, including the emancipation of his slaves, for the gift of freedom to a slave, is a most precious specific legacy, are all of them specific legacies which can, in no manner, be made abateable or reducible by any deficiency of the testator’s personal estate; but, in case of any deficiency of that which he has designated as the creditors’ fund, the several devisees, charged with contribution, might be compelled to contribute toward the satisfaction of the testator’s debts to the whole amount of the property given to them, before the donations to the wife and freed slaves, who are hot so charged, could be at all molested. Indeed it seems to be admitted, that the intention of the will, to this effect, is so unequivocally clear as not to leave room for the smallest doubt upon the subject.
But the testator, by his codicil, informs us, that he himself had broken in upon the proportionate distribution which he had previously made with so much precisión, and which he had manifested so much solicitude to preserve, by parting with some of the negroes he had given to-his son Charles, and his daughter Harriet, and then says, ‘ I do therefore, in lieu of the said devises, give and bequeath to my said son Charles the sum of $700, and to my said daughter Harriet the sum of $300, respectively.’
From which it clearly appears to. have been the intention of the testator to restore, in all respects, the proportions which had. been thus disturbed; and that thé money, so given, should .take 'the place, and stand in lieu of the negroes in those shares from which they had been withdrawn; and that he intended to declare, that-as the negroes had been given as specific legacies, subject only-to contributions in the event and manner designated, so those sums of money should, in like manner, be deemed and taken as specific legacies, attended with the.like benefits, and subject to the same extent of contingency and incumbrance, and no more..
I-am therefore of opinion, that these sums of money, given to. Charles and Harrietshotlld have been paid by the- executors in ■the first instance, as specific legacies, out of the fund set apart by the testator for. the payment of his debts, as, in fact, not forming any part of it; since it cannot be inferred from any thing said by him, that they were to be paid from any other portion of his estate. And that then each division, charged with contribution, must contribute, as prescribed by the will, to the payment of such debts as remain unpaid from that fund, after those two legacies have been *315 deducted from it. In so far as the executors, into whose hands a sufficiency of assets came to satisfy those two legacies failed to do so, they are chargeable with a devastavit; and consequently, they alone are liable for the whole amount, principal and interest; and the legatees cannot be allowed to take the place of creditors and have the amount raised by contribution from the devisees.
It is, in general, true, that pecuniary legacies bear interest from the end of one year after letters testamentary have been granted, allowing that time for the executors to collect the effects of the deceased, (c) In this instance, there appears to be an additional reason why interest should be allowed from that time on these legacies; and that is, their having been expressly declared to be in lieu of certain specific legacies which, if they had not been withdrawn, should have been delivered immediately, and could have been at once made profitable to the legatees; thus indicating it to have been the intention of the testator himself, that interest should be allowed as a substitute for the profits of the slaves in lieu of which the money was given; since it is in general, true, that where one legacy is substituted for another, the substitute will be attended with the same incidents as the original, (d) I am therefore of opinion that interest on these sums has been correctly charged.
It is alleged, that the whole fund, set apart by the testator for the payment of his debts, will not be sufficient for that purpose: and it is upon the truth of this fact, that the plaintiffs claim to have the assets accounted for by the executors; to have the amount of the unsatisfied claims against the deceased ascertained; and to have the other devisees compelled to contribute to the payment of such debts, according to the terms of the will. Although all the executors, and the legatees Charles and Harriet, as such, with all the devisees who have been charged with contribution by the will, have been made parties to this bill; yet it is not alleged, that the suit has been instituted generally for the benefit of those interested in the correct distribution of the real or personal assets of the testator; or for the benefit of those creditors and others who' may have an interest in the fund appropriated by the testator for the payment of his debts. The bill contains no distinct and express allegation, that the plaintiffs had instituted this suit, as *316 well for the benefit of creditors as of themselves; and yet the case has been hitherto so conducted as if it were by positive allegation and in its nature a creditor’s suit.
The defendants have urged, that there is nothing in the pleadings, as amended and aided by the agreement filed on the 7th of November last, which can warrant these plaintiffs in assuming the position of creditors; or which can give them a right to have their complaint considered as a creditor’s suit, under which they could, as has been done, give notice, in the usual manner, to the creditors of Philip Hammond, deceased, to come in and participate in the distribution of this fund. To answer this objection, and for the purpose of obtaining a clear view of the whole subject, I shall take this occasion to consider the nature of a creditor’s suit more at large, than the questions now presented, may seem to require.
The estate of a deceased person must be first applied to the payment of his debts, leaving the residue only to go, as directed by his will, or as the law has provided in cases of intestacy. But as the person who takes out administration of his estate, in most cases, cannot know who are his creditors, and may not know who are his next of kin; and the administration of his estate may be exposed to great delay and embarrassment; the Court of Chancery has long exercised a most wholesome jurisdiction, in such cases, for the prevention of delay and embarrassment; and for the assistance and protection of the representatives of the deceased, by assuming the administration of his estate, (e) With these views ; and, for the purpose of securing the fund, and of doing equal justice to all, this court will take upon itself, the general administration of the assets of a deceased debtor, either at the instance of one or more of his creditors, (f) or legatees, (g) or next of kin; (h) or on a bill filed by an executor; (i) or a trustee of the testator’s estate, for direction or indemnity in the payment of debts, (j) And it will, in like manner, in some cases, assume the distribution of the estate *317 and effects of a living insolvent debtor among bis creditors, (k) The foundation upon which this jurisdiction seems to rest, is the principle, that equality is equity; and that its proper application requires the interposition of the peculiar powers of a Court of Chancery, (l) as well for the benefit of creditors, as for the protection of the representatives of the deceased debtor; (m) either because the assets of the deceased are, or may, if not placed in safety and correctly administered, be insufficient to satisfy all: or because it is necessary for the legatees, or secondary claimants, who can obtain nothing until the creditors, or primary claimants or incumbrances have been first called in and satisfied; (n) or because the debtor, though alive, being insolvent, has no more than a certain amount to be distributed rateably among his creditors; or has by a deed of composition specially appropriated all his estate and effects for the satisfaction of all his creditors, who all come in accordingly; (o) which property is likely to be misapplied, or wasted by the debtor or holder of it; or that the parties to the deed of composition are too numerous to be made parties to such suit, (p) The sole or principal object of bills in equity for any of these purposes being the satisfaction of creditors, they are emphatically called creditors’ suits; and are, for the most part, governed by rules common to them all. (q)
By the common law, lands in the hands of the heir, were liable to1 bond creditors only, where the' heir was specially bound; and even to that extent, as they had no lien upon the real estate descended, the heir was only personally liable, in respect of and to the value of the real assets descended; and, therefore, a bond creditor could make no claim against such real estate in the hands of a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, (r) But even a bond creditor could not recover his debt of the heir, if he *318 had aliened the land before an action was brought, or of a devisee of his debtor at any time, (s) To prevent this wrong and injury to creditors, it was declared by an English statute, passed in the year 1691, that the heir should be liable to the value of the land descended to, and aliened by him; and that all devises should be void, as against creditors ; who should have the same right to sustain an action of debt against such devisee, that they could have had against the heir, (t) But as the relief, given by this statute, is confined to those cases only where the creditor may recover by action of debt; the common law, in other respects, remains unaltered ; so that no damages can be recovered of a devisee of the land, for a breach of covenant made by the devisor, (u) This English statute has been expressly recognized as one of the legislative enactments of our code; (w) and, consequently, where a creditor’s suit is brought to charge any lands so devised, the heir as well as the devisee, must be made a party; because it is the statute alone which makes the land assets in the hands of the devisee; and that requiring the heir.to be made a defendant at common law, the bill in this court must follow the remedy therein prescribed. (x) But if the bill alleges, that the testator left no heirs. *319 or none who are citizens or residents of this state, then, following the provisions of the act of assembly, as to suits at common *320 law, (y) the creditor may, on stating the fact, proceed against the devisee alone, with the executor or administrator of the deceased, if there he any such personal representative.
But the statute of 1691 is confined to cases, where a debtor devises his real estate away from his creditors, and leaves them to chance to obtain satisfaction of their debts, enriching third persons at their expense* And therefore, the devising of an estate for the payment of debts takes the case out of the statute; and leaves the debt to stand as it would have done before, so that the creditor can come upon the real estate only in such manner as the will directs. The mere inconvenience of the mode prescribed by the testator for the payment of his debts will not bring the devise within the statute ; provided the fund be ultimately sufficient; and the gift of the estate for the payment of debts has been made in an effectual and practicable manner, so as to answer the purpose. (z) In all such cases the real estate thus made liable, is held to have been thereby converted from legal, into equitable assets, because of its being so made assets in equity where they would not be so at law; and also, because of there being no mode of administering such assets but in a Court of Chancery; (a) where, upon principles of equity, it is held, that specialty creditors can only be allowed to *321 come in, pari passu, with simple contract creditors; and moreover, that notwithstanding the infancy of the heir or devisees, the lands may, without allowing the parol to demur, he immediately sold for the benefit of all the creditors, (b) This construction and qualification of this English statute has been virtually affirmed by the act of assembly which authorizes the Chancellor, where lands are devised to be sold for the payment of debts or other purposes, and there is no person appointed to execute the trust; or the person appointed neglects or refuses to do so, to appoint a trustee, to order a sale, and to apply the proceeds accordingly, (c) And although the application under that act of assembly is always made ex parte, yet, if the object be to pay debts, it is treated, in all the subsequent proceedings, as a creditor’s suit; such as ordering notice to be given to the creditors of the testator to bring in their claims and the like, (d)
*322 In England, where a debt is secured by specialty, by which the debtor binds himself and his heirs for the payment of the debt, *323 such bond creditor may file a bill in behalf of himself and other bond creditors against the heir and devisee with the executor or administrator of the deceased, to obtain satisfaction of their claims *324 from the personalty, if sufficient to pay all, or by a sale of the realty, if the personal estate be insufficient, (e) And even if the bill be filed by one bond creditor only for the satisfaction of his own particular debt, the constant course, in England, is to direct an account of all the bond debts of the testator or intestate, with liberty to come in for satisfaction ; without which no decree for a sale can be, for as they have all a lien against the heir, who is bound as well as the ancestor, they are all entitled to receive satisfaction ; and might otherwise sue at law notwithstanding the decree for a sale; but it would be very mischievous should the court suffer another bond creditor, who has not obtained judgment, after a decree for a sale, to proceed against the estate, as the effect of a sale could not be had during the continuance of the levari on the judgment which must be removed in order to a sale, (f) But as bond creditors have an election to sue and obtain satisfaction from the executor, or the heir, at common law, it is not often, in England, that they proceed in equity; unless it be to have a discovery and account of the rents and profits of the realty, or to obtain some other advantage which they cannot have at law. (g)
*325 By a British statute, passed in the year 1732, and which appears to have been introduced and practised under here so early as the year 1740, it is expressly declared, that the real estate of a debtor shall be assets for the satisfaction of all just debts, duties or demands of what nature or kind soever, in like manner as real estates are by the law of England, liable to the satisfaction of debts due by bond or other specialty, and shall be subject to the like remedies for seizing, extending and selling the same, and in like manner as personal estate, (h) From which, it would seem, to be impossible to avoid coming to the conclusion, which has been so perfectly well settled in regard to bond creditors, that a suit, at common law, under the positive provisions of this statute, might be sustained by a simple contract creditor, as well as by a bond creditor, against the heir, grounded merely on the fact of real assets having descended to him. Yet it appears to have been always held, that this statute should not be so construed as to authorize such a suit on that foundation alone by a simple contract creditor; and it has been adjudged accordingly, that a simple contract creditor cannot sustain an action of assumpsit against the heir merely in respect of real assets descended; although he might maintain such an action if the heir had, in respect of such assets, made an expresa promise to pay. (i) The reason of a construction apparently in such direct opposition to the express letter of this statute, requires some-explanation.
At common law, lands were liable in the hands of the heir for the debts of his ancestor, due by specialty, in which the heir was bound; and they were also made liable by several English statutes giving an extent or elegit, which had been adopted here, (j) before the introduction of the statute of 1732, making lands in the colonies liable to be taken in execution for debt. In England a bond creditor, after the death of his debtor, might sue the executor, or the heir separately at common law; or he might file a bill in equity against both, in which suit all the specialty creditors of the deceased might come in and participate. But although the common law, after lands were made liable to be taken in execution for debt *326 by extent, statute staple, and elegit, seems to have relaxed in favour of the creditor so far as to let him in indifferently on the real or personal fund at his election, it provided no means of determining how the burthen should be borne as between the heir or terre-tenant and the personal representative of the debtor. Here, therefore, equity stept in; and considering the common law remedy against the heir, and the statute provisions against the land as instituted only for the sake of preventing the creditor from sustaining a total loss of his debt; and that, therefore, the ancient common law notion, that the land should be considered only as a dernier security for a debt to which the heir became subject on the contract, in respect of real assets, if the personal assets failed, furnished the true principle on which an adjustment ought to be made, between the heir and executor, founded an equity upon that common law notion; and thereupon substituted the heir in the place of the creditor, and fixed the debt on the' personal assets, if sufficient, making, the personal,, as between the heir and executor, exonerate the real estate. In which respect the Court of Chancery, acting in conformity with its principles, that in all cases, where there is a measuring cast between an executor and an heir at law, held,, that the latter should have the preference. Therefore, although a creditor by specialty may, at law, sue either the heir or executor, and shall have the benefit of his- security against the one or the other, at his election; yet if the heir or devisee be charged in debt, where the executor has assets, the former may ultimately compel the latter, in equity,, to pay the debt; unless he can shew some special exemption by the act of his testator upon ‘ which he ought to be discharged, (k)
After the adoption here of the statute of 1732, subjecting lands to the payment of debts, the phraseology of the writ of fieri facias was altered so as to authorize the levying of it upon the goods and chattels, lands and tenements, of the debtor; and the statute was thus directly put into operation against living debtors according to its very letter. But it was soon perceived, that a statute, so extensive in its bearing, could not be, in any similar way, literally applied to the estates of deceased debtors in the hands of their heirs, without creating much confusion in the administration of such estates; and without putting it in the power of each sim *327 pie contract creditor to have the estate collusively seized and sold, in fraudulent exclusion of other creditors ; or so as to operate injuriously upon the interests of others, and particularly upon the heir by compelling him. to seek reimbursement from the personal estate, which was the primary fund for the payment of debts. And therefore, those principles of equity by which the rights of bond creditors had been so far modified and controlled as, in many cases, to do equal justice to all creditors; and so as, at once, to the full value of the personalty, to protect the realty in the hands of the heir, were so followed out, in the construction of this statute, as not to permit a simple contract creditor to maintain an action at ■common law, at all, against the heir merely in respect of the real assets descended; but to compel him to go immediately into .a court of equity against the heir, together with the personal representative of his deceased debtor, so as to enable the heir to protect himself, without any circuity of judicial proceeding; and to save the realty, by having the personal estate first applied to the .satisfaction of the debts; and to do justice to all the creditors by-allowing them to come in according to their respective priorities; or for their due proportions. The adoption of these principles, and the giving of this construction to this statute, necessarily threw the administration of all real assets into the Court of Chancery ; and gave a new and very enlarged scope to a creditor’s suit.
Such must have been the course of proceeding, in all cases, under this statute, after the death of a debtor, as well where his heir was of full age, as in those cases where he was a minor; (l) for, if it were not so, then a simple contract creditor, as he was not allowed to sue at law, could,.before the year 1818, have had no recourse against the real assets in the hands of adult heirs in any way whatever; since prior to that time, the only act of assembly in relation to the matter, being merely intended to prevent delay in proceeding against infants, (m) this British statute which had made such real estate assets for the payment of debts, would have been, thus far, virtually nullified. (n) This matter has, how *328 ever, been put to rest by a positive legislative enactment, which declares, that the previous laws in relation to the sale of real *329 estates held by infant heirs or devisees shall be extended to defendants of fall age. (o)
*330 Formerly, in equity as well as at law, where a suit was brought against an infant heir, or against coparceners, any one of whom *331 ■was an infant, in respect of the real estate descended, the parol demurred; or, in other words, the further prosecution of the suit *332 was stayed, until the infant attained full age ; (p) which privilege had been, by our law, extended to all infants who claimed by pur *333 chase in like manner as to those who claimed by descent- (q) Hence, as it would seem, the guardian of an infant could not, at the *334 instance, and for the benefit of a bond creditor of his ward’s ancestor, be compelled in equity to account for the rents and pro *335 fits of the real estate descended; (r) probably, because those rents and profits were allowed to the heir as a support during his minority ; and as a means of preparing for his defence when he should attain his full age; or, because, upon feudal principles they were to be otherwise disposed of. (s) And therefore, after lands here had been made liable to the payment of debts, by the statute of 1732, no decree for the sale of it could be obtained for that purpose *336 against the heirs or devisees of the debtor so long as any one of them remained under age; until, by an act of assembly, the court was authorized, where lands possessed by an infant were chargeable with the payment of money, and therefore, liable to a decree for sale, to pass such a decree- with the consent of the guardian of the infant heir; (t) which delay and consent were in some particular cases dispensed with by special legislative enactments, (u)
After which it was, by a general law, declared, that in case an action at common law should be brought, in which the title to real estate was involved, which action should abate by the death of either plaintiff or defendant, and such title should' descend or be devised to an infant, the action should not be tried during the minority of such infant, unless his guardian or next friend should satisfy the court, that it would be for his benefit to have it tried, (w) And it was further provided, that, in case there should not be personal estate sufficient to pay the debts of the deceased, the heir or devisee, being of full age, or upon his arrival at the age of twenty-one, should, to the value of the land descended, pursue the same rules, in payment of the debts of the deceased, as were prescribed by law for executors or administrators, (x) Thus, in effect, constituting the adult heir or devisee of the deceased an administrator of his real assets.
But still, as in actions at law by bond creditors against infant heirs or devisees, as original defendants, the parol must demur; and as creditors by simple contract, or where the heir of the debtor was not bound, could only sue in equity to obtain satisfaction -from the real estate of their deceased debtor, where, as at law, the parol was allowed to demur in favour of infant heirs or devisees, to the great hindrance and delay of creditors, it was therefore, declared, that if any person should die without leaving personal estate sufficient to discharge his debts, and should leave real estate to descend, or which he had devised to a minor, the Chancellor might, upon the application of a creditor of the deceased, if he should deem it proper, after the minor had been summoned, and appeared by guardian, and the parties had been heard, and the justice of the claim had been fully established, order such real estate to be sold for the payment of the debts due by the deceased. (y)
*337 But, although, according to all general principles, every part of the real estate of a debtor in the hands of his heir should be held applicable to the payment of his debts ; yet it seems to have been unsettled, at common law, how far estates in remainder or reversion were to be considered as assets present or future. And formerly here, as in England, a notion prevailed, that such estates could not be sold in the first instance, (z) But in equity such *338 estates, whether dependent on a term for years, an estate for life, or an estate tail, are deemed to be of some value; and therefore, *339 ought to be sold immediately for the benefit of creditors, without waiting for the particular estate to fall in; and such is now the *340 practice here as well as in England; (a) and in affirmance of such a course of proceeding, the like power has been given to the Court *341 of Chancery to sell such estates in remainder or reversion belonging to minors as estates in possession. (b)
*342 Hence it appears, that by the operation of these last mentioned acts of assembly, and which, it is clear, from a consideration of *343 the then existing law, could have had, and were always understood to have had no other object, that the privilege formerly *344 granted to infants, of allowing the parol to demur until they attained their full age, has been totally abolished as regards creditors’ suits in equity; (c) since the Chancellor has been thereby directed, on the indebtedness of the deceased ancestor or devisor being established, and the insufficiency of his personalty being made to appear, to cause his real estate to be sold and conveyed by a trustee to the purchaser; (d) notwithstanding the minority of the heirs or devisees, (e) And consequently, the pretext, that of allowing the parol to demur, for depriving the creditors of the rents and profits of their deceased debtor’s real estate in favour of his infant heirs or devisees, having been thus abrogated, an account of such rents and profits may now be called for from the infant as well as from the adult heirs and devisees of a deceased debtor; (f) upon the same ground, that his executor or administrator may be made to account for the increase and profits of his personal estate, (g) So that in all cases, where it appears that the realty must be responsible, a receiver may be put upon it, where necessary, for the purpose of taking care of its rents and profits for the benefit of the creditors. (h)
To enable a creditor to sue on behalf of himself and all others who stand in the same relation with him to the subject of the suit, it must appear, that the relief sought by him is, in its nature, beneficial to all those whom he undertakes to represent; (i) and that *345 the object of the bill is not merely to establish any existing priorities among them as creditors, (j) A mortgagee or a vendor holding an equitable lien, claiming merely as such, has no common interest with the creditors at large; and therefore, cannot be allowed to represent them by suing on their behalf, and having them called in to participate in a suit, the sole object of which is to obtain the benefit of such a lien, by which the whole subject in controversy is claimed, and may be entirely borne away. (k) As where the plaintiff alleged, that he was the vendor of a tract of land, for which a part of the purchase money was still due, which land had descended to the defendants as heirs of the vendee; and that the personal estate of the deceased purchaser was insufficient to pay his debts. The truth of all which was admitted; and the administrator by his answer prayed, that the balance of the proceeds of sale, after paying the plaintiffs, might be put into his hands to be applied to the payment of the debts of the deceased. But this prayer of the administrator was rejected; upon the ground, that no sufficient foundation had been laid to authorize the court to treat the case as a creditor’s suit, and to assume the administration of the assets of the deceased for the general benefit of his creditors. (l)
But, in so far as a mortgagee or the holder of a vendor’s lien has a claim beyond the extent of such lien; because of the deficiency of the premises to pay the debt; or because of some other claim, in addition to such debt, which there is not a sufficiency of personal estate to satisfy, he may, in respect of such claim, sustain a creditor’s suit by thus blending two distinct causes of suit, in only one of which the other creditors have a common interest. As where a vendor, in addition to a balance of the purchase money, set forth a large claim as due to him on another account, to pay which he alleged, that the personal estate of the deceased was insufficient; the case was treated as a creditor’s suit; because, as regarded such additional claim the plaintiff had an interest in common with the other creditors who he undertook to represent; and for whose general benefit it was necessary that the court *346 should assume the administration of all the assets of the deceased debtor, (m)
And there are likewise instances in which a creditor’s suit may be engrafted upon another suit; which, in its origin and object, had no relation whatever to a case of debtor and creditor; or in which the only object was to enforce a lien, such as a mortgage or vendor’s lien, for the- payment of a single debt. As where a mortgagee had filed a bill against the heirs of a mortgagor to obtain a sale of the mortgaged realty for the payment of his debt; or where a bill had been filed to obtain a partition of an intestate debtor’s real estate; or where the real estate of a deceased debtor had been, or was about to be sold under the special provisions of an act of assembly; (n) or where in any such case, a share of the proceeds of sale was about to be awarded and paid to parties as heirs or devisees of a deceased debtor, (o) any creditor of the deceased may come in, by petition, for himself and on behalf of the other creditors, without calling in his executor or administrator as an additional party to such pending suit, and have the surplus, or the whole proceeds of sale; or the share to which the deceased debtor may be entitled; and which then remains subject to the control of the court, applied in satisfaction of his debts; upon which all the proceedings are taken together as forming one creditor’s suit, as to the whole, or the particular share, and are so treated accordingly through all its subsequent stages. (p) The object of the secondary proceeding, in such instances, being to intercept the assets, and prevent their misapplication is, in effect, a prayer for relief against the proceedings in the original suit; and is a kind of engraftment of a scion of a different species upon a then growing stock, (q)
*347 As to who may or must be made parties to a creditor’s suit, the general rule is, that all persons having an interest in the object of the suit, ought to be made parties. But as this rule results from a consideration of the advantage which all persons must have in the entire settlement of the matter in litigation, it is founded on convenience; and is therefore made to yield in cases of necessity, or where it would be attended with any inconvenience which may be safely avoided; upon the ground of their being a common interest among creditors, which any one of them may sufficiently represent; and to avoid the great inconvenience of making all of them parties, any one has been allowed to file a bill for himself, and in behalf of all others of his co-creditors. But, as regards the defendants to a creditor’s suit, the general rule would lead, in administering the assets of a deceased person, to taking notice of his credits, and following his estate beyond his personal representatives; and, consequently, to the bringing forward of his debtors; yet the practice of the court has prescribed bounds to the inquiry; and accordingly the rule is to stop short at the personal representatives of the deceased, unless the justice due to the plaintiffs, or the peculiar circumstances of the case, should require others to be called in. (r)
The personal estate being the primary and natural fund for the payment of debts, must be first resorted to, even for the satisfaction of debts due to the state, as well as to individuals, so far as it remains and can be found, (s) And if that estate be insufficient, there can, with propriety, be no other person than the executor or administrator of the deceased, made defendant to a creditor’s suit. But if the bill alleges, or it can be shewn, that the deceased debtor left no personal estate, or that it had been exhausted or wasted, or by any means become insufficient for the payment of the debts of the deceased; and that he left real estate, then all the heirs and *348 devisees must be made parties to enable the creditors to obtain satisfaction out of such real assets, (t) Owing, however, to our law of partible inheritances, much inconvenience arises, in some cases, from the rule, that all the heirs and devisees must be made parties; which the legislature has endeavoured to remove, by requiring the heir, at common law only, to be summoned; and allowing an order of publication against the rest, (u) But although it is, in general, necessary to have the executor or administrator before the court; either as a plaintiff, asking direction and indemnity, or as a suing creditor; (w) or as a defendant, to have an account of the personal estate, that it may be first applied as far as it will go; yet if the debtor left no personal estate whatever, and that fact plainly appears in the case; or the personal estate left by him, was of so little value, that no one had taken out letters of administration ; (x) which fact of there having been no letters of administration may be sufficiently shewn by a certificate of the register of wills of the county in which the debtor died; (y) or if the executor of the deceased debtor be dead and insolvent, a creditor’s suit may be sustained against the heirs and devisees of the deceased debtor alone, without making his personal representatives defendants, (z)
If the deceased debtor at the time of his death, was a partner with others, then, upon the allegation of that fact; and because of his assets having been so, during his life-time, mixed up with the property of others, his surviving partners, upon whom the whole had devolved, must be also made parties, in order, that the plaintiffs may have an account of the personal estate entire; and so obtain, from the surviving partners, that which properly forms a part of the assets of the deceased, (a) Where the bill charges, that by collusion between the executor or administrator of the deceased, and some third person the assets have been misapplied or wasted, such third person will be held liable; and, therefore, should be *349 made a party, in order to obtain a decree against him; (b) so too, where the executor is insolvent and has not the means to sue, or will not act, a creditor’s suit may be brought against him and other persons accountable to the estate, (c) And where, after the death of a debtor, his personal estate had passed into the hands of his executor or administrator, who died without accounting for such assets, the executor or administrator of the deceased executor or administrator becoming thereby, as it were, a representative of the first deceased debtor, in respect of the assets which had thus come to the hands of his testator or intestate; and being so liable to that extent, should be charged and made a party accordingly, together with the surviving executor, or the administrator de bonis non of the first deceased; not, however, upon the ground, that an executor of an executor is entitled, here as in England, to administration de bonis non of the first deceased ; (d) but because of there being, in respect of such assets, a privity and a mediate representation of, and indebtedness to the first deceased, (e)
In a creditor’s bill against the representatives of a deceased debtor, it was formerly not unusual to describe particularly the real estate of which the deceased debtor died seized; but as it may,in most cases, be impracticable for a creditor to do so, it has been held to be unnecessary to set forth any description of the deceased’s real estate, (f) But it is usual, and in most cases necessary, in such bills, to set out with a qui tam allegation, that “ your orator, A. B., of-r county, as well on behalf of himself, as of other the creditors of C. D., late of-county, deceased, who shall come in and contribute to the expense of this suit, that the said C. D. being, in his life, and at the time of his death, seized in fee simple of a considerable real estate,” &c. (g) Whence it would seem, that the other creditors should always be called in to participate as co-plaintiffs ; but when they do come in, they are thenceforward considered as parties to the suit; (h) and may be regarded as taking the position of either plaintiffs or defendants as their in *350 terests or the nature of the case may require, (i) And as it must appear, in all cases, where a creditor undertakes, by a creditor’s suit, to represent the interests of others, that the relief sought is, in its nature, beneficial to those others, it follows, that where a creditor may sue either for his own claim alone, or as well in behalf of others as of himself, that he should, by an express averment in his bill, make his election to sue in the one way or the other; (j) and where he has sued merely in his own name, but can only obtain the relief he seeks by suing as well in behalf of the other creditors as himself, his. bill must be amended to that effect before or at the hearing, (k) But, in general, it is the nature of the case which gives to it the character of a creditor’s suit; for an allegation in the bill, that the plaintiff sues as well for himself as other creditors, will not alone justify its being treated as a creditor’s suit where the case does not warrant it; nor will the omission of such an. allegation prevent its. being so considered, where the nature of the case is such as to require the creditors to be called in. (l)
The establishment of the whole, or a part, of the claims of all, or of some one or more of the originally suing creditors, is the first point to be determined. In all cases, it is indispensably necessary that the plaintiff should sustain the facts- of his case, either by proof, or by the admission of his opponents; for, otherwise he can have no standing in court, nor any right to sue, whatever may be the law arising out of such facts. If, therefore, the claim of the plaintiff be denied by all, or any one of the defendants, it must be proved, (m)
A guardian ad litem of an infant defendant, being appointed by the court for the purpose of having the proceedings substantiated against him, so that justice may be done to the plaintiff, (n) like a solicitor, becomes thereby so far one of the guardians of the lis, that he is bound to have it conducted with as much fairness and benefit to the infant as the nature of things will permit, (o) It is *351 Ms duty to use all proper diligence in answering for the infant; (p) and in seeing that the proofs are correctly taken and brought in; (q) and he will be held liable if guilty of any fraud, misconduct, or negligence; (r) generally speaking, the infant will be bound by the consent of such a guardian, as well as by that of his solicitor in relation to the regular conduct of the suit, (s) But where, after evidence had been taken under an original bill, an amended bill was filed, making infants parties, their guardian ad litem was not allowed to consent to the reading of such evidence against them; (t) nor has such a guardian any power to execute a release for the purpose of giving competency to a witness ; (u) nor is he allowed, merely as such, to receive any money which, in that suit, may be awarded to the infant; (w) or, in any way to bind the interests of the infant by a consent, operating as a contract, in relation to matters intended to sustain the claim of the plaintiff; or to supply a defect in the merits of the plaintiff’s case, which do not constitute a part of the regular proceedings in the suit. Yet, if there be no apparent and just ground of defence, such a guardian may consent to a decree againt the infant, (x) An infant defendant, however, who always answers by his guardian ad litem, who alone swears to the answer, cannot be bound by'any admission in his answer so made; it amounts to nothing; it cannot be read against him; and for that reason, where he admitted the claim by such an answer, it was, nevertheless, deemed necessary to read the proofs to see that the plaintiff had made out his ease; and even where such proof might readily be produced, the parol was allowed to demur until the infant attained his full age. (y)
*352 These principles of law and equity operated very prejudicially against creditors who had no other means of obtaining satisfaction of their claim than from the real estate of their deceased debtor in the hands of his infant heir or devisee; and therefore, it was, by an act of assembly, declared, that a decree for a sale of the real estate for the satisfaction of any claim against it might be obtained by the consent of the guardian of the infant heir or devisee, (z) Thus, in effect, giving to the answer of an infant, by his guardian, in all creditors’ suits, and suits by mortgagees, the force and operation of an adult defendant in so far as to authorize the immediate sale of the realty without allowing the parol to demur, (a) By a subsequent legislative enactment it was declared, that if any person should die without leaving personal estate sufficient to discharge the debts by him due, and should leave real estate, the Chancellor, after summoning the minor heir or devisee, and his appearance by guardian to be appointed for that purpose, and to answer and defend for him; and on the justice of the claim of the creditor being fully established, might order the real estate to be sold for the payment of the debts due by the deceased. (b) Thus virtually, abolishing the infant’s privilege of having the parol to demur, and of shewing cause when he attained his full age; and so placing it in the power of the Court of Chancery, at once, to compel him to do justice to the creditors of his ancestor or devisor, by divesting him of the privilege of alleging his minority as a means of obstructing, for a time, the regular course of justice.
It having been thus put upon infant defendants, in such cases, to defend their interests immediately, and as effectually as they can, by a mere guardian ad litem, who has been expressly authorized to consent to an immediate sale of the real estate; the answer of an infant by his guardian, in all such cases, must be taken to be as conclusive against him as if he had answered as an adult, (c) And as a creditor, who comes in under a decree, may have his claim allowed upon affidavit,, if it be not expressly denied and contested ; so a creditor, suing as an original plaintiff, may obtain a decree on a similar authentication of his claim, unless it be expressly denied and put in issue by the answer of an adult or infant defendant; otherwise a plaintiff creditor would be made, to encounter greater difficulties than one who came in under the de *353 cree. (d) Such has always been held to be the true construction and necessary consequence of those legislative enactments ; for, if it were not so, they would have removed no obstructions, nor given to creditors any additional facilities whatever in recovering satisfaction of their debts from the real estate of their deceased debtor, in the hands of his infant heirs or devisees, (e)
*354 The next point to be established in a creditor’s suit against the representatives of a deceased debtor to enable his creditors to ob *355 tain satisfaction by a sale of his real estate, is the insufficiency of his personal estate to pay his debts. If that fact be denied, an ae *356 count must be taken of the personalty; and the creditors must be notified to file the Touchers of their claims, so that that fact may be *357 determined before there can be a decree for a sale of the realty; or, even if the insufficiency of the personal estate be to some *358 extent- admitted, not denied, or established, still, for the benefit of the heirs or devisees, the creditors may be notified to bring in their *359 claims in order to ascertain what proportion of the real estate must fee sold, (f) If, on thus taking an account of the personal estate, it should be clearly shewn to be abundantly sufficient to satisfy all the creditors of the deceased, then the suit may, thenceforward, be confined to the administration of the personal estate alone, continuing the personal representatives only as defendants, and dismissing the bill as against the- heirs. But, it is the habit of the court, where the insufficiency of the personal estate is admitted or shewn, and it thus foresees that the real estate must be sold, to decree a sale of it immediately without setting the case down for final hearing- (g)
The establishment of some claim of a creditor, and the insufficiency of the personal estate to discharge the debt due by the deceased, thus shewn, or not denied by the heirs, being the foundation on which a decree for a sale of the realty must rest; and without which it could not have been passed, such a decree, therefore, necessarily establishes the validity of such claim, and the insufficiency of the personalty, without leaving those matters open to any further question by any of the immediate parties to it. (h) And as the coming in, under such decree, implies a submission to it, no creditor, who thus comes in, can be allowed to impeach it; except on the ground of fraud among the original parties to it; and in so far as it injuriously affects his interests, by making a wrong disposition of the property, (i) If a part only of the claim of the plaintiff be sustained, the decree should specify what part has been established; and how much has been finally rejected, or is to be allowed to stand over to be again brought forward, upon further proof, with the claims of other creditors; but if no such specification be made, then it must be assumed, that the decree has finally established the validity of all the claims of the several plaintiffs, (j) And although the personal estate may not be suffi *360 cient to pay all; yet if it appears, that there is still a portion of it to be accounted for, and distributed, then the same decree, which ■directs a sale of the realty, should also require the executorj[or administrator to account for the personalty; and, if the creditors have not been previously called in, the same decree should moreover direct the trustee appointed to make the sale, to give them notice, at the time of advertising the real estate for sale, to file the vouchers of their claims in the chancery office.
Such a decree virtually takes possession of the property and vests it in the court, for the purpose of distribution; (k) and, consequently, the court may thenceforward exercise over it all such control and authority as may be necessary for its beneficial preservation. If it cannot be immediately sold, it may be rented, or .disposed of in the mean time, to the best advantage; (l) the committing of any waste upon it, maybe prohibited by injunction; (m) or a receiver may be put upon it to collect and take care of its rents ■and profits, (n) The trustee appointed to make the sale, being the mere agent of the court; (o) it is the court who must be regarded -as the vendor; and as the holder of the vendor’s equitable lien, (p) The trustee, without incumbering the report of his proceedings, with any thing more than a concise reference to the decree; and a brief averment, that he had, in all respects, complied with its directions ; or if not, with a statement of the way in which he had departed from those directions, should clearly and distinctly set forth the date and terms of the contract of sale which he had made with the purchaser, naming him ; and which contract he thus submitted to the court for its confirmation or rejection.
So soon as the court has, by a decree, assumed the general administration of the assets, it will on motion or petition; (q) and without, as formerly, a second bill filed for that purpose, (r) interpose by injunction; and stop in its progress, to judgment, an action at law, brought by any creditor for payment of his debt; (s) and *361 although the name of such creditor was, without his consent, inserted in the bill filed on behalf of all the creditors of the testator; (t) or to restrain an action brought by a lessor against an executor, as executor, for a breach of covenant to repair; since the fact of a breach, and- the damages may be as well ascertained by the auditor as by a jury, (u) And the like injunction may be obtained, not only where the bill is filed by creditors; but also where it is filed by an executor to have the directions of the court for the execution of the will, and to be indemnified; (w) or for the same purposes, by trustees of the testator’s estate; (x) or where it is filed by a residuary or other legatee; (y) and the injunction may be obtained on the application of an executor, where the bill is filed by creditors; (z) or by trustees; (a) or on the application of a creditor plaintiff, the bill being filed by creditors against the executor ; (b) or on the application of a legatee, by whom the bill is filed against the executor, (c)
But, in granting an injunction, in cases of this kind, in order to protect the real or personal representatives from pressure at law, the court is always careful not to exclude creditors, proceeding at law, from.the benefit of their diligence, by which' they have established a right to be satisfied, either out of the assets of the deceased, or de bonis propriis of the representative; a right which, in some cases, the conduct of the representative will confer on them, and in others their activity; and will not indulge creditors who have lain by to the extent of depriving the diligent of the fruits of their diligence. (d) And, therefore, an injunction may be obtained to shelter assets against execution under a judgment against the heir or executor ; (e) as where after a decree to account, a creditor proceeds to trial at law, and there obtains a verdict; (f) or where *362 after such decree, the executor suffers judgment by default; (g) although so far as a judgment may affect the executor’s own property, the court will not interfere to protect him. (h) ■ And if a bond creditor has got a judgment against the executor or heir, before the decree, then after the decree, although such creditor may come in and prove accordingly, as a judgment creditor, against the personal, or the real estate in the hands of the executor or heir; yet the court will, on application, grant an injunction to prevent him from taking out execution against the assets, (i)
The principle upon which an injunction rests in such cases, is, that substantially, a bill by a creditor, in behalf of himself and all others; or a suit by any one, in which all the creditors may be represented, and allowed to come in to obtain satisfaction, is considered as making all of them parties to it; and that the decree is in the nature of a judgment for them all; and, therefore, the court, to prevent difficulty, confusion, and injustice; and to sustain its jurisdiction, thus assumed over the administration of the estate, will never permit another suit to be instituted for the same object, with the same parties, and directed to -the same relief. If the relief in the first suit can be extended ; if expense can be saved by incorporating with it any proceeding which will avoid the necessity of a second bill, there is an obvious propriety in not permitting another suit to go on. But a second suit may be rendered necessary either, by collusion in the former suit; or by its having- left out some principal matters of charge; or by its having omitted, from ignorance or negligence, some important ground of relief, (j)
Such an injunction may, however, in some cases be made an instrument of fraud and injury to the whole body of the creditors, by persons, who have more interest in forbearing than urging their demands against the representatives of the deceased, so managing it as to leave the representatives in almost as undisturbed enjoyment of the assets as before the bill was filed. To prevent such an abuse of its authority, the court, when asked for such an injunction, may look into the answer of the executor or administrator and see what amount he admits to be in his hands; or if he has not there stated *363 it, may order him to make affidavit of the amount, and to bring into court that, if any, which he so admits to be in his hands. Yet it is not an absolute rulé of the court to refuse an injunction, unless there- is an affidavit stating the assets in the hands of the personal representative. Or, should a case arise, of assets wasted by a personal representative, from the neglect of- the solicitor, by whom the suit was conducted, the court would hold him responsible ; (k) or should there be any improper delay by the original plaintiff, any one, who has been allowed to come in as a creditor or party, may be -permitted to take his place, and prosecute the suit. (l) For, although a plaintiff, who sues on behalf of himself and all other persons of the same class, as he acts upon his own mere motion, and at his own expense, retains the absolute dominion of the suit, until another has been admitted as a co-plaintiff, or until a decree to account, and may dismiss the bill at his pleasure; yet, after another has been admitted as a co-plaintiff, or a decree has been passed, he cannot, by his conduct, deprive other persons of the same class, who thus become actors, of the benefit of the suit if they think proper to prosecute it. (m)
I am, therefore, of opinion, that this is, in effect, and may properly be considered as a creditor’s suit; although it is not expressly alleged to have been instituted for the benefit as well of the creditors of the testator, as of these plaintiffs; and that the. order directing notice to be given to the creditors of the late Philip Hammond to bring in their claims, was, in every respect, proper; and must have the effect and operation of allowing a satisfaction to be awarded to those creditors who shall come in as thus warned,- and of making a distribution of the residue of the estate among the respective claimants. And, moreover, that the injunction granted on the 29th of September last, to prevent the creditor, Ridgely, from proceeding at law on the judgment he had obtained against these executors, was proper and well warranted by the nature of the case.
In order to ascertain who are creditors, and also, where necessary, who are the next of kin of the deceased, the court directs public notice to be given by advertisements in newspapers, or *364 otherwise, subject to the restrictions of the act of assembly, (n) , in those quarters where creditors and next of kin are most likely to be found, calling on them to come in and file the vouchers of their claims in the chancery office, usually within four months from the day appointed for the sale of the real estate. And when that time has expired, it being Considered that the best possible means have been taken to ascertain the parties really entitled, the auditor is then, and not befofe, allowed or directed to make a statement and distribution of that amount of the personalty, if any : and of the proceeds of the sale of the realty, .after the sale has been finally ratified, among the claimants. It is, however, obvious, that the parties really entitled may never have seen or heard of the advertisements, or of the suit; and, therefore, it would be the height of injustice, that the proceedings of the court, wisely adopted with a view to general convenience, should have the effect of conclusively applying the fund unequally and wrongfully; or of transferring the property of the true owner to one who had no right to it. And, therefore, the court will, at any time before it has actually parted with the fund, upon the application of a claimant, let him in, and send the case again to the auditor, to have the' distribution recast at his expense; except, indeed, as to small claims, which can be satisfied out of the accruing interest of the purchase money of the real estate which had been sold, without incurring the expense of a re-statement, (o)
If, however, a part only of the- fund remains in court, such part will be charged with no more, than its due proportion, leaving the *365 claimant to seek satisfaction for the residue from the next of kin, legatees, heirs or devisees to whom the other shares of the iund had been actually paid. But after the court has actually parted with the whole fund, upon a bill filed by a creditor, next of kin, heir, or devisee against those alleged representatives of the deceased, among whom the property had been distributed, the court will, upon proof of no wilful default on the part of such creditor, next of kin, heir or devisee; nor any want of reasonable diligence, compel the next of kin or distributees to pay or restore to such plaintiff that to which he may appear to be justly entitled, (p) But if the whole estate has been distributed and actually paid over to the creditors of the deceased, or in so far as it had been so actually paid away, then, as such creditors cannot be made to refund, claimants of, and under the deceased debtor, who may thereafter come in, can take nothing by their application; not upon the ground, that their claims are without foundation ; but because by their negligence they have lost all means of relief, (q)
A publication warning all claimants, unknown to the court, to come in and file the vouchers of their claims against the estate, is a constructive notice, upon which it is presumed to be safe to proceed to make a distribution of it among all those who then, after such notice, shall have come in and made claim. That, however, cannot apply to a legatee, or any other claimant who then fails to come in and assert his right, but whose title appears upon the face of the proceeding; and who must, therefore, have a proportional share of the fund set apart for his satisfaction, (r)
Should a claimant find it necessary, for any purpose advantageous to himself, to introduce any matter, not apparent upon the face of the voucher of his claim, he may be permitted to do so by petition ; or if the relief he seeks cannot be so obtained he may file a cross bill, (s) But the most usual way for a creditor to come in is by merely filing the voucher of his claim with such an affidavit *366 annexed as is required for authenticating such a claim in the Orphans Court, (t) The meaning of which practice is, that a person should not come here, and claim a debt without giving that assurance, that it is due, which arises from his affidavit; which also, if the debt be contested, affords a protection against the conclusion from other evidence, that it is due, when the contrary may be within the knowledge of the party himself; (u) and moreover, because of its being proper to follow the rule prescribed for the Orphans Court, under similar circumstances, in order that there may be a consistency in the administration of justice. But if the claim be contested, as it may, by a plaintiff, a defendant, or any one who has been allowed to come in, and whose interest may be affected by it, no attention is to be given to the affidavit, the claim must be established by full proof as on issue joined before a jury; or it will be rejected. The admission of, or even a judgment against an executor or administrator can be of no avail against the heir or devisee, (w) And if all the original parties to the suit should waive the statute of limitations, still it may be relied on by any one who comes in, and may have an interest to protect by relying on the statute, (x)
In general no claim can be considered as a debt due by the deceased ; and, as such, entitled to be paid out of his estate, but that which he owed-at the time of his death, and was then, or thereafter payable; and the balance only of such a claim, for which the deceased was then liable, is the amount to be satisfied in whole, or in due proportion, (y) Where the assets are sufficient to pay all the creditors of the deceased; or where there is an ample solvent fund, it cannot be necessary to attend to the order in which the debts are satisfied, or to adjust any apportionment among them; since nothing can be awarded to the next of kin or legatees, heirs or devisees of the deceased, or to the debtor himself until all his creditors have been satisfied to the full amount of their respective claims, principal and interest; for if a creditor is entitled to any interest it is as much a debt as the capital itself, (z)
*367 A statement liquidating the amount due to each creditor, inclusive, or exclusive of interest, must always be made, in a creditor’s suit, according to the nature of each claim. And therefore, it is necessary, in all such suits, that the nature of the claim for interest, and the mode of computing it should be attended to, in order, that a correct distribution may be made, even where the fund may be sufficient to pay all; and more particularly so where, the estate being insufficient, the several claimants can only be satisfied in part and in due proportion.
Interest on money is defined to be the compensation which the borrower pays to the lender for the profit which he has an opportunity of making by the use of the money; part of that profit naturally belonging to the borrower who runs the risk, and takes the trouble of employing it; and part to the lender who affords him the opportunity of making the profit. (a) According to this definition, it is only that part of the interest which belongs to the lender, and which he may legally sue for and recover, that is now, and so often becomes the subject of judicial consideration.
In England, according to the principles of the common law, interest was not allowed upon a sum certain, payable at a given day. The action of debt being the only mode of recovering a sum certain, except where there was a breach of covenant; and, in that action, the defendant being commanded to render to the plaintiff the debt, or shew cause, the. payment of the specified debt, without any thing more, answered the action and put an end to the suit. And thus, interest forming no proper part of the original debt at law, it was held to be created only by the nature of the security. This general rule, it is said, prevents acts of kindness from being converted into mercenary bargains; and, by making it the interest of traders to press for payment, thereby checks that pernicious extension of credit which is so often ruinous to both parties. (b) But in debt upon a bond, with a condition to pay a lesser sum, the defendant was authorized by a statute to make satisfaction by the payment of the lesser sum with inte *368 rest, (c) And, in many other cases, where there is either an express or implied contract or usage of trade requiring interest to be paid, as on negotiable notes and the like, the English courts of common law give interest down to the day of signing the judgment. (d) And so too, where there has been a wrongful withholding of the debt, the jury is permitted to bring in a verdict allowing interest in the shape of damages for the detention of the money. But, in general, no interest is ever given, by the English courts, upon mere simple contract debts, as for goods ■ sold and delivered, &c. (e) A plaintiff is- not suffered to sue out execution, in any case, for more than the whole amount awarded to him by his judgment; yet if his judgment be not satisfied, he may bring an action of debt upon it, in which the whole accumulated amount of it, constituted of the principal and interest of the debt, or the damages assessed, and the costs, considered as one entire debt will be allowed to carry interest until the signing of judgment in such action, (f)
In Maryland interest on money is not only given in all cases where, in England, it would be awarded, to the creditor; but, in many other cases where, according to the English law, he would not be allowed to recover any thing in the nature of interest for the detention of. his money. It is 'here given by the court, or left to the jury, as in some cases in England, to give or not, at their pleasure, in almost all kinds of cases; (g) as on a claim for rents and profits ; (h) for rent; (i) for the value of goods replevied; (j) for the value of land not conveyed according to contract-; (k) for money which had been actually used; (l) for the balance due on an account stated; (m) for a sum of money which the defendant, *369 by his receipt, promised to return ‘when called on to do so (n) and the like. By an English statute, passed in the year 1705, and adopted here, it is declared, that, in an action on a bond, with a condition for the payment of a lesser sum, the defendant may plead the payment of the principal and interest due by the condition in bar; or may, pending the suit, bring such principal and interest into court in satisfaction of the debt, (o) And, by a legislative enactment of the provincial government, it was declared, that the courts of common law might assess damages and give final judgment in all actions of the case upon assumpsit, whether the same should be entered upon default, demurrer, or confession without a writ of inquiry. (p) Under this authority, and in accordance with the English, practice, the court itself, in all actions upon bills of exchange and promissory notes; and, in some other cases, where interest was allowed in the shape of damages, calculated the interest, added it to the principal, and gave judgment for the whole amount thus found due. (q) This provincial law having been repealed by an act confined, by its terms, to cases after an interlocutory judgment where the plaintiff was entitled to a writ of inquiry; and where thé damages sustained could not be ascertained without the intervention of a jury; (r) the courts still continue to exercise the power, as formerly, in actions on bills of exchange, and the like, of calculating the interest, and entering up judgment for the whole, thus ascertained, and costs, (s)
In the year 1760, it was declared, by the court of King’s Bench, of England, that nothing could be more agreeable to justice, than that interest should be carried down to the actual payment of the money, (t) Yet notwithstanding the obvious correctness of this position, owing to the strict forms by which the courts of common law were tied up, interest has never, in England, been carried down farther than to the day of signing judgment; nor here until lately, and that only exclusively of costs. Although it had always been the course of the courts of equity, as well in England as here, in ordering tbe payment of money, on which interest was *370 allowable, to direct interest to be carried down to the time of the actual payment, or the bringing of the money into court. (u)
It has -been declared by an act of assembly, that, in all actions brought for the penalty of any bond or contract, the jury may, under the direction of the court, upon the plea of payment or performance, find what sum of money is really due to the plaintiff; upon which judgment shall be entered for the penalty to be released upon the payment of the sum so found due, and interest on the same until paid and costs, (w) So that, under this act, the plaintiff may, as in an action of debt upon a judgment, recover further interest, except on the costs, upon the aggregate amount of his judgment, and have his execution thereon levied accordingly. As for example, if the debt really due was $100, with $30 interest, the jury would be directed to find a verdict for $130, upon which judgment would be entered with interest on the same from the day of signing the judgment until paid. (x) It had also become usual, in the courts of common law, in actions of debt, assumpsit, &c. where the defendant confessed judgment, to enter it for the amount claimed in the declaration, with a memorandum at the foot of the judgment, that it should be released on the payment of the whole sum then due, with interest thereon from that day until paid, and costs of suit, (y) After which it was enacted, that all judgments by default, and in all cases where a verdict should be given, the judgment thereon should carry interest in the same manner as in cases of a confession of judgment, (z)
Equity, in this respect, follows the law; or, rather has always pursued a similar course, and allows interest in all cases where, under like circumstances, it might be recovered at law. (a) And therefore, as a judgment here, as in England, always had the effect of converting the interest then due into principal, so that, in an action of debt, interest might be recovered upon the whole amount; and as such subsequent interest may now be levied here under a fieri facias, (b) So upon the whole amount awarded by an *371 order or decree of this court, subsequent interest is, to the same extent, and in like manner, recoverable. The auditor, in a creditor’s suit, always makes a statement of the claims of the creditors, allowing interest to each, if entitled to it; and, the aggregate thus shewn, is considered as the liquidated debt then due to each; and an order confirming such a statement, is a judgment of the court in favour of each creditor, which, like a judgment at law, converts the interest into principal. Interest is, therefore, to be computed from that time forward upon the aggregate amount, (c) So that it may be regarded as a general rule, here as in England, that where a debt is liquidated by an auditor’s statement confirmed, the whole carries interest from the date to which such confirmation relates; and so toties quoties, as any new statement may be made. (d) And if the debtor should appeal; and the judgment *372 below should be affirmed, here as in England, the appellate court may, according to the express provisions, and the spirit of several *373 legislative enactments, add the interest which had accrued upon the judgment below to its aggregate amount, and direct the whole *374 to carry interest from the time of the affirmance until paid, (e) In England interest is allowed upon the whole amount of the debt, *375 thus ascertained by a judgment at law, or an order in equity, although a large part of such amount should be constituted of *376 costs; (f) on which costs, as a separate claim, no interest would he allowed, (g) But here, as our acts of assembly have not made *377 the costs a part of that judgment debt upon which subsequent interest is to be computed until paid, no interest has been allowed *378 to a creditor upon his costs; although the trustee of the court always has a due proportion of interest awarded to him on the *379 amount allowed to him as commission by the order confirming the auditor’s report, (h)
*380 This judicial conversion of the interest into principal, has, in some respects, the appearance of allowing compound interest, *381 and of being in fact usurious; but it is not so. (i) Compound interest is the annual or periodical conversion of interest into prin *382 eipal, so that the whole may carry interest to the end of the next year or period, and so on. The contracting for which originally would be deemed illegal, (j) But where the interest is converted into principal by a judgment at common law, or by an order of this court, it is because of the whole being found to be then due as an entire debt, which is so judicially required to be paid, on which, if the debtor fails to pay as commanded, he must, thenceforward, he charged with interest upon the whole amount so adjudged to be due. (k) And upon similar principles, on a hill to foreclose, or redeem a mortgage, if, by the decree, the mortgagor is allowed a certain time to redeem, by the payment of principal, interest and costs down to a specified day; and if he fails to do so, the interest will be added t. Anderson. — This bill, filed on the 20th of November, 1788, states that the late Rebecca Anderson, by her will, gave to the plaintiffs certain legacies, and charged the payment of them upon her real estate, which she devised to James Anderson; that the testatrix was indebted by bond to Alexander Christie, and jointly bound with Ann Ogle to pay a composition of 6s. 8d. in the pound to the creditors of the said James Anderson, the devisee; that one of the legatees was dead, to whose legacy the plaintiffs were entitled as next of kin; that another legatee was dead, who, by his will, had given his legacy to one of these plaintiffs, and that a third legatee having married and died without issue, letters of administration had been granted to one of these plaintiffs; that the testatrix Rebecca Anderson left no personal estate, and that the devisee James Anderson had died leaving a daughter, the infant defendant, his sole heir. Whereupon it was prayed that the real estate so devised, might be sold, in the first place, to satisfy the debts of the testatrix Rebecca ; and in the next place, the legacies given by her, and also the debts due by James Anderson, deceased, the devisee.
The infant defendant answered by her guardian ad litem, admitting the allegations of the bill, and alleged that Ann Ogle had paid the composition to the creditors of James Anderson, and having obtained an assignment of their claims against the estate of the testatrix, she, Ann Ogle, claimed contribution.
17tk April, 1789. — Rogers, Chancellar. — Decreed, that the real estate of Rebecca Anderson he sold, &c.; that James Hindman, the trustee, shall, on his receipt of the purchase money, first pay and satisfy to the said Alexander Christie, the said sum of ¿£300 sterling, and interest of five per centum thereon from the date of the said bond, in current money, at sixty-six and two-thirds per cent, exchange. And to the said Ann Ogle one moiety of the said composition of 6s. 8d. in the pound of the debts of the said James Anderson, due and owing in London, and now assigned to the said Ann Ogle, the said moiety amounting to the sum of ¿£2,464 15s. 4l¡d. sterling, with interest thereon of .five per centum from the 8th day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and seventy-four, in current money, at sixty-six and two-thirds per cent, exchange; and out of the residue of the money arising from such sale, pay the said legacies to the aforesaid persons respectively entitled to receive the same devised by the last will and testament of the said Rebecca Anderson to her daughter, and Harriet Rebecca, and her son William Anderson, with interest on the same of five per cent, respectively, from the first day of February, in the year seventeen hundred and seventy-six, in current money, at sixty-six and two-thirds per cent, exchange; and the surplus of the money arising from such sale, to pay and apply to the satisfaction and discharge of the debts due and owing from the said James Anderson, deceased, which there shall not be personal assets of the said James Anderson, in the hands of the said trustee, as his administrator, to discharge; a commission of four per,cent, allowed to the trustee. The personal estate to be first applied before any of the said proceeds of sale, &c. — Chancery Proceedings, lib. S. H. H. lett. B.fol. 620.
Jones v. Jones, 1 Bland, 452 .
Sumner v. Kelly, 2 Scho. & Lefr. 398.
Kenebel v. Scrafton, 13 Ves. 370; Bluett v. Jessop, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep. 112; Winter v. Hicks, 5 Cond, Cha. Rep. 490.
Abell v. Screech, 10 Ves. 356; Watkins v. Maule, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep. 45; Young v. Everest, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep. 499; Rowland v. Tucker, 4 Cond. Cha. Rep. 591.
Barrett v. Blake, 2 Ball. & Bea. 354.
Greenwood v. Taylor, 4 Cond Cha. Rep. 381; 2 Mad. Chan. 657; Millar v. Baker, 1 Bland, 147 , note.
Pue v. Dorsey, 1 Bland, 139 , note.
Howard v. Harris, 1 Vern. 193; Antrobus v. Davidson, 3 Merival, 570; Arthur v. The Attorney General, ante 246.
Harris v. Ingledew, 3 P. Will. 98.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6683240. Public record. Not legal advice.
