# Hermogenes v. Brown

> United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims · April 11, 1996 · 9 Vet. App. 75

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6613058

## Case

- **Full name:** Bienvenido V. HERMOGENES v. Jesse BROWN, Secretary of Veterans Affairs
- **Court:** United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
- **Decided:** April 11, 1996
- **Citations:** 9 Vet. App. 75; 1996 U.S. Vet. App. LEXIS 215; 1996 WL 170661
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Kramer
- **Judges:** Farley, Holdaway, Kramer
- **Cited by:** 8 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6613058

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that Supreme Court has held that an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute is entitled to deference when not inconsistent with the statutory mandate and when consistent with the policy that Congress sought to implement

## Opinion text

KRAMER, Judge,
concurring:
I concur, but arrive at the result reached in Part III by way of a slightly different analysis. In the absence of the appellant’s pursuit of appellate review (with the filing of a Notice of Disagreement and Substantive Appeal) as to the regional office’s August 1990 termination of adjudication, such termination became final one year after the date of such determination. As a consequence, the only avenue open to the appellant to reestablish such benefits was the filing of a new claim, an action he took with his February 1991 letter to the regional office (which letter clearly constituted the filing of a new claim rather than a disagreement with the August *79 1990 termination decision). As the filing of this new claim occurred after the effective date of Pub.L. No. 101-508, compliance with that statutory provision was mandatory, rather than discretionary, on the part of the Secretary. Thus, it cannot be argued that Karnas v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 308 (1991), requires that the old version of 38 U.S.C. § 1502 (equating post-age 65 status with total and permanent disability) apply in that the Secretary promulgated his revision of 38 C.F.R. § 4.17 during the pendency of the appellant’s new claim.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6613058. Public record. Not legal advice.