# Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Norristown Area School District

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · June 3, 1977 · 473 Pa. 334

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6261610

## Case

- **Full name:** PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION v. NORRISTOWN AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 3, 1977
- **Citations:** 473 Pa. 334; 374 A.2d 671; 1977 Pa. LEXIS 721
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Manderino
- **Judges:** Brien, Eagen, Former, Jones, Manderino, Nix, Pomeroy, Roberts
- **Cited by:** 83 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6261610

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that trial court erred in dismissing murder charge against defendant based upon the earlier acquittal of defendant’s accomplice arising out of the same killing
- finding that guidelines promulgated by the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission for school desegregation amounted to a statement of policy, because the guidelines were applied through agency adjudication
- explaining that valid substantive rules establish standards of conduct and carry the force of law, whereas policy statements convey future intentions without binding effect
- stating that an administrative agency can formulate “policy that will have the force of law,” among other ways, “through adjudications which constitute binding precedents”

## Opinion text

MANDERINO, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts, but would like to add additional comments concerning the use of the word imbalance in discussing unlawful discriminatory-practices. The Pennsylvania Human Relations Act outlaws various discriminatory practices if such practices are based on a person’s race, color, religious creed, ancestry, age, sex, national origin and in certain cases a person’s handicap or disability. Every imbalance does not, per se, establish discriminatory practices. If it did, we would in effect be sanctioning a quota system. No public institution can have or is legally required to have a perfect balance. Therefore, a racial imbalance, or a sex imbalance, or a national origin imbalance does not in and of itself establish a discriminatory practice. If it did, then every institution would be required to have, in relation to the community’s population, the same ratio of Catholic, females, blacks, Italians, Jews, blind persons and so on. I, therefore, object to the use of the word imbalance as implying a result brought about by unlawful practices.
When, however, a substantial degree of imbalance is present, one may reasonably infer that the substantial imbalance has resulted from unlawful activity. In this *358 case, the statistical guidelines issued by the Human Relations Commission were simply an announcement as to the degree of imbalance which the Commission would consider as sufficient evidence from which to infer that the imbalance resulted from unlawful activity. Such guidelines are obviously helpful, indeed desirable. Regardless of the guidelines, however, the inference drawn by the Commission in this case that the degree of imbalance was sufficient to conclude that the Act had been violated was a reasonable inference to be drawn. If it were not, it could of course be struck down. Since the evidence before the Commission, however, indicated a substantial degree of imbalance, the Commission properly concluded that discriminatory practices existed and it could properly order a remedy.
A Commission order cannot be sustained merely on the basis of racial imbalance or any other kind of imbalance. Such an order can be sustained only if the imbalance presented is of such a substantial degree that it is reasonable to infer that unlawful discrimination preceded the imbalance.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6261610. Public record. Not legal advice.