# Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co.

> Supreme Court of the United States · May 24, 2010 · 560 U.S. 242

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6680910

## Case

- **Full name:** BRIDGET HARDT v. RELIANCE STANDARD LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
- **Court:** Supreme Court of the United States
- **Decided:** May 24, 2010
- **Citations:** 560 U.S. 242; 22 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 351; 78 U.S.L.W. 4448; 49 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1001; 176 L. Ed. 2d 998; 130 S. Ct. 2149; 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4164
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Stevens
- **Judges:** Alito, Breyer, Ginsburg, Kennedy, Parts, Roberts, Scalia, Sotomayor, Stevens, Thomas
- **Cited by:** 738 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6680910

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that plaintiff, whose claim for benefits was denied by insurer, achieved some success on the merits of her ERISA claim when, although the plaintiff “failed to win summary judgment on her benefits claim, the [d]istrict [c]ourt nevertheless found ‘compelling evidence’” t…
- holding provision of the Patent Act that requires applicants who file action in federal court to pay “[a]ll expenses of the proceeding,” 35 U.S.C. § 145 , does not overcome the American Rule’s presumption against fee shifting to permit the Patent and Trademark Office to recove…
- finding that the plaintiff was entitled to attorney’s fees after a finding that “the plan administrator . . . failed to comply with ERISA guidelines” and remanded the plaintiff's case back to the plan administrator who reversed its decision and awarded the plaintiff “the benef…
- holding that “purely procedural victories]” do not qualify for fees even under standards “less stringent” than the prevailing-party requirement
- holding that “‘prevailing party’ precedents . . . do not govern the availability of awards under [29 U.S.C.] § 1132(g)(1) [ ] because this provision does not limit the availability of attorney’s fees to the ‘prevailing party.’”

## Opinion text

SEPARATE OPINION
[ 560 U.S. 257 ]
Justice Stevens,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
While I join the Court’s judgment and Parts I and II of its opinion, I do not believe that our mistaken interpretation of § 307(f) of the Clean Air Act in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 , 103 S. Ct. 3274 , 77 L. Ed. 2d 938 (1983), should be given any special weight in the interpretation of this—or any other—different statutory provision. The outcome in that closely divided case turned, to a significant extent, on a judgment about how to read the legislative history of the provision in question. Compare id., at 686-693 , 103 S. Ct. 3274 , 77 L. Ed. 2d 938 , with id., at 703-706 , 103 S. Ct. 3274 , 77 L. Ed. 2d 938 (Stevens, J., dissenting). I agree with the Court in this case that 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (g)(1) does not impose a “pre *1011 vailing party” requirement; I agree, further, that the District Court acted well within its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to this petitioner. But I would examine the text, structure, and history of any other federal statute authorizing an award of fees before concluding that Congress intended the same approach under that statute as under this one.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6680910. Public record. Not legal advice.