# Edwards v. Erie Coach Lines Co. > New York Court of Appeals · June 30, 2011 · 17 N.Y.3d 306 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/5486870 ## Case - **Full name:** Sheila Elizabeth Edwards, Individually and as of Richard Edwards, and as Administratrix of the Estate of Brian Edwards v. Erie Coach Lines Company, , Defendants Meagan Godwin v. Trentway-Wagar, Inc., , Defendants Traci Butler v. Stagecoach Group, PLC, and Trentway-Wagar, Inc., Respondents Courtney Cowan v. Stagecoach Group, PLC, , Defendants Lauralee Davidson v. Coach USA, Inc., Respondents Michael Roach, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Catherine Roach v. Coach USA, Inc. - **Court:** New York Court of Appeals - **Decided:** June 30, 2011 - **Citations:** 17 N.Y.3d 306; 952 N.E.2d 1033 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Ciparick - **Judges:** Ciparick, Read - **Cited by:** 23 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/5486870 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - applying Ontario’s loss allocating statute to claims made by Plaintiff against Defendants and New York’s loss allocating statute to claims by Defendants/Third-party Plaintiffs against Third-party Defendants ## Opinion text Ciparick, J. (dissenting in part). Because I believe that a single analysis pursuant to Neumeier v Kuehner ( 31 NY2d 121 [1972]) should be applied where nondomiciliary defendants are jointly and severally liable to nondomiciliary plaintiffs in a tort action arising out of a single incident within the State of New York, and that under such an analysis New York law should *332 apply to all defendants for purposes of uniformity and predictability, I respectfully dissent. Neumeier sets forth a three-rule framework for determining what law should govern when there is a conflict between the laws of the domiciles of the parties or the state in which the tort occurred. 1 The first Neumeier rule provides that when the plaintiff and the defendant are domiciled in the same state, the law of that state shall govern (see 31 NY2d at 128 ). The second rule “addresses true conflicts, where the parties are domiciled in different States and the local law favors the respective domiciliary” (Cooney, 81 NY2d at 73 [internal quotation marks omitted]). This rule is not applicable to this case. The third rule provides that when plaintiff and defendant are differently domiciled, the law of the location of the tort shall usually apply unless “it can be shown that displacing the normally applicable rule will advance the substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multistate system or producing great uncertainty for litigants” (Neumeier, 31 NY2d at 128 ). In this matter, all plaintiffs and the bus defendants are domiciliaries of Ontario whereas the tractor-trailer defendants are domiciled in Pennsylvania. The majority opines that each defendant should be analyzed separately under the Neumeier rules relying on Schultz v Boy Scouts of Am. ( 65 NY2d 189 [1985]) (see majority op at 329). In applying a separate Neumeier analysis to each defendant, the majority determines that Ontario law should apply to the bus defendants, while New York law should apply to the tractor-trailer defendants. I disagree. While the facts in Schultz lent themselves to a separate analysis for each defendant, the facts in this case do not justify such an analysis. The plaintiffs in Schultz alleged that the two defendants, the Boy Scouts of America and the Brothers of the Poor of St. Francis, had each negligently hired and supervised the same sexually abusive employee. The alleged sexual abuse occurred while the plaintiffs’ sons were at a Boy Scout camp in New York and continued at a school in New Jersey. The tortious activities in Schultz took place over varied periods of time and in different locations. Moreover, there was no relationship between the defendants’ actions other than the fact that they *333 employed the same alleged bad actor. Because the torts were distinct acts occurring at different times, it was appropriate for us to perform a separate choice-of-law analysis. In contrast, in the instant case, the causes of action arise from a single incident in New York — the collision of the bus into the parked tractor-trailer — and the liability of the defendants is interrelated (see King v Car Rentals, Inc., 29 AD3d 205, 213 [2d Dept 2006] [“(b)ecause the liability of all of the defendants here is thus interrelated, the application of the laws of different jurisdictions to the several defendants may lead to unanticipated complications as potentially inconsistent law is applied”]). Furthermore, a separate Neumeier analysis for differently domiciled defendants creates additional unpredictability and lack of uniformity in litigation that arises from a single incident. The purpose of the Neumeier rules is to “assure a greater degree of predictability and uniformity, on the basis of our present knowledge and experience” ( 31 NY2d at 127 ). Applying a single Neumeier analysis to jointly and severally liable defendants and having them subject to the same laws would further the goals of predictability and uniformity. In fact, this case illustrates the potential for grossly inequitable results when different laws are applied to defendants who are jointly and severally liable. Here, during a jury trial on liability, defendants entered into a stipulation whereby they agreed that they are 100% jointly and severally liable to plaintiffs and further agreed to apportion such liability between themselves at 90% to the bus defendants and the remaining 10% to the tractor-trailer defendants. The majority allows for a situation whereby the tractor-trailer defendants may end up paying more than the bus defendants because of the cap applied on noneconomic tort awards by Ontario — a patently absurd result. Therefore, to further the goal of predictability and uniformity, this matter should be analyzed under a single Neumeier analysis. In analyzing this matter under a single Neumeier analysis, it is clear that, because plaintiffs and defendants are differently domiciled, the law of the site of the tort — here New York— should apply as set forth in the third Neumeier rule (see 31 NY2d at 128 ). 2 Moreover, the exception to the third Neumeier rule does not apply to these facts. *334 Indeed, applying New York law here will not “impair . . . the smooth working of the multi-state system and produce great uncertainty for litigants by sanctioning forum shopping” ( 31 NY2d at 129 [internal quotation marks and brackets omitted]). New York was the site of the accident and the only state in which jurisdiction over all defendants could be acquired. New York is a proper location for this action and there is no indication that the cases were brought here on account of its favorable loss-allocation rules. In addition, the exception to the third Neumeier rule should only apply when a state other than the forum-locus state has a “greate[r] interest in the litigation” (see Schultz, 65 NY2d at 197, quoting Miller v Miller, 22 NY2d 12, 15 [1968]; see also Cooney, 81 NY2d at 72). Here, it is uncontroverted that both defendants are commercial enterprises that perform significant business in the State of New York and more significantly are frequent users of New York’s highways in pursuit of their business. New York has a strong interest in the conduct of business enterprises on its highways and in properly compensating the victims of torts, whether New York or foreign domiciliaries, committed by business enterprises on its highways (see Sullivan v McNicholas Transfer Co., 224 AD2d 966, 967 [4th Dept 1996] [applying Ohio law to an accident in Ohio because “Ohio has a substantial interest in regulating conduct on its highways and in ensuring that those who use its highway(s) will compensate those whom they have injured”]). Thus, in determining which forum has the greatest interest in this litigation, it is clear that it is New York. Not only does New York have a strong interest in regulating the conduct of commercial vehicles on its highways, it also has an even stronger interest in having commercial vehicles that use its highways maintain insurance to compensate victims of torts committed by said vehicles. In contrast, Ontario’s primary interest in having its law applied and capping nonpecuniary losses is to keep motor vehicle insurance costs low (see Arnold v Teno, [1978] 2 SCR 287 11 109). That interest, however, need not extend to commercial vehicles operating outside of Ontario and subject to the loss-allocation laws of those states. Finally, because New York is “the only State with which [all] parties have purposefully associated themselves” (Cooney, 81 NY2d at 74) and availed themselves of New York highways for profit and tourism, applying New York law is entirely appropriate in this matter. *335 Accordingly, I would reverse the order of the Appellate Division. Judges Graffeo, Smith, Pigott and Jones concur with Judge Read; Judge Cipabick dissents in part and votes to reverse in a separate opinion in which Chief Judge Lippman concurs. In each case: Orders modified, etc. . While the Neumeier rules specifically referred to guest statutes, the rules have been expanded to cover other loss-allocation conflicts (see Cooney v Osgood Mach., 81 NY2d 66, 73 [1993]). . While the enumerated Neumeier rules describe situations with one plaintiff and one defendant, I see no reason why the rule should not be applied to situations, such as here, where there are multiple jointly and severally liable defendants (see Restatement [Second] of Conflict of Laws § 172). --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/5486870. Public record. Not legal advice.