# People v. Atkins

> California Supreme Court · March 12, 2001 · 25 Cal. 4th 76

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/5452345

## Case

- **Full name:** THE PEOPLE, and v. ROBERT NELSON ATKINS, and
- **Court:** California Supreme Court
- **Decided:** March 12, 2001
- **Citations:** 25 Cal. 4th 76; 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738; 2001 Daily Journal DAR 2561; 18 P.3d 660; 2001 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2037; 2001 Cal. LEXIS 1304
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Brown
- **Judges:** Brown, Chin, Mosk
- **Cited by:** 185 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/5452345

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- noting that attempted rape is a lesser included offense of rape under California law

## Opinion text

BROWN, J.
I concur in the determination that arson is a general intent crime precluding a defense of voluntary intoxication. I write separately because I remain convinced People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 428 , 959 P.2d 735 ] (Mendoza) was wrongly decided (see id. at pp. 1138-1141 (dis. opn. of Brown, J.)) and, as this case illustrates, will continue to wreak havoc in the lower courts for years to come.
In finding arson to be a specific intent crime, the Court of Appeal initially cited its own decisions in In re Stonewall F. (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1054 [ 256 Cal.Rptr. 578 ] and People v. Fabris (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 685 [ 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 667 ]; but it substantially bolstered this conclusion by drawing heavily on Mendoza, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pages 1126-1132, as well as People v. Whitfield (1994) 7 Cal.4th 437 [ 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 858 , 868 P.2d 272 ]—on which the Mendoza court principally relied—and People v. Reyes (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 975 [ 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 39 ]—which it cited with approval. The common thread of these cases is the transmutation of a knowledge requirement into a specific intent: Thus, the Mendoza court explained that “although knowledge ‘may not fall literally within the Hood formulation of specific intent, the element [of aiding and abetting liability] that requires that the defendant act with knowledge of [the perpetrator’s criminal intent] is closely akin to Hood’s definition of specific intent, which requires proof that the *97 defendant acted with a specific and particularly culpable mental state.’ [Citations.]” (Mendoza, at p. 1131, quoting Whitfield , at p. 450, and citing Reyes , at pp. 982-986.) From this kernel and its analysis of Whitfield and Reyes , the Court of Appeal extracted the essential support for its earlier determination that voluntary intoxication is a defense to arson.
Unconvincingly, in my view, the majority attempts to distinguish Mendoza . (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 92-93.) Consistent with the reasoning in my dissent, I anticipate this effort will likely cause more confusion than clarification by reinforcing the fundamental analytical error of Mendoza , which was to step outside the terms of Penal Code section 22 without a principled basis for doing so.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/5452345. Public record. Not legal advice.