# Commonwealth v. O'Neill

> Superior Court of Pennsylvania · August 31, 1990 · 396 Pa. Super. 520

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6308342

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Charles O'NEILL, III
- **Court:** Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 31, 1990
- **Citations:** 396 Pa. Super. 520; 578 A.2d 1334; 1990 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2626
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Olszewski
- **Judges:** Has, Johnson, Kelly, Olszewski
- **Cited by:** 25 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6308342

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “it is well settled that in criminal cases[,] appeals lie from judgment of sentence rather than from the verdict of guilt.”
- explaining that in criminal cases, appeals lie from judgment of sentence rather than from the verdict of guilt
- stating that “in criminal cases appeals lie from judgment of sentence rather than from the verdict of guilt”

## Opinion text

OLSZEWSKI, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I wholeheartedly agree with the majority that the evidence presented was sufficient to convict appellant of homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, and that Commonwealth v. Uhrinek, 518 Pa. 532 , 544 A.2d 947 (1988) provides a rule concerning the admissibility of evidence, and not the sufficiency of evidence. On the other hand, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s disposition of the homicide by vehicle charge as “surplusage.” In my opinion, that portion of the appeal dealing with the homicide by vehicle charge is subject to quashal and remand to the trial court for appropriate action. Upon filing of the notice of appeal, the trial court was divested of jurisdiction pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a). Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court retained jurisdiction to enter its order dated January 11, 1989. Accordingly, I cannot join in the comments set forth in footnote 1 of the majority opinion.
In the interest of judicial economy and prompt and effective disposition of cases, the better practice involving crimes arising from the same occurrence would be to argue and dispose of all post-verdict motions together. Since the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy mandates that such crimes be tried together, it logically follows that post-trial matters in such cases should be dealt with in one proceeding wherever possible. Had the trial court done so *527 in this case, we would not be faced with the procedural morass confronting us today.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6308342. Public record. Not legal advice.