# Benny Vaughn v. Coffee County, Tennessee

> Court of Appeals of Tennessee · May 25, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6343834

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** May 25, 2022
- **Precedential status:** Unpublished
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Western Section Presiding Judge J. Steven Stafford
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

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## Opinion text

05/25/2022
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
March 31, 2022 Session

BENNY VAUGHN v. COFFEE COUNTY, TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Coffee County
No. 45634 Vanessa Jackson, Judge
___________________________________

No. M2021-00653-COA-R3-CV
___________________________________

An inmate filed this case alleging that he sustained injuries while in the county jail after
slipping on water in his cell. The trial court granted the county’s motion for summary
judgment, ruling that the county lacked actual or constructive notice of the alleged
dangerous condition. Because we conclude that the inmate submitted sufficient proof to
create a dispute of material fact as to the county’s actual notice of the alleged dangerous
condition, we reverse.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Reversed and
Remanded

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S. delivered the opinion of the court, in which ARNOLD B.
GOLDIN and KENNY ARMSTRONG, JJ., joined.

Drew Justice, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Benny Vaughn.

Jeffrey R. Thompson and Gina S. Vogel, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Coffee
County, Tennessee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

1
Rule 10 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals of Tennessee provides:

This Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse
or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion
would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it
shall be designated “MEMORANDUM OPINION,” shall not be published, and shall not
be cited or relied on for any reason in any unrelated case.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 19, 2018, Plaintiff/Appellant Benny Vaughn (“Plaintiff”) filed a
complaint against Defendant/Appellee Coffee County, Tennessee (“Defendant”), alleging
that he fell and broke his hip in the Defendant’s jail due to defective and leaking plumbing.
On April 22, 2019, Defendant answered denying the material allegations in the complaint.
Specifically, Defendant pleaded all defenses available to it under the Tennessee
Government Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), as well as asserted that it lacked actual or
constructive knowledge of any unsafe or dangerous condition.

On October 6, 2020, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on two bases:
(1) that Plaintiff could not present proof that Defendant had actual or constructive
knowledge of a dangerous condition; and (2) that Plaintiff was more than 50% at fault for
his injuries. In support of this motion, Defendant filed selections from Plaintiff’s
deposition, selections from the deposition of nurse Lynn Carter, affidavits from Jail
Administrator Pam Freeman, correctional officers Chase Alford and Juan Flores, and
certain jail records.

Defendant also filed a statement of undisputed facts, to which Plaintiff responded
on February 19, 2021. The following facts were therefore undisputed for purposes of
summary judgment:

1. Plaintiff was incarcerated in cell BD 114 of the Coffee County Jail in
December 2017.
2. When Plaintiff was placed in cell BD 114, he noticed that there was water
leaking from the seal where the toilet attaches to the cell floor.
3. The water had caused a stain to form on the cell floor.
4. Plaintiff testified that the leak was “slow,” and it “took a while for the
water to creep out.”
5. The water did not cover the entirety of Plaintiffs floor; instead, the
plaintiff described the water as follows: “it was long, and it come out of
the commode and went toward the door.”
6. Plaintiff testified that the toilet consistently leaked for a month leading up
to the incident at issue.
7. A few days prior to the events giving rise to Plaintiffs alleged injuries in
this case, Plaintiff slipped in the water in his cell and fell.
8. Plaintiff alleges to have reported the fall to Officer Juan Flores.
9. The fall which is the basis of this lawsuit occurred on December 21st or
22nd, 2017. [Plaintiff admitted this fact but alleged that the incident
occurred on December 22.]

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10. On the date Plaintiff said he fell, Plaintiff testified that he was “in a hurry”
to get his food tray which was being delivered to his cell door by Officer
Chase Alford.
11. According to the plaintiff, at the time of the fall, there was the “usual”
amount of water on the floor which had leaked from the toilet.
12. Plaintiff acknowledges that there was an area in his cell that he could have
traversed in order to avoid the water but chose not to because “he was in
a hurry to eat.”
13. Plaintiff knows the water was “mopped up once,” but does not know if
the toilet/water were addressed at any time while he was not in his cell.
14. Pam Freeman, Chase Alford, and Juan Flores have all attested that none
of them saw [Plaintiff] slip and fall on the water located in his cell.
15. Lynn Carter, FNP treated Plaintiff while he was incarcerated at the Coffee
County Jail and testified regarding his medical care.
16. Plaintiff had a history of psychosis and suicidal behavior during his stay
at the Coffee County Jail.
17. On January 1, 2018, Plaintiff reported to a jail medical provider that
“warlocks caused him to break his hip.”
18. Nurse Carter testified that following surgery for his hip, Plaintiff was not
compliant with doctors’ orders.
19. For example, Plaintiff repeatedly pulled the staples out of his surgical
cite, rubbed feces into his wound and generally exhibited poor hygiene
which resulted in “extreme infection.”
(Renumbered and record citations omitted).

The following allegations, however, Plaintiff denied by referencing portions
of his own deposition:

1. The plaintiff never reported to Ms. Freeman, Mr. Alford, or Mr. Flores
that he had a leaky toilet in his cell, that the leaky toilet caused water to
accumulate, or that he had fallen on water in his cell.
2. Having no notice of the alleged water, none of them know the source of
the water, or how long the water had been accumulated in his cell at the
time Plaintiff alleges to have fallen and sustained injury on December 21
or 22, 2017.
3. Had any of them been made aware of the leaking toilet, or the water
accumulation, it would have been reported to maintenance and there
would be a record of it.
(Renumbered and record citations omitted).

In support of his denials, Plaintiff cited the following from his deposition:
Q. Okay. And did you talk to anybody at Coffee County Jail about that?
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who did you talk to?
A. Several people.
Q. Okay. Can you name them?
A. They said -- Alford, Ms. Freeman. I told Ms. Freeman. She said she would
have maintenance look at it.
* * *
Q. Okay. Did somebody come look at it?
A. Never did.
* * *
Q. So you talked to Ms. Freeman about it, and I think you also said you talked
to Mr. Alford about it.
A. Yeah.
Q. What did he say?
A. That they was supposed to get to it.
* * *
Q. Okay. Other than these two conversations, did you ever talk to anybody
else about it?
A. I even told maintenance myself, I think. They said, yeah, that they was
supposed to come by there and look at it.
Q. Who did you talk to in maintenance?
A. Some older guy. I don’t know what his name is. Some older guy. The guy
that runs it, whatever his name is.
Q. So the head guy over maintenance is the one you talked to.
A. Yes, sir.
* * *
Q. Other than those conversations you have told me about, did you have any
other conversations with anyone at the Coffee County Jail about the toilet
issue.
A. I probably told the inmates. I don’t know which one or who. Probably my
friend. We would talk about it.
Q. Okay. But other than Ms. Freeman, Mr. Alford and the maintenance guy,
did you talk about anybody else about the toilet issue?
A. No sir. Not that I can remember.

Elsewhere in his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he had also slipped a few days before
the accident at issue and had informed Officer Flores of that fact; according to Plaintiff,
however, Officer Flores “more or less blowed it off.” Finally, Plaintiff also denied the
following allegation on the basis that the jail’s maintenance records were plainly
incomplete and inadmissible: “Based on the maintenance records of the Coffee County
Jail, there was no issues reported as to a toilet in BD 114 for the month of December in
2017.”

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On February 23, 2021, Defendant filed a statement containing additional undisputed
material facts, which alleged that:

1. On December 18, 2017, Plaintiff filed a medical sick call request
complaining that the whole pod (including his cell) was flooded with
water. A [] nurse responded to the request stating, “Mr. Vaughn the
officers reported that you keep flooding your cell by stuffing your clothes
in the toilet. Please refrain from doing that.”
2. Minutes later, Plaintiff filed a grievance directed to the officers
complaining of the water in his cell. The grievance was answered on
December 18, 2017 at 5:07pm, indicating that Plaintiffs cell “has been
cleaned and is free of any access water.”
3. Plaintiff testified that the fall which is the basis of this lawsuit occurred
on December 21, 2017.
4. However, the fall which resulted in Plaintiff’s hip fracture actually
occurred on or before December 20, 2017.
(Record citations omitted). Plaintiff did not respond to these additional facts.

On March 4, 2021, the trial court entered an order granting Defendant’s motion. In
its order, the trial court noted that Plaintiff testified in his deposition that he informed Ms.
Freeman, Officer Alford, and Officer Flores of the leaky toilet, but that he could not recall
the dates of these conversations. But the court further noted that these individuals had stated
via affidavit that they had not been made aware of the issues. As such, the trial court
concluded that

Plaintiff’s uncorroborated deposition testimony does not overcome the sworn
statements of these three jail employees. In the absence of any other proof,
there is no material evidence from which the Court could find that these three
employees (or any other employee of the Defendant) had actual or
constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition in the Plaintiff’s cell.

The trial court next referenced the additional undisputed facts submitted by Defendant,

[T]he only notice to Defendant of any dangerous condition occurred
on December 18, 2017. Officers responded to that notice and Plaintiff’s cell
was cleaned and was free of excess water at 5:07 p.m. on that same day.
Officers reported that the water from the toilet in Plaintiff’s cell was a result
of Plaintiff stuffing his clothes into the toilet. No other reports of a water leak
or water problem in Plaintiff’s cell were made prior to his fall.
The Court finds that there is no material evidence in the record from
which the Court could conclude that the Defendant’s employees at the Coffee
County Jail, exercising reasonable care and diligence, should have
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discovered the alleged dangerous condition (water on floor of Plaintiff’s
cell), or that they had actual knowledge thereof.

The trial court further ruled that the issue of comparative fault was moot. A final order was
entered dismissing Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice on May 12, 2021. This appeal followed.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff raises a single issue in this case:

In this premises liability case, the trial court granted summary judgment to
the Defendant, Coffee County, by holding that the Defendant’s witnesses
were more believable than the Plaintiff, and consequently that the Plaintiff
could not show that the Defendant had any notice of the unsafe condition.
Did the trial court wrongly grant summary judgment?

In the posture of appellee, Defendant frames the issues as follows:

1. Whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to the defendant
on plaintiff’s negligence claim when the undisputed, material facts in the
record demonstrated that the defendant did not have constructive or actual
knowledge of the alleged dangerous condition.
2. Whether summary judgment to the defendant is proper on additional,
alternative grounds, when the undisputed, material facts in the record
demonstrate that the defendant did not breach a duty of care owed to the
plaintiff.
3. Whether summary judgment to the defendant is proper on additional,
alternative grounds, when the undisputed, material facts in the record
demonstrate that plaintiff was more than fifty percent or more at fault for his
injuries.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. Summary
judgment is appropriate where the moving party has demonstrated that “there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477
S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015). “We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary
judgment de novo, without a presumption of correctness.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at
250 (citing Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618, 622 (Tenn. 1997)). The burden is upon the
moving party to establish that its motion satisfies these requirements. See Staples v. CBL
Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 88 (Tenn. 2000). Under the summary judgment standards
established in Rye, when the moving party does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it
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“may satisfy its burden of production either (1) by affirmatively negating an essential
element of the nonmoving party’s claim or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s
evidence at the summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s
claim or defense.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264.

IV. ANALYSIS

A.

There is no dispute in this case that Defendant enjoys governmental immunity under
the GTLA. Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-101 et seq. Tennessee Code
Annotated section 29-20-203(a), provides, however, that: “Immunity from suit of a
governmental entity is removed for any injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous
condition of any street, alley, sidewalk or highway, owned and controlled by such
governmental entity.” Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-20-204(a) also provides:
“Immunity from suit of a governmental entity is removed for any injury caused by the
dangerous or defective condition of any public building, structure, dam, reservoir or other
public improvement owned and controlled by such governmental entity.” The removal of
immunity only applies under either statute, however, where “constructive and/or actual
notice to the governmental entity of such condition be alleged and proved[.]” Tenn. Code
Ann. §§ 29-20-203(b), 204(b). This Court has previously held that “[t]he section of
the GTLA which removes sovereign immunity for injuries caused by dangerous or
defective structures essentially codifies [the] common-law” rule that:

To sustain a claim for premises liability, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the
dangerous or defective condition was caused or created by the owner,
operator, or his agent, or (2) that the condition was created by a third party
and the owner, operator, or agent had actual or constructive notice of the
condition before the accident.

Brown v. Chester Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. W2008-00035-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 5397532,
at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2008) (citing Martin v. Washmaster Auto Ctr., 946 S.W.2d
314, 318 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996)). In this case, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to
submit proof that it created the dangerous condition or had either actual or constructive
notice of the dangerous condition at issue so as to remove governmental immunity.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has described actual notice as “knowledge of facts
and circumstances sufficiently pertinent in character to enable reasonably cautious and
prudent persons to investigate and ascertain as to the ultimate facts.” Kirby v. Macon Cnty.,
892 S.W.2d 403, 409 (Tenn. 1994) (quoting Texas Co. v. Aycock, 190 Tenn. 16, 227
S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tenn. 1950)). Constructive notice, in contrast, is defined as “information
or knowledge of a fact imputed by law to a person (although he may not actually have it)
because he could have discovered the fact by proper diligence, and his situation was such
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as to cast upon him the duty of inquiring into it.” Parker v. Holiday Hosp. Franchising,
Inc., 446 S.W.3d 341, 351–52 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting Hawks v. City of Westmoreland, 960
S.W.2d 10, 15 (Tenn. 1997)). Constructive notice may be established by showing that a
dangerous or defective condition existed for such a length of time that a property owner,
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have become aware of it. Parker, 446 S.W.3d at
352 (citing Simmons v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tenn. 1986)).
Constructive notice may also be established by showing that the dangerous condition
resulted from “‘a pattern of conduct, a recurring incident, or a general or continuing
condition.’” Parker, 446 S.W.3d at 352 (quoting Blair v. West Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d
761, 765 (Tenn. 2004)).

In this appeal, Plaintiff asserts that he put forth specific evidence that Defendant had
actual knowledge of the dangerous condition, citing his own deposition testimony that he
had informed multiple employees of the Defendant that his floor was flooded before his
injury. We agree. Here, the trial court was faced with directly competing proof. According
to Plaintiff’s deposition, he informed at least Ms. Freeman and Officer Alford of the water
on the floor before his fall. Ms. Freeman and Officer Alford denied that these conversations
took place. But because there was directly conflicting testimony on this issue, a credibility
issue was created. And issues that turn on credibility generally cannot be decided via
summary judgment. See Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 216 (Tenn. 1993), holding modified
by Hannan v. Alltel Publ’g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008), and holding modified by Rye,
477 S.W.3d 235 (“When a material fact is in dispute creating a genuine issue, when the
credibility of witnesses is an integral part of the factual proof, or when evidence must be
weighed, a trial is necessary because such issues are not appropriately resolved on the basis
of affidavits.”); Vaulton v. Polaris Indus., Inc., No. E2021-00489-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL
628502, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 2022) (“At the summary judgment stage, we do not
weigh the evidence, nor do we engage in credibility determinations regarding the
deponents.”). But see Hashi v. Parkway Xpress, LLC, No. M2018-01469-COA-R3-CV,
2019 WL 5431858, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019) (quoting Hepp v. Joe B’s, Inc.,
No. 01A01-9604-CV-00183, 1997 WL 266839, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 1997)
(“[T]o warrant a denial of summary judgment, credibility questions ‘must r[ise] to a level
higher than the normal credibility questions that arise whenever a witness testifies.’”).

Defendant asserts, however, that a crucial component is missing from Plaintiff’s
deposition testimony—when he had these conversations with Ms. Freeman and Officer
Alford. And because the proof was undisputed that a flooding had occurred on December
18 and been cleaned up by Defendant, there was no proof that Defendant had any notice of
the dangerous condition that existed on December 20, the date of Appellant’s injury. Thus,
Defendant asks us to infer from the proof presented that Plaintiff may have had these
conversations with Ms. Freeman and Officer Alford prior to December 18, when the first
flooding was reported and ameliorated, and not in the time between December 18 and
December 20.

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Respectfully, we cannot agree. Under Tennessee’s summary judgment standard,
when there are inferences to be drawn from the facts, we are required to draw all reasonable
inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Vanquish Worldwide, LLC v. Sentinel Ins.
Co., Ltd., No. E2020-01650-COA-R3-CV, 2022 WL 189791, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan.
21, 2022) (citing Parker v. Holiday Hosp. Franchising, Inc., 446 S.W.3d 341, 346–47
(Tenn. 2014)) (“Because the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of
proof, we view the evidence in favor of the non-moving party by resolving all
reasonable inferences in its favor and discarding all countervailing evidence.”). Here,
Plaintiff responded to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment by pointing to specific
proof that he informed Defendant’s employees about the water that he asserts caused him
to slip and fall. Moreover, he testified that after he told these individuals about the problem,
no one ever came to look at it or fix it. So, Plaintiff’s proof taken with all the reasonable
inferences in his favor, was that his conversations concerning the water on the floor must
not have been in reference to the incident on December 18 because that water was cleaned
up by Defendant’s employees. In other words, it is reasonable to infer from Plaintiff’s
testimony that his conversation with Ms. Freeman and Officer Alford occurred between
the December 18 clean up and his December 20 fall. Thus, he presented proof that
Defendant had actual notice of the condition that he alleged caused him to fall and be
injured. This proof creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to the issue of actual notice,
making summary judgment on this issue inappropriate.

Plaintiff also contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
without addressing his argument that Defendant had constructive notice. Defendant does
not address Plaintiff’s contention that the trial court failed to specifically address this
component of Plaintiff’s argument. Instead, Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to present
proof to establish constructive notice. As previously discussed, however, Plaintiff may
overcome Defendant’s motion for summary on the issue of notice by establishing either
actual or constructive notice. Brown, 2008 WL 5397532, at *2; see also Reed v. Greene
Cnty., No. E2004-00090-COA-R3CV, 2005 WL 100843, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19,
2005) (noting that the defendant must prove that the plaintiff had “neither actual or
constructive notice”). We have concluded that Plaintiff pointed to specific proof in the
record to establish a genuine dispute of material fact as to Defendant’s actual notice of the
alleged dangerous condition at issue. As such, Plaintiff need not establish that Defendant
also had constructive notice. We therefore pretermit consideration of that issue.

B.

Defendant next asserts that this Court should affirm the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment on a different basis—either lack of duty or comparative fault. It is true
that this Court may sometimes affirm a trial court’s summary judgment ruling on a different
basis than that relied upon by the trial court. See Bobo v. City of Jackson, 511 S.W.3d 14,
26 n.14 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (“[W]e are entitled . . . to affirm the entry
of summary judgment on grounds that differ from those forming the basis of the trial
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court’s decision.”). We note, however, that as an appellate court, our jurisdiction is
appellate only and “we are constrained to only review those issues that have been decided
by the trial court in the first instance.” Whalum v. Shelby Cnty. Election Comm’n, No.
W2013-02076-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 4919601, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2014)
(citing Reid v. Reid, 388 S.W.3d 292, 294 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). As a result, we often
decline to address issues that were pretermitted by the trial court; under those
circumstances, we will remand to the prior court for consideration of the pretermitted issue.
See, e.g., Payne v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 467 S.W.3d 413, 438 (Tenn. 2015) (“It is
not unusual for this Court to instruct a trial court or an intermediate appellate court to
address unresolved or pretermitted issues on remand, provided that the issues have not
been waived.”). Here, the trial court specifically pretermitted Defendant’s argument
concerning comparative fault as moot. As such, we conclude remand for the trial court to
resolve this previously pretermitted issue is most appropriate.

Although the result is the same, we decline to rule on Defendant’s argument
concerning lack of duty on a different basis: this was not an argument raised by Defendant
in its motion for summary judgment. With a few exceptions not relevant in this case,
arguments not raised in the trial court will not be entertained on appeal. See, e.g., City of
Memphis v. Shelby County, Tennessee, 469 S.W.3d 531, 560 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015)
(citing Lawrence v. Stanford, 655 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tenn. 1983)) (holding that “[i]t has
long been the general rule that questions not raised in the trial court will not be entertained
on appeal”). Because Defendants did not raise lack of duty as a basis for summary
judgment, we will not consider this argument on appeal.

V. CONCLUSION

The judgment of the Coffee County Circuit Court is reversed, and this cause is
remanded for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are taxed to Appellee Coffee
County, Tennessee, for which execution may issue if necessary.

S/ J. Steven Stafford
J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6343834. Public record. Not legal advice.