# Four Seasons Hotels Ltd. v. Vinnik

> Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York · April 28, 1987 · 127 A.D.2d 310

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/5892795

## Case

- **Full name:** Four Seasons Hotels Ltd. v. Daniel M. Vinnik
- **Court:** Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
- **Decided:** April 28, 1987
- **Citations:** 127 A.D.2d 310; 515 N.Y.S.2d 1; 1987 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 42399
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Kupferman
- **Judges:** Kupferman, Wallach
- **Cited by:** 204 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/5892795

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that material terms must be definite, but that “[a] contract does not necessarily lack all effect merely because it expresses the idea that something is left to future agreement”

## Opinion text

Kupferman, J. P.
(dissenting). I would affirm for the reasons stated at Special Term.
We are familiar with the background of this matter involving the operation of the Pierre Hotel, a cooperative housing corporation. (See, Vinnik v 795 Fifth Ave. Corp., 94 AD2d 685, affd 62 NY2d 698 .)
I see no great need to differ with the Second Department on the question of whether there must be notice by the court to obtain CPLR 3211 (c) treatment. (See, Reed v Shoratlantic Dev. Co., 121 AD2d 525 .) Notice by one of the parties should be sufficient. There should be uniformity in the approach to this procedural matter to avoid confusion at the Bar. Moreover, it would also seem that the Second Department has a better view of this aspect.
Carro, Kassal and Ellerin, JJ., concur with Wallach, J.; Kupferman, J. P., dissents in an opinion.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered on April 28, 1986, modified, on the law, to deny plaintiffs’ cross motion for summary judgment, and otherwise affirmed, without costs and without disbursements. The appeal from the order entered on October 15, 1986 be, and the same hereby is, unanimously dismissed, without costs and without disbursement.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/5892795. Public record. Not legal advice.