# Corinio Pruitt v. State of Tennessee

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee · May 6, 2022

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6338619

## Case

- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
- **Decided:** May 6, 2022
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion
- **Judges:** Judge Jill Bartee Ayers
- **Cited by:** 0 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6338619

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that “the standards of neutrality for prosecutors are not necessarily as stringent as those applicable to judicial or quasi-judicial officers”
- holding that the court had “never presumed bias absent either an affirmative statement of bias, willful concealment of bias, or failure to disclose information that would call into question the juror’s bias, and we decline to do so now”

## Opinion text

05/06/2022
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT JACKSON
May 4, 2021 Session

CORINIO PRUITT v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County
No. 06-00460 Chris Craft, Judge
___________________________________

No. W2019-00973-CCA-R3-PD
___________________________________

Petitioner, Corinio Pruitt, was convicted in 2008 of first degree felony murder and was
sentenced to death. After Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed by the
Tennessee Supreme Court on direct appeal, Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition.
After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. In this
appeal, Petitioner raises the following claims for relief: 1) the post-conviction judge erred
by failing to recuse himself; 2) Petitioner is ineligible for the death penalty due to his
intellectual disability, and trial counsel were ineffective in their handling of Petitioner’s
intellectual disability claim at trial1; 3) trial counsel were ineffective for failing to
investigate and present additional mitigating evidence regarding Petitioner’s traumatic
social history, mental health, and cognitive impairments; 4) the prosecutors abused their
discretion by seeking the death penalty in this case, operated under a conflict of interest,
and committed misconduct by exercising peremptory strikes against African-American
jurors and making inappropriate statements and arguments, and trial counsel were
ineffective for failing to raise appropriate objections to these issues; 5) trial counsel
rendered ineffective assistance during the course of voir dire, trial, closing argument, and
jury instructions during the guilt phase; 6) the death penalty is unconstitutional and is a
disproportionate sentence in this case; and 7) the cumulative effect of these errors rendered
Petitioner’s trial fundamentally unfair. After a thorough examination of the briefs of the
parties and amici curiae, the records of the post-conviction hearing and direct appeal, and
the applicable law, this court affirms the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

1
Petitioner’s trial predated the 2010 amendment of Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203,
which replaced the term “mental retardation” with “intellectual disability.” This opinion will use the term
“mental retardation” only when referring to the testimony of witnesses or pieces of evidence that used that
term. No disrespect is intended thereby.
JILL BARTEE AYERS, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which JOHN EVERETT
WILLIAMS, P.J., and D. KELLY THOMAS, JR., J., joined.

Kelly A. Gleason (on appeal and at hearing); Lucie T. Butner (on appeal); and Jonathan
King and Barbara Sidelnik (at hearing), Assistant Post-Conviction Defenders, Nashville,
Tennessee, for the appellant, Corinio Pruitt.

Herbert H. Slatery III, Attorney General and Reporter; Andrée Sophia Blumstein, Solicitor
General; Benjamin A. Ball, Assistant Attorney General; Amy P. Weirich, District Attorney
General; and Steve Jones, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of
Tennessee.

J. David Wicker and Elizabeth Bowden, Nashville, Tennessee; Collin P. Wedel and
Andrew B. Talai, Los Angeles, California; and Alex E. Sirio, Washington, D.C., for the
amicus curiae, the Tennessee Conference of the NAACP.

David R. Esquivel, Sarah B. Miller, and Elizabeth Harwood, Nashville, Tennessee, for the
amicus curiae, Just City.

Ross M. Johnson and Zachary Lawson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amicus curiae,
Tennessee Conservatives Concerned About the Death Penalty.

John S. Hicks, Nashville, Tennessee, for the amici curiae, the Arc of Tennessee, Professor
Daniel Kiel, and Professor Steven J. Mulroy.

OPINION

Factual and Procedural Background

I. Trial and Direct Appeal

Petitioner, Corinio Pruitt, was indicted for first degree felony murder and first
degree premeditated murder for the death of the victim, Lawrence Guidroz. Both at trial
and on direct appeal, Petitioner was represented by attorneys from the Shelby County
Public Defender’s Office. After a six-day trial in 2008, the jury found Petitioner guilty of
felony murder and the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder, which was merged
into his conviction for felony murder. The jury then imposed the death penalty after
determining that the following aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating
circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) Petitioner was previously convicted of one
or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use
of violence to the person; (2) the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or
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aided by Petitioner, while Petitioner had a substantial role in committing, or attempting to
commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to
commit a robbery; and (3) the victim was 70 years of age or older at the time of the murder.
See T.C.A. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (7), (14). Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed
on direct appeal by both this court and the Tennessee Supreme Court, with two Justices
dissenting as to the proportionality of the death penalty. See State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d
180 (Tenn. 2013), cert. denied sub nom Pruitt v. Tennessee, 134 S. Ct. 2874 (2014).

The Tennessee Supreme Court summarized the facts presented in the trial court as
follows:

A. Evidence at Guilt Phase

On the morning of August 2, 2005, Courtney Johnson encountered
[Petitioner] by chance as he walked to the Apple Market on Winchester Road
in Memphis, Tennessee. [Petitioner] talked about stealing a car and asked Mr.
Johnson if he would get in the car with him if [Petitioner] took one. Although
Mr. Johnson told [Petitioner] “no,” he remained with [Petitioner] outside the
market and spoke to people who came to the market, including [Petitioner]’s
cousin, Michael Rockett. Later, Mr. Johnson’s friend, “Sed,” came to the
market. [Petitioner] remained outside the market as Mr. Johnson and Sed
walked to the Family Dollar store at the other end of the shopping center. Mr.
Johnson testified that he went with Sed to the Family Dollar store because he
did not want to be involved in whatever [Petitioner] was going to do.

Taka Pruitt[, who is unrelated to Petitioner,] arrived at the Apple Market
with her neighbor. They parked directly outside the front door of the market.
Ms. Pruitt stayed in the car while her neighbor went inside. As she waited in
the car, she observed a “younger gentleman,” later identified as [Petitioner],
standing to the left of the door. Ms. Pruitt recognized him as someone who
lived in her apartment complex. After five or six minutes, Ms. Pruitt saw an
older man walk out of the market with groceries in his arms and walk to his
car. As he reached the driver’s side door, [Petitioner] ran up behind the older
man and pushed him into the car. Although she could not see clearly into the
car, it appeared to Ms. Pruitt that the two men were “tussling.” She saw
[Petitioner] on top of the older man, and she could see the older man’s feet
dangling out of the car. After about fifteen seconds, she saw [Petitioner] throw
the older man to the ground, slam the car door, and drive away. When Ms.
Pruitt checked on the victim, he was shaking and having trouble breathing and
he was bleeding from his nose and both ears.

-3-
Ms. Pruitt ran inside the market, told employees that someone had just
been carjacked, and asked them to call 911. She then ran back to the victim
and called 911 on her cell phone. Ms. Pruitt went to the police station after the
carjacking. She identified [Petitioner] from a photo lineup as the person who
beat the victim and took the victim’s car. At trial, Ms. Pruitt was shown a still
photo created from the market’s security camera video. She circled an image
of [Petitioner], identifying him as the younger man she saw push the victim
into his car. Ms. Pruitt also confirmed that [Petitioner] was alone when he
attacked the victim.

Courtney Johnson testified that he saw the victim arrive at the Apple
Market in a brown Chevrolet and walk into the market just before he and Sed
went to the Family Dollar store. Mr. Johnson said that the victim appeared to
be fine when he went into the Apple Market. Mr. Johnson and Sed were in the
Family Dollar store for “three to four minutes.” When they walked back in the
direction of the Apple Market, Mr. Johnson saw “an old man laying down with
blood coming out of his head, and his car was gone.” [Petitioner] was also
gone. Mr. Johnson said he ran inside the market and asked someone to call
911. He left the scene before the police arrived because he did not want to be
involved and did not want to “snitch” on [Petitioner].

Memphis Police Officer Charmell Smith was the first officer on the
scene and arrived before emergency medical personnel. She found the victim
lying on his back on the ground and bleeding from his ears and mouth. She
testified that the victim was “semi-conscious” and that she helped load the
victim into an ambulance when it arrived. Based on her prior medical training
as a certified nursing assistant, she opined that the bleeding from the ears
indicated some kind of head trauma.

Thomas J. Leech III identified the victim, Mr. Lawrence Guidroz, from
a still photo created from the Apple Market’s security camera video. Mr.
Leech testified that he had known Mr. Guidroz for more than twenty-five years
and that he was very close to Mr. Guidroz. Mr. Leech went to the hospital to
see Mr. Guidroz when he heard that Mr. Guidroz had been attacked. Mr. Leech
remained in Mr. Guidroz’s hospital room throughout the night. At no point
was Mr. Guidroz able to communicate with Mr. Leech. Mr. Guidroz died the
next day. Mr. Leech testified that Mr. Guidroz was seventy-nine years old at
the time of his death. Mr. Guidroz was buried in Louisiana after a service in
Memphis. Mr. Leech identified photographs of Mr. Guidroz’s car, bearing the
license plate number CUX 845.

-4-
Following the carjacking, Memphis Police began looking for the
victim’s car. Officer Jonas Holguin found the car parked at the Somerset
Apartments near Tullahoma and Winchester and was instructed to watch it
from a distance. At trial, Officer Holguin was shown the photograph of Mr.
Guidroz’s car, which had been identified by Mr. Leech, and confirmed that the
license plate was the same as the car he was instructed to watch. At some
point, the car was moved from the apartment complex without the knowledge
of the police, and the police began to search the area in an attempt to locate the
car. The car was later observed pulling into a residence at 3180 Beauchamp,
and a team of police officers converged on that location.

The driver of the car, who was wearing a red shirt, went inside the
house. The police made the decision to apprehend the driver. Mr. Johnson
came out of the house and the police took him into custody. According to
Sergeant Robin Hulley, Mr. Johnson yelled, “the guy you want is in the back
yard.” Officers went to the back yard and saw a man wearing a red shirt jump
over a fence and run. Although dogs were called in to track the man, police
had no success in finding him.

Mr. Johnson testified that after the incident at the Apple Market, he did
not see [Petitioner] again until three days later, when [Petitioner] telephoned
and asked to come to Mr. Johnson’s house to take some liquor from Mr.
Johnson’s grandmother’s bar. Because he knew [Petitioner] had stolen the
victim’s car, Mr. Johnson told [Petitioner] not to come to his house.

Nevertheless, [Petitioner] drove to Mr. Johnson’s house and parked the
car in the garage. Shortly thereafter, three to four unmarked police cars arrived
on the scene. Mr. Johnson knew that the police were there for [Petitioner].
Although Mr. Johnson was not aware that Mr. Guidroz had died, [Petitioner]
informed Mr. Johnson that he had “body-slammed” the victim before taking
his car. At trial, Mr. Johnson identified a photograph of himself with
[Petitioner] at the Apple Market on the day of the carjacking and identified the
victim’s car as the one [Petitioner] parked in his garage. Mr. Johnson was
never charged in the case.

The car was taken to the crime scene investigation office, where Officer
Francis Donald Carpenter processed the car for fingerprints. Officer Carpenter
testified that he found several latent prints on the car. Two prints were lifted
from the outside windshield on the front passenger side. Officer Nathan
Gathright, a latent fingerprint examiner for the Memphis Police Department,
testified that these prints belonged to Mbenda McCracken. A print found on
the left rear fender outside the car belonged to Kendricks Scott. Another print
-5-
found on the right rear fender above the wheel belonged to [Petitioner]. Both
Mr. McCracken and Mr. Scott testified at trial.

Mr. McCracken identified [Petitioner] in the courtroom. In August
2005, Mr. McCracken had known [Petitioner] for approximately eight months.
Mr. McCracken identified a photo of the victim’s car and stated that he saw
[Petitioner] driving the car in August 2005. When Mr. McCracken asked
[Petitioner] where the car came from, [Petitioner] told him it was his
girlfriend’s car. Mr. McCracken got into the car and went with [Petitioner] to
buy beer and marijuana. [Petitioner], Mr. McCracken, and a friend named
“Fred” drove around in the car for three to four hours and got high. Mr.
McCracken later saw on the news that the car [Petitioner] was driving had been
taken in a carjacking. Mr. McCracken denied any involvement in the
carjacking.

Before Mr. McCracken testified, he and [Petitioner] were accidentally
placed in the same holding cell for about forty-five minutes. Mr. McCracken
was in custody on an aggravated burglary charge unrelated to the present case.
Mr. McCracken testified that while he and [Petitioner] were in the holding cell,
[Petitioner] told Mr. McCracken that there were two persons involved in the
carjacking and that the other person had not been charged. [Petitioner] said
that he and the other person were trying to get into the victim’s car. When the
victim approached the car, they jumped on him. [Petitioner] told Mr.
McCracken that he grabbed the victim and threw him down. [Petitioner] tried
to persuade Mr. McCracken to testify that he did not know [Petitioner] and that
another man came into the neighborhood to attempt to sell Mr. McCracken
parts from the car.

Kendricks Scott, whose fingerprints were found on the left rear fender,
testified that he saw [Petitioner] driving the victim’s car in August 2005.
[Petitioner] offered Mr. Scott a ride to work and told Mr. Scott that it was “his
auntie’s car.” Mr. Scott opened the rear door of the car and briefly sat in the
back seat with the door open, but did not ride in the car. Another person, whom
Mr. Scott did not know, was in the car at the time. The following day, when
the police came looking for [Petitioner] at the house next door to Mr. Scott’s
residence, Mr. Scott learned that the car had been taken in a carjacking. Mr.
Scott did not volunteer any information to the police at that time.

Alma Rockett is [Petitioner]’s aunt. [Petitioner] was living with Ms.
Rockett in the Somerset Apartments in August 2005. On August 2, 2005, Ms.
Rockett recognized [Petitioner] in video footage shown on a television news
broadcast. She also recognized another man in the video who previously had
-6-
been in her home with [Petitioner]. At trial, she was shown still photographs
from the Apple Market security video. Ms. Rockett identified [Petitioner] as
the man wearing the dark-colored shirt, a larger man as her son, Michael, and
a smaller man as the man who previously came home with [Petitioner]. She
also identified Michael’s car in the photograph with the three men. After
seeing the video footage on the news, Ms. Rockett and her son went downtown
“to straighten it out, to let them know that [Michael] was not involved.” After
that night, [Petitioner] never came back to her house. When [Petitioner] later
called Ms. Rockett, she told him to turn himself in to police.

[Petitioner] testified in his own defense. He acknowledged his prior
convictions for aggravated burglary, robbery, criminal attempt to commit
robbery, and theft over $500. He stated that on the morning of August 2, 2005,
he left for work around 6:00 a.m. When he arrived at work, however, he
discovered he had left his identification badge at home. Although he called
his aunt to confirm the badge was there, he never went home to get it. Instead,
[Petitioner] went to Courtney Johnson’s house and arrived between 8:00 and
8:30 a.m.

[Petitioner] stated that he and Mr. Johnson talked for awhile and went
to the Apple Market for the express purpose of stealing a car. While they were
standing by the drink machine attempting to decide which car to steal,
[Petitioner]’s cousin, Michael, arrived and went into the market. When
Michael came out of the market, Michael, Mr. Johnson, and [Petitioner]
walked to the Family Dollar store. [Petitioner] stated that Michael bought
something, and the three of them returned to the front of the Apple Market by
the drink machine until Michael left. [Petitioner] acknowledged seeing Taka
Pruitt arrive at the market. He claimed that he and Mr. Johnson knew her
because “[they] smoke[d] weed with her.”

Mr. Johnson spoke to Mr. Guidroz when he arrived at the market. After
Mr. Guidroz went inside, Mr. Johnson walked toward the Family Dollar store
because he did not want to be seen on the surveillance camera. According to
[Petitioner], Mr. Johnson “popped up on the other side” from where
[Petitioner] was and “scoped out” Mr. Guidroz’s car. [Petitioner] testified that
he was the lookout while Mr. Johnson got inside the car.

According to [Petitioner], when Mr. Guidroz came out of the store, he
saw Mr. Johnson in Mr. Guidroz’s car. Mr. Guidroz began struggling with Mr.
Johnson. [Petitioner] ran up to Mr. Guidroz, grabbed him, and “slung him”
into the car. He believed that Mr. Guidroz fell to the ground after he hit the
car. [Petitioner] admitted pushing Mr. Guidroz hard. [Petitioner] testified that
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he was scared and that he got into the car and drove it to Mr. Johnson’s house
on Beauchamp. Mr. Johnson did not get into the car with him. When Mr.
Johnson came home, [Petitioner] left. [Petitioner] testified that he did not have
a gun at the time he took the victim’s car and that his intent was to steal the car
and sell its parts.

The next day, Mr. Johnson called [Petitioner] and met him at the
Somerset Apartments, where [Petitioner] was staying. The car was parked at
an apartment complex across the street from the Somerset Apartments.
[Petitioner] believed that Mr. Johnson was the person who moved the car to
that location. [Petitioner] stated that on August 3, 2005, he and Mr. Johnson
went back to Mr. Johnson’s house in the victim’s car and drove it into the
garage. When the police arrived, [Petitioner] ran because he was scared. He
claimed he did not know at the time that the victim had died. The following
day, [Petitioner] turned himself in and gave a statement to the police.

When cross-examined about his statement to the police, [Petitioner]
admitted that he told police he left Mr. Johnson standing outside the Family
Dollar store when he took the victim’s car. He admitted telling police that he
did not leave the victim’s car at Mr. Johnson’s house. He also admitted telling
police that he drove a number of friends around and that he let his friend,
Reggie, use the car. [Petitioner] stated that he initially lied about Mr.
Johnson’s involvement because he did not want to “snitch” on him.
[Petitioner] admitted that his version of the events did not match the security
video, which shows Mr. Johnson walking to the Family Dollar store before the
carjacking and walking back after the carjacking. He said that most of his
statement to police was true. As to any inconsistencies between his version of
events and the testimony from Taka Pruitt and Mr. McCracken, he claimed
both were lying. He maintained that he did not intend to hurt the victim.

The State presented medical evidence regarding Mr. Guidroz’s injuries.
Dr. Karen Chancellor, the Chief Medical Examiner in 2005 for Memphis and
Shelby County, Tennessee, performed Mr. Guidroz’s autopsy. As a result of
her internal and external examinations of Mr. Guidroz, Dr. Chancellor
concluded that the cause of Mr. Guidroz’s death was multiple blunt force
injuries sustained to the head and chest and that the manner of Mr. Guidroz’s
death was homicide.

Dr. Chancellor found an abrasion on the front of Mr. Guidroz’s face and
a laceration on the left side of his forehead. She also noted that “there [was]
ecchymosis or hemorrhag[ing] around both eyes, and that was caused by skull
fractures . . . found inside the body.” The injuries to Mr. Guidroz’s body
-8-
included bruising on the ear, the right and left side of the chest, the upper left
arm, the neck and shoulder, the right ankle, the backs of both hands, both
forearms, and the lips. Dr. Chancellor opined that all the victim’s bruises were
caused at the same time and at the time of the incident at the Apple Market.

As to her internal examination of Mr. Guidroz, Dr. Chancellor noted
that “there was quite a bit of hemorrhage overlying the ribs on the left side”
and a complete fracture of the clavicle. Eleven ribs on Mr. Guidroz’s left side
were fractured, with resulting bruises on the surrounding lung tissue. Dr.
Chancellor remarked that Mr. Guidroz had extensive blunt force injuries to his
head, which included skull fractures, bruises to brain tissue, and hemorrhaging
around the brain. In addition, Mr. Guidroz suffered a subdural hematoma,
which required surgery to avoid severe brain injury. She opined that the skull
fractures were caused by at least three separate blows or impacts to the left side
of the head. Mr. Guidroz also suffered fractures to the orbital plates directly
above the eyes, which resulted in blood collecting around his eyes.

Dr. Chancellor was unaware that Mr. Guidroz had coagulopathy, a
condition making him prone to bleed, but she was aware that Mr. Guidroz had
severe coronary atherosclerosis, a blockage of the blood vessels of the heart.
No evidence of surgical intervention for these blockages was present. Dr.
Chancellor did not collect any of Mr. Guidroz’s fractured bones during the
autopsy. Dr. Chancellor stated that, although the practice of removing bones
during autopsy was once “in vogue,” the practice is no longer common. She
also did not conduct a bone density test on Mr. Guidroz because a bone density
test is not a routine part of an autopsy. Although she opined that Mr. Guidroz’s
injuries were consistent with being beaten, she was not able to determine the
order of his injuries or whether his injuries resulted from being struck by a hard
object, being forcibly thrust against a hard object, or a combination of these
two actions. She did not believe, however, that a fall alone would have caused
all of his injuries.

The defense introduced testimony from Dr. O.C. Smith, former Chief
Medical Examiner for Shelby County, Tennessee. Dr. Smith reviewed the
medical examiner’s files and Mr. Guidroz’s medical records in July 2007. Dr.
Smith noted several deficiencies in the autopsy record. He commented on the
absence of X-rays taken as part of the autopsy procedure and the absence of
bones for review. Dr. Smith testified that bones can be excised, cleaned, and
retained in inventory, or can be preserved with photographs or X-rays. Dr.
Smith testified that when he was the medical examiner, the lab was able to test
for bone density either by X-ray or by excising the bone and examining it. He
opined that loss of bone density due to age or osteoporosis could have made
-9-
Mr. Guidroz’s bones more vulnerable to trauma. Dr. Smith’s routine practice
when he was medical examiner was to excise every fractured bone in a
homicide or suspected homicide. He also commented that he was unable to
examine Mr. Guidroz’s brain specimen because the preserving fluid had been
allowed to dry out.

Dr. Smith testified that Mr. Guidroz’s medical records indicated he
suffered from coagulopathy, which made him prone to bleed. Mr. Guidroz lost
1.5 liters of blood during his brain surgery, which required a transfusion of
blood, fresh frozen plasma, and platelets. Dr. Smith opined that the
coagulopathy, together with the blockages in Mr. Guidroz’s heart, made him
particularly vulnerable to injury. The coagulopathy also would have caused
“seepage” of blood during surgical procedures, which would have made Mr.
Guidroz’s injuries look worse than they actually were. The ecchymosis, or
hemorrhaging or bleeding under the skin, on various parts of Mr. Guidroz’s
body also could have been exacerbated by the coagulopathy. Dr. Smith
discussed a condition known as “senile ecchymosis” that occurs as part of the
aging process and opined that some of Mr. Guidroz’s ecchymosis might be
attributable to his age. He explained that with such a condition, even minor
trauma can cause bruising with superficial bleeding on the skin’s surface. He
conceded that the ecchymosis could be from the original injuries but thought
that it was probably a combination of surgery and original injury. Dr. Smith
agreed that blood beneath the skin on the left side of Mr. Guidroz’s neck likely
resulted from the fracture and dislocation of the clavicle and fractures of the
adjacent ribs, not from surgery.

Dr. Smith found evidence of a “contre-coup” or “decelerating” brain
injury and distinguished between accelerative trauma and contre-coup trauma.
Accelerative trauma occurs when a moving object strikes a fixed head and
leaves a bruise on the skin and causes damage in the area of the brain
immediately beneath the blow. A contre-coup injury, however, is decelerative
trauma caused when a moving head hits a fixed object. Injury to the skin
occurs at the point of impact, but the injury to the brain occurs on the opposite
side of the head. Dr. Smith testified that, although the fractures of Mr.
Guidroz’s skull were on the left side of his head, he suffered a contre-coup
injury to the right side of his brain, indicating that his injuries occurred in a
fall.

Dr. Smith noted that the fractures to the clavicle, ribs, and head were all
on Mr. Guidroz’s left side and opined that the cause of death was “a fall to a
flat surface or some contact where the body is in motion, and then it’s been
arrested by a hard, unyielding surface.” Dr. Smith opined that the fall could
- 10 -
have been from a standing height, from running and falling, from falling from
a height, or from being propelled, depending on the strength of Mr. Guidroz’s
bones and the force that caused the fall. He ruled out the possibility that blows
or strikes to Mr. Guidroz’s body were the sole cause of his injuries.

Dr. Smith agreed with Dr. Chancellor that the manner of Mr. Guidroz’s
death was homicide and the cause of Mr. Guidroz’s death was blunt force
injury to his head and chest. He also agreed that Mr. Guidroz’s injuries were
consistent with a scenario of

being pushed in on the left-hand side of his car—something was
going [on] in that front seat of the car to the point that an eye
witness saw Mr. Guidroz’s feet dangling . . . out of the driver’s
side door with the [d]efendant on top of him, and then the next
thing that an eye witness sees is this [d]efendant pick up the body
of Mr. Guidroz and sling him out of [the] car onto the concrete.

Dr. Bruce Levy, then Chief Medical Examiner for the State of
Tennessee and the Medical Examiner for Davidson County, testified for the
State in rebuttal. Although Dr. Smith’s routine practice during his tenure was
to remove bones from the body and store them, Dr. Levy testified that this
practice was unique to Memphis and uncommon. In Dr. Levy’s opinion, Dr.
Chancellor, who actually performed the autopsy, was in the best position to
render opinions as to what she saw and to interpret her observations. In his
view, she followed the standard practice of documenting the autopsy by
photographs, diagrams, and narratives describing what she saw.

Dr. Levy stated that Mr. Guidroz suffered blunt force trauma injuries.
He opined that the victim’s skull fractures, which were indicative of at least
two separate blows, combined with the fractures to the ribs and clavicle, led to
a “differential diagnosis.” In other words, there could be different causes for
the injuries: either a fall from some height, a car collision, or an accelerated
fall in which the victim was thrown to the ground with some force. Dr. Levy
opined that breaking eight or nine ribs was not consistent with a simple fall to
the ground, but might be consistent with an accelerated fall. Likewise, the
multiple injuries to the chest, arms, face, and head were inconsistent with a
simple fall.

He testified that when faced with a differential diagnosis, a medical
examiner will rely on the history of the case. In this case, the anecdotal reports
that Mr. Guidroz was assaulted in a carjacking and thrown to the ground were
factors in determining the cause of his injuries. Dr. Levy testified that “body-
- 11 -
slamming” can cause multiple fractures like the ones observed in Mr. Guidroz.
The presence of complex skull fractures was indicative of a significant amount
of force, “much greater than you could possibly get from simply falling to the
ground and striking your head on a flat surface.”

Based on the evidence, the jury convicted [Petitioner] of first degree
felony murder in the perpetration of a robbery. The jury also convicted
[Petitioner] of second degree murder as a lesser-included offense of the
charged first degree premeditated murder. The trial court merged the two
convictions and proceeded to the penalty phase.

B. Evidence at Penalty Phase

Marie Leech[, wife of Thomas Leech,] was a close family friend of Mr.
Guidroz. She testified that she met Mr. Guidroz at St. Paul the Apostle
Catholic Church and had known him for more than twenty-five years. On
Sundays after church, Mr. Guidroz usually had dinner at Ms. Leech’s home.
Mr. Guidroz was the godfather of Ms. Leech’s middle child and particularly
close to that child. Ms. Leech explained that Mr. Guidroz had a very active
life. He attended Mass daily at different churches throughout Memphis and
went to St. Peter Villa, an assisted living facility, three days a week to visit and
care for residents there. Ms. Leech testified that Mr. Guidroz was fondly
regarded in the Oakhaven neighborhood where he had lived for more than forty
years.

The State introduced [Petitioner]’s indictments and judgments of
conviction from five prior offenses through Shelby County Criminal Court
Deputy Clerk, Alice Robinson. Those offenses were robbery and an attempted
robbery committed on November 26, 2002, and three aggravated robberies
committed on November 4, 1996.

In mitigation, [Petitioner] presented the testimony of Dr. Rebecca
Rutledge, a clinical psychologist, who assessed him in November 1996 at the
request of the Memphis and Shelby County Juvenile Court. [Petitioner] was
sixteen years old at that time. As part of her assessment, Dr. Rutledge
administered to [Petitioner] the Slosson Intelligence Test, a Bender Visual
Motor Gestalt Test, and a Rorschach Psycho-diagnostic Technique Test.
[Petitioner]’s score on the Slosson test was sixty-six, which is in the upper
mildly mentally retarded range. Dr. Rutledge stated that someone who is
mildly mentally retarded would tend to be impulsive and would not likely
consider the consequences of his actions. She noted that at the time of the
assessment, which lasted about forty-five minutes to one hour, [Petitioner] did
- 12 -
not appear to be taking the process seriously. She stated that [Petitioner]’s test
results may have been slightly lower than his actual level of cognitive
functioning. She opined, however, that had he put forth more effort he would
have continued to test in the mildly mentally retarded range. She did not have
access to [Petitioner]’s academic records at the time of the evaluation and knew
only that he had repeated the first grade. She also commented that mild mental
retardation is difficult to recognize because the person may appear “normal”
until he is engaged in conversation. The level of functioning of a person who
is mildly mentally retarded can improve with training, family support, job
support, and various community resources.

Prior to her testimony, Dr. Rutledge reviewed a report from the Middle
Tennessee Mental Health Institute (“MTMHI”) resulting from a September
2006 evaluation of [Petitioner]. She noted that the MTMHI staff’s diagnosis
of [Petitioner] as mildly mentally retarded was consistent with her 1996
diagnosis.

On cross-examination, Dr. Rutledge conceded that she did not have any
particular memory of [Petitioner]. At the time of the 1996 screening, she did
not find that he suffered from any mental illness that would have prevented his
transfer to adult court, nor did she find any disorders when she administered
the Rorschach and the Bender Gestalt tests. Dr. Rutledge testified that the
juvenile court asked her to administer the Slosson test. She explained that the
Slosson test was designed to provide an estimate of general verbal cognitive
ability in a short time frame. She acknowledged that the Slosson test, unlike
other tests, did not have built-in standards for determining malingering. Dr.
Rutledge testified that the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Screening (“WAIS”)
test is the “gold standard” for functional intelligence quotient (“I.Q.”) testing
and is better at discerning specific areas of impairment. She opined, however,
that [Petitioner] “would have fallen pretty close to [his score on the Slosson
test]” if he had been given the WAIS test in 1996.

Dr. Rutledge was aware of the staff observations in the MTMHI
evaluation that [Petitioner] was exaggerating his mental illness symptoms.
MTMHI had also noted [Petitioner]’s self-reported paranoid schizophrenia,
although there was no record of his having received treatment for the disorder.
Dr. Rutledge conceded that [Petitioner] could have deliberately
underperformed on the 1996 Slosson test to avoid being transferred to adult
court. She also conceded that [Petitioner] had many reasons to underperform
during his 2006 assessment at MTMHI because of his pending capital murder
charges.

- 13 -
[Petitioner]’s mother, Vivian Pruitt, testified that if [Petitioner] were to
receive a death sentence, it “would just kill [her] too.” She recounted that
[Petitioner] was the youngest of five children she had by three different men.
[Petitioner]’s father was about sixteen years younger than Ms. Pruitt, and
[Petitioner] never had a relationship with him. When she was pregnant with
[Petitioner], Ms. Pruitt smoked, but she did not recall drinking. When
[Petitioner] was born, she was married to Walter Lee Pruitt. Although the two
have since divorced, [Petitioner] thought of Walter Lee Pruitt as his father and
was close to him.

Vivian Pruitt detailed a family history of mental health issues. She had
previously been hospitalized at Memphis Mental Health Institute three times
due to addiction problems, but had been sober for fifteen to twenty-five years
at the time of trial. During her period of addiction, she was arrested numerous
times, usually for minor offenses like public intoxication, and was frequently
in and out of prison. On one occasion she was arrested for aggravated assault
when she shot [Petitioner]’s father. When Ms. Pruitt was in prison, [Petitioner]
stayed with his grandmother, Frankie Timberlake.

According to Ms. Pruitt, Ms. Timberlake, who helped raise [Petitioner],
spent time in and out of mental institutions. Several of Ms. Timberlake’s
siblings (Vivian Pruitt’s aunts and uncles) had mental health problems as well.
One of Ms. Timberlake’s siblings died from a drug overdose and another
committed suicide. One of [Petitioner]’s sisters, Tapika Pruitt, had attempted
suicide several times. Vivian Pruitt considered [Petitioner] a normal child with
good test scores, and she never sought any type of treatment for him. He did
not seem “slow” to her, but she believed he was in resource class in fifth and
sixth grade.

Vivian Pruitt testified that [Petitioner]’s first arrest was at age thirteen
or fourteen and that he had experienced “problems” since that time. After
[Petitioner] was released from juvenile court, he was arrested for several other
offenses, including stealing shoes and writing graffiti on the school walls. He
was in and out of juvenile court and was sent at various times to different
juvenile facilities. He escaped from the Memphis Boys Group Home after he
was charged with the three aggravated robbery offenses in 1996. Ms. Pruitt
testified that [Petitioner] eventually quit school “because they had him in
juvenile.”

Ms. Pruitt said that [Petitioner] was living with his aunt, Alma Rockett,
on the day of the carjacking and was scheduled to work at Patterson
Warehouse. She indicated that [Petitioner] had moved in with Ms. Rockett
- 14 -
after he and his sister, Quiana Pruitt, with whom he had been living, had a
dispute about [Petitioner]’s discipline of Quiana’s son. Vivian Pruitt believed
[Petitioner] was experiencing stress over the fight with his sister and his
housing situation at the time of the offense.

Quiana Pruitt testified that if her brother were sentenced to death and
executed it would “really hurt [her].” She and [Petitioner] have the same
father, who was not involved in their lives, and she considered Walter Pruitt
her father. She recounted that she and [Petitioner] had a difficult upbringing.
Their grandmother, Ms. Timberlake, was their primary caretaker because their
mother was frequently in prison. Their aunt, Alma Rockett, told them their
mother was “on drugs, didn’t want [them], [and] neglected [them].” Quiana
Pruitt also recounted the family history of mental health problems. Her mother
and extended family on her mother’s side – including an uncle and two aunts
– suffered from paranoid schizophrenia. Their sister, Tapika, had mental
health and drug problems. Ms. Timberlake had Alzheimer’s disease and was
hospitalized in a mental institution in 2000.

Quiana Pruitt did not consider her brother “slow” when he was growing
up. She recalled that [Petitioner] began getting into trouble at the age of
thirteen or fourteen and was in and out of “juvenile.” He eventually dropped
out of school in the seventh grade. [Petitioner] moved in with Quiana Pruitt
and their mother following his release from prison after serving his sentence
for the 1996 aggravated robbery convictions. [Petitioner] left their home after
attempting to discipline Quiana Pruitt’s son and went to live with his aunt,
Alma Rockett.

In rebuttal, the State presented Sandra Atkinson, the records supervisor
for Memphis City Schools. Ms. Atkinson reported that [Petitioner] was
enrolled in the first grade at Carnes Elementary School in September 1987.
Although his grades and conduct were average in the first grade, he was
retained and repeated the first grade. During April of his second year in the
first grade, he transferred to Larose Elementary School, where he remained for
the rest of his elementary school years. [Petitioner] received mostly As and Bs
for grades, and Es and Ss for conduct. His Tennessee Comprehensive
Assessment Program (“TCAP”) scores varied somewhat from year to year but
at times were exceptional. He scored in the ninety-eighth percentile overall
during his fifth-grade year and in the ninety-fifth percentile overall during his
sixth-grade year.

[Petitioner]’s academic performance declined dramatically during his
seventh-grade year. He enrolled at Vance Middle School in the Fall of 1994
- 15 -
and attended until December, when he transferred to Colonial Middle School
for one week, then returned to Vance Middle School until May 5, 1995, after
which he withdrew. Ms. Atkinson testified that [Petitioner] was frequently
absent in the seventh grade. No grades were available because he did not
complete his seventh-grade year. Although [Petitioner] took some of the
TCAP tests, he apparently missed some of the testing days because he had no
scores for reading or spelling. [Petitioner]’s remaining scores were poor,
ranging from a low in the eighth percentile for science to a high in the forty-
second percentile for study skills.

Although [Petitioner] did not complete the seventh grade, he was
nevertheless promoted to the eighth grade. During his eighth-grade year in
1995, however, he did not attend school until November 2, 1995, and he
stopped attending after January 30, 1996. His grades were dramatically lower
his eighth-grade year, reflecting all Fs for the semester. His records were
transferred to an alternative school on April 26, 1996. Ms. Atkinson testified
that the transfer to an alternative school could have been for non-attendance or
behavior issues, but the records did not reflect the reason. Nothing in
[Petitioner]’s records indicates that he was ever in a resource class.

In surrebuttal, the defense recalled Vivian Pruitt to explain the dramatic
decline in [Petitioner]’s academic performance following elementary school.
She testified that [Petitioner] fell in the fifth grade and struck his head. She
stated that he had persistent headaches following that injury, but that she
“didn’t think it was that serious.” When he was in the seventh grade, four of
[Petitioner]’s friends were killed in a particularly gruesome car wreck.
[Petitioner] went to the scene and observed their injuries. [Petitioner]’s
behavior declined after witnessing the accident. [Petitioner] also had a brother
who died from AIDS during this period. Ms. Pruitt testified that she did not
believe [Petitioner] knew right from wrong or that he meant to kill Mr.
Guidroz.

Prior to the jury charge in the penalty phase and before closing
arguments, [Petitioner] made an oral motion challenging the appropriateness
of the death penalty in his case pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section
39-13-203 because he had a functional I.Q. “below seventy” and deficits in
adaptive behavior. The trial court denied the motion, noting that neither the
court nor the State had been provided notice that a motion pursuant to
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203 would be made. The trial court
commented that the motion should have been filed prior to trial and stated that
the timing of the motion was improper.

- 16 -
The jury found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt the
aggravating circumstances that: (1) [Petitioner] was previously convicted of
one or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements
involve the use of violence to the person; (2) the murder was knowingly
committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the [Petitioner], while [Petitioner]
had a substantial role in committing, or attempting to commit, or was fleeing
after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit a
robbery; and (3) the victim was seventy years of age or older at the time of the
murder. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-204(i)(2), (7), (14) (2010). The jury
further found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
statutory aggravating circumstances outweighed any mitigating circumstances
and sentenced [Petitioner] to death.

C. Evidence at the Hearing on the Motion for New Trial

After the jury returned a sentence of death, [Petitioner] filed a motion
for new trial, in which he challenged, among other things, the trial court’s
refusal to consider his oral motion to disallow the consideration of the death
penalty due to intellectual disability. At a hearing, trial counsel testified that
he had given the State a “Notice of Intent to Present Expert Testimony
Regarding Mental Condition” on February 5, 2008, but failed to formally file
this motion with the trial court clerk until March 10, 2008, after the trial had
ended. He argued that this motion, together with the proof at trial of
[Petitioner]’s diagnosis of “mild mental retardation” gave the State sufficient
notice that he was challenging the applicability of the death penalty.

The trial court held a hearing on December 12, 2008, and January 16,
2009, on the issue of [Petitioner]’s eligibility for the death penalty. The
defense initially rested on the proof presented at trial by Dr. Rutledge. The
State introduced testimony from Dr. Sam Craddock, a clinical psychologist at
MTMHI, who testified that he evaluated [Petitioner] from August 31 to
September 27, 2006, at MTMHI. During this evaluation, MTMHI staff
observed [Petitioner] “around the clock.” Dr. Craddock administered I.Q.
tests, aptitude tests, and a personality test. In addition to interviewing
[Petitioner]’s mother, Dr. Craddock also examined law enforcement files in
the case, certain court documents filed in the case, and a forensic evaluation
conducted by the Midtown Mental Health Center.

Dr. Craddock identified a staff conference report from MTMHI dated
September 22, 2006. Noted on the report was an Axis I diagnosis of
“schizophrenia, differentiated type,” and an Axis II diagnosis of “mild mental
retardation.” Dr. Craddock testified that the latter diagnosis was recorded in
- 17 -
error and should have read “borderline intellectual functioning.” Other notes
throughout the file, including the discharge summary, recorded the Axis II
diagnosis as borderline intellectual functioning, not mental retardation. Dr.
Craddock could not explain why he had made the transcription error. After
reviewing [Petitioner]’s records, Dr. Craddock prepared an addendum to the
report stating that the “mild mental retardation” note was made in error.

Dr. Craddock testified that there are three requirements for a diagnosis
of mental retardation: subaverage intellectual functioning demonstrated by an
I.Q. below seventy, impairments in the subject’s adaptive functioning, and a
diagnosis before the age of eighteen. [Petitioner]’s I.Q. score was sixty-eight
on the test Dr. Craddock administered at MTMHI. Dr. Craddock
acknowledged that his report indicated [Petitioner] appeared to be making a
good effort on the test “[w]ith the exception of him occasionally giving quick
responses with accompanying little thought.” Dr. Craddock therefore believed
that [Petitioner]’s I.Q. was actually higher than his scores reflected.

Other factors led Dr. Craddock to conclude that [Petitioner]’s score was
not indicative of mental retardation. For instance, at the age of eighteen,
[Petitioner] had received a score of eighty-one on a Beta test administered
through the Department of Correction. At that time, [Petitioner] indicated an
interest in earning his Graduate Equivalency Degree and learning about small
engine repair. The Beta test score indicated that [Petitioner] was reading at an
eighth-grade level, spelling at a high school level, and understanding math at
a fifth-grade level. Furthermore, [Petitioner]’s school records indicated he had
performed well both academically and on his TCAP tests until the sixth grade.
School records did not indicate that [Petitioner] was ever in special education
classes, which Dr. Craddock would have expected if [Petitioner] was mentally
retarded.

Dr. Craddock also did not see any deficits in [Petitioner]’s adaptive
behavior. [Petitioner] had stated to Dr. Craddock that one of his interests was
playing chess, which Dr. Craddock noted is inconsistent with someone who is
mentally retarded. Also, Dr. Craddock “question[ed] the scores because
mentally retarded individuals . . . typically score high on performance and low
on verbal.” [Petitioner]’s scores revealed just the opposite. Dr. Craddock
stated that

[w]hen you score low on performance, there is an implication
there that you may not be making your best effort. So, if you
look in the textbooks, time after time, mentally retarded people,
they have poor[er] verbal, math skills, and so forth than they do
- 18 -
manipulation skills, visual skills, but that was not the case with
[Petitioner].

In rebuttal, [Petitioner] presented the testimony of Dr. Rutledge. She
had compared the results of the test that she administered to [Petitioner] with
the results of the test administered by Dr. Craddock. She stated that both tests
indicated [Petitioner] had an I.Q. of approximately sixty-eight. Dr. Rutledge’s
memory of [Petitioner]’s adaptive skills was that he had fifth-grade reading
skills, third-grade math skills, was unable to live independently, and was
unable to remain gainfully employed. She admitted that she last saw
[Petitioner] twelve years earlier, when he was sixteen years old and spent, at
most, an hour with him. She also admitted that at the time she thought his
scores might not accurately reflect his actual ability. She did not have his
school records and was unaware that at one point he scored in the ninety-eighth
percentile on his TCAP tests.

On May 22, 2009, the trial court entered an order denying [Petitioner]’s
motion for new trial and found that [Petitioner] had failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he was intellectually disabled and thus
ineligible for the death penalty under Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-
13-203. The trial court found that [Petitioner] had failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he had significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning as evidenced by an I.Q. of seventy or below. The court found that
neither the test score in 1996 nor the test score in 2006 was the product of
[Petitioner]’s best efforts and that his grades in school and TCAP scores
indicated that the 1996 and 2006 test scores were unreliable. The trial court
also determined that [Petitioner] failed to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that he suffered deficits in his adaptive behavior. The trial court
based this finding on [Petitioner]’s excellent performance in school through
the sixth grade and testimony from his mother that he seemed like a “normal”
child. The trial court also noted Dr. Craddock’s testimony that he did not see
any deficits in [Petitioner]’s adaptive behavior. The trial court found that the
drop in [Petitioner]’s grades and test scores after the sixth grade appeared to
result from traumatic events in his life, drug use, incarceration, and absence
from school.

Id. at 187-200 (footnotes omitted).

On the issue of intellectual disability, the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that the
“review of [Petitioner]’s intellectual disability claim has been made more difficult by
[Petitioner]’s timing in raising the issue at trial” and that the “best practice” would have
been “to raise the issue in a pretrial setting to ensure that both the State and the defendant
- 19 -
are provided a full and fair opportunity to collect, exchange, and present the requisite
proof.” Id. at 201. However, the supreme court reviewed the evidence in the record “to
determine if [Petitioner] has an intellectual disability that precludes imposition of the death
penalty.” Id.; see T.C.A. § 39-13-203(b) (2010). The supreme court held that the evidence
preponderated against the trial court’s finding that Petitioner’s I.Q. scores were
“unreliable” because “neither expert opined that [Petitioner]’s I.Q. was greater than 70,
whether through lack of effort or on some other basis for adjustment of the raw score.”
Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 203. Therefore, the supreme court concluded that Petitioner had met
his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he had significantly
subaverage general intellectual functioning as evidenced by a functional I.Q. of 70 or
below. Id.; see T.C.A. § 39-13-203(a)(1) (2010).2 However, the supreme court noted that
“little evidence was presented” regarding whether Petitioner had any deficits in adaptive
behavior and whether his intellectual disability manifested before the age of eighteen.
Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 204; see T.C.A. §§ 39-13-203(a)(2), (3) (2010). Accordingly, the
supreme court affirmed the trial court’s finding that Petitioner failed to establish that he
had an intellectual disability that rendered him ineligible for the death penalty. Pruitt, 415
S.W.3d at 204.

The Tennessee Supreme Court was split on the issue of the comparative
proportionality of the death penalty in this case. See T.C.A. 39-13-206(c)(1)(D). The
majority opinion reaffirmed the analysis set out in State v. Bland, 958 S.W.2d 651 (Tenn.
1997), which compared the case at bar to other first degree murder cases in which a capital
sentencing hearing had been conducted. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 213-17. Upon conducting
a comparative proportionality review with such cases, the majority determined that
Petitioner’s death sentence was not disproportionate. Id. at 217-223. Two Justices
concurred with the majority’s decision to affirm Petitioner’s conviction but dissented with
respect to both the appropriate pool of comparison cases as well as to the proportionality
of the death penalty in this case. Id. at 223 (Koch and Lee, JJ. concurring in part and
dissenting in part). The dissenting Justices staunchly disagreed with the Bland analysis
and argued that the pool of comparison cases should include all cases that resulted in a
conviction for first degree murder. Id. at 225-232. The dissenting Justices, comparing
Petitioner’s case both to cases in which the death penalty was sought and cases in which it
was not, concluded that Petitioner’s offense was “much more similar to crimes that did not
result in the death penalty than to crimes that did.” Id. at 232-237.

II. Post-Conviction Proceedings

2
Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-203(a)(1) was amended effective May 11, 2021,
removing the language “as evidenced by a functional intelligence quotient (I.Q.) of seventy (70) or below.”
See 2021 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 399, § 1. The amendment of this subsection, and the addition of subsection
(g), does not affect our opinion in this case.
- 20 -
Petitioner subsequently filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. Post-
conviction counsel was appointed, and an amended petition was filed raising numerous
claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, intellectual
disability, and the constitutionality of the death penalty. Petitioner filed a motion seeking
the recusal of the post-conviction judge, the denial of which was affirmed by this court in
an accelerated interlocutory appeal pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B, § 2.
See Corinio Allen Pruitt v. State, No. W2017-00960-CCA-T10B-CO (Tenn. Crim. App.,
at Jackson, July 31, 2017) (order), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 17, 2017). The
evidentiary hearing in this case was conducted over multiple days between April and
August 2018, during which the following testimony was presented.

A. The Prosecutors and General Weirich’s Family

Assistant District Attorney Carolyn Alanda Dwyer testified that she was the lead
prosecutor in the Special Prosecution Unit. Ms. Dwyer explained that Petitioner’s case
qualified for the Special Prosecution Unit because of his prior record. Ms. Dwyer testified
that she was involved in Petitioner’s case since it was indicted, although she did not recall
handling Petitioner’s preliminary hearing. She testified that the usual practice in Shelby
County was for the prosecutor handling the case to determine the charges to be presented
to the grand jury, so it would have been her decision to charge Petitioner with both felony
murder and premeditated murder. Before filing a notice of intent to seek the death penalty,
Ms. Dwyer reviewed the facts of the case and the applicable aggravating factors with then-
District Attorney General William L. Gibbons and received his approval to file the notice.
Ms. Dwyer testified that there was no formal process for the defense to present mitigating
evidence at the time the charging decision or the decision to seek the death penalty is made
and that she had no information regarding Petitioner’s mental health or I.Q. at that time.

Ms. Dwyer did not recall signing an agreed order to have Petitioner evaluated at
MTMHI because the doctor at Midtown Mental Health Center had concerns about his
competency, but she explained that such an order was a “form order that we enter on most
homicide cases.” Ms. Dwyer acknowledged that she received notice of the defense team’s
intent to present expert testimony regarding Petitioner’s mental condition through Dr.
Rutledge, but she did not recall when she received such notice. She agreed that there was
a note in her file to obtain Petitioner’s mental health records in order to rebut such
testimony and that she subpoenaed records from TDOC in February of 2008. Ms. Dwyer
agreed that her file contained “form responses” to defense motions requesting individual
voir dire and jury questionnaires that she printed but never filed because the defense never
filed such motions in this case. She explained that individual voir dire was not a common
practice in Shelby County at the time, though it was more common at the time of the post-
conviction hearing.

- 21 -
Ms. Dwyer testified that then-Assistant District Attorney Amy Weirich3 became
involved in the case just a week or two before trial. Ms. Dwyer testified that another
prosecutor had recently left the office so she asked Gen. Weirch to help her pick the jury.
Ms. Dwyer testified that “it had been awhile since I had done a death penalty case” and
that she relied on Gen. Weirich’s experience. Ms. Dwyer denied that she had ever seen a
“Voir Dire Manual” that was supposedly used by the District Attorney’s Office as a
training tool. She disagreed with some of the manual’s suggestions that the goal of voir
dire is to establish the credibility of the prosecutor and “to get [the jury] on the side of the
State,” explaining that “the most important thing is the jury understand their duty and
they’re to follow the law.”

Katherine4 Alfonso Weirich, the mother-in-law of Gen. Weirich, testified that she
was employed at St. Paul Catholic Church as an administrative assistant and choir director.
Mrs. Weirich knew the victim in this case because he sang in the choir that usually
performed at funerals. She testified that the victim was a “very private person. He was in
my choir, but I can’t say that I knew him other than he was always there to come and sing.”
She testified that she did not socialize with the victim, though she was friends with Marie
and Thomas Leech, who both testified for the State at trial. Because of her employment at
the church, Mrs. Weirich received a call that the victim had been “carjacked and beat up,”
so she went to the hospital. After the victim passed away, Mrs. Weirich assisted with his
funeral arrangements, “pretty much [taking] care of . . . the planning, the reading, the songs
and all that.” She also directed the choir that sang at the victim’s funeral, which was not
unusual given her role at the church. Mrs. Weirich attended Petitioner’s trial as a
representative of the church, and she knew that her daughter-in-law was one of the
prosecutors. Mrs. Weirich did not have any discussions with the prosecution regarding the
potential outcome of the sentencing phase. Mrs. Weirich had attended other trials as an
observer, including at least two murder trials prosecuted by Gen. Weirich.

Charles Weirich, Gen. Weirich’s husband, testified that he is an attorney in the
Memphis area. Mr. Weirich and his family attended St. Paul Catholic Church until they
moved to East Memphis. At that point, Mr. Weirich continued to attend St. Paul as a lector
while his family attended a different church. Mr. Weirich would advertise his services as
an attorney at St. Paul. In 2002, Mr. Weirich was contacted by the victim, whom he
recognized from the church, about drafting a will. At the time, the law required an executor
to live in Tennessee, so Mr. Weirich agreed to be co-executor of the victim’s will with
Thomas Leech, who lived out of state. After the victim’s death, Mr. Weirich filed a petition

3
In January of 2011, after Petitioner’s trial but before the post-conviction hearing, Amy Weirich
became the District Attorney General of Shelby County. Accordingly, we will refer to her throughout the
opinion as Gen. Weirich, particularly as it distinguishes her from other witnesses who share her last name.
4
Petitioner’s brief indicates that this witness’s name may actually be spelled “Catherine.” This
opinion will utilize the spelling used in the transcript and the post-conviction court’s order. No disrespect
is intended if this is an incorrect spelling.
- 22 -
to probate the estate in his role as an attorney. He attempted to renounce his role as a co-
executor, but the probate judge wanted either an in-state executor who was subject to the
contempt power of the court or for Mr. Leech to post a bond. Mr. Weirich agreed to stay
on as co-executor, and he was eventually paid $5,000 “for fees and expenses related to the
administration of the estate.” The estate was closed in September of 2007, several months
before Petitioner’s trial. Mr. Weirich testified that the outcome of the criminal prosecution
in this case had no bearing on the probate proceedings.

District Attorney General Amy P. Weirich testified that in 2008, she was the head
of the Gang and Narcotics Prosecution Unit for the Shelby County District Attorney’s
Office. She became involved in Petitioner’s trial when Ms. Dwyer asked her to assist with
the case the week before trial. Because of other cases she was trying, Gen. Weirich did not
read through the file until the weekend prior to the start of trial. Gen. Weirich testified that
she was aware that the defense team would present evidence that Petitioner was
intellectually disabled but that she was not involved in any pretrial discussions of the
matter. Gen. Weirich did not specifically recall that she was the “primary attorney handling
voir dire” or that voir dire was completed in a single day. Gen. Weirich testified that she
had seen the “Voir Dire Manual” as a reference available in the District Attorney’s Office
but that she had never been instructed by previous supervisors to study it or relied on it in
preparing for voir dire. Gen. Weirich testified that she had participated in capital cases
where individual voir dire was used but that it was not a common practice.

Gen. Weirich recalled that Thomas Leech testified as a witness during the guilt
phase of Petitioner’s trial and that his wife, Marie Leech, testified during the sentencing
phase. Gen. Weirich testified that she knew the Leeches prior to trial because they were
“good friends of my in-laws” as well as through attending St. Paul Catholic Church. Gen.
Weirich testified that she was not aware of the probate of the victim’s estate at the time of
trial. Gen. Weirich testified that she did not have an independent recollection of her
mother-in-law attending the trial but that it would not surprise her that Mrs. Weirich would
attend as a representative of the church and as support for the Leech family. Gen. Weirich
was unaware that Mrs. Weirich was involved in the victim’s funeral arrangements but
explained “that was one of her main responsibilities for members of the parish who died[.]”
Gen. Weirich testified that she did not attend the victim’s funeral.

B. Petitioner’s Defense Team

Lead counsel5 testified that when he first began representing Petitioner in 2005, he
was employed part-time in the Capital Case Unit of the Shelby County Public Defender’s
5
Petitioner was initially represented by two attorneys from the Shelby County Public Defender’s
Office. When one attorney left the Capital Case Unit, a new attorney joined the defense team. All three
attorneys testified at the post-conviction evidentiary hearing. For the sake of clarity, we will refer to the
trial attorneys together as “trial counsel” and individually as “former lead counsel,” “lead counsel,” and
- 23 -
Office while also maintaining a private practice consisting of both criminal and civil cases.
Throughout the three years leading up to Petitioner’s trial, lead counsel was also assigned
to approximately 38 other cases with the Capital Case Unit for varying lengths of time,
although not every case resulted in a capital trial. Lead counsel was originally assigned to
Petitioner’s case as co-counsel with another attorney in the Public Defender’s Office.
Former lead counsel was primarily in charge of case development while lead counsel
assisted “mostly under her direction.” When former lead counsel left the capital case unit
prior to Petitioner’s trial, lead counsel took over and new co-counsel joined the team. At
that point, the primary responsibility for case development shifted to lead counsel because
he had more experience handling capital cases. Petitioner’s defense team also consisted of
Ralph Nally as a fact investigator and Jeanette Stanback as a social investigator.

Lead counsel testified that he attended an initial intake interview of Petitioner on
August 26, 2005, along with other members of the defense team. Lead counsel testified
that he attended monthly case reviews with the entire Capital Case Unit where pending
cases “were discussed and strategized.” Lead counsel identified some formal, written
requests for Mr. Nally to investigate certain issues, and he testified that he also made casual,
verbal requests for investigation. The defense team was able to put together an arrest
history for Petitioner’s mother, Vivian Pruitt, going back to Petitioner’s birth, but lead
counsel acknowledged that he did not obtain records for any arrests during Vivian’s
pregnancy with Petitioner. One of the defense’s mitigation theories was “bad family
situation,” which lead counsel explained included “Vivian Pruitt’s history with respect to
arrests before and other behavior.” However, lead counsel agreed on cross-examination
that he made strategic choices based on how the jury may view the evidence and that he
did not think that Vivian’s arrests would be viewed as mitigating.

Lead counsel recalled that the trial court signed an agreed order in June 2006 for
Petitioner to be evaluated at Midtown Mental Health Institute to determine his competency
to stand trial and mental status at the time of the offense. In August 2006, clinical
psychologist Dr. John Whirley sent a letter to the trial court expressing concerns about
Petitioner’s competency to stand trial and recommending that Petitioner be transferred to
MTMHI for further evaluation. During the evaluation at MTMHI, Dr. Craddock
administered the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 3 (WAIS-3) and determined that
Petitioner had a full-scale I.Q. score of 68. Lead counsel acknowledged that Dr. Craddock
did not administer any tests of adaptive functioning or have any adaptive rating scales from
family members. Lead counsel did not recall providing any information to MTMHI to
assist with an adaptive behavior assessment. However, Dr. Craddock’s psychological
evaluation report indicated that Petitioner was diagnosed with mild mental retardation in
addition to schizophrenia and substance abuse.

“co-counsel.” Petitioner was represented by a different attorney from the Public Defender’s Office on direct
appeal, but appellate counsel did not testify at the post-conviction hearing.
- 24 -
Lead counsel recalled that prior to the time he became lead counsel, the defense
team retained the services of clinical psychologist Dr. Fred Steinberg to evaluate Petitioner.
Case review memos from July and September 2007 listed Dr. Steinberg as a potential
defense expert and cited the discharge summary from MTMHI diagnosing Petitioner with
schizophrenia and “borderline” mental retardation as one of the working mitigation
theories. Lead counsel testified that he spoke to Dr. Steinberg many times, although he did
not recall meeting with him in person. Lead counsel testified, “my recollection was that
[Dr. Steinberg] was not - - his opinion would not help us in this case.”

In January 2008, lead counsel retained the services of Dr. Rutledge to testify during
the sentencing phase regarding her evaluation of Petitioner for Juvenile Court in 1996 and
her diagnosis of mild mental retardation. In preparing for the case, Dr. Rutledge primarily
reviewed her report and the records from MTMHI. After the trial court granted the ex parte
motion for expert services, lead counsel provided the State with a notice of intent to present
expert testimony regarding Petitioner’s mental condition at trial. Although the copy of the
notice in the Public Defender’s file had a handwritten notation that it was filed on February
5, 2008, a copy could not be found in the trial court clerk’s file. Lead counsel testified that
he intended the notice to be an attempt to communicate the defense’s position that
Petitioner was exempt from the death penalty due to intellectual disability. Lead counsel
did not have an independent recollection of the prosecutor indicating that the State might
seek an evaluation from its own expert. Lead counsel recalled moving for a directed verdict
on the death penalty on the basis that the State had not presented any evidence to contradict
Dr. Rutledge’s testimony during the sentencing phase. Lead counsel testified that one of
the reasons for this decision was the fact that the defense team could not afford to pay Dr.
Rutledge twice for her testimony. Additionally, the statute indicated that the issue could
be raised at trial and did not mandate that it be raised pretrial.6

Ultimately, the trial court denied the motion for a directed verdict because of the
lack of a pretrial motion. However, when ruling on the motion for new trial, the trial court
concluded that the timing of the motion was an issue of first impression and reserved ruling
on the intellectual disability issue. Lead counsel filed a formal written motion for a hearing
on July 17, 2008, and attached the reports from MTMHI and Dr. Rutledge, which were
consistent in diagnosing Petitioner with mild mental retardation. However, prior to the
hearing, lead counsel learned that Dr. Craddock had sent a letter to the prosecution stating
that he had erred in diagnosing Petitioner with mild mental retardation and changing his
diagnosis to borderline intellectual functioning. Lead counsel contacted Dr. Rutledge again
in August 2008 and requested the raw data from MTMHI for her to review. Dr. Rutledge
told lead counsel that she “did not see any reason to justify change of diagnosis.”

6
See T.C.A. § 39-13-203(e) (2003).
- 25 -
In an email from November 2008 discussing scheduling Dr. Rutledge’s rebuttal
testimony in this case, lead counsel asked if Dr. Rutledge would also be willing to be
involved in another case. In that email, lead counsel stated that he wanted to “consider
some measure of adaptive behavior” for the other defendant because that was “classically
the area in which we lose on [the intellectual disability] issue” and asked Dr. Rutledge if
there was “any test or scale which might facilitate our proof of such deficits.” Lead counsel
testified that adaptive functioning was an important area to explore in any case and that he
was aware of the Adaptive Behavior Assessment System (“ABAS”) test for adaptive
deficits. Additionally, Dr. Rutledge’s response to his email referred to the Vineland
Adaptive Behavior Scales when she offered to evaluate the other defendant. However,
lead counsel never asked Dr. Rutledge to perform any adaptive behavior assessments of
Petitioner, nor did she interview Petitioner or any of his family members. However, on
cross-examination, lead counsel agreed that a diagnosis of mild mental retardation required
a finding of adaptive deficits. Lead counsel agreed that he relied on the opinions of the
experts and did not tell them what tests they needed to do.

Lead counsel testified that he did not consider filing a motion challenging the State’s
dual charging of felony murder and premeditated murder. He testified that Ms. Dwyer was
the lead prosecutor throughout the case and that he did not recall the circumstances of Gen.
Weirich becoming involved in this case. Lead counsel stated that he “never heard anything
to th[e] effect” that Gen. Weirich knew the victim, and he did not recall Gen. Weirich
disclosing that her family was close to the victim’s family at any point during the trial.
Lead counsel testified that if he had known that Mr. Weirich was co-executor of the
victim’s estate, he would have addressed that issue during his cross-examination of Mr.
Leech. Lead counsel was not aware that Mrs. Weirich attended the trial or that she was
Gen. Weirich’s mother-in-law.

Lead counsel estimated that he met with Petitioner in person approximately 20 to
30 times prior to trial to discuss the facts of the case and Petitioner’s social history. Lead
counsel’s notes from a meeting on February 8, 2008, indicated that Petitioner was
depressed and had been prescribed Cogentin and Risperdal, which lead counsel believed
were both psychotropic drugs. Lead counsel could not recall what dosages Petitioner was
taking but testified that he had the jail medical records available. On cross-examination,
lead counsel agreed that the upcoming trial could have been a cause of Petitioner’s
depression. Lead counsel testified that he did not notice anything about Petitioner’s
demeanor, behavior, or ability to communicate that would have indicated that Petitioner
was impaired by the medication and that he would have addressed the matter with the court
if he had. On redirect examination, Lead counsel agreed that he did not consult with a
medical doctor regarding Petitioner’s medication.

Lead counsel testified that he participated in the ongoing process of investigating
mitigation evidence. He believed that he met with Petitioner’s family members in their
- 26 -
homes, though he admitted he could be confusing this case with another. Lead counsel did
not recall meeting with any of Petitioner’s teachers or any of his friends and former
neighbors from the Fowler Homes neighborhood. When presented with a photograph from
the Public Defender’s file labeled “Corinio Pruitt family,” lead counsel testified that he did
not recognize any of the children in the photo but that he had “no reason to doubt that that
is his family.” Lead counsel conceded that he requested a mitigation instruction regarding
Petitioner’s prenatal exposure to drugs and alcohol even though Vivian Pruitt denied
drinking while she was pregnant, and no other witnesses testified on the issue. Lead
counsel also requested a mitigation instruction that Petitioner experienced “significant
ad[a]ptive deficits,” even though including the term “significant” when it was not in the
statute “was probably a mistake.” Lead counsel also testified that he would generally agree
with the Tennessee Supreme Court’s opinion that “little evidence” of Petitioner’s deficits
in adaptive behavior was presented.7 Lead counsel agreed that in investigating adaptive
deficits and mitigating circumstances, “all the records that are available should be
obtained.” Lead counsel also agreed that it was important “to attempt to interview anyone
that would know anything about that issue,” including family, friends and neighbors “if we
were aware of [them].” On cross-examination, lead counsel agreed that it was possible for
the jury to determine that Vivian Pruitt was not being truthful when she denied drinking
while she was pregnant with Petitioner.

Lead counsel did not recall if there was a strategic decision not to file a motion
requesting individual voir dire but testified that such a motion was in the “standard motion
packet” created by a former supervisor of the Capital Case Unit, although “it was
commonly overruled.” Lead counsel testified that he was familiar with juror questionnaires
and had used them previously with this particular trial judge and in other capital cases, so
he “probably” made “a conscious strategic decision” not to use them in this case. Lead
counsel recalled that voir dire was conducted as a group in the courtroom and that more
than one juror responded that they had heard of the defense expert, Dr. Smith, and would
not credit his testimony. Lead counsel was aware that Dr. Smith had stepped down from
his position as Shelby County Medical Examiner after he was charged with possession of
explosives and lying to investigators, a case that ultimately ended in a mistrial. Lead
counsel had not seen an episode of the television show, 48 Hours, featuring Dr. Smith’s
story and discussing his “history of lying.” On cross-examination, lead counsel agreed that
Dr. Smith had been employed by defense attorneys on numerous occasions and that as a
former medical examiner, he was in a unique position to review and critique autopsy
procedures. Dr. Smith also testified about his practice of preserving bones during an
autopsy. On redirect-examination, lead counsel testified that he was not aware of the case
of State v. Jerry Ray Davidson where a pathologist from Arkansas provided similar

7
See Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 204.
- 27 -
testimony for the defense.8 Lead counsel testified that he would not be surprised if there
were other experts but that he had known Dr. Smith for several years, had seen him testify
before in other cases, and had a certain rapport with him despite his legal issues.

Lead counsel did not have an independent recollection of delivering the closing
argument in this case but recognized a document he created containing notes of topics that
he wanted to discuss. He acknowledged that the notes contained the statement, “What
happened here to Lawrence Guidroz? No one cared about him.” Lead counsel did not
recall reading an article in a local newspaper just after the murder describing the high
regard in which the victim’s neighbors held him. Lead counsel did not speak to anyone
from St. Paul Catholic Church before the trial, although he did meet Mr. Leech and other
parishioners outside of the courtroom during the trial. Lead counsel recalled that Mr. Leech
told him that “they were not out for blood.”

Lead counsel testified that he did not recall a plea offer but that the State would
usually approve a plea agreement if the victim’s family did not object. Lead counsel
testified that he discussed settling the case with Petitioner many times, but Petitioner
“would have no part of it.” Lead counsel explained to Petitioner the possible defenses and
the likelihood of conviction at trial. With regard to whether Petitioner understood the
charges against him, lead counsel testified, “I think he understood it but I don’t think he
accepted it” because “his position all along . . . was that at most he was guilty of
carjacking.” Lead counsel explained that Petitioner did not believe he was guilty of murder
because he did not intend to kill the victim, even though he had several lengthy
conversations with the defense team about the elements of felony murder. During one
interview with Petitioner in September 2005, which lead counsel recorded and transcribed,
Petitioner recited from memory the legal concept of criminal responsibility for felony
murder and asked why his “trial partner” was “out on the street.” During this interview,
Petitioner admitted that he knew Courtney Johnson intended to rob somebody, and
Petitioner also admitted that he grabbed the victim and threw him to the ground, causing
the victim to hit his head on the concrete. Lead counsel explained that even though
Petitioner could recite the elements of felony murder, “I don’t believe he ever accepted
felony murder” because he “had made his mind up that he wasn’t guilty of felony murder
and that’s what he wanted.” Lead counsel testified that his advice to Petitioner was not to
testify during the guilt phase but only during the sentencing phase. However, after a
Momon hearing,9 Petitioner decided that he wanted to testify during the guilt phase of the
trial, which lead counsel recalled was “definitely unhelpful.”

8
See State v. Jerry Ray Davidson, No. M1998-00105-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 15381 (Tenn. Crim.
App., at Nashville, Jan. 7, 2002), aff’d, 121 S.W.3d 600 (Tenn. 2003).
9
See Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152 (Tenn. 2000).
- 28 -
On cross-examination, lead counsel testified that the Public Defender’s file
contained copies of letters that Petitioner had sent to his mother, which included
instructions to call certain people along with phone numbers and directions on how to
access messages on an answering machine. Lead counsel agreed that the records from
MTMHI indicated that Petitioner began using marijuana at age fourteen, cocaine at age
sixteen, and methamphetamine and various pills at age twenty-two. Lead counsel agreed
that the Public Defender’s file also contained a psychological evaluation of Petitioner from
1998 in which he reported that he began selling drugs at the age of fourteen and that he
typically made a $350 weekly profit. A September 2006 discharge summary from MTMHI
indicated that Petitioner was diagnosed with schizophrenia, undifferentiated type; history
of cocaine and cannabis abuse; and borderline intellectual functioning. On redirect
examination, lead counsel read from a staff conference report from MTMHI that indicated
Petitioner’s “below average cognitive abilities” would limit his ability to assist in his
defense, though he did have “sufficient ability” to work with his attorneys, understand the
evidence, and weigh the merits of a plea offer.

Lead counsel identified a “social chronology” for Petitioner listing his juvenile and
adult arrests, psychological evaluations, periods of incarceration, and suicide attempts prior
to his arrest in this case. Lead counsel obtained the presentence reports from Petitioner’s
prior convictions, which indicated that Petitioner was in a gang. Lead counsel obtained
records from Petitioner’s employer at the time of the offense as well as Petitioner’s school
records. Lead counsel testified that he and former lead counsel presented Petitioner’s case
at a seminar put on by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers where the
participants were able to consult with experienced attorneys and mitigation experts in order
to brainstorm ways to defend their cases. On redirect examination, lead counsel testified
that the seminar probably included presentations on Atkins v. Virginia and that he
purchased the AAMR manual around that time.

Co-counsel testified that he worked for the Public Defender’s Office and that he
joined the Capital Case Unit in 2007. He was assigned to Petitioner’s case as second chair
after former lead counsel left the Capital Case Unit and lead counsel became first chair.
Co-counsel agreed that his role was to assist lead counsel, who had the primary
responsibility to manage the defense team. Co-counsel testified that he participated in the
monthly case reviews with the rest of the capital defense team. On cross-examination, co-
counsel testified that this was his first capital trial. Co-counsel acknowledged that capital
defense is “constantly evolving” and that attorneys must “do the best we can at the time.”

Co-counsel first met with Petitioner in February 2007, and his notes from that
meeting indicated that Petitioner was taking Risperdal and Cogentin. Co-counsel believed
that Risperdal was “an anti-psychotic or something they prescribe for people with
schizophrenia” and that “Cogentin deals with the side effects of Risperdal.” Co-counsel
was not aware of the dosages Petitioner was receiving or why those drugs had been
- 29 -
prescribed. Co-counsel testified that the defense obtained Petitioner’s jail medical records
and that they discussed it with their experts. Co-counsel testified that he and lead counsel
discussed whether to inform the jury regarding Petitioner’s medication, but they considered
it to be “a double edge sword” because the jury might be more fearful of a defendant who
is psychotic. Co-counsel testified that Petitioner “didn’t appear crazy to me but I’m not a
doctor.” Co-counsel did not recall any discussion of retaining a psychiatrist or
neuropharmacologist. On cross-examination, co-counsel testified that he never had an
indication that Petitioner’s medication was interfering with his ability to communicate and
that he would have brought it to the attention of the trial court if he had.

When presented with a report from MTMHI that indicated that Petitioner’s “below
average cognitive abilities will limit the quality of what he contributes to his defense,” co-
counsel agreed that he experienced communication issues with Petitioner. Specifically,
co-counsel explained that he did not “know that we ever got through to him” that felony
murder was first degree murder and was death penalty eligible. On cross-examination, co-
counsel testified that Petitioner had the opportunity to plead guilty and receive a sentence
of either life or life without parole. Co-counsel agreed that he advised Petitioner with
regard to that offer and discussed possible defenses and the likelihood of conviction at trial,
but Petitioner chose not to plead guilty. Co-counsel testified he discussed the concept of
felony murder and the fact that it was death eligible with Petitioner “[m]any times.”

Co-counsel testified that he did not have any contact with Dr. Steinberg, whose work
on the case had been conducted prior to co-counsel’s joining the team. Co-counsel’s notes
from a conversation with former lead counsel in January 2007 reflected that Petitioner had
been diagnosed as schizophrenic and “borderline” intellectually disabled by MTMHI but
that former lead counsel agreed with Dr. Steinberg’s opinion that there was “nothing
wrong” with Petitioner. The notes also indicated that there was “lots of mitigation,” that
Petitioner had a bad family situation and a long juvenile record, and that the biggest
problem would be the facts of the case. Co-counsel testified that it would not “surprise”
him if Dr. Steinberg’s report was not located in the Public Defender’s Office’s files for this
case “because if we have a conversation with our doctors and it’s not going to be helpful,
we’ll often tell them to not bother writing a report.” Co-counsel did not know whether Dr.
Steinberg’s testing resulted in an I.Q. score of less than 70, stating, “All I know is I was
told that he was not helpful to us.” On cross-examination, co-counsel testified that he did
not recall if Dr. Steinberg had indicated that Petitioner was malingering.

Co-counsel testified that lead counsel was primarily responsible for contacting and
preparing Dr. Rutledge. Co-counsel did not specifically recall discussing with lead counsel
the reason for not having a pretrial hearing on the intellectual disability issue but testified
that “some of it had to do with Doctor Rutledge’s schedule.” Co-counsel also explained
that “part of it also was we had the report from [] MTMHI that was helpful and that we
were not going to press the issue because we were afraid that the State was going to fix it
- 30 -
if we did.” Co-counsel explained that by “fix it,” he meant having an expert testify that
the report was inaccurate, which is ultimately what happened during the post-trial hearing.
Co-counsel’s notes from that hearing indicated that the trial court agreed to consider
evidence of intellectual disability and deficits in adaptive behavior presented during the
mitigation phase. The defense waived the presence of Dr. Rutledge during the initial
hearing because of her illness, and the trial court agreed to bifurcate the hearing to allow
Dr. Rutledge to testify in rebuttal on a later date. Co-counsel’s notes taken during Dr.
Craddock’s testimony for the State indicated “no work done” with regard to “measures of
adaptive behavior,” which co-counsel believed meant “there’s no scale for adaptive
behavior.” Co-counsel testified that his understanding of the “clinical standard” for
adaptive deficits was “you either have deficits or you don’t” and that adaptive strengths
did not matter. With regard to whether the defense team made a strategic decision not to
investigate Petitioner’s adaptive deficits, co-counsel testified that “we did endeavor to
develop those things.” On cross-examination, co-counsel testified that only an expert could
diagnose intellectual disability and that such a diagnosis required a finding of adaptive
deficits and manifestation before the age of eighteen. On redirect examination, co-counsel
testified that the “legal standard” for intellectual disability under Tennessee’s statute
“includes not just I.Q. score but also deficits,” which was based on the “current level of
medical standards.”

With regard to the mitigation investigation, co-counsel testified that he was involved
in some of the family meetings but that lead counsel had primary responsibility for
mitigation since that had been his job when he was second chair. Co-counsel testified that
he did not accompany Ms. Stanback when she met with Petitioner’s family members in
their homes but that he met with them in the office. Co-counsel did not meet with any of
Petitioner’s teachers, friends, or former neighbors. Co-counsel’s notes from a team
meeting two months before trial indicated that “no family members will help” with
mitigation, and co-counsel explained that they were relying on Ms. Stanback “to marshal
the family” to Petitioner’s defense. Co-counsel testified that one of the possible mitigation
themes was Petitioner’s “horrendous childhood.” Co-counsel denied that there was a
strategic decision not to seek out or develop mitigating evidence. On cross-examination,
co-counsel acknowledged that some of the mitigation evidence could “cut the other way.”

Co-counsel’s notes also reflected that the defense team was considering the
possibility of having someone form the victim’s church testify that the Catholic Church is
against the death penalty. However, co-counsel explained that he did not know whether
such testimony would be admissible and that they were simply “brainstorming” possible
mitigation theories. Co-counsel acknowledged that a news report after the trial indicated
that Mr. and Mrs. Leech did not necessarily agree with Petitioner’s death sentence. On
cross-examination, co-counsel testified that he presumed from the outset that the Leeches
were against the death penalty because of their religion. Co-counsel testified that he did
not recall “how far we got” with calling a Catholic priest to testify about the Church’s
- 31 -
position but that he would not dispute the record showing that the State’s objection to such
testimony was sustained.

Co-counsel reviewed his notes from a meeting with Petitioner’s family on the
Saturday before the start of trial that included Shirley Pruitt, the widow of Petitioner’s
stepfather, Walter Pruitt. The notes reflected that Petitioner’s grades dropped in the sixth
grade after his parents split up. Both of Petitioner’s parents, as well as his grandmother,
were drinking a lot, and “everything was very dysfunctional.” Petitioner grew up moving
from place to place, and his mother was not always around. Co-counsel’s notes reflected
that there was always “some fighting going on,” including one incident in which
Petitioner’s mother shot or stabbed her boyfriend, and he ended up in the hospital;
Petitioner was twenty-four years old at the time. According to Shirley Pruitt, Petitioner
never had a job long enough to get his own apartment or be self-sufficient, and he never
had a steady girlfriend.

Co-counsel’s notes reflected that there was a second family meeting that same day
with Vivian and Antonio Pruitt. At the time of the post-conviction hearing, co-counsel did
not recall that Vivian Pruitt was Petitioner’s mother. The notes from that meeting reflected
that there was some discussion as to whether Alma Rockett or Quiana Pruitt would act as
the “family historian” during the mitigation phase. According to the notes, Petitioner’s
mother agreed that an I.Q. test of Petitioner at sixteen years old indicated that he was
“mildly mentally retarded.” Petitioner’s mother indicated that Petitioner never did
anything wrong around her, denied “early drinking,” but stated that “all boys smoked
marijuana.” The notes indicated that whenever Petitioner’s mother was arrested, he would
stay with his grandmother, who was mentally ill, and that mental illness ran in the family.
On cross-examination, co-counsel testified that “probably a lot of kids did smoke
marijuana” in the neighborhood where Petitioner grew up. With regard to whether
Petitioner’s lack of a job and lack of a stable living situation were unusual compared to his
other clients, co-counsel testified that “[p]eople who are defendants often have trouble
because of their situations, their traumatized childhoods, their adolescent development or
lack thereof I think it’s typical for the clients that I deal with.”

Co-counsel testified that most of the pretrial motions had been filed before he
became involved in the case. He did not recall if there was a specific strategic decision for
not filing motions requesting individual voir dire or the use of juror questionnaires. Co-
counsel testified that lead counsel primarily handled voir dire while co-counsel took notes.
During the State’s voir dire, co-counsel noted that the prosecutor stated that mitigating
circumstances are “something that makes it not so bad,” which co-counsel circled because
he thought it was a misstatement of the law. Co-counsel denied making a conscious
strategic decision not to object to the prosecutor’s statement. Co-counsel did not dispute
that more than one juror stated that they had heard about Dr. Smith and would not credit
his testimony. Dr. Smith had been retained as an expert witness before co-counsel became
- 32 -
involved in the case. Co-counsel was aware that Dr. Smith had resigned as the county
medical examiner after he was charged with possessing explosives and lying to
investigators, though co-counsel was not aware of the specific allegations. Co-counsel
denied seeing an episode of 48 Hours discussing Dr. Smith’s story, though he was aware
that “there was some media exposure there.” On cross-examination, co-counsel testified
that he had never heard of using juror questionnaires or individual voir dire until he started
working on capital cases.

Co-counsel testified that during the trial, lead counsel was able to lean back to confer
with Petitioner, who was seated behind counsel table. Co-counsel testified that even
though the attorneys had advised Petitioner not to testify during the guilt phase but only
during the sentencing phase, “he did exactly the opposite.” On cross-examination, co-
counsel testified that the defense planned to use remorse as a mitigating circumstance but
that “kind of required Mr. Pruitt to take the stand during the Sentencing Phase and he
decided not to.” With regard to whether Petitioner expressed remorse during his guilt phase
testimony, co-counsel recalled that Petitioner was not “the best witness for himself.”

Co-counsel did not recall when Gen. Weirich became involved in this case. Co-
counsel testified that Gen. Weirich did not inform the defense that her husband handled the
victim’s estate and that co-counsel did not learn that information until “much later.” Co-
counsel testified that he was aware that Gen. Weirich knew the victim through “her church
community” but that he did not know if “she had much personal interaction” with the
victim. Co-counsel testified that he did not think that Mr. Weirich’s prior representation
of the victim would have been important to the defense. Co-counsel testified that he was
not sure if he would have filed a motion to disqualify Gen. Weirich on that basis but that
he “would have considered anything to get either Ms. Dwyer or [Gen.] Weirich off the case
because they’re both good trial lawyers.” Co-counsel testified that he may have addressed
the issue during the cross-examination of Mr. Leech but that he did not know “what
inference that might have raised for the jury.”

During the State’s rebuttal closing argument in the guilt phase, co-counsel objected
to Gen. Weirich’s statement that she “t[ook] offense” to lead counsel’s argument that
“nobody care[d]” about the victim because he thought it was inflammatory and improperly
“put[] her opinion in front of the jury.” Co-counsel testified that he was not aware that lead
counsel was going to argue that the victim had no family and was “a little surprised that he
mentioned that at all.” Co-counsel testified that he continued to object during Gen.
Weirich’s rebuttal closing argument because he was “trying to slow her down.” In co-
counsel’s notes, he circled the term “predators” because he “thought maybe it was an
improper argument, improper way of describing my client.” However, co-counsel testified
that he “probably” made a strategic decision not to object to that argument “because I
objected a bunch and I think that at a certain point the jury holds it against you when you
interfere, and she was about to close, be done anyway so I didn’t want to stop her and have
- 33 -
her restart and get her going again.” Co-counsel explained that whenever Gen. Weirich
gave a closing argument, he would “read this chapter on prosecutorial misconduct because
she played it very close to the line.” Co-counsel testified that he did not consider filing a
motion in limine regarding improper argument, explaining that Gen. Weirich “was really
good at what she did, you know. We just had to be on our toes to catch her where we
could.”

On cross-examination, co-counsel testified that the defense team had copies of
Petitioner’s report cards from elementary school. Co-counsel testified that Petitioner had
“done really well” on some tests in the fourth and fifth grades but that “his academic
performance had dropped off precipitously around the sixth grade, maybe had a head injury
at that point.” The report cards reflected that Petitioner made the honor roll and principal’s
list in second, third, and fourth grade. Some of the handwritten comments from Petitioner’s
teachers indicated that Petitioner was “smart,” “a good learner,” “an excellent student,”
and had “great potential,” though some cautioned about his behavior and excessive
absences. On redirect examination, co-counsel testified that he had not been to Larose
Elementary and did not recall that Petitioner grew up in the adjacent Fowler Homes
neighborhood. With regard to the safety and security of the children living in that area and
whether the teachers cared for the children by providing food and clothes, co-counsel
testified that he “relied on Ms. Stanback for a lot of that information” since “[s]he knew
about the area and the culture a lot better than I ever will.”

On cross-examination, co-counsel recalled seeing Petitioner being interviewed on a
show called Gangland that aired shortly after the trial. Co-counsel was “a little taken back”
when he saw the episode so close after trial because “[i]t appeared that [Petitioner] had
done meetings with these people during my representation of him” and not told his
attorneys about it. With regard to Petitioner’s demeanor, co-counsel testified that “[h]e
seemed very well spoken and articulate on this episode.” Co-counsel testified that during
the interview, Petitioner “went into some detail” about the Lemoyne Gardens gang, or
LMG, including “how it was organized and who some of the players were.” Co-counsel
testified that defendant “knew [Petitioner] had some affiliation” with a gang, so he “wasn’t
surprised by that.” On redirect examination, co-counsel testified that he did not know when
or where the interview was filmed and that he did not know how much of the interview
was edited out of the episode that eventually aired. Co-counsel agreed that because he saw
the episode after Petitioner’s trial, it did not affect his trial strategy but that he probably
would have advised Petitioner not to participate.

Former lead counsel testified that she had worked for the Public Defender’s Office
for twenty-three years and was the lead attorney on Petitioner’s case until she left the
Capital Case Unit in December 2006. She recalled handling Petitioner’s preliminary
hearing in September 2005. In July 2006, Petitioner was evaluated by Midtown Mental
Health, who subsequently referred Petitioner to MTMHI for further evaluation because his
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competency was “questionable.” Former lead counsel testified that in her experience, it
was “rare” that Midtown would refer someone to MTMHI. She had Petitioner sign a
release so that the defense could have access to the records from MTMHI, including copies
of social histories and staff reports. Former lead counsel recalled filing an ex parte motion
requesting funds to hire Dr. Fred Steinberg to conduct an independent psychological
evaluation of Petitioner. In December 2006, she signed a certification of the time that Dr.
Steinberg spent on the case, including the time he spent drafting a forensic report. Former
lead counsel testified that even after leaving the Capital Case Unit, she was willing to assist
in Petitioner’s case and that lead counsel even asked the supervisor if she could be “third
chair” at trial, but Petitioner “said no.”

On cross-examination, former lead counsel testified that she still worked in the
Public Defender’s Office after leaving the Capital Case Unit and was available to consult
with Petitioner’s defense team. She recognized a copy of Dr. Steinberg’s report and
testified that she did not know why a copy could not be located in the Public Defender’s
Office’s file for Petitioner. She testified that she “wouldn’t have signed the certification if
the work hadn’t been done, so I would have had to have received it at least at some point
in time.” Dr. Steinberg’s report indicated that Petitioner “was noticeably medicated and
somewhat slowed in psychomotor response in the initial sessions” but that “he was more
spontaneous and normal in psychomotor response” during a later session. The report stated
that Petitioner’s I.Q. test “indicates that he is functioning within the Borderline range of
intelligence.” The report indicated that Petitioner had a “tendency to exaggerate and feign
mental illness” and that there was “corroborating data suggestive of symptom exaggeration
and malingering of psychiatric symptoms.” The report stated that further
neuropsychological testing was not necessary in light of these results. Former lead counsel
testified that she did not recall following up with Dr. Steinberg about his report but that she
would have shared the substance of her conversation with the other members of the defense
team.

Former lead counsel recognized her notes from a meeting with Petitioner in
September 2005 in which Petitioner relayed his version of the incident, including detailed
directions of how he and Courtney Johnson walked to the store. Former lead counsel also
recognized a letter she sent to Petitioner in January 2006, which stated that she was
providing Petitioner with copies of his discovery and pretrial motions that she had filed on
his behalf. Former lead counsel’s notes from April 2006 indicated that “Aunt Alma doesn’t
want us calling or coming to see her anymore.” At some point, Petitioner indicated to her
that he was not willing to accept any plea offers. Former lead counsel’s notes from a
meeting with Petitioner in December 2006 indicated that Petitioner wanted the charges
reduced to manslaughter and that she explained to him that there was no chance of that
happening and that the best offer the State was willing to make was life. The notes also
indicated that Petitioner did not want to take the stand. Former lead counsel testified that
she attended a conference with Ms. Stanback and lead counsel during which they
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developed mitigation themes for this case. Former lead counsel acknowledged that
Petitioner filed a complaint about her with the Board of Professional Responsibility and
that she wrote a response detailing the work she had done on the case.

On redirect examination, former lead counsel testified that she could not recall an
occasion where she did not get a report from an expert who had worked on one of her cases.
She testified that she would have concerns about discoverability if the report was unhelpful
to her client but denied that she would fail to put it in her file or shred it for that reason.
She testified that while she would not plan on calling such a witness to testify, she would
put the report in the file if for no other reason than to be able to show on post-conviction
that the evaluation was performed. Former lead counsel noted that she signed the
certification for Dr. Steinberg on December 22, 2006, not long before she left the case, so
she “can’t say” if the report was received after she left and “somebody else did something
with it.” However, she testified that she would have put the report in the file had she
received it so that “the people who came behind me would be able to look at it and see
what’s there.” She also testified that she was not aware of anyone in the Public Defender’s
Office removing reports from files and that doing so would be an ethical issue. She testified
that the copy of the report that was entered into evidence had underlining and handwritten
notes, but she did not recognize the handwriting. On recross-examination, former lead
counsel testified that she recalled being “a little surprised” by the results of Dr. Steinberg’s
evaluation “because it came back very different from what I had heard from Middle
Tennessee, and I was disappointed that it didn’t say the same thing.”

Jeannette Stanback testified that she worked on Petitioner’s case as a mitigation
investigator. She was present with former lead counsel and lead counsel during Petitioner’s
intake interview and took notes. Ms. Stanback gave a lay opinion that Petitioner’s behavior
was consistent with other defendants she had worked with who were assessed as having a
low I.Q. score. Ms. Stanback testified that she regularly met with Petitioner in preparation
for trial, meeting with him at the jail at least once a month if not more frequently. Ms.
Stanback testified that her initial impression of Petitioner was that he was “stoic” and
“unpenetrable” and that it took some time to get through to him. Ms. Stanback agreed that
Petitioner was prone to child-like outbursts and was easily influenced by jailhouse lawyers.
She could not recall if Petitioner was taking anti-psychotic medication.

Ms. Stanback testified that she gathered records from the jail, MTMHI, and other
places. Ms. Stanback also interviewed various witnesses and compiled a report of
Petitioner’s social history. She testified that everyone on the defense team had access to a
shared file and that they would share theories and notes during meetings. Ms. Stanback
recalled the defense team meeting with Dr. Steinberg, though she admitted that she may
have confused him with someone else.

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Ms. Stanback testified that Petitioner grew up in South Memphis. Petitioner lived
with his mother and sister in the Clementine Apartments, a poor, high-crime neighborhood.
Petitioner sometimes lived with his aunt, Alma Rockett, where the conditions were better.
However, at the time of his arrest, Petitioner was “couch surfing” among different
residences. Ms. Stanback testified that she was familiar with the Fowler Homes
neighborhood, which in the 1980s and 1990s had a reputation as being a very volatile
community with high crime and low income and education.

C. Lay Witnesses

Gaynell Talley, a retired teacher, testified that she taught in the Memphis City
School system for thirty-five years. Much of that time, she taught third and fifth grade at
Larose Elementary School. Ms. Talley also taught a special reading program under Title
I, which she explained was a government program for students who had low test scores
and were living below the poverty line. Ms. Talley testified that 99% of the students at
Larose were on the free lunch program, and a majority lived the nearby Fowler Homes
housing project. Ms. Talley testified that the school provided a clothes closet, free school
supplies, and basic hygiene products for the children. The teachers encouraged attendance
by calling and visiting the children’s homes. The school provided a safe and nurturing
environment for the children. Ms. Talley recalled Petitioner’s name, but she did not
recognize him, and he was never assigned to one of her classes.

Sirderrick Payne testified that he grew up in the Fowler Homes housing project and
that he had been best friends with Petitioner since they were about eight or nine years old.
Mr. Payne described the neighborhood as being “rough” with a lot of violence, crime, and
drug use. On one occasion, when they were about nine or ten years old, Mr. Payne and
Petitioner were outside playing curb ball when “Marco the Beast” shot at Petitioner’s house
while Petitioner’s mother and sisters were inside. The boys hit the ground during the
shooting, then afterwards ran to the house and saw big holes in the walls and door.
Petitioner could not stop crying and “was crazy.” Mr. Payne testified that, to his
knowledge, the holes in the walls were never fixed.

Mr. Payne also described Petitioner’s home life as “rough.” Petitioner lived with
his mother, his grandmother, his two older sisters, and his two older brothers, as well as
one of his sisters’ children. Although the house had five bedrooms, Petitioner did not have
his own bedroom and often slept on the couch. Mr. Payne testified that Petitioner’s mother
and siblings were all using drugs, selling drugs, and/or engaging in prostitution. Mr. Payne
testified that Petitioner’s house was always loud and there was a lot of traffic in and out of
the house at all hours. Petitioner’s house was considered the place to “hang out, smoke,
shoot dice, [and] have sex . . . [I]t was like they don’t sleep.”

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Mr. Payne testified that Petitioner’s mother could not control her drug addiction.
On one occasion when he was eleven years old, Petitioner’s mother offered to have sex
with Mr. Payne in exchange for drugs. Petitioner’s mother also used her welfare checks
and food stamps to buy drugs, so by the end of the month Petitioner would either come
over to Mr. Payne’s house for food or would have to steal to get food. Mr. Payne testified
that although his own mother was also a drug addict, she always made sure to feed and
clothe her children, unlike Petitioner’s mother who “ran the street to make sure she got
high.” Additionally, unlike Petitioner’s older siblings, Mr. Payne’s older siblings looked
out for him and helped to provide for him.

Mr. Payne testified that the interactions between Petitioner and his mother were
often violent. Petitioner’s mother would yell and curse at Petitioner, call him names, and
beat him with an extension cord or a belt. On one occasion, Petitioner’s mother smacked
Petitioner so hard that Mr. Payne thought she had broken his neck. Petitioner’s mother
was also violent with her boyfriends. She and her boyfriend “Buck” would get drunk or
high and start fighting most days of the week. Mr. Payne testified that it happened so often
that the Memphis Police Department stopped responding to the domestic disturbance calls.

Both Petitioner and Mr. Payne attended Larose Elementary School, which Mr.
Payne described as “fun” and a place “where you can go, really, to feel most safe at” and
where “[y]ou can eat and have food.” The situation was much different at Vance Middle
School, which was located near a different housing project. Mr. Payne testified that if they
walked through the other housing project to get to school, they risked getting “jumped.”
However, if they walked the long way around, they would not get to school on time and
either the doors would be locked or they would be written up for tardiness. Petitioner and
Mr. Payne stopped attending school, and Mr. Payne eventually transferred to a different
school because of the violence.

Mr. Payne described Petitioner as a “follower . . . [m]eaning he can’t think for
himself.” Petitioner was constantly asking Mr. Payne what to do. Petitioner was bullied
as a child because he tried to stand up for his older brother who was gay. The other children
picked on Petitioner, hit him, and stole his shoes, and Petitioner was afraid to go to school.
Mr. Payne testified that he started selling drugs around age nine or ten because he saw the
older boys doing it and buying nice things. However, Petitioner did not sell drugs because
“he didn’t know how” and did not have the “mind set” to do it. Mr. Payne gave an example
where someone switched real drugs for “fake” drugs without Petitioner noticing, and
Petitioner ended up having to refund money to the people to whom he inadvertently sold
the fake drugs. Petitioner would often lose money when trying to sell drugs, and Mr. Payne
would have to help him pay for it. Mr. Payne testified that to his knowledge, Petitioner did
not use drugs and denied that Petitioner was in a gang. Mr. Payne admitted that he was a
member of the Vice Lords and that he was incarcerated on a second-degree murder
conviction at the time of Petitioner’s trial.
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Myron Stewart testified that he grew up in the Fowler Homes housing project about
a block away from Petitioner. Mr. Stewart testified that many of the kids who lived in
Fowler Homes stopped attending school because of the difficulty involved in walking to
Vance Middle School. Mr. Stewart testified that there were frequent gang fights and that
“[a] lot of kids was getting jumped on and chased from school, back in the day.” However,
because he played sports, Mr. Stewart “had like a pass to go through different projects.”
Mr. Stewart also had the opportunity to spend time with family in Chicago and nicer
neighborhoods in Memphis, which motivated him to do better. Mr. Stewart eventually
graduated high school and attended community college. In his career, Mr. Stewart worked
for the local jail, prison, and police department before leaving the criminal justice field
because of too many encounters with people he knew from the old neighborhood.

Mr. Stewart explained that growing up, his house was better than most in terms of
cleanliness and discipline. His mother also provided food for many of the kids, including
Petitioner. Mr. Stewart testified that Petitioner’s family was “dysfunctional” in
comparison. Petitioner’s mother had a reputation for her drinking and drug use, and there
was no one to be a father figure to Petitioner. Mr. Stewart also described the violence in
the neighborhood, including shootings and gang fights. Many of the young men who had
stopped attending Vance Middle School were selling marijuana for a man named “Jab-
Blue” because he let them smoke as much of the marijuana as they wanted.

Mr. Stewart testified that he worked in the Shelby County Jail at the time Petitioner
was incarcerated there before trial. Mr. Stewart testified that Petitioner did not seem like
the same person he knew, and he was not sure that Petitioner recognized him. Mr. Stewart
testified that Petitioner did not want to get up to eat or shower and that he seemed “[s]low
. . . like he was out of it.” Mr. Stewart testified that he had worked on the medical floor of
the jail where inmates were prescribed psychiatric drugs and that Petitioner exhibited
behavior like someone who had been prescribed a high dose of such drugs.

Talon Williams testified that he grew up in the Fowler Homes housing project and
that he met Petitioner when they played basketball as kids. Mr. Williams testified that his
mother, Doris Barker, tried to make sure that the kids in the neighborhood had clean clothes
to wear, enough food to eat, and organized social activities and outings to keep them
engaged. Petitioner participated in one of her programs and played on the neighborhood
basketball team. Although Petitioner was a good player, he would get frustrated that he
could not read the defenses and would quit a lot. Even though Petitioner wanted to be
included in things, he was not good in group settings and generally did not fit in.

Petitioner spent a lot of time at Mr. Williams’s house because his own house “wasn’t
the best place to be.” Mr. Williams testified that even among others in the housing project,
Petitioner’s family stood out for their poverty, violence, and drug use. Petitioner’s entire
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family used or sold drugs. Petitioner’s mother was always high or drunk. Petitioner’s
mother and her boyfriends would fight in the front yard “pretty regular[ly],” and “it was
kind of like a spectacle where people were drawn to watch them and laugh.” Petitioner’s
house was “dark, smelly, garbage everywhere, a lot of people in and out.” Mr. Williams
testified that you could not sit on the minimal furniture there was because it was all infested
with bed bugs. Petitioner’s house was always hot in the summer because the only air
conditioning unit was located in one of his brothers’ bedroom behind a locked door. On
one occasion, the family got evicted for failing to pay rent, and all of their belongings were
put out on the curb. The community had to come together to pay their rent so that they
could go back inside.

Mr. Williams testified that Petitioner did not have a lot of family support growing
up. Petitioner’s grandmother would stare at the television all day and mumble to herself,
or she would wander off and knock on other people’s doors. Mr. Williams testified that he
later learned that she was mentally ill. Petitioner’s brother, Tony, sold drugs and usually
kept to himself and his “crew” without paying attention to Petitioner. Petitioner’s sister,
Tapika, was “strung out on drugs” and would often leave her children for days at a time.
Petitioner’s brother, Rico, was gay and was frequently assaulted due to the homophobia in
the community. Mr. Williams often provided Petitioner with clothes off of his own back,
made sure that he ate, and would give him a haircut when he had not had one in a while.

Mr. Williams testified that he observed Petitioner using marijuana and cocaine as a
teenager. On one occasion, Petitioner was “hanging out with a group of wrong characters”
and had been using cocaine for three or four days. When Mr. Williams tried to get
Petitioner out of there, Petitioner was “just spaced out, out of his mind on drugs.” Mr.
Williams testified that Petitioner obtained money to buy drugs by robbing people and
gambling. Mr. Williams testified that Petitioner would “try to hustle crap games” but that
he was usually not successful at making money because he did not understand the game.

Mr. Williams testified that he spent time in the Shelby County Jail with Petitioner
prior to trial in this case. He noticed that Petitioner was “lethargic and incoherent and
seemed spaced out.” Mr. Williams testified that Petitioner would sit very still and that
Petitioner spoke slowly and could not complete a sentence.

Doris Barker, Mr. Williams’s mother, testified that she lived in the Fowler Homes
housing project in the 1980s and 1990s and that she knew Petitioner as “one of the children
that [she] helped to raise in our development.” She first met Petitioner when he was eight
or nine years old. She described Petitioner as “[a] real nice boy” who came to many of the
programs that she organized. Ms. Barker explained that she planned social activities for
the children in the neighborhood and tried to make sure that they did not go hungry and
that they knew they were loved. Ms. Barker received a grant called Esteem Fifty

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6338619. Public record. Not legal advice.