# Brown v. Paul

> Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · January 22, 2002 · 290 A.D.2d 469

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6081959

## Case

- **Full name:** Juanita T. Brown v. Anthony Paul
- **Court:** Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- **Decided:** January 22, 2002
- **Citations:** 290 A.D.2d 469; 736 N.Y.S.2d 415; 2002 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 583
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Opinion of the court
- **Cited by:** 5 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6081959

## Opinion text

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Price, J.), dated August 9, 2000, which granted the motion of the defendant Anthony Paul for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him.
Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion is denied, and the complaint is reinstated insofar as asserted against the respondent.
The infant plaintiff allegedly suffered lead poisoning as a result of exposure to lead paint in her apartment in a building owned by the respondent. To establish that a landlord is liable for a lead-paint condition, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of, and a reasonable opportunity to remedy, the hazardous condition (see, Chapman v Silber, 97 NY2d 9 ; Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team, 88 NY2d 628 ; Bellony v Siegel, 288 AD2d 411 ). The respondent correctly contends that he cannot be charged with constructive notice of the alleged lead-paint condition pursuant to the Administrative Code of the City of New York, since the building is not a multiple dwelling (see, Juarez v Wavecrest Mgt. Team, supra). However, even in the absence of any applicable legislation, the plaintiffs raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the respondent had constructive notice under the circumstances of this case (see, Chapman v Silber, supra). Therefore, the respondent’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him should have been denied. Altman, J.P., Feuerstein, O’Brien and H. Miller, JJ., concur.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/6081959. Public record. Not legal advice.