# Blinderman Construction Co. v. United States

> United States Court of Federal Claims · November 13, 1997 · 42 Cont. Cas. Fed. 77,210

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6646719

## Case

- **Full name:** BLINDERMAN CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC. v. United States
- **Court:** United States Court of Federal Claims
- **Decided:** November 13, 1997
- **Citations:** 42 Cont. Cas. Fed. 77,210; 39 Fed. Cl. 529; 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 262; 1997 WL 719912
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Gibson
- **Judges:** Gibson
- **Cited by:** 23 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6646719

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “the only way to accurately assess the effect of the delays alleged ... on the ... project’s progress is to contrast updated CPM schedules prepared immediately before and immediately after each purported delay”
- holding that for a contractor to receive an equitable adjustment, it must prove liability, causation and resultant injury by a preponderance of the evidence
- declining to apply the mirror-image rule upon the basis that there was no evidence that the con tracting officer had considered the counterclaim
- stating that “contra proferentum comes into play only if the non-drafting party’s interpretation of the contract is reasonable.”
- stating that the contractor must prove liability, causation, and resultant injury by a preponderance of the evidence

## Opinion text

OPINION
REGINALD W. GIBSON, Senior Judge:
INTRODUCTION
This government contract case is before the court following a trial on the merits held in Chicago, Illinois, on June 23-27, 1997, and in Washington, D.C., on July 8, 1997. Plaintiff, Blinderman Construction Company (BCC or plaintiff) is a general contractor, engaged primarily in public construction projects for both municipalities and the Federal Government. On January 3,1990, the defendant, the United States acting through the United States Department of the Navy, Northern Division of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (Navy or defendant), awarded Contract No. N62472-87-C-0052, in *534 the amount of $10,675,115.00, to plaintiff for the construction of an Electricians Mate/Interior Communications (EMIC) training facility in Great Lakes, Illinois. JX BB at 1, 11111-2. 1 This facility was intended to function as a school providing instruction to Naval enlisted men concerning sophisticated communication technologies. The Navy accepted the EMIC building on September 19, 1991.
Thereafter, plaintiff submitted various claims to the Navy’s contracting officer. Following an adverse final decision of the contracting officer on the bulk of said claims, plaintiff filed a 17-count complaint with this court on July 22, 1994, seeking equitable adjustments against defendant. 2 In response, defendant filed its Answer and three counterclaims on November 17, 1994. In February 1997, the parties agreed to settle five of the original 17 claims alleged by plaintiff — Counts IV, VII, XI, XIV, and XVII— and those counts were dismissed with prejudice by order dated March 5, 1997. Another five of plaintiffs claims — Counts V, VIII, IX, X, and XIII — and two of defendant’s three counterclaims, were settled by the parties in mid-trial, and are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiffs remaining seven claims and defendant’s single remaining counterclaim, seeking judgment in the amounts set forth below, plus statutory interest, were tried on the merits.
$ 46,071 Count I — The CQC Representative Issue
36,520 Count II — The Steel Rebar Issue
78,512 Count III — The Concrete Rubbing Issue
10,779 Count VI — The Ground Face Masonry Issue
68,408 Count XII — The Substantial Completion Issue
45,677 Count XV — The Subterranean Concrete Removal Issue
20,301 Count XVI — The Asbestos Abatement Issue
$306,268 Total award sought by plaintiff, exclusive of interest
$ 11,208 Defendant’s Counterclaim (Count III), exclusive of interest
On July 26, 1997, plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s counterclaim under RCFC 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Said motion is pending for decision.
The first five of the seven counts before the court, including defendant’s counterclaim on Count III, are amenable to independent resolution and, in the discussion that follows, shall be addressed in five separate sections. A sixth section shall be devoted to Counts XV and XVI, which present closely related issues of fact and law.
Having laboriously reviewed the extensive record before us and the litigants’ post-trial submissions, we hold that plaintiff is entitled to judgment on Count I in the amount of $24,603.00, plus appropriate statutory interest. As to the remaining six counts, defendant is entitled to judgment and, therefore, plaintiffs claims are dismissed. Finally, plaintiffs motion to dismiss defendant’s counterclaim on Count III under RCFC 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted. We next address the merits of each count, seriatim.
DISCUSSION
1. COUNT I — THE CONTRACTOR QUALITY CONTROL (CQC) REPRESENTATIVE ISSUE
A. Facts
Plaintiffs Count I seeks an award of $46,-071.00, averred to be the direct costs incurred as a result of the Navy’s wrongful refusal to approve plaintiffs appointee as the sole Contractor Quality Control (CQC) Representative on the contract, as well as indirect costs relating to five days of perfor- *535 manee delay, plus statutory interest from the date this claim was submitted to the contracting officer for decision. The contract sets forth at great length the procedure by which the contractor, BCC, was to ensure proper compliance with the various contract specifications, i.e., quality control. To that end, the contract called for the establishment of a “quality control organization.” JX AA § 01400, at U 1.2(a). Plaintiff was required to prepare a CQC plan identifying the members of the aforementioned organization and their respective duties, and to submit said plan to the Navy for approval within 15 calendar days after receipt of the notice of award. Until the Navy’s contracting officer approved said plan, no construction on the EMIC project could begin.
At a minimum, the CQC organization had to include the CQC Representative, an Alternate CQC Representative, a Submittals Assistant, and at least two specialized supplemental personnel — a registered mechanical engineer and a registered electrical engineer. The contract further delineated certain minimum qualifications which each of the foregoing members of the CQC organization had to possess. Moreover, the contract explicitly cautions that BCC “shall be responsible for providing additional qualified staff at no cost to the Government when necessary for a proper CQC organization to fulfill the CQC requirements.” JX AA § 01400. at K 1.4.
Of the required personnel, the CQC Representative was to fill the role of overall supervisor of the entire CQC organization. More specifically, pursuant to the terms of the contract, the CQC Representative was required to be on the work site at all times, was authorized to take “any action necessary to ensure compliance with the contract,” and was prohibited from assuming any “job-related responsibilities other than quality control.” Id. at U 1.2(b). Said quality control responsibilities included but were not limited to: inspecting the daily work; supervising and coordinating the testing of the relevant materials and equipment; certifying that all the material and equipment complied with the contract specifications and drawings; approving shop drawings; recording daily any deviations from the contract specifications; and removing any individual from the project whose work repeatedly failed to comply with specifications.
The controversy at bar centers upon the interpretation of the contractual definition of the minimum qualifications the CQC Representative was required to possess, to wit:
The CQC representative shall be a Registered Professional Engineer with a minimum of eight years of construction experience on not less than three projects of similar type construction to this contract including not less than two years of experience in Quality Control. Additionally, the CQC representative shall be experienced in concrete construction. The CQC Representative shall also clearly demonstrate previous construction experience in masonry work.
JX AA § 01400, at 111.4.1 (emphasis added). On or about February 12, 1990, roughly 40 days after the contract was awarded, BCC submitted for the Navy’s approval the requisite CQC plan, which named Mr. Roger Con-nor as CQC Representative. After reviewing Mr. Connor’s resume, the Navy sought additional information, by letter dated February 15, 1990, for the purpose of completing its determination as to whether Mr. Connor was duly qualified. Upon receiving the requested information from plaintiff, the Navy’s Head of Construction, Mr. Christian Baudhuin, 3 and its Deputy Resident Officer in Charge of Construction, Mr. Matthew Stahl, interviewed Mr. Connor on February 28, 1990. Following the interview, the Navy concluded that Mr. Connor lacked the requisite experience in masonry and concrete construction sought by the Navy, and so informed BCC by letter dated March 1, 1990. Further discussions between the parties took place, as a result of which the Navy apparently accepted plaintiff’s proposal to appoint a concrete engineer and a masonry engineer to supplement Mr. Connor’s experience, in an effort to stem any further delay on the project as a result of the dispute over Mr. Connor’s qualifications. On March 5, 1990, plaintiff finally *536 began its initial site preparation and excavation work on the project.
Shortly thereafter, by letter dated March 7, 1990, the Navy indicated its willingness to accept Mr. Connor as the CQC Representative, but only if BCC provided supplemental personnel, qualified as structural engineers specializing in concrete and masonry work, at no additional cost to the Government. In addition, the Navy agreed to allow Mr. Con-nor to serve both as the CQC Representative and as the requisite CQC mechanical engineer, if the Government received an appropriate credit for permitting Mr. Connor to play this dual role. Although plaintiff continued to maintain that Mr. Connor was duly qualified, it eventually appointed supplemental CQC masonry and concrete engineers in response to the Navy’s demands.
On June 11, 1991, BCC submitted a change proposal to the Navy’s project manager, Ms. Sandra Ginalski, seeking an increase in the contract price in the sum of $46,071. Plaintiffs request for this adjustment rested on the premise that the Navy had wrongfully rejected Mr. Connor as its proposed CQC Representative. In rejecting BCC’s claim in its entirety on July 21, 1993, the contracting officer’s final decision stated that Mr. Connor’s experience in concrete and masonry “was general in nature, and in order to accept him as [the] overall CQC Representative, the specific masonry/concrete experience would be required of one of the supplemental CQC representatives.” JX 2 at 2; JX BB at 4,1111.
B. Contentions
1. Plaintiff
Plaintiff contends that the Navy wrongfully rejected Mr. Connor as its CQC Representative and proffers two alternative arguments, each of which directs the court’s attention to the scope of the word “experience” as employed throughout § 01400, 1t 1.4.1 of the contract. First, plaintiff maintains that this “experience” specification is unambiguous and, accordingly, that the relevant language must be interpreted in light of its plain and ordinary meaning. In that connection, plaintiff stresses that its obligation was to interpret the pertinent contract language reasonably, not “correctly.” Accordingly, says plaintiff, the contract merely required the CQC Representative to possess practical “ ‘experience’ in similar projects to the contract at issue, and furthermore be ‘experienced’ in concrete and masonry work,” no more, no less. As a registered professional engineer with nearly 35 years of related work experience, avers plaintiff, Mr. Connor clearly possessed the requisite minimum experience with concrete and masonry, and with projects comparable to the EMIC building at issue here. Thus, by tendering a person “who clearly met the plain language of the contract specification,” plaintiff submits it is entitled to be justly compensated for the additional costs incurred as a result of the Navy’s unwarranted refusal to accept Mr. Connor as the overall CQC Representative.
Alternatively, if the “experience” specification is deemed ambiguous, plaintiff argues that it should prevail, nevertheless, pursuant to the well-established principle of contra proferentum. Said principle, in plaintiffs view, requires a “court [to] construe an ambiguity in favor of the non-drafting party if such an interpretation is reasonable.” Plaintiff further emphasizes that it is not bound by the Navy’s unexpressed, subjective interpretation of the contractual term “experience.” While pointedly abstaining from offering its own definition of the term “experience,” plaintiff opines that its interpretation is reasonable inasmuch as it is “one that encompasses the actual and literal meaning of the word.” In short, plaintiff asserts that Mr. Connor possessed the requisite experience regardless of whether the language of the “experience” specification is marked by clarity or by ambiguity.
2. Defendant
Conversely, defendant meets plaintiffs contentions with the emphatic assertion that Mr. Connor failed to satisfy rigorous qualifications clearly delineated in the contract. First, defendant points specifically to the requirement that the CQC Representative have “construction experience on at least three projects of similar type construction” to the EMIC project. In order to satisfy this criterion, defendant explains, an individual must *537 “have direct experience in designing, constructing, inspecting!]] or approving multistory, deep caisson, reinforced concrete and masonry buildings” like the EMIC school. Defendant avers that Mr. Connor’s experience was primarily in mechanical rather than structural engineering and, moreover, that his background with respect to reinforced concrete, masonry, and caisson work was limited to time spent simply “watching” others perform such work. Should plaintiffs interpretation prevail, defendant adds, “any individual on a construction site, including the person who delivers the sandwiches at lunch, could qualify for this position.” As to concrete and masonry work specifically, defendant contends that Mr. Connor’s related experience was obtained on projects dissimilar to the EMIC facility. Consequently, defendant proclaims, Mr. Connor’s background “do[es] not amount to similar type construction experience required in the [c]ontract.”
Second, defendant alleges that Mr. Con-nor’s experience was deficient because he did not possess the necessary two years of experience in “Quality Control.” Defendant avers that the capitalization of the term “Quality Control” in the contract connotes a requirement that the CQC Representative previously must have been a member of another “Quality Control” organization. The mere fact that Mr. Connor had overseen the quality of work performed by his own contracting firm could not, according to defendant, satisfy the contractual requirement. Thus, since Mr. Connor “did not demonstrate that he had two years experience in Quality Control,” defendant argues, he “did not possess the requisite experience to protect the Navy’s interests.”
Third, defendant emphasizes the clarity of the contract language providing that BCC was “responsible for providing additional qualified staff at no cost to the Government when necessary for a proper CQC organization to fulfill the CQC requirements.” JX AA § 01400, at f 1.4. Having made its point, defendant challenges plaintiff to identify a provision in the contract that would entitle plaintiff to charge the Navy for the two additional CQC Representatives.
Finally, defendant attacks plaintiff’s computation of damages. Defendant mainly contends that the $10,000 credit allowed the Navy in plaintiffs damages computation is inadequate. Also, defendant alleges that plaintiff has failed to prove its entitlement to five days’ worth of delay damages.
C. Discussion
It is axiomatic that to receive an equitable adjustment to a contract with the Government, a contractor-plaintiff must prove three essential elements before this court— liability, causation, and resultant injury. Wilner v. United States, 24 F.3d 1397, 1401 (Fed.Cir.1994) (citing Servidone Constr. Corp. v. United States, 931 F.2d 860, 861 (Fed.Cir.1991)). Furthermore, plaintiff must establish each element by a preponderance of the evidence. Delco Electronics Corp. v. United States, 17 Cl.Ct. 302, 319 (1989). In other words, in order to carry its burden, BCC must prove that the Navy’s acts or omissions, more likely than not, caused BCC to incur increased costs in performing the contract at issue.
1. Liability
Against the foregoing factual background, the issues postured in Count I are solely a matter of contract interpretation, which is a question of law to be decided by the court. P.J. Maffei Bldg. Wrecking Corp. v. United States, 732 F.2d 913, 916 (Fed.Cir. 1984). Familiar rules of contract interpretation apply here. Foremost, of course, is the principle that “[a]n interpretation that gives a reasonable meaning to all parts of the contract will be preferred to one that leaves portions of the contract meaningless.” Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288, 1292 (Fed.Cir.1985). It is also well established that the words of the contract “are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning.” Thanet Corp. v. United States, 219 Ct.Cl. 75, 82 , 591 F.2d 629, 633 (1979). 4 We are further guided by the principle that a *538 plain and ordinary reading of contract language yields the meaning “which would be derived by a reasonably intelligent person acquainted with the contemporary circumstances.” Rice Lake Contracting, Inc. v. United States, 33 Fed.Cl. 144, 151-52 (1995).
Certain other principles guide us when the contract provision at issue is ambiguous. Contract language may manifest a patent ambiguity where there is “an obvious error in drafting, a gross discrepancy, or an inadvertent, but glaring gap.” WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 874 , 163 Ct.Cl. 1, 6 (1963). See also Grumman Data Systems Corp. v. Dalton, 88 F.3d 990, 997 (Fed.Cir.1996). A patent ambiguity imposes upon the contractor a duty to inquire about the true meaning of the contract. J.B. Steel, Inc. v. United States, 810 F.2d 1139, 1141 (Fed.Cir.1987). It is by now well settled that a contractor cannot raise a patent ambiguity as a ground for an equitable adjustment unless the contractor previously sought clarification of said ambiguity before bidding the contract. Dalton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 98 F.3d 1298, 1306 (Fed.Cir.1996); Grumman Data Systems, 88 F.3d at 998 .
By way of comparison, a latent ambiguity exists where a contract “is susceptible of two different and reasonable interpretations, each of which is found to be consistent with the contract language.” Community Heating & Plumbing Co. v. Kelso, 987 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed.Cir.1993). In such eases, the doctrine of contra proferentum places “the risk of ambiguity, lack of clarity, and absence of proper warning on the drafting party which could have forestalled the controversy.” Sturm v. United States, 421 F.2d 723, 727 , 190 Ct.Cl. 691, 697 (1970). However, contra proferentum comes into play only if the non-drafting party’s interpretation of the contract is reasonable. Interwest Constr. v. Brown, 29 F.3d 611, 614 (Fed.Cir.1994) (citing Newsom v. United States, 676 F.2d 647, 650 , 230 Ct.Cl. 301 (1982)).
Applying these principles of construction to the language of the disputed “experience” specification of the contract, we find that Mr. Connor’s qualifications reasonably met the requirements of the contract. For clarity of analysis, it is helpful to reduce this specification into its five constituent criteria, all of which the CQC Representative had to satisfy, given the use of the conjunctive. Three of the five requisite criteria are not truly contested. First, it is uncontroverted that Mr. Connor was a registered professional engineer at all times relevant to this dispute. Second, the CQC Representative had to “be experienced in concrete construction.” JX AA § 01400, at 111.4.1. Third, said person had to “clearly demonstrate previous construction experience in masonry work.” Id. Inasmuch as the parties stipulated that Mr. Connor possessed both concrete and masonry construction experience, we find that these latter two requirements were satisfied.
The remaining two criteria of the “experience” specification are the focus of this controversy. First, the CQC Representative had to possess “a minimum of eight years of construction experience on not less than three projects of similar type construction” to the EMIC building. Second, said person had to have “not less than two years of experience in Quality Control.” JX AA § 01400, at 111.4.1 (emphasis added). We find both requirements are latently ambiguous because they are laden with terms, highlighted above, that readily lend themselves to multiple reasonable interpretations. Community Heating & Plumbing, 987 F.2d at 1579 . 5 Thus, in order to determine whether the doctrine of contra proferentum applies so as to construe this latent ambiguity against defendant — -its drafter — we next consider whether plaintiffs interpretation of the disputed provision is reasonable.
In assessing the reasonableness of a proffered interpretation, the court’s duty is to assign the contract provisions in question the meaning imputed to a reasonable and prudent contractor fully acquainted with the circumstances at hand. Blake Constr. *539 Co., Inc. v. United States, 987 F.2d 743, 746 (Fed.Cir.), cert, denied, 510 U.S. 963 , 114 5. Ct 438, 126 L.Ed.2d 372 (1993); Western States Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 818, 825 (1992) (citing P.J. Maffei Bldg. Wrecking Corp., 732 F.2d at 917 ). Thus, under time-honored principles, we look not only to the language employed by the contract, but also to the subject matter and the circumstances surrounding the contract’s making. Western States Constr., 26 Cl.Ct. at 825 (citing Nash v. Towne, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 689 , 18 L.Ed. 527 (1866)). We emphasize as well that under the doctrine of contra proferentum the issue is not which party’s interpretation is “better.” Rather, plaintiff is entitled to have the ambiguous contract provision in question construed against defendant so long as plaintiff’s interpretation falls merely within the “zone of reasonableness.” WPC Enterprises, 323 F.2d 874 , 163 Ct.Cl. at 6 (emphasis added).
Concerning the requirement that the CQC Representative possess “a minimum of eight years of construction experience on not less than three projects of similar type construction,” the ambiguity is twofold. The term “construction experience” is undifferentiated as to the relative breadth and depth of experience required in each of the multitude of building trades involved in the construction of the EMIC building, i.e., reinforced concrete, masonry, carpentry, plumbing, etc. 6 In addition, the qualifying phrase “similar type of construction to this contract” relies upon the familiar but overworked term “similar,” yet fails to specify the degree of closeness of the similarity contemplated, i.e., size, value, duration of project, etc. We hold that plaintiff, by proposing Mr. Connor as the CQC Representative for the EMIC project, acted upon a reasonable interpretation of this terminology.
Both parties agree that this controversy centers on the extent of Mr. Connor’s experience with the construction of multi-story reinforced concrete and masonry buildings such as the EMIC facility. Plaintiff points to Mr. Connor’s 35 years in the construction industry, during which he has become familiar with “all phases of construction.” DX 43 at 4. Mr. Connor testified that his construction background included work on more than 30 projects involving multi-story concrete and masonry buildings. Furthermore, his responsibilities have run the gamut of the construction trades, from excavation, reinforced concrete and masonry, to mechanical, carpentry and roofing work. In sum, Mr. Connor’s resume, his interview with the Navy, and his credible and persuasive testimony at trial all demonstrate that he possessed sufficient “construction experience,” consistent with any reasonable meaning of that term, to satisfy § 01400, 111.4.1 of the contract.
Defendant assails Mr. Connor’s experience with multi-story reinforced concrete and masonry construction, thereby relegating Mr. Connor’s knowledge of all other building trades to a secondary status. We acknowledge that Mr. Connor’s experience lies predominantly in mechanical engineering rather than, as defendant would prefer, structural engineering. However, defendant’s argument is flawed insofar as it thrusts too precise a meaning upon ambiguous contract language. Had the Navy desired a person whose predominant field of expertise was multi-story reinforced concrete and masonry construction to serve as CQC Representative, it was within the power, and was undoubtedly the obligation, of the Navy to state that requirement with greater precision in H 1.4.1.
We reach this conclusion, in part, by reading 111.4.1 as a whole, so as to give reasonable effect to all of its provisions. See Julius Goldman’s Egg City v. United States, 697 F.2d 1051, 1057-58 (Fed.Cir.1983); Fortec Constructors, 760 F.2d at 1292 . If the Navy intended to require that a structural engineer serve as CQC Representative, as defendant contends, the Navy no doubt could have chosen more precise language than the general reference to a “Registered Professional Engineer” in the first sentence of H 1.4.1. *540 Moreover, if the phrase “construction experience on not less than three projects of similar type construction” is interpreted so as to implicitly emphasize concrete and masonry construction, the last two sentences of H 1.4.1, which expressly address concrete and masonry construction, would be rendered superfluous. This would offend the fundamental canon of contract interpretation, supra, that the court must construe a contract so as to give reasonable meaning to all of its parts. Two points deserve emphasis. First, the Navy found Mr. Connor was sufficiently experienced to serve as CQC Representative for all purposes on the EMIC project, except concrete and masonry work. However, defendant’s objections to Mr. Connor’s concrete and masonry experience are not grounded in the language of the contract, for the last two sentences of H 1.4.1 address concrete and masonry construction only in the most general terms, specifying neither the nature nor the extent of experience required. Second, it bears repeating that defendant has stipulated that Mr. Connor was experienced in concrete and masonry work generally. Thus, defendant cannot now raise objections to Mr. Con-nor’s concrete and masonry experience, which is uncontested, for the purpose of disqualifying his general “construction experience.”
Likewise unavailing is defendant’s contention that Mr. Connor’s experience in reinforced concrete, masonry and caisson work was limited to time spent merely “watching” others perform such work. Nothing in 111.4.1 expressly supports defendant’s asser tion that the CQC Representative had to be a person whose background included the direct supervision, design, inspection, or performance of each and every facet of multi-story reinforced concrete and masonry construction. 7 Such a reading of H 1.4.1 also fails to take into account the overall nature of the responsibilities of the CQC Representative under § 01400. We find it noteworthy that the CQC Representative was expressly prohibited from performing any activities relating to the construction of the EMIC facility “other than quality control.” JX AA § 01400, at H 1.2(b). Indeed, no member of the CQC organization could have responsibilities other than quality control.
A balanced reading of § 01400 reveals that the CQC Representative was, among other things, supposed to (i) head up the CQC organization; (ii) administer the detailed CQC plan submitted by plaintiff to the Navy prior to the onset of physical construction activity; (iii) enforce compliance with quality control procedures throughout the EMIC project; (iv) prepare and submit daily CQC reports to the Navy; (v) be responsible for inspection and testing of the work generally; (vi) coordinate inspection and testing performed by outside laboratories and other third parties; (vii) certify shop drawings for compliance with contract specifications; (viii) maintain documentation of inspections; (ix) maintain a list of noncomplying work; and (x) submit a final CQC certification at such time as the building was complete and ready for acceptance by the Navy.
*541 Plainly, § 01400 speaks to the systematic administration and coordination of project-wide quality control procedures, not to direct participation in the performance of the construction work itself. We note also that § 01400 does not contemplate that the CQC Representative would necessarily conduct all inspections in person, inasmuch as the CQC plan requires the submission of “the names of persons responsible for the inspection and testing for each segment of work.” JX AA § 01400, at U 1.2(c)(7). Especially relevant is a provision that concrete and masonry work inspections and tests were to be conducted by an independent testing laboratory. Another clause states that certain concrete-related inspections were to be conducted by a professional civil or structural engineer, with the CQC Representative’s role limited to the provision of a certification that such inspection had taken place. Still another section of the contract required plaintiff to employ a qualified masonry inspector to aid the CQC Representative. In addition, the CQC Representative was not solely responsible for approving shop drawings, since such drawings had to be certified by an “authorized reviewer” as well. JX AA § 01400, at H 1.5.2.
In short, the CQC Representative was responsible for ensuring that inspections and other quality control activities took place in an orderly, systematic fashion, but played no role in the actual performance of the construction work itself. This distinction between performing construction work and controlling the quality of construction work pei’formed by others is consistent with the usual definition of “quality control” as “[t]he inspection, analysis, and other relevant actions taken to provide control over what is being done, manufactured, or fabricated, so that a desirable level of quality is achieved and maintained.” Dictionary of Architecture & Constr. 655 (emphasis added). Nor was the CQC Representative required to perform every single quality control activity personally. Rather, the CQC Representative could discharge his responsibilities by procuring the assistance of appropriately qualified persons. Indeed, the very reason for having a CQC Representative on the project is that Navy personnel are involved with multiple projects at any one time and cannot fully supervise the quality of the construction on any single job. Consequently, it is more cost effective to have “a dedicated person on each project, to perform those functions.” Tr. 970-71. 8 However, from the language of this contract, it does not follow that a person qualified to administer the quality control program for the EMIC project had to possess “hands on” experience with every facet of construction work. To paraphrase a remark Mr. Connor made at trial, an engineer need not lay brick to know more about masonry construction than an experienced bricklayer. The court agrees with this observation and holds that plaintiff acted reasonably by proposing Mr. Connor as a CQC Representative who possessed the requisite “construction experience” required by 111.4.1 of § 01400 of the contract.
Turning briefly to defendant’s assertion that Mr. Connor failed to possess at least “two years of experience in Quality Control,” as required by 111.4.1, we find that plaintiff is entitled to have the ambiguous term “Quality Control” construed against defendant under the doctrine of contra proferentum. Plaintiff reasonably interpreted this contract requirement because the evidence adduced at trial establishes that Mr. Con-nor’s prior experience in quality control well exceeded two years. At the time he came under consideration for the CQC Representative position on the EMIC project, Mr. Connor had just completed, or had nearly completed, his work as plaintiffs CQC Representative on another Navy construction contract relating to the Nimitz Family Housing Project, which is also located in Great Lakes, Illinois. 9 Mr. Connor testified that *542 his tenure as CQC Representative on the Nimitz project lasted for “about a year and a half.” Tr. 275. Moreover, at the time he was considered for the position of CQC Representative on the EMIC project, Mr. Con-nor had owned and managed a construction firm — R.J. Connor Co., Inc., Mechanical Contractors — for 35 years. On construction jobs performed by his company, Mr. Connor explained in his interview with the Navy that he was “responsible for quality control all the time.” DX 43 at 11; see also DX 43 at 18.
Against the substantive evidence of Mr. Connor’s experience in quality control, defendant tortuously argues that the contract’s capitalization of the term “Quality Control” implies the requirement that a proposed CQC Representative had to have served two years within a formal CQC organization. We disagree, because “any ambiguity that is solely the result of the party’s unexpressed, subjective belief is insufficient to bind the other contracting party.” Western States Constr., 26 Cl.Ct. at 825-26 . Here at bar, we only find a de minimis quantum of evidence in the record to support defendant’s assertion that the occasional capitalization of “Quality Control” in the contract connotes a special meaning. 10 Moreover, while the term “quality control” is not specifically defined by the contract, the common understanding of this term, supra, is quite consistent with the role of the CQC Representative, which was to perform certain activities in order “to assure compliance with the contract provisions.” JX AA § 01400-1 f 1.2(b). Thus, since Mr. Connor’s experience in said area satisfied the ordinary definition of “quality control,” it likewise satisfied the requirements of the contract.
In sum, we hold that plaintiff reasonably interpreted the contract to mean that Mr. Connor’s engineering credentials and 35 years of experience in the construction industry adequately qualified him as the overall CQC Representative on the EMIC project. Therefore, defendant wrongfully rejected Mr. Connor as the overall CQC Representative. 11
2. Damages
Having determined that the Navy wrongfully rejected Mr. Connor, we now consider the issue of damages. In so doing, we are mindful of the well-established principle that “[a] claimant need not prove his damages with absolute certainty or mathematical exactitude. It is sufficient if he furnishes the court with a reasonable basis for computation even though the result is only approximate.” Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 173 Ct.Cl. 180, 199 , 351 F.2d 956, 968 (1965). Plaintiffs $46,071 damages claim consists of $24,603 of direct costs allegedly incurred to hire two additional engineers to supplement Mr. Connor, and $21,468 of office and field overhead costs allegedly incurred as a result of a five-day delay in the commencement of work on the EMIC project.
a. Employment Of Supplemental CQC Representatives
In its complaint, plaintiff seeks an equitable adjustment for costs associated with hiring a supplemental masonry engineer and a supplemental concrete engineer for the CQC organization, net of certain credits to the Navy. The documentary evidence adduced at trial, which defendant did not pointedly contest, sufficiently supports by the requisite burden a finding that plaintiff is entitled to an award in the sum of $24,603, calculated as follows:
Item Amount
Hiring of masonry construction engineer Hiring of concrete construction engineer Credit for Mr. Connor’s service as supplemental CQC Representative for
$24,039 10,275
mechanical engineering
(10,000)
Credit for deletion of concrete and soil testing associated with the caisson
*543 work (2,081) 12
Subtotal 22,233
Profit at 10% 2,223
Subtotal 24,456
Bond at 0.6% 147
Total damages claim — direct costs $24,603.
We find the $10,000 credit allowed the Navy to be sufficient, based upon the testimony of Mr. Peter Pieroni, plaintiffs project engineer, that $10,000 was the amount attributed to the CQC mechanical engineer position in BCC’s bid. Defendant challenges the adequacy of the $10,000 credit with a vague averment that plaintiff has a tendency to “play with its damages calculations.” However, defendant offered no probative evidence to rebut plaintiff’s prima facie showing that $10,000 constituted a sufficient credit to the Navy. Thus, we hold that plaintiff is entitled to $24,603, representing the direct costs incurred, less the credits due the Navy, plus profit and bond.
b. Delay Damages
BCC also seeks certain delay damages for the additional time taken to complete the project, allegedly as a consequence of the Navy’s failure to timely approve Mr. Connor. Said delay damages are calculated and proffered as follows:
Item Amount
Five days of office overhead costs at
$2,542.46/day $12,712
Five days of field overhead costs at
$l,337.62/day 6,688
Subtotal 19,400
Profit at 10% 1,940
Subtotal 21,340
Bond at 0.6% 128
Total damages claim — delay costs $21,468.
Specifically, plaintiff asserts that it was ready to begin the initial excavation for the project on February 28, 1990, but could not commence said excavation until March 5, 1990. Plaintiff points out that, under the contract, the initial excavation could not begin without an approved CQC Representative on site. It naturally follows, in plaintiff’s view, that this five-day delay was caused by the Navy’s refusal to promptly approve Mr. Connor as the CQC Representative when plaintiff nominated Mr. Connor for this position on February 12, 1990. Plaintiff further avers that the initial excavation work was “axiomatieally” on the critical path of the EMIC project, because this five-day delay “had a ripple effect which followed through the end of the project.”
In order to recover damages for the five days of delay alleged in Count I, plaintiff must prove each essential element of a compensable delay by a preponderance of the evidence. First, plaintiff must quantify the extent of each delay, if any, that was unreasonable. Mega Constr. Co., Inc. v. United, States, 29 Fed.Cl. 396, 424 (1993) (citing Wunderlich, 173 Ct.Cl. at 199 , 351 F.2d at 967 ). Second, plaintiff must prove that each delay was proximately caused solely by the Navy’s actions, e.g., by showing that both parties did not concurrently cause said delay. Blinderman Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States, 695 F.2d 552, 559 (Fed.Cir.1982); Mega Constr., 29 Fed.Cl. at 424 (citations omitted); Young dale & Sons Constr. Co., Inc. v. United States, 27 Fed.Cl. 516, 550 (1993). Third, it must be shown that each delay resulted in some measurable injury to plaintiff. Mega Constr., 29 Fed.Cl. at 424 (citing Wunderlich, 173 Ct.Cl. at 199 , 351 F.2d at 968 ).
Given the record before the court and the applicable law, the court holds that plaintiff is not entitled to recover any delay damages relating to the Navy’s evaluation of Mr. Connor’s credentials and experience. First, plaintiff has not proven that the Navy’s acts unreasonably delayed the start of the EMIC project by five days. After plaintiff named Mr. Connor as CQC Representative in its CQC plan submitted February 12,1990, the Navy responded only three days later, on February 15, 1990, with a request for additional documentation of Mr. Connor’s qualifications. Although the parties thereafter discussed the nature of said documentation in a meeting on February 22, 1990, it appears that plaintiff still had not responded fully to the Navy’s request as of February 27, 1990. On the very next day, February 28,1990, the *544 Navy interviewed Mr. Connor for the purpose of evaluating his qualifications. One day after said interview took place, on March 1,1990, the Navy informed plaintiff by letter that Mr. Connor’s qualifications were unacceptable. By letter dated Friday, March 2, 1990, the Navy invited plaintiff to meet on Tuesday, March 6, 1990, for further discussions.
Viewed in their entirety, the foregoing events demonstrate that there was clearly nothing dilatory about the Navy’s conduct relating to the CQC Representative issue during the time period in question. On the contrary, the Navy’s openness to discussion and prompt responses to plaintiffs communications manifest a sincere interest in resolving the dispute with dispatch so that construction could begin as soon as possible. Thus, we cannot conclude on this record that the Navy unreasonably delayed the start of the EMIC project.
Conversely, the record is devoid of evidence suggesting what actions, if any, plaintiff took between March 15 and March 27, 1990 — apart from attending a single meeting with the Navy on March 22, 1990 — in order to respond to the Navy’s request for more documentation of Mr. Connor’s qualifications. Moreover, the contract expressly required plaintiff to submit its CQC plan to the Navy for approval within 15 calendar days after receipt of notice of the award. Since plaintiff received notice of the award on January 3, 1990, it should have tendered the requisite CQC plan, including Mr. Connor’s nomination as CQC Representative, to the Navy no later than January 18,1990. However, plaintiff failed to submit its CQC plan until February 12, 1990, 25 calendar days after the contract deadline. On this record, we cannot confidently say which party was responsible, in whole or in part, for the five days of delay alleged in Count I. Against this background, it is well settled that “[wjhere both parties contribute to the delay neither can recover damage[s] unless there is in the proof a clear apportionment of the delay and the expense attributable to each party.” Coath & Goss, Inc. v. United States, 101 Ct.Cl. 702 , 714-15, 1944 WL 3694 (1944), quoted with approval in Blinderman, 695 F.2d at 559 . Plaintiff’s failure to establish that the purported delay was proximately caused solely by the Navy is, therefore, fatal to plaintiffs claim for delay damages.
Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant’s liability for the five days of delay alleged in Count I were proven, plaintiff has failed to establish that it incurred measurable damages as a result. In order to establish that the alleged delay is compensable, plaintiff must show that the construction activity delayed was an activity on the critical path of the EMIC project. See Youngdale, 27 Fed. Cl. at 550 . 13 None of the documentation in evidence relating to the critical path of the project indicates that the Navy’s approval of the CQC Representative was a critical path activity. Moreover, even if the site excavation which began on March 5, 1990, was an activity on the project’s critical path, plaintiffs original CPM schedule dated February 28, 1990, indicates that March 5, 1990, was the very date on which excavation was intended to begin. We are unpersuaded by the testimony of Mr. Pieroni, plaintiffs project engineer, to the effect that excavation could have begun as early as February 28, 1990. As the creator of plaintiffs CPM schedule, Mr. Pieroni’s testimony cannot overcome his own handiwork.
The court holds that plaintiff has proven none of the elements of a compensable delay. Accordingly, defendant is entitled to judgment on plaintiffs claim for delay damages in Count I.
c. Interest
Insofar as plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the sum of $24,603, the court must consider its prayer for an award of statutory interest. The pertinent statute provides that:
Interest on amounts found due contractors on claims shall be paid to the contractor from the date the contracting officer receives the claim pursuant to section 605(a) of this title from the contractor until payment thereof. The interest provided for in *545 this section shall be paid at the rate established by the Secretary of the Treasury pursuant to Public Law 92-41 ( 85 Stat. 97 ) for the Renegotiation Board.
41 U.S.C. § 611 (1994) (emphasis added). Regarding the date on which the contracting officer received plaintiffs claim in Count I, the pleadings and the record are quite confusing. Plaintiffs complaint avers that interest is payable from June 11, 1991, the date on which plaintiff submitted its Change Proposal No. 1 to the Navy. However, in its post-trial submissions, plaintiff states that it submitted this claim to the contracting officer for final decision by letter dated November 11, 1991 and, further, that defendant admitted as much in its answer. Yet careful review of the defendant’s answer clearly reveals that said admission was conditioned upon plaintiffs introduction of the November 11, 1991 letter. Inexplicably, plaintiff never offered any letter dated November 11, 1991, into evidence. The contracting officer’s final decision dated July 21,1998, makes no reference whatever to the date on which plaintiffs claim was received. Moreover, there was no testimony adduced at trial on this issue. On the other hand, the parties have stipulated that the contracting officer’s final decision denied the price increase sought in plaintiffs June 11,1991 change proposal.
In order to fix the date from which interest runs pursuant to the CDA, the court is obligated to determine the date on which the contracting officer received plaintiffs claim. See Youngdale, 27 Fed.CI. at 560-64. Lacking any specific proof of the date on which the contracting officer received plaintiffs claim, the text of 41 U.S.C. § 611 might be literally construed to bar any award of interest. Such a result, in the circumstances at bar, would undoubtedly seem unduly harsh, not to mention unfaithful to the remedial aim of the statutory provision for interest on judgments in contract cases. Although there is virtually no case law squarely addressing the subject, we believe the CDA grants this court the discretion to fix the date from which interest runs on the basis of all of the record evidence, including circumstantial evidence. See Wilner v. United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 241 , 263 n. 17 (1991). Rather than to blandly speculate in reaching this decision, we deem it to be prudent to choose from the dates of the total relevant documentary evidence in the record. Awarding interest from June 11, 1991, the date of plaintiffs change proposal, strikes the court as overly generous, because that would effectively reward plaintiff for its failure to prove the date on which its entitlement to interest began. The only other date fixed in the record is July 21, 1993, the date of the contracting officer’s final decision. Accordingly, we hold that plaintiff is entitled to statutory interest, pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 611 , from July 21,1993.
II. COUNT II — THE STEEL REBAR ISSUE
A. Facts
Count II of plaintiffs complaint seeks an award of damages in the sum of $36,520, plus statutory interest from the date of submission of this claim to the contracting officer, for work that was required to modify steel reinforcing bars (rebar) to the Navy’s satisfaction and which allegedly went beyond the parameters of the contract. Vertical support columns in the building’s frame were constructed of steel-reinforced concrete. Drawing Sheet S-22, a Navy drawing made part of the contract specifications, governed the size and configuration of rebar that ran vertically through these columns. Five different lengths of reinforcing bars were depicted in the upper left-hand corner of Drawing S-22. Relevant here are the “B” bars and the “C” bars. “B” bars were specified to run continuously from the ground floor to a point between the third floor and the roof. 14 “C” bars traveled a shorter vertical distance, from the ground floor to a point between the second and third floors.
*546 Drawing S-22 also illustrated two methods for the assembly of multiple bars into the “column cages” which made up the internal steel framework of the concrete support columns. After the column cages were constructed and set in place, boxlike wooden forms conforming to the exterior dimensions of the finished columns were constructed around the column cages. Concrete was then poured into the forms and about the column cages within. One specified method •of rebar assembly was titled the “Typical Column Bar and Tie Arrangement” (herein the “typical method”). JX 16. Six different diagrams of this method were provided, showing the manner in which four, six, eight, twelve, sixteen, or eighteen bars were to be ^arrayed within the perimeter of a column. The other method was outlined in a section of Drawing S-22 titled “Various Bar Lapping Arrangement” (herein the “lapping method”). JX 16. Lapping describes the method by which bars are spliced, or joined, where one bar ends and another bar begins within a vertical support column. At such junctures, the ends of the bars are lapped over one another for reinforcement purposes, “so there is continuity of tensile stress in the reinforcement when the concrete member is subjected to a flexural or tensile load.” Dictionary of Architecture and Constr. 478. The Various Bar Lapping Arrangement diagram illustrates six ways in which differing numbers of steel bars running together from above and below their point of intersection are lapped, i.e., 12 bars from below and 8 bars from above.
In addition to the aforesaid specifications, each of the building’s support columns was tapered in design, resembling the sections of a collapsible telescope, with the column section between the second and third floors being two inches narrower in width than the column section between the ground and second floors, and two inches narrower still between the third floor and the roof. Due to the narrowing of each column where it made the transitions at the second and third floor levels, the rebar within each column likewise had to taper, at a specified maximum slope of 1:6, in order to fit inside the column cage of the narrower column above. In other words, as a length of rebar traveled vertically through a transitional section of a column, Drawing S-22 permitted one inch of horizontal deflection inward for every six inches of vertical travel. The “offset” is the total horizontal deflection over the course of the transition. See also Dictionary of Architecture and Constr. 565 (defining an offset in a reinforced concrete column as “any bend that displaces the center line of a section of the bar to a position parallel to the original bar”).
Drawing S-22’s intricacies prompted BCC to forward a Request For Information (RFI), to the Navy on February 14, 1990. The Navy’s response dated February 20, 1990, stated:
“B” bars are to be continuous for the length shown in the column schedule & are to be bent & offset at a slope of 1:6 where column size changes occur. For Column B2 the “B” bars are to be located at the corners. “C” bars are to be lapped as shown in the various bar lapping arrangements.
PX 9. Upon receipt of the Navy’s response, BCC and its rebar subcontractor, Ambassador Steel, began creating shop drawings for the column cages. Plaintiffs CQC Representative, Mr. Connor, subsequently approved these shop drawings. Following Mr. Con-nor’s approval of the drawings, Ambassador Steel began the fabrication and assembly of the rebar column cages. However, upon delivery of the rebar column cages to the project site, the Navy informed plaintiff that a number of the cages failed to satisfy the requirements of Drawing S-22 for two reasons. First, BCC’s subcontractor had assembled certain cages at the ground floor level according to the lapping method, but the Navy insisted that Drawing S-22 called for the typical method to be used at the ground floor level. Second, the column cages had been constructed with 3-3/8 inch offsets, which the Navy rejected on the ground that the contract permitted a three-inch maximum offset. Consequently, BCC’s subcontractor had to disassemble the rejected column cages and rebuild them to the Navy’s satisfaction.
B. Contentions of the Parties 1. Plaintiff
Plaintiff contends that Drawing S-22 contained an ambiguity, to which plaintiff re *547 acted by submitting its RFI to the Navy seeking clarification of the contract requirements. 15 Plaintiff maintains further that the Navy delivered an unambiguous response which, when read in conjunction with the rebar specifications and drawings already extant, allowed plaintiff to dispense with further inquiry, and proceed with the rebar fabrication in reasonable reliance upon the direction given by the Navy. Thus, in utilizing the lapping method to set the ground floor “C” bars and fabricating the rebar column cages with 3-3/8 inch offsets, plaintiff avers that it acted in reasonable reliance upon the Navy’s clear direction. Costs relating to the rework the Navy demanded are, in plaintiffs view, properly chargeable to the Navy because said rework surpassed the scope of the work delineated by the Navy’s earlier representations.
As to the Navy’s demand that the typical method be used to assemble rebar on the ground floor, BCC states that it was entitled to utilize the lapping method because the Navy’s RFI reply expressly instructed plaintiff to use the lapping method for “C” bars. Since, in fact, “C” bars as well as “B” bars had to be installed on the ground floor, plaintiff determined the lapping method to be the only method available. Moreover, plaintiff notes that Drawing S-22 depicts “C” bars as open circles and “B” bars as darkened circles, and, further, that no open circles indicating the presence of “C” bars appear in the Typical Column Bar and Tie Arrangement diagram. Therefore, reasons plaintiff, Drawing S-22 precludes the use of the typical method to assemble “C” bars with “B” bars.
Concerning the matter of the rebar offsets, BCC argues that Drawing S-22 and the Navy’s RFI reply fail to set a maximum offset value, mentioning only the 1:6 ratio slope. As evidence of an ambiguity, plaintiff points out that Mr. Baudhuin testified that calculations based upon the specified 1:6 slope would merely yield a figure falling somewhere “in the neighborhood of three inches.” Tr. 916. Plaintiff concludes, in short, that a 3-3/8 inch offset resides in that neighborhood.
2. Defendant
Defendant meets plaintiffs contentions with an array of pointed counter-arguments. Regarding the rebar assembly method, defendant avers that Drawing S-22 is clear and unambiguous, specifying in great detail the length of each bar. the spacing of the bars within the columns, the placement and overlap of the bars when lapped, and the manner of offset when bars make the transition from one floor to the next. The Navy’s response to plaintiff’s RFI neither modified the contract nor created an ambiguity, defendant maintains, since the Navy’s response merely reiterated that “C” bars had to be lapped at the second floor using the Various Bar Lapping Arrangement diagram in Drawing S-22.
Even assuming Drawing S-22 was ambiguous, defendant contends that it makes no difference whether the ambiguity was patent or latent, since plaintiff would not be entitled to recovery in either ease. Defendant asserts that a truly patent ambiguity would have obligated plaintiff to seek clarification prior to bidding the contract, rather than deferring inquiry until after the contract had been awarded. If, on the other hand, a latent ambiguity was present, defendant charges that plaintiff has failed in three respects to meet its burden of showing that its interpretation of the contract was reasonable. First, to interpret Drawing S-22 to require the use of the typical method only for columns incorporating solely “B” bars would render meaningless three of the six diagrams of the typical method. The only columns which contained solely “B” bars were certain columns made up of four, six, or eight bars, and defendant takes this to mean that the Typical Column Bar Arrangement diagrams for columns containing 12, 16, or 18 bars would be superfluous under plaintiff’s interpretation. Second, defendant contends that there is nothing in Drawing S-22 to suggest that any “C” bars ended on the ground floor *548 and required lapping there. Id. at 12-13. Rather, “C” bars are shown to end on the second floor in all columns, at which point the “C” bars had to be lapped to other bars extending from the second to the third floors. Third, defendant pointedly observes that the Various Bar Lapping Arrangement diagram called for lapping a certain number of bars from above with at least 12 bars from below. Where the base of each column was situated at the ground floor level, asserts defendant, there were no bars from below to be lapped, but only four steel dowels extending upward from the concrete footing foundation.
Turning to the rebar offset issue, defendant contests the notion that the Navy’s requirement for a three inch offset was a contract modification. Defendant directs us to Mr. Baudhuin’s testimony that the three inch offset is the natural mathematical result flowing from the 1:6' vertical column slope specified in Drawing S-22. Additionally, defendant notes that the contract expressly refers BCC to the requirements outlined in the relevant American Concrete Institute (ACI) Publication. During his testimony, Mr. Baudhuin stated unequivocally that the ACI standards mandate a maximum three-inch offset for rebar configured at a 1:6 vertical slope, because a greater offset would compromise the strength of the column. Therefore,' concludes defendant, plaintiffs subcontractor failed to adhere to contract specifications by fabricating the rebar column cages with 3-3/8 inch offsets.
C. Discussion
On this record, Count II can be disposed of in a straightforward fashion, because plaintiffs deficient evidentiary showing at trial failed to buttress plaintiffs arguments in support of its claim. Moreover, defendant’s counter-arguments, which we find persuasive, are unmet by either competent evidence or cogent rejoinder from plaintiff. We consider the sub-issues relating to the rebar assembly method and the rebar offset seria-tim.
1. Rebar Assembly Method
The parties’ dispute over the rebar assembly method distills down easily into a simple question — whether the rebar specifications in Drawing S-22, as amplified by the Navy’s RFI response, authorized plaintiff to employ the lapping method to assemble “B” and “C” bars into column cages at the ground floor level of the building. Therefore, we must construe Drawing S-22 and the Navy’s RFI response to determine what was required of BCC, a determination we address as a question of law. P.J. Maffei Bldg. Wrecking Corp., 732 F.2d at 916 . After thorough scrutiny of the record, we agree with defendant that Drawing S-22 is clear and unambiguous and, further, that the Navy’s RFI response effected no modification of Drawing S-22.-Accordingly, plaintiff cannot recover the costs of remediating its own noncompliance with contract specifications.
Even assuming, arguendo, that Drawing S-22 is ambiguous, plaintiff would not be entitled to recovery. In the unlikely event that said ambiguity was so conspicuous as to be patent, an equitable adjustment is conclusively barred by plaintiffs failure to present evidence that it sought clarification from the Navy prior to bidding the contract. Dalton v. Cessna Aircraft, 98 F.3d at 1306 ; Grumman Data Systems, 88 F.3d at 998 . If, on the other hand, said ambiguity was latent, plaintiff must establish that its interpretation of Drawing S-22 is reasonable. Interwest Constr. v. Brown, 29 F.3d at 614 . Plaintiffs interpretation of Drawing S-22 is so unreasonable as to border upon mere pretext.
Plaintiff mistakenly contends that Drawing S-22 precluded the use of the typical method to assemble “B” bars and “C” bars into ground floor level column cages. It is true that the Various Bar Lapping Arrangement (VBLA) diagram in the center of Drawing S-22 depicts “B” bars as darkened circles and “C” bars as open circles. Immediately above the VBLA diagram, there is a pictorial legend that identifies “B” bars and “C” bars in precisely this fashion. The “B” bar and “C” bar in the pictorial legend are connected by arrows to corresponding depictions of “B” and “C” bars within one of the six sub-diagrams within the VBLA diagram. It is also true that the great majority of the bars shown in the Typical Column Bar and Tie Arrangement (TCBTA) diagram, which ad *549 joins the left edge of the VBLA diagram, are depicted as darkened circles. 16 However, it simply does not follow that the typical method in the TCBTA diagram was suitable only for assembling those column cages made up solely of “B” bars, as plaintiff would have it. Nothing in or about the TCBTA diagram suggests that its darkened circles represent only “B” bars. Furthermore, the pictorial legend which draws the visual distinction between “B” bars and “C” bars is unconnected in any manner to the TCBTA diagram. Plaintiff, in short, would have the court add to Drawing S-22 an arrow connecting the darkened circle in the pictorial legend over the VBLA diagram to one of the darkened circles in the TCBTA diagram, and this we are unwilling to do in the absence of any evidence suggesting that such a modification is proper. A far less strained interpretation of Drawing S-22 instructs that the typical method was intended to apply to “B” bars and “C” bars alike at the ground floor level, such that there was no need to darken some circles and leave others open in the TCBTA diagram.
In addition, plaintiffs interpretation of the TCBTA diagram to govern only the assembly of those columns made up of solely “B” bars at the ground floor level utterly fails to account for those columns which contain no “B” bars whatever at the ground floor level. For example, there were numerous ground floor columns assembled from “A” bars and “C” bars, or from “A” bars alone. Certainly, in the case of a ground floor column containing only foui “A” bars, of which there were several, the lapping method would have been unsuitable because lapping any two “A” bars would necessarily leave one of the four column corners without reinforcement. Similar reasoning compels our concurrence with defendant’s observation that the TCBTA diagrams for columns containing 12, 16, or 18 bars would be superfluous under plaintiffs interpretation of Drawing S-22, since every column containing solely “B” bars was made up of either four, six, or eight bars. 17 Here again we are guided by the principle that an interpretation which renders portions of a contract meaningless is disfavored. Fortec Constructors, 760 F.2d at 1292 .
Having determined that the typical method of column cage assembly was not limited to columns made solely of “B” bars, we turn to plaintiffs corollary assertion that lapping was the exclusive method of assembly wherever “C” bars were used. We find this contention similarly unpersuasive. Plaintiffs argument hinges entirely upon the final sentence of the Navy’s RFI response, which states: “ ‘C’ bars are to be lapped as shown in the various bar lapping arrangements.” PX 9 (emphasis added). We note first that plaintiffs RFI inquired not about the placement of “C” bars at the ground floor level, but rather, about the lapping of “B” bars at the second floor level. Since plaintiff did not ask the Navy about the assembly of column cages at the ground floor level, it is difficult to comprehend why the Navy’s response should be read to address the placement of “C” bars at the ground floor level. Moreover, we readily embrace defendant’s contention that its instruction regarding “C” bars neither added to nor subtracted from Drawing S-22. On the contrary, the Navy merely redirected plaintiff to the VBLA diagram. Although it governed the lapping of “C” bars wherever lapping was required, the VBLA diagram did not explicitly set out instances in which lapping was required. By necessary implication, though, we reach the conclusion that plaintiff improperly used the lapping method to place “C” bars at the ground floor level. All six illustrations in the VBLA diagram show at least 12 bars from below the point of juncture being lapped with some lesser number of bars from above. As de *550 fendant correctly observes, Drawing S-22 elsewhere shows that at ground level no more than four steel dowels extend upward from the concrete footing foundation where the base of each column is situated. Since the VBLA diagram plainly makes no provision for lapping at the ground floor level, where many “C” bars were to be found, we reject plaintiffs contention that lapping was the exclusive method of assembly wherever “C” bars were used.
From the foregoing discussion, it naturally follows that plaintiff has failed to prove that Drawing S-22 was tainted by latent ambiguity, which requires a finding that the contract “is susceptible of two different and reasonable interpretations, each of which is found to be consistent with the contract language.” Community Heating & Plumbing, 987 F.2d at 1579 (emphasis added). Plaintiff presented no evidence tending to establish that lapping “C” bars at the ground floor level was reasonable in connection with recognized concrete construction practices, in terms of the resulting effect on column strength, or in any other sense. 18 Instead, plaintiff relies solely upon its hospitable reading of Drawing S-22 and the Navy’s RFI response. Because plaintiffs interpretation of the rebar assembly specifications set out in Drawing S-22 leads to incongruous and irrational results, it is legally untenable. Julius Goldman’s Egg City, 697 F.2d at 1057-58 ; Fortec Constructors, 760 F.2d at 1292 . Thus, plaintiffs claim in Count II is denied insofar as it relates to costs incurred to rework “B” and “C” bars improperly lapped at the ground floor level.
2. Rebar Offsets
The question presented by the rebar offset sub-issue is whether the contract specifications called for a three-inch maximum offset. Plaintiff accurately notes that Drawing S-22 and the Navy’s RFI response specify only a 1:6 slope ratio and fail to expressly quantify the maximum allowable offset in inches. However, plaintiff draws a wholly unwarranted conclusion from this evidence. The omission of an explicit reference in these documents to a three-inch maximum rebar offset was not tantamount to the Navy’s “representation,” as plaintiff puts it, upon which plaintiff could rely for the purpose of selecting the proper rebar offset at its sole discretion. This was hardly the case, for the contract expressly directed plaintiff to a number of ACI publications for guidance concerning the fabrication and assembly of the rebar column cages. At trial, plaintiff completely failed to carry its burden of proving compliance with the relevant ACI standards. Plaintiff offered no evidence regarding the content of the ACI manuals referenced by the contract. 19 Nor was there any evidence that plaintiff had faithfully consulted and followed the relevant ACI manuals in selecting a 3-3/8 inch offset. For that matter, when asked about the three-inch offset demanded by the Navy, plaintiffs assistant superintendent on the EMIC project, Richard Cooper, testified that he was unaware of its significance.
Defendant, on the other hand, presented Mr. Baudhuin’s unequivocal testimony that the applicable ACI publication required a three-inch maximum offset. 20 Plaintiffs fail *551 ure of proof and Mr. Baudhuin’s uncontro-verted testimony compel the conclusion that defendant is entitled to judgment on the rebar offset sub-issue. Accordingly, given our disposition of the rebar assembly method sub-issue in defendant’s favor, supra, plaintiffs Count II is dismissed in its entirety.
III. COUNT III — THE CONCRETE RUBBING ISSUE
A. Facts
Plaintiff’s Count III seeks an award in the sum of $78,512 for costs allegedly incurred pursuant to the Navy’s direction to rub certain exposed concrete surfaces within the budding in order to achieve a uniform appearance, plus statutory interest from the date of this claim’s submission to the contracting officer. The relevant contract provisions state:
3.3 SURFACE FINISHES (EXCEPT FLOOR, SLAB, AND PAVEMENT FINISHES)
3.3.1 Defects: ... Exposed surfaces shall be uniform in appearance and finished to a smooth form finish unless otherwise specified.
3.3.3 Formed Surfaces
3.3.3.1 As-Cast Rough Form (for Surfaces Not Exposed to Public View): Remove fins and other projections exceeding .25 inch in height; level abrupt irregularities.
3.3.3.2 As-Cast Rough Form (for Surfaces Exposed to Public View, such as columns and concrete guard wall): Form facing material shall produce a smooth, hard, uniform texture on the concrete.
3.3.4 Rubbed Finish: Provide concrete with a smooth form finish. Finish as follows:
a. Smooth Rubbed: Provide newly hardened concrete within 24 hours following form removal. Wet surfaces and rub with an abrasive tool to produce uniform color and texture. Use only cement paste drawn from the concrete rubbing process.
3.5 CURING AND PROTECTION:
3.5.6 Removal of Forms: Remove forms in a manner which will prevent damage to the concrete. Do not remove form without approval, nor sooner than 24 hours after placement of concrete.
JX AA § 03300, at HH3.3, 3.5.6 (emphasis added). This controversy centers on 11113.3.4(a), which specifies the process by which concrete surfaces are rubbed so as to achieve a smooth form finish of uniform color and texture. The parties have stipulated that plaintiff did not smooth rub the exposed concrete in accordance with U 3.3.4(a), that the finished concrete was not of uniform color, and that the Navy rejected the appearance of the exposed concrete as unsatisfactory. In September 1990, the Navy directed plaintiff to take corrective action regarding the appearance of the exposed concrete surfaces. Plaintiff responded by performing additional work in an effort to provide a finish acceptable to the Navy. Thereafter, by letter dated December 17, 1991, plaintiff submitted its certified claim to the contracting officer, seeking an equitable adjustment in the sum of $89,720 for costs associated with rubbing the exposed concrete surfaces, which plaintiff asserted was additional work not required by the contract. The contracting officer’s written final decision dated July 21, 1993, denied this claim in part and granted it in part. Therein, the contracting officer stated:
Although, the specification required a rubbed finish which would have produced a uniform color and texture, the contract lacked detail as to how the procedure should be accomplished. We agree that you expended additional effort trying to *552 achieve a specified uniform color and texture on the concrete surfaces. However, we find the amount claimed to be overstated and have determined that you are entitled to an equitable adjustment in the amount of $11,208.
JX 2, at 2. Thus, plaintiff asks this court to award the remaining $78,512 of the $89,720 originally sought. Defendant, on the other hand, not only challenges this claim, but also counterclaims for the $11,208 the contracting officer previously awarded to plaintiff.
B. Contentions
1. Plaintiff
Inasmuch as plaintiff has stipulated that it did not rub any exposed concrete surfaces, plaintiff self-servingly contends that “the only interpretation of the contract that does not lead to absurd results is an interpretation that does not require any concrete to be rubbed.” In support of this contention, plaintiff advances a complex argument based upon the paragraph numbering system in § 03300 of the contract. Plaintiff interprets the contract to mean that concrete rubbing was required only in areas specifically delineated by the contract. According to plaintiff, 113.3.3 applies to formed surfaces, while H 3.3.4 applies to rubbed surfaces. Since the concrete surfaces in dispute were formed surfaces governed by 113.3.3, reasons plaintiff, no rubbing was required. Plaintiff insists that any other reading of the contract would lead to an absurd interpretation requiring even unexposed concrete, including concrete buried in the ground, to be rubbed because the contract draws no delineation between exposed and unexposed concrete as far as rubbing is concerned.
Plaintiff further contends that the Navy’s failure to specify that architectural concrete was to be used to form the exposed concrete surfaces in question demonstrates that rubbing was not to be performed on said concrete surfaces. This is so, contends plaintiff, because it is understood within the contracting industry that architectural concrete, which is more expensive than ordinary structural concrete, is typically specified where a surface finish of uniform color is truly important.
In addition, plaintiff alleges that the result demanded by the Navy was commercially impracticable, because U 3.5.6 prohibited the removal of forms for at least 24 hours after concrete was poured into the forms. After 24 hours, plaintiff avers, the rubbing process would not cause the concrete to exude enough of the concrete paste necessary to achieve the rubbed finish sought in 113.3.4(a).
Concerning defendant’s counterclaim, plaintiff maintains that this court lacks jurisdiction under the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. § 605 (a), to entertain a contract claim that was not submitted in writing to the contracting officer and on which the contracting officer has rendered no final decision. Plaintiff asserts that the contracting officer allowed the $11,208 adjustment in question as a unilateral modification, not as an award pursuant to a final decision over which this court has jurisdiction.
2. Defendant
Defendant contends that 113.3.4(a) is unambiguous and clearly obligated plaintiff to rub concrete surfaces covered by 113.3 within 24 hours of form removal in order to produce a uniform texture and color. Although defendant concedes that a strictly literal, technical interpretation of 113.3.4(a) would require all concrete except the floors, slab, and pavement to be rubbed, defendant points out that it never insisted that unexposed concrete be rubbed. Having thus met plaintiff’s claim that H 3.3.4(a), if given effect, required the rubbing of buried concrete, defendant asserts that an interpretation under which H 3.3.4(a) requires the rubbing of no concrete whatever is unreasonable. Defendant argues that plaintiff cannot premise the existence of a contractual ambiguity upon an unreasonable and bizarre interpretation of H 3.3.4(a).
Even postulating that 113.3.4(a) is ambiguous, defendant maintains that plaintiff would not be entitled to recovery. Such an ambiguity would be patent, defendant submits, because the contract devotes an entire paragraph to the matter of concrete rubbing. Thus, to the extent 113.3.4(a) presents an inconsistency, it is an inconsistency that is blatant and significant, not subtle, hidden, or minor. Moreover, defendant avers that a patent ambiguity would be established if *553 plaintiffs interpretation were sustained so as to render H 3.3.4(a) entirely meaningless. Defendant asserts that plaintiff had a duty to raise any such patent ambiguity with the contracting officer prior to bidding the contract, and that recovery is barred by virtue of plaintiffs unexplained failure to seek clarification prior to bidding. Assuming, on the other hand, that the alleged ambiguity were latent, defendant argues that plaintiff must demonstrate that its interpretation of H 3.3.4(a) is reasonable. Id. Defendant contends that an interpretation which renders 113.3.4(a) meaningless and superfluous is by no means reasonable.
As to plaintiffs claim that the Navy’s failure to specify that architectural concrete be used to form the disputed concrete surfaces meant that said surfaces need not have been rubbed, defendant asserts that structural concrete can be rubbed to produce the aesthetically-pleasing finish sought by 113.3.4(a). Defendant further contends that the contract called for architectural concrete to be used in areas where the Navy desired architectural concrete, and the mere fact that architectural concrete was not specified in certain other areas has no bearing on whether the concrete in those areas should have been rubbed.
Responding to plaintiffs commercial impracticability argument, defendant asserts that plaintiff left the forms on for several days, even though the contract permitted form removal after 24 hours, and made no attempt to rub the concrete within 24 hours after form removal as required by H 3.3.4(a). Defendant attributes this failure to rub the concrete in a timely manner to plaintiffs failure to adequately staff the job.
Defendant’s counterclaim seeks to recover the $11,208 and statutory interest thereupon that was previously paid to plaintiff pursuant to the contracting officer’s final decision dated July 21, 1993, plus statutory interest for the period during which plaintiff has enjoyed possession of the $11,208. The Navy is entitled to recover on its counterclaim, contends defendant, because plaintiff was incorrectly allowed an equitable adjustment for concrete rubbing work that was required by the contract. Defendant meets plaintiffs jurisdictional objection with the assertion that this counterclaim is a “mirror image” counterclaim because it arises from the same concrete rubbing work on which plaintiffs claim is premised. According to defendant, a contracting officer’s final decision is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to this Court’s ability to entertain a “mirror image” counterclaim brought by the Government.
C. Discussion
1. Plaintiffs Claim
As the parties agree, the issue postured in Count III of plaintiffs complaint is squarely one of contract interpretation. If the court finds that BCC was required to rub the exposed concrete surfaces, then it is not entitled to any of the monies claimed. This issue is readily resolved by reference to a familiar principle of contractual interpretation, echoed throughout countless opinions.
We follow the established general rules that provisions of a contract must be so construed as to effectuate its spirit and purpose, that it must be considered as a whole and interpreted so as to harmonize and give meaning to all of its provisions, and that an interpretation which gives a reasonable meaning to all parts will be preferred to one which leaves a portion of it useless, inexplicable, inoperative, void, insignificant, meaningless, superfluous, or achieves a weird and whimsical result.
State of Arizona v. United States, 216 Ct.Cl. 221 , 575 F.2d 855, 863 (1978) (emphasis added), quoted with approval in Julius Goldman’s Egg City, 697 F.2d at 1057-58 . At bar, it is manifestly apparent that plaintiffs reading of the pertinent contract language runs counter to the aforementioned principle, for it renders H 3.3.4(a) utterly meaningless. For this reason, plaintiffs interpretation merits the closest scrutiny. Having so inquired, we conclude that plaintiffs claim must be denied.
We observe initially that 113.3.4(a), when read in conjunction with the entirety of the contract provisions governing concrete surface finishes (other than floors, slab, and pavement), lends itself to an amply reasonable construction. In relevant part, 113.3.1 unambiguously provides that “[ejxposed sur *554 faces shall be uniform in appearance and finished to a smooth form finish unless otherwise specified.” JX AA § 03300, at H 3.3.1 (emphasis added). Thus, absent some specification to the contrary, exposed concrete surfaces were required to be finished to a smooth form finish of uniform appearance. The term “smooth form finish” next appears in 113.3.4, which states simply, “Provide concrete with a smooth form finish. Finish as follows [in U 3.3.4(a) ].” Obeying this directive, we arrive at 113.3.4(a), which explains the concrete rubbing procedure. In short, exposed concrete surfaces had to have a smooth form finish, and rubbing was required to achieve a smooth form finish.
Plaintiff urges the court to stand this routine contract language on its head. Frankly, we are at a loss to comprehend how plaintiff can credibly assert that rubbing was required only for surfaces expressly delineated by the contract, when H 3.3.1 makes it perfectly clear that a smooth form finish — and, concomitantly, rubbing — was required for exposed surfaces everywhere “unless otherwise specified.” Plaintiff has not directed our attention to, and we have not found, a contract provision that excepts the disputed concrete surfaces from this requirement. Likewise unavailing is plaintiffs contention that H 3.3.4(a), read literally, would compel unexposed concrete surfaces, including underground concrete, to be rubbed. To reiterate, 113.3.1 states quite unequivocally that it is exposed surfaces that must be finished to a smooth form finish. Against the plain language of the contract as written, plaintiffs strained interpretation must fall. 21
Plaintiffs attempt to infuse the contract’s paragraph numbering system with legal substance is similarly misguided. Although plaintiff correctly observes that the exposed concrete surfaces in dispute are formed surfaces governed by U3.3.3, we reject plaintiffs contention that such formed surfaces are exempt from the rubbing requirement of 113.3.4(a). Concerning exposed formed concrete surfaces, the operative language in 113.3.3 merely states: “Form facing material shall produce a smooth, hard, uniform texture on the concrete.” JX AA § 03300, at U3.3.3.2. Two conclusions follow from a plain reading of this language. First, H 3.3.3.2 speaks to the nature and quality of “the form facing material,” directing plaintiff to employ form material that will produce “a smooth, hard, uniform texture” on the surface of the formed concrete. 22 Paragraph 3.3.3.2 says absolutely nothing about whether concrete surfaces within its ambit must be rubbed, a process that necessarily takes place after the forms have been removed. Second, the “smooth, hard, uniform texture” called for by 113.3.3.2 is hardly inconsistent with the rubbing requirement of If 3.3.4, which seeks a “smooth form finish” of “uniform color and texture.” Thus, we are unpersuaded that plaintiffs hypertechnical -reliance on the numbering of the relevant paragraphs should overcome the plain language of the paragraphs themselves.
Given the specious nature of plaintiffs interpretation of the contract, plaintiffs arguments warrant short-shrift. No ambiguity can be present unless the contract “is susceptible of two different and reasonable interpretations, each of which is found to be consistent with the contract language.” Community Heating & Plumbing Co., 987 F.2d at 1579. Plaintiff cannot unilaterally fabricate a contractual ambiguity, patent or latent, from an unreasonable interpretation of the contract. See United Int’l Investigative Servs. v. United States, 109 F.3d 734, 738 (Fed.Cir.1997).
Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs interpretation could lift itself by its bootstraps into the status of a prima facie ambiguity, defendant rightly asserts that plaintiff is not entitled to recovery. Insofar as plain *555 tiff contends for an interpretation that renders 113.3.4(a) meaningless surplusage — an obvious, gross, or glaring result to say the least — this would militate toward classifying any resulting ambiguity as patent. Grumman Data Systems, 88 F.3d at 997 ; Reliable Bldg. Maintenance Co. v. United States, 31 Fed.Cl. 641, 644 (1994). Plaintiff cannot allege patent ambiguity as a ground for an equitable adjustment unless it in fact sought clarification of said ambiguity before bidding the contract. Dalton v. Cessna Aircraft, 98 F.3d at 1306 ; Grumman Data Systems, 88 F.3d at 998 . In the present case, plaintiff has neither asserted nor established that it ever made inquiry concerning this purported ambiguity before the contract was bid. Consequently, plaintiff would not be entitled to recovery even if a patent ambiguity were present here.
Assuming, on the other hand, that the alleged ambiguity were latent, the doctrine of contra proferentum, on this record, would not accrue to plaintiffs benefit. A latent ambiguity is construed against the contract’s drafter only if the non-drafting party’s construction is reasonable. Interwest Constr. v. Brown, 29 F.3d at 614 . In order to evaluate the reasonableness of the interpretation proffered by plaintiff, we adopt the viewpoint of a reasonable and prudent contractor fully acquainted with the circumstances at hand. Blake Constr., 987 F.2d at 746 ; Western States Constr., 26 Cl.Ct. at 825 . Moreover, we take it as axiomatic that a contract must be construed in the context of the entire agreement and “[a]n interpretation which gives reasonable meaning to all parts of a contract is preferred to one which renders part of it insignificant or useless.” Blake Constr., 987 F.2d at 747 (citing Hills Materials Co. v. Rice, 982 F.2d 514, 517 (Fed.Cir. 1992)); Dalton v. Cessna Aircraft, 98 F.3d at 1305 .
Here at bar, plaintiff urges that to have given 113.3.4(a) effect would have led plaintiff to rub underground concrete, because this provision draws no distinction between exposed and unexposed concrete. Notwithstanding our conclusion, supra, that the plain language of the contract by no means led inevitably to such an absurd result, the court now considers whether a reasonable, prudent, and knowledgeable contractor would have construed H 3.3.4(a) as did plaintiff. In so doing, we find that H 3.3.4(a), standing alone, lends itself comfortably to a reasonable alternative interpretation.
Paragraph 3.3.4(a) is directed to the production of a uniform texture and color on concrete surfaces. A reasonable, prudent, and knowledgeable contractor would logically determine, as counsel for plaintiff grudgingly conceded in closing argument, that the concrete rubbing described in H 3.3.4 is a technique directed at producing a desired visual appearance. To continue in this vein of reasoning, our hypothetical reasonable contractor would consider the circumstances in which visual aesthetics are relevant. The solitary logical conclusion, again as conceded by counsel for plaintiff, is that a concrete surface’s appearance becomes a matter of concern only when said concrete is exposed to plain view. Put differently, it seems undeniable that a reasonable contractor, not to mention a reasonable owner, would not be unduly concerned with the appearance of unexposed concrete such as caissons and footings buried beneath the surface. Moreover, why and how would one “[w]et ... and rub ...” unexposed surfaces?
Accordingly, the only way for a reasonable contractor to harmonize 113.3.4(a) with the contract’s entire language, purpose, and context would be to adopt the interpretation requiring every concrete surface exposed to public view, unless otherwise specified, to be rubbed. As already noted herein, supra, to apply H 3.3.4(a) in broad, inclusionary fashion accords fully with the plain language of H 3.3.1. Conversely, plaintiffs reading of 113.3.4(a) would excise this provision from the contract altogether for the sake of avoiding the illusory threat of subterranean concrete rubbing. In sum, we hold that even if the contract language is latently ambiguous, plaintiffs reading of K 3.3.4(a) is clearly and grossly untenable.
Plaintiffs commercial impracticability argument meets a similar fate. Whether the concrete rubbing requirement of f 3.3.4(a) is impossible or commercially impracticable is a question of fact, as to which *556 plaintiff bears the burden of proof. Blount Bros. Corp. v. United States, 872 F.2d 1003, 1007 (Fed.Cir.1989) (citing Maxwell Dynamometer Co. v. United States, 386 F.2d 855 , 181 Ct.Cl. 607 (1967)); Ehlers-Noll GmbH v. United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 494, 499 (1995). Mr. Cooper testified on plaintiffs behalf that by the time the forms were removed from the concrete at issue here, there was no concrete paste available with which to perform the rubbing process. In addition, Mr. Cooper testified that even if the forms had been left on no more than 24 hours after the concrete had been poured, the minimum period specified by H 3.5.6, the concrete would have been rock hard and would have yielded no paste for rubbing. However, his testimony concerning the actual length of time the forms were left on was inconclusive, since Mr. Cooper stated at one point that the forms had been left on for more than 24 hours, but later stated that the forms had been removed 24 hours after the concrete had been poured.
On the other hand, Mr. Baudhuin, an expert in structural engineering, testified that he had been involved in approximately a dozen projects where sufficient concrete paste was produced 24 hours after the concrete was poured to accomplish the rubbing process described in 1Í 3.3.4(a). Plaintiffs own concrete expert, Mr. Norman Scott, testified that the earlier the forms are removed and the rubbing begun, the more paste is brought up by the rubbing and the likelihood of achieving a uniform color is improved. Mr. Scott also testified that, due to the time required to remove the forms and perform work required to repair small imperfections, like fins, projections, and holes caused by air bubbles and honeycomb formations, it might be two to three days after the removal of the forms before the rubbing work could begin. However, on cross-examination, Mr. Scott admitted that the rubbing work could have been accomplished much sooner had plaintiff maintained a large enough work crew on site. 23 Other probative testimony from Ms. Ginalski and Mr. Pieroni established that plaintiff left the forms on the concrete for periods ranging from at least three days to one week after the concrete had been poured, by which time the concrete was no longer “green” and had become too hard to produce any paste. Consequently, on this record, we find that the sole impediment to achieving the rubbed finish specified in H 3.3.4(a) was plaintiffs failure to remove the forms and commence rubbing the concrete in a timely manner.
Furthermore, plaintiff “has the burden to prove that it explored and exhausted alternatives before concluding the contract was legally impossible or commercially impracticable to perform.” Blount Bros., 872 F.2d at 1007 (citing Jennie-O Foods, Inc. v. United States, 580 F.2d 400, 409 , 217 Ct.Cl. 314 (1978)). Plaintiff never weighed alternative rubbing methods against the rubbing method prescribed in 113.3.4(a). Indeed, the record before the court indicates that plaintiff made at most perfunctory attempts to perform the rubbing with paste exuded from the concrete, as required by the contract. 24 Plaintiff instead substituted corrective work by coating the exposed concrete surfaces with a separately-mixed cementitious concoction. It appears to the court that, even then, plaintiff performed this corrective work on but a small proportion of the exposed concrete surfaces in question. As a result, about a year after plaintiff vacated the site, the Navy had to retain another contractor to complete this corrective work at a cost exceeding $16,000. In short, plaintiff voluntarily elected to forgo the concrete rubbing process specified in IT 3.3.4(a) in favor of an *557 alternative approach consisting of corrective work that plaintiff failed to completely perform. Voluntary nonconformity with contract specifications does not make a plausible case of commercial impracticability.
Finally, we are also unpersuaded by plaintiffs contention that the Navy should have specified the use of architectural concrete wherever a rubbed finish of uniform texture and color was desired. While the exposed concrete surfaces in question were no doubt constructed from commonplace structural concrete normally used for slabs, footings, and walls, plaintiffs witnesses equivocated as to whether architectural concrete was truly necessary to achieve the uniform appearance contemplated by 113.3.4(a). 25 By way of contrast, Mr. Kevin Sullivan, testifying as an architectural expert and the architect of the EMIC building, unequivocally stated that an aesthetically pleasing finish can be obtained by using structural concrete and, moreover, that the type of rubbing prescribed in 113.3.4(a) would help achieve such a finish.
Therefore, after applying our interpretation of the relevant contract provisions to the record before us, we hold that plaintiff was required to rub the exposed concrete surfaces in question. Accordingly, Count III of plaintiffs complaint is dismissed.
2. Defendant’s Counterclaim
Concerning defendant’s counterclaim, the parties posture the dispositive question as to — whether this court can exercise jurisdiction over a defendant’s counterclaim which has not been subjected to a contracting officer’s written final decision, solely on the basis that said counterclaim is a “mirror image” of a claim brought by the plaintiff pursuant to the Contract Disputes Act of 1978(CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-13 . Inasmuch as the Federal Circuit has not squarely addressed this precise question, we proceed from fundamental principles. A determination of whether this Court has jurisdiction over a CDA claim is a question of law. Case, Inc. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1004, 1008 (Fed.Cir.1996) (citing Transamerica Ins. Corp. v. United States, 973 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1992)). For purposes of deciding plaintiffs motion to dismiss defendant’s counterclaim, we make this jurisdictional determination by reference to the actual circumstances existing at the time plaintiff’s complaint was filed. Sharman Co., Inc. v. United States, 2 F.3d 1564, 1569 (Fed.Cir. 1993) (citing Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830 , 109 S.Ct. 2218, 2221-22 , 104 L.Ed.2d 893 (1989)). As the party seeking to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction for present purposes, defendant has the burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds v. Army & Air Force Exch. Serv., 846 F.2d 746, 748 (Fed.Cir.1988). Thus, we now consider the character of defendant’s burden. In pertinent part, the CDA provides:
All claims by the government against a contractor relating to a contract shall be the subject of a decision by the contracting officer____ The contracting officer shall issue his decisions in writing, and shall mail or otherwise furnish a copy of the decision to the contractor____ Specific findings of fact [by the contracting officer] are not required, but, if made, shall not be binding in any subsequent proceeding.
41 U.S.C. § 605 (a). The FAR defines a “claim” as “a written demand or written assertion by one of the contracting parties seeking, as a matter of right, the payment of money in a sum certain, the adjustment or interpretation of contract terms, or other relief arising under or relating to the con *558 tract.” 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 . As to the contents of a contracting officer’s “written decision,” the FAR requires, inter alia: (i) a description of the claim or dispute; (ii) a reference to the pertinent contract terms; (iii) a statement of the factual areas of agreement and disagreement; (iv) a statement of the decision itself, with supporting rationale; and (v) a statement identifying the writing as a contracting officer’s final decision appeal-able to this Court. 48 C.F.R. § 33.211 (a)(4).
At bar, the record plainly demonstrates that the literal requirements of § 605(a) and the FAR are not met, for defendant never formally submitted a counterclaim in the amount of $11,208 to the contracting officer, and the contracting officer never rendered a separate and distinct written decision per se on this counterclaim. These circumstances would ordinarily compel the court to summarily dismiss defendant’s counterclaim, for ease law firmly establishes that “the Government’s counterclaims must first be raised before a CO.” Joseph Morton Co., Inc. v. United States, 757 F.2d 1273, 1281 (Fed.Cir.1985). See also Sharman, 2 F.3d at 1568-69 ; Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572,1575 (Fed.Cir.1995). However, defendant takes the position that its $11,208 counterclaim is not an independent Government claim that must satisfy the requirements of § 605(a), but rather, a partial “mirror image” of plaintiffs direct claim in the sum of $89,720 that was originally submitted to the contracting officer. After careful reflection on the subject of “mirror image” counterclaims and the record before the court, we conclude that defendant has failed to carry its burden of proving that this counterclaim is a bona fide “mirror image” of plaintiffs original claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
Logic instructs that one claim is the “mirror image” of another if the claim is, in fact, effectively the same claim but made by the opposing litigant. Kit-San-Azusa, J.V. v. United States, 32 Fed.Cl. 647, 664 (1995) (citing Sharman, 2 F.3d at 1570 ), affd in part and modified in part on other grounds by unpublished opinion, 86 F.3d 1175 (Fed. Cir.1996). Thus, the court must consider the extent to which defendant’s counterclaim rests upon the same operative facts as plaintiffs original claim and the contracting officer’s disposition thereof. We find, without any misgivings, that defendant’s counterclaim and plaintiffs original claim derive from the same chain of events — namely, the disputed concrete rubbing work. See Sharman, 2 F.3d at 1571 (“mirror image” where each claim “allege[d] entitlement to the same money based on the same partial performance, only under a different legal label.”). Compare Case, Inc., 88 F.3d at 1010 (no “mirror image” where claims relating to same contract arose from different events, alleged different grounds for recovery, and sought different amounts). However, there remains the pivotal question of whether, as a matter of fact, the contracting officer took defendant’s counterclaim into consideration when rendering the final decision on plaintiffs original claim. In making this determination, we are mindful of the principle that the contracting officer’s decision is the “linchpin” for judicial review of contract claims under the CDA. Paragon Energy Corp. v. United States, 645 F.2d 966, 967 , 227 Ct.Cl. 176 (1981), aff'd, 230 Ct.Cl. 884 , 1982 WL 25259 (1982), cited with approval in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. United States, 754 F.2d 365, 370 (Fed.Cir.1985).
Seeking an exception to this principle, defendant relies mainly on Placeway Constr. Corp. v. United States, 920 F.2d 903 (Fed. Cir.1990), affg in part and vacating in part 18 Cl.Ct. 159 (1989), wherein the Federal Circuit held that, following submission of a contractor’s claim to the contracting officer pursuant to the CDA, the Government’s assertion of an unliquidated set-off likewise constitutes a “claim” under the CDA. Place-way, 920 F.2d at 906 . By denying the contractor’s direct claim, the Federal Circuit reasoned, the contracting officer effectively makes a final decision on the Government’s claimed set-off, even though the contracting officer issues no distinct, formal written decision on the claimed set-off and reserves the power to redetermine the precise amount of the set-off in the future. Id. Notwithstanding the foregoing, we find that defendant’s counterclaim in the case at bar is factually distinguishable from the Government set-off at issue in Placeway.
*559 In Placeway, the plaintiff submitted various claims to the contracting officer for decision, including a claim in the amount of $297,226.12 for the balance alleged to be due on the contract price. Placeway, 18 Cl.Ct. at 161 . The contracting officer denied the plaintiffs claims because the Government intended to set off claims it anticipated receiving from contractors on other projects that had allegedly suffered delays as a result of plaintiffs delay in performing its contract. Id. By way of distinction, in the present case plaintiff does not appeal a contracting officer’s decision allowing a Government set-off against the contract price. Rather, defendant brings a counterclaim seeking to overturn the contracting officer’s decision increasing the contract price by the sum of $11,208. More importantly, in Placeway, the Government’s assertion of a right of set off was held to be tantamount to a request directed to the contracting officer for “the adjustment ... of contract terms” pursuant to 48 C.F.R. § 33.201 . Placeway, 920 F.2d at 906 , 18 Cl.Ct. at 164 . Here, unlike Place-way, the record gives no hint that the contracting officer ever contemplated the possibility that either the $89,720 sought by plaintiff or the $11,208 actually awarded to plaintiff might be, or become, the subject of a set-off demand or counterclaim by defendant. Nor, in allowing only $11,208 of the equitable adjustment sought by plaintiff, did the contracting officer’s decision make reference to a set-off demand or counterclaim by defendant. Quite the contrary, the contracting officer’s decision merely stated, without elaboration, that the amount claimed by plaintiff was “overstated.” JX 2, at 2. Thus, Placeway is distinguishable, and we find that the decision of the Navy’s contracting officer increasing the contract price by $11,208 was not tantamount to a final decision denying defendant’s counterclaim of like amount.
In its quest to establish the authenticity of its “mirror image” counterclaim, defendant also relies upon the Federal Circuit’s decision in Sharman, but to no avail. As defendant correctly observes, Sharman involved a Government counterclaim and a contractor’s “mirror image” claim. Sharman, 2 F.3d at 1569 . Therein, “each ... ‘claim’ allege[d] entitlement to the same money based on the same partial performance, only under a different legal label.” Id. at 1571 . Yet it defies reason to assert, as defendant does, that in Sharman “the Federal Circuit reiterated its holding in Placeway.” On the jurisdictional issue, Placeway and Sharman reached opposite outcomes, insofar as the Federal Circuit held in Sharman that the Claims Court never had jurisdiction over either the Government claim or the contractor’s “mirror image” counterclaim because the contracting officer had never issued a valid and timely final decision on either claim. Sharman, 2 F.3d at 1569, 1573 . More to the point, the Federal Circuit expressly distinguished the actions taken by the contracting officer from the final decision rendered by the contracting officer in Placeway. Sharman, 2 F.3d at 1571 n. 9. Both the counterclaim and “mirror image” claim in Sharman arose when, following a termination for default, the contracting officer issued a letter demanding that the contractor repay certain progress payments. Id. at 1566-67 . The contracting officer rendered no final decision, the Federal Circuit reasoned, because the letter “invited negotiation of the amount demanded.” Id. at 1571 n. 9. 26 Thus, defendant’s attempt to cast Sharman as a reaffirmation of defendant’s faulty reading of Placeway is unpersuasive.
For present purposes, what Placeway and Sharman instruct is that the question of whether defendant’s counterclaim is a bona fide “mirror image” of plaintiff’s claim turns in large part upon a factual inquiry into the nature, extent, and timing of the action taken, if any, by the contracting officer concerning said counterclaim. That is, the court must examine “the logical relationship between the two claims” and determine whether the contracting officer has rendered a *560 “decision, actual or constructive,” regarding defendant’s purported “mirror image” counterclaim. (Kit-San-Azusa■, 32 Fed.Cl. at 664 (construing Placeway, 920 F.2d at 906-070 )). Here there was no actual or constructive decision because nothing in the record suggests the contracting officer was even cognizant of defendant’s counterclaim. Therefore, we find that defendant has failed to meet its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that its counterclaim is a “mirror image” of plaintiffs claim.
Moreover, to entertain defendant’s purported “mirror image” counterclaim on this record would not accord with the purpose and spirit of the CDA, under which the “exhaustion of administrative remedies should occur before the ease is ripe for judicial review.” Placeway, 920 F.2d at 906 . This exhaustion requirement acknowledges that, in enacting the CDA, Congress sought to promote the efficient resolution of contract claims by relying in the first instance upon the contracting officer’s general experience in the administration of Government contracts and specific knowledge of the contract and parties in question. Joseph Morton Co., 757 F.2d at 1280 . For this reason, “[bjoth issues of liability and of damages should usually be resolved [by the contracting officer] before judicial review is sought.” Placeway, 920 F.2d at 906 . Defendant presented no evidence suggesting that it raised any contemporaneous objection to the contracting officer’s decision to award plaintiff the sum of $11,208. Unaware that defendant contested — or would later contest — this equitable adjustment, the contracting officer plainly was given no opportunity whatever to resolve defendant’s counterclaim on the merits. 27 Lacking any credible evidence suggesting that defendant even pursued, much less exhausted, its administrative remedy before the contracting officer, we conclude that accepting jurisdiction over defendant’s counterclaim would frustrate the intended scheme of the CDA.
Finally, lest this ruling be misconstrued, we do not hold here that, as a matter of law, the CDA confers no jurisdiction over “mirror image” counterclaims upon this Court. Rather, we give effect to the legal tenet that the party invoking the court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of proving the elementary jurisdictional facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Reynolds, 846 F.2d at 748 . We duly take note, however, that the Federal Circuit has never expressly extended the exception for Government set-offs set out in Placeway, 920 F.2d at 906-07 , so as to create an exception for “mirror image” counterclaims. Moreover, decisions of this Court acknowledging the existence of an exception for “mirror image” counterclaims have done so only in dicta. See Kit-San-Azusa, 32 Fed.Cl. at 663-64 (applying Placeway set-off analysis); Alaska Pulp Corp. v. United States, 38 Fed.Cl. 141, 145-46 (1997) (rejecting contractor’s invitation to apply Sharman to exercise jurisdiction over purported “mirror image” claim, where there was no evidence of claim’s submission to contracting officer). Elsewhere, as defendant concedes in its brief, this Court has expressly rejected jurisdiction over an alleged “mirror image” counterclaim as to which the contracting officer had made no determination of liability or of damages. Volmar Constr. Co. v. United States, 32 Fed.Cl. 746, 756-57 (1995) (declining to adopt “mirror image” claim dictum in Kit-San-Azusa). Assuming, arguendo, that the case at bar presented a compelling reason to reach the unsettled question of subject matter jurisdiction over “mirror image” counterclaims, it would suffice to say that we concur with the result in Volmar.
Based upon the foregoing discussion, plaintiffs motion to dismiss defendant’s counterclaim on this Count III under RCFC 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is *561 granted. 28
IV. COUNT VI — THE GROUND FACE MASONRY ISSUE
A Facts
Plaintiffs Count VI seeks an award of damages in the sum of $10,779, representing costs allegedly incurred to remove mortar stains from certain interior masonry walls of the building, plus statutory interest from the date of this claim’s submission to the contracting officer. Although Count VI is the least of plaintiffs claims still pending at bar, the meaning of the relevant contract provisions and the significance of the underlying operative facts have been energetically contested, as evidenced by the parties’ refusal to stipulate to even a single fact relating to this claim. Nonetheless, after a careful examination of the record, we find numerous matters not truly in dispute.
Interior corridor walls in the EMIC school were constructed of ground face masonry units. Ground face masonry units are concrete blocks on which one face, the surface visible after installation, has been ground smooth. Architecturally speaking, ground face masonry units are used when an aesthetically pleasing masonry wall is desired. As with any other sort of masonry wall, mortar is used to fill the joints, gaps roughly 3/8 inch in width, between any two adjoining ground face masonry units. Mortar, a mixture— usually of cement, lime, sand, and water — is applied with a trowel in its plastic state and thereafter hardens in place. Dictionary of Architecture & Constr. 538. As a natural and unavoidable consequence of assembling a masonry block wall, mortar squeezes out of the joints between blocks and falls to the ground below, occasionally leaving some mortar residue behind on the adjacent block faces. Consequently, for the sake of the wall’s finished appearance, this mortar residue must be removed from the faces of the blocks.
Concerning the initial cleaning of the ground face masonry units after the blocks have been set in place, the contract states:
3.8 POINTING AND CLEANING: After mortar joints have attained their initial set but prior to hardening, completely remove mortar and grout daubs or splash-ings from exposed masonry surfaces. Before completion of the work, rake out all defects in joints in exposed masonry surfaces, fill with mortar and tool to match existing joints. Immediately after grout work is completed remove scum and stains which have percolated through the masonry using a high pressure stream of water. Do not use metal tools or metal brushes for cleaning.
3.8.1 Concrete Masonry Units: Dry brush exposed concrete masonry unit surfaces at the end of work each day and after any required pointing. Use stiff-fiber brushes only.
JX AA § 04230-19, MI 3.8, 3.8.I. 29 While plaintiff retained ultimate responsibility for compliance with this provision, the immediate responsibility for such daily cleaning and brushing rested with plaintiffs masonry subcontractor. At the end of each day, when the brushing called for in 113.8.1 had to be performed, the mortar remained somewhat soft. Consequently, a brush had to be used that was stiff enough to remove the mortar residue on the face of the blocks, yet not so stiff as to damage the mortar in place.
After the erection of the ground face masonry unit walls was complete, the contract provisions governing paints and other fin *562 ishes within the building’s interior called for the application of a masonry coating to the walls. Commonly referred to as “Tamms” coating (so named after its manufacturer), this transparent masonry coating was intended to enhance the aesthetic appeal of the ground face masonry unit walls by adding a subtle tint and visually accentuating the texture of the blocks’ ground faces. As to surface preparation prior to application of the Tamms coating, the contract provides: “Remove all dirt, splinters, loose particles, grease, oil, and other substances deleterious to coating performance as specified for each substrate.” 30 JX AA § 09900, at 113.2. In addition, the contract prescribes specific methods of surface cleaning and preparation that had to be used to remove each of “the following deleterious substances” from the walls: (1) dirt, chalking, grease, and oil; (2) fungus and mold; (3) glaze and loose particles; and (4) efflorescence. 31 JX AA § 09900, at H 3.4.1(a). Whereas the brushing and cleanup required after the blocks had been laid each day was to be performed by the masonry subcontractor, the painting subcontractor was obligated to clean the walls in preparation for the application of the Tamms coating with, of course, plaintiff retaining ultimate responsibility.
This dispute arose in early March of 1991 after a portion of the ground face masonry unit walls had been erected and it was discovered that, wherever mortar had splashed on the face of the blocks, discoloration had resulted. Because the Tamms coating was transparent, it did nothing to hide the diseol-oration. In fact, the Tamms coating actually amplified the visibility of the discoloration, thereby spoiling the aesthetics of the ground face masonry walls. Dissatisfied with this result, the Navy insisted that plaintiff use a stiffer brush to remove the mortar smears. However, plaintiff maintained that the contract did not require removal of the discoloration in question and, further, that a stiffer brush would disturb the mortar in the joints. Thereafter, the parties discussed the problem at length and tried different methods of removing the offending discoloration, and for purposes of experimentation even erected a small test wall, photographs of which are in evidence. 32 Mike Angeloff, the Navy’s field inspector, tried using a stiffer brush to remove mortar splashes from the test wall, but, like the brush used by plaintiffs masonry subcontractor, Mr. Angeloffs brush failed to remove the discoloration left behind by the mortar splashes.
Thereafter, plaintiffs masonry subcontractor began to supplement the daily brushing by rubbing the newly erected ground face masonry unit walls with burlap sacks each day. As to walls erected after this altered daily cleaning procedure was adopted, the parties experienced no more problems with mortar-induced discoloration showing through the Tamms coating. However, the discoloration on blocks previously laid remained a problem. Ultimately, the parties determined that light hand sanding was the only method capable of removing the discoloration from the walls. By letter dated April 1, 1991, the Navy instructed plaintiff to eom- *563 menee hand sanding the ground face masonry units to remove the discoloration. Plaintiffs masonry subcontractor undertook and completed the hand sanding, which successfully cured the discoloration problem.
Before proceeding to the parties’ contentions, we must address certain matters of terminology. At trial and in filings thereafter made with this court, the parties have waged a battle of semantics, referring to the discoloration problem variously as “stains,” “daubs,” “mortar splashes,” “blotches,” “mortar smears,” and other terms. For the sake of clarity, we shall continue to refer generally to the problem at issue as “discoloration.” “Mortar stains” shall be used to refer to plaintiffs characterization of the problem, and defendant’s characterization of the problem shall be termed “mortar smears.” The testimony taken at trial firmly established the parties’ concurrence that (1) a “mortar stain” is a form of discoloration permeating below the surface of a block; (2) a “mortar smear” constitutes a deposit upon the surface of a block extending above the surface; and (3) mortar stains and mortar smears are not mutually exclusive dilemmas, since a mortar smear may leave behind a mortar stain even after the mortar smear is brushed off. Where the litigants part ways, as we shall see. is over the nature of the cause — mortar stains or mortar smears — of the discoloration in question, and whether the daily brushing undertaken by plaintiffs masonry subcontractor satisfied the requirements of the contract.
B. Contentions of the Parties
1. Plaintiff
Plaintiff contends that hand sanding for the purpose of cleaning the discoloration from the ground faced masonry units was work not required by the contract. Seeking to establish its full compliance with the contract’s masonry cleaning requirements, plaintiff cites Stuyvesant Dredging Co. v. United States, 834 F.2d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1987), for the principle that a design specification states how a contract must be performed and tolerates no deviation, whereas a performance specification states the desired result and vests discretion in the contractor to select the means of achieving that result. Plaintiff argues that contract § 04230, H 3.8.1, which requires daily cleaning with “stiff-fiber brushes,” is a design specification, the soundness of which was impliedly warranted by the Navy. Thus, daily cleaning of the masonry with stiff brushes, and nothing more, was all that plaintiff had to do in order to accomplish literal compliance with this alleged design specification. In short, plaintiff concludes, if the daily stiff brushing removed the mortar smears but failed to remove the underlying mortar stains, the Navy’s design specification was at fault, and it is the Navy which must bear the cost incurred to remove the mortar stains by hand sanding.
Factually, plaintiff’s argument rests upon the testimony of its assistant superintendent on the EMIC school project, Richard Cooper. Mr. Cooper testified that mortar smears naturally result from the process of erecting masonry walls and that mortar stains, in turn, are the inevitable byproduct of mortar smears. According to Mr. Cooper, plaintiff’s masonry subcontractor used the stiffest brush possible to clean the walls at the end of each day. Had a stiffen brash been used, Mr. Cooper asserted, damage would have resulted to the as yet unhardened mortar joints. Mr. Cooper stated that the daily brushing performed by plaintiff’s masonry subcontractor accomplished the complete removal of all mortar smears as required by § 04230, H 3.8 of the contract. Consequently, Mr. Cooper concluded, the problem had to be mortar stains, as opposed to mortar smears, because the discoloration was within the blocks themselves and could not be scraped off.
Plaintiff raises two additional arguments relating to contract § 09900, H 3.4.1, which governs the cleaning of concrete and masonry surfaces prior to the application of Tamms coating, paint, sealer, or other finishes. First, plaintiff notes that mortar smears and mortar stains are not among the “deleterious substances” listed in 113.4.1. Second, plaintiff avers that the discoloration problem affected only the appearance of the walls and, further, that appearance is not an element of “coating performance.” At trial, Mr. Cooper conceded that mortar stains would affect the *564 “appearance” of the Tamms coating, but asserted that coating “performance” remained undiminished inasmuch as mortar stains would not make the Tamms coating rub off more easily or otherwise shorten its useful life.
2. Defendant
Defendant contends that plaintiff seeks to recover the costs incurred to rectify its own poor workmanship and its threefold failure to comply with the contract specifications for masonry cleaning. 33 First, plaintiffs masonry subcontractor failed to “completely remove mortar and grout daubs or splashings from exposed masonry surfaces.” JX AA § 04230, at H 3.8. This contention rests on the factual premise that mortar smears, rather than mortar stains, were the cause of the discoloration problem. At trial, Mr. Bau-dhuin candidly acknowledged that the masonry specifications in § 04230 of the contract refer to the word “stain” only in connection with grout, not in connection with mortar. Moreover, in response to a hypothetical posed by counsel for plaintiff, Mr. Baudhuin grudgingly admitted that, if the natural result of using mortar to assemble ground faced masonry unit walls was mortar stains, but not mortar smears, then plaintiff would be entitled to recover for extra work, such as hand sanding, required to remove said mortar stains.
Having briefly entertained plaintiffs hypothetical, Mr. Baudhuin quickly rejected it as ungrounded in fact. Mr. Baudhuin unequivocally testified that the discoloration in question constituted mortar smears, not mortar stains. Taking issue with the premise that mortar stains are unavoidable, Mr. Baudhuin asserted that plaintiffs masonry subcontractor was careless in allowing mortar squeezed from the joints to smear the adjacent block faces. He distinguished a mortar smear, which can be removed in its entirety by light sanding, from a mortar stain, which cannot be so removed because it permeates the surface of the block to some extent. Testifying as an architectural expert and the architect of the EMIC building, Mr. Sullivan likewise maintained that the problem was mortar smears, not mortar stains. Because the discoloration could be completely removed by light sanding, Mr. Sullivan concluded that it could not have penetrated the surface of the ground face masonry units.
Defendant’s second contention is that, in brushing newly erected block walls each day, plaintiffs masonry subcontractor violated the contractual requirement to “[u]se stiff-fiber brushes only.” JX AA § 04320, at 113.8.1. Here, defendant relies mainly upon the testimony of Ms. Ginalski, who not o

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6646719. Public record. Not legal advice.